Thread: Russia building naval base in Syria - report

Hmm, thought this sounded familiar...

Russia to build naval base in Syria

Here's a pretty good analysis of the situation from MDB (a year old, but still interesting):

Russia in the Mediterranean

Mikhail Barabanov

In June 2006, Russian newspaper Kommersant unveiled Russian plans to upgrade the servicing station it has maintained since Soviet times at the Syrian port of Tartus. The short-term goal is to enable Russian ships to dock at Tartus, with a view to its transformation into a fully-fledged naval base. Kommersant’s unidentified source in the General Staff said the Navy plans eventually to relocate the bulk of the Black Sea Fleet, currently in Sevastopol, to Syria.

Russia has already undertaken to deepen the port to permit the docking of its largest fighting ships, and to build a stationary mooring place. Moscow has also begun work on a new mooring at the Syrian port of Latakia, which could also be used in the future to base fighting ships. In this respect it is worth noting that the Black Sea Fleet Project 1164 Moskva guide missile cruiser called on Latakia in February 2006. Kommersant got its information about the work at Tartus from Vladimir Zimin, the Russian Embassy’s senior counselor for economic issues in Syria.

According to Kommersant’s source in the General Staff, Moscow plans over the course of the next three years to establish a Naval Squadron led by the Moskva guided missile cruiser, currently the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet. This squadron would be permanently based in the Mediterranean Sea to participate in the NATO’s anti-terrorist Active Endeavour, and other operations.

For this reason, the base in Tartus and the mooring under construction in Latakia are needed for the full servicing of the Black Sea Fleet, and in the future, of the Northern Fleet ships that will reinforce the Russian naval forces in the Mediterranean. Tartus is being prepared as the base for this squadron. Anti-air defence for these forces will be upgraded to the new S-300PMU2 Favorit (SA-20) SAM systems.

The sharp escalation of military-technical cooperation between Syria and Russia lends credence to these reports. The reported timeline for the upgrade of the servicing center into a base was repudiated by the press service of the Russian MoD, but the fact of growing Russian naval and construction activity in Tartus and Latakia is not in question. At the same time, one must keep in mind that the mere designation of such sites as a “servicing point,” a “mooring station” or a “naval base” is quite loose and does not in itself determine or restrict the actual range of activities that could go on there. Even if a group of ships and support forces were actually based in Tartus, their official place of registration could remain in Sevastopol, which suggests that their stay in Syria could be only temporary. So, in any case, it is unlikely that conditions would be established in Tartus for permanent residence of the crew or serious ship repair capability, both of which are necessary for the full scale functioning of a military naval base.

Nevertheless, the appearance of Russian ships in Tartus for any period of time would represent a dramatic reinforcement of Russia’s naval potential in the Mediterranean Sea, even when compared to the cold war period. It is worth recalling that permanent access to the Mediterranean has been the dream of Russia’s rulers for several centuries. Already in the second half of the 18th century for operations against Turkey, squadrons of the Baltic Fleet were sent to the Mediterranean. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, Russian forces in the Mediterranean came to the aid of Greece, linked through dynastic ties to the Romanovs. In 1913 an agreement was reached with France for the basing of Russian ships at Bizerta (Tunisia) but this agreement came to nothing as a consequence of the First World War and the Russian Revolution. As a sad irony, Bizerta was the last port of call for those Black Sea Fleet ships controlled by the White Forces leaving Sevastopol at the end of 1920.

The rebirth of Russia’s naval presence in the Mediterranean began in the 1950s with the aim of countering NATO forces and to support Moscow’s interests in the Middle East. In 1958, a permanent base for Soviet submarines was established at Vlyora in Albania, but as a consequence of worsening Soviet-Albanian relations it was closed. In the future, in spite of the establishment of close relations with a range of middle eastern Arabic states, the Soviet Union never acquired a permanent naval base in this region, and the powerful Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean (Fifth Operational Squadron) had to anchor at small plots in the neutral waters off the coast of Tunisia and Libya.

From 1964 to 1977 an agreement with Egypt established a few servicing stations at Alexandria and Mersa Matruh (and also, from 1967 to 1972, at Port Said), which were in essence just floating moorings with minimal infrastructure and good only for short term stays. Even these stations were closed with the worsening of Soviet-Egyptian relations, and were replaced in 1984 with analogous servicing stations at Tartus which, along with Latakia, was used for calls by Soviet ships since 1971.

After the closure in recent years of the former Soviet bases in Vietnam (Cam Ranh) and Cuba (Lourdes), the logistics, supply and servicing station at Tartus was the only remaining permanent Russian military presence outside the CIS. As a result of the near total rolling up since 1991 of Russian naval forces in the Mediterranean, the station in Tartus was rarely used for its main purpose and until recent times was in a sorry state. Russian military ships called very infrequently, for example, in 1996 when the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier made Tartus its sole distant destination.

In terms of logistics, the station in Tartus offers a floating mooring with a small complex of onshore equipment: two prefabricated and demountable metallic storehouses, a diesel workshop, a barracks, mess-room, and an administrative building. Ships are able to refuel and receive potable water. A repair ship is maintained permanently in Tartus on the basis of six-month rotations from the Black Sea Fleet.

Thus, after nearly 240 years of military presence on the Mediterranean, Russia has almost never held a permanent base for its fleet there for an extended period. It is not surprising that the news of the possible transformation of Tartus into a basing point for the Russian Navy has attracted significant interest. Of course, even if this project is realized it will have a primarily symbolic, rather than practical, character.

Russia, today and for the foreseeable future, can afford to relocate to the Mediterranean only a very insignificant force, and the Black Sea Fleet, destined to form the basis of a new Mediterranean squadron, is extremely weak and has only one more or less modern large warship, the above mentioned Moskva guide missile cruiser. The remaining four large surface ships (a Kerch antisubmarine cruiser and three frigates) are hopelessly obsolete and have virtually no military value. Even with the addition of ships from the Northern Fleet (including one or two nuclear-powered submarines) and the theoretical possibility of transferring to this squadron the new Project 20380 Steregushy class corvettes currently under construction, these forces will be in a position to handle only the most limited of tasks, little more than showing the flag, and will hardly pose a serious threat to the US Sixth Fleet. In any case, as mentioned above, it is likely that the Russian Mediterranean squadron will participate in joint missions with NATO countries.

Nevertheless the political implications of a significant escalation of Russian military presence in Tartus are obvious. It will undoubtedly solidify the position of Syria, which is feeling significant pressure from the US in general and its military weakness with respect to Israel in particular.

Having offered Russia a base in Tartus, the regime of Asad-Junior is avoiding isolation on the international arena and is making of Russia a military factor that undercuts Israel’s options for an attack on Syria. Syria’s desire to have a Russian presence in Tartus is demonstrated by the fact that it is not charging for leasing the land to be used by the current logistics and servicing support station, nor is it charging for the use of water or electricity. Meanwhile, Russia will strengthen its role as a player in the Middle East, including in the Israel-Palestine conflict. In this way, the decision of the establishment of a Russian Mediterranean squadron can seen as a typical move by Vladimir Putin, i.e., to carefully and to a large degree symbolically restore the external attributes of Soviet greatness, while maintaining a general course of cooperation with the West.

http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2006/item1/item2/