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  • Haqqani network & ISI

    To help us understand the Afghan insurgency and the major players I am starting this thread. I will be putting summerised analysis from study material and shall give references for the benefit of the reader.

    To most readers with would come as a surprise that Mullah Omar and the Taliban were at loggerheads with Al Qaida.....

    It would be pertinent to understand that since hundreds of years the chief rebellious region of Afghanistan is the Khost - Paktia - Paktika provinces and in Pakistan - North & South Waziristan. This region is mountainous and agriculturally unproductive. See the map below with the legends to understand the region in question.

    "Pushtunistan" or the Pushtun "nation"- is depicted in the pink coloured region that straddles the Durand line.



    Pushtuns are made up of the Nang and the Qalang. The Nang Pashtuns inhabit the mountainous fringe where the land is poor and life is harsh, and codes of conduct are bound by traditional codes of honour. Qalang Pashtuns, inhabit the fertile lands of the valleys and produce large marketable surplus. Their social interaction is governed by patron-client relations.

    The Haqqanis follow a long line of nang Pashtuns or highland Pashtuns who have been fiercely independent and have maintained their autonomy. Neither Pakistan or Afghanistan have been successful in integrating the highland Pushtuns within their respective systems. The people in these "autonomous" regions escape state subordination of taxation, state laws etc. These highland Pashtuns form the Karlanri Pashtun confedracy, that has troubled most invading armies. The other Afghan confedracies are - Durrani (a.k.a Abdali), Ghilzai and Ghurghusht.

    In the region there exists a broadbased clerical network, of clerics and their deciples (through the madarsas), amongst the highland Pashtuns. The reader should also note that the rebellions in these regions have been clerical led and not by tribal leadership. A kind of supratribal solidarity. The madarsas afford a ready manpower base for the militias.

    Whenever, state authority has tried to exercise their writ on these regions, the highland Pashtun clerics have led revolts. The reasons could be as varied as the Afghan state implementing modernisation process on the lines of Turkey or the British getting back a Hindu girl from her "kidnappers" (the famous Fakir of Ipi led revolt).

    Reference: The Fountainhead of Jihad - The Haqqani Nexus, 1973 - 2012

    Cheers!...on the rocks!!

  • #2
    When you look at the map in the post above, and note pink shadded portion - the "Pushtun nation". The "Pushtun nation" forms a substantial part of Pakistan and hence, Pakistan cannot afford any Afghan unity with respect to the concept of "Pushtun nation" or negotiation on the Durand line. A troubled and fragmented Afghan is in Pakistani interests.

    Before the British had finalized the partition of the Indian sub-continent, Afghanistan had started lobbying aggressively for the annulment of the Durand Line, which was viewed as an illegal boundary imposed by the British by force in 1893. Afghanistan appealed to the British Parliament in June 1947 for the inclusion of two additional options to the upcoming plebiscite in the Northwest Frontier - i.e union with Afghanistan or formation of an independent Pushtun nation ("Pushtunistan"). The British Parliament rebuffed the request and the plebiscite went ahead, limiting the Pushtuns of the frontier to choose between joining India or Pakistan. In this plebiscite the highland Pushtuns were not allowed to vote, because they were living in semi-autonomous limbo (Reference: Arnold Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest).

    This soured relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghanistan supported Pakistani Pushtun movements for Pushtunistan independence, by Pushtun nationalists (like Khudai Khidmatgar) led by Khan Abdul Gafar Khan, a.k.a the Frontier Gandhi and also tribal religious leaders like the Fakir of Ipi, whose "Free Pushtunistan" movement went well into the 1950s. (Reference: Rizwan Hussein, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, Chapter 2)

    In 1947, Pakistan used the highland Pushtuns to wrest Kashmir and to block Pushtun separatism. (Reference: Jamal, Shadow of war).

    In teh aftermath of Pakistani defeat in Dec 1971 in East Pakistan, in 1973 trouble was brewing in Balochistan and the provincial govt was dismissed, sending many Baloch leaders fleeing across to Afghanistan, also a coup by in Afghanistan by the former Primister Daoud again raised the Pushtunistan boogey. Afghanistan and Pakistan initiated covert campaigns to cross-border support for destablizing insurgencies against one another's regimes. (Reference: Rizwan Hussein, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan)

    Cheers!...on the rocks!!

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    • #3
      Originally posted by lemontree View Post
      Pushtuns are made up of the Nang and the Qalang. The Nang Pashtuns inhabit the mountainous fringe where the land is poor and life is harsh, and codes of conduct are bound by traditional codes of honour. Qalang Pashtuns, inhabit the fertile lands of the valleys and produce large marketable surplus. Their social interaction is governed by patron-client relations.
      You left out the Kuchi Pashtuns. The Kuchi are nomadic Pashtuns who tend to their livestock, migrating between fixed winter and summer pastures. They have historically been used for the purpose of Pashtun expansion into the North by previous Pashtun dominated governments of Afghanistan, as well as the Taliban. The Kuchi view the Northern tribes as foreign occupiers of Afghan lands. (To most Pashtuns, the words "Afghan" and "Pashtun" are synonymous). This has resulted in a deep resentment of the Kuchis by the Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbek and other Farsiwans.

      A subsection of the Kuchi Pashtuns (known as the Powindah Pashtuns in Punjab) were historically famous for being seasonal merchants who would come to Punjab to sell dry fruits, wool, and other goods from Afghanistan. This largely came to an end after partition.
      Last edited by Tronic; 28 Aug 13,, 01:45.
      Cow is the only animal that not only inhales oxygen, but also exhales it.
      -Rekha Arya, Former Minister of Animal Husbandry

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      • #4
        Originally posted by Tronic View Post
        You left out the Kuchi Pashtuns.....
        The Kuchi Pashtuns come under the Ghilzai tribal confederacy, who have been mentioned in the first post. I am avoiding too much detailed anthopological background information to avoid deviation from the topic.

        Cheers!...on the rocks!!

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        • #5
          Jalaluddin Haqqani



          - Jalaluddin Haqqani, the founder and leader of the Haqqani network, was born in 1939, the village of Karezgay in the Wazi Zardan district of Paktia province.

          - Jalaluddin and his family belong to the Sultankhel clan of the Zadran tribe. He was the eldest of four sons, and his father Khwaja Muhammad Khan was a wealthy landlord with trading interests in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Jalaluddin and his brothers were sent for advanced religious education to Pakistan.

          - The world into which Jalaluddin was born was a conflict zone, with on-going jihads against the Afghan state. Armed defence of highland Pushtun territorial independence, violent resistance to state meddling with tribal or Islamic culture.

          - In 1964, Jalaluddin began advanced religious studies in Dar al-Ulum Haqqqaniyya madrassa in NWFP, Pakistan. He graduated in 1970 with the equivalent of a doctorate degree and was qualified to be addressed as “maulvi”.

          - This Deobandi seminary was the birthplace of the Haqqani network and the institution from which the Haqqani’s take their name. This madrassa has always been closely associated with the Jamait Islami of Pakistan and Jamait Ulema-e Islam (JUI), a Pakistani Sunni Islamist political party.

          - The current leaders of the two main factions of Jamait Ulema-Islam (JUI) – Maulana Fazl ur Rehman (head of JUI-F) and Maulana Sami ul Haq (Head of JUI-S), both members of Pakistan’s national assembly – are graduates of Haqqaniyya. In Pakistan, between 1966 and 1985 roughly a third of all Deobandi clerics in Pakistan graduated from the Haqqaniyya. (Reference: Jamal Malik, Colonisation of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions of Pakistan).

          - Most Haqqaniyya graduates belonged to highland Pashtun regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the largest number of students originating from North Waziristan and Bannu, and the second largest group coming from eastern Afghanistan – especially Paktia. (Reference: Jamal Malik, Colonisation of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions of Pakistan. Based on registry data from the madrassa covering 1977-84).

          Cheers!...on the rocks!!

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          • #6
            Anti-Daoud jihad in Afghanistan in 1973

            - When the Mohammed Daoud Khan, came to power through a coup in 1973, Jalaluddin Haqqani declared jihad. He announced jihad some ulema and students joined him. The government interfered and appealed to the tribes who did not let Jalaluddin continue his jihad, so he carried out his jihad in secret.

            - Between 1973-75, Jalaluddin Haqqani shifted base of operations to North Wazirstan. Here the Kabul islamists like Massoud, Hekmatyar, Rabbani and the highland Pashtuns received training and support from Pakistan via the Frontier Corps.

            - In the summer of 1975, Jalaluddin Haqqani and his activists were part of an uprising in Urgun, Paktika, which was in concert with planning by the Kabul islamists and and Frontier Corps officers in Peshawar. In that operation he killed the District Police Commander and 9 policemen and also wounded the Urgun District Chief, who managed to escape. Thereafter, he and his group of 30 odd men escaped back into North Waziristan. (Reference: “The Historic Battle of Paktia”, Manba’ al-Jihad (Oct-Nov 1991)).

            - After the 1975 short lived revolt, Pakistan’s support to Afghan dissidents waned. The Hizb-I Islami then carried out assassinations and political violence in Kabul on their own.

            - Pakistan did not feel it necessary to support the Afghan islamists as Daoud Khan had backed off in his demands for Pashtunistan.

            - In 1978, Daoud Khan was killed in a coup by PDPA and a communist government came to power in Kabul.

            Cheers!...on the rocks!!

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            • #7
              Originally posted by lemontree View Post
              The Kuchi Pashtuns come under the Ghilzai tribal confederacy, who have been mentioned in the first post. I am avoiding too much detailed anthopological background information to avoid deviation from the topic.
              LT, I agree that a large portion of Kuchi Pashtuns are from the poorer Ghilzai tribes, but they are not all Ghilzai. The Kuchi are based on a nomadic class composition, rather than tribal kinship. I consider them important as they are at the forefront of most of the sectarian violence between the Pashtuns and the non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan.

              That said; apologies for the sidetracking. Please continue on with your informative posts.
              Last edited by Tronic; 28 Aug 13,, 06:30.
              Cow is the only animal that not only inhales oxygen, but also exhales it.
              -Rekha Arya, Former Minister of Animal Husbandry

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              • #8
                The Urban and highland Islamic organisations

                - King Zahir Shah made some serious effort to create an open political atmosphere in Afghanistan. He commissioned a new and liberal constitution in 1964 and introduced unprecedented freedoms of press and political organization. Legislation to form political parties was passed in 1968 in the house of parliament.

                - During this period Afghanistan witnessed a sudden explosion of political parties, forming around journals and magazines. On the left, the Marxist-Leninist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) formed in 1965, organized in two factions “Parcham” (banner) and “Khalq” (masses), named after two communist magazines.

                - On the Islamic right, a group of professors from the Faculty of Sharia at Kabul University inspired a network of student activists and formed “Jawanan-i-Musulman” (Muslim Youth) in 1969.

                - All these developments were concentrated in Kabul and the protagonists were literate, highly political and hailed from upper and middle classes of Afghan society. The urban or Kabul Islamists leading members included the future leaders of the “fundamentalist” mujahideen parties: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Abdal Rabb Rasul Sayyaf, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Ahmed Shah Massoud. (Reference: Barnett R Rubin, “The Fragmentation of Afghanistan).

                - By 1970, the Kabul Islamists had developed close organizational ties to their ideological cousins in Pakistan, the JI. (Reference: David B Edwards, “The Evolution of Shi’I Polotical Dissent in Afghanistan”).

                - The Kabul Islamists and JI were urban and modern university based in the origin of their leaders, and both were revolutionary in their outlook as they sought the seizure of state power to usher in order based on Islamic tenets.

                - In contrast, an alternate form of organized Islamic opposition to the state emerged during the same period in the Pushtun highlands. Economically depressed and having the lowest literacy rates in the entire region, the border tribes mobilized against Zahir Shah’s reforms. The opposition had nothing to do with freedom of press or campus activism, but more to do with the age old struggle for regional autonomy. It is to this context that the ideological and organizational origins of the Haqqani network can be traced.

                Reference: The Fountainhead of Jihad - The Haqqani Nexus, 1973 - 2012

                Cheers!...on the rocks!!

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                • #9
                  The Haqqani network

                  The Kabuli Islamists leaders formed the following militias:-
                  - Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – Hizb-I Islami-Gulbuddin (HIG).
                  - Burhanuddin Rabbani – Jamait-I Islami Afghanistan (JIA), Ahmed Shah Massoud was one of his best commanders in the north.

                  Haqqani network

                  - Jalaluddin Haqqani joined Hizb-I Islami Khalis (HIK), a group formed by fellow Haqqaniyya alumnus Yunis Khalis.

                  - During the anti-Soviet years, Yunis Khalis a prominent activist and Mohammad Nabi Muhammadi would establish two tradional highland Pashtun mujahideen parties: hizb-I Islami-Khalis (HIK) and Harakat-I Inqilab-I Islami (Harakat). These two party leades and their senior battlefield commanders – foremost of them being Jalaluddin Haqqani – formed along with the Pakistani Pashtun Islamist politicans of JUI, what could be called the “Haqqaniyya network”, an intertwined group of Haqqaniyya graduates who deployed distinctive practices of islamist mobilization in the highland tribal regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan during 1970s and 1980s.

                  Reference: The Fountainhead of Jihad - The Haqqani Nexus, 1973 - 2012

                  Cheers!...on the rocks!!

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                  • #10
                    Organisation for anti-Soviet war

                    - At the time of the influx of foreign aid from ISI and the CIA, Haqqani and other Haqqaniyya parties enjoyed certain advantages over the Kabul parties in terms of organizational effectiveness and advantageous geographical position.

                    - The war against the Soviets in Afghanistan was being staged from Pakistan, and all the vital fronts and essential supply lines to the resistance areas , were located in the highland Pashtun regions. The route from Miranshah to Khost (see map in post 1) was the most vital line of communication during the whole conflict.

                    - On either side of the Durand line, the Haqqanis were respected locals with deep strong attachment to highland Pashtun traditions, with the ability to mobilize popular support against the regime.

                    - The Kabuli islamist parties, were exiles rather than locals on Pakistan’s highland frontier, and were less successful in establishing a dominant presence in the Pak-Afghan border.

                    - When Gen. Zia ul Haq came to power in 1977, he had restored aid to the Afghan resistance, and being a strong supporter of the Jamait-I Islami, started the process of bringing JI into his regime. JUI was in fact anti-Zia and sided with the pro-democracy parties in Pakistan.

                    - When millions of dollars in military aid poured in from the US, Zia directed the ISI to prioritize the JI linked parties, liked Hekmatyar’s HIG, Sayyaf’s Ittihad, and to a lesser extent Rabbani’s JIA were favored recipients of aid. But the ISI also distributed funds on the basis of battlefield effectiveness and rewarded parties for bringing down Afghan or Soviet planes. (Reference: Rubin, “Fragmentation of Afghanistan).

                    - Because of Jalaluddin was an unrivalled guerilla leader in the all important southeast, he was never at a disadvantage due to Zia’s alliance with the JI-HIG. Pakistan's favoritism towards HIG continued till the emergence of the Taliban in 1994.


                    Reference: The Fountainhead of Jihad - The Haqqani Nexus, 1973 - 2012

                    Cheers!...on the rocks!!

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                    • #11
                      Zakat Ordinance

                      - The JUI and their mujahideen partners benefited enormously during Zia’s rule. Zia enacted the Zakat Ordinance in 1980, and instituted a deduction at source withdrawal on the first day of every Ramadan of 2.5% from all savings accounts in Pakistan above a certain exemption limit. These funds went to “the needy”, and one of the primary beneficiaries of these funds were the madarssas, for providing food and lodging to needy students they were deemed legitimate recipients.

                      - The JUI already had a large network of madarssas, and the ordinance saw a rapid mushrooming of madarssas, many of them in the highland frontier throughout 1980s.

                      - This creation of madarssas was to cater to deploy young mujahids in the theater of conflict has wreaked havoc in the Pashtun society along with the Kalashnikov culture.

                      For the Haqqani’s this madarssa boom was a critical resource mobilization advantage that others could not match, as Jalaluddin Haqqani had begun establishing his own seminaries in eastern Afghanistan since early 1970s. With the zakat funds, the number of seminaries under him rose to 80 madarssas. The crown jewel was the Manba al-Ulum (Fountainhead of Knowledge), in Danday Darpakhel, near Miranshah, North Waziristan.

                      Reference: The Fountainhead of Jihad - The Haqqani Nexus, 1973 - 2012

                      Cheers!...on the rocks!!

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Thank you for the educational thread, Captain.

                        Can some of the mods make this one sticky?

                        Not for the comments sake, but to always appear on top of the threads in the forum.
                        No such thing as a good tax - Churchill

                        To make mistakes is human. To blame someone else for your mistake, is strategic.

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                        • #13
                          Re-cap till now

                          - The Haqqani network emerged from a long standing tradition of cleric led highland Pushtun resistance to state attacks on political and cultural autonomy of the tribes.

                          - Unlike the more radical Pashtun Islamists of the HIG (the urban or Kabuli islamists), the Haqqanis utilized existing social structure and patterns of mobilization that had been adapted by previous generations.

                          - The Haqqanis followed the footsteps of the Hadda Mullah (active since 1880still his death in 1903) and his disciples, in building a network of activist seminaries (madarssas) and harness religious authority to the cause of intertribal defense against perceived threats.

                          - By late 1970s, the Haqqani network had amassed many of the assets that would prove critical:-
                          o Direct support from the Pakistan military establishment.
                          o A nationwide network of political sympathizers in Pakistan’s JUI.
                          o Safe haven in North Waziristan and deep roots in Loya Paktia (Greater Paktia – collectively the provinces of Paktia, Khost and Paktika).

                          The above elements that make the Haqqanis such a formidable opponent of the western and Afghan armies today – were well in place by 1979 (on the eve of the Soviet invasion). Hence, contrary to the popular belief that it was CIA funding that created these monsters of global jihad, we shall see that it was Arab and Pakistani donations that actually created them.
                          Last edited by lemontree; 29 Aug 13,, 07:15.

                          Cheers!...on the rocks!!

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                          • #14
                            The Haqqani network, foreign fighters and the origins of the Al-Qaida

                            - In 1978, despite renewed interest by Gen. Zia ul Haq of Pakistan, in the anti-Afghan insurgency, the Afghan Islamists were resource poor and disunited and debated about returning to Afghanistan and starting another uprising or appealing to the oil rich Arab states for aid. (Reference: Interview of Jalaluddin Haqqani in Abu I-Walid, a Taliban Arabic language magazine). The situation however, saw a sea change once the Soviet invasion took place, with Saudi, US, Chinese and other partner states pouring in aid for the mujahideen.

                            - The Haqqanis pursued both tracks simultaneously, but they also introduce an innovation in their appeals to the Arab world that would prove fateful. The Haqqanis made direct calls for foreign fighter volunteers, and they were the only ones willing to accept large numbers of non-Afghan volunteer fighters into their ranks.

                            - This innovation transformed the nature of jihad in Afghanistan, giving birth in the following decade to the concept of global jihadism. It was in this context regarding foreign fighters that Osama bin Laden and his supporters established the Al –Qaida organization towards the latter half of 1980s.

                            - It was also in this connection (inviting foreign fighters) that the Pakistani military would turn to the Haqqanis to train Kashmiri militants, establishing the Haqqanis as a “strategic asset” in Pakistan’s policies of war-by-proxy. (Reference: David Sanger, “The Inheritance”. Haqqanis were called a strategic asset by Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, former ISI chief and current COAS Pakistan Army).

                            Reference: The Fountainhead of Jihad - The Haqqani Nexus, 1973 - 2012

                            Cheers!...on the rocks!!

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                            • #15
                              Rise of the Afghan Arabs

                              - The first Arabs who had direct battlefield participation were recruited by the Haqqanis in the Gulf several months before the Soviet invasion. Before 1986, the majority of Arabs were humanitarian aid workers based in Peshawar from Islamic NGOs. These workers were from Islamic activist networks with ideological and personal links with JI and JI associated Kabuli Islamic parties.

                              - Bin Laden had first visited Pakistan shortly after the Soviet invasion to meet Mian Mohd Tufail a JI leader and to present to him money collect from his family for the cause of the Afghan mujahid.

                              - Most accounts ignore the role played by Jalaluddin Haqqani in inviting foreign fighters and give all the credit to the Palestinian activist Abdullah Azzam and his Maktb al-Khidamat (MAK), established in Peshawar in 1984. Hekmatyar and Sayyaf were the recipients of recruits from MAK. But the Haqqanis had preceeded Azzam by 5 years. Haqqanis appealed to Non-Afghan muslims to “offer themselves for jihad”, a duty that they stressed cannot be absolved by any other aid.

                              - Jalaluddin Haqqani had made various trips to Saudi, UAE and Iran to raise money and he also based his followers in UAE and Saudi Arabia to ensure a regular supply of donations. For recruitment of foreign fighters the Haqqanis sent a group of clerics to tour mosques in the Gulf in search of support. At a mosque in Abu Dhabi, the met an Egyptian journalist Abu i-walid al-Masri (Mustafa Hamid). Abdul i-Walid spent the next twelve years fighting alongside the Haqqanis in Afghanistan. He began working closely with Al-Qaida in early 1990s and became their adviser in al-Faruq training camp at the Haqqani base in Zhawara. (Reference: Vahid Brown, “Abu i-Walid al-Masri: A Biological sketch”).

                              - Abu i-Walid is also credited with convincing Bin Laden in early 1990s, to re-orient the organization around a global confrontation with the United States. He was also the chief correspondent of Al-Ittihad and covered the anti-Soviet war, and he was also instrumental in presenting the Haqqanis struggle before an international Arab audience. His efforts played a big role in portraying Haqqani fronts as the destination of choice for Afghan Arab war volunteers.

                              Reference: The Fountainhead of Jihad - The Haqqani Nexus, 1973 - 2012

                              Cheers!...on the rocks!!

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