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Bigfella
24 Jul 18,, 11:42
I've borrowed this from another forum, but I'm hoping some of the deep knowledge here will produce a decent discussion. Maybe we can tempt the Colonel to favour us with an opinion.

We will need to suspend a few likely outcomes to get to the meat - how would Russian & Chinese conventional forces go head to head in 1989?

The scenario is that the Tiananmen Square protests spread more widely in China, and having put them down, hardliners decide to unite the country with a great national undertaking. They take advantage of Russian weakness post-Afghanistan & with reform shaking the foundations of the Soviet state & Warsaw pact.

There is a grab for Mongolia & Vladivostock/Far East, with the trans-Siberian railway cut & occupied in places. The contrived part of the scenario is that somehow NATO & the US manage to pressure both sides not to escalate to nukes. I know it is a leap, but it makes this more interesting.

What happens next?

What sort of forces can Russia bring to bear & what shape are they in? Will it risk using forces from some of the more unhappy republics - Baltics, Caucases, Central Asia. Will the Warsaw pact contribute anything? How long can Russia fight before cracks start to show?

On the Chinese side, what shape are its forces in? Can they go toe to toe with the Red Army? Will China trade space & lives for time hoping Russia starts falling apart before it dies much damage?

Curious to get some views.

astralis
24 Jul 18,, 13:40
China gets ripped a new one-- the PLA was not an effective fighting force in the 1980s. IIRC they were still busily re-instituting the concept of ranks then! doubt they could power project to Vladivostok.

they had enough trouble projecting power to -Beijing- in 1989, lol.

HenryAngelic
17 Aug 18,, 11:32
"IIRC they were still busily re-instituting the concept of ranks then! doubt they could power project to Vladivostok."

And plus points for that too.

Monash
20 Aug 18,, 06:19
Question. What forces did Russia have prepositioned along the Sino-Soviet border? I ask because as far as I was aware the majority of their first line assets were deployed against the West at the time. (Although that could simply be my Euro centric ignorance of military history talking.)

Not withstanding the lack of readiness on the part of China, assuming there was little or no warning of such a move (IMO highly unlikely) Russia might have trouble moving significant new forces to the region in question before the shooting started.

The only advantage I can see for the Chinese is that in this scenario their territorial ambitions are limited to a relatively small section of Soviet territory directly adjacent to their own border. The Chinese are not seeking to annex all of Siberia and the rest of the Russian Far East in one insane grand campaign.

Given the element of surprise, or at least short notice I could sort of see them fumbling their way into Vladivostok. I simply don't see them being able to hold onto it for very long once the Russians got organised. Or is even that to optimistic?

Bigfella
20 Aug 18,, 10:56
Too optimistic. Vladivostock sits behind some major swamps & a really, really big river. I'm not convinced that even a much better equipped and trained Chinese force would have much success against Vladivostock. Maybe now, but not then. They have a better chance of taking bits of Mongolia, but holding them would be a different matter. It would also make sense for China to move forces to occupy the more vulnerable bits of the trans-Siberian railway. Whether or not they could do it.....

It is hard to imagine that China could mass forces sufficient to take on Russia without being noticed. While transferring land forces all the way east might be difficult for Russia once fighting began, shifting enough air power to stop any major Chinese incursion would be a lot easier. The gap in quality in the air was big. China would struggle to provide decent air cover for its land forces.

Monash
20 Aug 18,, 22:59
Yep, its the positioning of their land based forces in advance of the operation that should be the big tell, even at a time when Moscow's was in chaos politically their military would have been able to track that kind of action so close to the border.

Now on the other hand a second (revenge) push into Vietnam??

zraver
28 Aug 18,, 01:43
Chinese advantages in 1989 include a CIA eaves dropping station, American and Israeli AAAM's and the 105mm gun and most importantly, US support at least politically even if we won't join the fray. US blocking a UNSC resolution and our build up in the West would pin the Soviet's best divisions in the West. Whatever the USSR is gonna do they have to do it on a 1/3rd tank of gas...

hboGYT
28 Aug 18,, 09:49
Chinese advantages in 1989 include a CIA eaves dropping station, American and Israeli AAAM's and the 105mm gun and most importantly, US support at least politically even if we won't join the fray. US blocking a UNSC resolution and our build up in the West would pin the Soviet's best divisions in the West. Whatever the USSR is gonna do they have to do it on a 1/3rd tank of gas...

But Soviet brute force was too stronk. Wasn't it a time when PLA's best tanks were type-69s?

Skywatcher
29 Aug 18,, 01:09
But Soviet brute force was too stronk. Wasn't it a time when PLA's best tanks were type-69s?

Well, the Type 80s (I don't think there were any Type 85s in service then). With a 105mm gun, it could pose somewhat of a threat to your run of the mill T-72.

zraver
03 Sep 18,, 19:45
But Soviet brute force was too stronk. Wasn't it a time when PLA's best tanks were type-69s?

The main Soviet tank in the East was the T-55 followed by the T-62. The upgunned type 59's (69, 79) were a match for them. Soviet strength was in the air and in artillery.

Bigfella
04 Sep 18,, 10:46
The main Soviet tank in the East was the T-55 followed by the T-62. The upgunned type 59's (69, 79) were a match for them. Soviet strength was in the air and in artillery.

Faced with an actual invasion Russia will move units with better tanks to lead the counter attack.

China might have numbers on the ground, but Russia has spent most of the century training its military to undertake large scale combined arms warfare. China doesn't have the doctrine, training or for the most part equipment to match that. Any Russian deficiencies will pale in comparison to this.

There are aspects of this war that could well resemble Russia 1941, though Russia won't make the mistake of driving too deep. If it can target & engage Chinese armies there is a good chance it can chew a few up & take a bunch of prisoners. if it also grabs some defensible territory & uses air power to make a mess of important Chinese infrastructure it has all the bargaining chips it needs to negotiate a favourable settlement.

zraver
08 Sep 18,, 12:44
Faced with an actual invasion Russia will move units with better tanks to lead the counter attack.

China might have numbers on the ground, but Russia has spent most of the century training its military to undertake large scale combined arms warfare. China doesn't have the doctrine, training or for the most part equipment to match that. Any Russian deficiencies will pale in comparison to this.

There are aspects of this war that could well resemble Russia 1941, though Russia won't make the mistake of driving too deep. If it can target & engage Chinese armies there is a good chance it can chew a few up & take a bunch of prisoners. if it also grabs some defensible territory & uses air power to make a mess of important Chinese infrastructure it has all the bargaining chips it needs to negotiate a favourable settlement.

Maybe, and I say this because of Grozny and a whole host of other issues. The failing Soviet economy really impacted Soviet army units in the interior and east heaviest. The Red Army already got the lowest class of recruits. Anyone with any real talent went to the Navy, Air Force, Air defense forces, or strategic rocket forces first. Of those that were left, the best of the worst so to speak went West to Germany, Hungary and then European Russia. Many were deficient in Russian language skills let alone national fervor. They lacked anything even resembling a professional NCO corps, NTC style training regime or any sort of professional development infrastructure. Besides severe hazing, Soviet privates also spent a lot of time helping bring in crops or doing other non-military tasks that ate into the 2 years in uniform. This meant a Soviet private getting ready to ETS likely didn't have much more skill than a Western private only 6 months from his completion of initial training.

There were some good units like the Talinin Guards or some airborne and spetznaz units but by and large the bulk wasn't much better than the Chinese. They lost pitched battles against the Muhajadeen in Afghanistan despite overwhelming superiority in armor, air support and artillery. The war may well have devolved into something like Iran-Iraq. By the late 70's the inefficiencies in the Soviet system were becoming known. It's one reason Reagan thought we could spend the Soviet's into defeat. By 89 the Soviet's are begging for a way out. Gorbachev is desperate to cut both conventional and nuclear forces, he is facing massive strikes across the Soviet economy and the Baltics were already boiling. Hungary and East Germany were teetering by 88. We all know what happened next the Soviet union imploded in 1990 and when a new born Russia tried to do a pitched battle in 1994 in Grozny it turned into a bloody defeat.

Skywatcher
11 Sep 18,, 00:22
Maybe, and I say this because of Grozny and a whole host of other issues. The failing Soviet economy really impacted Soviet army units in the interior and east heaviest. The Red Army already got the lowest class of recruits. Anyone with any real talent went to the Navy, Air Force, Air defense forces, or strategic rocket forces first. Of those that were left, the best of the worst so to speak went West to Germany, Hungary and then European Russia. Many were deficient in Russian language skills let alone national fervor. They lacked anything even resembling a professional NCO corps, NTC style training regime or any sort of professional development infrastructure. Besides severe hazing, Soviet privates also spent a lot of time helping bring in crops or doing other non-military tasks that ate into the 2 years in uniform. This meant a Soviet private getting ready to ETS likely didn't have much more skill than a Western private only 6 months from his completion of initial training.

There were some good units like the Talinin Guards or some airborne and spetznaz units but by and large the bulk wasn't much better than the Chinese. They lost pitched battles against the Muhajadeen in Afghanistan despite overwhelming superiority in armor, air support and artillery. The war may well have devolved into something like Iran-Iraq. By the late 70's the inefficiencies in the Soviet system were becoming known. It's one reason Reagan thought we could spend the Soviet's into defeat. By 89 the Soviet's are begging for a way out. Gorbachev is desperate to cut both conventional and nuclear forces, he is facing massive strikes across the Soviet economy and the Baltics were already boiling. Hungary and East Germany were teetering by 88. We all know what happened next the Soviet union imploded in 1990 and when a new born Russia tried to do a pitched battle in 1994 in Grozny it turned into a bloody defeat.

Zraver, weren't there also serious questions in the late 1980s about how willing the average Soviet conscript (or heck, even the lower ranking officers) would be to prop up a puppet government, like say, Poland, in the event of civil unrest?

zraver
14 Sep 18,, 04:05
Zraver, weren't there also serious questions in the late 1980s about how willing the average Soviet conscript (or heck, even the lower ranking officers) would be to prop up a puppet government, like say, Poland, in the event of civil unrest?

They stuck it out in A-stan. I thik the questions were directly more at the lolaty of WP troops, not the Red Army.

WABs_OOE
17 Sep 18,, 19:36
Good Day, Gentlemen,

Been away for a while. Went down to Georgia for a wedding and then on the spot decided to do a fishing tour of the lakes in the US.

The scenario does not make sense militarily. The bulk of the PLA was stationed 100 miles from the Sino-Soviet border. That was the strategic depth they were counting on absorb a Soviet thrust. So, right off the bat, the Chinese would have to build the logistics tail just to get to their own border, never mind venturing forth into the teeth of Soviet military might.

The PLA was also starved of funds during this period; having to cut over 2 million men just to have funds for equipment. And that was another can of worms. The bulk of Chinese air might was the MiG-19 and these would have go against MiG-21bis/23/27s and the Soviet had numeric and qualatative superiority in airpower. Chinese tanks was the Type-59 variant and it was a wet dream if they can punch through the T-72 armour.

However, look at the map. The Soviet 58th Army was poised against Lop Nor and there was nothing in between them and Lop Nor. And this would not be a conventional strike. The 58th Army was going to use nukes to blast their way to Lop Nor within 24 hours. The time the Soviets think the Chinese would need to issue a nuke strike order against Moscow. Lop Nor represented the only point in China where they could hit Moscow with a nuke.

Whatever the issue with Grozny, do note nothing stopped the Soviet Army from reaching Grozny and nothing was going to stopped the 58th from reaching Lop Nor.

Plesae look at where Lop Nor is. The Soviets take Lop Nor. They cut China in half. Tibet automatically becomes indefensivable.

In the East, there has been a lot of talk of repeating AUGUST STORM. By 1989, I don't think that was going to happen. The Soviet economy was going downhill and there was no threat from the PLA (being 100 miles behind their own border). There was also Deng Xia Peng. As bad as a shape the PLA was in, there was absolutely no doubt that he was going to fight. Tianamen Square proved that much.

And before you asked, I was feeding musquittoes more than I was catching fish. Almost all catch-and-release. Motel living isn't condusive cooking a nice fish dinner.

WABs_OOE
17 Sep 18,, 22:01
There were some good units like the Talinin Guards or some airborne and spetznaz units but by and large the bulk wasn't much better than the Chinese. They lost pitched battles against the Muhajadeen in Afghanistan despite overwhelming superiority in armor, air support and artillery. The war may well have devolved into something like Iran-Iraq.Really not a fair comparison at all. Both Chechnya and Afghanistan were at best battalion level engagements. When the Soviets massed regimental or larger, they achieved their objectives with relative ease. In those battles that the Soviet Army lost in Afghanistan, they were company garrisons or platoon houses being swamped by Mujahadeen numbers hugging the Soviets negating Soviet superior firepower that when employed friendly fire did more damage than the Mujahadeen did.

This would be a far cry from any Soviet-Sino conflict where the battle would be at the Army and Front level. There is no doubt that a battle would be fought at Lop Nor. 4 Chinese armies would clash with the Soviet 58th. Lop Nor is not a city. It's a nuclear weapons base and that means open spaces and lots and lots of maneuver room.

Considering the fact that the Chinese were shocked by the Kuwait War in how advanced military technique and technology had surpassed them, the PLA did not even have the Generals to even comptemplate a successful defence of Lop Nor.

And again, if the Chinese lose Lop Nor, the Soviets would have divided China in half.

astralis
18 Sep 18,, 18:34
Been away for a while. Went down to Georgia for a wedding and then on the spot decided to do a fishing tour of the lakes in the US.

it's damn good to have you back. and if you caught up on a Celine Dion concert on the fishing tour, all the better! ;-)




The PLA was also starved of funds during this period; having to cut over 2 million men just to have funds for equipment. And that was another can of worms. The bulk of Chinese air might was the MiG-19 and these would have go against MiG-21bis/23/27s and the Soviet had numeric and qualatative superiority in airpower. Chinese tanks was the Type-59 variant and it was a wet dream if they can punch through the T-72 armour.

However, look at the map. The Soviet 58th Army was poised against Lop Nor and there was nothing in between them and Lop Nor. And this would not be a conventional strike. The 58th Army was going to use nukes to blast their way to Lop Nor within 24 hours. The time the Soviets think the Chinese would need to issue a nuke strike order against Moscow. Lop Nor represented the only point in China where they could hit Moscow with a nuke.

Whatever the issue with Grozny, do note nothing stopped the Soviet Army from reaching Grozny and nothing was going to stopped the 58th from reaching Lop Nor.

a nuke against the 58th staging grounds might, although China would probably be radioactive for quite a while afterwards. i wonder if PRC nuke targeting was up to it.


Plesae look at where Lop Nor is. The Soviets take Lop Nor. They cut China in half. Tibet automatically becomes indefensivable.

pretty sure DXP wouldn't give half a sh*t about Tibet or Xinjiang once the war with the Soviets start. it'll be about saving himself and the CCP top cadre first, Beijing second.



In the East, there has been a lot of talk of repeating AUGUST STORM. By 1989, I don't think that was going to happen. The Soviet economy was going downhill and there was no threat from the PLA (being 100 miles behind their own border). There was also Deng Xia Peng. As bad as a shape the PLA was in, there was absolutely no doubt that he was going to fight. Tianamen Square proved that much.

i have no doubt that the PLA would -fight-, but wouldn't it really have been like the Red Army fighting the Japanese? PLA getting cut off, fixed, and annihilated.

now i wonder what things would have been like in 1969 or 1962, with the Korea War vets still in place.

WABs_OOE
19 Sep 18,, 00:22
it's damn good to have you back. and if you caught up on a Celine Dion concert on the fishing tour, all the better! ;-)I got lucky. I believe she's tormenting Australia or will torment Australia.


a nuke against the 58th staging grounds might, although China would probably be radioactive for quite a while afterwards. i wonder if PRC nuke targeting was up to it.Not her missile force. Do recall that China only had about a dozen nukes that were kept apart from their delivery vehicles and all her rockets were liquid fueled. That meant 2Arty must mount the warhead onto the missile and then fueled up the missile, taking valuable hours under the direct threat of continous Soviet air and missile strikes.

Also, China's nukes at the time were the 3-5 Megaton beasts mainly because they lack the accuracy against harden targets and would rely on such a large blast radius against softer targets. This essentially means the only reliable accurate delivery are the H6 bomber. I would not put money on any H6 getting off the ground at Lop Nor.


pretty sure DXP wouldn't give half a sh*t about Tibet or Xinjiang once the war with the Soviets start. it'll be about saving himself and the CCP top cadre first, Beijing second.DXP would have no choice but to continue the fight in both Tibet and Xinjiang; much like Stalin had no choice but to keep the Partisans in operation behind German lines. Deng, like Stalin, would have been dead if he yielded those territories. Dictators cannot tolerate the loss of that much power.


i have no doubt that the PLA would -fight-, but wouldn't it really have been like the Red Army fighting the Japanese? PLA getting cut off, fixed, and annihilated.The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan convinced the Chinese on how just inadequate that 100 miles depth and their natural barriers were. If you recall from CMF and CDF, the talk was People's War Under Modern Conditions. If the unorganized, ill-disciplined, divided Mujahadeen can prevent a Soviet conquest of Afghanistan, imagine a Deng lead organized, doctrinated, and trained PLA People


now i wonder what things would have been like in 1969 or 1962, with the Korea War vets still in place.Kruschev? He would have nuked China. He was a racist and he hated Mao.

DOR
19 Sep 18,, 00:55
It is indeed good to here the Colonel's voice back in the forums, although the tone is suspiciously genteel. Too long south of the Mason-Dixon line?

Tibet and Xinjiang: The PLA thought nothing of ceding ground for strategic advantage, and when it comes down to it there were only ever about 2% non-Han in the top party ranks. Saving the heartland would be top-of-mind, and only in the North-east might they have been fretting about losing a significant minority group (Manchus).

It isn't about yielding territory, but more about strategic retreat with the full intention of kicking the Soviets out in this or the next century.

WABs_OOE
19 Sep 18,, 02:19
It is indeed good to here the Colonel's voice back in the forums, although the tone is suspiciously genteel. Too long south of the Mason-Dixon line?Fishing is a very meditative past time. I was one with the fish ... or more precisely, the salesmen at the Bass Pro Shop. Since I didn't bring any gear down with me ... they saw me coming.


Tibet and Xinjiang: The PLA thought nothing of ceding ground for strategic advantage, and when it comes down to it there were only ever about 2% non-Han in the top party ranks. Saving the heartland would be top-of-mind, and only in the North-east might they have been fretting about losing a significant minority group (Manchus).

It isn't about yielding territory, but more about strategic retreat with the full intention of kicking the Soviets out in this or the next century.You're forgetting the butterflies. Deng started 2 wars with Vietnam and was prepared to start another one with India. Now in the middle of a life or death struggle with the Soviet Bear, could the PLA divert spare parts and munitions to either of these theatres?

The Soviet Army was concerned with Lop Nor. It would not be they who would take Tibet but India and you can be sure that Vietnam would be more than eager to settle the border threat.

Lastly, the only Soviet war plan that we know of was a nuclear first strike against China's nuclear capabilities and that also includes the nuclear release authority, aka DXP. Through NATO's Parrallel History Project (where former NATO and Warsaw Pact Officers discuss their war plans against each other as a matter of recording history), that plan was never replaced. In short, DXP's bunker would be under a mushroom cloud.

Oracle
19 Sep 18,, 11:57
Colonel, what makes you say that India would have taken Tibet in 1969? I don't think the IA had any warplans of liberating Tibet, and would have sat out of the confrontation between USSR and China.


DXP would have no choice but to continue the fight in both Tibet and Xinjiang; much like Stalin had no choice but to keep the Partisans in operation behind German lines. Deng, like Stalin, would have been dead if he yielded those territories. Dictators cannot tolerate the loss of that much power.

Why do this logic not apply to the Pak Army?

hboGYT
19 Sep 18,, 13:44
I got lucky. I believe she's tormenting Australia or will torment Australia.

Not her missile force. Do recall that China only had about a dozen nukes that were kept apart from their delivery vehicles and all her rockets were liquid fueled. That meant 2Arty must mount the warhead onto the missile and then fueled up the missile, taking valuable hours under the direct threat of continous Soviet air and missile strikes.

Also, China's nukes at the time were the 3-5 Megaton beasts mainly because they lack the accuracy against harden targets and would rely on such a large blast radius against softer targets. This essentially means the only reliable accurate delivery are the H6 bomber. I would not put money on any H6 getting off the ground at Lop Nor.

DXP would have no choice but to continue the fight in both Tibet and Xinjiang; much like Stalin had no choice but to keep the Partisans in operation behind German lines. Deng, like Stalin, would have been dead if he yielded those territories. Dictators cannot tolerate the loss of that much power.

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan convinced the Chinese on how just inadequate that 100 miles depth and their natural barriers were. If you recall from CMF and CDF, the talk was People's War Under Modern Conditions. If the unorganized, ill-disciplined, divided Mujahadeen can prevent a Soviet conquest of Afghanistan, imagine a Deng lead organized, doctrinated, and trained PLA People

Kruschev? He would have nuked China. He was a racist and he hated Mao.

Suppose that a dictator does lose a gigantic chunk of territory. Explain step by step what happens.

WABs_OOE
19 Sep 18,, 19:33
Colonel, what makes you say that India would have taken Tibet in 1969?The timeframe in question was 1989 and that was just after the Sino-Indo Border incident.


I don't think the IA had any warplans of liberating Tibet, and would have sat out of the confrontation between USSR and China.Don't think India would have a choice. The Tibetans would certainly be uprising after a weakened China losing Lop Nor. India would certainly be re-enforcing her borders against spill overs and this in turn would strongly tempt the PLA to strike first as they did Vietnam to clear their southern problems before tackling the life-and-death struggle against the USSR.


Why do this logic not apply to the Pak Army?Pakistan didn't have a dictator when they lost Bangladesh.


Suppose that a dictator does lose a gigantic chunk of territory. Explain step by step what happens.It's not a dictator losing a gigantic chunk of territory. It's the dictator acknowledging that he gave up the fight for that territory. Stalin did not give up the Soviet territories under Nazi occupation though the military effect of the Partisans can be described as miniscue.

A dictator needs 2 of 3 three things to stay in power: support of the people, money, and the army. Within context, if the army was still willing to fight to reclaim lost territories and the dictator is unwilling, then the army would either accident the dictator or more likely shoot him as a traitor.

Albany Rifles
21 Sep 18,, 15:48
Good Day, Gentlemen,

Been away for a while. Went down to Georgia for a wedding and then on the spot decided to do a fishing tour of the lakes in the US.

The scenario does not make sense militarily. The bulk of the PLA was stationed 100 miles from the Sino-Soviet border. That was the strategic depth they were counting on absorb a Soviet thrust. So, right off the bat, the Chinese would have to build the logistics tail just to get to their own border, never mind venturing forth into the teeth of Soviet military might.

The PLA was also starved of funds during this period; having to cut over 2 million men just to have funds for equipment. And that was another can of worms. The bulk of Chinese air might was the MiG-19 and these would have go against MiG-21bis/23/27s and the Soviet had numeric and qualatative superiority in airpower. Chinese tanks was the Type-59 variant and it was a wet dream if they can punch through the T-72 armour.

However, look at the map. The Soviet 58th Army was poised against Lop Nor and there was nothing in between them and Lop Nor. And this would not be a conventional strike. The 58th Army was going to use nukes to blast their way to Lop Nor within 24 hours. The time the Soviets think the Chinese would need to issue a nuke strike order against Moscow. Lop Nor represented the only point in China where they could hit Moscow with a nuke.

Whatever the issue with Grozny, do note nothing stopped the Soviet Army from reaching Grozny and nothing was going to stopped the 58th from reaching Lop Nor.

Plesae look at where Lop Nor is. The Soviets take Lop Nor. They cut China in half. Tibet automatically becomes indefensivable.

In the East, there has been a lot of talk of repeating AUGUST STORM. By 1989, I don't think that was going to happen. The Soviet economy was going downhill and there was no threat from the PLA (being 100 miles behind their own border). There was also Deng Xia Peng. As bad as a shape the PLA was in, there was absolutely no doubt that he was going to fight. Tianamen Square proved that much.

And before you asked, I was feeding musquittoes more than I was catching fish. Almost all catch-and-release. Motel living isn't condusive cooking a nice fish dinner.

Welcome back, Sir!

You have been missed.

And as usual your arguments are cogent and well constructed.

Albany Rifles
21 Sep 18,, 16:23
Fishing is a very meditative past time. I was one with the fish ... or more precisely, the salesmen at the Bass Pro Shop. Since I didn't bring any gear down with me ... they saw me coming.

Sir, you bring this video to mind...


https://youtu.be/aEgdQCG8h3c

WABs_OOE
23 Sep 18,, 03:25
Sir, you bring this video to mind...There were a few times that a large mouth bass toyed with me (saw it come close several but never touch the lurer) that I wished I had a Dupoint lurer, aka quarter stick dynamite.

Oracle
23 Sep 18,, 03:37
There were a few times that a large mouth bass toyed with me (saw it come close several but never touch the lurer) that I wished I had a Dupoint lurer, aka quarter stick dynamite.

Some of my friends in the hills love angling (I think this is the correct term to catch and release fishes), but I could never put myself up for it. I find it boring, and believe in buying it from the market when I want to eat some. What is so good about fishing anyway?


Pakistan didn't have a dictator when they lost Bangladesh.

1958 Sir, martial law was declared and General Ayub Khan took over. And since then Pak has been under military dictatorships, covertly and overtly. The civilian government is a farce there, everybody knows it. Right now, Taliban Khan is the PM, propped up by the PA.

WABs_OOE
23 Sep 18,, 06:27
Some of my friends in the hills love angling (I think this is the correct term to catch and release fishes), but I could never put myself up for it. I find it boring, and believe in buying it from the market when I want to eat some. What is so good about fishing anyway?It's very meditative when you have a stressful life. You're trying to outsmart the fish and you need every alert brain cell to do so, not allowing any stressful thoughts to enter your head. Because those damned fish can outsmart you if you're not careful.


1958 Sir, martial law was declared and General Ayub Khan took over. And since then Pak has been under military dictatorships, covertly and overtly. The civilian government is a farce there, everybody knows it. Right now, Taliban Khan is the PM, propped up by the PA.There's no one head hancho in charge meaning there is no dictator. Everything is decided in a committee where power factions have to do horse trading to get the things they want.

Compare this to the likes of Stalin, Hitler, Mao, Deng, and even Saddam where these men couldn't care less what those under them thought. They had the power to clobber anyone who did not follow the leader's vision.

AndrewSimons
25 Sep 18,, 02:35
damn, never knew that, that's crazy

WABs_OOE
30 Sep 18,, 18:23
Tibet and Xinjiang: The PLA thought nothing of ceding ground for strategic advantage, and when it comes down to it there were only ever about 2% non-Han in the top party ranks. Saving the heartland would be top-of-mind, and only in the North-east might they have been fretting about losing a significant minority group (Manchus).

It isn't about yielding territory, but more about strategic retreat with the full intention of kicking the Soviets out in this or the next century.Actually this part has been bugging me. Now, I figured out why. The People's War Under Modern Conditions.

In short, Mao's People's War.

The enemy attacks, we retreat.
The enemy fatiques, we harrass.
The enemy retreats, we attack.

Deng's Modifications to the People's War Under Modern Conditions.

The enemy attacks, we make them pay for every inch in blood.
The enemy fatiques, we bleed them white.
The enemy retreats, we annihilate.

In short, Deng had no intentions of allowing the Soviets an easy time just because they take Lop Nor. How, I have not figured out.

Oh, BF, from your original OP, any war between USSR/Russia and China would have a deciding conventional battle at Lop Nor whether nukes are used or not. The Russians/Soviets have to take Lop Nor if only to prevent further nukes from being used and the Chinese have to fight to the last man because losing Lop Nor would split China in half.

I started to do research on the ORBAT and TOE but my condition does not allow me to focus enough to go through all that material. On the surface of it, it would have been the Soviet 58th Army against the LANZHOU Military Region which had about 4 Group Armies (Corps level strength) including at least one of the two best equipped Group Armies in China ... not that it meant anything against the 58th Army.

gunnut
01 Nov 18,, 09:18
It's not a dictator losing a gigantic chunk of territory. It's the dictator acknowledging that he gave up the fight for that territory. Stalin did not give up the Soviet territories under Nazi occupation though the military effect of the Partisans can be described as miniscue.

A dictator needs 2 of 3 three things to stay in power: support of the people, money, and the army. Within context, if the army was still willing to fight to reclaim lost territories and the dictator is unwilling, then the army would either accident the dictator or more likely shoot him as a traitor.

Does this explain Chiang's plan to retake China between 1949 and 1975?

WABs_OOE
01 Nov 18,, 20:03
Does this explain Chiang's plan to retake China between 1949 and 1975?CKS was delusional. The US was not going to let him. However, during the GPCR, there was a strong chance that the PRC could erupt into full blown Civil War and an organized KMT army could take advantage of such a disarray.

gunnut
03 Nov 18,, 00:22
CKS was delusional. The US was not going to let him. However, during the GPCR, there was a strong chance that the PRC could erupt into full blown Civil War and an organized KMT army could take advantage of such a disarray.

Oh no, I don't mean if he had a decent chance of retaking China. I'm wondering if he had to at least pretend to have a plan to retake China to keep his army happy and his people motivated.

WABs_OOE
03 Nov 18,, 06:56
Oh no, I don't mean if he had a decent chance of retaking China. I'm wondering if he had to at least pretend to have a plan to retake China to keep his army happy and his people motivated.No, he didn't have to pretend because the decision to invade the ML would have been made in Washington and not Taipei. Every single one of his Generals knew it and so did CKS.

Besides, no one thought CKS a military genius, not even his generals.

Triple C
04 Nov 18,, 06:12
One interpretation of CKS's intent was to justify the military's size and power. The internal security apparatus of CKS were military intelligence units.

DOR
04 Nov 18,, 17:31
CKS was delusional. The US was not going to let him. However, during the GPCR, there was a strong chance that the PRC could erupt into full blown Civil War and an organized KMT army could take advantage of such a disarray.

My reading of the GPCR era PLA leadership (MR and up) is that they would have quickly set aside domestic differences in the event of any coherent ROC/KMT force posing an actual threat to PRC national integrity.

WABs_OOE
04 Nov 18,, 18:35
My reading of the GPCR era PLA leadership (MR and up) is that they would have quickly set aside domestic differences in the event of any coherent ROC/KMT force posing an actual threat to PRC national integrity.By the time anyone outside of the PRC knew what a mess the GPCR had made of China, the Sino-Soviet Split had errupted into a full border war. The PRC became a defacto US ally. CKS's wet dreams of reconquering China was sidelined in the more pragmatic WWIII prep work.

WABs_OOE
05 Nov 18,, 18:28
Come to think of this, this would have been a PLA nightmare. They were preparing for a war against the USSR. A sudden offensive by the KMT would have left them both physically and pyschologically oriented the wrong way. And they could not withdraw enough armies from the Sino-Soviet border in case the Soviet Army does strike, in essence a two front war.

astralis
13 Nov 18,, 15:59
but as you said, if CKS comes over the fence it's because the US let him.

the USSR would probably look upon this...unfavorably. Taipei would probably go up in a mushroom cloud.

WABs_OOE
13 Nov 18,, 22:47
Eric, recall the timeline. Brezhnev asked Nixon for a joint strike.

astralis
14 Nov 18,, 13:34
yes, but a joint US-USSR strike on PRC nuclear facilities is different than re-introduction of Nationalist armies into the ML.

WABs_OOE
05 Jan 19,, 20:00
Sorry, Eric, for the extreme delayed reply. No, I did not run off with She Who Shall Not Be Named. She was in Australia tormenting BF.

In context, I don't think Brezhnev would have much of a choice. The US was not about to hand China over to the USSR. Taking Lop Nor effectively would destroy the CCP, reducing the rest of China into a 2nd rate power. Don't think the Soviet Army would have any intentions of marching to Guanzhou but Southern China would have little inclination to obey power brokers in the north who lost their power.

It would have been quib pro quo. The Soviets in the north. The KMT in the south.

DOR
06 Jan 19,, 10:50
The two holy causes of the 20th century, according to all sides of the post-Qing political leadership, were to kick out the foreigners and unify the country. The first was accomplished on December 20th, 1999, when Macau was recovered from Portugal. The second (Taiwan) is still pending.

One small part of the means of ensuring that no warlords would reemerge was to rotate the Field Armies around the country, and later, rotate their commanders and political commissars out of their power bases.* From early 1967 through 1969, more PLA corps were relocated than at any time since the Korean War.

If the USSR decapitated the CCP/PLA leadership in the north, which is a huge and not necessarily valid assumption, the notion that whatever units were in the South would act differently from those in, say, the North-east, is hard to support.

ADD footnote:

* An excellent analysis is in China Quarterly No. 51 (Jul-Sep, 1972, pp 444-474): Military Forces in the Cultural Revolution, by Harvey Nelsen. The appendix details unit movements.

WABs_OOE
06 Jan 19,, 16:08
One small part of the means of ensuring that no warlords would reemerge was to rotate the Field Armies around the country, and later, rotate their commanders and political commissars out of their power bases.* From early 1967 through 1969, more PLA corps were relocated than at any time since the Korean War.1) They were building up to face a Soviet onslaught. In 1964, the Soviets had 225,000 men, 200 planes, and zero nukes on the Sino-Soviet border. In 1968, they had 375,000, 1200 planes, and 120 nuke tipped missiles. The PLA responded with 1.5 million men.

2) At least 4 of those Field Armies would have been destroyed at Lop Nor including the best Chinese Armoured Corps.


If the USSR decapitated the CCP/PLA leadership in the north, which is a huge and not necessarily valid assumption,A very real and valid assumption since Soviet plans include destroying the Nuclear Release Authrority, aka the CMC, aka Peking/Beijing. And we're not talking flights of MiG-23s dropping 1000lb bombs. We're talking 3 warheads of 3-5 megatons each.


the notion that whatever units were in the South would act differently from those in, say, the North-east, is hard to support.Of course they will. You don't have to look any further than the 1979 Sino-VN War. The GPCR made a mess of the PLA and was nothing more than a WWI army. Their prepared offense was a joke, going up against an army who made them look like kids building sand castles in the same year when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

Add to that, they would not have been physically and psychologically prepared to face a KMT attack while trying to figure out what to do against the Soviet Army kicking their ass. And they would not have the CMC to do their thinking for them.

Stop thinking political, the military dimensions of this thing would jerk your assumptions into the crazy house.

DOR
06 Jan 19,, 17:30
1) They were building up to face a Soviet onslaught. In 1964, the Soviets had 225,000 men, 200 planes, and zero nukes on the Sino-Soviet border. In 1968, they had 375,000, 1200 planes, and 120 nuke tipped missiles. The PLA responded with 1.5 million men.

2) At least 4 of those Field Armies would have been destroyed at Lop Nor including the best Chinese Armoured Corps.

A very real and valid assumption since Soviet plans include destroying the Nuclear Release Authrority, aka the CMC, aka Peking/Beijing. And we're not talking flights of MiG-23s dropping 1000lb bombs. We're talking 3 warheads of 3-5 megatons each.

Of course they will. You don't have to look any further than the 1979 Sino-VN War. The GPCR made a mess of the PLA and was nothing more than a WWI army. Their prepared offense was a joke, going up against an army who made them look like kids building sand castles in the same year when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

Add to that, they would not have been physically and psychologically prepared to face a KMT attack while trying to figure out what to do against the Soviet Army kicking their ass. And they would not have the CMC to do their thinking for them.

Stop thinking political, the military dimensions of this thing would jerk your assumptions into the crazy house.


First, my use of "Field Army" is very specific to the PLA's five FAs (as commanded by Ho Long, Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen), and I have no doubt that nuking Lap Nor would destroy several corps or what were later Group Armies.

Second, maybe I mistook the north-south issue to mean that Chiang Kai-shek's woeful excuse for an army was the threat to southern China. Throw in the 7th Fleet and the 101st Airborne, and the equation changes very fast.

Third, I stand by my statement about the PLA being all about national unity.

WABs_OOE
06 Jan 19,, 18:37
First, my use of "Field Army" is very specific to the PLA's five FAs (as commanded by Ho Long, Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen),You're speaking of MRs?


and I have no doubt that nuking Lap Nor would destroy several corps or what were later Group Armies.Do you even understand the military dimensions of this? The Soviets were not just going to nuke Lop Nor and the nuclear release authority, they were going to occupy Lop Nor. The Soviet 58th Army was tasked to take that base and forever denied the only place in China where 2Arty can reach Moscow.

Taking Lop Nor means China is divided in half with a big desert protecting the Soviets, hardly the geography needed for the People's War.


Second, maybe I mistook the north-south issue to mean that Chiang Kai-shek's woeful excuse for an army was the threat to southern China.Again, I point to the PLA woeful performance in the 1979 Sino-VN War. The odds would be at least even if the Soviets were not involved. Look, the PLA would be on the ropes being punched drunk by the Soviet Army and now, here comes a sucker punch by the KMT.


Throw in the 7th Fleet and the 101st Airborne, and the equation changes very fast.You're way over-estimating the value of a single light infantry division but any KMT incursion would require some massive American logistics support.


Third, I stand by my statement about the PLA being all about national unity.That point is moot. The national unity is destroyed. Look, the primary goal of the Soviet attack is to destroy Chinese nuclear capabilities and that means also destroying the nuclear release authority, aka the CMC, aka Peking/Beijing. That also means every possible 2ndary and tertiary HQ where the nuclear release authority can be assumed, ie every MR HQ by three 3-5 megaton bombs and very possibly every corps HQ would also be targetted by tac nukes.

You are NOT going to maintain national unity under those conditions. You're going to be forced into Warlordism whether you like it or not. There could not be any co-ordinated military actions between MRs. At best, the MRs have a common goal but nowhere close to a unified command structure.

DOR
07 Jan 19,, 10:11
Field Armies, not Military Regions (or Military Districts)

At the end of 1949, the five Field Armies settled down in place (for the most part), and became the local government and security forces. So, 2nd FA in the Southwest (later Chengdu MR), 3rd in the East (Nanjing MR), 4th in the South (Guangzhou), etc. They were reshuffled during the Korean War, but then again returned to their post-1949 bases. Some of the commanders were in place from the late 1950s well into the 1970s (e.g., Yang Dezhi and Chen Xilian).

As for MRs,
Early 1950s
Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Kunming, Wuhan, Chengdu, Lanzhou, Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia. Add Fuzhou in 1956.

Late 1960s
Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Kunming, Wuhan, Chengdu, Lanzhou, Xinjiang, Fuzhou.

Late 1980s
Shenyang, Beijing, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Lanzhou, Jinan

Mid-2010s
Eastern, Western, Northern, Southern, Central


As for dividing China East-West, defense in depth, and the army swimming in the sea of the people, there arenít a whole lot of people in the Gobi Desert.

Finally, people who started their careers beating warlords and pulling together the diverse parts of a former great empire are not going to fall back into warlordism at the drop of a hat. I give the Eighth Route Army and its successors more credit than that.

WABs_OOE
07 Jan 19,, 15:53
As for dividing China East-West, defense in depth, and the army swimming in the sea of the people, there aren’t a whole lot of people in the Gobi Desert.Translation: The Soviets won their war and the Chinese nuclear threat ended once and for all with half of China in their hands and the rest trying to recover from mushroom clouds.


Finally, people who started their careers beating warlords and pulling together the diverse parts of a former great empire are not going to fall back into warlordism at the drop of a hat. I give the Eighth Route Army and its successors more credit than that.How? At least 8 major cities are gone. The Command/Control/Communications (C3) reduced to foot messengers. Any radio signals would be automatically detected and targetted and aerial and satellite reconnasiance will detect anything bigger than a battalion (300 men) up. All your Field Marshall HQs are destroyed and more than likely, all your Field Marshalls are dead. Corps would be rendered ineffective and leadership would most likely fall to division level.

Sure, whatever survives might have a chance against the KMT but against the Soviets? The people who wrote the book on maneuver warfare? In the desert? The PLA C3 is not going to be able to control anything bigger than battalion level operations. You have warlords whether you like it or not. The C3 would not allow anything bigger.

Plus, whatever military force that survives is going to be damned busy trying to figure out what to do with those 8 destroyed cities and their survivors. A lot of riots and looting are going to occur simply because people want food and water and you will have to kill to get those. Cholera is going to be rampaging through those areas. You think the sucessors of the Eighth Army are prepared for that?

You simply do not grasp the scale of nuclear war the Soviets were prepared to unleashed on China. Do you even begin to understand what nuclear weapons can do? Well, I have news for you. Neither did the Chinese.

DOR
07 Jan 19,, 18:49
OK, I didn’t realize the scenario was an 8-city Pearl Harbor nuking: no warning, no chance to disperse key personnel, nothing at all hinting that the birds are about to fly. In that scenario, you’re entirely right: China dies.

At which point, the USSR occupies and actually runs China as it did Poland? Really?
How many divisions would that take?

astralis
07 Jan 19,, 19:38
well, if the Soviets wanted to take Chinese nukes in the late '60s or '70s, then yeah, they'd probably turn Beijing into an uncomfortable place to be. i doubt Chinese leadership would -all- be holed up there for that very reason, they'd probably be dispersed to cave complexes across China.

Beijing is toast as is Lop Nor, but I don't think the Soviets would have -really- gone to town. they had to leave enough conventional and strategic deterrent against the US/NATO, plus wrecking too much of China would be a temptation for CKS to get involved.

probably enough to wipe out Chinese nukes, kill enough monkeys to scare everyone else, put in place a pliant regime, and GTFO.

WABs_OOE
07 Jan 19,, 21:09
OK, I didn’t realize the scenario was an 8-city Pearl Harbor nuking: no warning, no chance to disperse key personnel, nothing at all hinting that the birds are about to fly. In that scenario, you’re entirely right: China dies.You're not getting it. The Chinese was expecting war as far back as 1968. That was why they withdrew from Vietnam. But this type of war is far from their experience. It is completely alien to them. To them, they're still expecting front line assaults, thinking that their rear were safe. They have litterally no concept of deep battle - a Soviet invention. They litterally could not understand that Beijing and all the other MR HQs would be hit long before Lop Nor. The Soviets ARE NOT aiming TO KILL KEY PERSONNEL. They're aiming to KILL HQs. Even if your staff survives, they have NO WAY to identify, control, nor communicate with surviving units.

When Brezhnev went to Nixon, the Soviets had already identified key C3 nodes and their fall back positions.

The Kuwait War shocked the hell out of the PLA. Do you know why? Baghdad was hit before anything else and they were expecting war. Immediately, the Iraqis lost control of all front line units. Saddam still lived but without his HQ, he was effectively gone. This is the scenario you're looking at. Only instead of the USAF, the Soviets were going to use their Strategic Rocket Forces.


At which point, the USSR occupies and actually runs China as it did Poland? Really? How many divisions would that take?I said the 58th Army was going to occupy Lop Nor, cut China in half and destroy all HQs capable of issuing a nuclear release which happens to be all MR and Corps level HQs. In case you're not seeing it, that's the entire PLA C3 for the entire country destroyed without killing one single front line soldier.


well, if the Soviets wanted to take Chinese nukes in the late '60s or '70s, then yeah, they'd probably turn Beijing into an uncomfortable place to be. i doubt Chinese leadership would -all- be holed up there for that very reason, they'd probably be dispersed to cave complexes across China.120 nuke tip rockets on the Sino-Soviet border, Eric. 10 minute flight time. By 1969, they were ready, waiting for the go ... and still Mao did not moved out of Beijing.


Beijing is toast as is Lop Nor, but I don't think the Soviets would have -really- gone to town. they had to leave enough conventional and strategic deterrent against the US/NATO, plus wrecking too much of China would be a temptation for CKS to get involved.120 nukes and 1 army occupying Lop Nor while freeing 1200 planes and 41 divisions to go West? Another reason why Nixon said no.


probably enough to wipe out Chinese nukes, kill enough monkeys to scare everyone else, put in place a pliant regime, and GTFO.I can't see them leaving Lop Nor.

WABs_OOE
08 Jan 19,, 00:46
I may be guilty of expecting people to see what is obvious to me.

Let me explain.

Soviet and American missiles back in the 60s and 70s were not as accurate as they are today, not really suited for hard target busting. Hence, the reliance on megatonage to compensate the inaccuracies. Because rockets were unreliable back then, we tasked 3 rockets per target. The hardened target may still stand a chance but the surrounding 20 mile radius is basically a death zone.

What are the Soviet objectives? To destroy the Chinese nuclear capabilities. Again, because of the relative inaccuracies of rockets back then, no one can be sure you get the Chinese nukes unless you have eyes on the ground. Hence, why the Soviet 58th Army is tasked with taking Lop Nor. However, it would take at least 2 days to reach Lop Nor. And you can bet there are 4 armies trying to slow them down. More than enough time for the Chinese to gather whatever nukes and rockets that survived and lob it towards Moscow.

So, what do you do? You take out the nuclear release authority. Moving to hardened caves ain't going to help. Signal analysis would identify the location and even if the people survive, those radio dishes and antennaes ain't going to survive a nuclear blast, isolating the nuclear release authority from command and control. That is even assuming the Chinese knows how to ground all their electronics.

However, like all command structures, the Chinese would have rendundacies. We and the Soviets didn't know who they were but we do know what and where is capable of taking over in case the CMC gets taken out. The MR HQs. As for why 8 cities? Where are those HQs located? Hence, they too would be attacked before Lop Nor is even touched. I also think corps HQs would also be attacked simply based on the number of nukes the Soviets tasked against China. 120 nukes - 40 targets. Lop Nor and the cities are 9, leaving 31 more targets.

If the nuclear release authority cannot get their release codes out, then you have time to nuke Lop Nor while the 58th Army smashes their way through. Make no mistake, the primary OPOBJ is the 58th Army's occupation of Lop Nor.

One more thing to add: there was no such thing as Chinese Distance Early Warning during the period in question. The only way for the Chinese to know that they would be under nuclear attack is when mushroom clouds appear over their cities.

DOR
08 Jan 19,, 10:46
The Third Line, industrial dispersion strategy of spreading key industries across the map started in the mid-1950s, but got a strong kick in the early 1960s. They expected a coastal – i.e., USA – attack, and so moved parts of the military industrial complex inland.

China withdrew from Vietnam because of the Cultural Revolution. The 100 generals sent there in the early 1950s (led by Wei Guoqing, later PC of the Guangzhou MR, PLA GPD Director and Politburo member) had largely returned home by the time of the major American involvement.

.

I’m having a hard time envisioning every single provincial capital under a mushroom cloud.

WABs_OOE
08 Jan 19,, 16:50
The Third Line, industrial dispersion strategy of spreading key industries across the map started in the mid-1950s, but got a strong kick in the early 1960s. They expected a coastal – i.e., USA – attack, and so moved parts of the military industrial complex inland.The war would be long over before that kicks in. This is at max a 5 day campaign for the Soviets to take Lop Nor, to deny the only place in China where Chinese rockets can reach Moscow.


China withdrew from Vietnam because of the Cultural Revolution. The 100 generals sent there in the early 1950s (led by Wei Guoqing, later PC of the Guangzhou MR, PLA GPD Director and Politburo member) had largely returned home by the time of the major American involvement.PLA engineers and AAA were defending VN during LB I and II.

Doesn't change the fact that those units were deployed north to prepare for a Soviet onslaught ... though completely inadequate as it was. PLA engineers dug 10s of miles of shelters but no air pumps. Never occur to them that nukes consume oxygen and creates enough negative pressure for your guts to burst out of your chest.


I’m having a hard time envisioning every single provincial capital under a mushroom cloud.Welcome to my world.

Why? Because the Soviets were nice guys? They were going to burn Beijing alive. What's 7 more cities?

We also hit every Iraqi capital during both the Kuwait and the Iraq War because of military necessity. The only difference in this scenario, the Soviets needed the SRF to do what we did with the USAF.

astralis
08 Jan 19,, 21:33
120 nukes and 1 army occupying Lop Nor while freeing 1200 planes and 41 divisions to go West? Another reason why Nixon said no.

but the reason why the Soviets -asked- Nixon in the first place was because they sure didn't want to do this and then find NATO breathing down their throats. essentially if the war with China was going to be a cakewalk with several great strategic payoffs (end to Chinese nuke threat, closing off one entire front), the Soviets would have just -done- it, US assistance or not.

thinking things through, wonder if the Chinese couldn't just go nuclear mines. or devolve nuclear command and control in the event of a war.

WABs_OOE
08 Jan 19,, 21:50
but the reason why the Soviets -asked- Nixon in the first place was because they sure didn't want to do this and then find NATO breathing down their throats. essentially if the war with China was going to be a cakewalk with several great strategic payoffs (end to Chinese nuke threat, closing off one entire front), the Soviets would have just -done- it, US assistance or not.The Soviets needed the US to at least stay neutral. That wasn't the case. Nixon stated that the attack would be intolerable to US interest, leaving enough ambuguity that the US might intervene militarily. The reason why Brezhnev was screaming the US betrayed us.

Do recall that after Nixon's no, the Soviets started to consider China to be under the American nuclear umbrella.


thinking things through, wonder if the Chinese couldn't just go nuclear mines. or devolve nuclear command and control in the event of a war.They don't think like us. They were not thinking nuclear warfighting but deterrence. We did not know it then but the CMC absolutely had no intentions of releasing nuclear authority to MR HQs. The reason why 2Arty went conventional, to bypass the CMC ridiculus weapons hot procedures.

The only time the release was issued in 1960s by Lin Biao, Nie ignored it and kept the nukes and rockets recessed.

astralis
08 Jan 19,, 22:38
The Soviets needed the US to at least stay neutral. That wasn't the case. Nixon stated that the attack would be intolerable to US interest, leaving enough ambuguity that the US might intervene militarily. The reason why Brezhnev was screaming the US betrayed us.

Do recall that after Nixon's no, the Soviets started to consider China to be under the American nuclear umbrella.


because that would have been the only way the US could have intervened in a five-day Sino-Soviet war. frankly i think Nixon's "no" was more of a face-saving excuse for the Soviets not to act, because the idea that Nixon was going to start World War III to save Communist China, a state the US didn't even recognize in 1969 (and was actively killing US troops in Vietnam!), is a fantasy.


They don't think like us. They were not thinking nuclear warfighting but deterrence. We did not know it then but the CMC absolutely had no intentions of releasing nuclear authority to MR HQs. The reason why 2Arty went conventional, to bypass the CMC ridiculus weapons hot procedures.

The only time the release was issued in 1960s by Lin Biao, Nie ignored it and kept the nukes and rockets recessed.

i wonder to what extent this was true when China's nuclear arsenal was still in the single digits. they had to know that with such a small arsenal, there was no deterrent factor at all, the opposite in fact.

same type of calculations i'm guessing KJU is going thru right now.

WABs_OOE
09 Jan 19,, 02:40
because that would have been the only way the US could have intervened in a five-day Sino-Soviet war.Who said it would be a 5 day war? The Chinese certainly didn't think so. I said this would be a 5 day campaign to achieve a very specific 58th Army OPOBJ. At this point, any kind of US intervention including humanitarian aide would only help the CCP re-establish its leadership. Certainly, the PLA would need time to lick their wounds but there's nothing stopping the US from arming and training the PLA to help them retake Lop Nor.


frankly i think Nixon's "no" was more of a face-saving excuse for the Soviets not to act, because the idea that Nixon was going to start World War III to save Communist China, a state the US didn't even recognize in 1969 (and was actively killing US troops in Vietnam!), is a fantasy.Several things wrong with this premis.

The Soviets didn't lose face because no one knew about it. Moscow did not threaten war diplomatically. There was no ultimatum to disarm. No negotiations to demand Chinese actions to avoid war. No one outside of Moscow, not even Nixon, knew why the Soviets didn't attack. It was long after the fall of the USSR and Nixon's own memoirs that we learned the extent of war footing. The Soviet plans did not emerged until NATO's academic Parallel History Project.

I certainly did not know that the SRF was at 100% readiness in Siberia (peacetime footing is 25%).

Do recall that the Soviets' only objective was Lop Nor, not to march all over China. With US help, that would be indeed required as American armed Chinese armies keep marching north. Nixon would have loved to hand Brezhnev his Vietnam multiply by 100. American firepower and Chinese manpower would prove too much of a combination.


i wonder to what extent this was true when China's nuclear arsenal was still in the single digits. they had to know that with such a small arsenal, there was no deterrent factor at all, the opposite in fact.

same type of calculations i'm guessing KJU is going thru right now.The deterrence is from nuclear attack, not from war itself. Do recall that the Soviets could not be sure of destroying all the nukes at Lop Nor without the 58th Army securing the site and even then, while Moscow maybe out of danger, she can never be sure that Vladivostok is outside of the nuclear bullseye.

Also, while Lin Biao was ready to start a nuclear war. Nie, however, was ready to lose the entire nuclear arsenal than to invite a Soviet nuclear strike. Do recall those old Chinese liquid fuel rockets would take a day to prep - more than enough time Moscow to notice and land their nukes before the Chinese could finish fueling their rockets. However, both were expecting war.

astralis
09 Jan 19,, 15:02
Who said it would be a 5 day war? The Chinese certainly didn't think so. I said this would be a 5 day campaign to achieve a very specific 58th Army OPOBJ. At this point, any kind of US intervention including humanitarian aide would only help the CCP re-establish its leadership. Certainly, the PLA would need time to lick their wounds but there's nothing stopping the US from arming and training the PLA to help them retake Lop Nor.

under the context here, it would be both a 5 day campaign and a 5 day war. actually, it'd probably be 11 Chinese cities that would get nuclear fire (there were 11 MRs back then).

probably anywhere from 3-5% of the Chinese population would die right then and there, double that in the month thereafter. if Mao and the Politburo and the other high echelons of CCP leadership all die, there'd be either chaos or paralysis. it was already bad enough in our 1969, with the GPCR in full swing.

and again, i highly doubt Nixon was going to help re-establish the CCP or arm/train the PLA back then...let alone risk nuclear war with the Soviets. not in 1969.


Do recall that the Soviets' only objective was Lop Nor, not to march all over China. With US help, that would be indeed required as American armed Chinese armies keep marching north. Nixon would have loved to hand Brezhnev his Vietnam multiply by 100. American firepower and Chinese manpower would prove too much of a combination.

100 million dead Chinese in a month and rising, the CCP decapitated. rest of China in civil war. i doubt there'd be all that much opposition to the Soviets setting up a puppet regime or at least de-nuclearizing China.


Do recall that the Soviets could not be sure of destroying all the nukes at Lop Nor without the 58th Army securing the site and even then, while Moscow maybe out of danger, she can never be sure that Vladivostok is outside of the nuclear bullseye.

once Moscow was out of danger, i think as far as Soviet leadership was concerned the rest would be gravy. what, China's going to threaten Vladivostok and in so doing, turn the rest of China into radioactive glass? threatening just one frontier city isn't credible, not for the Soviets anyway.

WABs_OOE
09 Jan 19,, 18:17
under the context here, it would be both a 5 day campaign and a 5 day war. actually, it'd probably be 11 Chinese cities that would get nuclear fire (there were 11 MRs back then).

probably anywhere from 3-5% of the Chinese population would die right then and there, double that in the month thereafter. if Mao and the Politburo and the other high echelons of CCP leadership all die, there'd be either chaos or paralysis.Recall what China was back then. 80% rural with the PLA growing their own food. You could not bomb China back to the Stone Age when they were already in the Stone Age.

The CCP had already prepared the People's War. Surviving Cities would still be under CCP leadership. Collective Farms have their own militia orgainizations and the militia alone numbered 5 million. Most of the PLA would survive under Divisional leadership. The CCP would remain in charge of the country side. They had thought this through.


and again, i highly doubt Nixon was going to help re-establish the CCP or arm/train the PLA back then...let alone risk nuclear war with the Soviets. not in 1969.The Brezhnev-Nixon summit was 1972, the same year Nixon visited Mao, and what risk? Did Moscow risked nuclear war with the US when they armed and trained Vietnam?


100 million dead Chinese in a month and rising, the CCP decapitated. rest of China in civil war. i doubt there'd be all that much opposition to the Soviets setting up a puppet regime or at least de-nuclearizing China.The Iranian Revolution wrecked Iran. How did that worked out for Saddam? Iran was not even prepared for war. Here, you have a China who already thought things through and organized for the People's War.


once Moscow was out of danger, i think as far as Soviet leadership was concerned the rest would be gravy. what, China's going to threaten Vladivostok and in so doing, turn the rest of China into radioactive glass? threatening just one frontier city isn't credible, not for the Soviets anyway.Deterrence is not warfighting. The idea here is not even to inflict unacceptable damage to the Soviets but rather would the Soviets pay the price for such a small gain? What did the Soviets actually gain here? A big desert. What might they lose? The Soviet Far East. Just one nuke would wreck 20 miles of the Trans-Siberian railway leaving vulnerable to a 7 million foot army which doesn't drink gasoline as much as the Soviets do.

All of this does not mean the Soviets could not win and win easily but the shift would be from counter-force to counter-population, from de-nuclearizing China to genocide ... and that was not the plan.

astralis
10 Jan 19,, 20:20
Recall what China was back then. 80% rural with the PLA growing their own food. You could not bomb China back to the Stone Age when they were already in the Stone Age.

The CCP had already prepared the People's War. Surviving Cities would still be under CCP leadership. Collective Farms have their own militia orgainizations and the militia alone numbered 5 million. Most of the PLA would survive under Divisional leadership. The CCP would remain in charge of the country side. They had thought this through.

i don't get this. you originally mentioned to DOR that if the Soviets ended up hitting China, Chinese national unity would be kaput, warlordism would be back, PLA C3 would be gone, and whatever remained of the military would be trying to stop the urban chaos from engulfing everything else. that looks like USSR victory to me, because the Soviets have achieved their strategic objectives-- elimination of China as a nuclear threat and probably as a regional power bucking the Soviets.

even holding onto Lop Nor afterwards is optional, because good luck to China restarting a nuclear program anytime soon after the nuclear holocaust.


What did the Soviets actually gain here? A big desert. What might they lose? The Soviet Far East. Just one nuke would wreck 20 miles of the Trans-Siberian railway leaving vulnerable to a 7 million foot army which doesn't drink gasoline as much as the Soviets do.

All of this does not mean the Soviets could not win and win easily but the shift would be from counter-force to counter-population, from de-nuclearizing China to genocide ... and that was not the plan.

doubt that WWI foot army is going anywhere with all the MR HQs gone, Beijing gone, and as you say, 4 of their best field armies destroyed...and the KMT right there. so at the end of 5 days the Soviets have achieved their objective of de-nuclearizing China.

before this gets even more confusing, i wanted to re-vector back to the original discussion. Brezhnev was willing to risk nuclear war with China provided the US was alongside the USSR, or at least neutral. but even the POTENTIAL of getting into some sort of conflict with the US was a deal-breaker for Brezhnev. he knew it was unlikely that the US was going to start WWIII over China, but he couldn't be sure. deterrence, not warfighting! :-)

just like LBJ was always afraid of ground troops invading North Vietnam because he couldn't be sure about the Chinese response...even tho everyone knew that the likelihood was low.

WABs_OOE
10 Jan 19,, 21:29
i don't get this. you originally mentioned to DOR that if the Soviets ended up hitting China, Chinese national unity would be kaput, warlordism would be back, PLA C3 would be gone, and whatever remained of the military would be trying to stop the urban chaos from engulfing everything else.That point still stands. No Chinese army is going to march north in the aftermath of a Soviet nuclear strike. However, you did note that I said AFTER the PLA licked their wounds.


that looks like USSR victory to me, because the Soviets have achieved their strategic objectives-- elimination of China as a nuclear threat and probably as a regional power bucking the Soviets.Again, look at the Soviet objectives. The elimination of the nuclear threat to Moscow. They're not counting on CCP collapse. They're attacking the C3 but they couldn't care less if Mao or Zhou survived the nuclear strikes. Bonus if they did but again, that is not an objective just we attacked Baghdad but we couldn't care less where Saddam was when the bombs fell.


even holding onto Lop Nor afterwards is optional, because good luck to China restarting a nuclear program anytime soon after the nuclear holocaust.You don't know how many nukes were outside of Lop Nor or how many IRBMs they can assembled in Southern China and transport it to Lop Nor.


doubt that WWI foot army is going anywhere with all the MR HQs gone, Beijing gone, and as you say, 4 of their best field armies destroyed...and the KMT right there. so at the end of 5 days the Soviets have achieved their objective of de-nuclearizing China.Again, without conquering the rest of China, you do not know how many nukes the Chinese have stored away elsewhere. Lop Nor represented the threat to Moscow only. We know all this now that 2Arty had all the nukes but we and the Soviets back then also counted H6 and Q5s as nuclear delivery vehicles.

And the Soviet Army automatically becomes a foot army once they ran out of fuel, hence the reference to the Trans-Siberian railway.


before this gets even more confusing, i wanted to re-vector back to the original discussion. Brezhnev was willing to risk nuclear war with China provided the US was alongside the USSR, or at least neutral. but even the POTENTIAL of getting into some sort of conflict with the US was a deal-breaker for Brezhnev. he knew it was unlikely that the US was going to start WWIII over China, but he couldn't be sure. deterrence, not warfighting! :-)

just like LBJ was always afraid of ground troops invading North Vietnam because he couldn't be sure about the Chinese response...even tho everyone knew that the likelihood was low.There's 3 fingers of Lagavulin 16 waiting for you.