Big Battleship Doctrine

[Gun Grape]

Originally Posted by Defcon 6

Then show away. Because gun, the options are running out and liquids if used right have far greater potential, right? But I have never seen anyone else suggest such a thing so if every 20 people say it I guess my idea is pretty popular.

talk to the people that tried to get the liquid propellant idea to work in the Crusader project for over 10 yrs.

They are quite large, especially for a 33,000 tons ship that needs over 200,000 hp. But maybe your right.

Well 2 seem to push a 41,770 ton LHD well enough for the Navy





By the way, somebody on another forum read your past posts regarding caliber and told me to ask you this.

I repeat that in the context of US artillery systems :

1. The M185 cannon is a 155-mm/39-cal and not /38-cal.[/quote]

OK, I was going from memory.

2. The caliber of a tube is the diameter of the bore measured at the muzzle between opposite lands.

Doesn’t matter where its measured from as long as it is in the tube proper past the tapered lands of the forcing cone. Unless you are talking about something like the WW2 German PAK 41 and its tapered barrel that went from 75mm at the breech to 55mm at the muzzle.

3. The caliber length of a tube is the distance from the muzzle to the face of the breech recess and is expressed in calibers.

Depends on which country is doing the measuring. US measures from the inner breech face, Germany measured the whole barrel. Brits measured different ways depending on if the ammo was fixed or seperate loading

[Defcon 6]

Thanks gun. I gave that guy your answers and I hope he chokes. He basically googled it and tried to tell me I was wrong, and I was using the answers you gave me.

[Anon]

I'd actually stick with the nuke power. IMO, it's the one thing that Defcon got right in his design.

[B.Smitty]

Originally Posted by M21Sniper

I'd actually stick with the nuke power. IMO, it's the one thing that Defcon got right in his design.

Well if you're going nuke, and eating the huge costs to build a handful of BBs, then why not go all out & use railguns? They provide far more range (and velocity) potential than conventional "gas expansion" propulsion methods, and you don't have to deal with dangerous propellants.

I'm thinking a ship with two or three fixed, forward-pointing railguns running much of the ship's length, at an 'optimal' elevation.

Maybe aim to sling a few hundred to a thousand pound projectile out to 5-700nm or more.

It might even be relatively easy to support a range of projectile sizes for different targets, on the fly.

Running it the length of the ship would allow you to lower the absolute max G's and power output required.

One might argue that a fixed-forward mount means you'd have to point the ship at the target, but we're talking guided rounds here, so you really only have to point in the general direction. The ship could cruise in a racetrack pattern, a hundred or more miles offshore - slow towards the target for station keeping and sprinting back out when it got too close.

Given nuclear power, and relatively simple mechanical components, I imagine a twin-barreled railgun of this type could produce a rather high ROF. It'd be constrained by the cooling system and power transfer electronics.



Also, as a general question, if you have a ship who's primary weapons are 300+nm guns, then why bother heavily armoring it? With that range, it can stand off at considerable distances - near NavAir distances - and still deliver fires.

[Sameer]

I have not read through the entire thread but assuming 10 missiles hit this heavily armoured battleship

How are you going to armor plate your sensors though? Even the most heaviliy armored battleship is going to be a sitting duck after a few antiship missiles have swept the electronics off the superstructure.
What kind of armor will protect the command centre etc?

[Anon]

"Well if you're going nuke, and eating the huge costs to build a handful of BBs, then why not go all out & use railguns? They provide far more range (and velocity) potential than conventional "gas expansion" propulsion methods, and you don't have to deal with dangerous propellants."

Rail guns are about 20 years from reality IMO.

Scramshells will be ready much sooner, and provide a tremendous capability in their own right.

[Anon]

"How are you going to armor plate your sensors though?"

You can't. What the Iowas had was full manual reversions for their main gun systems with mechanical fire control computers deep inside the ships protected citidel.

"What kind of armor will protect the command centre etc?"

On the Iowas it was 19" of solid Class B armored plate.

[Defcon 6]

Originally Posted by Gun Grape

No that was research that helped develop the 120mm scramjet round. GASL was taken over by ATK industries. The work is going towards the 120mm tank shell. ATK is also the company that built the X-43. That is going towards a space shuttle replacement.

Feel free to read the reasoning on why a scramjet round is easier to produce for a 120mm cannon compared to a 16in cannon. Your an engineer, you tell me.


Puters been down for a few days due to a mesh of breaker box and lightning. Good news is that the surge protector worked

Actually that isn't true. There were 16" high velocity shells developed, and guided shells.

-Project HARP
And the DARPA program which worked with 16" shells.

There is no real obstacle to overcome in creating a 16" projectile, especially with higher velocity guns. But thats just my opinion. Anything can be done with enough money. Thats sure enough.

[Defcon 6]

Well if you're going nuke, and eating the huge costs to build a handful of BBs, then why not go all out & use railguns? They provide far more range (and velocity) potential than conventional "gas expansion" propulsion methods, and you don't have to deal with dangerous propellants.

Rail guns are the biggest reason I developed the Advanced Battleship in the first place. However they have not been perfected by any means yet, and lack the capability to fire larger weapons. Currently the conctact plates corrode under stress making them useless for a weapon. However this will be fixed in time.

I think liquid hydrogen is a good cantdiate if cyrogenic equipment could be used. And theres other propellants that are promising as well. If using a solid, I think c4 is a alternative, but it will never have the performance of liquid.

I'm thinking a ship with two or three fixed, forward-pointing railguns running much of the ship's length, at an 'optimal' elevation.

Maybe aim to sling a few hundred to a thousand pound projectile out to 5-700nm or more.

Eventually yes, but currently they can't fire a 5 kg shot far enough to be effective. Sure they go Mach 9+ when fired, but the distance here is the kicker. The problem again being corrosion on the rails contact plates.

It might even be relatively easy to support a range of projectile sizes for different targets, on the fly.

Absolutely.

Running it the length of the ship would allow you to lower the absolute max G's and power output required.

Thats a good idea.

One might argue that a fixed-forward mount means you'd have to point the ship at the target, but we're talking guided rounds here, so you really only have to point in the general direction. The ship could cruise in a racetrack pattern, a hundred or more miles offshore - slow towards the target for station keeping and sprinting back out when it got too close.

You should post details on that because I don't quite understand what why or what it's doing.

Given nuclear power, and relatively simple mechanical components, I imagine a twin-barreled railgun of this type could produce a rather high ROF. It'd be constrained by the cooling system and power transfer electronics.

You are absolutely correct. Rail guns can fire upwards of a 10,000 rounds a minute if you use what I call a box gun. What it looks like is a MRLS except it fires stacked rounds through the rail drivers. It's a rail gun, except really it's a bunch of rail guns all installed into one mount.

Also, as a general question, if you have a ship who's primary weapons are 300+nm guns, then why bother heavily armoring it? With that range, it can stand off at considerable distances - near NavAir distances - and still deliver fires

Because a cruise missile like the tomahawk can still go 700+ miles. And accidents do happen. One of the requirements I came up with after reading over current Naval issues is the lack of...defense in ships as far as physically, that as above a single missile can sink a ship of 9,000 tons or more just depending. If a missile gets through then it could sink a billion dollar ship in one hit. The Navy is worried about this, so I developed this as a more obvious solution to the problem.

[Defcon 6]

Originally Posted by Sameer

I have not read through the entire thread but assuming 10 missiles hit this heavily armoured battleship

How are you going to armor plate your sensors though? Even the most heaviliy armored battleship is going to be a sitting duck after a few antiship missiles have swept the electronics off the superstructure.
What kind of armor will protect the command centre etc?

This is a very good question.

My ship has secondary comm and sensor systems on a retractable mount which can be raised or lowered below deck, activated in case of disruption to the primary systems. It can also be manually controlled.

Another thing is I eliminated the bridge. The command and fire support areas are now all near the bottom of the ship since that is where attacks will concentrate. The only thing besides the turrets above deck is a small observation dome used to survey whats going on and relay information. I imagine this would connect directly to the bridge. A secondary control station can be installed in this dome. The dome itself is like a turret, low to the deck and armored more than the deck itself.

I figured, a worse possibility is a missile hitting the bridge and killing commanding officers while also knocking out most control systems.

[Defcon 6]

Originally Posted by M21Sniper

I'd actually stick with the nuke power. IMO, it's the one thing that Defcon got right in his design.

Yes I noted this on another board, and the anti-bb trolls there started massing.

Anyways I basically proved them incorrect. The ship is protected enough to safely protect a reactor. But if the ship is damaged to a sinking point, I wouldn't care whether the reactor was damaged and leaking or not.

So nuclear power is the wisest choice.

[Gun Grape]

Originally Posted by Defcon 6

Actually that isn't true. There were 16" high velocity shells developed, and guided shells.

-Project HARP
And the DARPA program which worked with 16" shells.

There is no real obstacle to overcome in creating a 16" projectile, especially with higher velocity guns. But thats just my opinion. Anything can be done with enough money. Thats sure enough.

Noooooooooooooo Not again. You have been hanging out reading the USNFSA site havn't you?

HARP data has no bearing on 16in guns on ship. It was suppose to explore orbital launch from a gun. Any claims made by USNFSA or any Stearman, Meyers or Sparks website concerning the "extended range" are BS. The program was designed for height not distance.

If you want to use anything learned from it then you have to

1. Double the length of the tube.

2. Bore the tube out. Effectivly making it bigger than 16 in. This does wonders for accuracy.

3. Use a Sabotted projectile. Another range and accuracy killer at long distance.

4. Design a workable way to suck the air out of the forward end of the tube for each round. The forward near vacuum has lots to do with the range capabilities that certain "less than honest" BB experts put forth.


Those DARPA rounds never got out of the drawing board design stage. None were ever built and definatly none were ever test fired. Especially "After the program was shut down" as is sometimes claimed.

The "With enough money" statement tells me the cost isn't justified. Why spend billions on a projectile for a limited run production that "Could, at sometime in the future" have the same downrange effects to weapons that are already in production?

[Defcon 6]

Originally Posted by Gun Grape

Noooooooooooooo Not again. You have been hanging out reading the USNFSA site havn't you?

HARP data has no bearing on 16in guns on ship. It was suppose to explore orbital launch from a gun. Any claims made by USNFSA or any Stearman, Meyers or Sparks website concerning the "extended range" are BS. The program was designed for height not distance.

If you want to use anything learned from it then you have to

1. Double the length of the tube.

2. Bore the tube out. Effectivly making it bigger than 16 in. This does wonders for accuracy.

3. Use a Sabotted projectile. Another range and accuracy killer at long distance.

4. Design a workable way to suck the air out of the forward end of the tube for each round. The forward near vacuum has lots to do with the range capabilities that certain "less than honest" BB experts put forth.


Those DARPA rounds never got out of the drawing board design stage. None were ever built and definatly none were ever test fired. Especially "After the program was shut down" as is sometimes claimed.

The "With enough money" statement tells me the cost isn't justified. Why spend billions on a projectile for a limited run production that "Could, at sometime in the future" have the same downrange effects to weapons that are already in production?

The AGS system says otherwise.

A sabotted projectile with guidance on the other hand.

The HARP project would work even better for this, the higher the trajectory the further it ultimately can go. Perhaps if HARP had been continued we would have a sub-orbital round.

[Defcon 6]

November 19, 2004
The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett
Chairman, Subcommittee on Projection Forces
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Subject: Information on Options for Naval Surface Fire Support
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Land-, air-, and sea-based components form the “fires triad” that is used to
support Marine Corps amphibious assault operations. The sea-based part
of the fires triad is referred to as Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS). From
World War II until the Persian Gulf War in 1991, NSFS resided mainly in
the capability of the 16-inch guns on the Navy’s Iowa class battleships. The
thick armor of these battleships and the 24-nautical-mile range of their
16-inch guns gave the battleships increased survivability in high-threat
scenarios. The last Iowa class battleship was decommissioned in 1992.
Their retirement left a void in the NSFS part of the fires triad. To field a
replacement NSFS capability, the Navy developed a two-phased plan in
1994. In the near-term to midterm, it would modify the capability of 5-inch
guns on existing destroyers and cruisers, and develop extended-range
guided munitions for the modified 5-inch gun. In the far term, it would
field a sufficient number of new destroyers fitted with an even-longerrange
advanced gun system and ultimately a very-long-range
electromagnetic gun or “Rail Gun.”
However, in 1996, congressional authorizers became concerned that the
Navy would not be able to produce a replacement NSFS capability
comparable to the battleships until well into the twenty-first century. In
that year’s Defense Authorization Act,1 the Congress directed the Secretary
of the Navy to restore at least two Iowa class battleships to the naval
vessel registry until a capability was developed equal to or greater than
that provided by the battleships. By 1999 the Navy had placed the Iowa
and Wisconsin battleships back on the naval vessel registry and has been
maintaining them in an inactive state since then.
1 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, Sec. 1011.
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS
In recent years, the Navy’s efforts to develop a NSFS replacement
capability have not progressed as quickly as planned. Given concerns
about the gap in NSFS capability, you requested that we review (1) the
validated requirements for NSFS, (2) the estimated cost and schedule for
reactivating and modernizing two Iowa class battleships to provide NSFS,
and (3) the status of Navy efforts to develop a replacement NSFS
capability. This letter summarizes our findings and transmits the detailed
briefing that we prepared for your staff. (See encl. I.)
To address our engagement objectives, we interviewed responsible
officials and reviewed official documents, including internal memos,
operational requirements documents, and related studies, from the Marine
Corps Combat Development Command, the Navy’s Inactive Ships Program
Office, the Navy’s Surface Warfare Directorate, the Navy’s Guided
Projectile Office, the Joint Staff (J-8) Force Application Assessment
Division, and the U.S. Naval Fire Support Association. We also toured the
Battleship Wisconsin (BB-64) and the USS Winston Churchill (DDG-81).
We conducted our work from April through September 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
The Navy and Marine Corps have only recently begun the process to
establish validated NSFS requirements that address the overall capabilities
needed and the balance between different systems that will be required to
provide effective, continuous, and sustaining support fire for forces
operating ashore. Validated requirements for some specific systems have
been established, however.
The cost and schedule for reactivating and modernizing two Iowa class
battleships have not been fully developed. However, the Navy believes that
reactivation of the battleships should not be pursued for a number of
reasons. These include, among other things, manpower requirements and
modernization needed to integrate the battleships into today’s modern
Navy. Therefore, the Navy has no plans to conduct the detailed studies
needed to identify the full extent of needs and costs.
The Navy’s fielding of a replacement NSFS capability has been delayed.
The near-term and midterm efforts to extend the range of munitions fired
from the 5-inch guns on its cruisers and destroyers have been delayed
from 2001 to possibly as late as 2011, but other program options have
been discussed including the option of canceling or reducing the
extended-range munitions program to fund development of another gun
system. Far-term plans to help fill the NSFS gap by 2015 using a new
destroyer with advanced gun systems were revised in 2001 to employ a
Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS
different destroyer concept—the DD (X). The Navy currently expects
sufficient numbers of DD (X) destroyers to be ready to help fill the NSFS
gap by 2018 at the earliest.
The role of naval surface fire support has been evolving in tandem with the
Navy’s amphibious assault doctrine, and for well over a decade, since the
decommissioning of the last of the Iowa class battleships, both the Navy
and Marine Corps have strived to address the specifics of how to fulfill
NSFS requirements. Until recently, these services have had difficulty with
reconciling their respective positions. Operational requirements
documents for several systems, such as the new destroyer, that will
contribute to the NSFS mission have been developed. On several
occasions, the Marine Corps has specified to the Navy what they believe
the replacement NSFS capability should be and the timing of the
capability. However, no single document has ever addressed the overall
capabilities and the balance between different systems that will be
required to provide effective, continuous, and sustainable supporting fire
for increasingly capable expeditionary forces operating ashore.
Although no formal NSFS requirement currently exists, in August 2004, the
Navy and Marine Corps agreed on an approach to correct the problem by
formally agreeing to develop an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) that
would address the overall capabilities needed for naval fire support. The
goal of this ICD is to document and address the overall capabilities
required of naval fire support. This will assist in determining the most
effective and efficient balance of capabilities and in determining the
cumulative offensive power that naval forces must be capable of
generating. An integrated product team chaired by the Marine Corps’
Deputy Commandant for Combat Development office, in coordination
with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, will conduct the required
analyses, develop the ICD, and endeavor to gain the Department of
Defense’s approval for the ICD.
Validated
Requirements for
NSFS Overall Have
Not Been Established
Page 4 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS
To reactivate two Iowa class battleships to their decommissioned
capability, the Navy estimates costs in excess of $500 million. This does
not include an additional $110 million needed to replenish gunpowder for
the 16-inch guns because a recent survey found that it is unsafe. In terms
of schedule, the Navy’s program management office estimates that
reactivation would take 20 to 40 months, given the loss of corporate
memory and the shipyard industrial base.
Reactivating the battleships would require a wide range of battleship
modernization improvements, according to the Navy’s program
management office. At a minimum, these modernization improvements
include command and control, communications, computers, and
intelligence equipment; environmental protection (including ozonedepleting
substances); a plastic-waste processor; pulper/shredder and
wastewater alterations; firefighting/fire safety and women-at-sea
alterations; a modernized sensor suite (air and surface search radar); and
new combat and self-defense systems. Although detailed studies would be
needed to identify the full extent of modernization needs and costs, the
Navy has no plans to conduct these studies.
The Navy’s program management office also identified other issues that
would strongly discourage the Navy from reactivating and modernizing the
battleships. For example, personnel needed to operate the battleships
would be extensive, and the skills needed may not be available or easily
reconstituted. Other issues include the age and unreliability of the
battleships’ propulsion systems and the fact that the Navy no longer
maintains the capability to manufacture their 16-inch gun system
components and ordnance.
Following the retirement of the last Iowa class battleship in 1992, the Navy
laid out a two-phase plan to provide a replacement NSFS capability:
• The near-term and midterm phases called for modifying the 5-inch guns on
the current class of destroyers and cruisers planned for production and
developing extended-range guided munitions (ERGM) to be used in the
upgraded guns for improved range.
• The far-term phase called for developing a longer-range advanced gun
system to be fitted on a new destroyer and eventually a Rail Gun with even
greater range.
In the near-term and midterm, expected fielding of the ERGM system for
use in upgraded 5-inch guns on current destroyers and cruisers has been
delayed from 2001 to possibly as late as 2011. Technical and design
Full Cost and
Schedule for
Reactivating and
Modernizing
Battleships Have Not
Been Analyzed
Delays in Fielding
Replacement NSFS
Systems After
Retiring Battleships
Extend Gap in NSFS
Capability
Page 5 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS
problems on the ERGM, which has been under development since 1996,
have led to test failures and delays.2 The Navy has awarded a contract to a
different company for developing an alternative technology. The Navy now
intends to issue a solicitation in 2005 to hold full and open competition for
development and low-rate production for the extended-range munitions
for the 5-inch gun. Other program options have also been discussed to
include canceling or reducing the extended-range munitions program to
fund the development of another gun under consideration for the future
destroyer called the “hypersonic naval rail gun.” Also, the Navy is
considering the benefits of installing modified 5-inch guns on the current
cruisers to fire the extended-range guided munitions. However, if
undertaken, the Navy does not intend to use these platforms in an NSFS
role. This decision will reduce the number of ships able to provide NSFS
by 41 percent in those scenarios where a 25-nautical-mile standoff range of
the ships from the shore is needed to protect them from shore-based
threats. Without the 5-inch gun modification to handle the extended-range
guided munitions, the range of the cruisers’ guns is only 13 nautical miles.
In the far term, the fielding of an advanced gun system has been delayed.
Initial plans called for fielding 32 new destroyers, designated the DD 21,
with advanced gun systems between 2008 and 2020 to fill the NSFS gap. In
2001, the Navy announced that it would replace the DD 21 with another
destroyer concept called the DD(X). The Navy now expects to field 24
DD(X) destroyers between 2011 and 2023. A sufficient number of DD(X)
destroyers to help close the NSFS gap will not be available until 2018.
We reported that the ship’s construction plan was risky because some
technologies are unproven and the design is not yet stable.
DOD provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated in our
letter where appropriate.

[Gun Grape]

Liquid propellants.

Short answer "They blow up" have not figured out how to create a controlled burn much less a reproducible, consistant controlled burn.

Been working on the problem since the 1940s.

Does this answer your question?

If not,
Do you have a basic understanding of how powder works in a combustion chamber?
The differences of burn rates, ect of flake, solid pellet, perforated pellet and multiperforated pellet powder?

And what makes different powders better for different missions?

Not trying to be condescending, just don't want to bore you and others with information that may be unnecessary. Ie, Trying to establish the baseline of knowledge