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#1 (permalink) |
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Contributor
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Big Battleship Doctrine 2
The last thread on this matter was derailed and spun out of control. So I've posted a new thread in order to keep everything together and reform old arguements.
First we need to establish what is necessary and what is not necessary. The Iowa's cost peanuts in the grand scheme of things to operate. However we must face the fact that the Iowa's are outdated and obsolete. However, my original Big Battleship Doctrine pointed this out, listing that indeed, we need a future battleship. Now, issues such as armor may be discussed on the side since armor by todays standards goes far beyond Iowa armor design. 16" rounds have a role to play in todays combat roles. The USMC has stated that 155mm systems are effective enough for fire support. However, we debating this you need to take into account the current fire support triad. Which includes current "substitutes" for 16" rounds. Firstly, tomahawks are more effective in certain applications than 16" rounds, such as precision attacks. I'm going to provide a NSFS chart so that everyone can take a good look at NSFS mission requirements. ![]() When debating the effectiveness of 16" systems (and thus the idea of a battleship in general) you need first establish what requirements they don't meet before you start going into what requirements they do meet. And this debate doesn't stay with current rounds. I'll state: A.) 16" guided munitions will need to be developed B.) 16" assisted munitions need to be developed. C.) Eventually a new gun system needs to be developed since the Mark 7 is obsolete. However for this current dicussion we will just consider that the Mark 7 is currently adequate. When dealing with hardened targets, aside from air dropped munitions and cruise missiles we just don't have a gun system capable of handling hardened targets. Also, this discussion doesn't take the stance of Iowa BB's vs. DD(X) platforms since the DD(X) is a different animal. And now the DD(X) isn't even intended as a replacement for the Burkes. So the DD(X) isn't going to be the system we thought it was. I do however support the DD(X) project since the technology developed for it can be used in future ships and applications. However the DD(X) firing PGM's only partially mitigates 4 out of the 4 NSFS mission gaps, while the Iowa firing dumb shells partially mitigates 2 out of the 4 NSFS mission gaps. So you see that the Iowa firing PGM 16" shells could partially mitigate 4 out of the 4 while possibly mitigating one of those gaps. Let's consider when the DD(X) will be available to cover NSFS requirements- GAO-05-39R Nov 14, 2004 The Navy’s fielding of a replacement NSFS capability has been delayed. The near-term and midterm efforts to extend the range of munitions fired from the 5-inch guns on its cruisers and destroyers have been delayed from 2001 to possibly as late as 2011, but other program options have been discussed including the option of canceling or reducing the extended-range munitions program to fund development of another gun system. Far-term plans to help fill the NSFS gap by 2015 using a new destroyer with advanced gun systems were revised in 2001 to employ a different destroyer concept—the DD (X). The Navy currently expects sufficient numbers of DD (X) destroyers to be ready to help fill the NSFS gap by 2018 at the earliest. According to the Navy's 313 ship plan, the DD(X) is not a replacement for the Burkes. So the DD(X) isn't replacing the burkes, and we still have to find a replacement for the burkes. So the idea that reactivating the Iowa's will force us to keep building burke IIA's is ridiculous since it is no longer considered a replacement platform anyways. Consider these points- • Current estimate of 20 to 40 months to reactivate the battleships • Current cost to reactivate estimated for both ships • Cost assumption based on 1999 inflation rate • Cost assumption does not consider to complete the reactivation • $500 million reactivation cost does not include estimated $110 million needed to replenish gun powder for battleships’ 16-inch guns • June 2004 – Navy discusses options for accelerating Rail Gun development to meet DD(X) schedule • According to Navy officials funding for Rail Gun research is deficient • Options discussed to address funding deficiency included canceling or descoping the extended range munitions program • August 2004 – Navy again modifies plans for extended range munitions for 5-inch gun • Navy notifies industry of intent to issue a solicitation in 2005 for System Development and Demonstration with a low rate initial production option of precision-guided, extended range munitions to be fired in the Navy’s 5-inch gun • According to program official, depending on which system is selected, initial operational capability could be as late as 2011 • October 2004 – Navy is currently reconsidering decision to not put 5-in guns on cruisers • Even if cruisers receive new gun, the Navy does not intend to use them in the NSFS role • Will reduce available NSFS capable platforms by 41 percent if 25 nautical mile stand-off range is adhered to • Marine Corps 2002 memo to CNO lists the following near term NSFS gun range requirement • Desired/Objective – 63 nautical miles from ship to shore • Minimal Acceptable/Threshold – 41 nautical miles from ship to shore • Current NSFS guns are not able to achieve Marine Corps stated NSFS gun range requirements when ships are positioned 25 nautical miles from shore due to increased land based threats • The 5-inch guns with a range of 13 nautical miles currently in use on destroyers and cruisers unable to meet range objective • Desired/Objective range could be met with anticipated increase in range using ERGM currently in development • The 16-inch guns with a range of 24 nautical miles used on battleships unable to meet range objective when 25-nautical-mile standoff range is required • Minimal Acceptable/Threshold range to target could be achieved if battleships operated closer to shore • Desired/Objective range to target could be achieved with previously tested but not fielded advanced projectiles |
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#2 (permalink) |
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Contributor
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GAO-05-39R Report:
Marine Corps requirements now captured in this draft document. Document identifies four Joint Fires capabilities gaps: Joint environment—Integrated Fires command and control is not well defined Weather restrictions—Existing and future target acquisition systems do not provide sufficient capability to engage moving targets under restricted weather conditions Collateral damage—Existing and future target acquisition systems do not provide sufficient capability to engage targets when friendly forces are in close contact or when causing collateral damage is a concern Fires volume—Insufficiency in existing capability to deliver a large quantity of fires on multiple targets simultaneously or over a short period of time If you take notice of the "Fires Volume" mission requirement, which by the way is one of the 4 gaps listed above. I point out that an Iowa BB would indeed fulfill that requirement if using guided shells. |
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#3 (permalink) | |
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Quote:
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#5 (permalink) | ||
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Resident Curmudgeon
Military Professional
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Could you tell me where in GAO 05-39R that is? And how they apply to NSFS. This is in the report: (pg 18 I think) Quote:
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#7 (permalink) | |
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And the term here would not be "fail" it would be "does not mitigate"Last edited by Defcon 6 : 01-04-2006 at 22:55 PM. |
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#8 (permalink) | |||
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Quote:
Which was published last month dec, 05 as opposed to GAO-05-39R which is over a year old. Quote:
Quote:
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#10 (permalink) | |
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Resident Curmudgeon
Military Professional
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Maybe you would like to look up the frag radius of the 250lb SDB, or the 1k inert LGB"Concrete" bombs that the Brits drop to reduce collateral damage before you start smarting off. We don't hit everything with 2k JDAMs. |
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#11 (permalink) | ||
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Resident Curmudgeon
Military Professional
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Give me a few min to reread it. Its on my hard drive ![]() |
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#12 (permalink) | |
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I wonder what your comparison is. lol. Last edited by Defcon 6 : 01-04-2006 at 23:10 PM. |
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#14 (permalink) | |
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Resident Curmudgeon
Military Professional
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Quote:
Read it a few times. But yes I will stand by my statement. Fered to page 4, the report only focused on NSFS , mentioned that there are air and shore based assets but did no investigative work to see if they can fufill some of the "NSFS gaps". 2 examples, that leads me to feel that they didn't look is that for one that isn't what they were tasked with by the Sen mission statement pg 2:You requested that we review requirements for fire support and whether or not these requirements could be met with Navy battleships. We agreed to focus our work on two objectives. Specifically, we identified (1) mission requirements established by the Department of Defense (DOD) for fire support to expeditionary operations and how DOD officials view these needs and the ability of the battleships and current and planned capabilities to meet these requirements, and (2) cost factors that should be considered in evaluating whether to sustain, reactivate, modernize or delist the battleships. On November 10, 2005, we provided you with a briefing on our observations regarding battleships and fire support issues. This letter summarizes our observations and transmits the briefing slides as requested. the other blurp being when they referred to Marine Corps 105mm howitzers on page 4. The MC got rid of 105s in Oct 1994. |
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#15 (permalink) | ||
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Resident Curmudgeon
Military Professional
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Quote:
as you said Quote:
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