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Missile Stability in South Asia

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  • Missile Stability in South Asia

    Missile Stability in South Asia
    URL: http://www.india-defence.com/reports/738
    Date: 27/10/2005
    Author: Ashwin Kumar & Mridusmita Borah for IPCS

    In looking to their future, armed forces consider the strategic options available to them and like to know where technology is heading and what the options are. There are different ways of looking at war and how it is conducted. Also, how we look at the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of weapons systems is significant.

    Introduction to the Patriot System

    The Patriot system was originally meant as an anti-aircraft system, but was modified in the 1980s to also defend against ballistic missiles. When Patriot missiles were used against Iraqi Scuds in the first Gulf War, it was typical to fire two missiles against a single Scud target. During the war there were reports about the success of the Patriot missiles in intercepting Scuds. Following the war, the initially reported intercept rates were questioned. Studies performed by the US Congress and the General Accounting Office (GAO) showed that there was little evidence to prove that Patriot missiles hit more than a few Scud missiles. The GAO study concluded that only nine per cent of engagements demonstrate strong evidence of success - as measured when radar data or debris indicated that a Scud was destroyed when a Patriot detonated near it.

    Dr. Postol and I had also studied the effectiveness of the Patriot system in intercepting Scud missiles during the Gulf War. Their study found that video footage was often misleading, and many Patriots were simply wounding or deflecting Scuds. We estimate that of the 158 Patriots fired during the war, about 24 were fired into empty space and 47 at falling debris. We concluded that there was no definite evidence that a Patriot destroyed any Scud warhead. The available hard evidence for system performance came from launch data statistics from infrared early warning satellites, dot matrix printouts during engagements (altitude, speed, heading and projected impact point at a small number of times), press video, photographs, classified precision video in Israel, and possibly software dependent kill indicators. In addition, digital data was recorded for a few engagements on Portable Data Recorder units operated by the Israelis.

    Furthermore, the Scud missiles experienced anomalies during reentry, including large lateral manoeuvres, breaking up resulting in decoys, and sudden changes in both drag forces and radar cross sections after disintegration.

    After the Gulf War, the United States wanted a new version of the Patriot which involved new interceptors. Several upgrades were made to the system following the Gulf War, including an increase in the radar sensitivity and the addition of a remote launch capability. The recent PAC-3 has an attitude control system which makes it more agile, and is designed as hit-to-kill. The PAC-3's are being sold to the Netherlands and Japan.

    Patriot System in the Context of South Asia

    Technical capabilities get lost amidst the noise of political discussions on deployment. In missile defence systems like the Patriot, there are differences in performance. For example, one difficulty in analyzing a nuclear situation is that it is a core threat to national political autonomy. The nuclear situation is different from the conventional situation because small uncertainties get amplified. The facts of political and human behaviour are important while technically assessing the missile system.

    The Patriot is deadly as an anti-aircraft system. The PAC-2 is more than sufficient if this is the goal. But, the situation is different if missiles are to be targeted. For example, in the Gulf War, even with hits on the body of scuds their warheads caused some damage. The lesson from this is that the warhead should be targeted. In summary, the PAC-3 is an excellent technical step forward over previous versions in trying to hit ballistic missiles, but not nearly enough.

    Nuclear Stability and Shared Surveillance in South Asia

    The military objective should be to provide political decision-makers with an opportunity to take a wait and see posture. Chances of a nuclear accident increase dramatically when weapons are on alert, which often coincides with periods of political tension. The United States and Russia/Soviet Union have used space-based missile launch sensors for over 25 years. These outer space-based sensors detect the infrared radiation emitted by the hot plume of a missile launch. The difficulty with such a system was that sun reflection of clouds sometimes triggers false alarms. These false alarms could be reduced by waiting for two to three sequential detections from a missile trace.

    One possibility is a missile surveillance network of three satellites in geosynchronous orbit - sufficient to cover the earth's area. This was within reach of the Europeans' ability to pay, and consistent with their inclination towards independence. An internationally shared missile surveillance system could defuse tense situations arising from uncertainty about missile launches. In their proposal, each country would have access to the raw data.

    Such a surveillance network could help reduce the potential for accidents. An example of a near accident: In 1979, the US falsely assumed a massive Russian nuclear missile launch when training tapes were inserted incorrectly. US nuclear forces were put on heightened alert and a national threat assessment conference was convened at the Pentagon. No launches were detected upon looking at the raw satellite data, and the forces were made to stand down. Examination of the information from space-based surveillance of missile launches has prevented at least four different situations that caused nuclear alerts from escalating into wars. Such a missile network would help stabilize a situation involving short-range ballistic missiles. This network would help by ensuring that no missiles were launched, by increasing the transparency of missile development and increasing collaboration between the participants.

    Space Weapons

    The US position has been that satellites are being threatened. My group's study has looked at the threats that being cited, and which would require space weapons platforms. Our conclusions were that the threats have not been characterized well, and that vulnerabilities do not amount to threats.

    The recent push for space weapons in the US is a legacy of the Star Wars programmes. In the last decade, the Rumsfeld Commission on ballistic missile threats to the US stated that the ballistic missile threat, especially asymmetric, was the most significant security threat to the US. The Rumsfeld Space Commission of 2000 stated the possibility of a Pearl Harbor type attack on low earth orbit satellites. Finally, the push for space weapons is influenced by the desire for full spectrum domination, of which space is the last high ground.

    The threats to satellites and space systems include anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), orbital small satellites, high altitude nuclear weapons and other threats such as jamming communications to satellites from the ground, using large aperture optics to dazzle satellites, and attacks on ground control stations. In ground based ASAT, which involves direct ascent missile attacks on satellites in low earth orbit, satellites could manoeuvre away with small amounts of thrust in the 5-7 minutes that are needed for the weapons to reach their apogee. It is more likely that a fragmentation warhead can destroy a satellite. In the case of laser illumination of an optical satellite, low power ground based lasers - if in-band - can saturate the optical sensors. This method was successfully demonstrated in an experiment conducted in the United States in 1997. High power lasers - both ground based and space based - can damage satellites temporarily and sometimes even permanently. Space based weapons targeting the ground are not cost effective because of the number of platforms required.

    The capabilities of small satellites have been improving. These are used for inspection and imaging, and can potentially be adapted for use as weapons. They can potentially be launched from aircraft. The costs of such satellites are low and can be involved in technology transfer to asymmetric threats. However, their launch costs are high and they involve significant amounts of know how and training programmes. The risk of high-altitude nuclear explosions has been understood for decades. A study by the Pentagon (HALEOS) describes various scenarios that could result in damage to satellites via this route.

    Both the US and USSR have tested anti-satellite weapons but did not deploy them. The military use of space increased with the introduction of spy satellites in the 1960s and other efforts that provided a direct link to military operation. Space debris could become a serious issue in low earth orbit. Geosynchronous earth orbit already has space constraints. The US is more vulnerable than any other country as it has more satellites. The solution is to develop international norms for rules of the road, involving both technical and diplomatic means. Additionally, to reduce space debris, there must be control over how countries launch and litter in space.

    Comments


    * India should explore what problems and concerns it could have with shared surveillance.

    * While it is difficult to think in terms of destroying other's satellites, corruption is not out of bounds. Space should be open to soft weaponization, although hard weaponization must not be permitted.

    * It is not long before we have the capability of space-based surveillance that detects during boost phase. But, ABM systems concentrate on the terminal phase. This means the missile's trajectory needs to be successfully projected.

    * Further analysis remains is necessary to understand how to protect satellite
    s.
    * Weapons and space are the biggest issues today.

    * In 2003, no Patriot units had an operating data recorder. The only available data on performance was from press video and tapes from Operating Centre.


    Question & Answers

    Question: What are the difficulties with PAC-3 intercepting ballistic missiles?
    Answer: One difficulty with manoeuvrable warheads is that the angle of attack is not observable and a delay is introduced in responding to changes in direction. The excess lateral acceleration available to compensate for this delay is limited.

    Question: What types of data were the Israelis recording on the Patriots?
    Answer: Israelis were aware that the Scuds were manoeuvring and breaking up, and that the Patriots were often shooting at debris. They asked the United States for Portable Data Recorders to use with Patriot units.

    Question: How does the PAC-3 compare with the Arrow?
    Answer: This is an ongoing debate in service headquarters. Until about a year and a half or two, the PAC-3 was not even a contender for the Arrow, but now it is.
    I rant, therefore I am.
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