End of an era

[Anon]

Because i was talking about the Marine Corps?

The Army is a much bigger formation with state of the art weapons systems nearly throughout. Of course it's more expensive.

[rickusn]

On the Army:

"The Army requested $11.8 billion for procurement in 2006. Two emergency funding requests — one in 2005 and the most recent one in February 2006 — bolstered the Army’s procurement accounts by nearly $17 billion. In 2005, a $10.4 billion procurement budget rose to $24.6 billion also via supplemental appropriations."

The NG situtaion is even worse:

"The Guard views the $21 billion investment as a down payment towards an estimated $102 billion price tag that would cover the needs of 34 Guard brigades currently in the force.

Portions of that $102 billion bill already are being paid, Dixon explains. There’s the $21 billion Army commitment, in addition to $63 billion worth of existing equipment that will be kept, and not replaced. That leaves about $39 billion worth of un-funded needs. "

But then it is easier to constantly beat on the USMC/USN than it is to look at objective reality. Is it not?

[rickusn]

"Because i was talking about the Marine Corps?"

No you were denigrating the USMC for something far more prevalent , debilitating and expensive for the Army.

Your total lack of an objective perspective once again perplexes me.

[rickusn]

The Army like all the services are vast money pits, heres more on Army supplementals:

ARMY CHIEF OF PROGRAMS PREDICTS AT LEAST $65 BILLION SUPPLEMENTAL
Inside the Army - 2/13/2006
Citing a pending supplemental spending request of up to $69 billion and an increase to the Army’s fiscal year 2007 base budget request, the service is enjoying “unprecedented levels of resourcing,” said its chief of ....


The USMC by comparison is requesting only $6b at the same time as the Armys $65b request.

LOL

[Anon]

Originally Posted by rickusn

On the Army:

"The Army requested $11.8 billion for procurement in 2006. Two emergency funding requests — one in 2005 and the most recent one in February 2006 — bolstered the Army’s procurement accounts by nearly $17 billion. In 2005, a $10.4 billion procurement budget rose to $24.6 billion also via supplemental appropriations."

The NG situtaion is even worse:

"The Guard views the $21 billion investment as a down payment towards an estimated $102 billion price tag that would cover the needs of 34 Guard brigades currently in the force.

Portions of that $102 billion bill already are being paid, Dixon explains. There’s the $21 billion Army commitment, in addition to $63 billion worth of existing equipment that will be kept, and not replaced. That leaves about $39 billion worth of un-funded needs. "

But then it is easier to constantly beat on the USMC/USN than it is to look at objective reality. Is it not?

All you have to do is look at the size of the Army and it's easy to see why it costs more. You dont just need vastly more tanks, trucks and rifles, but you have to pay, feed, and house all those folks too.

[Anon]

Originally Posted by rickusn

The USMC by comparison is requesting only $6b at the same time as the Armys $65b request.

LOL

And providing a much smaller force with largely obsolete vehicles and aircraft that is modernizing only a portion of it's key systems at an absolute snails pace.

The Army is also the one that's carrying the fight in two nations plus providing the vast majority of SOCOMs shooters worldwide.

Another reason the USMCs budget is so deceptively low is because all those super expensive amphibious warfare ships count against the naval budget.

[rickusn]

"Another reason the USMCs budget is so deceptively low is because all those super expensive amphibious warfare ships count against the naval budget."

I already addressed that issue. In that if we were to maintain an amphibious capability with Army those ships would have to be procured in any event.

And just how do you think 95% of Army equipment and supplies get to a conflict?

BY ship and the Army doesnt pay for those.

Nor does the Army pay for the C-17's and other aircraft that haul the troops and the other 5% of their equipment and supplies.

Once again you are not being objective.

"The Army is also the one that's carrying the fight in two nations plus providing the vast majority of SOCOMs shooters worldwide.'

Once again you make it sound like the USMC is not pulling its load. BS

Once again for the operations being undertaken the USMC performs the same tasks. Ive heard no complaints except from you.

My whole point is that if the USMC is disbanded all its units would have to be reconstituted in the other services at a price that would far more expensive.

The Marines have always done more with less as its said.

You may not like it but the USMC is a bargain by any measure.

The USN at the very least would have to reconstitute seven of 20 USMC squadrons to fill out the Carrier Battle Groups.

If we are to maintain an amphibious capability the Army would have to reconstitute those units.

The Air Force or the USN would have to provide organic air.

In adidition the Army would have to stand up more of the new Brigade Combat Teams to provide more ground units to make up for the loss of the USMC units now doing those tasks.

In order for this to happen it would take probably cost $90b a year compared to 18a nd maybe more.

The NG is grossly underfunded if was funded adequately the Army budget would run about $200b a year. And with the supplementals is doing just that. And the NG is still a second-class citizen doing first-line tasks as the regyular Army sucks up all the funding.

Its a disgrace.

And thats why I said the USMC is relatively cheap(and you imply as useless although all tyhe experts I know disagree) and are not going to be disbanded.

But IMHO seeing as how you refuse to look at the issues objectively I say disband the USAF and Army and make the USN/USMC Team the only two armed services for the United States.

The Army is an overfunded boondoggle always has been and always will be. So is the USAF. LOL

LOL How do you like that!! LOL

BTW the Army is not ten times or more bigger than the USMC by any stretch of your imagination.

I can be as grossly subjective and disregard facts, practicality, reality and reasonability as you but I have a driving need to be credible.

Its alot more time consuming to do so.

And the outward rewards are less because Im not going to win any popularity contests with any of the many parochial factions. Especially the ones youve allied yourself with.

Some years ago I thought you would be an excellent ally against the parochial nonsense.

Im not often wrong but I sure got fooled on that one. In nearly 50 years of life Ive never misjudged a persons character so badly.

It wont happen again and I thank you for making me much more wary and skeptical of anything anyone has to say. I had often been scolded for being both too wary and skeptical and I was starting to actually believe it. No longer.

[Anon]

Originally Posted by rickusn

"I already addressed that issue. In that if we were to maintain an amphibious capability with Army those ships would have to be procured in any event.

Not in a world of 40% vacancy on US supercarriers they don't.

The USN is putting to sea flight groups only 60-65% of the size of the 90TACAIR groups from the cold war. There is plenty of room on the supercarriers for a decent sized amphib force now.

It's not like we're ever gonna do any kind of a real ampnibious invasion again. We are afterall, told all the time by the likes of the USN themselves that this is an extinct operation.

And just think of all the money that would be saved eliminating the AAAV, AMTRAKS, LCAC, and all those various amphibious ships.

We could buy more real carriers then.

Originally Posted by rickusn

Once again for the operations being undertaken the USMC performs the same tasks. Ive heard no complaints except from you.

Miss spoonman's comments did you?

But, if you want more people arguing for the USMC to go bye-bye, here you go:

Here:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...t/1988/BWM.htm

A whoooooole bunch more here:
http://www.google.com/search?q=disba...en-US:official

[Anon]

Originally Posted by rickusn

The Army is an overfunded boondoggle always has been and always will be. So is the USAF. LOL

Actually coming from a Navy guy i have a hard time even getting worked up to defend my branch.

The Navy is a cluster fucck many orders of magnitudes beyond what the Army or USAF are.

We havn't even gotten into LCS yet on this board....

[rickusn]

Im not defending anything just pointing out that all services are "cluster fucck" not just the USN.

And you know full well that Ive taken the USN to task on many issues but to say that USN troubles mean the army and USAF have none is outrageous.

You well know my stand on LCS.

Those links you provided dont make your case period.

And once again you duck all the real issues.

Just one of many examples of your total lack of objectivity:

What about how the Army gets to the conflict?

You totally ignore it because you know you cant justify having the USMC absorb the cost w/o making the Army do the same.

And you cant do that without the whole world seeing the enormous cost to support any useful employment of the Army. LOL

So you conveniently think your comments will go unnoticed by the rest of the world if you choose to ignore them after the fallacy of them is pointed out. LOL Maybe so.

I would hope most readers are not so easilly fooled by such tactics.

"The Navy is a cluster fucck many orders of magnitudes beyond what the Army or USAF are." BS

What a totally outlandish exaggeration. LOL

Here we are almost 60 years later and its the same old tired story. LOL

[Anon]

I agree with the characterization that all branches are cluster fuccks.

The navy is by far the worst.

When the USA or USAF field 60% strength and air wings and divisions you can talk smack.

I never said those links made a good case for disbanding, i merely disproved your contention that only i have said anything about the subject.

I dont know what gives with you rick. You're constantly criticizing the navy but if anyone else does it you get all offended. What up dude?

[-{SpoonmaN}-]

Originally Posted by M21Sniper

The only reason the marines are so cheap is because their equipment is reaching block obsolecensce and the systems that are being replaced are being done so over a LOOOOOOOOONG period of time.

Look at how far they've got the AMTRAK deal spread out- 30 years- lol.

The USMCs monetary needs are IMMENSE.

And as is pointed out in the USMC budget article, that 18bn budget is misleading for other reasons as well. Ie, there are two supplementals that almost double it, and it still barely address modernization costs even at a snails pace.

To refit the USMC in a timely fashion would cost a truly massive amount of money over the short term vs what they're spending now.

Based on what the pros on this forum say, it seems the USMC's lower costs could aslo have something to do with their more limited logistical capabilities. They seem to be a lot more dependent on the USN for logistical backup than the Army is (because the Army has it's own integrated logistical system), thus those costs would go to the Navy rather than the Marines.
Just a thought, correct me if I'm wrong.

[rickusn]

Dunno if your right or wrong but this link would seem to refute any such contention. And it would seem to me that the USMC pays for as much for their logistics as does the Army. In fact I would think that much of the cost is borne by DOD-wide funding. But I havent studied it in any detail. And of course not being one of the " pros" here hampers me.. Not that Im sure exactly who is. But I do know who it isnt. LOL:

http://www.logcom.usmc.mil/logcom/StrategicPlan.pdf

[rickusn]

Heres an overview by an Army Colonel(Ret.) with links at the end for those wishing to pursue the issue further.:

http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues...arinecorps.htm

What Army Logisticians Should Know About the Marine Corps

by Lieutenant Colonel James C. Bates, USA (Ret.)

Joint task force logisticians who understand the logistics methods and capabilities of the U.S. Marine Corps can enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of logistics operations. This is especially important when one considers that accessing international seaports and foreign shores and providing security for forces transiting through them are ever-increasing concerns of military planners. As a result, joint logistics over-the-shore operations, which require both Navy and Marine Corps and Army forces, most likely will become more prevalent in the future, in both forced and permissive-entry environments.

This changing operational environment means that Army logisticians should be familiar with Marine Corps logistics. What follows is a brief overview of how the Marine Corps conducts logistics, with a specific emphasis on its logistics structure and doctrine. Soldiers serving as joint logistics planners should recognize the synergies involved in Army and Marine Corps operations and should work to streamline combat service support. Moreover, just as other services, agencies, and countries can learn from understanding U.S. Army logistics, the Army can adapt and improve its logistics processes by understanding and incorporating methods from others, like the Marine Corps.


Components of Joint Task Forces

U.S. military operations, regardless of whether they are small-scale peacekeeping operations or major regional conflicts, involve joint forces (provided by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) and are conducted under the overarching control of a regional combatant commanderformerly called a commander in chieffrom either the U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Southern Command, or, in some instances, the U.S. Special Operations Command.

The regional combatant commander appoints a joint task force commander, who directly oversees a joint task force (JTF). While the makeup of a JTF can vary (it could have service-specific subordinate commands, for example), it sometimes is composed of an air component command, a maritime component command, a special operations component command, and a land component command. The services provide forces to these component commanders. Typically, the Army and the Marine Corps constitute the land component command. Since these two services operate in the same area of operations, logisticians of one service might be able to use some of the combat service support assets of the other service in addition to their own; they also might tap into the logistics capabilities of joint, interagency, and multinational activities.


Marine Corps Force Structure

Like the Army, the Marine Corps has both an administrative and a deployed organizational structure. There are approximately 173,000 marines on active duty and 100,000 Marine Reservists; there are no Marine National Guard forces. In comparison, the Army has approximately 485,000 active-duty soldiers, 360,000 Na tional Guardsmen, and 200,000 Army Reservists.

The Marine Corps has three active Marine divisions (each with about 18,000 marines), three active Marine aircraft wings (each with about 15,000 marines and 300 aircraft), and three force service support groups (FSSGs), which have about 9,000 marines each. The FSSG is a permanently structured command consisting of eight battalions whose mission is to provide combat service support to Marine Corps forces worldwide.

Marines deploy as a Marine air ground task force (MAGTF), with marines providing their own aviation support. A MAGTF includes a command element, a ground combat element, an aviation combat element, and a combat service support element (CSSE).

MAGTFs deploy in three configurations: a Marine expeditionary force (MEF); a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB); or a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) special operations capable (SOC). As a general rule, an MEF has 50,000 marines and is commanded by a lieutenant general; an MEB has 16,000 marines and is commanded by a brigadier general; and an MEU has 2,200 marines and is commanded by a colonel.

An MEF consists of one or more of the following: an infantry division, which consists of three infantry regiments (with a total of nine infantry battalions in the
division); an artillery regiment (with four artillery battalions); a tank battalion; a light armored reconnaissance battalion; an amphibious assault battalion; a Marine
aircraft wing, which provides both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft; and an FSSG.

The Marine Corps has three MEF's: the I MEF is located on the U.S. west coast, the II MEF is located on the east coast, and the III MEF is located in Okinawa, Japan. Each of the MEFs has an MEB (the 1st MEB, the 2d MEB, and the 3d MEB, respectively). There also is a 4th MEB (Anti-terrorism), activated in September 2001, that provides antiterrorism support to regional combatant commanders worldwide.

Marine Corps Logistics Structure

The MAGTF's CSSE provides supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and services. Services include personnel administration; religious ministries support; financial management; disbursing; communications; billeting; messing; military bands; morale, welfare, and recreation activities; postal services; exchange services; security support; legal services; civil affairs; and graves registration.

Normally, there is one CSSE for each MAGTF. An FSSG is the CSSE that supports an MEF. A brigade service support group (BSSG) is the CSSE that supports an MEB. A Marine expeditionary unit service support group (MSSG) is the CSSE that supports an MEU.


Maritime Pre-positioning

Also supporting the MEFs is the Maritime Pre-positioning Force, which is operated by the Navy's Military Sealift Command. The Maritime Pre-positioning Force currently is composed of 14 maritime pre-positioning ships that carry nearly all of the equipment and supplies deploying marines need to conduct operations. The Maritime Pre-positioning Force is divided into three Maritime Pre-positioning Ship Squadrons (MPSRONs). MPSRON One is usually on duty in the Atlantic Ocean or Mediterranean Sea. MPSRON Two is usually located near the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. MPSRON Three is usually stationed near Guam or Saipan in the Western Pacific Ocean.

When MPSRON ships are needed, they transport their equipment and supply loads to a relatively secure environment for offloading either in port or at sea. Deploying marines, normally arriving at nearby airfields, offload the supplies and equipment from the MPSRON. One maritime pre-positioning ship can support an MEU. One MPSRON (four to five ships) can support an MEB for 30 days. All three MPSRONs combined (14 ships) can support an MEF. The chart at left shows a partial list of the impressive amount of supplies and equipment found on the ships of one MPSRON.


Wholesale-Level Logistics and Research

Like the Army, the Marine Corps, in conjunction with the Navy, is in the process of transforming itself in order to exploit our Nation's technological and doctrinal advances. Concepts associated with the Operational Maneuver from the Sea vision include enhanced joint, sea-based capabilities that will use high-speed support vessels, floating forward staging bases, and Maritime Pre-positioned Force-Future ships. These future assets will provide platforms where troops can marry up with their equipment, both during deployments and during periods of reconstitution. A floating logistics base provides several advantages. It can remain safely over the horizon until needed; it can be moved relatively quickly to other locations, such as sparsely defended enemy coastal areas; and it can reduce the amount of supplies and equipment needed ashore, thereby expediting the redeployment process at the tactical level.

At the strategic level of supply, the Marine Corps oversees the Marine Corps Materiel Command (MATCOM). Similar in purpose but smaller in size than the Army Materiel Command, MATCOM commands the Marine Corps logistics bases at Albany, Georgia (site of MATCOM Headquarters), and Barstow, California. Blount Island, Florida, is a Marine Corps depot subordinate to the logistics base at Albany.

MATCOM also oversees the Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia. MARCORSYSCOM's mission is to provide life-cycle management of Marine Corps ground weapon systems, equipment, munitions, and information systems to ensure materiel readiness of its forces in the field. It serves as the principal agent for equipping marines for their warfighting mission.


To learn more about Marine Corps logistics doctrine, visit the 4-series Marine Corps Warfighting and Reference Publications at https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil/htm/doc9.htm. The Marine Corps offers formal logistics training at the Marine Corps Combat Service Support Schools (MCCSSS), which are located at Camp Johnson, 5 miles from Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The schools provide combat service support training for marine officers, noncommissioned officers, and junior enlisted personnel. Its Web site is www.lejeune.usmc.mil/mccsss/schools.htm.

As the Department of Defense and the armed services transform into an ever more efficient military force through the use of advanced joint doctrine and warfare, those Army logisticians who understand the implications and potential for interservice logistics planning and operations will be in a better position to have a positive influence on future combat service support. Soldiers must know all about their comrades in arms in the Marine Corps. ALOG


Lieutenant Colonel James C. Bates, USA (Ret.), is a former Army logistics officer who works for Alion Science and Technology. He currently serves as a sustainment planner for the U.S. Joint Forces Command, J*9 Transformation Office, in Suffolk, Virginia. The author wishes to thank Lieutenant Colonel James Washington, USMC (Ret.), for his invaluable assistance in writing this article.

[Gun Grape]

Originally Posted by -{SpoonmaN}-

Based on what the pros on this forum say, it seems the USMC's lower costs could aslo have something to do with their more limited logistical capabilities. They seem to be a lot more dependent on the USN for logistical backup than the Army is (because the Army has it's own integrated logistical system), thus those costs would go to the Navy rather than the Marines.
Just a thought, correct me if I'm wrong.

Limited logistical capabilities? Where do you get that from?

You are aware that during the opening part of Desert Shield, when the only units on the ground were the 82d Airborne Div and the 7th MEB, the MEB was providing all logistical support to the Army.

They jump with maybe 3 days of supplies. A MEU is self sustaining for 7 days of combat and a MEB is self sustaining for 30 combat days.

Pretty good for , as you say "More limited logistical capability"

And as pointed out by Rick, the Navy moves about 95% of the Armys logistics. The AF the other 5%.

You will also find is that much of the CSSE in the army are not in the active duty force.