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Thread: The Chinese Military’s Strategic Mind-set

  1. #106
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    Being supportive of good relations with Japan and theorizing an American threat is not necessarily contradictory, but I agree that the hawk label is insufficient.
    Last edited by Inst; 05 Mar 08, at 17:49.

  2. #107
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    Quote Originally Posted by xinhui View Post
    copy and paste from an earlier post


    Here are some security / military related

    China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (Zhongguo xiandai guoji guanxi yanjiusuo) (grand daddy, research for Central Committee of CCP)

    China Institute of International Studies (Zhongguo guoji wenti yanjiusuo)

    Foundation for International Strategic Studies (Guoji zhanlu¨e yanjiu jijinhui) (research for State Council Ministry of State Security)

    China Institute for International Strategic Studies (founded by PLA's GSD, hardliner)

    Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (Zhongguo renmin waijiao xuehui) (founded by Foreign ministry) (soft liner)

    Foreign Affairs Leading Group (founded by Central Committee of CCP)

    Centre for Peace and Development Studies (founded by PLA's GPD)


    Xinhua Centre for World Affairs (the only one that has an areas that deasl with Inida)

    Institute of Taiwan Studies (the only that is an official organization)


    China Society for Strategy and Management (founded by PLA Academy of Military Sciences and Deng Xiaoping’s former foreign affairs advisor Huan Xiang )

    Shanghai Centre for International Studies and Shanghai Institute of International Studies (one of the few powerful "NGO", that is NGO with Chinese characteristic )

    There are many more, but the above are the most influential according to some.
    Why so many? Is it just to get some outside-the-box ideas and to stop groupthink?

  3. #108
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    looks like both sides managed to cool things down a bit.










    China, Japan agree to strengthen defense co-op

    english.chinamil.com.cn 2008-02-28

      BEIJING, Feb. 27 (Xinhua) -- Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan and Japanese Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Office of the Self-Defense Force Saito Takashi on Wednesday agreed to strengthen defense cooperation between the two countries.

      Cao, also vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and a state councilor, said he hoped the two countries could take this year, the 30th anniversary of the China-Japan peace and friendship treaty, as an opportunity to promote the healthy and steady development of relations.

      "I hope the two sides can prudently and properly handle issues, deepen exchanges and cooperation, continue to consolidate the political basis of bilateral relations, and enhance mutual strategic trust," said Cao.

      Saito said stronger ties between the two major powers in Asia was significant to regional and world peace and stability.

      He hoped the defense departments of both countries would strengthen high-level exchanges to enhance mutual trust and understanding.

      Cao stressed the importance of the Taiwan issue, saying it concerned China's core interests, and he hoped the Japanese side would respect China's positions and oppose "Taiwan independence".

      Saito said the Japanese side would adhere to the spirit of the Japan-China joint communiques, adding Japan's position on the Taiwan issue was unchanged.

      Before meeting with Cao in Beijing, Saito held talks with his Chinese counterpart, Chen Bingde.

      Chen, Chief of General Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), said he hoped China and Japan would deeply understand and respect each other's security concerns and work harder to build defense security and mutual trust.

      Saito told Chen that the visits by Defense Minister Cao and the Chinese fleet to Japan last year marked a new start for exchanges between the two defense departments, and he hoped they would strengthen defense exchanges to promote friendship between Japan and China.

      Saito, who arrived on Tuesday, also expressed his sympathy for problems caused by the severe winter weather in southern China.

  4. #109
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    Quote Originally Posted by Inst View Post
    Being supportive of good relations with Japan and theorizing an American threat is not necessarily contradictory, but I agree that the hawk label is insufficient.
    There are different views regarding the role of Japan in a possible Sino-US confrontation, but if you want, we can start a new thread on that. As other had noted, Sino-Japan relations seems to follow with that of the Sino-US, for some odd reason.

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    Mark Leonard is making the rounds, but he didn't manage to show up in this month's FA. According to posters on Prospect Magazine, China Economic Quarterly savaged his book.

    Here's another article by the writer.

    World View: The Rise of China’s Neocons | Newsweek International Edition | Newsweek.com

    The Rise of China’s Neocons
    By Mark Leonard | NEWSWEEK
    Mar 17, 2008 Issue

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    So much focus is given to the Olympics and China's economy these days that it's easy to overlook the deeper shifts occurring in Beijing's foreign policy. But concealed behind the anodyne comments of China's leaders, who generally try to underplay their country's power, a fierce debate over China's international approach is underway. The argument, waged in government-run think tanks and universities, pits liberal internationalists against China's neocons—who aim for nothing short of remaking the entire international order in China's image.

    For now the liberal internationalists have the upper hand. They include thinkers like Zheng Bijian, a former deputy to President Hu Jintao at the Communist Party's Central School and the man who coined the term "China's peaceful rise." They maintain that China should respect the traditional rules of the international system, avoid conflict and sell others on the idea that China is not a threat. Zheng has argued that China needs to exploit Washington's unpopularity by projecting its own "soft power," or cultural and political appeal. He wants Beijing to answer the "American Dream" of individual success by promoting a "Chinese Dream" based on economic development (to help the poor) and respect for sovereignty and international law (to defend national independence). Although the term has been discarded, China's peaceful rise now defines the foreign policy of President Hu, who is crisscrossing the world offering Chinese friendship and aid to all takers, and easing tensions with the West by softening Beijing's stand on touchy international issues like Darfur, Iran and North Korea.

    By contrast, the neocons—or "neocomms," as they should be known, since they represent a new twist on the Mao-era policy of challenging Western hegemony—are men like Yan Xuetong, an academic with close links to the Ministry of State Security, and Rear Adm. Yang Yi, one of the brightest thinkers in the Chinese military. The neocomms argue that China should be less focused on appeasing Washington and more concerned with Beijing's own priorities. These include resisting democracy promotion and humanitarian intervention abroad, in order to protect China and its allies from external interference.


    The neocomms have taken up the idea of multilateralism— associated in the West with the dilution of national sovereignty by member states agreeing to be bound by the rules of supranational institutions (like the European Union or the World Trade Organization). Thinkers like Yan have transformed the concept into a tool of power projection that would reinforce China's independence while helping it develop links with other Asian countries, in arrangements that would exclude China's great rival, the United States.

    Since the mid-1990s, Yan has worked tirelessly to sell this concept to the Chinese Foreign Ministry—which has traditionally been suspicious of international institutions—arguing that regional integration will bring all kinds of practical benefits to China. And Beijing has slowly come around; for example, it now supports the idea of an "East Asian Community" that would be modeled on the European Union. Yan argues that such a community would be an effective means of promoting Chinese power and sidelining Japan, since Tokyo, as America's most powerful Asian ally, would likely be a reluctant partner in any such project. In this new scheme, China would play a central role like that of France or Germany in Europe, while Japan would be the outsider, like Britain in the EU context.

    Over time, the more aggressive neocomms may come to dominate. In recent history, China has followed a pattern of making changes on a minor scale before expanding them outward. Domestically, for example, it first introduced the free market in special economic zones, waiting years before expanding them to the country at large. Expect something similar in the international sphere. Already Beijing has started taking baby steps toward building a new system in its image, spearheading the creation of regional groups such as the East Asian Community and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These groups, which are underpinned by Chinese values and norms rather than Western ones, represent the thin edge of a wedge that Beijing is likely to expand in the future.

    China's own emancipation from the West is also creating an illiberal path, characterized by high levels of state control in the economic, social and political spheres. Other developing countries—in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and Latin America—may seek to follow that road. The richer and more powerful China grows, the more attractive the "Chinese model" is likely to become—and the more real the threat it will pose to the liberal democratic example that's dominated international affairs since the end of the cold war.

    Leonard is executive director of the European Council on Foreign Relations and author of “What Does China Think?”

  6. #111
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    Inst,

    You have my thanks!


    Don't get me wrong, it is a great work but it will be a better read if he take the label out. Neo-con/Neo comm? oh come on. I still think he mis-readed about Rear Adm. Yang Yi

  7. #112
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    joelhar,

    From what I understand, Informationization means giving PLA officers laptops to play minesweeper with.

    Anyways, this is from 3/16/2008's PLAdaily.

    New Infantry Training Gangyao (roughly translated as guild line or doctrine) released for all infantries (ground, marine, Airborne, etc) They are planned to equip NCO with GPS devices and more importantly, give NCO the capabilities to call and direct close air support, in this article, from LH (army aviation).

    http://www.pladaily.com.cn/site1/xwp...nt_1165793.htm

    士官任永辉利用卫星导航系统手持机进行观察报知。夏安杰摄

    本报郑州3月16日电 记者胡君华、费士廷报道:从“一杆枪跑战术”到“身带多种信息化装备作战”,新大纲 使我军单兵作战能力发生了历史性变化,传统步兵将告别演兵场。

      记者今天在济南军区某机步旅新大纲试训现场看到,一营三连二级士官任永辉,身背新型电台,肩挎卫星导航 系统手持机,手握新式步枪投入战斗,搜集传递情报、搜索引导目标、爆破打击“敌人”……单兵作战能力今非昔 比。

      战斗间隙,任永辉告诉记者:“以往,步兵训练手中的家当基本上就是‘一杆步枪、四枚手榴弹’,携带的武 器装备单一,战技术综合运用能力有限。如今,步兵按新大纲要求携带好几种现代化装备,这在以前是不可想象的 。”

      正说着,任永辉携带的电台通信突然出现异常。经过仔细搜索,发现不远处有一座“敌”移动卫星通信站,他 迅速拿出卫星导航系统手持机,精确测量目标坐标,同时把情报传递给了远在数十公里之外的陆航指挥中心。很快 ,我武装直升机飞临上空,一举将“敌”卫星通信站摧毁。

    任永辉的出色表现,正是这个旅新大纲试训带来的一大亮点。据悉,为了适应未来陆、海、空、天、电(磁)五位 一体联合作战需要,新大纲对单兵综合演练内容进行了较大幅度调整,将原有的检验身体素质、战斗技能和战斗行 动,细化组合为检验观察报知能力、战斗运动能力、打击能力、爆破能力和防护能力等5种能力,突出科技、心理 等5种素质,形成信息化条件下单兵综合训练新模式。

    “单兵不再是战场上独立的个体,而是整个作战链条上的一个节点。”旅参谋长张书杰说,以往只是单一战斗员的 传统步兵,现在已成为集战斗员、情报搜集员、目标引导员等多种身份于一体的现代士兵。他们的出现,将极大地 提高战场感知能力、火力打击能力,促进我军作战效能成倍增长。



    Here is a very poor Google machine translation.


    NCO Linyonghui use handheld satellite navigation system to observe notification. Jiaanjie perturbation

    -- Zhengzhou, March 16 - China's Hu, fees Shiting reported: "Yiganqiang run tactics" to the "body with a wide range of information equipment operations," and the outline of the new one-man army in the history of combat capability changes in the traditional infantry will bid farewell to the drill ground.

    -- Today at the Jinan Military Region of a mechanized infantry brigade new outline training are at the scene to see, even a camp three Linyonghui two noncommissioned officers, a new radio than he led, Jianku handheld satellite navigation system, new rifles in their hands fighting, collect transfer intelligence, search guidance, blasting against the "enemy"…… single combat capability beyond.

    Battle space, Linyonghui told reporters: "In the past, infantry training is basically the hands of the family belongings' one rifle, four hand grenades', carrying weapons and equipment of a single, integrated use of technology warfare limited capacity. Today, the infantry with the new program requirements Several modern equipment, which was unimaginable in the past. "

    Now Then, Linyonghui portable radio communications suddenly appeared abnormal. After careful search, found not far from there an "enemy" mobile satellite communication station, he rapidly produce handheld satellite navigation system, the accurate measurement of target coordinates passed to the intelligence at the same time, far in the dozens of kilometers from the Army Aviation command Centre. Soon, I armed helicopters flew above, and in the "enemy" satellite communication stations destroyed.

    Linyonghui outstanding performance, it is this brigade new outline of the training are a major bright spot. Reportedly, in order to adapt to the future of land, sea, air, space, and (magnetic) five integrated joint operations, the new outline of a comprehensive exercise on the content of man-a more substantial adjustments, the original physical fitness test, fighting skills and combat operations, refining portfolio to test observations were reported to capacity, and the battle exercise capacity, capability, blasting and defense capabilities, such as five kinds of capabilities, outstanding scientific, technological, psychological and five kinds of quality of information under the conditions of a single new model of comprehensive training .

    "Man-on the battlefield is no longer an individual, but the entire chain of operations on a node." Brigade Chief of Staff Zhang Jie said, in the past only a single member of the traditional infantry fighting, it is now set to become combatants, the collection of intelligence, , and other members of goals to guide one's identity in the modern soldier. They emerge, it will greatly enhance the battlefield sensing capability and firepower capability and combat effectiveness of our military to promote doubled.

  8. #113
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    Andy,

    One thing I find very strange is that very few uses JANUS or other computerized wargaming (RAINBOW SIX and clones do not apply) in beefing up the military basics. I mean we saw it as a divisional exercise (computer wargame) but I didn't see them as a cadet exercise.
    Chimo

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    good point, I will see what I can find.

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    I have What Does China Think? in my hands right now. I'll scan it and convert it to the digital format.

  11. #116
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    Quote Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
    Andy,

    One thing I find very strange is that very few uses JANUS or other computerized wargaming (RAINBOW SIX and clones do not apply) in beefing up the military basics. I mean we saw it as a divisional exercise (computer wargame) but I didn't see them as a cadet exercise.
    A copy of Command and Conquer should teach them well. I learnt all my tactics from it: Is this a cause for worry?
    I have no idea what I'm doing. Honestly!

  12. #117
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    Quote Originally Posted by Indirect Fire View Post
    A copy of Command and Conquer should teach them well. I learnt all my tactics from it: Is this a cause for worry?
    Very much a cause for concern. Try Sudden Strike instead,it is a bit more genuine.
    In Iran people belive pepsi stands for pay each penny save israel. -urmomma158
    The Russian Navy is still a threat, but only to those unlucky enough to be Russian sailors.-highsea

  13. #118
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    http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/
    Hambantota, Chittagong, and the Maldives – Unlikely Pearls for the Chinese Navy
    Publication: China Brief Volume: 10 Issue: 23
    November 19, 2010 12:36 PM Age: 12 days
    Category: China Brief, Home Page, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific
    By: Daniel Kostecka

    Chittagong Port

    Much of the discussion regarding China’s maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean has revolved around the so-called “String of Pearls” strategy that Beijing is alleged to be pursuing. As part of this strategic construct it is claimed that Beijing is building a comprehensive network of naval bases stretching from southern China to Pakistan. This theory, a creation of a 2004 U.S. Department of Defense contractor study entitled Energy Futures in Asia, is now accepted as fact by many in official and unofficial circles [1]. While the study contains some useful arguments, certain elements of it have been selectively quoted as singular evidence of Beijing’s strategic intent in this region. In spite of the lack of evidentiary proof supporting the assertion that China intends to turn these facilities into military bases, claims regarding future bases in these locations for the Chinese Navy continue to this day, particularly in the United States and India [2]. This is somewhat ironic given that in past six months, Sri Lanka’s president and Bangladesh’s foreign minister stated publicly that China’s investments in port facilities in their nations are strictly commercial while over the past year the Maldives under the leadership of a new pro-Indian president reached out to New Delhi, not Beijing, to assist with maritime security for the island archipelago (The Times of India, June 28; BBC News, May 17; IndianExpress.com, August 13, 2009).

    From the Chinese perspective, in June 2009 Senior Captain Xie Dongpei of the PLA Navy stated that China’s port construction in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan was strictly commercial (The Straits Times, June 24, 2009). Further, in a 2004 article Senior Captain Xu Qi discussed Chinese investment in port facilities in the Indian Ocean within the same context as Chinese commercial investments in Russia, Africa, and the Caribbean as well the importance of China’s membership in the World Trade Organization [3]. Yet, despite strident denials from high level officials, rumors of Chinese military activity in these nations will not cease. This article will examine allegations of Chinese military facilities in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives to include the practical benefits of these locations for China’s security.

    Hambantota (Sri Lanka): While Hambantota is not listed as one of China’s “pearls” in Energy Futures in Asia, numerous (later) sources have since associated Chinese investment in the port with China’s wider naval ambitions in the region. These include Joint Operating Environment 2008 by U.S. Joint Forces Command along with an article by an Indian analyst claiming that Hambantota will provide extensive replenishment facilities for Chinese warships and submarines [4]. China has provided $360 million for the development of Hambantota that includes building a harbor, cargo terminals and a refueling depot (Sri Lanka Guardian, June 16). The construction agreement was signed on March 12, 2007, between the Sri Lanka Ports Authority and the Consortium of China Harbor Engineering Company Limited and Sino Hydro Corporation Limited.

    Beyond Chinese financing of commercial port construction, there is little else to support the contention that Hambantota will one day serve as a base for Chinese warships. On a map, a Chinese-funded naval base in Sri Lanka looks like a dagger pointed directly at India. From an historic standpoint, the idea of a Chinese naval base in Sri Lanka provides further intrigue because for centuries the island nation served as a key nexus of China’s maritime trade in the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka was even visited by all seven of Zheng He’s Treasure Fleets and represents one of the few places that Zheng He led troops in combat [5].

    In reality, such a base, due to its proximity to India, would be a liability in a serious conflict as Sri Lanka lies less than 50 nautical miles from India at its nearest point. Given the small size of Sri Lanka’s air force and navy, without the addition of substantial air defenses and hardened infrastructure that Sri Lanka cannot afford to provide, any Chinese military forces on Sri Lanka would find themselves vulnerable to strikes by the Indian military. At the same time, a robust base at Hambantota or anywhere else in Sri Lanka is a costly investment for the support of forces engaged in counter piracy and peacetime presence patrols that would have the added negative effect of inflaming China’s relations with India. Additionally, President Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka envisions Hambantota, which is in his home district, as a second Colombo, Sri Lanka’s largest port, in order to further economic development of his nation. That he has sought and secured Chinese funding for the project should not be taken as indicator that a large foreign military presence, Chinese or otherwise, would be welcome in an area he is committed to opening up to development, trade and tourism (Sri Lanka Guardian, June 16).

    Chittagong (Bangladesh): China’s interest in investing in the container port of Chittagong in Bangladesh was reported in Energy Futures in Asia in 2004 with the claim that China could be seeking more extensive naval and commercial access to Bangladesh although the report admits that China’s interest in Chittagong for military purposes could not be confirmed [6]. As with other claims surrounding China’s alleged “String of Pearls” strategy, Energy Futures in Asia is consistently cited as credible evidence of China’s long term intentions in Bangladesh.

    Like Hambantota, there is no evidence to suggest the end state of China’s investment in Chittagong will be a base for Chinese warships. Additionally, like Hambantota, there is reason to conclude that Dhaka will not permit China to develop a naval base at Chittagong. First, simple economics do not support arguments that Chittagong is becoming a “Chinese Pearl.” According to the Bangladeshi Foreign Minister, Dipu Moni, China has agreed to help finance an $8.7 billion expansion of Chittagong, already Bangladesh’s primary port, which handles approximately 90 percent of the nation’s foreign trade. Yet, Bangladesh’s leaders have an expansive vision for the port that is commercial, not military. Bangladesh envisions Chittagong as a transshipment hub for trade flowing into and out of India, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, and China through a developing network of river, road, and rail links (China Daily, March 25). In fact, just as Dhaka is negotiating with Beijing for investment in Chittagong and is considering road and rail links from Chittagong through Burma to Kunming in China’s Yunnan Province, Dhaka signed an agreement with New Delhi in May 2010 for the transshipment of Indian goods through Bangladesh to the land locked state of Tripura in northeastern India (Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha, May 31; China Daily, March 25). India in turn agreed to provide dredging equipment to assist Bangladesh in its efforts to dredge rivers for improved flood control, navigation and access (UNB Connect, January 12). Also, while China and India are Bangladesh’s number one and two trading partners with Bangladesh suffering from a substantial trade imbalance with both nations, in 2008, Bangladesh’s exports to India were over three times higher than its exports to China [7]. This in addition to Bangladesh receiving electricity from India’s power grid arguably makes India the more important trading partner (UNB Connect, January 12).

    Second, the geography of Chittagong, or what Alfred Thayer Mahan calls position, is not in China’s favor. With the exception of a small section of its southeastern border, Bangladesh shares its entire land border with India. Given that, it is difficult to envision a set of circumstances that would cause Dhaka to risk antagonizing a major trading partner that also surrounds it on three sides by permitting a foreign power to develop a naval base there. Foreign Minister Moni is on record as stating that she views Bangladesh as a bridge between India and China hoping to capitalize on its position between the two nations while being careful not to offend either. She stated specifically, “I don't believe if China helps us build this sea port that China will be able to use it for other purposes. Bangladesh will never let any part of its territory be used for any kind of attacks or anything like that” (BBC News , May 17).

    Marao (Maldives): One of the more sensationalistic claims regarding China’s military ambitions in the Indian Ocean revolves around reports that China has developed a submarine base in the Maldives Islands, a chain of over 1100 atolls and islets approximately 400 nautical miles south and east of India. Press reports began circulating in 1999 that the government of the Maldives leased Marao Atoll to China to set up a monitoring station. Additional reports followed a 2001 visit to the Maldives by Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji claiming that China intended to build a submarine base on Marao to be completed in 2010 [8]. One article by an Indian analyst even claimed a PLA Navy officer welcomed the possibility that the Maldives could be submerged by 2040 due to global warming because an underwater base would be “ideal for submarines” (Dhivehi Observer , May 8, 2005). In 2000 President Gayoom of the Maldives attempted to assure New Delhi that his nation was not negotiating with China for the development of a naval base but was not entirely successful as the story continues to propagate (Minivan News, October 9, 2006). Contributing factors are likely general Indian paranoia over even rumored Chinese military activity on its periphery and public criticism in 2006 and 2008 by political opposition leaders over perceptions of then President Gayoom’s close relationship with Beijing (Dhivehi Observer, June 12, 2008; Minivan News, September 18, 2006). Regardless, as late as 2009, articles were still being written by Indian security analysts and retired military officers about China’s attempts to encircle India that included mention of China’s base in the Maldives [9]. In February 2010 a professor at the University of Pennsylvania wrote that China’s submarine base in the Maldives represented a direct challenge to the American air and naval base at Diego Garcia (Japan Times Online, February 12).

    Assertions aside, there is no Chinese submarine base in the Maldives. In fact, it is unlikely that any of the atolls that make up the Maldives could even handle the type of sophisticated infrastructure required to support submarines (Dhivehi Observer, May 8, 2005). It also makes no sense for the government on Male Atoll to risk relations with its closest neighbor by permitting a potentially hostile power to develop a naval base among its islands as India is the island group’s primary security partner. The Indian Army and Navy conduct exercises with the Maldivian National Defense Forces, officers from the Maldives train in Indian military schools, and in 2006 India donated a fast attack craft to the Maldives (IndianExpress.com, August 13, 2009). India also sent ships and aircraft to the Maldives to assist with tsunami relief in 2004, and in 1988 the Indian military sent 1600 troops to the Maldives to defeat an attempted coup against President Gayoom by Tamil mercenaries (IndianExpress.com, November 4, 2008; Asian Defence, October 16, 2009). More important, in 2009 the Maldives under the leadership of the new pro-Indian President Mohamed Nasheed approached India about becoming integrated into India’s security grid in order to enhance existing security cooperation agreements and out of growing fears that a Maldivian island resort could be taken over by terrorists (The Hindu, October 22, 2009). According to Indian press, as a result of this request the Indian Navy and Coast Guard will each base one helicopter in the Maldives, India will install coastal radars on Maldivian atolls, where there are currently only two such devices as well as integrate them with India’s maritime surveillance network, and Indian patrol aircraft now conduct flights over the islands (IndianExpress.com, August 13, 2009).

    Given the Maldives reliance on India for security assistance, it is inconceivable that China or any other nation would be permitted to develop military facilities there. It would not only undermine Maldivian security but, given the small size of the atolls that make up the Maldives, any such facility would be small and difficult to defend, making it a vulnerable target for India’s navy and air force. India showed in both 1988 and 2004 that the Maldives are within its operational reach and while those missions were to provide assistance against a coup attempt and a natural disaster, the point is still instructive for any nation that would seek to use the Maldives as a base to undermine Indian security.

    Conclusion

    Despite almost a decade of speculation there appears to be no hard evidence that suggests China plans to base warships in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or the Maldives, or that these nations even desire a Chinese military presence. In fact, all three of these nations’ proximity to India and their desires to balance their relations between India and China indicate that China will not develop military facilities in these countries. While the Chinese are heavily investing in developing infrastructure for improved access into the Indian Ocean, which in turn is helping it gain political influence in these countries, the extent to which it has improved access and infrastructure will translate into basing arrangements remains to be seen.

    China will no doubt continue to maintain positive relationships with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Maldives, but this does not mean China will seek to establish a military presence in any of these countries or that such a presence would even be permitted as it would not only undermine their security, it would do very little to enhance China’s. Recent denials of future Chinese naval bases in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka by leaders of those nations and the Maldives’ reliance on India for security assistance should be taken as clear signs that such arrangements are farther from reach than some may think, and reflect the growing concerns over the intentions of these nations regarding the possibility of Chinese military bases on their soil.

    Notes:

    1. Julie MacDonald, Amy Donahue, and Bethany Danyluk, Energy Futures in Asia, Booz-Allen Hamilton Report Sponsored by the Director of Net Assessment, (November 2004).
    2. Congressional Research Service, China Naval Modernization – Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf, (October 1, 2010). and Jagannath Chattopadhyay “When China is the Enemy Look East – Taking Control of Oil Route, China Surrounds India by Establishing its Bases all Around,” Bartaman Hard Copy, (October 15, 2010).
    3. Xu Qi, “Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the 21st Century,” translated by Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, Naval War College Review, (Autumn 2006).
    4. The Joint Operating Environment 2008, http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storya...08/JOE2008.pdf, (25 November 2008) and Sanjay Kumar, “China’s Naval Strategy – Implications for India,” by, (March 2, 2009).
    5. Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas – The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 114-115, (Oxford University Press, 1996).
    6. Julie MacDonald, Amy Donahue, and Bethany Danyluk, Energy Futures in Asia, Booz-Allen Hamilton Report Sponsored by the Director of Net Assessment, (November 2004).
    7. Bangladesh – EU Bilateral Trade and Trade With the World, trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113349.pdf, (September 22, 2009).
    8. Gurpreet S. Khurana, “China’s String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean and its Security Implications,” Strategic Analysis, (January 2008).
    9. Sanjay Kumar, “China’s Naval Strategy – Implications for India,” by, (March 2, 2009).

    [The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Navy or Department of Defense.]
    Last edited by mister unknown; 02 Dec 10, at 02:59.

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