PDA

View Full Version : BMPT - the new Russian class - Tank Assistance Combat Vehicle.



Garry
15 Oct 05,, 11:57
Hi Officer of Engineers, Shek, Lemontree, Snipe and other gentlemen!

What are your comments on this new conceipt - the tank, whose primary goal is to fight enemies infatry in urban warfare.... it has quite strong firepower and it is multichannel - several crew each of them can engage different enemies simultaneously. With four ATGM it can engage ANY tanks but is not intended for that. Its Ataka-T ATGM is laser guided - a much better solution could have been a radar and radar guided ATGM.

Specs:

Weight - 47tons
The hull from T-72
Engine power/weight- 21.3 horse power per ton
Speed - 65 km/h on road,

Crew - 5 (one driver, one commander+turret operator - both can hadle it, two grenade launchers on sides, one turret operator)

Unmanned Turret: Two - 30mm 2A42 automatic guns + one 7.62 machine gun + four ATGM Ataka-T
Two automatic grenade launchers at right and left angles in front.

amunition - 900 shells for 30mm guns, 2000 bullets for 7.62, 600 grenades for two automatic grenade launchers

Sights and targeting
Commanders sight/targeting - panoramic with TV channel and laser, turret operator combined optical/infrared + laser targeter and guidance, for grenade launchers AGAT MP (night/day). They all can see at night and in smoke.

TopHatter
17 Oct 05,, 02:13
Wow....pretty impressive. :cool:

How much can I pick one of those up for? :redface:
Are they in production?

lemontree
17 Oct 05,, 09:25
All they have done is marry a ICV turret to a tank chassis. The only improvement better protection due to a tank chassis.
Now one has to remember that in Urban conflicts the real ranger is from ATGMs/RPGs fired from roof tops. The top attack nature of the protectile negates the increased protection of a tank chassis. Besides it cannot carry troops.
Its a waste of money and increased expense on fuel.

raj
17 Oct 05,, 09:26
Excuse my limited knowledge in tank stuff, is this some thing like a tank killer part of mechanized infantry. If yes, i think this concept has been in since WWII(limited knowledge from war games) how is this a new concept?

Garry
17 Oct 05,, 13:03
Wow....pretty impressive. :cool:

How much can I pick one of those up for? :redface:
Are they in production?

Probably around 20-30% markup on the T-72 price of $2mln => $2.4-2.6mln. Basically it will share most of the hull but have different turret/sights. Hence most of spareparts are unified with T-72.

I made some search on BMPT weapons and combat loads...... it looks quite impressive

The two 2A42 30 mm guns are the same as BMP-2.... should deliver strong fire power of 1kg shells.
http://www.shipunov.com/eng/str/cannons/2a42.htm
There should be two 450 shell belts feeding both. One belt is loaded with Armor Piercing Discarding Sabot and one with HE. The total weight of this would be 900kg for 900 shells. Very interesting the market price of this load is just $6750!
http://www.pmulcahy.com/ammunition/autocannon_ammunition.html

I guess that 7.62 machine gun is Kalashnikov.... the load is 2000 bullets

In addition to that 4 Ataka-T ATGMs
http://www.deagel.com/pandora/ataka_mn00163001.aspx
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/at-9.htm

two AG-17 grenade launchers - good area covering weapon.
http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/encyclopedia/a/ag/ags-172.htm
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/AGS-17.html
http://www.rusarm.ru/p_prod/army/ags17.htm

The load is 600 grenades - a belt of 300 in each launcher with VOG-17 of VOG-30 rounds
http://www.arcus-bg.com/products/fuzes/1_medium_caliber/5_vmg_m_l/print.html

All this looks quite impressive to suppress any infantry and protect tanks from RPG fighters in urban warfare. Two 30mm guns and two separate launchers would put infantry away from tanks!

Garry
17 Oct 05,, 13:33
Excuse my limited knowledge in tank stuff, is this some thing like a tank killer part of mechanized infantry. If yes, i think this concept has been in since WWII(limited knowledge from war games) how is this a new concept?

It is actually not a tank killer but infantry suppressor.... to support tanks in a battlefield where there are many devoted RPG fighters ready to attack a tank colunms from different direction simultaneously. Russians have lost quite a lot of armored vehicles due to such attacks from suiside RPG fighters.

Garry
17 Oct 05,, 13:56
All they have done is marry a ICV turret to a tank chassis. The only improvement better protection due to a tank chassis.
Now one has to remember that in Urban conflicts the real ranger is from ATGMs/RPGs fired from roof tops. The top attack nature of the protectile negates the increased protection of a tank chassis. Besides it cannot carry troops.
Its a waste of money and increased expense on fuel.

Somebody commented me that no tank can hold a good shot from ATGM.... for sure T-72 hull can be killed by RPG-7.... but if I undestand it correctly Abrams were lost due to RPGs as well! (though crews survived).

After talking with Andrei (former officer from Chechnya who assaulted Grozny twice). I was watching movie 9th command. Some people who I was talking then served in Afghanistan.... they told that it was there when Soviet soldiers discovered that thinly armored Shilka (ZSU) turned to be better protecting transport columns than heavy armored tanks..... in mountains Shilka could suppress ambushing enemies with so much of fire that they would retreat..... that is why mojahideens were attackign Shilkas first of all in the columns.....
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/ZSU-23-4.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZSU-23-4

later in Chechnya this was proven right again. Shilka is so vulnrable that even a light fire can damage it. However its firepower made its a safeguard to supply columns.... imagine when its four barrels shoot hundred shells a second on attacking infantry.... nobody wants to put their head out!!! Well here we have two barrels sending 27 of 30mm shells per second each 1kg !!! Will it convince infantry to hide away.....

there is an addition here.... it can shoot 3 directions at a time.... look at the crew

lemontree
17 Oct 05,, 14:15
Garry,
The difference between the Shilka 23mm and BMPT 30mm is the rate of fire. The rip from the Shiklas' 1000 RPM (from each gun) is devastating against ground targets compared to the "old man's cough" of the BMPTs 30mm.
The BMP-2/3 can do the same why waste resources. Casulties in MOUT ops is enevitable, tactics make all the difference.

Officer of Engineers
17 Oct 05,, 15:12
This thing looks like someone just looked around and see what's available and then slap it together in one kit.

It's overdone which means that it won't do any one thing good.

MOUT means one thing when it comes to armoured vehicles - engineers. Which means give me an armoured bulldozer with FIVE-OH for protection and a demo gun (155mm and up).

TopHatter
17 Oct 05,, 15:24
This thing looks like someone just looked around and see what's available and then slap it together in one kit.

Looking at it again, it reminds me a little bit of an Ontos.
Probably a terrible comparison, just a thought.

B.Smitty
17 Oct 05,, 17:18
Garry,
The difference between the Shilka 23mm and BMPT 30mm is the rate of fire. The rip from the Shiklas' 1000 RPM (from each gun) is devastating against ground targets compared to the "old man's cough" of the BMPTs 30mm.
The BMP-2/3 can do the same why waste resources. Casulties in MOUT ops is enevitable, tactics make all the difference.

The question really is, what rate of fire is sufficient to achieve the effects seen in Chechnya and elsewhere. It may be that two 550 RPM 2A42s is sufficient.

Also, is it really physically devestating against infantry, or is it more demoralizing/frightening?

BMP-2/3s are rather lightly armored in comparison to the BMP-T. This may be a factor.

B.Smitty
17 Oct 05,, 17:23
This thing looks like someone just looked around and see what's available and then slap it together in one kit.

It's overdone which means that it won't do any one thing good.

MOUT means one thing when it comes to armoured vehicles - engineers. Which means give me an armoured bulldozer with FIVE-OH for protection and a demo gun (155mm and up).

I agree, the BMP-T armament seems a bit hap-hazard.

I don't completely agree that MOUT equals armored dozer and demo gun. The Thunder Runs in Baghdad showed that you don't have to demolish entire blocks to take a city.

Not to say dozers and demo guns aren't valuable in MOUT.

B.Smitty
17 Oct 05,, 17:26
Looking at it again, it reminds me a little bit of an Ontos.
Probably a terrible comparison, just a thought.

Superficially perhaps, but the BMP-T and Ontos are completely different animals.

One is a SPAAG-like turret on a tank, with ATGMs thrown in for good (or bad) measure. The other is a lightly armored recoilless rifle carrier.

TopHatter
17 Oct 05,, 19:18
Superficially perhaps, but the BMP-T and Ontos are completely different animals.

One is a SPAAG-like turret on a tank, with ATGMs thrown in for good (or bad) measure. The other is a lightly armored recoilless rifle carrier.

Yeah, like I said, terrible comparison.
On the other hand, they're both "throw a lot of weapons on a tracked vehicle" :redface:

I dunno...That BMP-T looks really nice...but a battlefield is not a parade ground. :frown:

Officer of Engineers
18 Oct 05,, 04:15
I don't completely agree that MOUT equals armored dozer and demo gun. The Thunder Runs in Baghdad showed that you don't have to demolish entire blocks to take a city.

Not to say dozers and demo guns aren't valuable in MOUT.

Baghdad is not an example of organized defence.

Garry
18 Oct 05,, 07:16
Garry,
The difference between the Shilka 23mm and BMPT 30mm is the rate of fire. The rip from the Shiklas' 1000 RPM (from each gun) is devastating against ground targets compared to the "old man's cough" of the BMPTs 30mm.
The BMP-2/3 can do the same why waste resources. Casulties in MOUT ops is enevitable, tactics make all the difference.

Yes, 2A42 can not deliver 1000 rpm x 4 which makes around 66 of 23 mm shells a second..... while two 2a42 barrels would deliver at 800 rpm x 2 => 27 of 30 mm shels a second.... that is 2.5 times less of slightly more powerful shells. Though 2A42 can not sustain this rate of fire for longer than 20 seconds (no water cooling).

Well I would have preferred Shilkas 4 guns ..... because this system has been proven sufficient and effective against infantry..... still there might be a chance that 27 shells a second is enough! It is still twice more than single barrel of BMP-2/3

Garry
18 Oct 05,, 08:50
This thing looks like someone just looked around and see what's available and then slap it together in one kit.

It's overdone which means that it won't do any one thing good.

MOUT means one thing when it comes to armoured vehicles - engineers. Which means give me an armoured bulldozer with FIVE-OH for protection and a demo gun (155mm and up).

This thing is assumed to work together with tanks which have 125mm gun to demolish buildings and fortified points. However tank itself is vulnerable to an attack of few RPG fighters on narrow streets.... Shilkas could protect it but were thinly skinned themselves - even 7.62 was damaging it. Now Russian designers decided that this vehicle build on T-72 hull would be more protected to suppress infantry......

However I agree with Lemntree that four 23mm guns (water cooled) with 1000 rpm are better than two 30mm (not cooled) 800rpm. Addition in callibre is overweighted by 2.5 times less rate of fire. Probably it was high rate of fire which made Shilkas so effective in infantry suppressing .......

lemontree
18 Oct 05,, 10:41
This thing is assumed to work together with tanks which have 125mm gun to demolish buildings and fortified points. However tank itself is vulnerable to an attack of few RPG fighters on narrow streets....
Garry,
You are contradicting your self. If tanks are vulneable in MOUT then what makes the BMPT any less vulnerable. IMO the BMPT 30mm has to hit the enemy in the exact room to suppress them, but a 125mm tank shell 2 rooms away from the target room will collapse the whole floor.

Garry
18 Oct 05,, 12:17
Garry,
You are contradicting your self. If tanks are vulneable in MOUT then what makes the BMPT any less vulnerable. IMO the BMPT 30mm has to hit the enemy in the exact room to suppress them, but a 125mm tank shell 2 rooms away from the target room will collapse the whole floor.

I meant that tanks can not shoot many shells at a time against multiple targets and that is why they are vulnerable when RPG armed infantry attacks the tank from different directions.....

here BMPT would give the tank the nessesary cover by suppresing infantry around with its 30mm high rate guns and AGS-17s.... while leaving the heavy job of demolishing a fortified points to tanks with their 125mm guns.

However I would agree with you that two 30mm barrles with 800 rpm for max of 20 seconds brought in to to suppress infantry is better to switch for four 23mm barrels with 1000rpm and water cooling which lets Shylka shoot entire load at a time..... (1-2 minutes)

Officer of Engineers
18 Oct 05,, 12:53
Suppressing enemy infantry is not the job of armour. That's the job of dismounted infantry. Yes, it would be nice to use a canon for suppressing the enemy but a FIVE-OH, ie .50cal is more than adequate for the job.

Using a tank to do the job of a demo gun is adequate but not ideal. Tanks normally do not carry the necessary rounds to collapse buildings and they certainly can't clear the rubble afterwards.

B.Smitty
18 Oct 05,, 16:36
Suppressing enemy infantry is not the job of armour. That's the job of dismounted infantry.


It isn't? When a tank carries more firepower (not to mention ammo) than an entire platoon, it would appear to be a prime suppressor.

A .50 cal might be enough, but I imagine there are significant secondary effects from HE autocannon/AGL rounds.

Officer of Engineers
18 Oct 05,, 18:30
It isn't? When a tank carries more firepower (not to mention ammo) than an entire platoon, it would appear to be a prime suppressor.

Grozny


A .50 cal might be enough, but I imagine there are significant secondary effects from HE autocannon/AGL rounds.

For the 1% of the time I might need such firepower, I rather take the extra ammo of the FIVE-OH.

B.Smitty
18 Oct 05,, 20:20
Grozny


Grozny was a cluster-f*ck of epic proportions. They had ill-trained, conscript troops with crappy Russian AFVs, terrible communications and a poor plan.

Using tanks for infantry suppression was the least of their problems.



For the 1% of the time I might need such firepower, I rather take the extra ammo of the FIVE-OH.

Perhaps. But if you're just talking suppression, might as well use a 7.62mm MG and carry a LOT more ammo.

As an infantry-killer, an AGL is generally better than a .50cal.

There was a Canadian study a while back that compared the Carl Gustav, 40mm Mk19 and .50 cal in terms of kills for a given weight of ammo, and effects vs various targets. The .50 cal didn't do so well. Wish I could find it...

Garry
18 Oct 05,, 21:48
Grozny

In 1994 assault of Grozny they indeed made a lot of stupid things which turned to loss of hundreds of armored vehicles of all classes (tanks, BMPs, BTRs, Shilkas).

In 1999 they were smarter...... most of the job was done by dismounted infantry but it was supported by tanks from good distance. Tanks followed infantry on a good distance and shoot enemy over infantry's heads using a "carusel" tactic. This tactic was learned in first assauled and used widelly in second.

Carousel is when one tank comes and shoots HE and HE-FRAG shells fast until it empties its autoloader.... then pulls back for reloading while next starts shooting same time.... with several tanks in each caruosel it created so much shells on enemies positions that Russian infantry could come to good distance to enemy's positions. A two parallel carousels were used on a narrow street and much more on wide squares. Rebels could not hit tanks with RPGs from a distance of 500 meters, at least deliver it preciselly. This assumes that neigbouring houses were cleared by infantry before......

In general tank losses were quite moderate in 2nd assault.

Officer of Engineers
19 Oct 05,, 00:20
Grozny was a cluster-f*ck of epic proportions. They had ill-trained, conscript troops with crappy Russian AFVs, terrible communications and a poor plan.

Using tanks for infantry suppression was the least of their problems.

It was also a case of the Chechens knowing what they were doing. Op THUNDER RUN could not have had happenned in Grozny.


Perhaps. But if you're just talking suppression, might as well use a 7.62mm MG and carry a LOT more ammo.

7.62 do not have desireable anti-material properties like the FIVE-OH.


As an infantry-killer, an AGL is generally to a .50cal.

There was a Canadian study a while back that compared the Carl Gustav, 40mm Mk19 and .50 cal in terms of kills for a given weight of ammo, and effects vs various targets. The .50 cal didn't do so well. Wish I could find it...

I'm aware of the study but that's not the comparison. The comparison is a twin 37mm cannon with a FIVE-OH in a MOUT environment.


In 1994 assault of Grozny they indeed made a lot of stupid things which turned to loss of hundreds of armored vehicles of all classes (tanks, BMPs, BTRs, Shilkas).

In 1999 they were smarter...... most of the job was done by dismounted infantry but it was supported by tanks from good distance. Tanks followed infantry on a good distance and shoot enemy over infantry's heads using a "carusel" tactic. This tactic was learned in first assauled and used widelly in second.

Didn't you just proved how useless this thing is?

B.Smitty
19 Oct 05,, 03:05
I'm aware of the study but that's not the comparison. The comparison is a twin 37mm cannon with a FIVE-OH in a MOUT environment.

I threw it out there to as testament to the difference between small-cal, autocannon/AGL HE rounds and .50 cal in anti-infantry/anti-vehicle effectiveness vs. volume/weight.

Granted, 30mm autocannon rounds don't have the bursting radius of a 40mm AGL round, and are heavier and require a larger mount. And the study wasn't geared towards a MOUT environment.

So YMMV.

In general, I'm not crazy about the BMPT either. I just don't think the suppressive effects of a SPAAG-like vehicle should be completely discounted in MOUT.

Officer of Engineers
19 Oct 05,, 04:24
I just don't think the suppressive effects of a SPAAG-like vehicle should be completely discounted in MOUT.

Well, 1st of all, this is not a SPAAG. It doesn't have the elevation. However, I do agree with your assertion that a SPAAG is useful. It's elevation angles give it the advantage of shooting upwards into those shooting down.

canoe
19 Oct 05,, 05:45
Well as others have said and I agree armour is going to be high risk in urban areas regardless of what you do to it. It just takes one pot shot from someone popping up on a roof top with an anti-tank weapon and your done.

The safest way to secure an urban area is to just carpet bomb it, unforunately thats rarely if ever an option due to collatoral damage.

I read a similar recommendation that had been written by someone in the U.S army to mod the M1, it called for replacing the turret fired 7.62 with a 5.56 mini gun. Also adding a automatic grenade launcher to the commanders 50 cal, and switching the loaders skate mounted weapon from a 7.62 to a 50 cal as well. In terms of armor enhancements he recommended slant armour be installed around the entire chassis and addition composite armour be added to the top of the tank.

But generally speaking I think larger heavily armed UAV's with good optics and tons of persistence would be the most useful advance in an urban setting. Sorta a poor mans spectra gunship which could eliminate any ground targets identified by ground forces and stay up there for hours or days. IMHO theres not much in the way of armour advances that will make a big difference in an urban setting at the moment.

lemontree
19 Oct 05,, 06:15
Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers
Suppressing enemy infantry is not the job of armour. That's the job of dismounted infantry.
It isn't? When a tank carries more firepower (not to mention ammo) than an entire platoon, it would appear to be a prime suppressor.

B.Smitty,
Come on I am sure you know that armour without inf support are sitting ducks for enemy (infantry) tank hunting teams. It is the infantry that protects the armour from enemy infantry. This is a crucial principal in MOUT and jungle terrain.

B.Smitty
19 Oct 05,, 12:03
B.Smitty,
Come on I am sure you know that armour without inf support are sitting ducks for enemy (infantry) tank hunting teams. It is the infantry that protects the armour from enemy infantry. This is a crucial principal in MOUT and jungle terrain.

Who said anything about armor without inf support?

I said suppressing infantry is a job that armor can do.

B.Smitty
19 Oct 05,, 12:05
Well, 1st of all, this is not a SPAAG. It doesn't have the elevation. However, I do agree with your assertion that a SPAAG is useful. It's elevation angles give it the advantage of shooting upwards into those shooting down.

It can elevate to 45 degrees. Pretty good for a non-SPAAG.

lemontree
19 Oct 05,, 14:22
I said suppressing infantry is a job that armor can do.
True but that is not the tanks job.

B.Smitty
19 Oct 05,, 15:09
True but that is not the tanks job.

Ok then, what is a tank's "job"?

Terran empire
19 Oct 05,, 16:25
the Primary Role of the Tank is to engage enemy Tanks.
escorting friendly vehicles and then Suppression of Infantry.

TANKS ARE MADE TO KILL TANKS!!

B.Smitty
19 Oct 05,, 17:50
the Primary Role of the Tank is to engage enemy Tanks.
escorting friendly vehicles and then Suppression of Infantry.

TANKS ARE MADE TO KILL TANKS!!

When the enemy has no tanks, should they just go home?

From FM 71-1 TANK AND MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMPANY TEAM,


The tank platoon has the following capabilities:

* It has the necessary manpower and equipment to effectively develop the situation.

* It can conduct operations requiring firepower, mobility, armor protection, and shock effect.

* When equipped with mine rollers and mine plows, it can reduce mine and wire obstacles.

* It can employ maneuver (a combination of fire and movement) to destroy enemy tanks, fighting vehicles, antiarmor systems, and emplacements (such as strongpoints and bunkers).

* It can assault enemy positions.

* It can secure terrain.

* It can defend, repelling enemy attacks with fires.

* It can conduct combat operations under limited visibility conditions.

* It can conduct mounted patrols.

* It can provide support, in the form of armor protection and fires, to infantry and engineer elements in restricted terrain or during an assault.

* It can suppress enemy positions with machine gun and/or main gun fire.

* It can ford water obstacles up to 4 feet in depth.

* It can operate in an NBC environment.

* It can operate in a stability and support environment.

Officer of Engineers
20 Oct 05,, 01:12
It can elevate to 45 degrees. Pretty good for a non-SPAAG.

In the 1999 Battle for Grozny, Russian AAGs were typically used at 60+ degrees.


Who said anything about armor without inf support?

I said suppressing infantry is a job that armor can do.

That's not what you said.




Suppressing enemy infantry is not the job of armour. That's the job of dismounted infantry.It isn't? When a tank carries more firepower (not to mention ammo) than an entire platoon, it would appear to be a prime suppressor.

It is not the prime suppressor.


Ok then, what is a tank's "job"?

In this context, to kill what the infantry tells it to kill.

Of course there are exceptions, Op THUNDER RUN is one such exception. However, compare the Op with the Russian Grozny incursion in 1994. Tactically, there is very little difference except the Chechens were prepared and the Iraqis ain't.

Terran empire
20 Oct 05,, 01:25
the Primary Role of the Tank is to engage enemy Tanks.
escorting friendly vehicles and then Suppression of Infantry.

TANKS ARE MADE TO KILL TANKS!!

When the enemy has no tanks, should they just go home?



Dude stop reading what you want and discarding the rest. here I bold and underlined some thing you missed

B.Smitty
20 Oct 05,, 03:34
In the 1999 Battle for Grozny, Russian AAGs were typically used at 60+ degrees.


More is better. I can't argue with you there.



That's not what you said.


Yes, actually it is.



It isn't? When a tank carries more firepower (not to mention ammo) than an entire platoon, it would appear to be a prime suppressor.



It is not the prime suppressor.



"A" does not mean "the".

B.Smitty
20 Oct 05,, 03:43
Dude stop reading what you want and discarding the rest. here I bold and underlined some thing you missed

I'm sorry, I must've been distracted by the next sentence in ALL CAPS.

When you shout at someone, online or not, people tend to forget the rest of what you say.

lurker
20 Oct 05,, 03:50
Gentlemen, please note also the difference (from tanks) in armouring - BMPT have a lot of armour on a roof/sides/back.

The idea was to create a machine with 360 degrees of protection against close range AT infantry weapons.

http://podol.ru/tank/bmpt-03.gif

Officer of Engineers
20 Oct 05,, 05:15
Gentlemen, please note also the difference (from tanks) in armouring - BMPT have a lot of armour on a roof/sides/back.

The idea was to create a machine with 360 degrees of protection against close range AT infantry weapons.

http://podol.ru/tank/bmpt-03.gif
And that's where the BMPT is wrong. From your army's experience in WWII (and mine), protection comes from the infantry doing their jobs and not from heavier armour.

lurker
20 Oct 05,, 05:26
And that's where the BMPT is wrong. From your army's experience in WWII (and mine), protection comes from the infantry doing their jobs and not from heavier armour.
No one says that BMPT's are supposed to do a protection job just by them selves. There is P in the name that means "Support".

I can confirm what Garry said about Shilka's in Afghanistan. My classmate older brother was in tank forces in Afghanistan, and was telling exactly the same.

I think of the BMPT more as of the "city tank", that can do the infantry suppression (tank job now) in mountains or in cities. Thats why there is a lot of armour on top. Thats why it can aim and shoot at 4 targets at the same time, and that why there is a lot of anti-infantry weapons.

Officer of Engineers
20 Oct 05,, 05:39
No one says that BMPT's are supposed to do a protection job just by them selves. There is P in the name that means "Support".

I can confirm what Garry said about Shilka's in Afghanistan. My classmate older brother was in tank forces in Afghanistan, and was telling exactly the same.

I think of the BMPT more as of the "city tank", that can do the infantry suppression (tank job now) in mountains or in cities. Thats why there is a lot of armour on top. Thats why it can aim and shoot at 4 targets at the same time, and that why there is a lot of anti-infantry weapons.

No, I cannot agree with that and certainly not with your army friend's interruptations. The biggest problem in urban warfare is and was rubble and rubble will stop armour no matter what ... even if that rubble happens to be a dead tank.

Infantry has to push the enemy out of the way for the engineers to do their jobs ... and that's where I think this whole BMPT thing is wrong.

Give me a bulldozer with a demo gun to blast a collapsing buidling the out of the way and a FIVE-OH to drive the enemy infantry back while I push a dead tank out of the way. And I can only do this while the infantry is busy doing their jobs.

This BMPT ain't going to push any rubble out of the way and it certainly ain't going to demo anything.

lurker
20 Oct 05,, 05:53
No, I cannot agree with that and certainly not with your army friend's interruptations. The biggest problem in urban warfare is and was rubble and rubble will stop armour no matter what ... even if that rubble happens to be a dead tank.

Infantry has to push the enemy out of the way for the engineers to do their jobs ... and that's where I think this whole BMPT thing is wrong.

Give me a bulldozer with a demo gun to blast a collapsing buidling the out of the way and a FIVE-OH to drive the enemy infantry back while I push a dead tank out of the way. And I can only do this while the infantry is busy doing their jobs.

This BMPT ain't going to push any rubble out of the way and it certainly ain't going to demo anything.

My friend just was saying that Shilka's quickly turned any machine gun position (or any other source of enemy fire) into pile of very small rocks. I think it would not work against steel rod hardened concrete buildings.

Tanks cannot suppress high positioned enemy positons, because their gun lacks elevation.

I myself still think of tank in a city as a completely wrong idea. Stalingrad and later Grozny proved that infantry going from building to building and good artillery support from time to time - is the best thing for now.

p.s. This BMPT thing is just heavily modified T-90, put a bulldozer blade on it, and it can bulldoze the same way as tanks (with those blades) do.

lemontree
20 Oct 05,, 07:03
Ok then, what is a tank's "job"?
You are aware of cavalry roles in conventional war. Its primary role lies in maneuver warfare.

B.Smitty
20 Oct 05,, 13:15
You are aware of cavalry roles in conventional war. Its primary role lies in maneuver warfare.

Tanks also exist outside of cavalry formations. At least they do in the U.S..

kNikS
20 Oct 05,, 13:39
Ok, there is no substitute for infantry doing their jobs and engineers in MOUT. But also Shilka’s 4x23mm is proven thing for suppressing enemy (infantry). Again, Shilka lacked protection and this vehicle is compromise between tank armor and SPAAG armament. BMPT protection is certainly better than Shilka and its protection is improvement for T-series survivability – there is no carousel autoloader and top of the vehicle have added armor and unmanned turret. BMPT uses late series T-72/T-90 hull and T-80 side skirts so it’s a lot more different than Iraqi T-72 which are (worst, Czechoslovak) export version. Also it has provision for mounting KMT mine rakes like all T-series. Again it lacks SPAAG rate of fire and elevation and on the other side it has 2xPlamja and 30mm HE rounds. Like I said this is compromise but with infantry doing their jobs it could be useful.

I’d like to see Russian heavy APC on T-72 chassis instead of BMP-T. Its protection would be better than on the old T-55 hull, still there is possibility to mount various turrets (manned or unmanned, even similar to BMTP) and it’s standardized with T-72/90 tanks.

lemontree
20 Oct 05,, 13:55
Tanks also exist outside of cavalry formations. At least they do in the U.S..
Are you referring to Tank Destroyer Units (TDUs)? I thought that these had been either phased out/ converted to armour units.

lurker
20 Oct 05,, 14:07
Again it lacks SPAAG rate of fire and elevation and on the other side it has 2xPlamja and 30mm HE rounds. Like I said this is compromise but with infantry doing their jobs it could be useful.

I’d like to see Russian heavy APC on T-72 chassis instead of BMP-T. Its protection would be better than on the old T-55 hull, still there is possibility to mount various turrets (manned or unmanned, even similar to BMTP) and it’s standardized with T-72/90 tanks.

It have the elevation. Low flying planes ang helicopters are also declared targets for BMPT.

Btw, BMPT is already passed all tests and being ordered starting past summer. They are going to replace the 3rd tank in tank squads (or 2nd and 3rd in city terrain).

Officer of Engineers
20 Oct 05,, 14:32
Btw, BMPT is already passed all tests and being ordered starting past summer. They are going to replace the 3rd tank in tank squads (or 2nd and 3rd in city terrain).

In motor rifle regts? Or tank regts?

lurker
20 Oct 05,, 14:50
In motor rifle regts? Or tank regts?
No info yet.

Officer of Engineers
20 Oct 05,, 15:30
I myself still think of tank in a city as a completely wrong idea. Stalingrad and later Grozny proved that infantry going from building to building and good artillery support from time to time - is the best thing for now.

Helicopters. Add in helos. Insert troops from the top and fight down

kNikS
20 Oct 05,, 15:50
Btw, BMPT is already passed all tests and being ordered starting past summer. They are going to replace the 3rd tank in tank squads (or 2nd and 3rd in city terrain).
I know, I was talking about BMP-T, infantry combat vehicle –heavy not BMPT tank support combat vehicle. Israelis converted their captured T-55 for heavy APC role (Achzarit) and Ukrainians even converted T-84 to carry soldiers in troop compartment in back of the vehicle (BTMP-84). BMP-T is ( http://www.otvaga2004.narod.ru/Otvaga/armour-rus-other/a_btr-t.htm ) basically same thing as Achzarit and I hope to see Russian heavy APC on late version T-72/90 chassis instead of T-55.

lurker
20 Oct 05,, 16:40
I know, I was talking about BMP-T, infantry combat vehicle –heavy not BMPT tank support combat vehicle. Israelis converted their captured T-55 for heavy APC role (Achzarit).

I doubt that we will ever see any russian heavy transporter. Israelis could play with that because of their tiny army size, and no need to have amphibious vehicle (and other "specifics").

Blademaster
20 Oct 05,, 17:29
Helicopters. Add in helos. Insert troops from the top and fight down

Too vulnerable and of limited utility. What I would go for is an fixed wing gunship like the Spectre that can blast any hidden snipers or nested machine guns or RPGs.

The thing about helos is that it is somewhat difficult to find a suitable roof to land. Helos should only be used in conjunction with ground troops who are fighting from the bottom. That way you can sandwich the enemy between the high ground and low ground.

If you just use the high ground, you will find yourself cut off if something goes wrong. With the low ground, you can easily retreat. Not so on the high ground.

B.Smitty
20 Oct 05,, 17:31
Are you referring to Tank Destroyer Units (TDUs)? I thought that these had been either phased out/ converted to armour units.

No. Tanks are part of the TOE for all Army heavy divisions, and Marine divisions.

kNikS
20 Oct 05,, 18:02
Helicopters. Add in helos. Insert troops from the top and fight down
Sir, I’m not sure about that. Although there are relatively fairly good possibilities about coordinating infantry and helicopters, helicopters are still very sensitive to manportable AA missiles and even unguided AT launchers and AGL etc etc especially in urban, hilly or terrain with dense vegetation (or mix of some of these). And efficient use of aircraft (being fixed wing or helicopters) is questionable when they are operating in way which top goal is to minimize the risk of being shot down. My country in 1999 is best example for that.

kNikS
20 Oct 05,, 18:19
Too vulnerable and of limited utility. What I would go for is an fixed wing gunship like the Spectre that can blast any hidden snipers or nested machine guns or RPGs.

The thing about helos is that it is somewhat difficult to find a suitable roof to land. Helos should only be used in conjunction with ground troops who are fighting from the bottom. That way you can sandwich the enemy between the high ground and low ground.

If you just use the high ground, you will find yourself cut off if something goes wrong. With the low ground, you can easily retreat. Not so on the high ground.
In some extent I share this opinion about fixed wing gunships but we are at the artillery topic again and this is very applicable to Russian case, especially when taking into account their large experience about using artillery, SP or stationed, direct or indirect fire...

lurker
20 Oct 05,, 18:39
Helicopters. Add in helos. Insert troops from the top and fight down
Helicopters ... As others are stated already have high vulnerability to small arms fire. They are expensive, and have limited availability (Especially in mountains).
You cannot "clean" a city with infantry + helicopters.
You cannot escort trucks convoys through the mounains with helicopters.

BMPT is supposed to go everywhere tanks go, and be available in numbers.

p.s. I've heard a joke that BMPT is everything they wanted to put on a tank, but had no space.

Officer of Engineers
20 Oct 05,, 19:40
Like other aspects of any ground operations, helos are an asset, not a main force. It's alot easier to go down than up. Russian soldiers (as well as Canadians) would rather blow holes in walls on the top floors and cross from one building to the next and fight down rather than trying to assualt up.

Blademaster
20 Oct 05,, 20:56
Like other aspects of any ground operations, helos are an asset, not a main force. It's alot easier to go down than up. Russian soldiers (as well as Canadians) would rather blow holes in walls on the top floors and cross from one building to the next and fight down rather than trying to assualt up.

But how do you retreat safely if something goes wrong?

B.Smitty
20 Oct 05,, 21:07
Here's a snip from a Marine Lessons Learned on top-down vs bottom up:


Top Down verse Bottom Up Assaults:
An infantry squad can assault structures using two different methods. Traditionally, the
top down assault is taught as being the most ideal method for clearing a structure.
Realistically, this may not be the best option for the infantry squad. Below are the
advantages and disadvantages of both top down and bottom up assault methods.
Top Down:
Advantages-
1. Surprising the enemy by moving from the top down may throw
the enemy off balance. The enemy’s defenses may not be
prepared for a top down assault and the squad could
overwhelm the enemy rapidly.
2. The squad has more momentum when moving down the
ladderwells.
3. If the squad knows that the enemy is inside the roof can be
breached in order so grenades and explosives could be dropped
in.
4. The enemy’s egress routes are greatly reduced because the
squad can isolate the house by holding security on the back
alleys and the front of the house from the roof.
Disadvantages-
1. Once the squad makes entry and contact is made, pulling out of
the structure is extremely difficult. This limits the options for
the squad leader on how to engage the enemy. The structure
must be flooded and Marines have to go overtop of casualties
in order to kill the enemy. Momentum must not be lost.
Marines have been left behind in houses because the
momentum was lost.
2. If the squad decides to break contact they are moving opposite
of their momentum and more casualties will result.
3. Marine squads may not have enough Marines to effectively
flood the structure.
4. If casualties are taken they are nearly impossible to pull up the
ladderwell with all their gear and a limp body. This is another
reason why the structure must be flooded.
5. The casualties will not receive the immediate first aid because
the entire squad must be committed to neutralization of the
threat. The swiftness of medical attention may mean the
difference between life and death.

Bottom Up:
Advantages-
1. The squad leader has a slew of options when contact is made.
The structure does not have to be flooded.
2. Momentum can be maintained in assaulting or breaking contact
and the squad leader can switch rapidly from one to the other.
3. The structure can be cleared with fewer Marines because the
clearing is more controlled and smooth, whereas top down is
always in high gear.
4. Casualties can be pulled out faster and easier simply because
gravity is working for the squad.
Disadvantages-
1. The squad is moving into the enemy’s defenses. It is easy for
the enemy to hold the second deck and ladderwell.
2. The squad is slow moving up the ladderwell, which makes it
harder to maintain momentum.
3. The enemy has the ability to escape by using its preplanned
routes.
Overall, there should not be a standard assault method. Rather the squad leader should
understand the advantages and disadvantages of each, assess each structure quickly, make
a decision on which method to employ, and then take actions that maximize its
advantages while minimizing its disadvantages.


http://www.marinetimes.com/content/editorial/pdf/mc.infantry_squad_lessons418.pdf

kNikS
20 Oct 05,, 21:26
Ok, we are back to soldiers doing their jobs, top down or bottom up. Aerial insertion has some advantages and even if there are good possibilities of evacuation, supplies, fire support still there is the question about survivability of the helicopter in environments mentioned earlier. Is it really the optimal asset for this type of combat?

Officer of Engineers
20 Oct 05,, 22:09
But how do you retreat safely if something goes wrong?Same way you come in, air extract.


the question about survivability of the helicopter in environments mentioned earlier. Is it really the optimal asset for this type of combat?

Air insert has the advantage of you deciding where the fight is rather than having to crash through prepared defences. Is it an optimal asset? More so than this BMPT. I can get my people in where I want them to be without having to fight my way through.

kNikS
20 Oct 05,, 23:15
Air insert has the advantage of you deciding where the fight is rather than having to crash through prepared defences. Is it an optimal asset? More so than this BMPT. I can get my people in where I want them to be without having to fight my way through.
Attempt to insert, supply, provide fire support and evac light infantry in city flooded with enemies with unclear and well prepared defensive positions, unfriendly population (potential enemy) and variety of small arms, HMG, AA, AT and grenade launchers…Sounds just like Grozny and closely resembles Mogadish.

Officer of Engineers
21 Oct 05,, 04:00
Sounds just like Grozny and closely resembles Mogadish.

Not a good arguement. Had it been any other army, Mogadishu would have been declared a victory. At the cost of 18 fatalities, Adid's militia was wiped out and Adid was reduced to a petty thief and later killed by rivals whom once feared Adid.

lurker
21 Oct 05,, 04:16
Like other aspects of any ground operations, helos are an asset, not a main force. It's alot easier to go down than up. Russian soldiers (as well as Canadians) would rather blow holes in walls on the top floors and cross from one building to the next and fight down rather than trying to assualt up.

Agreed there. But russian helicopters are in transition now. Mi-24's which were armoured, could carry troops and a lot of firepower are phased away. Black Sharks just started to arrive in 2002 (1st three were shown in Chechnya).

At the same time a lot of ppl I know expressed need for a machine such as BMPT (although maybe with specialized weaponry). - So this is a start.
Maybe it would be unsuccessful, who knows.

Officer of Engineers
21 Oct 05,, 04:21
At the same time a lot of ppl I know expressed need for a machine such as BMPT (although maybe with specialized weaponry). - So this is a start.
Maybe it would be unsuccessful, who knows.

I can understand the arguement. I can even understand why the need is justified but people are not looking at the big picture. There are two battles (recee and main force) here and the people are trying to combined the two into one. If you seperate the two, (ie, allow the recee to do their jobs (ie, just find out where the enemy is and not try to take them out)) things become alot easier.

lemontree
21 Oct 05,, 05:42
No. Tanks are part of the TOE for all Army heavy divisions, and Marine divisions.
So does our army. These are armour units integral to the infantry division, and separate from the armoured division. But then these units are basically cavalry or do you have a separate conotation for this term.

kNikS
21 Oct 05,, 10:42
Not a good arguement. Had it been any other army, Mogadishu would have been declared a victory. At the cost of 18 fatalities, Adid's militia was wiped out and Adid was reduced to a petty thief and later killed by rivals whom once feared Adid.
I’m not questioning succes in Mogadishu and even Grozny in some extent, at the end loss of 18 vs 2000+ is certainly a victory. I’m questioning capabilities of low and slow helicopters no matter which warning an countermeasures systems they use in previous conditions, especially if you take into account that two Blackhawks was shot down in one day with cheap and archaic weapon such as RPG7.

Use of infantry + helicopters in urban, hilly and terrain with densed vegetation is possible in small scale - quick insertions, recce, picking valuable targets or target designation and extraction although even that kind of use is somewhat risky for helicopters. But in scenario where helicopter is spending much time in vicinity of contact, low and slow flying, maybe hovering for no matter what purpose – vulnerability and possibility of shot is very high, even without serious AA defense.

kNikS
21 Oct 05,, 10:58
I have somewhere one old VHS from Chechnya showing 45. Recon Specnaz Regiment in 99 where they were using 6 Mi24 for support. But on the same reportage there is the captured video from Chechen terrorists shooting at some Russian field heliport with AT missiles. I would have to find it to see about the range and type of weapon, but its possibly guided one and range is probably larger than one required for efficient shooting at tanks (in terms of accuracy not penetration, off course). It shows that helos are more vulnerable than armor when attacked in this way. Of course, this is the matter of security of base but sensitivity of helos is certainly far higher than tanks.

B.Smitty
21 Oct 05,, 12:25
So does our army. These are armour units integral to the infantry division, and separate from the armoured division. But then these units are basically cavalry or do you have a separate conotation for this term.

We have what are called Armored Cavalry Regiments, which are combined-arms formations (tanks and mech inf). They do the traditional cav role. Our heavy divisions are also combined-arms, with tanks and mech inf. They have full-spectrum capabilities and aren't "just" cavalry units.

Officer of Engineers
21 Oct 05,, 13:55
I’m not questioning succes in Mogadishu and even Grozny in some extent, at the end loss of 18 vs 2000+ is certainly a victory. I’m questioning capabilities of low and slow helicopters no matter which warning an countermeasures systems they use in previous conditions, especially if you take into account that two Blackhawks was shot down in one day with cheap and archaic weapon such as RPG7.

Again, not good arguements. Considering the number of RPGs actually fired at the helos in the entire time they were used, not just the Black Hawk Down incident, these were lucky shots. Something like over 500 RPGs were fired and out of 500, only 2 managed hits.

TopHatter
21 Oct 05,, 16:37
Again, not good arguements. Considering the number of RPGs actually fired at the helos in the entire time they were used, not just the Black Hawk Down incident, these were lucky shots. Something like over 500 RPGs were fired and out of 500, only 2 managed hits.

The hits that were managed were impressive enough, but as OoE said, many many RPGs were fired. Can you guess what happened to the grenadiers after they missed?

B.Smitty
21 Oct 05,, 18:23
Again, not good arguements. Considering the number of RPGs actually fired at the helos in the entire time they were used, not just the Black Hawk Down incident, these were lucky shots. Something like over 500 RPGs were fired and out of 500, only 2 managed hits.

Hmm, yes and this is against what amounts to an armed mob. And the two downings caused the subsequent massive rescue effort, and completely disrupted the intended mission. Against a more capable enemy, they would've suffered far worse.

More damning might the ill-fated Apache deep strikes during OIF over populated areas. If these far less vulnerable aircraft can get completely shot up like that, Blackhawks would've been falling from the skies.

I think non-attack helos can be used in a relatively benign MOUT environment. But I'd be seriously hesitant to use them if major opposition is expected.

They're just too big, slow, loud and vulnerable.

B.Smitty
21 Oct 05,, 18:25
The hits that were managed were impressive enough, but as OoE said, many many RPGs were fired. Can you guess what happened to the grenadiers after they missed?


In many cases, I would guess, not a whole lot.

kNikS
21 Oct 05,, 20:13
Again, not good arguements. Considering the number of RPGs actually fired at the helos in the entire time they were used, not just the Black Hawk Down incident, these were lucky shots. Something like over 500 RPGs were fired and out of 500, only 2 managed hits.
Again, you are missing the essence of my words. I’m perfectly aware of percentage of successful RPG hits. Even if we exclude AT weapons and even if we take into account that some helicopters are partially protected from autocanon ammo and has warning and countermeasures systems enhancing their survivability (mainly attack helos), array of AA weapons or weapons which could be more or less successfully used against helicopters is very large.

Officer of Engineers
21 Oct 05,, 21:34
More damning might the ill-fated Apache deep strikes during OIF over populated areas. If these far less vulnerable aircraft can get completely shot up like that, Blackhawks would've been falling from the skies.

The APACHEs were improperly deployed.


I think non-attack helos can be used in a relatively benign MOUT environment. But I'd be seriously hesitant to use them if major opposition is expected.

Depends on who wins the recee battle. If our side won the recee battle, I would have no hesitations to use transport helos.


array of AA weapons or weapons which could be more or less successfully used against helicopters is very large.

Why are you going in against prepared defences without reducing them 1st?

kNikS
22 Oct 05,, 13:13
Depends on who wins the recee battle. If our side won the recee battle, I would have no hesitations to use transport helos.

Why are you going in against prepared defences without reducing them 1st?
I never said even similar thing to going on prepared defences or using helos in MOUT without adequate preparations. I said earlier what I think is their appropriate use and if you read it again you’ll see that was combination with small recce units with addition of target designation and destroying valuable targets. Off course, with accent on being not exposed to enemy forces. It looks to me like a recce battle.

What do you think about recce with UAV, then on appropriate pleace HAHO/HALO insertion of small recce infantry units with support of aviation (included bombers and fixed wing gunships) and artillery (laser guided projectiles) and then sending adequate main force – infantry and engineers with artillery and aviation support, off course? In the main force there is certainly place for BMPT instead of Shilkas and BMD wit externally mounted light AAA. I don’t see it in recce role.


The APACHEs were improperly deployed.
That’s what I was talking about. Only wanted to add that situational awareness of helos is higher than fixed wing aircrafts but due to is slow speed and low flying altitude there is much higher risk of loss. Maybe, good example of attack helos usage is in Israel where they were used at highest possible altitudes and were shoting at targets (cars with PLO, Hamas etc leaders) designated by special forces, but again that is more or less benign environment. Usage of transport helicopters should be concentrated on supplies, medevac or some immediate insertions and extractions.

Officer of Engineers
23 Oct 05,, 02:01
I never said even similar thing to going on prepared defences or using helos in MOUT without adequate preparations. I said earlier what I think is their appropriate use and if you read it again you’ll see that was combination with small recce units with addition of target designation and destroying valuable targets. Off course, with accent on being not exposed to enemy forces. It looks to me like a recce battle.

Why restrict helos to the recee battle if you've already shaped the mainforce battle? You're not thinking things through. If you've won the recee battle, that means you can see and hear while the bad guys are blind and deaf. That means that they will guess at where you're coming from, mostly by reading a map. So, why wouldn't you insert a force where he cannot see nor hear?

Think it through.


What do you think about recce with UAV, then on appropriate pleace HAHO/HALO insertion of small recce infantry units with support of aviation (included bombers and fixed wing gunships) and artillery (laser guided projectiles) and then sending adequate main force – infantry and engineers with artillery and aviation support, off course? In the main force there is certainly place for BMPT instead of Shilkas and BMD wit externally mounted light AAA. I don’t see it in recce role.

I can live your TOE. Let's be clear about a few things. If I have the BMPT assigned to me, I will use it. I would be a fool to leave 37mm cannons and ATGMs behind. However, I will definetely not replace a demo gun and a bulldozer with the BMPT.


That’s what I was talking about. Only wanted to add that situational awareness of helos is higher than fixed wing aircrafts but due to is slow speed and low flying altitude there is much higher risk of loss. Maybe, good example of attack helos usage is in Israel where they were used at highest possible altitudes and were shoting at targets (cars with PLO, Hamas etc leaders) designated by special forces, but again that is more or less benign environment. Usage of transport helicopters should be concentrated on supplies, medevac or some immediate insertions and extractions.

There's a reason why army aviation is ARMY aviation. It's there to act in tandem with ground forces. Once you seperate the two, you have problems.

B.Smitty
23 Oct 05,, 04:19
The APACHEs were improperly deployed.


Definitely true.


Depends on who wins the recee battle. If our side won the recee battle, I would have no hesitations to use transport helos.


Problem is, winning the recc battle in MOUT is orders of magnitude harder than in the open, especially against insurgents.

They may look like civvies until they see a helo, then - pop - out comes the RPG.

Some web references on helos in MOUT,

http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1187/MR1187.appd.pdf


During the Battle of Hue, Communist Vietnamese anti-aircraft
fire drove helicopter gunships from the city and made conditions
extremely difficult for airborne observers.
...
Most of the anti-aircraft fire directed at Marine helicopters during
the Beirut peacekeeping mission was limited to small arms
and some RPGs. However, even that minimal opposition was sufficient
to severely restrict gunship operations over the city.
...
Furthermore, the Chechen air defenses—which included SAMs (SA-13s and SA-16s) and radar-controlled AAA, in addition to heavy machine guns and
RPGs—proved highly lethal to helicopters. As a result, the
Russians used helicopters mostly for noncombat missions.
...
Since the Vietnam War, helicopters have performed most trooptransport
missions within urban areas. Their small size and maneuverability
relative to transport planes—and, more recently, their
aerial-refueling and nighttime capabilities—have enabled helicopters
to drop off and pick up hundreds of individuals in fairly close
urban terrain and to transport them safely over considerable distances.
These characteristics have made helicopters especially useful
in urban-related NEOs. Nonetheless, recent U.S. engagements in
Somalia have demonstrated that even armored transport helicopters
can be brought down by relatively unsophisticated weapons such as
RPGs, making their employment problematic in nonpermissive urban
situations.
...
Helicopter transport within contested urban areas has become
quite hazardous.


http://www.iwar.org.uk/pipermail/infocon/2004-November/002022.html


(q) Heavy machine guns still offer good defense against close air attack,
especially from helicopters.
...
(z) Helicopters are not well suited for urban combat.

Officer of Engineers
23 Oct 05,, 04:34
B.Smitty,

You posted some contradicting info. I would not use the Chechen example since the Russians seemingly do not believe in the recee battle (ie, blinding the enemy as well finding the enemy). However, the best evidence I can point to is that we're still using helos in combat operations in Iraq.

lurker
23 Oct 05,, 04:46
I would not use the Chechen example since the Russians seemingly do not believe in the recee battle (ie, blinding the enemy as well finding the enemy).

The more I know about Chechen wars, the more I think that nobody should use it as an example in tactics.
Looks like russian military command was split between different political and economic factions, and carried orders sometimes totally against any opinion of other officers (If not to say more).

B.Smitty
23 Oct 05,, 05:04
B.Smitty,

You posted some contradicting info. I would not use the Chechen example since the Russians seemingly do not believe in the recee battle (ie, blinding the enemy as well finding the enemy). However, the best evidence I can point to is that we're still using helos in combat operations in Iraq.

Contradicting info? I included the "Since the Vietnam War.." comment primarily for the last sentence.


Nonetheless, recent U.S. engagements in
Somalia have demonstrated that even armored transport helicopters
can be brought down by relatively unsophisticated weapons such as
RPGs, making their employment problematic in nonpermissive urban
situations.


We are using helos in MOUT in Iraq, but in what capacity? Attack helos in combat ops, definitely. But how are we using transport helos? I haven't heard of us dropping assault elements on rooftops or anything.

Officer of Engineers
23 Oct 05,, 05:17
Contradicting info? I included the "Since the Vietnam War.." comment primarily for the last sentence.


Nonetheless, recent U.S. engagements in Somalia have demonstrated that even armored transport helicopters can be brought down by relatively unsophisticated weapons such as RPGs, making their employment problematic in nonpermissive urban situations.

I certainly do not agree with that non-official conclusion. As stated, over 500 RPGs fired and only 2 hits. And most certainly more flights occurred during that entire event and no further birds were hit, including the landing of the two snipers.


We are using helos in MOUT in Iraq, but in what capacity? Attack helos in combat ops, definitely. But how are we using transport helos? I haven't heard of us dropping assault elements on rooftops or anything.

The only air assualts that I am aware of was during the drive to Baghdad. Other than that, I am not privy to the operational nor tactical thinking. The good Captain Shek would be the best one to answer that.

troung
23 Oct 05,, 05:57
Opened a thread on IDF lessons of 1982 and most of it was MOUT...

B. Operational Lessons:

Lesson 8: The IDF had a well-developed military doctrine for urban warfare which influenced its tactics, but not its overall force structure. The IDF began developing doctrine for military operations in urban terrain in 1973 as a result of its experiences in fighting for Jerusalem in 1967 as well as in Suez City and Qantara in 1973. This doctrine envisioned two types of urban offensive, one in which armor leads and the other in which armor supports infantry as it opens and secures an area. Traditional IDF reliance on armor usually favored them using the former technique until an area proved too difficult to take with armor. Israel’s relative lack of significant urban warfare experience to date, plus a decided bias toward armored warfare, meant that Israeli doctrine for urban warfare had little impact on its overall force structure. Thus, the IDF lacked sufficient quantities of infantry necessary for urban operations in Lebanon.

Lesson 9: Training in urban operations greatly benefited those Israeli soldiers who received it. Unfortunately, not all soldiers were afforded that opportunity. Israeli combat training in military operations in urban terrain was extensive prior to the invasion of Lebanon and was judged very valuable in the aftermath of the battle for Beirut. Units with such training better understood the hazards of fighting in a city and appeared to be more confident than units which got no such training. Additionally, coordination of combat and combat support elements, as exercised in pre-invasion Israeli urban training, was afterwards judged more effective because of pre-invasion training. Part of that training included small tactical training exercises in captured Syrian towns in the Golan Heights and villages in southern Lebanon. Although the environment of these small towns differed significantly from the situation later encountered in heavily built-up Beirut, the training seems to have served the IDF well. Unfortunately, only the regular army units received training in urban warfare. This was a serious problem since the IDF maintains only a small cadre force which is fleshed out by large numbers of reservists -- none of whom received adequate training in urban operations because of the limited annual training time available to reservists. Consequently, reservists performed less well and experienced more casualties in urban fighting.

Lesson 10: Israeli rules of engagement were difficult to operationalize. The IDF was given clear, but conflicting, rules of engagement. Initial rules of engagement stressed the need to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage in cities. These same rules also mandated that Israeli commanders minimize their own casualties and adhere to a fast-paced operational timetable. The Israelis soon learned in the slow house-to-house fighting in the battle of Tyre that it was impossible to accommodate these conflicting instructions.

Lesson 11: Rules of engagement are sometimes difficult to enforce. Every effort was made in the initial phase of the campaign to enforce the rules about limiting injuries among non-combatants. Nevertheless, ground force personnel often sought ways around such restrictions upon the use of heavy weapons and target selection in cities. One such way was to call for an air strike when the ground forces met stiff resistance. In this way, responsibility for civilian casualties and collateral damage could be displaced to that more anonymous platform, the airplane, and to the difficulties of carrying out precision bombing in urban environments. In this way, the ground forces had strictly observed the letter of the restrictions against firing into civilian areas while successfully evading the spirit of those rules.

Lesson 12: Concern about civilian casualties and property damage declined as IDF casualties rose. The Israelis soon realized that heavy firepower was the only way to minimize their own casualties and maintain an adequate operational tempo. Consequently, the Israelis began to bring artillery fire to bear on Palestinian strong points with the consequence that collateral damage rose sharply. They also increasingly employed close air support, even in refugee camps. By the battle of Beirut, the IDF was engaging in “intensive bombardment” of Syrian and PLO targets in Palestinian sections of the city.

Lesson 13: Overwhelming firepower can make up for organizational and tactical deficiencies in the short-run if one is willing to disregard collateral damage. Early in the campaign, the Israelis realized that large numbers of infantry would be necessary to clear built-up areas; something that IDF lacked because of its traditional emphasis on maneuver warfare. Lacking enough infantry, the IDF resorted to heavy weapons. Firepower over infantry was probably the preferred (and preordained) solution in Lebanon since the IDF had earlier increased its reliance on mobile artillery to suppress enemy infantry rather than expand its own infantry forces in the wake of lessons learned from the 1973 War. Indeed, infantry forces proportionately declined as a percentage of the total IDF force mix between 1973 and 1982 as artillery forces were built-up.

Lesson 14: The tempo of urban operations is so intense that soldiers tend to “burn out”. After-action assessments of IDF performance during urban operations point out the difficulty the IDF had sustaining combat operations because of the high stress level it imposed on individual soldiers. This observation is borne out by Israeli casualty figures: i.e., 10-24% of Israeli soldiers serving in Lebanon experienced psychological problems as a result of their battle experience. This compared with a psychological casualty rate of only 3.5% to 5% in the 1973 war means that battle shock casualties suffered in Lebanon were two to five times more serious. The number of soldiers able to return to their units after treatment was also much lower than should have been expected.

Lesson 15: Non-combatants do not behave sensibly. Many Israeli military planners presumed that civilians in urban combat zones would follow “common sense” and abandon areas where fighting was taking place. In many cases, this did not occur. Civilians would instead try to stay in their homes. There were many reasons for this; some based on experiences in the earlier Lebanese civil war. Some families were convinced by PLO propaganda that if they left their homes during an IDF truce, they would be killed by the Israelis. Some probably underestimated the likely duration and intensity of the fighting and felt they could withstand the effects of Israeli/PLO/Syrian combat. Others simply feared that soldiers would loot their possessions if the rightful owners were not there to protect them. (A very reasonable fear given the prevalence of looting during the earlier Lebanese civil war.)

Lesson 16: The large-scale movement of urban non-combatants can significantly affect military operations. In excess of 30,000 non-combatants fled the city of Tyre for the beaches southwest of the city at the urging of Israeli psychological warfare units. Later, half of these people returned to the city in the midst of the fighting. Such a massive exodus clogged roads and delayed IDF attacks on PLO strongpoints. Similarly, the need to impose cease-fires and open lanes for civilians to escape the fighting in Beirut slowed IDF operations in the city.

Lesson 17: Psychological operations were a major element of Israeli strategy. Psychological warfare played a vital role in the Israeli seizure of Tyre and Sidon as well as during the siege of Beirut. Throughout the campaign, the IDF widely employed leaflets, pamphlets, and loudspeakers to get its message across. While Israeli psychological operations were often successful in achieving tactical goals like encouraging large numbers of civilians to abandon urban areas to facilitate combat operations, they were not successful at the campaign level nor at a strategic level in getting PLO fighters to lay down their arms nor in convincing the Lebanese Sunni Muslim population to pressure the PLO into leaving.

Lesson 18: Urban operations in Lebanon stressed the IDF’s logistics system because of unusual requirements and abnormally high consumption rates. The IDF took a number of modest, but important steps to supplement the standard equipment suites of units prior to deploying them in cities. Hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, light anti-tank weapons, and illumination rounds for mortars were issued to infantry platoons in larger numbers than normal. The number of short-range tactical radios, especially hand-held radios, were also increased beyond the usual unit allotments.


Lesson 19: Standard Israeli military unit configurations were inappropriate for urban combat. During the battle for Beirut, the IDF adopted a task-oriented form of tactical organization which cross-attached tanks and self-propelled artillery to infantry units. In such cases, the armor and artillery generally remained under the infantry’s command for the duration of the tactical action.

Lesson 20: Failure to understand the importance of civil affairs cost Israeli commanders dearly. Local IDF commanders did not understand the vital importance of civil affairs for on-going urban combat operations. Thus, civil affairs efforts were ineffectual. Commanders failed to grasp the immediate combat implications or the larger political implications of poor population management. Israeli psychological operations convinced 30,000 non-combatants to flee Tyre and head for beaches outside the city. The subsequent inability of the IDF to provide food, water, clothing, shelter, and sanitation for these people produced predictable consequences. Many tried to return to the city; a process which complicated the northward movement of Israeli troops and the delivery of ordnance on selected targets in Tyre. IDF commanders compounded these oversights by interfering with the efforts of outside relief agencies to aid the displaced population of Tyre lest the PLO is some way benefit. This second civil affairs failure created an adverse situation with was quickly exploited by PLO psychological warfare specialists. The IDF also failed to educate its troops in dealing with Lebanese civilians. Although the Shi’a Muslim population of southern Lebanon either initially welcomed or was neutral to Israeli presence, it soon became hostile because of the behavior of IDF personnel and other factors.

Lesson 21: Aircraft played several important roles in urban operations, especially at the battle of Sidon.
The Israeli Air Force carried out seven major missions in the attack on Sidon: (1) providing air cover for an amphibious landing, (2) bombing of selected targets prior to the IDF entering Sidon both to take out strong points and to psychologically demoralize PLO defenders in the refugee camps outside the city, (3) close air support during difficult battles for the city, (4) flying air cover over the city against the threat from Syrian fighters, (5) transporting of troops and equipment via helicopter around bottlenecks which developed on the ground in Sidon, (6) remove wounded via helicopter, and (7) dropping psychological warfare leaflets over the city.

Lesson 22: Amphibious operations have a role in urban warfare. Israel conducted two amphibious landings; a small one in support of operations in Tyre and a much larger one in about brigade strength during the campaign to capture Sidon.

Lesson 23: Special forces played a limited, but significant, role in Israeli operations. Israeli naval commandos made the initial landings during amphibious operations just north of Sidon and secured the beachhead for follow-on landing forces. This was the first major amphibious operation carried out by the Israeli Navy.

Lesson 24:
Naval forces can play an important supporting role in urban operations. Israeli naval forces were used to conduct amphibious operations to achieve tactical surprise and to isolate Tyre and Sidon at the outset of the campaign. These were technically difficult to conduct due to a shortage of landing craft. Indeed, the Israel Navy had to keep shuttling the landing craft back and forth the 55 kilometers between the beaches north of Sidon and Israel. At Sidon, the Navy also took the ancient port under fire. Due to Beirut’s coastal location, the Israeli Navy also played an important part in isolating the PLO and other hostile forces in West Beirut near the coast. Additionally, the Navy provided modest fire support using its 76mm guns, but its main activities involved coastal patrols to prevent reinforcement of PLO positions or the seaborne delivery of supplies. Other tactical missions included preventing opposition forces from mining the beach or preparing defensive position.

C. Tactical Lessons:

Lesson 25:
The shock value of artillery fire diminishes with time. The IDF discovered shock value of indirect artillery fire in urban warfare depending upon the frequency of its use. In urban areas like Tyre which were already accustomed to seeing and hearing artillery fire because of the Lebanese civil war, Israeli artillery fire had much less psychological shock value than Israeli commanders expected. Likewise in Beirut, its value continued to diminish as combatants (and civilians) became increasingly aware of its shortcomings when used in moderation against built-up areas.

Lesson 26: Forces operating in cities need special equipment not found in standard Israeli tables of organization and equipment. Beyond beefing up the quantities of standard TO&E equipment, the IDF also issued loudspeakers and snipping equipment which were not normally part of an infantry unit’s kit. Also supplemental armor was added to the sides and fronts of many tanks because of the heightened risk from anti-tank weapons in cities.

Lesson 27: Urban civilian structures (e.g., hospitals, churches, banks, embassies) are cited in tactically useful locations, command key intersections, and/or are built of especially solid construction and therefore afford defenders good protection. As mentioned earlier weapons emplacements in “off-limits” structures like hospitals, churches, schools, banks, and embassies afford the defender “political” protection if the attackers wishes to minimize civilian casualties and politically unacceptable collateral damage to the urban infrastructure. Such facilities also offer significant tactical military value since they are located at key intersections, command the high ground in an areas, and/or are so well built that their construction affords defenders an unusually high degree of protection. Thus, the decision to place weapons in “off limits” facilities may be dictated as much, or on some occasions more, by tactical military necessity as by political considerations.

Lesson 28: Rigorous communications security is essential. Overall IDF communications security was generally good, although a few lapses did occur. In part this was due to the way-spread use of encrypted communications equipment and employment of a double-cipher system. Additionally, the IDF changed codes daily and prearranged changes in radio frequency. Conversely, the IDF regularly monitored Syrian and PLO communications because neither practiced rigorous communications security because the PLO and Syrians made extensive use of commercial telephones throughout the urban areas of Lebanon. Commercial facilities provided instant communications for those forces, but also enabled the IDF to identify PLO locations and plan responses to orders intercepted over commercial phone lines.

Lesson 29:
Snipers were very cost effective. The PLO actively employed snipers, even though its people received little formal training and were not equipped with specialized equipment. Nevertheless, PLO snipers delayed IDF operations in Sidon out of proportion to the resources they had invested in such operations. Similarly, the Syrians used snipers very effectively to block Israeli advances in the southeastern suburbs of Beirut. The IDF came to view snipers as being extremely valuable for psychological reasons as well. Even if they did not kill large numbers of the enemy, their presence forced Israeli opponents to keep their heads down and put a higher level of psychological stress on enemy personnel. In addition, the Israelis believe that sniper teams were a valuable source of intelligence, since for much of their time, they are patiently observing enemy actions.

Lesson 30: Explosive ordnance disposal teams are essential in urban areas. Israeli explosive ordnance disposal teams inspected captured weapons caches, either destroying them or recommending their evacuation. They also performed their traditional function of neutralizing “dud” munitions (such as unexploded sub-munitions) and clearing bobby traps.


Lesson 31: Armored forces cannot operate in cities without extensive dismounted infantry support. The IDF, because of its traditional bias in favor of armor, often tried to use armor without proper infantry support. It soon discovered, however, that unaccompanied armor strikes were almost always more costly in lives and equipment than operations in which armor was supported by dismounted infantry. Thus, by the siege of Beirut, Israeli tanks almost always entered battle with infantry support to suppress man-portable anti-tank weapons.


Lesson 32: Direct-fire artillery can be a valuable tool in urban combat provided one does not care about collateral damage. The IDF made extensive use of point-blank, direct-fire artillery, especially 155mm self-propelled howitzers, during the fighting in Beirut in a technique called “sniping”. The much heavier 155mm high explosive projectiles were found especially effective in reducing strong-points and reinforced buildings; in some cases, causing the entire building to collapse. The need to employ self-propelled artillery in a direct-fire mode was partly due to the inability of available HEAT and APFDS tank rounds to penetrate concrete structures and to an absence of suitable HE-fragmentation rounds for tank guns.

Lesson 33: Small unit leadership was critical to Israeli tactical success. IDF doctrine endows small units like companies with the authority to operate with substantial independence throughout the battle zone. Thus junior officers were trained to exercise discretion and to adapt to operational circumstances without involving superior officers. These were important attributes since urban conflict, by its very nature, places a considerable premium on small units operating independently in a tactically fluid situation.


Lesson 34: Tanks are central to Israeli urban warfare doctrine. The centrality of the tank in Israeli tactical doctrine led the IDF to examine how tanks could best be employed in cities while at the same time guarding against their recognized vulnerabilities. IDF doctrine also emphasized that the shock value of tanks in cities could sometimes compensate for a lack of dismounted infantry support. Despite this predisposition for using unsupported tanks in cities, the IDF moved to using combined arms tactics during the siege of Beirut where the tank was judged the single most valuable weapons for suppressing enemy fire. It should also be noted that the Israelis lost few tanks in urban fighting. It is unclear whether this modest loss rate was due to extensive use of infantry support to suppress anti-tank fire, superior design characteristics, or poor PLO anti-tank tactics.

Lesson 35: Night operations are very difficult in urban terrain. The Israeli inventory included a variety of passive and active night-observation devices, light-enhancement devices, and tank-mounted searchlights. Nevertheless, night operations were very limited due to a shortage of night vision devices. (This shortage may explain why the Israelis used the headlights of armored personnel carriers and illumination rounds to capture Beaufort Castle in a rare night operation.) The relative absence of night operations was also due, in part, to the need for troops to rest in highly stressful urban battle conditions. Israeli commanders did, however, use the cover of night to move toward a target undetected, but waited until daylight to attack PLO positions.

D. Technical Lessons:

Lesson 36: Small arms, although not decisive, played a disproportionate role in the outcome of urban battles. Fifth-five percent of IDF casualties were attributed to small arms fire.

Lesson 37: Individual flak jackets significantly reduced Israeli casualties. Israeli forces were equipped with flak jackets that were light, easy to close, and higher than most standard military protective vests. Israeli after-action surveys of the number of hits on flak jackets (hits that otherwise would have penetrated the body of the wearers) indicates that casualties would have been 20% higher without the use of protective vests.

Lesson 38: Smoke enhances survivability in urban situations, but carries significant operational drawbacks. Israeli forces found smoke very effective in the battle for Sidon in reducing losses. The Israelis came to believe that smoke was effective between 100-300 meters in preventing PLO use of RPGs and light weapons against advancing forces. On the downside, smoke often caused as many problems as it solved. That is, smoke was found to impede visual communication among attacking Israeli forces, taxed the driving skills of vehicle operators, and slowed the overall rate of advance. Perhaps these drawbacks to using smoke were why the IDF made relatively little use of smoke during the siege of Beirut.


Lesson 39: Mortars were highly regarded by all sides, but had limited effectiveness. Many participants placed a great emphasis on the value of mortars, especially as a psychological weapon. Also, some believed that mortars were particularly useful in urban situations because their high angle of fire. Despite these perceptions of the participants, it appears that the Israeli 60mm and the 81mm small infantry mortars were largely ineffective since their high explosive projectiles could not, in most cases, penetrate roofs. The heavier Soviet 120mm mortar was much better since it often penetrated roofs. Additionally, the Syrians found the Soviet 240mm towed mortar highly effective for cratering roads as well as for gutting the top 1 to 3 stories of buildings. Finally, mortars were extensively used to fire smoke and illumination rounds.

Lesson 40: Machine-guns may be more valuable than assault rifles for urban combat. Syrian experience in urban warfare in Lebanon suggests that machine-guns, especially heavy machine-guns (12.7mm) were far more useful than assault rifles. Aside from their greater rate of fire, rounds from heavy machine-guns were better at penetrating many concrete and cinder block structures than rifle ammunition -- a very important consideration in built-up areas.


Lesson 41: Air defense guns are valuable for suppressing ground targets. The IDF found that M163 Vulcan 20mm anti-aircraft guns were very useful in urban settings because the Vulcan has sufficiently high elevation to target the upper stories of buildings. Secondly, the Vulcan offered a high rate of fire which was very effective in suppressing snipers and intimidating opponents. These views of anti-aircraft weapons were shared by Israel’s opponents as well. As a result of earlier experiences in the Lebanese civil war, standard Syrian tactical doctrine called for employing an anti-aircraft section of ZU-23 23mm cannons with a tank battalion when operating in an urban environment. The Syrians concluded that ZU-23s have a “devastating effect” when employed against the outside walls because they “denude structures with their high rates of fire.” Similarly, the PLO also employed anti-aircraft guns in a ground-support role.

Lesson 42: Commercial off-the-shelf technologies were employed for military purposes. The PLO produced self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery by mounting Soviet ZPU-1/2/4 14.5mm heavy machine-guns and ZU-23 23mm autocannons on light commercial trucks. Additionally, the PLO depended heavily upon commercial UHF hand-held radios made by Motorola, Telefunken and RACAL as well as Japanese-made VHF communications equipment for urban operations.

Lesson 43: Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) can provide real-time intelligence, but analysts have considerable difficulty interpreting it correctly. The Israelis employed RPVs to gather real-time intelligence on the movement of people within cities, the state of the battlefield, and for immediate attack assessment. On-board TV cameras relayed the pictures to ground stations where they could be analyzed or passed on. Such RPV-generated photos, however, only gave vague and contradictory data on troop movements in built-up areas. Photo interpreters also frequently misinterpreted the purpose of particular facilities and could only make estimates after this function had changed. This was in part because the PLO learned to shelter many of its activities as well as to adopt confusing and covert patterns of movement. All of this led to a significant degree of mistargeting in Beirut as well as the need to use area or multiple strikes. The photos from RPVs were quite good, however, for pinpointing major pieces of equipment like anti-aircraft defenses.


Lesson 44: Helicopters are not suited for urban combat. The Israelis made virtually no use of helicopter gun-ships in cities, apparently fearing that they were too vulnerable to anti-aircraft weapons and ground-fire. Helicopters were only widely used in cities for transporting men and materiel from rear areas to just behind the front lines.


Lesson 45: Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) are omnipresent and very effective weapons in urban combat. The PLO issued RPGs on a wide scale, although training in their use was often poor. PLO forces were equipped with one RPG per every 3-6 fighters. PLO-fired RPGs had little success against the Israeli Merkava tank, but forced the IDF to stop using M113 armored personnel carriers and trucks near the front line. RPGs were more widely used as general purpose weapons for attacking troops in buildings, behind barricades, or for harassing fire. The RPG was particularly useful since it was well suited to urban terrain. Fields of fire were seldom more than 300-500 meters, making such short-range weapons adequate. In addition, the rocket propelled grenade, although not optimized for destruction of concrete or cinder block, was more effective than small arms fire.

Lesson 46: Armored bulldozers are critical assets in urban combat. IDF combat engineers used armored bulldozers to clear barricades (some of which were mined) as well as other obstructions which slowed IDF operational tempo. Bulldozers were also used to smother bunkers, establish firing positions, widen and grade roads, and to create alternative avenues of advance to by-pass the urban infrastructure.


Lesson 47: Lightly protected armored personnel carriers are of limited value in urban terrain. Israeli infantry moved mostly on foot in cities because the lightly protected M113 armored personnel carrier was found wanting in several respects after initial operations in Tyre. PLO ambushes of Israeli columns with RPGs caused extensive casualties, in part because of the tendency of the M113’s aluminum armor to catch on fire after being hit by anti-tank weapons. In some IDF units, men became so frightened at the possibility of RPG induced fire that they simply walked next to them or rode outside rather than risk being burned to death. By the time of the siege of Beirut, armored personnel carriers were only used to carry supplies to advancing troops, always stropping at least 100 meters behind enemy lines. Besides the vulnerability of M113s to RPG fire, the IDF found them unsatisfactory for urban warfare because of their: (1) limited ability to provide suppression fire -- their machine-guns lacked sufficient elevation to use against upper stories of building; (2) extreme vulnerability of crews serving out-side mounted machine-guns to sniper fire; and (3) inability to maneuver in narrow roads and allies of cities and refugee camps.

Lesson 48: Some Israeli equipment was modified while in the field to counter enemy tactics and equipment. Lacking an adequate infantry transport vehicle for urban situations, the IDF fell back on several field-expedient solutions. For example, the unusual configuration of the Merkava tank, with its rear mounted turret, provided one option. This tank had been designed for rapid ammunition resupply through a pair of rear doors. By removing these ammunition racks, about 10 troops could be carried in cramped quarters. The Merkava was also used as an improvised armored ambulance to extract wounded infantry using the same method. The IDF also adapted an armored engineering vehicle called the Nagma-chon. This vehicle had a large compartment in the center to carry engineering troops, but could be used as necessary for moving infantry. It was relatively invulnerable to RPGs because its glacis and superstructure were protected by Blazer reactive armor. Additionally, the Israelis equipped some armored personnel carriers with add-on passive spaced-armor for more protection.


Lesson 49: Dissatisfaction with the survivability of combat infantry vehicles led to significant technological improvements after the war. One of the outcomes of the war in Lebanon was the IDF decision in the early 1990s to build a heavy armored infantry vehicle, the Achzerit, based on surplus T-55 tank hulls. About 250 Achzerits were build as a supplement to the M113 armored personnel carrier, especially in urban combat situations. The Achzarit weights 43 tons and carries a crew of two plus 10 infantrymen. It is armed with a Rafael OWS remote control machine-gun station plus two 7.62mm manually-operated FN machine-guns. Additionally, the Achzarit carries an internally-mounted 60mm mortar for use against man-portable anti-tank weapons. The M113 also underwent a series of upgrades to improve its survivability to RPGs and to make it more suitable for urban terrain. With about 4,000 M113s in service, the IDF had no choice but to improve the M113 rather than replace the fleet with a more suitable urban assault vehicle. After the war the IDF developed an improved add-on spaced armor based on Rafael’s TOGA applique armor. This was a carbon-steel, lighter-weight, perforated applique mounted to the sides of the M113’s hull and front. Not completely, satisfied with the TOGA’s performance against RPGs, the Israelis developed two more passive armor packages. Finally, in 1996, the IDF fitted their M113s with a reactive armor package.

Lesson 50: Accurate and up-to-date maps are essential for successful urban operations. Recognizing the importance of up-to-date maps, the IDF took great pains to assemble accurate and highly detailed maps for the Beirut operation. Besides conventional surface maps, the IDF also was able to obtain maps of the sewers and underground tunnels from their Lebanese allies. Conventional maps were also supplemented by photo mosaic maps created from aircraft and RPV reconnaissance missions which were highly valued because of their timeliness and detail. In spite of extensive efforts to develop accurate maps, urban navigation still remained difficult as units easily became lost in unfamiliar settings or were prevented from recognizing key landmarks by smoke or dust in the air.

Lesson 51: Cluster munitions are very effective in cities, provided one is not concerned about collateral damage. The Israelis found that cluster munitions, including both air-dropped CBU bombs and artillery-fired DPICMs, were very effective in city fighting. In the case of artillery, conventional ammunition usually struck the upper stories of buildings, causing little damage below whereas DPICMs dropped their payload into the streets below. Conversely, cluster munitions had little impact if the opponent had already reached shelter since DPICMs had little penetration capability against concrete and cinder block. Therefore, cluster munitions were found to be most effective when used in quick, short-duration time-on-target strikes and least useful in prolonged barrages where the defenders could take cover in buildings. Cluster munitions had a significant downside as well. The residue of unexploded sub-munitions posed problems for friendly forces occupying an area and especially for returning civilians.

kNikS
24 Oct 05,, 09:51
Why restrict helos to the recee battle if you've already shaped the mainforce battle? You're not thinking things through. If you've won the recee battle, that means you can see and hear while the bad guys are blind and deaf. That means that they will guess at where you're coming from, mostly by reading a map. So, why wouldn't you insert a force where he cannot see nor hear?

Think it through.
I said their use should be concentrated on urgent insertions, extractions and medical evacuations. Blind and deaf is very unstable term when bad guys have support of local population. This is even more prominent if we assume that urban terrain is spread on relatively small surface and if we know that mobility of defending units is incomparable since its restricted mainly by aviation. Again, use of aviation has serious limits if its like in my country in ’99. Finally, blind and deaf could literally not be the case if we take in to account that helos fly low, slow and loud. I’d rather insert a force by HALO/HAHO, although there are still some shortcomings and place for discussion.

Funny, last time I was the bad guy. :)


I can live your TOE. Let's be clear about a few things. If I have the BMPT assigned to me, I will use it. I would be a fool to leave 37mm cannons and ATGMs behind. However, I will definetely not replace a demo gun and a bulldozer with the BMPT.
Neither I nor the Russians are replacing demo guns or bulldozer with BMPT. Like Lurker said they are replacing the tank and I think its compromise between the Shilka armament and tank armor. Maybe there is the problem in weapon elevation and engine power.


There's a reason why army aviation is ARMY aviation. It's there to act in tandem with ground forces. Once you seperate the two, you have problems.
Seems to be that we have a consensus here.

kNikS
24 Oct 05,, 10:55
I’m not sure of number of RPG shots on helo while hovering but I’m sure that in that case probability of hit is greater, maybe even reasonable. Anyway, RPG is not the example for highly efficient AA weapon it’s example for paradox.

Off course, some really interesting stuff in troung’s post concerning artillery, Achzarit and APCs and Syrian (or Russian?) experiences with armor and AAA in MOUT.

Officer of Engineers
24 Oct 05,, 19:33
Blind and deaf is very unstable term when bad guys have support of local population. This is even more prominent if we assume that urban terrain is spread on relatively small surface and if we know that mobility of defending units is incomparable since its restricted mainly by aviation.

All the civies know is that birds are in the air and the general direction that they're going. They would not know specific destinations until moments before the birds land.


Again, use of aviation has serious limits if its like in my country in ’99. Finally, blind and deaf could literally not be the case if we take in to account that helos fly low, slow and loud.

So what? The bad guys are both physically and pyschologically oriented the wrong way. It takes time for them to react and couple with a ground action, maybe simply too overwhelming to react to two attacks at once. And God help you if there's two air assualts and one ground assualt.


Funny, last time I was the bad guy. :)

For the sake of this discussion, you are. You're argueing from the defence PoV.


Neither I nor the Russians are replacing demo guns or bulldozer with BMPT. Like Lurker said they are replacing the tank and I think its compromise between the Shilka armament and tank armor.

The tank is the demo gun in the Russian Army. Unlike the West, the Russians have no qualms about using tanks in indirect fire mode.


Maybe there is the problem in weapon elevation and engine power.

I don't like the BMPT because it's trying to do too many things without doing any one of them real good.

kNikS
26 Oct 05,, 22:05
All the civies know is that birds are in the air and the general direction that they're going. They would not know specific destinations until moments before the birds land.

So what? The bad guys are both physically and pyschologically oriented the wrong way. It takes time for them to react and couple with a ground action, maybe simply too overwhelming to react to two attacks at once. And God help you if there's two air assualts and one ground assualt.
I’m not talking about reaction on already dismounted infantry I’m talking about reaction on transport helicopter overflying urban area. Reaction time for manportable AA launchers is less than 30s (for Igla even 13) and shorter for high cal machine guns and autocannons. It’s even enough to know rough direction and place. If properly and densely deployed, which is probably the case knowing availability of these weapons, civilian support isn’t necessarily needed. It’s very hard for helos to choose the “safe” route and place, in best case they could be used in later phases of operation.


For the sake of this discussion, you are. You're argueing from the defence PoV.
Only thing I’m defending is painful and valuable experience of armies using helicopters in urban, mountainous and jungle terrain.


The tank is the demo gun in the Russian Army. Unlike the West, the Russians have no qualms about using tanks in indirect fire mode.

I don't like the BMPT because it's trying to do too many things without doing any one of them real good.
Russians realized that T-64/80 and T-72/90 are showing some serious shortcomings when used in MOUT. Their ammo storage and autoloaders make them vulnerable to top attacks and using infantry with them is questionable because of ERA, but with ERA blocks removed their survivability is reduced. Off course, mobility, rate of fire and weapon elevation is problem for all tanks. Obviously, that is the reason for “carousel tactics” Garry mentioned before. On the other side, their experiences proved that Shilka was more useful than tanks in this type of combat, and they tried to overcome Shilka’s survivability problem. At same time they removed T-series turrets, removing previous problems for new vehicle which is using T-72/90 hull. Armament is somewhat different than Shilkas since they learned that both Plamya and 2A42 too have god anti infantry capability and they added Ataka for AT protection. They tried to compensate Shilkas rate of fire and I could say that they even surpassed it for this role. It would be better that its (famous) elevation is at least 60 degrees, but again it could mean that you are shooting on enemy which is almost above and very close to you. I think vehicle is good replacement for Shilka in its ground attack role and good support/replacement for tanks in urban combat. They also use SP artillery which is in some cases happier solution than using tanks.

Officer of Engineers
27 Oct 05,, 03:39
I’m not talking about reaction on already dismounted infantry I’m talking about reaction on transport helicopter overflying urban area. Reaction time for manportable AA launchers is less than 30s (for Igla even 13) and shorter for high cal machine guns and autocannons. It’s even enough to know rough direction and place. If properly and densely deployed, which is probably the case knowing availability of these weapons, civilian support isn’t necessarily needed. It’s very hard for helos to choose the “safe” route and place, in best case they could be used in later phases of operation.

You're not understanding.

1st, How fast can you move from one rooftop in which you "think" the helos are coming to another rooftoop where the helos are "actually" coming."

2nd, all your listed systems were at Sarajevo and NOT ONE C-130 was shot down.


Only thing I’m defending is painful and valuable experience of armies using helicopters in urban, mountainous and jungle terrain.

The historic evidence is against you. Can you name me ONE company level helo insert that has failed? From Vietnam to Soviet Afghanistan, any determined company to battalion level helo insert has succeeded to unqualifying success.


Russians realized that T-64/80 and T-72/90 are showing some serious shortcomings when used in MOUT. Their ammo storage and autoloaders make them vulnerable to top attacks and using infantry with them is questionable because of ERA, but with ERA blocks removed their survivability is reduced. Off course, mobility, rate of fire and weapon elevation is problem for all tanks. Obviously, that is the reason for “carousel tactics” Garry mentioned before. On the other side, their experiences proved that Shilka was more useful than tanks in this type of combat, and they tried to overcome Shilka’s survivability problem. At same time they removed T-series turrets, removing previous problems for new vehicle which is using T-72/90 hull. Armament is somewhat different than Shilkas since they learned that both Plamya and 2A42 too have god anti infantry capability and they added Ataka for AT protection. They tried to compensate Shilkas rate of fire and I could say that they even surpassed it for this role. It would be better that its (famous) elevation is at least 60 degrees, but again it could mean that you are shooting on enemy which is almost above and very close to you. I think vehicle is good replacement for Shilka in its ground attack role and good support/replacement for tanks in urban combat. They also use SP artillery which is in some cases happier solution than using tanks.

All you've written ignores the fundamental fact that infantry and engineers are the primary force in MOUT. The BMPT is a complete failure in this regard because it's designed to support TANKS, NOT infantry and especially NOT engineers.

lemontree
27 Oct 05,, 06:14
The historic evidence is against you. Can you name me ONE company level helo insert that has failed? From Vietnam to Soviet Afghanistan, any determined company to battalion level helo insert has succeeded to unqualifying success.

Sir,
There is one case of an IPKF op. But intelligence failure and non-use of gunships was the culprit responsible for its failure.
The op involved insert by choppers in Jaffna Universtiy, only one platoon of 13 Sikh LI managed to land with some 10 Paras elements, the rest of the coys could not land and had to abort due to intense LTTE fire. 29 men including the coy cdr fought to the last man and died, the para cdos extracted themselves.
- LTTE linkRaid on Jaffna University, 12 October 1987 (http://www.tamilnation.org/tamileelam/armedstruggle/ipkf.htm)
- Bharat-Rakshak link Descent Into Danger - The Jaffna University Helidrop (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/Chapter3.html)

kNikS
28 Oct 05,, 13:43
1st, How fast can you move from one rooftop in which you "think" the helos are coming to another rooftoop where the helos are "actually" coming."
There is no need for moving from one rooftop to another if these weapons are properly deployed. Taking into account numbers of these weapons (for example my country destroyed surplus of 1200 of these weapons last year) and their horizontal range, they could be more than a densely deployed. And for reducing such defense you need different weapon than a helicopter, which is widening the list of included weapons and potential collateral damage.


2nd, all your listed systems were at Sarajevo and NOT ONE C-130 was shot down.
This example was somewhat different than scenario we are discussing but I will not confront you about this one because you were there. Therefore I will rely on your facts about number of missiles fired, successful shots etc. I’m not sure about determination of my side to take UN aircrafts and at least I could say that was stupid, with all political and military consequences. Also I’m sure that UNPROFOR commanders were thinking about capabilities of these weapons (and their users) when organizing defense of an airport. Most common version in Bosnia was Strela-2M, most primitive first generation system with non-cooled IR detector prone to flares and misguidance on sun, limited launching zone and hit probability 0.19-0.25, so if held on distance and choosing appropriate flight profile (case I assumed there) there was a good chance of minimizing losses of fixed wing aircrafts.

BTW this is strengthening my fact about using C-130 gunship and transport versions for ground support and HAHO/HALO insertion.


The historic evidence is against you. Can you name me ONE company level helo insert that has failed? From Vietnam to Soviet Afghanistan, any determined company to battalion level helo insert has succeeded to unqualifying success.
Historic evidence told us that Russians lost unofficially 315-333 helicopters and 77 fixed wing aircraft in Afghanistan, for then years of combat. Their losses remained more or less same on yearly basis during this time, no matter how their tactics and combat systems improved. Afghans had about 750 Stingers and undisclosed numbers of other manportable SAMs and they used them on large territory. In Grozny for example, Chechen terrorists had probably large amounts of these systems since they had access to arsenals of Soviet armies stationed there before. It means that that they could achieve a lot tighter AD than present in Afghanistan. The Russians learned that lesson, that’s the reason why they were using transport helicopters in Chechnya mainly in non-combat missions.

In Vietnam, Strela-2M was used first in 1972. and only in first eight months of use(before changing the flight profile and countermeasures) Americans lost 49 aircrafts. And In this case we must take into account relatively small number of these weapons and large territory where it was used. Total number of helicopters destroyed in the Vietnam was 5,086 out of 11,827 used. Even if there are no examples of failed infantry insertions (and this sounds impossible to me), price paid is very high.


All you've written ignores the fundamental fact that infantry and engineers are the primary force in MOUT. The BMPT is a complete failure in this regard because it's designed to support TANKS, NOT infantry and especially NOT engineers.
I’m a civilian (although I had and still have some plans in military), my opinion is based on things what I had heard or read (excluding firearms) and in this particular discussion I intentionally tried to stay in limits of Israeli and Russian experiences since these two countries, with more or less success, have largest experience in MOUT. If my knowledge and my facts were in collision with these I will pull off everything I’d said, you decide. I never agreed with fact that using armor in urban terrain is best or even good thing, but obviously these two armies tried and maybe succeeded to find some optimum about this. At the end I respect your opinion at least because you are NATO Colonel with years of experience.

troung
28 Oct 05,, 22:54
The historic evidence is against you. Can you name me ONE company level helo insert that has failed? From Vietnam to Soviet Afghanistan, any determined company to battalion level helo insert has succeeded to unqualifying success.

Zhawar in Afghanistan. A DRA commando battalion was taken out basically to the man after landing by the Mujahideen.

B.Smitty
29 Oct 05,, 05:26
You're not understanding.

1st, How fast can you move from one rooftop in which you "think" the helos are coming to another rooftoop where the helos are "actually" coming."


You don't have to move from rooftop to rooftop when the helos overfly your position on the way.

Helos have to penetrate the urban trashfire envelope and open themselves up to random DShK and Zu-23s sitting in parking lots or mounted on trucks, not to mention RPG or MANPADs. It's difficult to suppress or destroy all of these (as we saw in Op Anaconda), and especially difficult in complex urban terrain. And they are cheap enough to be widely available. Every street corner could have a DShk.

The helos have to fly OVER these systems - randomly scattered around a city - hover and/or land while the assault element debarks, and fly out. Or stick around and try to provide fire support, while the whole city wakes up to their location.

Officer of Engineers
29 Oct 05,, 05:34
Tomorrow, gentlemen. Need to go get the horses from the pond out in this freaking cold.

kNikS
29 Oct 05,, 15:14
Tomorrow, gentlemen.
Sir, how could I be a gentleman and a bad guy at the same time? :)

Officer of Engineers
30 Oct 05,, 04:57
Ok, Gentlemen, please be advised that there are alot of cross points here and therefore, I will mix up your quotes in order to remain coherant.


Zhawar in Afghanistan. A DRA commando battalion was taken out basically to the man after landing by the Mujahideen.

The insert succeeded.


Sir,
There is one case of an IPKF op. But intelligence failure and non-use of gunships was the culprit responsible for its failure.
The op involved insert by choppers in Jaffna Universtiy, only one platoon of 13 Sikh LI managed to land with some 10 Paras elements, the rest of the coys could not land and had to abort due to intense LTTE fire. 29 men including the coy cdr fought to the last man and died, the para cdos extracted themselves.

Unfortunate.


There is no need for moving from one rooftop to another if these weapons are properly deployed. Taking into account numbers of these weapons (for example my country destroyed surplus of 1200 of these weapons last year) and their horizontal range, they could be more than a densely deployed. And for reducing such defense you need different weapon than a helicopter, which is widening the list of included weapons and potential collateral damage.


You don't have to move from rooftop to rooftop when the helos overfly your position on the way.

Helos have to penetrate the urban trashfire envelope and open themselves up to random DShK and Zu-23s sitting in parking lots or mounted on trucks, not to mention RPG or MANPADs. It's difficult to suppress or destroy all of these (as we saw in Op Anaconda), and especially difficult in complex urban terrain. And they are cheap enough to be widely available. Every street corner could have a DShk.

Then, the recee battle was lost, wasn't it? If those assets still exists after reduction nor even suppressed during approach, then we are deaf and blind, not the enemy.

If we won the recee battle, you wouldn't even have a rooftop to stand on. Also, do recall how urban battles are fought. The city is divided into sectors. We clear one sector at a time. That makes the battle manageable. We don't have to find every AD asset, just those in our way.

Lastly, while the recee battle may or may not involve air assets, it will centre on ground assets. Recee and sniper teams working in stealth are the primary means of detection.


BTW this is strengthening my fact about using C-130 gunship and transport versions for ground support and HAHO/HALO insertion.

You need a runway of sorts.


Historic evidence told us that Russians lost unofficially 315-333 helicopters and 77 fixed wing aircraft in Afghanistan, for then years of combat. Their losses remained more or less same on yearly basis during this time, no matter how their tactics and combat systems improved. Afghans had about 750 Stingers and undisclosed numbers of other manportable SAMs and they used them on large territory. In Grozny for example, Chechen terrorists had probably large amounts of these systems since they had access to arsenals of Soviet armies stationed there before. It means that that they could achieve a lot tighter AD than present in Afghanistan. The Russians learned that lesson, that’s the reason why they were using transport helicopters in Chechnya mainly in non-combat missions.

In Vietnam, Strela-2M was used first in 1972. and only in first eight months of use(before changing the flight profile and countermeasures) Americans lost 49 aircrafts. And In this case we must take into account relatively small number of these weapons and large territory where it was used. Total number of helicopters destroyed in the Vietnam was 5,086 out of 11,827 used. Even if there are no examples of failed infantry insertions (and this sounds impossible to me), price paid is very high.


It's difficult to suppress or destroy all of these (as we saw in Op Anaconda), and especially difficult in complex urban terrain.

The losses were regrettable, maybe even extremely so, but they are acceptable. In the case of OP ANACONDA, the lost of the SOF team was not a show stopper.

The point here, gentlemen, is that while the threats presented against helos maybe daunting, they are, however, manageable, up to and including losses ... if the recee battle is won.

Officer of Engineers
30 Oct 05,, 05:03
Sir, how could I be a gentleman and a bad guy at the same time? :)

Son, you don't got the legs to be my wife. Just take the compliment from an old war dog.

kNikS
30 Oct 05,, 12:56
Son, you don't got the legs to be my wife. Just take the compliment from an old war dog.
Sorry Sir, I’m not doing very well with phrases which are not present in serbian language. Maybe you could simplify it for me? But, if I have to take the last one literally, I reassure you that I prefer to stay a bad guy rather than your wife. :)

B.Smitty
31 Oct 05,, 15:50
Then, the recee battle was lost, wasn't it? If those assets still exists after reduction nor even suppressed during approach, then we are deaf and blind, not the enemy.

If we won the recee battle, you wouldn't even have a rooftop to stand on. Also, do recall how urban battles are fought. The city is divided into sectors. We clear one sector at a time. That makes the battle manageable. We don't have to find every AD asset, just those in our way.

Lastly, while the recee battle may or may not involve air assets, it will centre on ground assets. Recee and sniper teams working in stealth are the primary means of detection.


How are recee and sniper teams going to find every 12.7mm and RPG without going house to house? I doubt they'd even find all the 23mms!

Also, I'm skeptical that they can manage any significant degree of stealth in an urban environment. They have to drive/walk down roads like everyone else, and all it takes is one teenager with a radio or cell phone to clue-in the bad guys.

And you definitely don't want a small recee team surrounded and under fire deep in a hostile urban environment. That kind of thing makes headlines - in a bad way!



The losses were regrettable, maybe even extremely so, but they are acceptable. In the case of OP ANACONDA, the lost of the SOF team was not a show stopper.

The point here, gentlemen, is that while the threats presented against helos maybe daunting, they are, however, manageable, up to and including losses ... if the recee battle is won.

I'm not so sure about that. History has shown that losing a helo during air-assault causes major operational disruptions as a rescue is attempted.

In Anaconda, we lost a second Ch-47, just trying to rescue the SEALs from the first downed one. And we diverted tons of danger-close CAS around the SEALs position.

Something similar happened in Mogadishu.

I just don't think you're ever going to have a clear-enough recee picture in an urban fight to risk helos to air-assault. Best to use them for medevac, placing forces in blocking positions outside the combat area, resupply, etc.

Officer of Engineers
01 Nov 05,, 05:22
How are recee and sniper teams going to find every 12.7mm and RPG without going house to house? I doubt they'd even find all the 23mms!

I'm not worried about FIVE-OHs and RPGs. Fire and armour will deal with those. 23mm guns need clear lanes of fire. Parking it in a garage ain't going to help and rushing out to meet the threat will mean that they would have to win the recee battle.

About the only real threat is MANPAD but if the recee battle is won, then again the threat is manageable.


Also, I'm skeptical that they can manage any significant degree of stealth in an urban environment. They have to drive/walk down roads like everyone else, and all it takes is one teenager with a radio or cell phone to clue-in the bad guys.

NATO recee teams operated as such in Yugoslavia with great success. The Brits did the same in Basra.


And you definitely don't want a small recee team surrounded and under fire deep in a hostile urban environment. That kind of thing makes headlines - in a bad way!

It's a risk to be sure but it's also the kind of job that they expect. The situation is would the recee team find the enemy and direct fire onto them or the enemy find them first.


I'm not so sure about that. History has shown that losing a helo during air-assault causes major operational disruptions as a rescue is attempted.

I'm not aware of one situation where a rescue attempt disrupted the main operation.


In Anaconda, we lost a second Ch-47, just trying to rescue the SEALs from the first downed one. And we diverted tons of danger-close CAS around the SEALs position.

And yet, there was sufficient helo assets to mount the secondary supporting Operation HARPOON.


Something similar happened in Mogadishu.

The main mission, to capture Adid's aides, succeeded without interruption.


I just don't think you're ever going to have a clear-enough recee picture in an urban fight to risk helos to air-assault. Best to use them for medevac, placing forces in blocking positions outside the combat area, resupply, etc.

I think you misunderstand here. The helo force is a supporting force. The ground element remains the main force.

B.Smitty
01 Nov 05,, 17:07
I'm not worried about FIVE-OHs and RPGs. Fire and armour will deal with those. 23mm guns need clear lanes of fire. Parking it in a garage ain't going to help and rushing out to meet the threat will mean that they would have to win the recee battle.

About the only real threat is MANPAD but if the recee battle is won, then again the threat is manageable.


I guess I don't understand how and when you'd want to use helos in urban environs.




NATO recee teams operated as such in Yugoslavia with great success. The Brits did the same in Basra.


NATO recee teams weren't operating in urban situations in Yugolsavia, where they? And weren't they doing more SASO work than major combat ops?

The population of Basra wasn't tremendously hostile. Notice we didn't do the same in Baghdad.




It's a risk to be sure but it's also the kind of job that they expect. The situation is would the recee team find the enemy and direct fire onto them or the enemy find them first.


In urban situations, with a dispursed enemy, I'd say it's a tossup. If anything it's probably more likely the enemy will find them first.




And yet, there was sufficient helo assets to mount the secondary supporting Operation HARPOON.


Yes but it was a major operational distraction. Those assets could've been used to strengthen blocking positions, establish new ones, prosecute the primary mission, etc..




The main mission, to capture Adid's aides, succeeded without interruption.


With an unacceptably high cost.



I think you misunderstand here. The helo force is a supporting force. The ground element remains the main force.

Can you point me to an example of this type of usage?

The only examples of helos used for air assault in urban situations I can come up with are examples of how vulnerable they are.

TopHatter
01 Nov 05,, 17:34
With an unacceptably high cost.
Unacceptable only to zero-casualty expecting societies that demand their soldiers to drop out of the sky into a seething town that is armed to the teeth, and yet return to base without a scratch on them or their vehicles.

I believe it was Colin Powell that remarked that such a "battle" with an equalivlent number of KIAs would not even elicited a second look in Vietnam.

It is a good thing that American and other societies have become much less tolerant of battle losses.
It is a bad thing that American and other societies have become too expectant of ZERO battle losses.

sparten
01 Nov 05,, 18:39
I believe it was Colin Powell that remarked that such a "battle" with an equalivlent number of KIAs would not even elicited a second look in Vietnam.
Well IIRC there were no dead Americans being dragged through the streets in Vietnam.

And then a battle with total number of Vietnam KIA would not have (and did not) shake American resolve in WWII.

TopHatter
01 Nov 05,, 18:55
Well IIRC there were no dead Americans being dragged through the streets in Vietnam.
Correct, they paraded live Americans at the Hoa Lo Prison and elsewhere for years.

B.Smitty
02 Nov 05,, 04:28
Unacceptable only to zero-casualty expecting societies that demand their soldiers to drop out of the sky into a seething town that is armed to the teeth, and yet return to base without a scratch on them or their vehicles.


No, it's unacceptable to a public who can't even find Mogadishu on a map, let alone understand why we were there hunting Aidid in the first place.

In any event, the public didn't demand their soldiers drop out of the sky into a hostile town, their leadership did.


I believe it was Colin Powell that remarked that such a "battle" with an equalivlent number of KIAs would not even elicited a second look in Vietnam.


Yes but we actually had a tangible purpose in Vietnam that people could understand - to prevent the spread of communism.

In Somolia, we were hunting backwater thugs that, in the grand scheme of things, had zero strategic benefit to us.


It is a good thing that American and other societies have become much less tolerant of battle losses.
It is a bad thing that American and other societies have become too expectant of ZERO battle losses.

Completely untrue. Over two thousand American soldiers have died in Iraq, and more in Afghanistan.

The American public can tolerate losses, if they believe in the cause.

Officer of Engineers
02 Nov 05,, 05:51
I guess I don't understand how and when you'd want to use helos in urban environs.

Helos are an asset that I do not readily dismiss. However, I have no illusions as to what the main force is.


NATO recee teams weren't operating in urban situations in Yugolsavia, where they? And weren't they doing more SASO work than major combat ops?

NATO recee teams, more specifically, SAS and JTF II were our eyes and ears to threats. Also, Canadian snipers earned their reputations in Yugoslavia, not Afghanistan.


The population of Basra wasn't tremendously hostile. Notice we didn't do the same in Baghdad.

Two times in the grind the US did.


In urban situations, with a dispursed enemy, I'd say it's a tossup. If anything it's probably more likely the enemy will find them first.

You don't understand the situation. The city would've already sufferred bombardment issues before the recee teams went in.


Yes but it was a major operational distraction. Those assets could've been used to strengthen blocking positions, establish new ones, prosecute the primary mission, etc..

Operation HARPOON was a battalion level blocking force.


With an unacceptably high cost.

I am not American and therefore, I will not comment on the cost. However, I've stated that any non-American force would have viewed it as a grand victory.


Can you point me to an example of this type of usage?

The only examples of helos used for air assault in urban situations I can come up with are examples of how vulnerable they are.

The only urban situation that presented itself is Iraq. However, I would point to Colonel Moore's battle La Drang Valley.

kNikS
02 Nov 05,, 10:22
Sorry, one member of nazi-youth distracted me from this thread long enough. It could take some time to read your posts and I’m little bit busy these days…

kNikS
06 Nov 05,, 12:32
Well, I will avoid posting others quotes but obviously there are two opinions here concerning usage of helicopters in urban areas. How manageable are threats for helicopters is another question and I suggest to stop this discussion since some armies prefer to not to use them (IDF and RFT) and on the other side, from what OoE posted here, NATO has no hesitations about that. I’ll only add that my personal opinion is closer to Israeli and Russian (although Russian experience is painful and some of their methods are completely wrong), and I think that helicopter losses until now are too high or at least at limit of acceptable, even without public opinion at home.

But let’s back to topic. OoE said that BMPT isn’t suited to support neither infantry nor engineers in urban environment. Well, Shilka was SPAAG but Russians used it in totally atypical role and concluded that it have some qualities. Troops in the field appreciated its presence and somebody tried to make hybrid vehicle incorporating tank armor and SPAAG armament adding more “anti-infantry” firepower.

Officer of Engineers
06 Nov 05,, 18:16
But let’s back to topic. OoE said that BMPT isn’t suited to support neither infantry nor engineers in urban environment. Well, Shilka was SPAAG but Russians used it in totally atypical role and concluded that it have some qualities. Troops in the field appreciated its presence and somebody tried to make hybrid vehicle incorporating tank armor and SPAAG armament adding more “anti-infantry” firepower.

As I stated before, I can very understand why the Russians would want something like this. I even stated that if assigned to my TOE, I would be a fool not to use it. What I've been saying is that there are three pieces of equipment (a bulldozer, a 50cal, and a demo gun) that would do a much better job than the BMPT.

kNikS
08 Nov 05,, 17:33
As I stated before, I can very understand why the Russians would want something like this. I even stated that if assigned to my TOE, I would be a fool not to use it. What I've been saying is that there are three pieces of equipment (a bulldozer, a 50cal, and a demo gun) that would do a much better job than the BMPT.
Basically, I agree with this, my only doubt is linked to 12,7mm. If accent is on amount of ammo, I will agree with that, too. But BMPT is a result of russian experiences. Anyway, there is one tendency common for all armies involved in combat in urban terrain – mechanization (Achzarit, Stryker, and BMPT). From what I see it’s a product of wish to minimize losses. Is this step forward or backwards, we will see.

Officer of Engineers
08 Nov 05,, 21:13
I don't see any ACHZARIT nor STRYKER equivlent to the BMPT.

kNikS
09 Nov 05,, 10:35
I don't see any ACHZARIT nor STRYKER equivlent to the BMPT.
I’m not saying they are equivalents, since these are APCs but they are all attempt to put armored vehicle in urban terrain.

Officer of Engineers
09 Nov 05,, 13:17
Battle Taxis ... and that is as they should all be.

kNikS
09 Nov 05,, 16:25
Right. Sometimes I think that constructors are still living in fear of nuclear blast or something so they try to pack infantry in these cans, forgetting what its primary role is.

Garry
10 Feb 06,, 17:33
One more addition BMPT is going to be equipped with two Igla mobile SAM launchers making it capable to defend tanks from helicopters.

Hamilcar Barca
05 Nov 07,, 18:50
Hi to everyone!
I've read a few posts in here regarding this machine and from what I see everyone here gets the wrong idea about the role of BMPT in war fare. First of all this machine was ment as a support vehicle for tanks and infantry in urban combat, providing protection of tank columns against ambush, and open field infantry support, it cannot be viewd as a single fighting unit storming the city, so any ideas about one intytank platoon taking out BMPT and repeling advance is foolish. BMPT is purely flanking machine meant to take out fortified positions in basements or highrise building which tanks can't attack simply because they can't raise/lower their guns at such angles (problem was encountered during first and second chechen compains). In the open field placing BMPT on the flanks to support infantry in an attack would have a devastating affect on enemies fortified position. BMPT can shoot in three different directions at the same time, in 1 minute it fires 900 - 30mm shells, 600 - 30mm granades and 2000 - 7.62 mm bullets and all of this is being dellivered simultaniusly!!! Also please keep in mind that this is just a conceptual model which will be developed further. Also forgot to add that all around and top of the front of the BMPT is equped with the dinamic active armour ( not sure if it makes sense in english ) combined with the conventional armour of t-72 hull, has smoke screen and other means of protection. So this machine is actually not absolite at all if used in the correct way.

Feanor
05 Nov 07,, 20:40
New member. You should probably post a thread in the introductions forum, and fill out your profile. Also posting in threads that have been dead for weeks/months is probably not a good idea.

wajahat
05 Nov 07,, 21:18
the chinese has a very high regard for this BMPT.just read this.

俄罗斯新推出的BMPT坦克支援车

点击此处查看全部军事图片
  在吸收车臣作战经验的基础上,俄军已经制造出一种用于压制敌方步兵攻击的新型近战平台——重型装甲自动 武器系统,即俄军所说的“坦克支援车”(BMPT)。实际上,在发展“坦克支援车”之前,俄军还有过其它尝 试。1997年,俄军曾推出一种采用T-55坦克底盘的新型装甲输送车,即BTR-T重型装甲输送车。俄军研制BTR-T的目的是希望能把武器平台与人员输送车两者的功能有效结合起来,即全车除驾驶员、车长、炮长和各种武器外 ,还可搭载5名步兵!这显然是一个错误的尝试。

  与BTR-T不同,“坦克支援车”是一种专为乘车战斗设计的车辆。该车采用加装了爆炸反应装甲的T-72坦克底盘,因此其战斗全重达47吨。该车拆除了T-72坦克上的125毫米主炮炮塔,取而代之的是一个双人扁平型小巧炮塔,首批“坦克支援车”还装有一门外置 式30毫米自动机关炮。在此基础上,第二版“坦克支援战斗车”不仅安装了两门30毫米机关炮,而且加装了一 挺7.26毫米并列机枪、4具AT-9反坦克导弹发射器以及2具由位于驾驶员两旁的两位炮手操作的前射型30毫米自动榴弹发射器。其中,2门3 0毫米机关炮的上射角达45度,可以有效打击楼上和建筑物顶层的目标,从而克服了坦克炮仰射角不足的缺陷。 在格罗兹尼战斗中,俄军曾使用ZSU-23-4型23毫米四管自行防空炮作为弥补坦克炮上射角不足的一种手段。

omon
05 Nov 07,, 21:30
the chinese has a very high regard for this BMPT.just read this.

俄罗斯新推出的BMPT坦克支援车

点击此处查看全部军事图片
  在吸收车臣作战经验的基础上,俄军已经制造出一种用于压制敌方步兵攻击的新型近战平台——重型装甲自动 武器系统,即俄军所说的“坦克支援车”(BMPT)。实际上,在发展“坦克支援车”之前,俄军还有过其它尝 试。1997年,俄军曾推出一种采用T-55坦克底盘的新型装甲输送车,即BTR-T重型装甲输送车。俄军研制BTR-T的目的是希望能把武器平台与人员输送车两者的功能有效结合起来,即全车除驾驶员、车长、炮长和各种武器外 ,还可搭载5名步兵!这显然是一个错误的尝试。

  与BTR-T不同,“坦克支援车”是一种专为乘车战斗设计的车辆。该车采用加装了爆炸反应装甲的T-72坦克底盘,因此其战斗全重达47吨。该车拆除了T-72坦克上的125毫米主炮炮塔,取而代之的是一个双人扁平型小巧炮塔,首批“坦克支援车”还装有一门外置 式30毫米自动机关炮。在此基础上,第二版“坦克支援战斗车”不仅安装了两门30毫米机关炮,而且加装了一 挺7.26毫米并列机枪、4具AT-9反坦克导弹发射器以及2具由位于驾驶员两旁的两位炮手操作的前射型30毫米自动榴弹发射器。其中,2门3 0毫米机关炮的上射角达45度,可以有效打击楼上和建筑物顶层的目标,从而克服了坦克炮仰射角不足的缺陷。 在格罗兹尼战斗中,俄军曾使用ZSU-23-4型23毫米四管自行防空炮作为弥补坦克炮上射角不足的一种手段。

that is very self explanatory, :mad:

wajahat
05 Nov 07,, 21:47
that is very self explanatory, :mad:

relax man..here r some more pics of the BMPT & with a link to boot

http://btvt.narod.ru/5/bmpt/bmpt11.jpg

u can learn more about the BMPT on the link below:)

BMP-T | Russian Arms, Military Technology, Analysis of Russia's Military Forces (http://warfare.ru/?linkid=1785&catid=245)

enjoy:)

http://btvt.narod.ru/5/bmpt/bmpt17.jpg

zraver
05 Nov 07,, 23:37
I am not impressed with the BMP-T at all. The M2A3 bradley offers equal firepower and infantry and its protection has proven to be more than adequate in an urban situation. The key to protecting tanks in an Urban setting is not more AFV's but dismounts.

Feanor
05 Nov 07,, 23:39
God I hate digging up old graves, but everyone just consider this. The BMPT has been ''entering the armed forces'' for a couple of years now. I don't think any serial production runs of it have been ordered. It's another weapons development that isn't getting any funding. We might as well be discussing the Black Eagle, Su-37, or BTR-T. None of them are going to be present in any meaningful numbers in the Russian army in the forseeable future. They might win some export orders, but even that seems unlikely.