USS New Jersey in Lebanon Channeling Thread

[Shipwreck]

(Emphasis added) :

Disaster in Lebanon: US and French Operations in 1983
By Tom Cooper & Eric L Palmer
Sep 26, 2003, 20:37

In reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, in June 1982, several countries brought a decision to deploy their troops in the country in order to separate the combatants and attempt to establish peace and order. According to this decision, from 11 August 1982, US, French, and Italian units started arriving in Beirut, establishing the basis for what later became known as the “Multi-National Force” (MNF). The first to arrive were French paras of the Foreign Legion, flown in directly from Corsica aboard Transall transport aircraft of the ET-64 already on 19 August. Six days later the first US Marines arrived, supported by the French carrier Foch (R-99), and its Super Etendards and Crusaders.

The French naval fighters were very soon to be deployed in combat: in reaction to some Syrian troop movements, considered threatening for the MNF troops, on 20 August 1982 eight Super Etendards bombed Syrian positions near Ein Dara and Dahra el-Baidar. The strike was considered as a “signal” to the Syrians, and its results were consequently only marginal.

The situation subsequently quietened, and remained stabile until April 1983. However, the appearance of MNF troops was considered an interference of Western powers by too many parties involved in the war in Lebanon, and consequently the were soon to be confronted with immense problems. The Israelis saw the Western intervention as support for their efforts and interests; the Muslims – and especially the Lebanese Shi’a – believed the Americans and other troops were there to support and reinforce the Christians and protect the Israelis; and the Christians believed that the MNF-troops would help them increase their influence in the country. Any hopes and uncertainties in this complex situation were eventually destroyed by the visit of Lebanese President Gemael in Washington: soon after the first shipments of arms for the Christian Phalanga started arriving, and the US special forces began training the reformed units of the Lebanese Army on them.

Such a decision instantly changed the status of the MNF in Lebanon: within only a few days the foreign troops became dangerous opponents. The USA then poured even more il in fire then it permitted the Israelis to patrol areas under their control, and far outside the part of southern Lebanon held by the Israeli troops. The Israelis tended to attack any suspicious target without much investigation or any warnings, and this caused a number of civilian deaths. Consequently, the MNF-troops were finally considered enemy not only by the Syrians, but also by the Shi’a and all the other Muslim fractions in Lebanon.

Until today there are frequently discussions about what exactly were the MNF-troops looking for in Lebanon: the situation in the country at the time was such that there was no possibility of establishing a durable peace, and the Americans, French, and the Italian could not but end being entangled into serious arguments with most of the involved parties – including the Israelis. On 2 February 1983, for example, a column of Israeli tanks attempted to enter the US compound around the Beirut IAP. The Israelis were so stubborn in their insistence to enter the area that a captain of the US Marines had to climb to the leading Merkava and threaten the commander to turn around at a gun-point. When the Israeli column refused to pull away from the USMC finally deployed several AH-1T Cobra helicopters, equipped with TOW-anti-tank missiles, forcing them to do so under a threat of attack. This incident could not change anything in the way the Muslims regarded the presence of the MNF-troops as a threat to their positions. Quite on the contrary, as soon as the US troops started mounting joint patrols with the Lebanese army, in March and April 1983, their bases came under attacks by the Shi’ia and the Syrians. Then the situation escalated.

On 14 July 1983 the artillery of the Druze Militia opened fire on US Marines compound at Beirut IAP, and subsequently the Druze fighters captured several hills overlooking the whole US bridgehead in the area. From there they were in a perfect situation to guide artillery fire against the Americans, and on 28 August 1983 two Marines were killed in one such attack. In response the US administration authorised the commanders in situ to react and retaliate, and now everybody started fighting: the Druze attacked the Lebanese Army positions near the Beirut IAP, and captured them, obtaining a basis from which a direct attack against the US Marine compound was possible. The US Marines countered the artillery fire, and then also called the battleship USS New Jersey (BB-62) for support, which arrived into that part of the Mediterranean Sea straight from a deployment in the Central America. Taking a position directly off the coast, the USS New Jersey was able to bombard targets over a range of 40km with its main artillery calibre 406mm.

Nevertheless, on 29 August the US Marine compound came under a new attack, and this time the Americans were finally forced to deploy several AH-1T Cobras of the HMM-169 into a counterattack.

The Syrians were all the time monitoring the situation – mainly with the help of their MiG-25RB reconnaissance fighters, which were frequently detected while passing high over Beirut. The MNF troops had no fighters deployed in direct support, and the Lebanese Air Force was everything but operational. Consequently, only the Israelis were able to attempt to disturb these overflights, but their attempts proved fruitless, despite the deployment of at least two MIM-23B I-HAWK SAM-sites in southern Lebanon.

Consequently, the USN began concentrating larger ships off the Lebanese coast, moving the carrier USS Eisenhower (CVN-69) from a station off Libya to a new station east of Cyprus, named “Bagel”. The carrier arrived accompanied with the helicopter carrier USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2), which had the troops of the 24th MEU aboard.

While the Israelis pulled their troops behind the Awali river on 4 September 1983, additional US, French and Italian troops arrived in Lebanon, and then also a British contingent (BRITFORLEB) was deployed near Beirut as well. The BRITFORLEB was initially supported by several Hercules C.1 transports and a detachment of No. 56 Squadron Phantoms, based at RAF Akrotiri, on Cyprus, but later also Buccaneer S.2Bs of the No.12 and No. 208 Squadrons were added, as well as – on 7 September 1983 – three Chinook C.1 heavy helicopters, which established a permanent air bridge between Akrotiri and Beirut.

The Buccaneers announced themselves in the skies over Beirut on 11 September by a spectacular power-projection show flown very low over the city. Because of the different threats in the area the aircraft were armed with AIM-9B Sidewinders and 454kg bombs, but also ALQ-109/W-10 ECM-pods, they did a power-projection show low over the city. Similar actions were repeated in the several following days as well, even if it is questionable if they impressed any of the warring parties in Lebanon. Nevertheless, the French followed the suit, starting regular overflights of the area by their Super Etendards and Crusaders from the newly-arrived carrier Clemenceau, and finally Italy felt compelled to deploy six F-104S Starfighters at RAF Akrotiri; it remains unknown, however, if these ever flew any patrols over Lebanon.

Meanwhile, the Americans did their best in attempts to bring the regular Lebanese Army back into operations. In the frame of such activities they also reactivated the Lebanese Air Force (FAL), which was laying inactive for most of the time since 1974. With British assistance three old Hunter F.Mk.70s were made airworthy and in September 1983 they flew their first combat operations. On 15 September the three Lebanese Hunters – supported by French Super Etendards – attacked Druze positions in the Shouf Mountains. On the following day, however, the Syrians reacted by a powerful artillery bombardment of MNF positions around Beirut and the Rayak airfield, which was the main air base of the FAL. With their airfield being put out of commission, the FAL Hunters were forced to operate from an auxiliary base on the road near Biblos in the following days.

Eventually, however, their pilots were to discover that the skies over Lebanon were heavily defended: every serious militia in the area – and especially the Syrian Army – was equipped with a large number of heavy automatic weapons and MANPADs, and they were frequently shifting them from one neuralgic position to the other, creating areas that were extremely dangerous for any kind of aircraft. When the FAL Hunters attempted to attack Druze positions for the next time, on 17 September 1983, they were surprised by a truly “hot welcome”: one was shot down and the pilot barely managed to eject himself into the sea, from where he was picked by a USN SH-3D helicopter. The second Hunter was heavily damaged and made a force landing back in Biblos, while the third did not even attempt to return to the base but flew straight to Akrotiri, the pilot eventually requesting political asylum there. Only two days later also a British Buldon SRS-126 light observation aircraft was shot down by Syrian ZSU-23-4 Shilka flaks.

With their Legionaries under heavy pressure on the ground, the French were the first to feel forced to counterattack again. On 19 September eight Super Etendards, escorted by eight Crusaders, attacked the Druze artillery positions near Dhour el-Choueir, Dahr El and a Dara with 454kg bombs and unguided rockets calibre 68mm. A single Etendard IVP was sent to make post-strike photographs as well, but one of the two Crusaders escorting it was heavily hit by flak and the pilot made a barrier landing aboard the Clemanceau.

Meanwhile, the Americans continued their efforts to reinforce the Lebanese Army, supplying it even with a number of M-48 Patton MBTs, and supporting its operations by heavy artillery, in turn making the Lebanese Muslims – and their Iranian and Syrian supporters – even more nervous. Nevertheless, it still came as a terrible surprise when the MNF-troops were hit by a new form of warfare: on 23 October 1983 a suicide-bomber drove a truck filled with explosives into the headquarters of the US Marine compound in Beirut and detonated his murderous load. The terrible explosion completely obliterated the building, killing 241 US troops in the process. Only few seconds later a similar vehicle hit the Headquarters of the French troops in Beirut, killing 58. The MNF troops did not properly recover from these blows, when in another similar assault against an Israeli security post in Tyre, on 4 November 1983, 23 Israeli troops were killed as well.

The USA seems not to have had a clear idea how and against who to react at the time, but the French felt it was time for another air raid against one of Druze or Syrian positions. On 17 November 1983 ten Super Etendards bombarded carefully selected bases of the Shi’ia Militia and the Iranians in the Balbek, while four hit the main base of the Jihad-al-Islami – the organization that took the responsibility for bombings of US and French headquarters – with napalm bombs. The French fighter-pilots were confronted by a considerable amount of flak and several SA-7s and their attack was not especially precise, most of their bombs landing in the nearby vineyards. The Shi’ia losses were nevertheless heavy. In the following days the USN reinforced its units off Lebanon, by deploying the carrier USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) and her combat group to the Bagel Station.

In the meantime the Israelis continued their withdrawal from Lebanon, in accordance with agreements reached in June and July 1982. But, as they moved out, the Syrians moved in to take their positions, bringing with them new and more powerful weapons. Already in the spring of 1983 the first SA-5 SAM-battery, reportedly manned entirely by between 500 and 600 Soviet troops – was deployed near Dmeyr, some 35km northeast of Damascus. Only a month later another was established in Shamshar, south of Homs. Although stationed within Syria, these two batteries covered the whole Lebanese airspace, and were also connected with Soviet warships shadowing the US 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. Both SA-5 sites were soon put under the direct Syrian control, and although the Soviets attempted to prevent Syrians from using them to attack Israeli, US, French, and British aircraft, in order to keep their wartime-codes secret, the Syrian Air Defence command (SyAAF/ADC) decided to use them at first opportunity.

The appearance of the SA-5s forced the IDF/AF and the USN to keep their E-2Cs, as well as Israeli Boeing 707s and Mohawk ELINT-reconnaissance aircraft away from the area, and this enabled the Syrians to rush additional units equipped with SA-3s, SA-6s, SA-8s, and SA-9s – all defended by numerous ZSU-23-4s, SA-7s and the new SA-14s – into Lebanon. Most of these assets were deployed along the Beirut-Damascus highway, in turn defending the main supply route for Syrian troops in the country: the SyAAF/ADC thus re-established the control of the Lebanese skies it lost in June 1982.

Such a threat could of course not be tolerated by the Israelis, then these considered their ability to strike terrorist targets in Lebanon at free as ultimately important. Consequently, the IDF/AF reacted with a series of strikes against different elements of the SyAAF/ADC and other Syrian positions. The Americans were also interested in monitoring this development, and after the 6th Fleet was reinforced by the second carrier – USS Independence (CV-62), which took part in the intervention on Grenada just a few weeks before – from early November the F-14A Tomcats equipped with TARPS-recce containers were sent into reconnaissance over Lebanon. Due to US aircraft using ECM-systems unknown to the Syrians, the Tomcats initially operated without any disturbance. However, in turn they were considered a much higher threat as well. On 10 November 1983 a French Etendard IVP only barely escaped from being hit by a SA-7 while operating over the Druze positions in Bourj el-Barajneh. On the same afternoon also two F-14As of the VF-143 were fired at while underway over Beirut.

In an interview published in the book “Intruder”, by Lou Drendel (Squadron/Signal Publications, 1991), an anonymous A-6E bombardier-navigator described the situation at the time:

We arrived in late October 1983. This turned out to be a seven and a half month cruise. We shared the duty initially with USS Eisenhower and then with USS Independence. The duty consisted of flying and standing 5, 10, or 15 minute alerts (alert aircraft are usually fighter, attack and tanker assets manned on the flight deck and situated so that they can launch on very short notice when needed), and we usually alternated on a daily basis with Independence. On day on alert, one day flying.

The flying for us consisted primarily of tankers for the F-14 and anti-surface warfare (ASUW) missions, in which we protected the gun line off of Lebanon. We had a bunch of small boys (destroyers and frigates) as well as the USS New Jersey, which would come in close to the beach and fire their guns at targets inland in support of the Marines….

We also flew ground support missions for the Marines at Beirut International Airport (BIA) or at the American Embassy. The Marines had FACs at both locations and they would call out possible targets. We were allowed to fly right up to the beach, but not over it, so the Rageheads knew of our presence. We generally carried laser-guided bombs and Rockeye cluster bombs for these missions, and there was always an A-6 airborne with live ordnance during this period. The alert airplanes could provide follow-up within minutes. We also patrolled between the island of Cyprus and the Lebanon coast to keep track of several Soviet ships. If they cam south from Syria, the Admiral wanted to know about it as soon as possible.

The Flight into Disaster

The situation reached the boiling point with an IDF/AF strike against the Syrian SAM-sites in Balbek, on 16 November, which resulted in quite some casualties on the Syrian side, but also saw one of Israeli Kfirs being shot down over Bhamdoun. The pilot ejected safely and fell directly into the British positions near Beirut. The Israelis came back on 3 December, striking Syrian SAMs with a larger group of F-4E Phantom IIs and Kfirs, which delivered a very precise attack this time. This happened in the same moment two F-14As of the VF-32 were in the area on a reconnaissance mission, and therefore it was actually no surprise when the Syrians fired more than ten different SAMs against the Tomcats. The Tomcats, one of them equipped with a TARPS-container, were underway at 35.000ft and over 960km/h, and could thus barely be hit from the ground. But, their crews noticed several SA-7s fired at them, and they were eventually forced to abort their mission. The U. S. Navy, however, saw this as another provocation: having finally a clear target at which it could hit back, it was clear that an answer was about to be delivered.

On the same evening, Rear Admiral Jerry Tuttle, the commander of the Task Force 60 – which now included two carriers, the USS Independence and USS J.F. Kennedy, as the USS Eisenhower was ordered back to the USA) – was given the order to prepare a retaliation strike. However, the issue of this operation almost immediately became a matter of several controversies. Tuttle, of course, has left the planning to the teams of the units embarked aboard the two carriers, foremost Cdr. John J Mazach of the CVW-3, aboard USS Kennedy, and Cdr. Ed "Honiak" Andrews of the CVW-6, aboard USS Independence, and the whole following night these have worked very hard in order to properly plan the action and prepare their aircraft.

On the early morning of 4 December 1983, however, a new order arrived from Washington, which included very specific instructions about the targets that were to be attacked, weapons to be used, as well as the time-point of the strike: instead of attacking at 1100 AM, the USN fighters were ordered to hit already at 0545AM, and to fly in at a level of 6.000m instead at a low altitude! It remains unclear who was the person that issued these orders, but the fact is that this had to lead straight into a disaster.

The instructions from Washington could not be ignored by R.Adm. Tuttle and his officers: Tuttle had excellent reputation within the USN, for being a perfectionist and completing immense amounts of work within the shortest period of time. He was not ready to permit anything to went wrong with the operation, but he had to obey his orders. The problem was that they were received barely 30 minutes before the point at which the planes had to start in order to reach their targets by 0545AM. The problem was also that all the aircraft were already armed: Mazach and Andrews planned Kennedy to launch eight A-7s, each armed with 12 Mk.83s, and Independence to add four aircraft armed with Mk.7 Rockeye CBUs, filled with APAM (anti-personnel/anti-material) bomblets), and the whole package to be supported by at least two EA-6Bs and several F-14As. This had to be changed on a short notice, however, and the aircraft re-armed, as well as additional aircraft armed for the mission - as per order from Washington. The following chaos on the decks of USS Independence and USS Kennedy was unimaginable: pilots had to be awakened several hours earlier than planned, and then brought to their aircraft almost without any briefing: Mazach was only able to give them a short briefing of barely five minutes. The “red-shirts” - weapons specialists that care about the armanent of the aircraft - were rushing new trolleys with bombs from the ammunition depots deep inside the ships, and moving from one plane to the other, removing already prepared weapons and attempting to mount new ones. They had not had the slightest chance to properly arm the aircraft, however, as there was obviously not enough time. The case of Lt.Cdr. Tom Corey is known, who - after noticing that his aircraft was not loaded, but saw a stack of Mk.83s parked on their trolley near the ship's bridge - simply ordered few "red shirts" to hang a TER with three of the bombs under his aircraft! Eventually, several pilots had to start into the attack armed only with two – instead of a full complement of 12 or 16 bombs: in fact, only one aircraft, an A-6E of the VA-85, took-off carrying the assigned bomb-load!

An additional problem was that the re-scheduling of the strike made it impossible for support aircraft to start as first in order to reach their assigned positions in time. Quite on the contrary, in a rush to bring the planes over the target in time the USS Independence had first to catapult 12 A-7Es of the VA-15 ("Valions") and VA-87 ("Goldern Warriors"), and then the same ship and USS Kennedy launched also 16 A-6E TRAM Intruders (from VA-75 "Sunday Punchers" and VA-85 "Black Falcons" aboard Kennedy, as well as VA-176 "Thunderbolts" from Independence) in a fast sequel. Three Intruders were from VA-75 and seven from VA-85, the remaining six from VA-176.

Only then could a single E-2C Hawkeye, two EA-6B Prowlers and two F-14A Tomcats be prepared for their missions. The two Tomcats of the VF-31 eventually managed to catch-up with strike planes, but the Hawkeye was late in reaching its position and establishing a good control of the Lebanese skies, while the two Prowlers were all the time flying behind the attack formations, attempting to cover them against threats as these appeared – and thus reacting to threats, instead of preventing them from becoming some. There was not the slightest chance of this attack to be properly organized.

High over the Task Force 60, the ten A-6s from Kennedy joined into a formation of six A-6s and 12 A-7s from Independence. Cdr. J. J. Mazach from USS Independence led the Intruders, as "Green 01", his target being Syrian artillery and ammunition depots near Falouga and Hamman, some 16km north of Beirut-Damascus highway. Corsairs were led by Cdr. Andrews.

Over the coast the first sign of the trouble became apparent, as the formation was hit by a volley of Syrian SAMs. Within seconds the first US aircraft - one flying directly behind Cdr. Andrews, who flew as "Red 01" - was hit:

- May Day! May Day! Here Three-Oh-Five. I'm moving out over the sea! Follow me. Speed 250 knots!

The controller aboard the E-2C of the VAW-122 ("Steeljaws") concluded, simultaneously announcing that a SAR helicopter is underway:

- Steel Jaw, Red Two is down. Three-oh-Four is the lead. Primo is underway. Out.

The downed aircraft was the A-7E "AE305" of the VA-15. Covered by his wingman the pilot ejected safely over the sea and was shortly after picked up by USN helicopters.

All the other SAMs missed, but in order to evade the A-6s and A-7s had to manoeuvre very hard and in the consequence the formation fell apart, with every plane attacking alone instead operating in mutual support – and this by day!

Once over Hamm, the Intruders reached their initial point and – one by one – dived towards their targets. Mid through the attack there was a radio call:

- Fireball! Fireball!

Cdr. Mazach then called Cdr. Jim Glover, Commander of VA-75, who flew as "Ace Lead":

- Green Lead, here Red Oh-One. I believe Five-Oh-Two went down!

But, the A-6E AC502, flown by "Blue Ribbon" Papst and "Jabbo" Jablonski, was not shot down: it was flying directly behind Mazach and could not respond because their radio was down. Papst accelerated slightly in order to overtake the lead Intruder and show himself to Mazach. Only then did Lt. Paul Bernard report that the position of the AC556 was empty.

Indeed, this Intruder from VA-85 was hit by an SA-7 or SA-9 missile into the engine nozzle right after dropping its bomb-load, while still in a dive through 1.800ft. The rear fuselage and one wing were immediately afire, and then the starboard engine exploded. The pilot, Lt. Mark "Doppler" Lange, did his best to keep the aircraft airborne and enable his BN, Lt. Bobby Goodman, to eject safely. After almost colliding with the ground the aircraft was seen to pull up into the sky for the last time - and then it crashed on a 245m high hill, directly above a village surrounded by Syrian AAA-positions. Lt. Lange ejected in the final moment, but his parachute failed to properly deploy by the time he hit the ground: his left leg was so severely injured, Lange died shortly after in the hands of several Syrian troops and Lebanese civilians. Goodman broke three ribbs and injured the shoulder and a knee during the landing, but was otherwise OK. He was captured by the Syrians immediately afterwards, and taken to Damascus.

Meanwhile, the Corsairs passed a Syrian SA-6 site near Jebel al-Knaisse and Mgite, some 30km from the Lebanese capital, and then dived towards their target. Once free of the bomb-load (his Corsair was originally armed with Mk.7 Rockeye CBUs and AIM-9 Sidewinders), Cdr. Andrews decided to start a search operation for the crew of the downed Intruder. The chance to find them and then also mount a successful recovery was minimal, but there was a crew lost in the middle of an area held by the Syrians, and Andrews could not just run away. Upon reaching the area where the A-6E came down he did several circles until the Syrian flaks opened fire: Andrews attacked the positions he could make out with 20mm canon-fire, but during his last pass his aircraft received a direct hit from a SA-7. The engine was destroyed but Cdr. Andrew nevertheless managed to return over the sea near Beirut, where he safely ejected. The rest of the formation joined the leader and wached as he fell into the sea under the parachute: immediately, two SAR helicopters were dispatched towards the area, but Andrews was eventually fished out of the sea by a local fisherman, and then handed over to the US Marines.

In the narrative from the book mentioned above, the anonymous A-6 BN from VA-85 that participated in this strike described it as follows:

A-6s and A-7s from the USS Kennedy and USS Independence flew this mission in two waves. CAG Andrews, from Independence, was the first aircraft over the beach. He was flying an A-7 and he was shot down. VA-85 lost an A-6. The A-6 pilot, Lt. Mark Lange, was killed and the BN, Lt Bobby Goodman, wound up a prisoner, although he was later released. The side number of their aircraft was 556.

This strike was a real quick reaction deal. We pulled out of Haifa, Israel, on 2 December and flew that afternoon. The next morning I was awakened at about 0400. One of my duties in the squadron was that of schedule officer, so when they needed crews I was the first one notified.

(Note: due to the early morning local time when the strike was flown, it was still 3 December 1983 in the USA).

I was told to get ten crews up and ready. We were given about five minutes to plan, five minutes to brief and ten minutes to get to our aircraft. The ordnance-men were busy changing the loads for our mission. We were given a time on target (TPT) of approximately 0800 and although the Admiral had asked for an extension, it was denied somewhere up the chain of command….

We counted a dozen surface-to-air missiles from our cockpit (probably infrared or heat seeking missiles) We were at high altitude which limited the A-6 infrared signature so the missiles didn’t have much to lock on to. Every Raghead over there was probably issued one of these things and they filled the sky with them (shoulder-launched SA-7s). There was a lot of artillery and they were obviously expecting us to come in low, because we overflew all of it, with the shells bursting several thousand feet below us. We were the last division over the beach, and the A-6 that was shot down was number three in our three plane division, so it was the last aircraft of the entire strike group to ingress. I likened the situation to following someone who has hit a hornet’s nest. By the time you get there, the hornets are really pissed! My pilot’s comment when we crossed the beach, outbound, sait it all, “Now I know how a dove feels on opening day of hunting season!”

We got a new airplane flown over from MATWING in Virginia Beach to replace the one we lost, so we gave it the side number 556…. My pilot and I jumped into that airplane on 11 January (1984) for a “routine” tanker mission….
The plane was eventually lost due to the so-called “Cold cat”, when the catapult failed, but the aircraft was already released and moving across the deck. With the deck being already slippery due to much previous use, the aircraft fell into the sea, the crew ejecting just milliseconds before it hit the surface. Eventually they both survived uninjured, both landing back on the deck of the carrier. The BN concluded:

It was absolutely amazing that we ejected in the middle of the sea and neither one of us got our feet wet! My injuries were limited to a bruised left arm. I think my bruises came from the centre canopy brace on my way out of the aircraft. I was able to fly the next day, but my pilot was down for about three weeks recovering from his bruises. After we lost our second A-6 with the side number 556, our skipper said, “There will be no more 556s in this squadron!”

The USN never published the official documents about this attack, so it remains problematic to assess it properly or find out the exact reason behind the order that led to this catastrophe. In the book mentioned above, the anonymous USN A-6 pilot summarized:

Conducting an “Alpha Strike” resulted in relearning a lot of the lessons from Vietnam… on short notice.

The beneficial fall-out of the mistakes made on this mission was the clockwork success of the mission carried out against Libya an few years later.

According to Israeli reports the strikes were not much off the target, and several artillery and radar positions that threatened the US Marines in Beirut were hit. The Syrians acknowledged a loss of at least three soldiers killed and several injured. Eventually, Adm. Turttle, Cdr. Mazach and Cdr. Andrews all have sharply protested against the orders from Washington: certainly the USN fighters were never again sent into an attack with similar orders – and especially no politician from Washington has ever ordered them again to enter the target area at a level of 6.000m – at least not without a substantial support from aircraft for electronic countermeasures. The USN pilots definitely draw important experiences from this disaster: in the following years the “Strike” Naval Fighter Weapons School was organized, essentially similar to the “Top Gun” for interceptor-pilots but with stress on air-to-ground operations, and the training of USN pilots in total became much more realistic.

It was, however, the unpleasant situation caused by the capture of the bombardier from the downed Intruder that caught the public attention in the following weeks, then this was not only a shame for the USN, but also an extremely negative development for the US position in Lebanon.

In the aftermath of this failure the US operations in Lebanon were much limited. The USS New Jersey continued supporting the Marines with her heavy artillery, repeatedly targeting Syrian and Druze positions around Beirut. But, the fate of the MNF was already sealed, and by February 1984 the US, French, Italian, and British troops were forced to withdraw from Lebanon, leaving the country in the chaos of its civil war. Even before their pull out, in January 1984, the Lebanese Army was heavily defeated by the Druze and Shi’ia militias, which marched down from Shouf Mountains into Beirut. The Christian Falanga fell apart and most of its fighters fled to join the Israeli-supported South-Lebanse Army (SLA), led by Maj. Haddad.

© Copyright 2002-3 by ACIG.org

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(Emphasis added) :

'83 Strike on Lebanon: Hard Lessons for U.S.
By BERNARD E. TRAINOR, SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES
Published: August 6, 1989

The only time the United States sent its bombers over Lebanon, as President Bush was reportedly prepared to do again this week, the mission ended in a fiasco, with two planes shot down and one damaged, one pilot killed and and one crewman captured, and little to show for the effort.

The memory of that December 1983 raid, which came only six weeks after 241 American servicemen were killed in the bombing of their barracks in Beirut, remains vivid among senior officers in the Pentagon as they await the outcome of diplomatic efforts to end the current hostage crisis.

The ill-fated Navy air attack on Dec. 4, 1983, was against Syrian anti-aircraft guns located around the village of Hammana, east of Beirut. It was launched in retaliation for Syrian anti-aircraft fire the day before against an American reconnaissance plane supporting the Marine peacekeeping force.

Planning for the attack was marked by confusion along the chain of command. When President Reagan ordered retaliation, one of the Navy aircraft carriers, the Kennedy, was about to leave for the Suez Canal and had already stored its bombs. The aircraft of the other carrier, the Independence, were armed with heavy bombs in anticipation of orders to attack a different target. Those bombs had to be replaced with a type more suitable for use against anti-aircraft emplacements.

Then, for reasons that remain obscure, the time of the attack was moved from 11 A.M. to 6:30 A.M., over the objections of the commanding admiral. This did not leave enough time to rearm all of the 28 aircraft taking part in the strike, and the formation became ragged as stragglers sought to catch up with those already in the air. That eliminated surprise, and the Syrian gunners were waiting.

The early launch forced the pilots to attack with the rising sun directly in their eyes. Then, a morning ground haze obscured the targets they were sent to destroy and the pilots had to fly low into the intense fire of the anti-aircraft guns in an attempt to spot the targets.

Inexplicably, the attacking squadrons also massed their planes for the attack - a tactic that made them further vulnerable to ground fire and that had been discredited years before in the Vietnam War. Two planes were shot down, with the pilot of one of the aircraft, a single-seat A-7 attack plane, parachuting into the Mediterranean Sea, where he was rescued. The pilot of the other plane, a two-seat A-6, was killed, and his navigator, Lieut. Robert O. Goodman Jr., was captured. He stayed in a Syrian prison for a month, until the Rev. Jesse Jackson went to Damascus and obtained his release.

A few Syrian guns were destroyed, but the intensity of the Syrian fire forced many of the planes to unload their bombs away from the targeted positions.

Accomplishments vs. Losses

The Pentagon declared that the raid was a success, but its accomplishments were disproportionate to the American losses.

Six weeks earlier, an air raid planned against an Iranian Revolutionary Guard barracks in Baalbek in Lebanon's Bekaa region was never carried out because of indecision by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger and some of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The White House was eager to retaliate for the Marine barracks bombing, but the top Pentagon officials worried and debated about the uncertain consequences of the attack.

The French ultimately conducted an air strike against Baalbek in retaliation for an attack against their peacekeeping forces on the same day as the Marine barracks bombing. This allowed the United States to shelve its own plans. The French suffered no losses but did only minor damage to the barracks.

The Baalbek barracks is said to still house the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. It is also still on the list of prime targets for the American military forces in the event that they are ordered to make a retaliatory strike against an Iranian target.

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[Shipwreck]

Originally Posted by Ucar

Dear Shipwreck

I have read both the Iowa thread and this thread. Can you summarize the primary points of discussion (pros and cons if possible) as I am completely lost after reading everything over the last weeks. Many thanks.

Ucar Bey,

The intention here is to show, using solely information publicly available, that :

1. On a strategic level, the decision to deploy USS New Jersey off the coasts of Lebanon in 1983-84 was based on wishful thinking rather than military considerations (e.g. see posts #10, #11 and #12).

2. The airstrike of 4 December 1983, where 2 aircrafts were lost, was sabotaged and the apparent failure of this airstrike was what cleared the way for USS New Jersey to use her 16-inch guns (e.g. see posts #31 and #32).

3. The shooting of USS New Jersey in Lebanon was lacklustre, suffering (among other things things) from excessive dispersion (e.g. see posts #2, #3, #4, #5, #6, #7, #8, #9, #13, #16).

4. The reasons commonly given for this poor gunnery performance (barrel wear, propellant inconsistency, lack of precise target location, lack of spotting, use of different datums) are either inaccurate or don't tell the whole story (e.g. see posts #2, #5, #15, #23, #24).

5. The poor gunnery performance of USS New Jersey can essentially be traced back to human factors.

6. This poor gunnery performance demonstrates that mastering battleship gunnery is a non-trivial issue and involves a painstaking learning curve.

Most of my archives have been repriated to CONUS in December, so it will be another 2 weeks or so before I can bring some crucial documents / testimonies in the discussion.

On a sidenote, I have checked the DOD website yesterday and noticed that no FOIA request was filled so far for the GAO study conducted in 1984/85 to review "the Capability and Effectiveness of USS New Jersey" in Lebanon (see post #18).

[Shipwreck]

(Emphasis added) :

The Silent Witness
by Chief Warrant Officer Three (Retired) Thomas Curran
Field Artillery, August 1989

At the entrance to I-See-O Hall, home of the Target Acquisition Department, part of the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, there is an impressive collection of mementos. They mark some important event or accomplishment that involved the Department's members. The entrance has trophies that honor athletes and plaques that recognize outstanding instruction. There are gifts from foreign students that praise the various divisions that taught them. But in one corner of this hallway is a guidon of the Field Artillery School Target Acquisition Battery (FASTAB) from 1983. It stands as a reminder of Field Artillerymen who fell in combat.

Beirut

On 28 July 1983, the FASTAB guidon was folded and packed along with other equipment the Battery would need in Beirut, Lebanon. There was an air of excitement as each soldier of the advance party realized he would be putting into practice the skills he had been teaching. Someone once said, "Those who can't do, teach." These soldiers were about to prove that statement wrong.

On 4 August 1983 when the main body of the Battery arrived in Beirut, the guidon was already flying over the operations area. The position and azimuth determining system (PADS) section had surveyed two locations for AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder weapon-locating radars emplaced on the north and south boundaries of the Beirut International Airport.

The full complement of 33 soldiers was ready to support the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit, Detachment Q, and the Multinational Peacekeeping Force. That support consisted of locating hostile rocket, artillery and mortar positions and sending those locations to the Marine Artillery for counterfire.

The FASTAB Team

From 4 August to 20 November 1983, the FASTAB guidon was a silent witness to an impressive display of military interoperability. By using the Firefinder's speed, accuracy and ability to interface directly with the counterfire units, the Battery located more than 1,000 targets per day and forwarded them to the target center at the Marine Barracks. Four of the FASTAB members lived at the barracks to support the Marines.

Chief Warrant Officer Three Richard C. Ortiz : He lived at the barracks and was the only Marine member of FASTAB, which made him one of the most valuable members of the unit. With his technical expertise in Firefinder and his understanding of the Marine way of doing things, the Battery depended on him to mold the two services into one organization.

Chief Ortiz was 37 years old, born and raised in New York City, a combat Marine in Vietnam and an 18-year veteran of the Corps. As a target processing officer in the targeting center, he displayed all the best traits of a technically and tactically displayed all the best traits of a technically and tactically proficient leader. Chief Ortiz not only recommended the most opportune targets to shoot counterfire missions against, but he also meticulously evaluated all other targets for intelligence. With the skill of a tactician and the experience of a technician, CWO Ortiz kept the situation map in perfect order.

Sergeant First Class James G. Yarber :

Designated FASTAB's acting First Sergeant, he would have taken offense at the term "acting." He was the first sergeant. At 37, he was a veteran of three to tours in Vietnam and 19 years in the Army. He took great pride in being an NCO and could blend just the right amount of discipline and compassion when dealing with his soldiers.

As the first sergeant, he took the time to ensure his soldiers got what they needed. From getting extra rations to finding sturdy building materials to harden the radar positions, Sergeant First Class Yarber could be counted on to produce. As an expert radar operator, he would sit in for a crew member on his daily inspections of the two sites. Always setting the example, he won the respect and admiration of the soldiers he led.

Specialist Fifth Class Daniel S. Kluck :

At 27, he was the senior direct support radar repairman (MOS 26BX5) for FASTAB. His job required him to stay close to the radar and work with the operators and organizational repairmen. A welcome addition to the radar crew, he gave the others a sense of security that the system wouldn't develop problems while he was there, - contractor engineers often asked his opinion on troubleshooting techniques. Specialist Fifth Class Kluck often visited Navy technicians at the Marine barracks to "talk shop" or borrow test equipement.

Specialist Fourth Class Marcus E. Coleman :

He arrived with the FASTAB as a radio operator. In only a few days, he proved he was a target processing expert. At 19, he was the youngest member of the unit, having been in the Army for less than a year.

A quiet person coming from a large family of nine brothers and sisters, he found it easy to live in close quarters. And because he volunteered to work in the target center during his off-duty hours, he lived in the Marine barracks.

The Silent Vigil

On the morning of 23 October 1983, the FASTAB guidon witnessed a truck loaded with explosives speed into the Marine Headquarters compound. Driven by a suicidal terrorist, the truck rammed into the barracks and exploded, reducing the building to fire and rubble. The guidon maintained its vigil of the frantic activities to free the wounded and locate the dead from the rubble that once was the living and working area for hundreds of people. It then flew silently as America mourned her servicemen.

On 20 November 1983, the remained of the FASTAB folded and packed the guidon away with other equipement for the trip back to Fort Sill. The guidon was being "relieved" by one of its counterparts, the guidon of the Army Target Acquisition Battery (ARTAB).

A Constant Reminder

Today, the FASTAB guidon's history is noted by a brass plaque that lists the names of the soldiers who met the challenge and set the standard. In its quiet corner, it honors these fine men who lost their lives.

The guidon reminds us of all it saw, — the greatest of sacrifices given by the best we had — all Field Artillerymen, willing and able.

Link

[Shipwreck]

FM 6-121, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for FIELD ARTILLERY TARGET ACQUISITION,

CHAPTER 2 : FIELD ARTILLERY TARGET ACQUISITION
ORGANIZATIONS

(emphasis added)

AN/TPQ-36 WEAPONS LOCATING RADAR SECTION

The AN/TPQ-36 weapons-locating radar section has a crew of eight. (See the table below.) Its primary mission is to locate enemy mortar, artillery, and rocket firing positions. This radar is optimized to detect high-angle indirect fire. It is equally capable of developing accurate grid locations of indirect fire units using low-angle fire. As a secondary mission, the friendly fire mode can be used to observe rounds and perform high-burst, datum-plane, or impact-predict registrations. The fire direction center can use the impact-predict data provided by the radar in friendly fire mode to conduct adjust-fire missions.

Use of the radar in the friendly fire mode may be required when no registration data are available, no observer is available, and the mission dictates that the target is a high-payoff target and must be destroyed. The FDC must compute the adjustments. The secondary mission is performed only when absolutely necessary. Radiation time should be reserved for the primary mission. Tactical and on-order missions will be assigned to the radar by the supported unit. On-order missions must facilitate future operations.

[Shipwreck]

(Free Preview)

Naval Gunfire Support: An Army Role in a New World Order
Authors: Zachary P. Hubbard; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
(Thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE)

This study investigates the Army's role in naval gunfire support, in light of the current force reductions and changing military missions. The discussion focuses upon naval gunfire training and pre-deployment planning and coordination for naval gunfire support of contingency operations. During the initial stages of a contingency operation, the Army relies upon other services for fire support until sufficient Army field artillery and aviation attack assets are available. Fixed-wing air support and naval gunfire provide this initial support. Naval gunfire for the Army was not coordinated during pre- deployment planning for operations Urgent Fury Just Cause, or Desert Shield. This study explains the Army's dependence upon the Marine Corps for the planning and coordination of naval gunfire support. It promotes methods to decrease this dependence by improving the field artillery community's naval gunfire training and awareness. The analysis addresses institutional...

Link

ABSTRACT :

Pages 25-26 : In a show of rare cooperation between the Army and the Navy, Lehman describes the great success the New Jersey enjoyed destroying eight Syrian artillery batteries while under the direction of an Army target acquisition battery radar.(11)

footnote (11) : John F. Lehman Jr., Command of the Seas, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), page 334.

[Shipwreck]

Quite sadly , I haven't been able to get hold of my (signed and inscribed) copy of Lehman's "Command of the seas" during my trip to CONUS.

Based on what's reported in Hubbard's thesis (which is pretty much what I remember from the book), there are a couple of things to note regarding the shore bombardment carried out by USS New Jersey on 8 February 1984 :

1. Targets were *eight Syrian artillery batteries* (see also post #14 in this thread).

2. Gunfire was *under the direction of an Army target acquisition battery radar* (see also post #21 in this thread).

[Shipwreck]

On 8 February 1984, USS New Jersey fired 288 x 16" rounds against 8 artillery positions. That's an average 36 rounds / target.

During the Korean War, the average expenditure on successful 16" missions against gun emplacements / shore batteries was 13 rounds.

In Vietnam, the average expenditure on 16" missions against artillery was 13.6 rounds (17.1 rounds per successful mission).

During ODS, the average expenditure on 16" missions against artillery / mortar was 12.4 rounds.

So basically, during her deployment off Lebanon, USS New Jersey fired, on average, 2 to 3 times more rounds per target than Iowa-class BBs historically did against similar targets during Korea, Vietnam and ODS.

[Shipwreck]

On 8 February 1984, USS New Jersey fired 288 x 16" rounds against 8 artillery positions. That's an average 36 rounds / target.

During the Korean War, the average expenditure on successful 8" missions against gun emplacements / shore batteries was 29 rounds.

In Vietnam, the average expenditure on successful 8" missions against artillery was 27 rounds.

So basically, during her deployment off Lebanon, USS New Jersey fired, on average, nearly 30% more rounds per target than 8"/55 cruisers historically did against similar targets during Korea and Vietnam.

[Shipwreck]

Warrior Soul : The Memoir of a Navy Seal by Chuck Pfarrer :

Pages 208-209 : In a chow line, someone had said to me that bringing New Jersey to Lebanon was like taking a bazooka to a bullfight. It was definitely a weapon that could win, but it wasn't the right weapon. Looming on the horizon, the ship was an impressive sight, - long, lean battle wagon -, but it didn't fool anyone.

New Jersey's sixteen-inch guns fired projectiles the size of Volkwagens, two thousands pounds of high explosive at ranges in excess of twenty miles. One such shell could vaporize a city block. Clearly, the devices that turned Pacific islands into lunar landscapes were not the weapons of choice in a densely populated city. Firepower and brimstone had brought down the Axis, but were not applicable to the chores of hard-core peacekeeping. Bad guys here did not congregate large bodies of troops, nor did they shell us from static massed-weapon positions. They offered no targets for such a heavy hitter.

It was not merely a coincidence that when the New Jersey arrived, the tactics of our antagonists underwent a dramatic change. Previously, Druze and Syrian gunners set up on isolated promontaries and whaled away when they felt the urge. Now the stakes were higher, and the consequences of establishing a battery in the open were 100 percent lethal. Offshore was a ship that could alter the geography of this country. Overnight, promontary shooting ended and "shoot and scoout" began. In the civilian centers, there was safety, there was cover, and in the first part of October, fire came almost exclusively from the most densely populated areas of the city. Indirect fire weapons, mortar and Katyusha rockets, were brought to bear from vacant lots and roofless buildings in the heart of Hooterville. Sixteen-inch shells would take out the mortars, but they would also get everyone else in the neighborhood. Not exactly a transaction in the spirit of peacekeeping.

[Shipwreck]

United States Battleships, 1935-92 by William Garzke and Robert Dulin (revised edition) :

Page 220 : In September 1987, the Iowa deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. Testing continued on 16" gunnery accuracy, and the weapons department decided to review the proof-range gunnery tests done at Dahlgren in 1939-40, using on-board computers.

FCCM(SW) Stephen Skelley played an important role in this investigation, which led to the development of a table of multipliers to account for gun-barrel erosion corrections to gun elevation.

Master Chief Charles Hill worked on the crew-training aspects and gunnery reliability. Commander Gene Kosmich, the weapons officer and Captain Larry Seaquist, the skipper of the Iowa, coordinated these efforts.

Safety and reliability were stressed so that finally a "Battleship 16"/50 Caliber Gunnery Handbook" was written, to be used by all the reactivated battleships.