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Deltacamelately
07 Feb 13,, 11:24
Gentlemen, many of my course mates have discussed this and its indeed an intriguing scenario.

What if Nixon was successful in convincing/coercing the Chinese to open the southern theatre with India in 1971, atleast 15 days before East Pakistan collapsed? How would that shape the course of the war? Would Bangladesh still come into existence?

I would like your individual analysis on this.

Regards,

Officer of Engineers
07 Feb 13,, 15:05
Gentlemen, many of my course mates have discussed this and its indeed an intriguing scenario.

What if Nixon was successful in convincing/coercing the Chinese to open the southern theatre with India in 1971, atleast 15 days before East Pakistan collapsed? How would that shape the course of the war? Would Bangladesh still come into existence?

I would like your individual analysis on this.

Regards,An open invitation to the Soviet 58th Army into Lop Nor.

Mihais
07 Feb 13,, 15:28
An open invitation to the Soviet 58th Army into Lop Nor.

Sir,aren't VDV divisions and Soviet AF in India enough?To heck with PakAF,the Russians,can level their air bases before they notice there's a war around.

Officer of Engineers
07 Feb 13,, 15:32
In 1971-1973, the Soviets were on a hair trigger to march in Lop Nor. It would take time for both armies to re-orient themselves to the Indian Front. Heck, it would take the Chinese 38th and 39th Group Armies two weeks just to get there. So, without a major re-orientation, the Soviets would be poised to take Lop Nor against a weakened Chinese defence.

Mihais
07 Feb 13,, 15:40
But would they still want to move the 38&39 GA's knowing they'll face Soviet troops in India?The VDV is the strategic reserve and they had contingency plans for such a deployment.Does not affect Soviet troops in Far East or Central Asia,much.

Doktor
07 Feb 13,, 15:41
Chinese and Pakistan in war with India, where one are US ally and the others will intervene on US push - where does this place the USN?

Officer of Engineers
07 Feb 13,, 15:45
But would they still want to move the 38&39 GA's knowing they'll face Soviet troops in India?The VDV is the strategic reserve and they had contingency plans for such a deployment.Does not affect Soviet troops in Far East or Central Asia,much.The 38 and 39GAs are the only formations of note. Any other army would face defeat.

Mihais
07 Feb 13,, 15:54
So the real choice for the Chinese is if they lose Lop Nor to the 58th or die in India at the hands of the 100's series of Guards Abn Div's(plus the Indians and the Soviet AF).

Officer of Engineers
07 Feb 13,, 15:57
Or both. Lop Nor without the 38 and 39 is a real tempting target for an army on a hair trigger.

Firestorm
07 Feb 13,, 16:04
I don't think the Soviets would send their troops and aircraft to India. They don't really need to. Their purpose is served by opening a second front against the Chinese (which is much easier since the Soviets already have their troops there), which would force the Chinese to withdraw from the southern theater. If they are able to capture Chinese territory in the bargain, that is a bonus. The Chinese knew this, so Nixon's attempt never really had a chance.

The Major's question becomes more interesting if we assume that the Soviets aren't in the picture and concentrate on the southern theater. What would the Chinese do? Would they send their troops into East Pakistan to reinforce Niazi? The IAF did a number on East Pak airfields within two days of the war starting. So the Chinese would have had to rely on their own airfields for air support. Or would the Chinese start another front in Ladakh or Arunachal Pradesh forcing the IA into an untenable three-front war.?

Mihais
07 Feb 13,, 16:10
I don't think the Soviets would send their troops and aircraft to India. They don't really need to. Their purpose is served by opening a second front against the Chinese (which is much easier since the Soviets already have their troops there), which would force the Chinese to withdraw from the southern theater. If they are able to capture Chinese territory in the bargain, that is a bonus. The Chinese knew this, so Nixon's attempt never really had a chance.

Soviet Abn's were put on alert.Officers were informed about a possible deployment to India.
If the ex-Soviet Abn. Major who told me that lied,so do I.The man was fresh from the officers school at the time.

Firestorm
07 Feb 13,, 16:11
Soviet Abn's were put on alert.Officers were informed about a possible deployment to India.
If the ex-Soviet Abn. Major who told me that lied,so do I.The man was fresh from the officers school at the time.Well I wasn't aware of this of course. It is surprising. Anyway, I edited my post to include a different scenario.

Skywatcher
07 Feb 13,, 16:58
What could Nixon give Mao that would persuade the PLA to march south?

DOR
07 Feb 13,, 19:13
What could Nixon give Mao that would persuade the PLA to march south?

More to the point, why in the world would the US want China in a shooting war with India? There is no strategic national interest served by such action.

However, I recognize that this is a "what if" scenario, not an alternative history.

Firestorm
07 Feb 13,, 20:24
More to the point, why in the world would the US want China in a shooting war with India? There is no strategic national interest served by such action.

However, I recognize that this is a "what if" scenario, not an alternative history.

This is 1971 we are talking about. US's interest was in preventing the breakup of their ally Pakistan into two parts. Nixon wanted to push China into attacking India so that India would lose the war and Pakistan would stay intact.

Doktor
07 Feb 13,, 22:09
Since when USA hesitated to use military to protect her interests?

DarthSiddius
07 Feb 13,, 22:38
Wouldn't it be very difficult for the Chinese regardless, to intervene because of extremely harsh weather and terrain (winter in Himalayas)?

Tronic
07 Feb 13,, 22:55
There's a reason the invasion of East Pakistan was planned for December. The Himalayan passes are sealed due to heavy snow during the winter, allowing India to pull away troops from the Chinese border and concentrate them on her Eastern and Western fronts.

Firestorm
07 Feb 13,, 23:19
Since when USA hesitated to use military to protect her interests?

Didn't get you. Who is saying that they did?

Doktor
07 Feb 13,, 23:53
Didn't get you. Who is saying that they did?

This is how I got post #15.

Firestorm
08 Feb 13,, 00:12
This is how I got post #15.

That's not what I meant. Nixon did send the Big E to the Bay of Bengal after all. But the strategy of convincing the Chinese to intervene, rather than the US intervening itself was more sound for several reasons.

1. The Chinese wanted Pakistan to remain intact as much as the US did.

2. The US was embroiled in Vietnam at the time and facing anti-war protests at home. Getting involved in another war in a far away place, on the side of a dictatorship against a democratic nation, where the benefits to the US are not immediately apparent would have been tough to sell politically. Especially since the media was reporting that the dictatorship in question was massacring innocents.

3. Even after the 1962 war, there was still Indian land that the Chinese coveted. It might have been possible to persuade them to see this as an opportunity.

4. While Pakistan was important, was it important enough to put American soldiers in harm's way? I don't know the answer. I guess Nixon probably thought it was better to put Chinese soldiers in harm's way.

There were mitigating circumstances of course. Like what Tronic mentioned about the Himalayan passes being closed. And the soviets.

But this is the "What if" section. So we are going OT.

Doktor
08 Feb 13,, 00:15
USSR openly fighting US ally is more then enough to change home opinion in the 70s. No?

Firestorm
08 Feb 13,, 00:28
USSR openly fighting US ally is more then enough to change home opinion in the 70s. No?

USSR would have intervened only if the Chinese or the US itself attacked India first. If the US wanted to sell it domestically, they needed a reason for the initial intervention. They could have managed it, but like I said, it would be much easier to let the Chinese do the dirty work. If only the Chinese attacked, I am still convinced that the Soviets would have limited themselves to forcing the Chinese to stop by opening a front in Lop Nor. And China wasn't officially a US ally in 71. Nixon went there the following year, although secret talks had been going on for a while.

That's why I said, this "what if" scenario becomes more interesting if the soviets are out of the picture. However, the physical hurdles like snow covered mountain passes remain.

Deltacamelately
09 Feb 13,, 14:32
Gentlemen thank you all for the responses. Its indeed refreshing.
I would get back with my own assessment in a while.
Just some food for thought - Nixon presumed the InA's intention was to dismantle the PA(and hence the panicky/urgency).
Which was not.

Deltacamelately
09 Feb 13,, 14:40
Since when USA hesitated to use military to protect her interests?
Upfront, it seems the US blinked. Many factors in play. The US Ambassador/Counsel in erst while East Pakistan didn't help either.
India was committed to that war and US was committed to some other theatres. Don't doubt the US capabilities, but priorities are what dictated the situation.
One thing for sure - Mrs. Gandhi was willing to walk the mine field, alone or otherwise.

Officer of Engineers
09 Feb 13,, 17:47
Thinking this through ...

It would have been a freaking disaster for the Chinese, even if the Soviets did not get involved. The Indian Army of 1971 was way superior to the PLA of 1979. That meant that the PLA would have been met with certain defeat. About the only good side for the allies is that the Indian Army must mass to meet the Chinese head on and that would have prevented the destruction of the Pakistani Army in Bangladesh though I still see it losing the war, albeit a negotiated settlement instead of outright independence.

It would have meant that the Chinese would have sought to appease the Soviets once they knew of their own weaknesses and in 1971, they did not have American backing.

Mao's faction would most certainly be deposed and a pro-Soviet camp emerging. Imagine a China armed with Soviet weaponry of the 70s and 80s.

Thank god it Nixon failed.

Doktor
09 Feb 13,, 18:11
But if Nixon persuades Chinese to open the front, wont that understand some sort of US "backing" for the Chinese side?

Mihais
09 Feb 13,, 18:21
But if Nixon persuades Chinese to open the front, wont that understand some sort of US "backing" for the Chinese side?
Backing with words only is worse than no backing at all.

Doktor
09 Feb 13,, 18:33
Backing with words only is worse than no backing at all.

Then, no wonder Chinese didn't "seize" the "opportunity".

Tronic
09 Feb 13,, 20:35
But if Nixon persuades Chinese to open the front, wont that understand some sort of US "backing" for the Chinese side?

The US was already backing the Chinese post-'60s.

Doktor
09 Feb 13,, 21:06
The US was already backing the Chinese post-'60s.

Kissinger 1971, Nixon 1972.

Tronic
10 Feb 13,, 05:53
Kissinger 1971, Nixon 1972.

During the Sino-Soviet border war in '69, it were American nukes which were holding back the Soviet armies from invading China.

Officer of Engineers
10 Feb 13,, 06:20
During the Sino-Soviet border war in '69, it were American nukes which were holding back the Soviet armies from invading China.Soviets weren't ready in 69. They were ready as of 72 and on full spring board mode in 73.

Deltacamelately
10 Feb 13,, 11:51
Soviets weren't ready in 69. They were ready as of 72 and on full spring board mode in 73.
Sir,

Yet Nixon believed the PRC would fall in line as per his contingency?

Officer of Engineers
10 Feb 13,, 16:29
Sir,

Yet Nixon believed the PRC would fall in line as per his contingency?I don't see how. The Chinese were busy getting ready to face the Soviets and they were scrambling to get the last of their troops out of Vietnam to move north. They could not remobilize and reorient themselves fast enough to make a difference. At best, a punitive expedition after the fall of East Pakistan.

lemontree
11 Feb 13,, 12:46
There's a reason the invasion of East Pakistan was planned for December. The Himalayan passes are sealed due to heavy snow during the winter, allowing India to pull away troops from the Chinese border and concentrate them on her Eastern and Western fronts.

This left only one approach for the PLA into India - Walong sector in Arunachal Pradesh. All other sectors were a no go area due to the snow.
Walong was well covered in 1971.

Firestorm
11 Feb 13,, 14:27
This left only one approach for the PLA into India - Walong sector in Arunachal Pradesh. All other sectors were a no go area due to the snow.
Walong was well covered in 1971.

What about attacking through Bhutan? The PLA could have quickly overwhelmed the small Bhutanese forces, made a mad dash across western Bhutan and tried to strike straight at the Chicken's neck area. If it was fairly early during the war, any PA units present in northern east pakistan could have assisted by attacking from the south. The objective of course would be to cut off the entire northeast from the rest of India. But I'm unfamiliar with the topography of the region and don't know if this could be possible in winter.

Tronic
11 Feb 13,, 19:21
Soviets weren't ready in 69. They were ready as of 72 and on full spring board mode in 73.

I stand corrected, sir. Though I guess it still shows the intent to back China, whenever the Soviets got ready.

Skywatcher
12 Feb 13,, 01:09
I doubt that even western Bhutan is suitable for that sort of combat ops.

lemontree
12 Feb 13,, 12:48
What about attacking through Bhutan? The PLA could have quickly overwhelmed the small Bhutanese forces, made a mad dash across western Bhutan and tried to strike straight at the Chicken's neck area. If it was fairly early during the war, any PA units present in northern east pakistan could have assisted by attacking from the south. The objective of course would be to cut off the entire northeast from the rest of India. But I'm unfamiliar with the topography of the region and don't know if this could be possible in winter.

Bhutan is an Indian protectorate state.
The PLA will face the same terrian and climatic restrictions as in other regions.
Another thing, there can be no mad dash in mountains like in plains/ deserts.

zraver
15 Feb 13,, 05:06
Bhutan is an Indian protectorate state.
The PLA will face the same terrian and climatic restrictions as in other regions.
Another thing, there can be no mad dash in mountains like in plains/ deserts.

Sir, dissagree, look at the Battle of Capparetto in WWI.

Deltacamelately
15 Feb 13,, 05:39
Sir, dissagree, look at the Battle of Capparetto in WWI.
Jason,

Many striking differences -

1. The terrain is very different.
2. The Italian defence was extremely weak, lacked moral, had practically no mobile reserves and surrendered en-mass.
3. Their forces failed to give any meaningful counter fire, gave away all weather and tactical info over the radio.
4. The Germans along with arty fire, generously used poison gas, not possible in the current context.

anil
17 Aug 13,, 12:01
Gentlemen, many of my course mates have discussed this and its indeed an intriguing scenario.

What if Nixon was successful in convincing/coercing the Chinese to open the southern theatre with India in 1971, atleast 15 days before East Pakistan collapsed? How would that shape the course of the war? Would Bangladesh still come into existence?

I would like your individual analysis on this.

Regards,
@Deltacamelately

From a 1987 interview with K Subrahmanyam (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K._Subrahmanyam)


Bengal Conflict

Interviewer: HOW DID INDIA'S SECURITY CONCERNS CHANGE DURING THE PERIOD THAT MRS. GANDHI WAS IN OFFICE THE FIRST TIME, '66-'77?

Subramanvam: Well it, the first major security crisis in 1971 when the Pakistani military action in Bengal exploded in such terrific violence and there were ten million refugees on... pushed into, onto our soil. And we had to face that situation. But the Pakistan's supported tacitly by the United States administration and China. And that was a very difficult period. And that was the period in which in order to countervail that inference India had turned to a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union which was a countervailing measure at that stage. But at the same time it drove home to India the point that India was in a very difficult position facing a combination of powers like the United States, China and Pakistan at that stage. Therefore we came through that crisis even though... I would say successfully. But it did leave India with the considerable concern about its security for the future.

Interviewer: WHY DID INDIA SIGN A FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH THE SOVIET UNION? WHAT DID SHE HAVE TO GAIN FROM IT?

Subramanvam: Well it was meant to be a countervailing inference against the United States going too far in its support to Pakistan. And it was proved in 1971 December, if you read Dr. Kissinger's memoirs, he himself says the US administration asked China to move against India and the Chinese asked the question, "What happens if the Soviet Union moved against China?" Even though in, the United States did give some guarantees to China about that contingency China did not move. And therefore it was quite obvious that the Indian action of entering into the friendship treaty with the Soviet did succeed in restraining China from acting in spite of all the goading from the United States.

Interviewer: HOW DID YOU INTERPRET NIXON'S DECISION TO SEND THE USS. ENTERPRISE INTO THE BAY OF BENGAL?

Subramanvam: Well it was one of the instances of what is known as demonstration of use of force without war, or diplomacy. And it didn't succeed. But it didn't succeed partly because for the fact the Enterprise came around two days late.

Interviewer: IN YOUR WRITING YOU'VE ALSO REFERRED TO IT AS THE ATOMIC GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY. WOULD YOU REMIND REPEATING THAT?

Subramanvam: Yes. Actually when you send your task force with the...

Interviewer: HOW DID YOU INTERPRET NIXON'S DECISION TO SEND THE USS. ENTERPRISE INTO THE BAY OF BENGAL DURING THE '71 WAR?

Subramanvam: It was a piece of class of diplomacy, when your... vessel which is known to contain nuclear weapons was sent into the Bay of Bengal in an attempt to exercise intimidation on India.

Interviewer: WHAT WAS YOUR REACTION TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S DECISION TO SEND THE USS. ENTERPRISE INTO THE BAY OF BENGAL AND WAS INDIA ALSO CONCERNED CHINA WOULD INTERVENE AT THAT POINT?

Subramanvam: We were not very worried about China intervening at that point because the passes were covered with snow.

Interviewer: [REPEATS QUESTION]

Subramanvam: It was a threat because the Enterprise had come in close enough to the shores of Bangladesh. Then they could have started flying in the aircraft over Dhaka in which case it could have faced India with a problem whether the Indian air force should fire on the US aircraft.

Interviewer: WHAT EFFECT DID THIS HAVE ON FOREIGN POLICY?

Subramanvam: Well it would have stagnated completely the liberation of Bangladesh.

Transcript
Interview with Kandury Subramanvam, 1987 - WGBH Open Vault (http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/wpna-396e86-interview-with-kandury-subramanvam-1987/print)

Video interview
Interview with Kandury Subramanvam, 1987 - WGBH Open Vault (http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/wpna-396e86-interview-with-kandury-subramanvam-1987)

Deltacamelately
19 Aug 13,, 06:48
@Deltacamelately

From a 1987 interview with K Subrahmanyam (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K._Subrahmanyam)



Transcript
Interview with Kandury Subramanvam, 1987 - WGBH Open Vault (http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/wpna-396e86-interview-with-kandury-subramanvam-1987/print)

Video interview
Interview with Kandury Subramanvam, 1987 - WGBH Open Vault (http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/wpna-396e86-interview-with-kandury-subramanvam-1987)
Anil,

Thanks for the the links. Though much of what is written is known to most of us, I would be more interested to know your personal analysis on the subject.

anil
19 Aug 13,, 17:35
India(with Russia as its protectorate)
v/s
Pakistan(with US and china as its protectorate)

--------

The chinese will not fight a war in which they don't think they can win

The americans will engage as long as the opponent doesn't acquire the capability to open a front(theater) on CONUS. If you go by this countrys past history, a logical front has to start with first strike.

--------

If the chinese had opened a front into india, the russians would have done the same. But the chinese knew that both of them have a capability that causes each to hesitate from ever fighting a real battle. So in reality, the US guarantee to china was lip service.

I personally and strongly feel that non-alignment was a mistake. India should have given the russians military bases around india. It would have given the russians confidence in india.

My actual unease is that 1971 keeps happening again and again. Kargil, 2003 stand off, mumbai attacks etc are nothing but a repeat of the 1971 predicament which subramaniam described as, that, "India is in a very difficult position facing a combination of powers like the United States, China and Pakistan".

zraver
19 Aug 13,, 23:19
Anil your assumption about the US is dead wrong. In almost every direct confrontation of the Cold War it was the Soviets that backed down, not the US. That both sides preferred war by proxy only "mostly" kept them out of direct confrontation. Threatening or hitting the US mainland would be a very bad idea.... In fact the last person to do so ended his career as fish food.

zraver
19 Aug 13,, 23:24
Jason,

Many striking differences -

1. The terrain is very different.
2. The Italian defence was extremely weak, lacked moral, had practically no mobile reserves and surrendered en-mass.
3. Their forces failed to give any meaningful counter fire, gave away all weather and tactical info over the radio.
4. The Germans along with arty fire, generously used poison gas, not possible in the current context.

Sir, sorry I missed this. Absolutely, I was merely pointing out that breakthroughs had been achieved in such terrain.

Firestorm
19 Aug 13,, 23:52
Anil your assumption about the US is dead wrong. In almost every direct confrontation of the Cold War it was the Soviets that backed down, not the US. That both sides preferred war by proxy only "mostly" kept them out of direct confrontation.
The question still remains as to whether the alleged Soviet presence in the Bay of Bengal discouraged Nixon from giving the go-ahead to the Big-E to carry out whatever plans they had (and I refuse to believe that the US sent a CBG into a conflict zone without specific plans for intervention). The Russians will claim it did. Americans might say it was only supposed to be a bluff, which got called and the Russian presence had nothing to do with it. Personally, I wouldn't believe the American version in this case. Even though it might have been fairly easy for the Enterprise's battle group to sink the Soviet vessels had they intervened, the possibility of a direct confrontation with the Soviets would have weighed heavily in any cost benefit analysis done in Washington and might have precluded an intervention.

zraver
19 Aug 13,, 23:58
The question still remains as to whether the alleged Soviet presence in the Bay of Bengal discouraged Nixon from giving the go-ahead to the Big-E to carry out whatever plans they had (and I refuse to believe that the US sent a CBG into a conflict zone without specific plans for intervention). The Russians will claim it did. Americans might say it was only supposed to be a bluff, which got called and the Russian presence had nothing to do with it. Personally, I wouldn't believe the American version in this case. Even though it might have been fairly easy for the Enterprise's battle group to sink the Soviet vessels had they intervened, the possibility of a direct confrontation with the Soviets would have weighed heavily in any cost benefit analysis done in Washington and might have precluded an intervention.

A single carrier arriving late isn't enough. When was the Big E ordered to the area, when did she arrive, what was here transit speed. East Pakistan collapsed so quickly that its easy to see why the US backed off, there was nothing left to save.

Firestorm
20 Aug 13,, 00:36
A single carrier arriving late isn't enough. When was the Big E ordered to the area, when did she arrive, what was here transit speed. East Pakistan collapsed so quickly that its easy to see why the US backed off, there was nothing left to save.

It wasn't a single carrier. There is a wiki article on Task Force 74 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Task_Force_74) which mentions 10 ships including the Big-E, the USS Tripoli and an unnamed SSN. I'm not sure of the exact date that they arrived on station. Different sources cite different dates.

zraver
20 Aug 13,, 01:21
It wasn't a single carrier. There is a wiki article on Task Force 74 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Task_Force_74) which mentions 10 ships including the Big-E, the USS Tripoli and an unnamed SSN. I'm not sure of the exact date that they arrived on station. Different sources cite different dates.

That is a single carrier in terms of power projection. The helos on the Tripoli are almost certainly all transport versions as the Supercobra had just been introduced and was not yet universally deployed. The SSN doesn't have slcm's yet and the guided missile ships had very short legged a2a only missiles. That is not enough power projection by itself to stop India.

TopHatter
20 Aug 13,, 01:23
It wasn't a single carrier. There is a wiki article on Task Force 74 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Task_Force_74) which mentions 10 ships including the Big-E, the USS Tripoli and an unnamed SSN. I'm not sure of the exact date that they arrived on station. Different sources cite different dates.

The actual striking power resided with the single carrier. Everything else was support, even USS Tripoli.

TopHatter
20 Aug 13,, 01:24
That is a single carrier in terms of power projection. The helos on the Tripoli are almost certainly all transport versions as the Supercobra had just been introduced and was not yet universally deployed. The SSN doesn't have slcm's yet and the guided missile ships had very short legged a2a only missiles. That is not enough power projection by itself to stop India.

Gah! Beat me to it!

zraver
20 Aug 13,, 02:32
Gah! Beat me to it!

tehehehe

Just enough American blood that if Nixon had moved earlier it would have forced India to back down or risk an unwinnable war with the US. Luckily for India Nixon wa s ore focused on Laos, Cambodia and of course the Vietnams.

Firestorm
20 Aug 13,, 03:10
That is a single carrier in terms of power projection. The helos on the Tripoli are almost certainly all transport versions as the Supercobra had just been introduced and was not yet universally deployed. The SSN doesn't have slcm's yet and the guided missile ships had very short legged a2a only missiles. That is not enough power projection by itself to stop India.


The actual striking power resided with the single carrier. Everything else was support, even USS Tripoli.

It might not have been enough to wage war on the Indian mainland. But it was enough to cripple the Indian Navy's eastern fleet. The loss of several major assets including the Vikrant would have been unacceptable and it would have forced India to declare a ceasefire if that's what it took to stop the American attack.

If the Soviet presence theory is discounted, the other possibility is that the Nixon admin only cared for the survival of West Pakistan. East Pakistan's future in itself, didn't really matter. Once it became clear that India's goals did not go beyond the creation of Bangladesh, an intervention was no longer deemed necessary.

Deltacamelately
20 Aug 13,, 06:54
All the concerned parties had legitimate concerns and limitations. However, they also suffered from serious misconceptions about the opponent's war plans and OPOBJs.

1. Let's be clear that inspite of the notion held by many in the PA and USA, India never had any ambitions in 1971, to dimantle the Pakistani Military.
2. Let's be clear that inspite of the notion held by many in India, the USA had no serious intent to get sucked into the Indo-Pak war, sort of fall of West Pakistan.
3. Let's also be clear that the USSR would stand by India only till B'Desh was liberated and that it was not going to get sucked into a war with the US beyond B'Desh.
4. Let's also be clear, considering US commitment around Vietnam AND Europe, the only potent fighting force it could bring to bear in such a war was the 82nd Airborne.
5. From Col Yu and Capt Lemontree's assessment, it is also clear that aside the mutual misconceptions and distrust, both sides never knew or calculated that -

1) India was a Nuclear Target for the US.
2) Diego Garcia and possible the Big-E was a IAF/IN Target.

Ultimately, I would concur with Jason and add, that it was miraculously good for both India and the US, that Nixon came up slow. History would've else, written our present very differently and probably with a lot of American and Indian blood.

Doktor
20 Aug 13,, 07:56
tehehehe

Just enough American blood that if Nixon had moved earlier it would have forced India to back down or risk an unwinnable war with the US. Luckily for India Nixon wa s ore focused on Laos, Cambodia and of course the Vietnams.

How much earlier? The whole Indian incursion in Bangladesh lasted for what, 2 weeks?

As for the Chinese, they were smart to decline him as I guess they'd get stuck in Nepal in winter. Besides, what was in for them, but the Soviets on the North?

anil
20 Aug 13,, 08:05
In almost every direct confrontation of the Cold War it was the Soviets that backed down, not the US.
Why did they back down?

Doktor
20 Aug 13,, 08:06
Why did they back down?

Coz poker is American game.

anil
20 Aug 13,, 08:22
Coz poker is American game.
That is no answer.

If they backed down albeit capability, what does that mean? What are they thinking?

Deltacamelately
20 Aug 13,, 09:57
That is no answer.

If they backed down albeit capability, what does that mean? What are they thinking?
Reading up on the Cuban Missile crisis will give you some of their thought processes.

anil
20 Aug 13,, 10:25
Reading up on the Cuban Missile crisis will give you some of their thought processes.
The objective was fulfilled

Bigfella
20 Aug 13,, 10:52
The objective was fulfilled

Broadly speaking both sides had different objectives. The USSR was more heavily focussed n protecting its territory & immediate surrounds. The US had a much wider 'perimeter' if you will. It also had dramatically better power projection. Provided that any given dispute didn't actually threaten the USSR or its immediate region and the US held its nerve the US had an advantage. Didn't mean a guaranteed win, but it did confer an edge.

Officer of Engineers
20 Aug 13,, 11:41
From the Soviet perspective, they won.

The Cuban Missile Crisis - it was a tit for tat. Missiles were withdrawn from Turkey.
Arab-Israeli War - Israel chickened out.
Bay of Bengal - the USS ENTERPRISE was deterred (yes, yes, that's not what happened but Moscow didn't know that, all they saw was that their task force stopped the Americans cold).

Blademaster
20 Aug 13,, 11:54
From the Soviet perspective, they won.

The Cuban Missile Crisis - it was a tit for tat. Missiles were withdrawn from Turkey.
Arab-Israeli War - Israel chickened out.
Bay of Bengal - the USS ENTERPRISE was deterred (yes, yes, that's not what happened but Moscow didn't know that, all they saw was that their task force stopped the Americans cold).

Arab-Israeli War - Soviets won?? No I do not think so for you were not looking at Soviet's pile before the game started. If you get millions but you had billions, it certainly does not mean you won. The Soviet lost a very important client - the Egyptians and another one, Jordan. The Soviets lost more than they won, hence an overall loss.

Sino-Soviet conflict - America won.

Cuban Missile crisis - A draw because US was getting its submarine ICBMs and Soviets were not getting its submarine ICBMs until much later and US was going to withdraw the missiles from Turkey anyway so US technically still had the upper hand.

Bay of Bengal - a Soviet victory.

So the final tally - one win, 2 losses, one draw. Not good winning percentage.

Officer of Engineers
20 Aug 13,, 12:09
Arab-Israeli War - Soviets won??I was speaking of the immediate results. Israel did chicken out before the Soviet threat.


Sino-Soviet conflict - America won.We all did. That was a nuclear war waiting to happen.


Cuban Missile crisis - A draw because US was getting its submarine ICBMs and Soviets were not getting its submarine ICBMs until much later and US was going to withdraw the missiles from Turkey anyway so US technically still had the upper hand.The Soviets did not know it at the time and the POLARIS was in no way a good replacement for Turkey.


So the final tally - one win, 2 losses, one draw. Not good winning percentage.Again, lacking the proper information, look at it from their perspective.

Blademaster
20 Aug 13,, 12:21
Turkey was still a major NATO country and a nuclear-armed country at that so the effects of removing the missiles were negligible and the missiles themselves were not reliable. Cuba was nuclear free and there was an American base on Cuba.

Officer of Engineers
20 Aug 13,, 12:35
And Cuba became a staging ground for Soviet boomers.

Blademaster
20 Aug 13,, 12:47
And Cuba became a staging ground for Soviet boomers.

And became easy targets for American subs since now we know where the Soviet boomers were headed and mapped out their sonar characteristics.

Officer of Engineers
20 Aug 13,, 13:14
And became easy targets for American subs since now we know where the Soviet boomers were headed and mapped out their sonar characteristics.You forget how Soviet boomers were to operate. A destroyer screen pinging the hell out of nearby waters, forcing USN task groups to blast their way through that screen before they can get to the boomer which by that time, already tossed her nukes.

Cuba offerred such a staging ground. USN task groups would have to blast their way through the destroyer screens in Cuba before they can get to the boomers.

Blademaster
20 Aug 13,, 14:05
You forget how Soviet boomers were to operate. A destroyer screen pinging the hell out of nearby waters, forcing USN task groups to blast their way through that screen before they can get to the boomer which by that time, already tossed her nukes.

Cuba offerred such a staging ground. USN task groups would have to blast their way through the destroyer screens in Cuba before they can get to the boomers.

That means the boomers were blind and can no longer use sonar to navigate their way out so had to use presribed routes and pinging the hell out just alert the USN to where the boomer groups are and localize the boomers to a search area. Not an effective strategy.

Doktor
20 Aug 13,, 14:17
Who cares after the nukes are lobed?

Blademaster
20 Aug 13,, 14:39
Who cares after the nukes are lobed?

How long does it take for the boomers to unload all of their missiles? Soviet boomers, IIRC, have not mastered of firing all of their missiles in quick succession such as within less than a couple minutes without stabilizing the buoyancy and center of gravity factor. If the destroyers are pinging like hell, then it is easy to see where the group is and the hunter subs can hone in on the sound of missiles launching quite quickly for it is damn impossible to mask the sounds of missiles launching.

Even more so, you could position an THAAD equipped Aegis destroyer to take out the missiles as they are being launched and have not reached their maximum velocity.

zraver
20 Aug 13,, 14:40
Why did they back down?

Because the Soviets thought we were serious about popping atomic tops and starting a deadman's party where everyone was invited. They called us Cowboys, but Cowboys with a history of slaughtering our enemies on a truly massive scale and no real personal experience of what it was like to be on the receiving end. The Soviets were terrified of us and were absolutely convinced that we were willing to fight a nuclear war. They never were, not against us. Every time push came to shove- Israel, China, Cuba, Turkey the Soviets backed down as soon as it looked like America was going all in.

Hand Nixon moved rapidly in 71 the Soviets would have backed down and left India hanging. India would have backed down too. Yankee Station was too close and Yankee Station had a good chunk of the US 17 carriers (12 large/super carriers, 5 Essex angled deck CV, 1 CVN) and 27 mostly gun cruisers. Some of the carriers would ahve to remain on Yankee Station but not all of them so there was nearby help for the Big-E. In addition there was a large force of B-52's in Thailand.

Given that against Pakistan alone the IAF suffered 10% losses to its pre-war strength in just 2 weeks. Add in USAF/USN/USMC aircraft to the mix which, with the exception of the Mig-21 totally outclassed everything India had.... Not a war India could win.

But to win it, Nixon had to be winning to eat higher ground losses in Vietnam as carriers left the area, the chance that the Soviets would send even more and different SAMs to Vietnam or stir up North Korea and a risk of cooling relations with China if the US was seen by the Chinese leadership as endangering China. Finally, to beat India, Nixon had to be willing to take his lumps in the street protests and Congressional debates inside America itself and he wasn't. Pakistan, then as now was a vassal not an ally.

Blademaster
20 Aug 13,, 14:49
Because the Soviets thought we were serious about popping atomic tops and starting a deadman's party where everyone was invited. They called us Cowboys, but Cowboys with a history of slaughtering our enemies on a truly massive scale and no real personal experience of what it was like to be on the receiving end. The Soviets were terrified of us and were absolutely convinced that we were willing to fight a nuclear war. They never were, not against us. Every time push came to shove- Israel, China, Cuba, Turkey the Soviets backed down as soon as it looked like America was going all in.

Hand Nixon moved rapidly in 71 the Soviets would have backed down and left India hanging. India would have backed down too. Yankee Station was too close and Yankee Station had a good chunk of the US 17 carriers (12 large/super carriers, 5 Essex angled deck CV, 1 CVN) and 27 mostly gun cruisers. Some of the carriers would ahve to remain on Yankee Station but not all of them so there was nearby help for the Big-E. In addition there was a large force of B-52's in Thailand.

Given that against Pakistan alone the IAF suffered 10% losses to its pre-war strength in just 2 weeks. Add in USAF/USN/USMC aircraft to the mix which, with the exception of the Mig-21 totally outclassed everything India had.... Not a war India could win.

But to win it, Nixon had to be winning to eat higher ground losses in Vietnam as carriers left the area, the chance that the Soviets would send even more and different SAMs to Vietnam or stir up North Korea and a risk of cooling relations with China if the US was seen by the Chinese leadership as endangering China. Finally, to beat India, Nixon had to be willing to take his lumps in the street protests and Congressional debates inside America itself and he wasn't. Pakistan, then as now was a vassal not an ally.

There was no way that US could alter the ground realities. yes the naval scene but not the ground realities or even aerial realities. And India was not going to back down in any case not especially after millions of refugees flooding into India.

Despite your belief in US, US is not the omnipotent power as you make it out to be.

Officer of Engineers
20 Aug 13,, 15:00
How long does it take for the boomers to unload all of their missiles? Soviet boomers, IIRC, have not mastered of firing all of their missiles in quick succession such as within less than a couple minutes without stabilizing the buoyancy and center of gravity factor. If the destroyers are pinging like hell, then it is easy to see where the group is and the hunter subs can hone in on the sound of missiles launching quite quickly for it is damn impossible to mask the sounds of missiles launching.You're missing a few steps. First, the pinging would help the boomer. They wouldn't be blind. There's no need to hide. Second, the pinging scares away all other subs, including those wanting to kill that boomer.


Even more so, you could position an THAAD equipped Aegis destroyer to take out the missiles as they are being launched and have not reached their maximum velocity.By the time THAAD was even dreamed off, Soviet SLBMs have come of age and range that they did not need Cuba.

zraver
20 Aug 13,, 15:12
There was no way that US could alter the ground realities. yes the naval scene but not the ground realities or even aerial realities. And India was not going to back down in any case not especially after millions of refugees flooding into India.

Despite your belief in US, US is not the omnipotent power as you make it out to be.

Not interested in getting into a pissing match with you, specially as I am glad India won. But, had the US decided to fight early, yes even the ground realities. India could not sustain an offensive army in Bangladesh without air cover. Not only that, war with the US means severe food and fuel shortages for India. In 1971-72 India imported between 72 and 111 million bushels of America wheat per year. If Nixon had the political will, India would have lost.

anil
20 Aug 13,, 15:58
zraver, I don't think fear had anything to do with the russians backing down. I think their objective was to win.

The bottom line is that thousands of nukes, military bases and billion dollar military spendings are utter worthless when you cannot even guarantee that you will outlast or outlive after a nuclear war. The US had no choice but to chest thump. The US objective in the cold war was to prevent a nuclear war. The russian objective was to outlast. But in the end, war never happened.

Had the US moved in 1971, under indira gandhi, there is no way india would back down. If you think she would have backed down then you got it wrong. She would have engaged and probably pulled the russians in. The possibility of an actual US russian confrontation would have been certain. Nixon had met her earlier so he was not sure what she was capable of. The fact is that she had a history of being capable. You have to remember that the US objective in cold war was to prevent a nuclear war.

Doktor
20 Aug 13,, 16:03
What would be the objective for US to go into this adventure with India? Saving Pakistan?

zraver
20 Aug 13,, 16:10
zraver, I don't think fear had anything to do with the russians backing down. I think their objective was to win.

Fear had everything to do with it. The Russian trigger pullers in 1971 were guys that fought from Poland to Moscow to Berlin. They knew the destruction wrought by war first hand.


The bottom line is that thousands of nukes, military bases and billion dollar military spendings are utter worthless when you cannot even guarantee that you will outlast or outlive after a nuclear war. The US had no choice but to chest thump. The US objective in the cold war was to prevent a nuclear war. The russian objective was to outlast. But in the end, war never happened.

The war never happened in part because the US was ready to dance at a dead man's party.


Had the US moved in 1971, under indira gandhi, there is no way india would back down. If you think she would have backed down then you got it wrong.

I am unaware of her being a brain dead moron.... she would back down. she is not going to wreck India for Bangladeshis


She would have engaged and probably pulled the russians in.

How, Russia wasn't going to fight the US for India.


The possibility of an actual US russian confrontation would have been certain.[/qute]

certainly zero

[quote]Nixon had met her earlier so he was not sure what she was capable of. The fact is that she had a history of being capable. You have to remember that the US objective in cold war was to prevent a nuclear war.

The US objective in the Cold War was not to prevent a nuclear war, it was to safeguard the Western Democracies. You can chest thump all you want but the correlation of forces and logistics situation says US. The only ingredient missing was the political will and this is why Nixon moved slowly. However, had he moved resolutely, India lacked the political will to impale herself on an American sword for a bunch of Bangladeshis.

zraver
20 Aug 13,, 16:11
What would be the objective for US to go into this adventure with India? Saving Pakistan?

Pretty much, which is why we didn't. Pakistan is just not that important, especially then with the American focus on Europe, domestic strife from the counter culture and anti-war movements and the Vietnams.

anil
20 Aug 13,, 16:42
zraver, you keep going on with this theme of US never turning down a confrontation. I'm not trying to win a battle of words. 1971 is a piece of history. You interpret it however you like.

Officer of Engineers
20 Aug 13,, 16:45
Jason,

I'm not sure Ghandi would have backed down. In fact, I think the complete opposite. Do recall that she did order an assault on Diego Garcia and the InAF was preparing to kamakaze the Big-E.

zraver
20 Aug 13,, 17:38
Jason,

I'm not sure Ghandi would have backed down. In fact, I think the complete opposite. Do recall that she did order an assault on Diego Garcia and the InAF was preparing to kamakaze the Big-E.

IIRC, the discussion about DG was hypothetical, the IAF lacked the carry capacity to even get to DG using Hakwer Sidley 748's of the time. As for the Big-E, I'll ask the same question others have asked. With what? The most capable elements of the IAF were heavily engaged on two fronts. Her best strike bombers, despite being needed to support the ground war, were virtual sitting ducks to the USN's SAM/MigCAP capability because the Canberra was slow and lacked precision standoff weapons. The only super sonic assets India had were very short legged. Call the Bay of BEngal a bay all day lon but it is still a sea and a large one at that. 2.1 million km^2 plus in size only a bit smaller than the Med.

In addition, if Nixon was truly determined to stop India and was really concerned India might not back down, he would have sent more than just the Big-E. Perhaps one of the other carriers in Asian waters (Yankee Station, Japan, Subic Bay); Constellation, Kittyhawk, Coral Sea, Ticonderoga, Hancock and Oriskany.

I hold, Nixon lacked the will so it was a minimum effort on the part of the US. I also hold that had Nixon really wanted to, and moved the assets indicating such will. India would have folded.

zraver
20 Aug 13,, 17:39
zraver, you keep going on with this theme of US never turning down a confrontation. I'm not trying to win a battle of words. 1971 is a piece of history. You interpret it however you like.

I never said the US never turned down a confrontation, I am saying the Soviets are the ones who backed down in every confrontation that actually happened.

Officer of Engineers
20 Aug 13,, 17:43
IIRC, the discussion about DG was hypothetical,No, it was real. The good Captain Lemontree's father was on the ambulance tasked to that mission. He was on the tarmac when the stand down came. That's all the info we have.

We deduced it was a brigade level op from having an ambulance and since the ambulance was on the tarmac, then the initial entry force was already enroute before the stand down was issued.

Doktor
20 Aug 13,, 17:48
IIRC, the discussion about DG was hypothetical, the IAF lacked the carry capacity to even get to DG using Hakwer Sidley 748's of the time. As for the Big-E, I'll ask the same question others have asked. With what? The most capable elements of the IAF were heavily engaged on two fronts. Her best strike bombers, despite being needed to support the ground war, were virtual sitting ducks to the USN's SAM/MigCAP capability because the Canberra was slow and lacked precision standoff weapons. The only super sonic assets India had were very short legged. Call the Bay of BEngal a bay all day lon but it is still a sea and a large one at that. 2.1 million km^2 plus in size only a bit smaller than the Med.

In addition, if Nixon was truly determined to stop India and was really concerned India might not back down, he would have sent more than just the Big-E. Perhaps one of the other carriers in Asian waters (Yankee Station, Japan, Subic Bay); Constellation, Kittyhawk, Coral Sea, Ticonderoga, Hancock and Oriskany.

I hold, Nixon lacked the will so it was a minimum effort on the part of the US. I also hold that had Nixon really wanted to, and moved the assets indicating such will. India would have folded.

Actually, the one folding in the situation is USA. Nixon showed the will to put pressure on India.

zraver
20 Aug 13,, 17:59
Actually, the one folding in the situation is USA. Nixon showed the will to put pressure on India.

I disagree that Nixon had the will to do more than a minor demonstration with no intent to back it up. He had too many other things on his plate that were more important than Pakistan. Which is why he folded. My argument deals mainly with the what if, what if Nixon really did have it out for India? I argue that if India was indeed on his radar he would have sent more than just 1 carrier and would have done so sooner and sent them at a faster speed.

Sending 1 carrier out of 17 isn't will power, its demonstration.

Doktor
20 Aug 13,, 18:03
Demonstration of what?

Anyway, the end result is the same. He folded.

anil
20 Aug 13,, 18:44
What would be the objective for US to go into this adventure with India? Saving Pakistan?
Pakistan and China were strategic allies of the US in countering russian influence. The indian leaders were watching them for many years trying to figure out that they were up to. It was difficult because they kept their alliances secret.

I. K. Gujral (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I._K._Gujral), the prime minister of india in 97-98, explains:


In 1954 Truman first time started giving arms aid to Pakistan. Nehru objected. And at that time categorically Truman said, "No, no. It is meant against Soviet Union." And there was a famous dictum of constrainment in the UN. He said "That gun has not yet been made which shoots only in one direction." We suspected it. And it went on. Then we found in '65 what we suspect in '54. Those weapons were used against us.

1971 for the first time proved what we were suspecting earlier. We were suspecting that there were certain commitments on the part of Americans with Pakistan's defense. We were also feeling that the arms being given to Pakistan were necessarily meant for in, against India and not for anything else. 1971 proved both the things.

It(bangla genocide) was not a sudden development. And we had at our hand ten million refugees in India. And Mrs. Gandhi was going from one capital of the world to the other trying to persuade to tell them, "Please do something now. It'll be difficult otherwise." But it was happening. And...was in a very benevolent, I'm sorry. Very belligerent mood. Also we were seeing that the American strategy was adverse to us. And now we were trying to find, trying to see that not only that the Americans were giving arms to Pakistan, that if need be they were willing to confront India. Threats there had been given to us by Kissinger and others. And I can tell you in retrospect because I'm privy of this information that we really went into negotiation for a treaty with Soviet Union after we were convinced of the belligerency of the other super power. '71 proved it conclusively when we got a direct threat of seventh fleet intervention.

You will recall that when the Bangladesh crisis was at its height Kissinger came here and we tried to explain to him what we were faced with. Kissinger went from here to Pakistan. And a day later we learned that he had gone to Pakistan to fly over to China secretly. Because all the time via...they were negotiating with China. So therefore that explained how strategically Pakistan was important to Washington despite whatever was happening in Bangladesh. Now we were faced with a new reality. We saw that a new alliance growing between the three once again. We also knew of the threats that were being given to us. And that really activated our talks for signing a treaty of friendship with Soviet Union. I think it helped our security at that critical moment.

zraver
20 Aug 13,, 19:26
Demonstration of what?

exactly, lukewarm tepid demonstration of power with no real incentive behind.


Anyway, the end result is the same. He folded.

Yup, no disagreement there. My argument was that if he had the will, the demonstration of power and resolve would have used more than just a single carrier and been carried out with more alacrity.

Anil, the Indian PM can be forgiven for having an Indo-centric view of the Indian place in the American cosmos. It does not make it right nor accurate but it is understandable. Given the resources Nixon had at his disposal in close proximity to Asia, had he wanted to he could have sent far more than the Big-E. Look at other US responses around the globe- Gulf of Tonkin, Cuba, Yom Kippur... Yom Kippur is in particular, relevant to the discussion because of the time and players. The US response ended up being 3 carriers (over 50 warships total), an airborne division a marine brigade and 50 B-52's.

I just checked and during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 6 carriers including the Big-E were awarded for operations exceeding 30 days. http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq90-3.htm

Those same assets and more were much closer to India in 1971 and yet not called upon. This indicates a lack of will for real confrontation. It was a show the flag and pat little Pakistan on the head as she hid behind the US while tsk tsking India.

Blademaster
20 Aug 13,, 23:18
Not interested in getting into a pissing match with you, specially as I am glad India won. But, had the US decided to fight early, yes even the ground realities. India could not sustain an offensive army in Bangladesh without air cover. Not only that, war with the US means severe food and fuel shortages for India. In 1971-72 India imported between 72 and 111 million bushels of America wheat per year. If Nixon had the political will, India would have lost.

And yet look at Vietnam despite all the bombing and ordnance and technological superiority, Vietnam was lost. So I take your assertions with a grain of salt. And no I am not getting into a pissing contest. I am refusing to get into one.

Gandhi had no choice but to act in Bangladesh. There are 10 million reasons why she couldn't back out and many more reasons why. Nixon knew that and counted the cards in his hands and folded and so did USA.

zraver
21 Aug 13,, 01:33
And yet look at Vietnam despite all the bombing and ordnance and technological superiority, Vietnam was lost. So I take your assertions with a grain of salt. And no I am not getting into a pissing contest. I am refusing to get into one.

Gandhi had no choice but to act in Bangladesh. There are 10 million reasons why she couldn't back out and many more reasons why. Nixon knew that and counted the cards in his hands and folded and so did USA.

Vietnam was an insurgency and not lost until after the US left and Congress cut funding to South Vietnam. However if you want to see what US air power could do to back up a weak non-American army look at the devastating defeat North Vietnam suffered in 1972 during the Easter Offensive. Same players on the US side, nearly identical time frame, same tech on the Us side and nearly the same tech that India/Pakistan would use on the NVA/ARVN side.

Had Nixon cared enough to actually fight, a conventional invasion of East Pakistan by India would have failed.

anil
21 Aug 13,, 06:03
Indira doesn't play poker, she would have engaged.

The US didn't mind india until she pulled in the russians with a strategic treaty in aug 1971. Nixon's "will"(let's call it "confidence") went out the window after that. It wanted the chinese to draw(divide) away the russians like the US did in 1962 with the cuban missile crisis.

Blademaster
21 Aug 13,, 07:14
Vietnam was an insurgency and not lost until after the US left and Congress cut funding to South Vietnam. However if you want to see what US air power could do to back up a weak non-American army look at the devastating defeat North Vietnam suffered in 1972 during the Easter Offensive. Same players on the US side, nearly identical time frame, same tech on the Us side and nearly the same tech that India/Pakistan would use on the NVA/ARVN side.

Had Nixon cared enough to actually fight, a conventional invasion of East Pakistan by India would have failed.

US could not react in time. The war was over before the USA could muster enough force to respond. Hence USA had no influence on ground or aerial scene, only the naval scene.

anil
21 Aug 13,, 07:40
Blade, the cleansing in east pakistan was going on for many months. The US had enough time to bring in more ships. It was the indo-russian treaty which cautioned the americans to exercise retrain. The americans didn't engage because this confrontation would get bigger and out of control.

You have to realize that by then the damage was already done. The pakistani army had already cleansed more than 300k civilians. If india didn't enter into an agreement with the russians in aug 1971, who knows how many more would have been cleansed.

PM IK Gujral described the US-Pakistan-China axis as a strategic axis. Some experts believe they developed this alliance in the late 50s.

zraver
21 Aug 13,, 15:03
US could not react in time. The war was over before the USA could muster enough force to respond. Hence USA had no influence on ground or aerial scene, only the naval scene.

Had Nixon cared there was plenty of tie for the US, the situation did not come out of nowhere. Nixon however had bigger fish to fry.

Anil,


Indira doesn't play poker, she would have engaged.


OK, lets plays a thought excercise. Lets say Nixon presses forward and demonstrates a strong resolve to preserve East Pakistan as the personal shooting range for the West Pakistani Punjabis. He sends not just TF74 but half the carriers (3) and support vessels making up TF77 plus sets aside 50 B-52 bombers in Guam and Thailand. This is a pretty typical US response for the era having been previously seen in Cuba, Vietnam, Six Day war and would be seen again in Yom Kippur.

You really think she would engage agaisnt those odds and certain defeat? To do what? Without air cover she can't invade East Pakistan.


The US didn't mind india until she pulled in the russians with a strategic treaty in aug 1971. Nixon's "will"(let's call it "confidence") went out the window after that. It wanted the chinese to draw(divide) away the russians like the US did in 1962 with the cuban missile crisis

Not supported by the evidence. By 1971 the US and Soviets had already had two major naval confrontations and the US didn't back down in either one. A third and fourth confrontations was just a short time away (under Nixon btw). In 1973 over 100 warships would be facing each other with Nixon as president and he didn't blink. Why do you think this time is outside the established historical norms? Why must it be an Indo-Soviet treaty for Nixon's lack of will and not the self evident distraction caused by his focus on Vietnam? Your argument has holes big enough to sail the Big-E through.

DarthSiddius
21 Aug 13,, 15:32
It is not a lack of capability but a lack of intent from the US. Sending the Enterprise in the BoB was nothing more than a show of faith (let the Indians know the American position) to placate the Pakistanis. Things would have escalated if the Chinese were to intervene, but due to a combination of extreme weather and faltering relations with the soviets they had to sit this one out. Moreover, America in the early 70's (as mentioned umpteen times here before) was a very divided nation, even NATO was troubled (france?) this along with the wrapping up of the very "unpopular" war by now in Vietnam and the Indo-Soviet treaty looming in the background must have influenced American policy. Why get into another fight especially if it has potential to blow horribly out of proportion?

zraver
21 Aug 13,, 16:10
Literally just a couple of months after this Nixon would mine the North Vietnamese harbors knowing full well it put a shit ton of Soviet sailors at risk. Also in the link below you'll see the Soviets effectively abandoned North Vietnam in pursuit of their own desire to reach dente with the US and keep the SALT talks on target.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA355037

anil
21 Aug 13,, 16:24
zraver, we actually have nothing to argue about. You're just repeating the same point again and again.

Q: Would east pakistan have become bangladesh had india and russia not entered into an agreement?
A: No, bangladesh wouldn't have come into existence. In the absence of russia, the americans would have had their way.

If it wasn't for the americans, india would have never entered east pakistan in the early stages and stopped the pakistani army before it could cull over 300 thousand banglas. Had india entered into an agreement with the russians in the 60s itself, the bangla genocide would have never happened. The chinese invasion in 1962 would have not happened either.

Nehru was in a wrong era so he misread the nature of the world by advocating for non-alliance. It took a generation and his own progeny to undo a noble idea. Such are the actual order of things.

Doktor
21 Aug 13,, 16:25
I still can't get my head around this. Why would Nixon put so many lives in risk. To just show support?!

DarthSiddius
21 Aug 13,, 16:28
He's not putting lives at risk if he is confident that there won't be a confrontation. As to where that confidence comes from I'm not certain. I'm not a fan of Nixon and co's decision making.

zraver
21 Aug 13,, 17:12
zraver, we actually have nothing to argue about. You're just repeating the same point again and again.

because you keep ignoring me. I've provided examples and evidence you have not.


Q: Would east pakistan have become bangladesh had india and russia not entered into an agreement?
A: No, bangladesh wouldn't have come into existence. In the absence of russia, the americans would have had their way.

Highlights a flaw in your thinking, "Americans had their way". I've shown repeatedly that had the Americans really cared, they would have had their way. They didn't care, they did not have a dog in the fight so to speak. The Indo-Russian relationship simply did not matter.


If it wasn't for the americans, india would have never entered east pakistan in the early stages and stopped the pakistani army before it could cull over 300 thousand banglas.

English problem? That makes zero sense, please try rewording it.


Had india entered into an agreement with the russians in the 60s itself, the bangla genocide would have never happened. The chinese invasion in 1962 would have not happened either.

Nehru was in a wrong era so he misread the nature of the world by advocating for non-alliance. It took a generation and his own progeny to undo a noble idea. Such are the actual order of things.

Uhm.... backing slowly away.....

Dok,


I still can't get my head around this. Why would Nixon put so many lives in risk. To just show support?!

No lives were at risk, he sent TF-74 sailing in at 15 knots with just enough combat power to make sure India didn't feel froggy towards the Us but not enough to commit US policy one way or another. It was a cuppydoll prize for Pakistan, nothing more.

Darth,


He's not putting lives at risk if he is confident that there won't be a confrontation. As to where that confidence comes from I'm not certain. I'm not a fan of Nixon and co's decision making.

I don't know, some of Nixon's FP moves were brilliant others were balsy. Compared to some Presidents his FP acumen is outstanding.

Doktor
21 Aug 13,, 17:19
Z, Darth,

The way I understand it from the other thread, Indira has given orders DG to get hit. And she did that after Big-E bumped into BoB.

zraver
21 Aug 13,, 17:38
Z, Darth,

The way I understand it from the other thread, Indira has given orders DG to get hit. And she did that after Big-E bumped into BoB.

I think more she asked if it could be done via feasibility study. Also the BoB is not a bay it is a sea and covers over 2.1 million KM^2.

1.The Indians at the time relied on the Hawker-Siddley 748 twin engined light transport. It lacked the range to even reach DG with a normal load.

2. DG at the time lacked an airfield, so even lightened the 748's could not land. In fact the only US personnel on the island were seabees who were construction a communications center and airfield that would not be completed until 1973.

3. All of the major parachute units in the Indian Army had other tasks during the war.

Officer of Engineers
21 Aug 13,, 17:43
I think more she asked if it could be done via feasibility study. Also the BoB is not a bay it is a sea and covers over 2.1 million KM^2.

1.The Indians at the time relied on the Hawker-Siddley 748 twin engined light transport. It lacked the range to even reach DG with a normal load.

2. DG at the time lacked an airfield, so even lightened the 748's could not land. In fact the only US personnel on the island were seabees who were construction a communications center and airfield that would not be completed until 1973.

3. All of the major parachute units in the Indian Army had other tasks during the war.Jason, Captain Lemontree's father was part of the ambulance tasked to that mission. He was on the tarmac which meant the initial entry force has already left.

zraver
21 Aug 13,, 17:51
Jason, Captain Lemontree's father was part of the ambulance tasked to that mission. He was on the tarmac which meant the initial entry force has already left.

Ok. So what was their thinking, parachute in, ditch the aircraft, take hostages and await the arrival of the USMC?

Officer of Engineers
21 Aug 13,, 17:55
What do you think I was trying to figure out for 7 years?

DarthSiddius
21 Aug 13,, 17:55
Darth,

I don't know, some of Nixon's FP moves were brilliant others were balsy. Compared to some Presidents his FP acumen is outstanding.

Maybe it was just those days or because I might be biased (In my opinion his FP vis a vis India was deplorable). I do think some of his crucial decisions as President were short sighted.


Z, Darth,

The way I understand it from the other thread, Indira has given orders DG to get hit. And she did that after Big-E bumped into BoB.

We don't really have a lot of information regarding that aborted operation, speculations aside (not disputing said speculations) what it tells us is had the US gotten itself intimately involved, things could have had escalated, we have been extremely lucky that some of these events did not come to pass. The important thing to consider here is that the mission was not given a go ahead could be just the military preparing itself for a scenario involving the US, contingencies?

EDIT: OOE if part of the forces had already left something major must have happened to stop the operation?

Officer of Engineers
21 Aug 13,, 17:59
The important thing to consider here is that the mission was not given a go ahead could be just the military preparing itself for a scenario involving the US, contingencies?It was given the go. It was countermanded.

From Captain Lemontree's details. His father was on an ambulance and he was on the tarmac before HE got the stand down. That tells us two things.

1) This was a brigade level operation (only brigades and up have ambulances tasked to them). Actually, for the InA, only divisions have ambulances but that is way too big of a formation.

2) The ambulance was on the tarmac. That meant the initial entry force had already left.

zraver
21 Aug 13,, 18:18
2) The ambulance was on the tarmac. That meant the initial entry force had already left.

or was at a different airstrip.

Plus I wonder if it was larger than a battalion with the ambulances assigned based on the special nature of the mission. DG simply does not have the resources to sustain a brigade. In the 1960's and early 70's it has a single stagnant freshwater marsh with no springs or flowing water. Foods is less of a problem in the short term, lots of feral pigs and chickens but a brigade sized force will eat all of them in the medium/long term. Plus there is no chance of rescue or resupply and every chance of massive escalation with the US.

With US sensitivity to POWs in the 1970's, the Son Tay raid was just a year earlier it seems an almost deliberate way to provoke an unwinnable war. The Soviets would not go to bat for India anymore than they would for Cuba, North Korea or Syria.

Doktor
21 Aug 13,, 18:18
We don't really have a lot of information regarding that aborted operation, speculations aside (not disputing said speculations) what it tells us is had the US gotten itself intimately involved, things could have had escalated, we have been extremely lucky that some of these events did not come to pass. The important thing to consider here is that the mission was not given a go ahead could be just the military preparing itself for a scenario involving the US, contingencies?

I don't know what was it. If it was a drill or live op. What I do know is that Nixon misread Indira and her determination, and by that he put a lot of lives into jeopardy. And for what? Solidarity with Pakistan?

I can't digest this. US must have had the info on what is going on in Bangladesh. Even more, some guys in various agencies must have had few chess parties. The Indian response in EP shouldn't have been a surprise to anyone. On top of that, when Chinese said "We will skip this one" why he raised the bets?

anil
21 Aug 13,, 19:13
zraver, india knew the US would show up once we intervened in east pakistan.

Again, As Late Indian Prime Minister IK Gujral describes:

It(bangla genocide) was not a sudden development. And we had at our hand ten million refugees in India. And Mrs. Gandhi was going from one capital of the world to the other trying to persuade to tell them, "Please do something now. It'll be difficult otherwise." But it was happening. And...was in a very benevolent, I'm sorry. Very belligerent mood. Also we were seeing that the American strategy was adverse to us. And now we were trying to find, trying to see that not only that the Americans were giving arms to Pakistan, that if need be they were willing to confront India. Threats there had been given to us by Kissinger and others. And I can tell you in retrospect because I'm privy of this information that we really went into negotiation for a treaty with Soviet Union after we were convinced of the belligerency of the other super power. '71 proved it conclusively when we got a direct threat of seventh fleet intervention.
We signed a strategic treaty with the russians because indian politicians had determined absolutely sure that the US would come for pakistan.


1971 for the first time proved what we were suspecting earlier. We were suspecting that there were certain commitments on the part of Americans with Pakistan's defense.
One aircraft carrier(USS enterprise) showed up on that day. If india hadn't gotten into an agreement with the russians, many more than one carrier would have showed up in the bay of bengal.

Blademaster
21 Aug 13,, 19:45
or was at a different airstrip.

Plus I wonder if it was larger than a battalion with the ambulances assigned based on the special nature of the mission. DG simply does not have the resources to sustain a brigade. In the 1960's and early 70's it has a single stagnant freshwater marsh with no springs or flowing water. Foods is less of a problem in the short term, lots of feral pigs and chickens but a brigade sized force will eat all of them in the medium/long term. Plus there is no chance of rescue or resupply and every chance of massive escalation with the US.

With US sensitivity to POWs in the 1970's, the Son Tay raid was just a year earlier it seems an almost deliberate way to provoke an unwinnable war. The Soviets would not go to bat for India anymore than they would for Cuba, North Korea or Syria.

India was no Cuba, North Korea or Syria. She was on the same level as China. And Diego Garcia was not yet a nuclear site or a developed base. Just some seabees and that's it. There were no active military installations or weapons posted there.

Firestorm
21 Aug 13,, 20:15
And for what? Solidarity with Pakistan?

I can't digest this. US must have had the info on what is going on in Bangladesh. Even more, some guys in various agencies must have had few chess parties. The Indian response in EP shouldn't have been a surprise to anyone. On top of that, when Chinese said "We will skip this one" why he raised the bets?
Maybe you are unaware of the Blood Telegram (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archer_Blood#The_Blood_telegram) sent by the US consul general in Dhaka.

So the Americans knew exactly what the pakistanis were doing there. But national interest trumps all, and the Nixon admin determined that at that time the US's interests were served by supporting Yahya Khan and letting his army do what they want to the East Pakistanis. "To all hands, don’t squeeze Yahya at this time,” was in Nixon's handwritten note found when the papers of that era were declassified.

anil
21 Aug 13,, 20:57
I can't digest this. US must have had the info on what is going on in Bangladesh.
It is because you have a misplaced idea of the real nature of the world order.

Officer of Engineers
21 Aug 13,, 21:01
OOE if part of the forces had already left something major must have happened to stop the operation?Captain Lemontree's father did received his stand down. So, someone smarten up.


or was at a different airstrip.Can't see it. It was an adhoc operation, so trying to co-ordinate so many flights from different airstrips to arrive on schedule would be ... hell, I don't think we could have done it ad-hoc.


Plus I wonder if it was larger than a battalion with the ambulances assigned based on the special nature of the mission.The ambulance part bugs me. I would have left it behind but water purification would be worth more than ambulance. The only thing that I can think of is that this is adhoc, here's the unit we've got available. It's got an ambulance. Send it. We don't have time to figure out what to replace it with.

zraver
21 Aug 13,, 21:15
zraver, india knew the US would show up once we intervened in east pakistan.

Again, As Late Indian Prime Minister IK Gujral describes:

We signed a strategic treaty with the russians because indian politicians had determined absolutely sure that the US would come for pakistan.


One aircraft carrier(USS enterprise) showed up on that day. If india hadn't gotten into an agreement with the russians, many more than one carrier would have showed up in the bay of bengal.

The Russians had nothing to do with it. I've already shown you several examples where if the US decided to act, she did, and it was the Russians who backed down- EVERY TIME. I've shown you these examples on either side of 1971 and some by Nixon. You are living in fantasy land if you think a few Soviet subs deterred the US in this one and only case when entire fleets of Soviet warships did not deter the US in other confrontations.... These is zero evidence to support your hypothesis. If Nixon had wanted to squash India to save East Pakistan he could have, and there was nothing India could do about it, and nothing the Soviets would do about it.

Blademaster,

In 1971 India was not on par with China sorry. India had less than 100 supersonic aircraft and only 600 combat aircraft total. Her only real strike platform was the Canberra and she had only a limited number of them. Her air defense and radar network was virtually nonexistent with no real SAM capability. She compensated to an extent with training. But it remains that her relative and growing weakness vis a vis Pakistan and China following a UK arms embargo is what made the deal with the Soviets so attractive.

That being said, the Soviets still were not going to risk national suicide for India. It was a fundamental weakness f the Soviets, they were never really emotionally invested outside of Eastern Europe. Not one during the Cold War when push came to shove and the US stepped up to bat did the Soviets play hardball, every single time they rolled over, showed their belly and slinked away. The Soviets were terrified of the US, they called us Cowboys, they really though if they pushed us, we'd push the button. Operation Chrome Dome had just recently ended and it was then in Sept 1971 that the two sides installed the red line. Plus both sides were already talking about SALT. If push came to shove the Soviets would observe but not interfere.

zraver
21 Aug 13,, 21:16
Captain Lemontree's father did received his stand down. So, someone smarten up.

Can't see it. It was an adhoc operation, so trying to co-ordinate so many flights from different airstrips to arrive on schedule would be ... hell, I don't think we could have done it ad-hoc.

The ambulance part bugs me. I would have left it behind but water purification would be worth more than ambulance. The only thing that I can think of is that this is adhoc, here's the unit we've got available. It's got an ambulance. Send it. We don't have time to figure out what to replace it with.

Question by ambulance you mean a medical unit not an actual ambulance vehicle right?

Officer of Engineers
21 Aug 13,, 21:21
Medical platoon, part of the service battalion.

zraver
21 Aug 13,, 21:37
Medical platoon, part of the service battalion.

That is what I assumed, just wanted to make sure.

Doktor
21 Aug 13,, 21:57
Maybe you are unaware of the Blood Telegram (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archer_Blood#The_Blood_telegram) sent by the US consul general in Dhaka.

So the Americans knew exactly what the pakistanis were doing there. But national interest trumps all, and the Nixon admin determined that at that time the US's interests were served by supporting Yahya Khan and letting his army do what they want to the East Pakistanis. "To all hands, don’t squeeze Yahya at this time,” was in Nixon's handwritten note found when the papers of that era were declassified.
Actually, I read the blood telegram some time back. That's what makes the thing more confusing to me. The outcome was known.


It is because you have a misplaced idea of the real nature of the world order.
Could be. However, when big players make a move, it is for a reason. The risk seem so huge to me for no real incentive (tapping Khan on the shoulder).

What is also confusing to me is idealizing the deal with the Soviets. In my view this is more of a reason to sent Big-E.

zraver
21 Aug 13,, 22:25
Actually, I read the blood telegram some time back. That's what makes the thing more confusing to me. The outcome was known.


Could be. However, when big players make a move, it is for a reason. The risk seem so huge to me for no real incentive (tapping Khan on the shoulder).

What is also confusing to me is idealizing the deal with the Soviets. In my view this is more of a reason to sent Big-E.

Big-E shows the flag is just enough support to mollify Khan. A mollified Khan agrees to allow Pakistan to be used by Kissinger to fly to China. Kissinger's visit is followed by Nixon's and China becomes an American ally countering the Soviets and largely blunting the expected Soviet gain when North Vietnam ultimately wins the Vietnam war.

India doesn't even figure into the equation and the Big-E was never in danger or in range of Indian assets.

Firestorm
21 Aug 13,, 23:15
Actually, I read the blood telegram some time back. That's what makes the thing more confusing to me. The outcome was known.

Which outcome? The Blood telegram was several months before Indian intervention and only talked about atrocities. Indira Gandhi went on her tour asking for intervention or support after that. Nobody knew if or when India would intervene and what would happen if there was a war. The outcome wasn't certain at all.



Could be. However, when big players make a move, it is for a reason. The risk seem so huge to me for no real incentive (tapping Khan on the shoulder).

Zraver is right. It was more than just tapping Khan on the shoulder. Nixon and Kissinger had China in their sights and were willing to go to any extent to get them on the American side. If that meant allowing a genocide, so be it.

Doktor
22 Aug 13,, 06:02
Which outcome? The Blood telegram was several months before Indian intervention and only talked about atrocities. Indira Gandhi went on her tour asking for intervention or support after that. Nobody knew if or when India would intervene and what would happen if there was a war. The outcome wasn't certain at all.

From the page 3 of the telegram (http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB8.pdf):, point 6 (excerpt):
..."i believe the most likely eventual outcome of the struggle underway in East Pakistan is a Bengali victory and the consequent establishment of an independent Bangladesh. At the moment we posses the good will of the Awami league. We would be foolish to forfeit this asset by pursuing a rigid policy of one sided support to the likely loser"

Look at the date ;)


Zraver is right. It was more than just tapping Khan on the shoulder. Nixon and Kissinger had China in their sights and were willing to go to any extent to get them on the American side. If that meant allowing a genocide, so be it.
Did Kissinger really needed Pakistan to fly to China? Are there no other routes?

anil
22 Aug 13,, 06:52
zraver, the americans didn't care? really?

The americans had given a commitment to the defence of pakistan from india. The indian politicians had figured this out through observation.

The americans were getting the chinese to intervene from the north(the chinese pointed to the russians)
The americans were asking the shah of iran(he too pointed to the russians)
They americans were talking with the jordanians, the saudis and the turks. They had moved their fighter jets to use for pakistani pilots.

For some f$%king reason, the americans were unwilling to engage unilaterally. That reason IMO, was because of the russians, the size of the indian army and the reputation of indira.


I've already shown you several examples where if the US decided to act, she did, and it was the Russians who backed down- EVERY TIME.
In war, military strength matters, it diktats strategy. Without the chinese army, the US military was severely outnumbered by the indians and the russians. Would the russians miss this opportunity?


Could be. However, when big players make a move, it is for a reason. The risk seem so huge to me for no real incentive (tapping Khan on the shoulder).

What is also confusing to me is idealizing the deal with the Soviets. In my view this is more of a reason to sent Big-E.
Doktor, concentrate on the bottom line. Had india not signed the treaty with the russians, there would have been nothing that could have stopped the cleansing in east pakistan. The toll would have raised from millions to several millions in the following years.

Indian policy makers primarily focus on a nation states psyche(what and how does it think?). The only way to know for sure is to look at its actions, its history. That settles the question.

Officer of Engineers
22 Aug 13,, 07:01
In war, military strength matters, it diktats strategy. Without the chinese army, the US military was severely outnumbered by the indians and the russians. Would the russians miss this opportunity?The Soviets were perfectly happy fighting the Americans down to the last Korean and Chinese (Korean War) and down to the last Vietnamese. What makes you think that they wouldn't be happy fighting the Americans down to the last Indian?

anil
22 Aug 13,, 07:08
The Soviets were perfectly happy fighting the Americans down to the last Korean and Chinese (Korean War) and down to the last Vietnamese. What makes you think that they wouldn't be happy fighting the Americans down to the last Indian?
Because they could win this one :)

Indians have been fighting internecine wars before america existed and before the europeans arrived on the american continent. When russians and the US engage in threats of mutual distruction, we indians recognize patterns of familiarity.

bolo121
22 Aug 13,, 07:42
Because they could win this one :)

Indians have been fighting internecine wars before america existed and before the europeans arrived on the american continent. When russians and the US engage in threats of mutual distruction, we indians recognize patterns of familiarity.

This is delusional nutbaggery.
In the 70s we had nothing capable of reaching a CVBG

zraver
22 Aug 13,, 13:37
zraver, the americans didn't care? really?

Ya really.... Pakistani was a bit player and vassal. Europe and to an extent Japan and the Gulf oil were all that mattered.


For some f$%king reason, the americans were unwilling to engage unilaterally. That reason IMO, was because of the russians, the size of the indian army and the reputation of indira.

cookoo cookoo cookoo.... I've given you numerous other reasons that are empirically provable. The size of the India Army.... really?



In war, military strength matters, it diktats strategy. Without the chinese army, the US military was severely outnumbered by the indians and the russians. Would the russians miss this opportunity?

How many ground troops did the US employ during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in the various standoffs over Israel???? Ground troops in a naval battle, do you really believe this stuff your writing or are you just trolling?



Indian policy makers primarily focus on a nation states psyche(what and how does it think?). The only way to know for sure is to look at its actions, its history. That settles the question.

Then why oh great one are you insisting that this time, this one and only time in the History of the Cold War the Soviets would have acted differently than they did every other time when push came to shove for brown skins?

Officer of Engineers
22 Aug 13,, 14:58
Because they could win this one :)Win what? They won Vietnam and strategically, they won the Korean War as well. In both cases, they bled the Americans to the point where the Americans don't want to bleed anymore.

And changed nothing over in Europe.

Hate to burst your dellusions but India ain't that important to Moscow. They can live and die without you.

Blademaster
22 Aug 13,, 15:29
Zraver is right. It was more than just tapping Khan on the shoulder. Nixon and Kissinger had China in their sights and were willing to go to any extent to get them on the American side. If that meant allowing a genocide, so be it.

Were they willing to lose India to get China? Did they place a higher value on China than India just because China could tie down divisions of USSR? What about granting access to Indian Ocean through Indian naval bases to USSR?

I thought USA wanted to keep USSR out of the Indian Ocean but siding with Pakistan just shot that plan to hell.

Officer of Engineers
22 Aug 13,, 15:39
Were they willing to lose India to get China?From the links, I think both sides had came to the conclusion that India and the US were on different paths.


I thought USA wanted to keep USSR out of the Indian Ocean but siding with Pakistan just shot that plan to hell.At the time, a reasonable assumption. The Soviets didn't have the navy to go into the Indian Ocean without depleting the Atlantic.

anil
22 Aug 13,, 16:00
Sorry zraver, I don't agree with you. And you're again repeating the same things over and over again.

The US attempt to undo bangladesh back to east pakistan was by applying pressure and intimidation on india. THESE WERE THE F$%KING OPTIONS!! Do you think that if the soviets weren't in the loop, the US would have restricted itself to these options? And to negotiate with the chinese on the side to open a front in the north asap, with the iranians, the turks and the jordanians? Shiiiiiyyytt!!

Cut the BS zraver. I won't entertain your replys anymore. Learn from you we should to take something very simple and F^&KING obvious into a spectacle of face saving arrogant rants about the size of your balls(which if you actually had, you wouldn't had to blow the chinese for a new set of balls you b#$@h now would you? HAIN?) and the awesome military hardware you had in the vicinity.

Cut the BS zraver.

Interview with Kandury Subramanvam, 1987 - WGBH Open Vault (http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/wpna-396e86-interview-with-kandury-subramanvam-1987)

the US administration asked China to move against India and the Chinese asked the question, "What happens if the Soviet Union moved against China?" Even though in, the United States did give some guarantees to China about that contingency China did not move. And therefore it was quite obvious that the Indian action of entering into the friendship treaty with the Soviet did succeed in restraining China from acting in spite of all the goading from the United States.

anil
22 Aug 13,, 16:03
Hate to burst your dellusions but India ain't that important to Moscow. They can live and die without you.
I do agree with you but I also believe that without their backing, we couldn't have intervened in east pakistan. Even if we did, we would have been encountered US intervention. The russian involvement forced the US to go to the chinese and to the UN(diplomacy).

Bigfella
22 Aug 13,, 16:05
Somebody just lost the plot.

anil
22 Aug 13,, 16:26
http://i.imgur.com/pruCsI4.jpg
*In my billy madison voice*

A prophet I claim not to be.

Now tell me more about the size of your balls!

zraver
22 Aug 13,, 17:30
Sorry zraver, I don't agree with you. And you're again repeating the same things over and over again.

That is because facts don't change, so of course I keep repeating them over and over.


The US attempt to undo bangladesh back to east pakistan was by applying pressure and intimidation on india.

There was no attempt to do so. A single carrier group was sent to mollify an embarrassed Pakistani leader so that he would facilitate a meeting with China.


THESE WERE THE F$%KING OPTIONS!! Do you think that if the soviets weren't in the loop, the US would have restricted itself to these options? And to negotiate with the chinese on the side to open a front in the north asap, with the iranians, the turks and the jordanians? Shiiiiiyyytt!!

What part of "IF THE US CARED IT WOULD NOT MATTER IF THE SOVIETS WERE IN THE LOOP" do you not understand? In Cuba the US cared and deployed 6 carriers and massive land air forces and dared the Soviets to act. In 1967 and 1973 the US moved its Sixth Fleet near to the Levant and dared the Soviets to act. In 1973 the combined warship totals were well over 100 with 3 carriers and 50 B-52's. Towards the end of 1971 the US had in close proximity to India 6 carriers and over 100 B-52's and yet only sent a single carrier to the Bay of Bengal late in the game in a self evident use of the crisis to facilitate her own goals vis a vis China. There are zero archival materials to show that the US cared. The only documents showed that the US leadership was neither going to stop nor help Khan it was simply a non-issue.

Had the US cared, she would have acted earlier and India would have backed down. The Indian air force did not have enough modern super sonic fighters to defend both borders with Pakistan and both coasts. She did not have enough strike bombers or naval power to menace the USN. Her army still mostly equipped as a WWII era organization would not dare go east with no hope of secure supply lines under US dominated skies. And make no mistake those skies would be US dominated. India would not even contest them lest she use up all of her best fighters for no gain and leave herself at the mercy of Pakistani F-104's (then believed to be a wonder weapon) on the borders and her cities at the mercy of the US along the coasts.


Cut the BS zraver. I won't entertain your replys anymore. Learn from you we should to take something very simple and F^&KING obvious into a spectacle of face saving arrogant rants about the size of your balls(which if you actually had, you wouldn't had to blow the chinese for a new set of balls you b#$@h now would you? HAIN?) and the awesome military hardware you had in the vicinity.

You skills at insult are sadly lacking. If you are going to insult someone, insult in ways they can not so easily throw back in your face. For example, lack of balls... Really, I am a vet from a combat arms MOS (19K- M1 Abrams crewmen) and I do search and rescue work and chase tornaodoes. I also defend my positions regardless of what other people think about them. Obviously when it comes to courage I've got it in spades. I've also got multiple children- DNA tested BTW so the physical set I have is firing live rounds down range. I've also got a history degree and have given you multiple self evident examples. I'm truly sorry that the truth doesn't fit your dreams of india uber alles. Even your own countrymen have told you that your conclusions are wrong.

Now for a graduate level course in insulting you little dipshit. Wait,... I'd get in trouble if I did insult you, and fanbois just are not worth the grief from Minks or Top. I guess the fact that you simply do not matter saves you from a true lashing. Have a wonderful day.

anil
22 Aug 13,, 17:59
Oh great, more hypothetical examples about large balls.

Convincing a country to invade another country is not a "we didn't care" position!!. This is a post-position cause you couldn't exercise your pre-position.

You took this post position because of the predicament in real time!!

'This woman suckered us', said Nixon of Indira Gandhi (http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/This-woman-suckered-us-said-Nixon-of-Indira-Gandhi/Article1-514267.aspx)
Hell yes she did!!

She assured the US that she would not intervene in east pakistan. She f$%king lied and that eclipsed your position.

Firestorm
22 Aug 13,, 18:06
Were they willing to lose India to get China? Did they place a higher value on China than India just because China could tie down divisions of USSR? What about granting access to Indian Ocean through Indian naval bases to USSR?

I thought USA wanted to keep USSR out of the Indian Ocean but siding with Pakistan just shot that plan to hell.

Lose India? They never had India. India was always considered part of the Soviet bloc (on the fringes maybe, due to the lack of Communism and Soviet bases, but their side nonetheless). And tying down Soviet divisions would have been kind of a big thing acc. to me. If the soviets get a peaceful southern front, they can can concentrate all their energy on Europe. If the Chinese can stop that with American help it would be a huge help.

As for naval bases in India, even if India granted them, how exactly would they help the SU? Their navy wasn't large or strong enough to become the dominant power in the IO with the Americans there. On the other hand if they rolled through Afghanistan and Pakistan and got land access to Karachi, that would be something. A land route from the Arabian Sea all the way to the SU would be useful I'm thinking. So it was imperative for the US to stop Pakistan from collapsing and making the job easier for the SU. To that end, they were willing to allow the East Pakistanis to get culled by their western brothers.

Firestorm
22 Aug 13,, 18:12
From the page 3 of the telegram (http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB8.pdf):, point 6 (excerpt):
..."i believe the most likely eventual outcome of the struggle underway in East Pakistan is a Bengali victory and the consequent establishment of an independent Bangladesh. At the moment we posses the good will of the Awami league. We would be foolish to forfeit this asset by pursuing a rigid policy of one sided support to the likely loser"

Look at the date ;)

I saw that. I don't know if he had anticipated India's intervention in April itself, because without it the Bengalis couldn't hope to win. The PA was too strong for them and they were leaving no holds barred in their suppression of the rebellion.



Did Kissinger really needed Pakistan to fly to China? Are there no other routes?
Not just the route. Pakistan and China were already buddies by then. Yahya could act as a sort of common friend and introduce them.

zraver
22 Aug 13,, 18:15
Anil, did you ever read your source? It does not appear that you did. Anyway havefun in fanboi land.

Blademaster
22 Aug 13,, 18:19
Lose India? They never had India. India was always considered part of the Soviet bloc (on the fringes maybe, due to the lack of Communism and Soviet bases, but their side nonetheless). And tying down Soviet divisions would have been kind of a big thing acc. to me. If the soviets get a peaceful southern front, they can can concentrate all their energy on Europe. If the Chinese can stop that with American help it would be a huge help.

As for naval bases in India, even if India granted them, how exactly would they help the SU? Their navy wasn't large or strong enough to become the dominant power in the IO with the Americans there. On the other hand if they rolled through Afghanistan and Pakistan and got land access to Karachi, that would be something. A land route from the Arabian Sea all the way to the SU would be useful I'm thinking. So it was imperative for the US to stop Pakistan from collapsing and making the job easier for the SU. To that end, they were willing to allow the East Pakistanis to get culled by their western brothers.

In 1962 USA supported India against China. USA was supposedly neutral in 1965. So USA had India in its periphery and India wasn't really part of the Soviet bloc. Only in 1971 did India become an unofficial part of the Soviet bloc when it signed that friendship treaty. So USA did lose India.

Naval bases always help you project naval power and increase your naval presence. If you don't have naval bases or aircraft carriers, your naval presence is weak.

anil
22 Aug 13,, 18:36
You too mate. Have fun. I know you'll keep contributing more fiction(and balls) all over WAB but the important thing is that you're going to enjoy it while you do it. Because that's what matters. Non-fiction is for losers.

Doktor
22 Aug 13,, 19:05
In 1962 USA supported India against China. USA was supposedly neutral in 1965. So USA had India in its periphery and India wasn't really part of the Soviet bloc. Only in 1971 did India become an unofficial part of the Soviet bloc when it signed that friendship treaty. So USA did lose India.
Hence why I wondered if that treaty with SU was as wise of a move as it is said here by some Indian posters.


Naval bases always help you project naval power and increase your naval presence. If you don't have naval bases or aircraft carriers, your naval presence is weak.
Having naval bases without a navy is like buying spare tires for the car you don't have.

zraver
22 Aug 13,, 19:18
In 1962 USA supported India against China. USA was supposedly neutral in 1965. So USA had India in its periphery and India wasn't really part of the Soviet bloc. Only in 1971 did India become an unofficial part of the Soviet bloc when it signed that friendship treaty. So USA did lose India.

Naval bases always help you project naval power and increase your naval presence. If you don't have naval bases or aircraft carriers, your naval presence is weak.

The US gave up on any ideas about winning over NAM members following the 1967 war when she started supplying Israel with arms. Siding against Nasser automatically moved the Us towards an anti-Indian stance. Not that it mattered, when the US made the choice to go all in with Israel, her naval power was unchallengable in the Indian ocean. Just 1 US carrier had 3x the combat power of India's carrier and overall the US had more carriers than the Soviets had cruisers.

India had shown no desire to side with the US and other democracies in opposing communism, even after US support in 62. So she wasn't a foil against China and there was no direct route to the USSR (unlike Pakistan) and she did not border other Us allies contiguously like Pakistan did. Finnally the RN had not yet begin its full scale retreat from the region. In short, in the early-mid 60's India was the backend of nowhere in terms of Cold War importance to the US.


Anil,


Non-fiction is for losers.

Guess I'm a loser along with most of the board.

BTW your lightbulb's burnt out.

zraver
22 Aug 13,, 19:30
Hence why I wondered if that treaty with SU was as wise of a move as it is said here by some Indian posters.

Yes but not for the reasons the posters have been positing. Without the Soviets and under a British Arms embargo and not on good terms with the Americans India found herself facing a dangerous correlation of forces. China had Mig-21's ad Tu-4 and Tu-16 bombers, Pakistan had improved F-86's and new F-104's. Not a good place to be. The treaty let India begin to catch up and modernize.


Having naval bases without a navy is like buying spare tires for the car you don't have.

The Soviets didn't want naval bases. They wanted a hedge against China (relations were going from bad to almost nuclear) a market for Soviet goods, support in the UN from the biggest former colony, and a minor propaganda victory against the west (look whose side the worlds biggest democracy picked nahahahah!!!!!!!).

Doktor
22 Aug 13,, 19:34
Z,


Yes but not for the reasons the posters have been positing. Without the Soviets and under a British Arms embargo and not on good terms with the Americans India found herself facing a dangerous correlation of forces. China had Mig-21's ad Tu-4 and Tu-16 bombers, Pakistan had improved F-86's and new F-104's. Not a good place to be. The treaty let India begin to catch up and modernize.
Make no mistake, us NAM nations bought weapons from everywhere and then between each other. Not the top edge, but still.
That beaing said, IMV, if India remained neutral, or to put it more bluntly, if she didn't sign the contract with Soviets, she would still have a backup from the SU. Only for less money spent on Indian side. And they would have backed her up for the same reason they did historically bar the treaty.


The Soviets didn't want naval bases. They wanted a hedge against China (relations were going from bad to almost nuclear) a market for Soviet goods, support in the UN from the biggest former colony, and a minor propaganda victory against the west (look whose side the worlds biggest democracy picked nahahahah!!!!!!!).
The Soviets reason for backing up India summed ;)

Firestorm
22 Aug 13,, 20:02
Zraver, the timelines are a bit off. The treaty was signed in 1971. India started buying Soviet hardware much earlier. The first Mig-21s entered service in the IAF in 1964. The Su-7s and SA-2's came in a little after that. T-55's must have been earlier, although I don't know the exact date.

India had attempted to buy F-104s earlier in 1961 I think. We were refused. And then the F-104s were given to Pakistan in addition to the F-86s earlier. And yet somehow, it was India which chose to side with the USSR.

DarthSiddius
22 Aug 13,, 20:09
IMO the indo-soviet treaty of friendship and collaboration was aimed more so towards the chinese (instead of the Americans). Anyhow it was India that was courted by the Soviets during that time (the push for a treaty was initiated by the Soviets). Keep in mind that the SU and India pretty much sandwiched China between themselves. My point being that India was not just a (sort of) client state to the Soviets and had the push come to shove in '71, things could have gotten interesting (especially if the Chinese were involved!)

As to why India FP tilted towards the Soviets significantly was because it was the Soviets that were willing to collaborate with Indians on matters such as military hardware ToT, Space Exploration and Co-operation, diplomatic support, etc. While the Americans were busy arming Pakistan, warming up to the Chinese and at times even threatening India.

EDIT: And isn't the USS Enterprise incident the direct catalyst for the Indian nuclear program?

zraver
22 Aug 13,, 20:31
Firestorm, my timeline might be a bit off but the relevant reasoning about motivations and outside pressures is accurate.

Officer of Engineers
22 Aug 13,, 21:11
I know you Indian gentlemen have explained this before but would you kindly repeat it so that I can get this through my thick skull.

Obviously, you had thought the Soviets had stopped the US for you.

So, why would India not think she was a WWIII target after the ENTERPRISE Incident? I'm not looking for rights or wrongs here. I just want an insight into Indian strategic thought. The US has chosen sides with Pakistan and China. India signed a treaty and got weapons from the USSR. And according to the Indian/Soviet side, it was Soviet submarines that stopped the ENTERPRISE from going further.

Would that not suggest that India now is a WWIII target?

Again, just help me understand why did India not consider herself a WWIII target after this.

Firestorm
22 Aug 13,, 21:15
DELETED (Double Post)

Firestorm
22 Aug 13,, 21:16
Firestorm, my timeline might be a bit off but the relevant reasoning about motivations and outside pressures is accurate.
The pressures were there. But we did not need the treaty to get the required hardware. The Soviets were selling it to us even without the treaty. That's why the timeline is important. Obviously, the treaty must have meant something more. Help against preventing more border adventures by China is my guess. The Chinese were even more dangerous than 1962 by then because of their nukes. Mere conventional parity with them might not have seemed enough.

DarthSiddius
22 Aug 13,, 21:29
I know you Indian gentlemen have explained this before but would you kindly repeat it so that I can get this through my thick skull.

Obviously, you had thought the Soviets had stopped the US for you.

So, why would India not think she was a WWIII target after the ENTERPRISE Incident? I'm not looking for rights or wrongs here. I just want an insight into Indian strategic thought. The US has chosen sides with Pakistan and China. India signed a treaty and got weapons from the USSR. And according to the Indian/Soviet side, it was Soviet submarines that stopped the ENTERPRISE from going further.

Would that not suggest that India now is a WWIII target?

Again, just help me understand why did India not consider herself a WWIII target after this.

Because we considered the treaty as a check against China and not America?

Firestorm
22 Aug 13,, 21:39
I know you Indian gentlemen have explained this before but would you kindly repeat it so that I can get this through my thick skull.

Obviously, you had thought the Soviets had stopped the US for you.

So, why would India not think she was a WWIII target after the ENTERPRISE Incident?
....

Even after the 1971 treaty, there were no Soviet bases of any kind on Indian soil. And the most common WWIII scenario was either the Soviets or NATO invading each other in Europe. India was far away and planned on basically staying out of the whole thing. Even in the case of a Sino-Soviet flare up, I'm pretty sure India planned on staying out of that as well even if the Soviets had asked India to open up a front. So the core thinking would have been, that as long as India did not make any concrete moves against US allies, they would ignore India since they had much more important targets to take care of.

This is all the speculation of a layman of course. I have no idea what the Indian establishment actually believed back then. Another possibility is that they knew India could be a possible target despite our best efforts. If so, there was nothing we could do to prevent it and we couldn't afford a civil defense program to reduce the damage with our limited finances and huge population. It would have only caused panic while being largely useless.

zraver
23 Aug 13,, 04:01
This is all the speculation of a layman of course. I have no idea what the Indian establishment actually believed back then. Another possibility is that they knew India could be a possible target despite our best efforts. If so, there was nothing we could do to prevent it and we couldn't afford a civil defense program to reduce the damage with our limited finances and huge population. It would have only caused panic while being largely useless.

In a Cold War era global thermonuclear war scenario you were going to get hammered. A dozen or a hundred made in America Smiling Buddhas, for no other reason that if you are not with us, you must be against us and if we are going down we are taking everyone who wants us dead with us. After-all, we've lost everything already so there is nothing left to lose. Welcome to a deadman's party.

Oingo Boingo Dead Man's Party - YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iypUpv9xelg)

Firestorm
23 Aug 13,, 04:42
In a Cold War era global thermonuclear war scenario you were going to get hammered. A dozen or a hundred made in America Smiling Buddhas, for no other reason that if you are not with us, you must be against us and if we are going down we are taking everyone who wants us dead with us. After-all, we've lost everything already so there is nothing left to lose. Welcome to a deadman's party.

That's just the thing. India didn't want the US dead and had no means to really affect the war in any meaningful way beyond defending ourselves against the Chinese if they decided to invade. More importantly it wasn't planning to. Either way, whether or not India was a target made no difference. There was nothing we could have done differently to avoid it considering the attitude that you are speaking of above.

zraver
23 Aug 13,, 05:24
That's just the thing. India didn't want the US dead and had no means to really affect the war in any meaningful way beyond defending ourselves against the Chinese if they decided to invade. More importantly it wasn't planning to. Either way, whether or not India was a target made no difference. There was nothing we could have done differently to avoid it considering the attitude that you are speaking of above.

Yup, during the Cold war to join the nuclear club you had to sign your own death warrant to gain entry.

Officer of Engineers
23 Aug 13,, 05:27
Jason,

I really did not want to get into whether India was a target or not. She was, if not by us, most definitely by the Chinese. They were expecting both India and Vietnam opening Southern Fronts while the Soviets strike from the North. Indian Gents, please, do not provide me with proof that India was not going to do that. That's not the point, the point is that the Chinese was expecting you to and they made contingencies ... and so did we.

What I was after, though, was what was going through their heads on how to stay out of WWIII.

The joker in all of this is Pakistan. What was she going to do?

And let's not get into a pissing contest on who can and who will do what? That is not the point of my questions. My point is to learn about the thinking of the times, not a dick measuring contest nor who's right or wrong. That is neither here not there. Decisions were made ... and I like to understand the reasoning behind those decisions.

Deltacamelately
24 Aug 13,, 07:01
Jason,

I really did not want to get into whether India was a target or not. She was, if not by us, most definitely by the Chinese. They were expecting both India and Vietnam opening Southern Fronts while the Soviets strike from the North. Indian Gents, please, do not provide me with proof that India was not going to do that. That's not the point, the point is that the Chinese was expecting you to and they made contingencies ... and so did we.

What I was after, though, was what was going through their heads on how to stay out of WWIII.

The joker in all of this is Pakistan. What was she going to do?

And let's not get into a pissing contest on who can and who will do what? That is not the point of my questions. My point is to learn about the thinking of the times, not a dick measuring contest nor who's right or wrong. That is neither here not there. Decisions were made ... and I like to understand the reasoning behind those decisions.
Sir,

Neither India expected NATO nukes nor was in the postion to make contingencies. India didn't expect a flourishing democracy and the leader of the free world to lob nukes on her. With respect to China, it was a different question. India didn't expect the PRC to nuke her for all totally different reasons. However, cosing up with the Soviets did take away whatever little apprehensions, the leaders of the time might have vis-a-vis China.

As we have deduced in the past, the perception that India had with respect to a nuclear China was different, else, Smiling Buddha would have happened immediately after 1962. The time lines of the test are an easy give away.

Personally speaking, contrary to all the reasonable logic Jason has quoted, I believe that Indira Gandhi was already done with all the cost-benefit and feasibility analysis of the 1971 war. I doubt she would stand down. Here is a hint - She was anxious to invade East Pakistan as early as Monsoon. It was the genius of FM Sam Manekshaw, which delayed the war till December, expecting the riverine water to go away and the Himalayan passes to close. She was just not bothered. Nah...I don't think she would back away. I also agree, it would otherwise become a bloody affair, wherein the war objectives would dramatically change from liberation of Bangladesh to dismantling of the PA.

Blademaster
24 Aug 13,, 14:44
Delta,

In addition to your post, Nixon simply just did not have the power to move all those supplies and manpower as zraver suggests and Soviet Union was a powerful deterrent no matter how you cut it. There was no way in hell Nixon would risk a nuclear confrontation over East Pakistan when western media was already broadcasting human rights violations and the majority of US people were already anti-Vietnam. By going against India, Nixon would lose a lot of political support for what he was about to do: Go to China.

Nixon already did his cost vs benefit calculations and realize that a head on confrontation was not going to work in his favor on the greater geo-political scheme. I think the real lesson here was that US did not value Pakistan highly enough to risk a confrontation otherwize zraver's more than incredible assertions would come to pass.

In short, it was US that folded after making a half hearted bet. No other way to cut it.

Officer of Engineers
24 Aug 13,, 15:14
As we have deduced in the past, the perception that India had with respect to a nuclear China was different, else, Smiling Buddha would have happened immediately after 1962. The time lines of the test are an easy give away. *** Grinning like a cat ***

Thank you for reminding me of that EUREKA moment. Something so obvious ... that until two thinkers started looking at all the facts ... and the traditional explanations didn't fit ... and then ... BAM!!!! That was fun ... and then, we had to convince others of what we saw. Unconventional thinking ... and that could not happen without two thinkers challenging each other. I don't think we could have came up with that without you debating and challenging me at every point.


Personally speaking, contrary to all the reasonable logic Jason has quoted, I believe that Indira Gandhi was already done with all the cost-benefit and feasibility analysis of the 1971 war. I doubt she would stand down. Here is a hint - She was anxious to invade East Pakistan as early as Monsoon. It was the genius of FM Sam Manekshaw, which delayed the war till December, expecting the riverine water to go away and the Himalayan passes to close. She was just not bothered. Nah...I don't think she would back away. I also agree, it would otherwise become a bloody affair, wherein the war objectives would dramatically change from liberation of Bangladesh to dismantling of the PA.The better question is what would happened if Pakistan had better Generals in East Pakistan. No one wanted that command, at least no one of worth.

zraver
24 Aug 13,, 15:18
Nixon already did his cost vs benefit calculations and realize that a head on confrontation was not going to work in his favor on the greater geo-political scheme. I think the real lesson here was that US did not value Pakistan highly enough to risk a confrontation otherwize zraver's more than incredible assertions would come to pass.

But the reason wasn't Indian or Soviet strength but Nixon's desire to get a date with China.


In short, it was US that folded after making a half hearted bet. No other way to cut it.

Or the US played an incredibly cynical game and won the big prize in her eyes for the least amount of cost- China. India, Bangladesh and the US all got the big prizes they wanted and Pakistan got told thanks for playing...

Delta,

Sir,


Neither India expected NATO nukes nor was in the postion to make contingencies. India didn't expect a flourishing democracy and the leader of the free world to lob nukes on her.

Sir, this is something I've tried to explain in the past and have apparently failed so I will try again. In a global nuclear war situation with the Soviets the US isn't the words most powerful democracy, she isn't the leader of the free world, SHE IS DEAD. She is burned to a cinder and all her promise, hope, dreams as well as her ills and evils dead with her. Her only remaining action is to take all those who wished her ill in what ever capacity with her. India falls into that category twice, first as a defacto ally of the Soviets. Secondly, she had nukes and was not a US ally and an enemy of US allies.

That is why I call it a deadman's party.

anil
24 Aug 13,, 18:52
Deltacamelately, the dismantling of the PA back in west pakistan was in fact on the cards.


On December 5 Executive Secretary Eliot sent a memorandum to Kissinger attaching excerpts from security assurances provided to Pakistan by the United States. One such excerpt was from a January 26, 1962, letter from President Kennedy to President Ayub, which reads as follows: "As a firm ally, Pakistan is entitled to the re-affirmation you have requested of the prior assurances given by the United States to Pakistan on the subject of aggression against Pakistan. My Government certainly stands by these assurances." The full text of the letter is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIX, Document 100. On November 5, 1962, Ambassador McConaughy gave President Ayub an aide-mémoire which offered the more explicit assurance that the United States would "come to Pakistan's assistance in the event of aggression from India against Pakistan."


Kissinger told President Nixon that after their meeting, Vorontsov had needed no further proof of United States resolve. He said that "we got the message loud and clear from the President yesterday." Vorontsov added: "I can tell you informally that if they are not working through the night now in Moscow, they are not doing their duty." Kissinger concluded: "We're going to get it." He said he had underlined the significance of the understanding President Kennedy had with President Ayub about coming to Pakistan's assistance. "I showed him the secret treaty. I said now I hope you understand the significance of this. It isn't just an obligation. It will completely defuse the Democrats because they are not going to attack their own President. So I said when the President yesterday spoke of an obligation he was speaking of a Kennedy obligation. . . . He said within an hour this will be on Mr. Brezhnev's desk. And I told him we're moving some military forces, but it will not be visible until Sunday night. . . . In effect, it was giving him sort of veiled ultimatum."


Message From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon

(A handwritten note on the message indicates it was received at 5 a.m. Haig transmitted the text of this hot line message to Kissinger at 7:37 a.m. in telegram WH 11131 to Lajes in the Azores. Haig observed about the message: "Obviously we are still in a holding pattern.")

Moscow, December 13, 1971.

We have attentively examined your message over the direct communications link. In accordance with the confidential exchange of opinions existing between us, we are advising you that at the present time, we are conducting a clarification of all the circumstances in India.

We will inform you of the results of the clarification without delay.


Message From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon

Moscow, December 14, 1971.

We are in constant contact with the Indian side. One of the results of these very contacts was the message transmitted to you on December 12 that India has no intention to take any military action in connection with West Pakistan. We have firm assurances by the Indian leadership that India has no plans of seizing West Pakistan territory. Thus as far as intentions of India are concerned there is no lack of clarity to which you have referred.

The russians advised indira against launching the offensive on PA.

Deltacamelately
26 Aug 13,, 06:37
*** Grinning like a cat ***

Thank you for reminding me of that EUREKA moment. Something so obvious ... that until two thinkers started looking at all the facts ... and the traditional explanations didn't fit ... and then ... BAM!!!! That was fun ... and then, we had to convince others of what we saw. Unconventional thinking ... and that could not happen without two thinkers challenging each other. I don't think we could have came up with that without you debating and challenging me at every point.

The better question is what would happened if Pakistan had better Generals in East Pakistan. No one wanted that command, at least no one of worth.
Sir,

Could certainly be true. However, the logistics that could sustain Pakistan's war efforts in the East would eventually crumble even if the command was with a better General.

Deltacamelately
26 Aug 13,, 07:15
But the reason wasn't Indian or Soviet strength but Nixon's desire to get a date with China.



Or the US played an incredibly cynical game and won the big prize in her eyes for the least amount of cost- China. India, Bangladesh and the US all got the big prizes they wanted and Pakistan got told thanks for playing...

Delta,

Sir,



Sir, this is something I've tried to explain in the past and have apparently failed so I will try again. In a global nuclear war situation with the Soviets the US isn't the words most powerful democracy, she isn't the leader of the free world, SHE IS DEAD. She is burned to a cinder and all her promise, hope, dreams as well as her ills and evils dead with her. Her only remaining action is to take all those who wished her ill in what ever capacity with her. India falls into that category twice, first as a defacto ally of the Soviets. Secondly, she had nukes and was not a US ally and an enemy of US allies.

That is why I call it a deadman's party.
Jason,

You could be very well correct, but then it appears to be a cultural difference of perception. India, or atleast the political leadership of India, till date has a anti-colonial hangover. Even though US was viewed through the Pakistani prism as an anti-India power, it was never considered as a Colonial power, rather a democracy catring to its own geo-political ends. I doubt, the leadership viewed your line of logic of a global-thermonuclear spill, gulping in the bulk of the nations, just because they were perceived to be "Not standing in the American Camp". Another slight correction, India as on 1971, was not a Nuclear Power.

Deltacamelately
26 Aug 13,, 08:02
Deltacamelately, the dismantling of the PA back in west pakistan was in fact on the cards.

The russians advised indira against launching the offensive on PA.
That's utter bullcrap. At max this was false flag by a mole in the Indian side that was suppossedly singing to the CIA.

There is ZERO credible evidence to suggest that the Indian Armed Forces had any verdict for dismantling of the Pakistani Military or even the PA.
There is nothing to suggest from the mobilization pattern, allocation of resources to actual deployment that could predict such grand war objectives.

anil
26 Aug 13,, 08:49
Yes it was that report. We don't know if the source was true but it definitely compelled the americans to send a letter to the soviets revealing the kennedy commitment treaty to the soviets, which I've posted earlier.


Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable

Washington, December 7, 1971.

SUBJECT: Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Briefing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on the IndoPakistani War

SOURCE: [5 lines of source text not declassified]

6. Mrs. Gandhi concluded her briefing by reiterating India's war objectives:

A. The quick liberation of Bangladesh,

B. The incorporation into India of the southern part of Azad Kashmir for strategic rather than territorial reasons, (because India has no desire to occupy any West Pakistan territory); and, finally,

C. To destroy Pakistani military striking power so that it never attempts to challenge India in the future.

Deltacamelately
26 Aug 13,, 09:22
Yes it was that report. We don't know if the source was true but it definitely compelled the americans to send a letter to the soviets revealing the kennedy commitment treaty to the soviets, which I've posted earlier.
Anil,

That was a false flag. Nothing to corroborate that dismantling the PA or the Pakistani Military was even considered. The US indeed must have cabled their commitments to the Soviets. The Soviets by all probablities must have been briefed up before hand, about the extent of our war ambitions. The IA on its part was plain satisfied to have 2 fronts to contend with instead of 3.

Officer of Engineers
26 Aug 13,, 11:34
Sir,

Could certainly be true. However, the logistics that could sustain Pakistan's war efforts in the East would eventually crumble even if the command was with a better General.The Pakistani Army simply could not win a war of attrition. However, they could win big. What I'm thinking of is to lure the InA into a trap, surround it, and force it to surrender. Then, they have hostages to negotiate an end to the war.

Deltacamelately
26 Aug 13,, 14:25
The Pakistani Army simply could not win a war of attrition. However, they could win big. What I'm thinking of is to lure the InA into a trap, surround it, and force it to surrender. Then, they have hostages to negotiate an end to the war.
Sir,

There was no way in hell, the PA could trap and make the IA surrender in East Pakistan. Let's look at what both the sides fielded in the battle-field.
The majority of the Tanks fielded by the PA were older models, especially the M24s and PT-76s. The PA fielded four infantry divisions, totalling about 40 battalions of infantry, with two light armoured units in support. Look at the overwhelming odds - The 9th Infantry Division was facing the Indian II Corps. The 16th Infantry was deployed between the Ganges and Jamuna Rivers, opposite XXXIII Corps. The 36th PA Infantry Division was opposite IV Corps and the 14th Infantry Division in the Northern part, opposite to the 101 Communication Zone. These PA units were supported by a small number of M-24 Chafee, and even few PT-76 tanks as I've mentioned above.

It should be mentioned here, that this Pak force had to hold an area with a population of about 70 million and a border of nearly 2250km long. The PA’s task was therefore utterly impossible, had it not been for the fact that with so many rivers dissecting EP, the IA had to make all their efforts along narrow and restricted fronts. Strongly defended positions, held in depth, could be used to attack Indian advances. The PA was therefore deployed forward in order to hold the IA at the border, the intention being to strengthen the Pakistani diplomatic position, waiting it out for the US/UK/China to force a cease fire. This was not to be.

Practically speaking, in 1971, India had the capability to wage atleast a two-month war on two fronts, possibly three, if at all the Chinese could muster the resolve to open the southern theatre. In comparison to the PA, the IA deployed about one Armoured, 13 Infantry, and ten Mountain Divisions, 2 Armoured and a variety of other Independent Brigades. Overall, the IA deployed about 250000 men the for invasion.

In contrast to the PA's plan of fighting from heavily defended and fortified position, the the IA's plan for invasion, envisaged attacks from all directions to break EP into fragments, by-passing fortifications and then drive directly Dacca, as fast as possible. The IA simply concentrated on eliminating, surrounding and/or by-passing salients and strongpoints held by the PA. It ensured that the enemy formations could not withdraw to Dacca. At no point of time did the IA gave the PA any incentive to channel it into killing zones and entrap it, let alone surrender en-mass. The PA's fall was inevitable and I have still not brought in the IAF and IN's exploits to the bigger picture.

Officer of Engineers
26 Aug 13,, 14:53
Major,

As I stated, if Pakistan had better Generals. I can see one plan right off the bat that could give East Pakistan a tactical victory but not a strategic one.

Operation MARS in which Model and Kluge ignored the penetrations and kept the strong points strong. This in turn had the effect of cutting off the LOCs to the penetrating units.

But then, this required Generals on the level of Model and Kluge. I'm not one of them.

Doktor
26 Aug 13,, 15:05
Pakistan had officers of that caliber?

Officer of Engineers
26 Aug 13,, 15:18
Nope. That's why they lost so big.

Mihais
26 Aug 13,, 15:19
Nope,they hadn't

Colonel,Sir,they still needed soldiers&officers of the caliber 9th Army had in 1942.Otherwise,they'll lose heart when isolated.

Major,Sir,numbers alone mean nothing.The Syrians and the Israelis proved it in 1973,if the Axis in the East wasn't enough proof .

zraver
26 Aug 13,, 15:20
Jason,

You could be very well correct, but then it appears to be a cultural difference of perception. India, or atleast the political leadership of India, till date has a anti-colonial hangover. Even though US was viewed through the Pakistani prism as an anti-India power, it was never considered as a Colonial power, rather a democracy catring to its own geo-political ends. I doubt, the leadership viewed your line of logic of a global-thermonuclear spill, gulping in the bulk of the nations, just because they were perceived to be "Not standing in the American Camp".


We toppled governments in Africa and the Middle East, bombed the snot out of multiple Asian countries, tens of thousands of nukes, had until just a few months previous a robust bio and CW program, would betray Taiwan in short order..... Ya make no mistake America is a cynical and more capable of a "fuck everyone then, see ya'll at God's place" move than the Soviet's ever were.


Another slight correction, India as on 1971, was not a Nuclear Power.

True, post 74 she is in the club though.

Firestorm
26 Aug 13,, 18:48
Major,

As I stated, if Pakistan had better Generals. I can see one plan right off the bat that could give East Pakistan a tactical victory but not a strategic one.

Operation MARS in which Model and Kluge ignored the penetrations and kept the strong points strong. This in turn had the effect of cutting off the LOCs to the penetrating units.

But then, this required Generals on the level of Model and Kluge. I'm not one of them.

Interesting. This made me go and read up more on Op. Mars. While the situations were similar, the PA's main problem I feel was Dhaka. They couldn't let the IA take it. That's what eventually ended the war anyway. The IA's casualties would have been much higher if they had tried to take the other strong points.

Model and Kluge had nothing like that to worry about. They also had nearly equal numbers of tanks as the Soviets. The PA had other problems too. East Pakistan had been blockaded by the IN and there were no supplies coming in. And the IAF had achieved complete air superiority within a few days. They could bomb Dhaka whenever they wanted with nothing more than AAA batteries opposing them.

The PA was understrength in the East by design. It was part of their "Defense of the east lies in the west" concept. They never planned on doing anything more than a holding and delaying action in the east while their western units which had significantly more mobile assets and firepower went on the offensive. Their best chance of a (big) tactical victory was at Longewala which they squandered.

Officer of Engineers
26 Aug 13,, 20:14
The point I was trying to make is to have better Generals instead of the crap the Pakistanis have. Their position was immediately unattainable because they didn't do the work needed. The axis of attack were all well known and though strong points were erected, fall back points were not.

I can do without equal number of tanks but I do want a superiority of artillery. I really don't care about the InAF. They didn't have B52s nor were they numerous enough to collapse the LOCs. AAA kept them high enough to deny them any accuracy at all.

But I understand it was a very unpopular command and those who took it were on the dead end of their career. It was their only chance to shine to get another promotion ... which they didn't deserve.

Deltacamelately
27 Aug 13,, 07:46
Major,Sir,numbers alone mean nothing.The Syrians and the Israelis proved it in 1973,if the Axis in the East wasn't enough proof .
Mihais,

Its just not about numbers, but rather the fromations and their deployment that's an easy give away as to what was inveitable and coming. Add in the topography to the mix.

33692

Mihais
27 Aug 13,, 08:38
Sir,you made me curious,so I'll at the details later.But at first glance it screams interior lines maneuver.Not the actual deployment of the PA,but what is possible.

Deltacamelately
27 Aug 13,, 08:44
Major,

As I stated, if Pakistan had better Generals. I can see one plan right off the bat that could give East Pakistan a tactical victory but not a strategic one.

Operation MARS in which Model and Kluge ignored the penetrations and kept the strong points strong. This in turn had the effect of cutting off the LOCs to the penetrating units.

But then, this required Generals on the level of Model and Kluge. I'm not one of them.
Sir,

There's a huge difference in the objectives and the resources available. General A.A.K.Niazi, was determined merely to delay the IA's advance. For, in this war, the real battle was against time. The longer it took the IA to secure their limited objectives, the greater the probability of the UN intervening to stop the war and effect a stalemate. Pakistan was confident that a stalemate was all that the IA could get. Towards this strategy, General Niazi, had fortified the towns and approaches to the EP heartland.

The initial brief given by FM Maneckshaw, to the Eastern Command was very limited. The aim was to occupy only two areas of EP- Chittagong and Khulna - so that an interim Bangladeshi government could be established. The capture of the whole of East Pakistan was not conceived in the initial brief. A major problem was the geography and terrain of EP. Three major rivers - the Brahmaputra, the Ganges and the Meghna divided EP into four natural regions. Each of the rivers were major ones, all of them wider than any European river. Each sub-region was further divided into several pockets cut by smaller rivers and their tributaries. The idea that an attacking army could bridge these, fight the enemy and then take territory, all within a couple of weeks, was ludicrous to say the leat. The immense practical problem of moving thousands of troops and tonnes of equipment across rivers and marshes was accomplished largely due to the efforts of the Army Corps of Engineers, and with a lot of local help. The IAF chipped in by using helicopters to lift entire battalions across larger rivers that could not be quickly bridged by the Engineers. In most places, the swiftly moving contingents quickly overcame enemy resistance and moved forward. Any General in his right mind wouldn't even consider neglecting the strongpoints and concentrate on the ancilliary pincers.

It was only at a later stage that the Eastern Command realized that in order to fully achieve the eastern objective, the campaign had to be menacingly quick. They realised that General Niazi was going to fortify the towns and defend them in strength. The IA therefore decided not attack any towns but bypass them using subsidiary tracks to get to the real objective, that was Dacca. There seems no way that the PA could tie-down the IA and force a general kill, so as to achieve any kind of tactical victory. Request you to kindly help, shape up a battle plan that could in general achieve the speculated objectives.

Deltacamelately
27 Aug 13,, 08:51
Sir,you made me curious,so I'll at the details later.But at first glance it screams interior lines maneuver.Not the actual deployment of the PA,but what is possible.
It is also interesting to note the places, wherein the IA was willing to offer battle and places wherein they simply skirted off.

Deltacamelately
27 Aug 13,, 09:05
We toppled governments in Africa and the Middle East, bombed the snot out of multiple Asian countries, tens of thousands of nukes, had until just a few months previous a robust bio and CW program, would betray Taiwan in short order..... Ya make no mistake America is a cynical and more capable of a "fuck everyone then, see ya'll at God's place" move than the Soviet's ever were.

Call it the shortsightedness of the Indian political brass. But then, I already conceded that there's a cultural angle in this as well.

Your Deadman's Party was not properly conceived back here.

Officer of Engineers
27 Aug 13,, 12:37
Request you to kindly help, shape up a battle plan that could in general achieve the speculated objectives.You're really determined to have fun with this. Let me look this over.

zraver
28 Aug 13,, 23:25
Call it the shortsightedness of the Indian political brass. But then, I already conceded that there's a cultural angle in this as well.

Your Deadman's Party was not properly conceived back here.


Your nation should have studied Indian history, the other Indians....


It was only at a later stage that the Eastern Command realized that in order to fully achieve the eastern objective, the campaign had to be menacingly quick. They realised that General Niazi was going to fortify the towns and defend them in strength. The IA therefore decided not attack any towns but bypass them using subsidiary tracks to get to the real objective, that was Dacca. There seems no way that the PA could tie-down the IA and force a general kill, so as to achieve any kind of tactical victory. Request you to kindly help, shape up a battle plan that could in general achieve the speculated objectives.

Easy, take significant Indian territory in the West... say Armistar. :)

Blademaster
28 Aug 13,, 23:43
Easy, take significant Indian territory in the West... say Armistar. :)

Not possible. PA tried and failed three times.

zraver
29 Aug 13,, 00:51
Not possible. PA tried and failed three times.


Oh I know, but the basic concept, defend the East from the West makes perfectly good military sense.

Tronic
29 Aug 13,, 03:01
Easy, take significant Indian territory in the West... say Armistar. :)

They tried and they failed badly.

4th Corps of Pakistan carried out an offensive operation (106 Infantry Brigade, constituting about 2 infantry battalions from the Baloch and Pakistan's Punjab Regiment, plus a troop of armour) towards Ferozepur in Indian Punjab. They started off well, but were eventually stopped by the 15th battalion of India's Punjab Regiment whose timid commander was begging his superiors to allow him to withdraw. The battle was won solely by the writ of the Indian troops. The opposing Indian commanders were just as incompetent as the Pakistanis.

Pakistan's 105 Independent Brigade (again from 4th Corps) carried out a spectacularly quick and aggressive offensive action against Fazilka, steamrolled over the forward Indian defence positions, and completely broke the morale of the Indian 67th Infantry Brigade. The incompetence of Indian commanders made the situation even worse, which finally resulted in Western Army Command sacking and replacing the Brigade Commander. Pakistan failed to take the initiative despite the breakthrough, and the Indian units were allowed to regroup. IAF's air superiority also made a big difference in dissuading the Pakistanis from advancing further.

1st Corps of the PA and IA clashed in the Jammu/North Punjab (the battle compiled here: Battle of Basantar - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Basantar)). Again, terrible leadership from the Corps commanders on both sides. Pakistan's 8th Division commander resorted to completely dumbfounded suicidal attacks, like that of the 35th battalion of the Frontier Force Regiment at Jarpal, where the entire battalion was wiped out by the IA. This was a battle between two Corps commanders, both with a defensive mindset, who simply refused to dedicate the needed resources and units for their attacks. It's understandable from an Indian POV, as their main objective was to hold the line in the West, while invading East Pakistan. It's completely bizarre when you look at it from the Pakistani side, who were completely banking on taking Indian territory in the West to protect the East.

Than there is the battle of Longewala. The Pakistani 18th Division (206th Inf Brigade, 51st Inf Brigade, 38th Cav and 22nd Cav) failed to overrun a single company, numbering about 120 men, of the 23rd Battalion (Indian) Punjab Regiment, and were eventually picked out and routed by the IAF. The incompetence of the Indian commanders once again is on display here, as they did not take the initiative to chase and destroy the routed Pakistani units. Infact, the Indian commanders even went ahead and cancelled 12th Divisions planned attack against Rahim Yar Khan. Than the Indian commanders went on and fumbled the 11th Indian Divisions attack towards Umarkot.

The poor decisions made on the Western front are nauseating. It didn't make much of a difference to India, as it's main focus was on the Eastern front; but the fact remains that neither side truly made the other side pay for their mistakes on the Western front in '71.

Blademaster
29 Aug 13,, 04:04
Oh I know, but the basic concept, defend the East from the West makes perfectly good military sense.

And the IA knows the strategy very well and came up with effective countermeasures.

Officer of Engineers
29 Aug 13,, 04:26
Request you to kindly help, shape up a battle plan that could in general achieve the speculated objectives.Major,

I'm thinking Battle of Changsha (1942) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Changsha_%281942%29)

A good, but not a great General, and an army nowhere close to the calibre of the British Indian Army manage to inflict a devastating defeat onto the IJA.

Essentially, Dhaka is the bait. As the Indian Army advances, it meets and pushes aside Pakistani divisions though it may seem a total collapse as the road to Dhaka are blasted open one division at a time. Dhaka itself would be fortified to the hilt signalling a Pakistani intent to do or die there, something the InA would expect to see.

As the InA engages in that do or die battle with every confidence of winning that battle, those Pakistani divisions that were pushed aside would start their true battle against the InA rear areas.

The key to this is that the InA must be convinced that they have destroyed the blocking Pakistani divisions and that the main Pakistani effort is at Dhaka. As you can see Major, the vital point is the deception, not the actual combat power.

Tronic
29 Aug 13,, 04:39
And the IA knows the strategy very well and came up with effective countermeasures.

lol... I think he was being sarcastic.

Deltacamelately
29 Aug 13,, 05:11
Your nation should have studied Indian history, the other Indians....
Umm...valid though. Your nation is significantly different, culturally atleast.

Easy, take significant Indian territory in the West... say Armistar. :)
Very cute.

Doktor
29 Aug 13,, 06:17
Major,

I'm thinking Battle of Changsha (1942) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Changsha_%281942%29)

A good, but not a great General, and an army nowhere close to the calibre of the British Indian Army manage to inflict a devastating defeat onto the IJA.

Essentially, Dhaka is the bait. As the Indian Army advances, it meets and pushes aside Pakistani divisions though it may seem a total collapse as the road to Dhaka are blasted open one division at a time. Dhaka itself would be fortified to the hilt signalling a Pakistani intent to do or die there, something the InA would expect to see.

As the InA engages in that do or die battle with every confidence of winning that battle, those Pakistani divisions that were pushed aside would start their true battle against the InA rear areas.

The key to this is that the InA must be convinced that they have destroyed the blocking Pakistani divisions and that the main Pakistani effort is at Dhaka. As you can see Major, the vital point is the deception, not the actual combat power.

Col,

IA had troops numbers outmatch PA, unlike the Japanese and what about InAF? They had clear skies.

Tronic
29 Aug 13,, 08:13
More importantly, India had superior intelligence in EP, thanks to the locals who were greeting the Indian forces as liberators, as opposed to the IJA in Changsha. The PA was facing a hostile local militia and difficult terrain. I don't think the PA would have been able to surround three Indian Corps with only 3 Divisions.

Firestorm
29 Aug 13,, 08:15
Tronic, the blunders made by senior officers from both the IA and PA are understandable to an extent. The higher defense staff from both sides had all been commissioned in the BIA which was basically an infantry force for all practical purposes. There was very little institutional experience of large scale armored or combined arms warfare. There were individual senior officers who were bright spots of course and the bravery of the soldiers and junior officers was beyond question, but overall, the inexperience showed.

The mistakes were even more glaring in 1965 - the performance of the respective 1st armored divisions of both sides for example. I guess there was really no other way for either army to learn.

Officer of Engineers
29 Aug 13,, 10:48
IA had troops numbers outmatch PA, unlike the Japanese and what about InAF? They had clear skies.The Japanese had better air superiority than the Indians had over the Pakistanis.


More importantly, India had superior intelligence in EP, thanks to the locals who were greeting the Indian forces as liberators, as opposed to the IJA in Changsha. The PA was facing a hostile local militia and difficult terrain. I don't think the PA would have been able to surround three Indian Corps with only 3 Divisions.Think you guys are missing the big picture.

You have an enemy division in your rear area.

I also think you've missed the main point. To win this fight, the Pakistanis cannot rely on combat power. They have to rely on deception.

Firestorm
29 Aug 13,, 22:15
I also think you've missed the main point. To win this fight, the Pakistanis cannot rely on combat power. They have to rely on deception.
How do they carry out the deception when every town and village is teeming with separatists who immediately report any PA troop movements to the IA or Indian intelligence? It was pretty much impossible for them to keep anything secret in EP and surprise the IA.

Officer of Engineers
29 Aug 13,, 22:37
How do they carry out the deception when every town and village is teeming with separatists who immediately report any PA troop movements to the IA or Indian intelligence? It was pretty much impossible for them to keep anything secret in EP and surprise the IA.You don't. You create confusion so that every report going into the InA HQ makes zero sense. Meanwhile, the main prize, Dhaka, is ready and waiting.

You present a picture that the InA expects to see and wants to see, that of Dhaka waiting for battle, while all the other confusing pictures, would tend to get ignored because they don't make sense.

The other term for the Fog of War is information overload.

Mihais
29 Aug 13,, 23:29
More importantly, India had superior intelligence in EP, thanks to the locals who were greeting the Indian forces as liberators, as opposed to the IJA in Changsha. The PA was facing a hostile local militia and difficult terrain. I don't think the PA would have been able to surround three Indian Corps with only 3 Divisions.

You don't engage 3 corps at once,you defeat them in detail.Starting with the Indians East of Dhaka.Those in the N are a bit farther away,while the rivers,distance and some delaying actions can keep everything W of Dhaka out of action long enough.

The Pakistani plan repeats an old mistake.Confuses politics with operational art.They dispersed in order to prevent the Indians to capture land,establish a rebel government there and wait for the mighty UN.Given the force ratio and the wide extent of territory,the allies,inevitably,will get a patch of land.They also rely on the main army in West Pakistan to win the war,then,of course,wait for the mighty UN.Which really doesn't solves their problem in E. Pakistan at all.They still have to beat the IA or the MB there.
The minute details are impossible to know/predict.A lot (most actually)depends on the actual terrain and local infrastructure,that don't show on google maps ;)

Tronic
02 Sep 13,, 02:06
Think you guys are missing the big picture.

You have an enemy division in your rear area.

I also think you've missed the main point. To win this fight, the Pakistanis cannot rely on combat power. They have to rely on deception.


You don't engage 3 corps at once,you defeat them in detail.Starting with the Indians East of Dhaka.Those in the N are a bit farther away,while the rivers,distance and some delaying actions can keep everything W of Dhaka out of action long enough.

The Pakistani plan repeats an old mistake.Confuses politics with operational art.They dispersed in order to prevent the Indians to capture land,establish a rebel government there and wait for the mighty UN.Given the force ratio and the wide extent of territory,the allies,inevitably,will get a patch of land.They also rely on the main army in West Pakistan to win the war,then,of course,wait for the mighty UN.Which really doesn't solves their problem in E. Pakistan at all.They still have to beat the IA or the MB there.
The minute details are impossible to know/predict.A lot (most actually)depends on the actual terrain and local infrastructure,that don't show on google maps ;)

I've been thinking this over and while I can envision these maneuvers on the Western front in the plains of Punjab or the Thar desert; Bangladesh still makes these type of maneuvers quite difficult, to say the least. One has to understand the topography of the country. Bangladesh is one of the wettest countries in the world; with 60 major rivers intersecting the country, with about 800 smaller tributaries. It is composed of the world's largest river delta, and the entire country's soil is made up by silt carried by these rivers.

Here's a river map of the country:

http://img825.imageshack.us/img825/7463/g5qw.gif

And some pics:

http://img801.imageshack.us/img801/536/fq81.jpg
http://img832.imageshack.us/img832/7273/37hh.png
http://img844.imageshack.us/img844/5667/xunt.png
http://img843.imageshack.us/img843/6814/f25o.png

Majority of the country sits under water most of the year. A very difficult place to maneuver armour. IA's thrust towards Dhaka followed thin, traversable routes. I guess the PA could've maneuvered to cut off supply lines, but moving out of it's own fortifications would mean PA would also bleed dry of it's supplies, and unlike the IA, could not be replenished by air or sea.

Officer of Engineers
02 Sep 13,, 02:22
Good Heavens, give me a marsh buggie and I'll stop an entire corps cold.

Crocodylus
02 Sep 13,, 03:00
Reminds me of what a war in the Florida Everglades or the Brazilian Pantanal would be like. Rivercraft and seaplanes would be important. As well, troop movements during the summer monsoon would be difficult at best. And let's not get started with the myriad of tropical diseases that would occur. I can see why the Americans did not like fighting in Vietnam.

Mihais
02 Sep 13,, 13:41
I've been thinking this over and while I can envision these maneuvers on the Western front in the plains of Punjab or the Thar desert; Bangladesh still makes these type of maneuvers quite difficult, to say the least. One has to understand the topography of the country. Bangladesh is one of the wettest countries in the world; with 60 major rivers intersecting the country, with about 800 smaller tributaries. It is composed of the world's largest river delta, and the entire country's soil is made up by silt carried by these rivers.

Here's a river map of the country:

Majority of the country sits under water most of the year. A very difficult place to maneuver armour. IA's thrust towards Dhaka followed thin, traversable routes. I guess the PA could've maneuvered to cut off supply lines, but moving out of it's own fortifications would mean PA would also bleed dry of it's supplies, and unlike the IA, could not be replenished by air or sea.

A prepared defender could dance around a heavy column.It's like Finland 1939,only instead of snow and skis you have rain and zodiac boats.The Indian air power is even less relevant against such a dispersed opposition.

zraver
03 Sep 13,, 05:53
ahh hem.... errr Arnheim. Before the introduction of effective long range man portable ATGM's that would be a nightmare to attack with armor. During the wet season a few tanks could stop any advance. It would be Market Garden all over again. Yet the Pakistanis had only light armor in country. I'm guessing because of bridge weight concerns.

Officer of Engineers
03 Sep 13,, 16:57
I was just thinking an indisputable superior position on the Pakistani side but if the intent is to inflict intolerable casualties, then I suggest the Battle of the Schelt as the model.

Firestorm
03 Sep 13,, 21:52
Correct me if I'm wrong but even in the battle of the Scheldt the Germans had numerical superiority or at least parity with the Canadians. They weren't defending against overwhelming odds like the pakistanis in the east. All this talk about tactical victories and inflicting casualties is more appropriate for the western front, where the Pakistanis had the required forces to effectively challenge the IA and didn't have to worry about Indian spies in every nook and cranny. They could have achieved a lot more on the western front and indeed that was their whole plan. Niazi's army in the east was little more than a token force if you look at the overall size of the PA. They were counting on the fact that the Indian people would never accept losing Indian territory for the sake of Bangladesh. A decent amount of territory captured on the western front and their job was done. The IA's gains in the east could be easily nullified. It was their western forces who failed miserably. The eastern ones who were just playing to the script ended up shouldering all the blame because all the important people in the PA were commanding in the west.

Mihais
03 Sep 13,, 22:47
Hindsight is always 20/20,but that doesn't excuse the PA.How about a proper concept on their part.The Western force prepares to capture land,while the Eastern force prepares to defeat the IA.It might not work well,but failing to plan is planning to fail.

The Colonel's point is not about numbers,but concept of operations.My guess is the initial question,regarding the possibilities of PA has been answered.Like in any war,there were many solutions.And like in any war,it's not over just because it starts under unfavourable odds.
Still a brilliant victory for the IA,who managed to read the enemy.

Officer of Engineers
04 Sep 13,, 00:24
Correct me if I'm wrong but even in the battle of the Scheldt the Germans had numerical superiority or at least parity with the Canadians.The Germans didn't know that Montgomery were only going to send the Canadians but even if Montgomery sent the entire American expeditionary force, the casualties would have been the same. You either fight up narrow walk ways or your equipment and wet uniforms are going to drag you to the bottom of flooded plains.


They weren't defending against overwhelming odds like the pakistanis in the east.The answer to overwhelming numbers have always been terrain and from the photos, this is an engineers defensive dreams. I have to flood, not build up, which leaves narrow axis of attacks, aka kill zones.


The eastern ones who were just playing to the script ended up shouldering all the blame because all the important people in the PA were commanding in the west.Poor Generals, poor planning. East Pakistan didn't even buy time for West Pakistan to recover from their failures.

Blademaster
04 Sep 13,, 01:34
OOE, the IA conducted the entire campaign like in 10 days. IA planned for speed because they did not want to give the eastern army time to build up defenses against IA's axises of attack. IA's axises of attack were kept secret until the first couple days of war.

Tronic
04 Sep 13,, 01:38
Colonel, the Pakistanis need not have looked that far. '65 war, Battle of Asal Uttar. A Pakistani armoured force, consisting of about six Armoured Brigades backed by an Inf Division, launched an attack in Punjab and took the IA by surprise (which was outnumbered by about 2:1). The IA simply broke the irrigation canals, flooded the plains, and had a field day, picking out and destroying bogged down Pakistani armour. That battle completely changed the momentum of that war; prior to which the Pakistanis seemed to have had the upper hand.

So in EP, it is without a doubt that the Pakistanis lost the plot very early. The original IA plan actually took this into account and envisioned the invasion to be carried out over a period of one month. That the IA rolled into Dhaka in less than 14 days goes to show the speed at which the PA capitulated, due to lack of proper planning and leadership. Once the IA brushed aside the Pakistani Brigades, the terrain advantage in EP would become their disadvantage, providing they still had the will to fight.

Tronic
04 Sep 13,, 01:41
OOE, the IA conducted the entire campaign like in 10 days. IA planned for speed because they did not want to give the eastern army time to build up defenses against IA's axises of attack. IA's axises of attack were kept secret until the first couple days of war.

The Pakistanis were already anticipating war for quite some time. They carried out a preemptive strike, Operation Chengiz Khan.

Officer of Engineers
04 Sep 13,, 02:01
Oh, don't get me wrong. It was a brilliant operation no matter how you look at it. They caught the enemy unprepared and they kept the enemy unprepared. Do recall what I said that you present a picture to the enemy that they expect to see. The Pakistanis saw what they wanted to see until it was too late.

But the Major's question was what can you do to defeat or impose an intolerable situation onto the InA. It's a sandbox exercise. The Major wanted me to be in the Pakistani shoes and show him what I would do. Mihais and I presented 3 battles that could be models for a Pakistani defence.

Now, you see the Major rushing off to study these battles and in his mind, contigencies are already rushing through his head on how to counter ... and there are counters, there always are.

It's a fun little exercise, nothing more. Put yourself in the Pakistani shoes and come up with a plan. After all, this is a "what if?"

lemontree
04 Sep 13,, 12:42
The answer to overwhelming numbers have always been terrain and from the photos, this is an engineers defensive dreams. I have to flood, not build up, which leaves narrow axis of attacks, aka kill zones.

Sir, please don't go by the photos of flooded paddy fields in post #201.
The war was planned for winters by Fd Marshal SAM Manekshaw, for the following reasons:-
- Ensure no Chinese support as the passes would be blocked with snow.
- The argo harvest would have taken place in India's bread basket - Punjab, and troops would not have to worry about destroying standing crops.
- The ground in East Pakistan would be firm enough for using armour and cross country advance. The terrain was not water bogged, and the only obstacles were the rivers. To maintain momentum PT-76 amphibious tanks were used to cross them and launch attacks on enemy defended positions. East Pakistan was not tank country hence armour deployment was not much.

Actual images of the ground conditions during the war:-

http://indrus.in/assets/images/2011-101112/big/AP-war-468(1).jpg

http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_Y9-xi5n9m3E/SryYpBg7UoI/AAAAAAAACgo/Zh6AoVbXiic/s640/T-55_tanks_in_the_Bangladesh_Liberation_War.jpg

Below: Navarang in Bangladesh during war on December 12, 1971.
http://www.timescontent.com/photos/preview/117782/India-Pakistan-War.jpg

Blademaster
04 Sep 13,, 13:57
The Pakistanis were already anticipating war for quite some time. They carried out a preemptive strike, Operation Chengiz Khan.

Yes still they did not know the IA's plan of attacking axises. IA took PA attacks into contigency and made sure that the PA attacks would not derail their planned attacks.

Mihais
04 Sep 13,, 14:39
Nobody KNOWS nothing before,during and a bit of time after a war.Multiple COA's need to be planned.
The ground being dry during the invasion doesn't fundamentally alter the situation.the IA still has to conduct numerous river crossings,the PA can still conduct delaying ops along secondary axis and concentrate against a selected target.Indian HUMINT superiority can be turned with some skill to work in the PA's favor. With a well crafted disinformation plan,put into action at the moment of the decisive maneuver.
Here's an idea.You take a real platoon,you create mockup btn and march this force with much beating of drums and severe ''security measures''. You count on many of these units and you also plan the particular peculiarity of the subcontinent to create RUMINT.
An adaptation of the use of decoys by Rommel in Africa :redface:

Officer of Engineers
04 Sep 13,, 17:02
Yes still they did not know the IA's plan of attacking axises. IA took PA attacks into contigency and made sure that the PA attacks would not derail their planned attacks.Hitesh, the Major gave you a thought exercise. Here's a challenge. You're the Pakistani General, you've just figured out the Indian attack (generally, not specifics) within 10 days of the attack. What do you do?

There is so much fun you can have with this. Go at it. If it makes you feel any better. You're the Venusian General and you've just figured out the Martian plan of attack, what do you do?

Blademaster
04 Sep 13,, 17:21
OK given the terrain and the weather at the time which meant dry conditions and fair weather, and taking into account of the hostile population which means I can only rely on my own troops and being surrounded by all 3 sides and getting no support from the sea, I would create a staggered defense like Gen Zhukov did in the Battle of Kursk but on a lesser scale given the limited manpower available due to the alienation of the local populace. The goal is not to stop them but to string the IA units along giving the PA a chance for a counteroffensive strike and encirclement and cutting the IA off from its main LOC and pound the IA units with artillery.

I am no military man but given the crisscrossing of rivers, I would use the strategy of entrapment and encirclement if feasible and pick off the supply units. Once the supplies have been cut off, the IA units become sitting ducks and become bogged down, thus dragging out the war and forcing the IA to the table. Sort like Finland scenario with USSR before WWII.

Officer of Engineers
04 Sep 13,, 17:41
You Indian gents would know better than me but what is the Pakistani qualities of Majors, LCols, and Cols? Hitesh, your plan basically boils down to splitting the Pakistani Army into battalions and companies and giving each their own AOs. Actually somewhat ingenius. No one big battle but forcing the InA to stop and fight a lot of small battles which takes time and co-ordination ... and slows down the entire advance. You need to mass a battalion to take on a company which in turns slows down the brigade and you need the brigade to take on the battalion which in turns slows down the division.

Blademaster
04 Sep 13,, 20:09
You Indian gents would know better than me but what is the Pakistani qualities of Majors, LCols, and Cols? Hitesh, your plan basically boils down to splitting the Pakistani Army into battalions and companies and giving each their own AOs. Actually somewhat ingenius. No one big battle but forcing the InA to stop and fight a lot of small battles which takes time and co-ordination ... and slows down the entire advance. You need to mass a battalion to take on a company which in turns slows down the brigade and you need the brigade to take on the battalion which in turns slows down the division.

You don't need to break the entire IA corps but just the front line units and some secondary units as to create, like a for better or worse analogy, a backlog traffic jam. The front units of IA would waste valuable time trying to sort out and create a coherent line of attack and the back units of the IA would be waiting for the front units to move forward thereby stretching the war more than 14 days perhaps into a couple months which would give US and China some ample time to apply necessary pressure and give the western PA army some time and opportunity to seize some Indian land. When you said coordination and time problems for IA, it also applies to PA because some PA units would be cut off as well and they need to know how to make an orderly retreat and make the IA pay in blood for each inch given.

I do not know about the quality of the PA lower echelon commanders but I surmise not that well just because there is no real advanced warfare school program that the PA has. PA has to send its officers overseas if they are to have any chance of becoming a higher commander. That, in itself, tells me that there is not much independence or creative thinking on the part of Majors and LCols because the lessons would not be applied at that point of their careers. Only when they go overseas for advanced warfare training do they get exposed to creative and independent thinking.

I may be totally wrong and blowing smoke from my ass but that is my best educated guess, albeit a non-versed/non military man.

Tronic
05 Sep 13,, 03:00
Sir, please don't go by the photos of flooded paddy fields in post #201.
The war was planned for winters by Fd Marshal SAM Manekshaw, for the following reasons:-
- Ensure no Chinese support as the passes would be blocked with snow.
- The argo harvest would have taken place in India's bread basket - Punjab, and troops would not have to worry about destroying standing crops.
- The ground in East Pakistan would be firm enough for using armour and cross country advance. The terrain was not water bogged, and the only obstacles were the rivers. To maintain momentum PT-76 amphibious tanks were used to cross them and launch attacks on enemy defended positions. East Pakistan was not tank country hence armour deployment was not much.

Actual images of the ground conditions during the war:-

LT, addressing the two bolded points;

-In Punjab, the only "flat" month for the fields is in October. By November, winter crops such as wheat and barley are planted which are harvested around April during the 'Rabi' harvest. So December would have standing crops.

-There are two ways to make low-lying EP water bogged; Wait for monsoons or bust open the canals and divert water from the countless rivers. The Pakistanis could have easily made EP look like those pics had they planned their defences accordingly. They didn't.

Tronic
05 Sep 13,, 04:08
You Indian gents would know better than me but what is the Pakistani qualities of Majors, LCols, and Cols?

Sir, theoretically, since the origins of both armies are the same, you'd expect the make of men on both sides of the border to also be somewhat the same.

That said, there may have been a cultural rift developed in the past six decades. The Pakistanis don't seem too open to acknowledging defeat. The '65 stalemate is celebrated in Pakistan as a great Pakistani victory. While post-'71, books written by their officers show that even some Pakistani commanders on the Western front were kept under the false illusion that Pak was winning the war in the East. Furthermore, Pak military circles solely blame the loss of East Pakistan on either Bhutto or on the "Bengali betrayal". If you don't admit to your failures, you won't learn from your mistakes. Now, I don't know if this same culture has plagued their military institutions, but I have doubts on the calibre of Pakistan's higher echelon, gauging by the Kargil conflict. A half baked operation where the Pakistani plan relied on having the Americans step in before the IA retaliated.. The basics of the plan were not bad, but they went in without any contingencies.

Firestorm
05 Sep 13,, 04:46
There's no reason to doubt the skill and quality of their junior and mid-level officers. There will be exceptions but that is true for all armies. Their basic officer training programs should also be similar to those of the IA due to the shared heritage, albeit with a large dose of Islamic chauvinism thrown in (which leads to statements like 1 Pakistani soldier = 10 Indians by Ayub Khan being taken seriously).
It is the higher defense staff where things get murky. The appointments there (especially in the Army) tend to be made on the basis of a lot more than seniority and merit. A guy like Musharraf could have never climbed to the level of COAS otherwise.

lemontree
05 Sep 13,, 05:52
LT, addressing the two bolded points;

-In Punjab, the only "flat" month for the fields is in October. By November, winter crops such as wheat and barley are planted which are harvested around April during the 'Rabi' harvest. So December would have standing crops.
In ordinary circumstances you are right, but in 1971, our troops were in forward locations by October-November 1971, and civilians in Punjab were already being moved to rear areas. So no new crop was sowed (in the East the war had already started by 19 November).


-There are two ways to make low-lying EP water bogged; Wait for monsoons or bust open the canals and divert water from the countless rivers. The Pakistanis could have easily made EP look like those pics had they planned their defences accordingly. They didn't.
(a) In Bangladesh, there were no canals to speak off, there are three main rivers Ganges, Jamuna (Bhramaputra) and Meghna and about 793 tributaries.
(b) In December you cannot breach the rivers to floor areas - and if you can, it may or may not affect the advance of the InA.
(c) The advance by InA was at a very high level of momentum - for example, my battalion which was the van guard for 101 Communication Zone, completed over 250 kms advance on foot from 8th Dec to 14th Dec, when they reached the out skirts of Dhaka, after fighting battles along the way. They entered East Pakistan from the north towards Jamalpur - Madhupur - Tangail - Dhaka (linked up with 2 Para on the bridge 11th Dec) and moved towards Dhaka.
(d) They were just side stepping any strongly defended location and moving towards Dhaka.

Having the enemy in your rear areas is very, very unnerving, this caused a big psychological collapse within the Pak Eastern Command, that is why a 24,000 strong garrison in Dhaka surrendered to a brigade (101 Communication Zone).

lemontree
05 Sep 13,, 06:05
You Indian gents would know better than me but what is the Pakistani qualities of Majors, LCols, and Cols?....

Sir, the majority of Pakistani officers are well educated and well trained, but some where down the line they seemed to have alienated themselves from the troops - the feudal lord system - may be a reason. But a majority of their officers so not rub shoulders with their men, baring a few exceptions. This was evident in 1971 and even when I was serving on the LOC.


Actually somewhat ingenius. No one big battle but forcing the InA to stop and fight a lot of small battles which takes time and co-ordination ... and slows down the entire advance.
You are right sir, but that is why we (my bn and bde) avoided all the strongly defended localities and raced towards Dhaka. All minor opposition was overrun and stronge points were avoided. The enemy did not manuever out of their strong points for fear of the Mukti Bhaini.

Firestorm
05 Sep 13,, 06:14
Having the enemy in your rear areas is very, very unnerving, this caused a big psychological collapse within the Pak Eastern Command, that is why a 24,000 strong garrison in Dhaka surrendered to a brigade (101 Communication Zone).
Wasn't it unnerving for the IA as well? They had sidestepped all the strong points as you say. How could they be sure that fear of the Mukti Bahini enough would ensure that the PA did not counter-attack in the rear areas?

lemontree
05 Sep 13,, 09:50
Wasn't it unnerving for the IA as well?
It must have been, anything can happen in war.


They had sidestepped all the strong points as you say. How could they be sure that fear of the Mukti Bahini enough would ensure that the PA did not counter-attack in the rear areas?
When you hear that the enemy has overrun all your forward postions and is in your rear, all communications are out, no supplies are coming in, no air support, you are being shelled and straffed - and the enemy has already made contact with your troops. What do you do? - you either fight or surrender. The same was done by most Pak units.

The Mukti Bahini, was also made up of regular East Pakistani bengali units, these units were also used for fients and harassing operations.

Officer of Engineers
05 Sep 13,, 11:51
Wasn't it unnerving for the IA as well? They had sidestepped all the strong points as you say. How could they be sure that fear of the Mukti Bahini enough would ensure that the PA did not counter-attack in the rear areas?The difference is that the InA knew where the Pakistanis were. The reverse is not true.

Blademaster
05 Sep 13,, 14:56
You are right sir, but that is why we (my bn and bde) avoided all the strongly defended localities and raced towards Dhaka. All minor opposition was overrun and stronge points were avoided. The enemy did not manuever out of their strong points for fear of the Mukti Bhaini.

Basically the IA caught the PA in their OODA loop and the PA became paralyzed with fear and it led to hunkering down and totally ceded the momentum to IA.

So, Captain, if you were in PA's shoes, how would you overcome that initial paralyzing fear?

Officer of Engineers
05 Sep 13,, 15:39
So, Captain, if you were in PA's shoes, how would you overcome that initial paralyzing fear?Leadership.

I recently saw a movie that exhumes this quality. When you're being overran and all your comrades say retreat, the leader is the one who stood and fight

Assembly (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aNIiBy_Z2Ag)

Yes, it's a Commie Chinese Army piece but it nevertheless details battlefield leadership both in and out of battle.

Mihais
05 Sep 13,, 15:48
The Battle of Hilli (http://www.defencejournal.com/oct99/battle-hilli.htm)

This piece seems to confirm some of our assertions.

Blademaster
05 Sep 13,, 15:54
Leadership.

I recently saw a movie that exhumes this quality. When you're being overran and all your comrades say retreat, the leader is the one who stood and fight.

I am not saying giving up the fight but I am talking about staying where you are and hunker down and resist because that is the easiest way to overcome that chaos and paralyzing fear. But when you do that, you totally give up the offensive momentum and you are now forever reacting as opposed to acting first. How do you overcome that?

Officer of Engineers
05 Sep 13,, 16:00
When the enemy is attacking, it means they want your position. You are denying that position to them. You are being pro-active.

Officer of Engineers
05 Sep 13,, 16:03
A fascinating thread to read as a civilian.

Was wondering if this method would work.
You have a corps ordered to advance on certain axes, it in turn assigns divisions to particular routes, the division parcels out brigades to accomplish this and in the end this boils down to a recon company actually moving down a particular road.
All the PA needs to do is block with a battalion, cut up the recon units so that the parent unit has to stop, concentrate, feel out the position, put in an attack and then get moving after this again.
This stop go stop go should eat up a lot of time.Major,

See what you've done? You got their brains to start working.

Bolo, you are describing the Reconnaisance Battle. It's a very crucial piece of any tactical engagement. You may not win the reccee battle but you cannot lose it. If you don't win, make sure it's a tie, otherwise, get the hell out of there.

Mihais
05 Sep 13,, 16:41
I am not saying giving up the fight but I am talking about staying where you are and hunker down and resist because that is the easiest way to overcome that chaos and paralyzing fear. But when you do that, you totally give up the offensive momentum and you are now forever reacting as opposed to acting first. How do you overcome that?

Nope.Tactically,defense is the more powerfull form of combat.Psychologically the attack is easier.Uraaaa,we're going to rip your guts!!You don't have time to think.You move,take cover,move again.Ignore the wounded,don't even look at them,that's what medics are for.
Being on the defense is being on the receiving the end of the crazy bastards coming for you.Before that you're the target of their effort to shape the battlefield.Meaning you get bombed,your comms are jamed etc...

Blademaster
06 Sep 13,, 01:10
How much time given the limited manpower would it take the PA to do what I suggested in my earlier post?

Blademaster
06 Sep 13,, 02:43
Major, where are you? Time to put in your opinion. Don't hold out on us.

notorious_eagle
06 Sep 13,, 02:54
You Indian gents would know better than me but what is the Pakistani qualities of Majors, LCols, and Cols?

Sir

Whats the point?

The General Staff was rotten to the core. The COAS and other Senior Generals instead of fulfilling their professional duties were busy having orgies in their harems. CNS who was drunk in a meeting with his Officers remarked, "What a lovely bonfire", after the IAF knocked out fuel depots in Manora. Incompetent Officers whom wouldn't have made past the rank of Major were promoted to Senior Positions during the 50's due to massive shortage of Officers. Officers whom were competent were sidelined to accommodate Officers who only knew how to say 'Yes Sir'. Mid and Junior Level Officers fought to the best of their abilities, but this war was lost even before the first shot was fired.

'Lions led by Lambs'.

notorious_eagle
06 Sep 13,, 03:05
some where down the line they seemed to have alienated themselves from the troops - the feudal lord system - may be a reason. But a majority of their officers so not rub shoulders with their men, baring a few exceptions. This was evident in 1971 and even when I was serving on the LOC.

Sir

This is not true. Officers from Day 1 in PMA are taught to work together with the Jawans and operate as one entity. In fact, newly commissioned Officers have to spend 6 months to a year sharing quarters with Jawans. It is not at all uncommon for Officers to visit the Quarters of Jawans and ensure that they have adequate arrangements. During the operations in Swat and SW, 1 and 2 Star Officers lead from the front sharing quarters and meals together with the troops. Corps Commanders, GOC's and even the COAS regularly visit the troops on the front line to keep their morale up. Those Officers with a British mindset have long retired. In fact, the current COAS Kayani has worked very hard in implementing a program to improve the living standards of Regular Jawans and improve the Synergy that exists between Officers and Regular Troops.

Officer of Engineers
06 Sep 13,, 03:41
Whats the point?NE, this is a "what if?" To explore the viability of a suggestion, I ask whether the company and battalion level officers can do the job independently, not necessarily a do or die, but effectively giving battle, including surrender, if only to force the front lines to stand guard (and thus reduce their effectiveness) and reduce the speed of their advance.

There are a lot of theories being tossed around, which are viable and which are still borne, I don't know. Certainly, the von Manstein style of battle could not be accomplished without a von Manstein style of leader but what about others?

lemontree
06 Sep 13,, 05:05
Sir

This is not true. Officers from Day 1 in PMA are taught to work together with the Jawans and operate as one entity. In fact, newly commissioned Officers have to spend 6 months to a year sharing quarters with Jawans. It is not at all uncommon for Officers to visit the Quarters of Jawans and ensure that they have adequate arrangements. During the operations in Swat and SW, 1 and 2 Star Officers lead from the front sharing quarters and meals together with the troops. Corps Commanders, GOC's and even the COAS regularly visit the troops on the front line to keep their morale up.

NE,
I take your word for it, since you would know better. My comments were on observations made by my father during his experience in 1971 in Khula-Jessore sector and my experience on the LOC.

Many captured PA JCOs and NCOs in 1971, were very critical of their officers, when they saw the behaviour or InA officers towards them and their own men.

My own experience - none of the PA forward posts had officers opposite my battalion (we had two of your battalions facing us), they stayed in the comfort of the Coy HQs at the rear. This makes a very bif difference.
Maybe they had a shortage of officiers, but then so did we.


Those Officers with a British mindset have long retired.
The British standard is what is followed by us.

Blademaster
06 Sep 13,, 05:09
Lemontree,

Has there been any changes to the British standard, i.e., indianizing and making it your own standards?

Officer of Engineers
06 Sep 13,, 05:30
Has there been any changes to the British standard, i.e., indianizing and making it your own standards?There have to be, if for no other reason than the standards of living and retirement packages have changed.

If you mean battle qualifications, I offer you the mindset of General KJ Sundarji, who has no equivalent in Western armies (ok, I'm a self admitted fan of the General).

Blademaster
06 Sep 13,, 05:46
There have to be, if for no other reason than the standards of living and retirement packages have changed.

If you mean battle qualifications, I offer you the mindset of General KJ Sundarji, who has no equivalent in Western armies (ok, I'm a self admitted fan of the General).

I mean in concepts of warfare on strategic level and on tactical level and low level leadership training.

lemontree
06 Sep 13,, 05:48
Lemontree,

Has there been any changes to the British standard, i.e., indianizing and making it your own standards?
Very little especially in the fight units, we follow the traditions that have been handed over to us over the past 300 years.

Example, religion - The officers follow the religion of the troops, irrespective of his own faith and beliefs. Officiers will visit the unit temple/gurudwara/mosque/church for collective prayers on Tuesday/Sunday/Friday (as the case may be).

The only indianization permitted (in some units) was to remove the tie (many still consider it a sacrilage to remove it) on ordinary week days for bachelor officers who lived in the officers mess, and to allow dark rum to be served in the officers mess too.

Raising of mixed units like the Brigade of Guards, Paras/ SF etc have been some of the Indianization efforts.

Our text books for troops are not in the devnagri script, but still in roman hindi (hindi in english alphabets).

lemontree
06 Sep 13,, 05:50
I mean in concepts of warfare on strategic level and on tactical level and low level leadership training.

Not really, we learn from our own medivial wars, and the western world.s modern concepts.
Best practices from all over the world are picked up and implimented if it suits us.

Blademaster
06 Sep 13,, 06:09
Very little especially in the fight units, we follow the traditions that have been handed over to us over the past 300 years.

Example, religion - The officers follow the religion of the troops, irrespective of his own faith and beliefs. Officiers will visit the unit temple/gurudwara/mosque/church for collective prayers on Tuesday/Sunday/Friday (as the case may be).

The only indianization permitted (in some units) was to remove the tie (many still consider it a sacrilage to remove it) on ordinary week days for bachelor officers who lived in the officers mess, and to allow dark rum to be served in the officers mess too.

Raising of mixed units like the Brigade of Guards, Paras/ SF etc have been some of the Indianization efforts.

Our text books for troops are not in the devnagri script, but still in roman hindi (hindi in english alphabets).

Why the strong adherence to British practices when British was a symbol of colonialism and occupation?

Firestorm
06 Sep 13,, 06:34
Since we are discussing India-Pakistan wars, this article deserves to be read. It was written by K. Subrahmanyam, one of India's best known Strategic Affairs Analysts. He passed away in 2011. The article is from 2005.

Guilty Gen of ’65 (http://www.indianexpress.com/oldStory/72455/)



In 1965 I was deputy secretary (budget and planning) in the Ministry of Defence. It was a Sunday evening in June, shortly after the Rann of Kutch clashes. I was returning from a visit to one of the Sainik Schools — I was the honorary secretary of the Sainik Schools society — when I met M.M. Hooja, then joint director of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), at Delhi’s Palam airport.

I had known Hooja in my earlier post as deputy secretary (joint intelligence organisation) and member of the Joint Intelligence Committee. He offered to drop me home and, in the car, told me IB had intelligence that Pakistan had raised a second armoured division by cheating the Americans. Though the army had been told, it had refused to accept this.

I asked him to communicate this in writing to enable me to bring it to the defence minister’s notice. The next morning I received a top-secret letter from K. Sankaran Nair, deputy-director, IB.

The defence secretary, P.V.R. Rao, was on four months leave. The secretary-in-charge was a new man, A.D. Pandit. I handed over the letter to H.C. Sarin, secretary (defence production), who enjoyed the confidence of the defence minister, Y.B. Chavan. He gave it to the minister for discussion in his daily morning meeting.

When the minister raised the issue, the army chief, General J.N. Chaudhuri argued, according to what Sarin told me, that IB was exaggerating and unable to produce credible evidence. Due to this casual attitude of the army chief, Pakistan was able to spring the surprise of 1st Armoured Division at Khemkaran and 6th Armoured Division at Sialkot.

That the Indian armoured brigade, under Brigadier T.K. Theogaraj, destroyed the Pakistani armoured division reflects to the credit of officers and men of the army, their guts, valour and skills. They had the full support of their corps commander, General J.S. Dhillon, and their army commander, General Harbaksh Singh.

Even for taking a stand at Khemkaran, General Chaudhuri had to be overruled by defence minister Chavan and the prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri. the army chief preferred withdrawal to the Beas river. The details may be found in R.D. Pradhan’s bFrom Debacle to Revival. Pradhan was Chavan’s private secretary upto end 1964 and was brought back during the war. Subsequently, he had access to Chavan’s diaries.

Earlier that year, General Chaudhuri had obtained cabinet orders to reduce our medium tank regiments from 11 down to four and increase the light tank regiments from four to 11. He carried this reorganisation through in spite of opposition from professional subordinates.

The Pentagon simulated a ‘game’ in March 1965, according to which Pakistan attacked India on September 1, 1966, and captured Srinagar, with Shastri unable to counter-attack. In reality, Pakistan attacked on September 1, 1965, and Shastri hit back very hard If Pakistanis had not been in such a hurry and had struck a year later with their two divisions of armour, India would have been in real trouble. After the war, General Chaudhuri not only had to abandon his plans for armour reorganisation, but ask the government to hastily import six regiments of medium armour — three T-54 regiments from Czechoslovakia and three T-55 regiments from the USSR.

General Chaudhuri, as was disclosed by Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal in a later lecture, did not keep the Indian Air Force (IAF) informed of his intending operation in the Lahore sector. The IAF was caught off-guard and incurred avoidable losses of aircraft, including newly-arrived MIG-21s.

The Indian Army was surprised by the Pakistani armour’s sudden appearance through the various aqueducts under the Ichogil canal. This intelligence about the aqueducts was available well in advance, since construction plans of the canal, including the aqueducts, were obtained from the World Bank by IB and provided to the army.

Shekhar Gupta (‘‘1965 in 2005’’, National Interest, June 4, 2005) was not wrong in calling the war one of mutual incompetence. It so happens both Ayub Khan and General Chaudhuri were in the same batch at Sandhurst.

TWO months before the war, in my planning branch, undersecretary I.C. Bansal did elaborate research on the US budgetary documents and calulated American military aid to Pakistan totalled slightly below $ 900 million. When this was put up to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, they (particularly the army chief) rejected the study. In their view, the aid should have been several billions of dollars.

We costed the equipment and facilities and argued it could not be very much more. But it was to no avail. Subsequently it was proved our calculations in the planning branch were not very much off the mark.

So on the one hand General Chaudhuri refused to accept the existence of the second Pakistani armoured division. But at the same time he had an exaggerated view of US aid to Pakistan.

Having negotiated with the Americans on aid for six Indian mountain divisions, we were aware US policy was to provide only six weeks’ war wastage of ammunition at US rates, which were lower than our rates, to aid-receiving countries. On September 2, 1965, through a top-secret telegram, I sought information from S. Guhan, my cadremate and at that time first secretary in our Washington embassy, to check through contacts in the Pentagon what was the ammunition supply rate to Pakistan.

Gohar Ayub Khan’s story of a stolen war plan is probably bogus. But 40 years on, the first full-fledged India-Pakistan war is still a very real presence for many Within a few days Guhan confirmed my assumption and a copy of the top-secret telegram went to General Chaudhuri also. He congratulated me for the information. Indeed, Gohar Ayub Khan has referred to Pakistan suffering from ammunition shortage within a few days of the war beginning.

India had some 90 days war wastage reserves. After the war ended, it was found only eight to 10 per cent of the tank and artillery ammunition had been spent. We had to cancel an order to Yugoslavia for a million rounds of L-70 anti-aircraft ammunition. The order had been placed during the operations.

If the war had been continued for another week, Pakistan would have been forced to surrender. Unfortunately General Chaudhuri advised the prime minister to accept the UN ceasefire proposal since he felt both sides were running out of ammunition. This was far from true for India.

Let me come to some major intelligence failures, even though we were not aware of them at the time. According to an article by Altaf Gauhar — in 1965, the alter ego of President Ayub Khan — in Nation on October 3, 1999, Brigadier Ayub Awan, director of the Pakistani Intelligence Bureau, travelled to Saudi Arabia in early 1965. He contacted Sheikh Abdullah in Jeddah and told him about Operation Gibraltar. Later however, President Ayub decided against taking Sheikh Abdullah’s help.

This version was confirmed by the then CIA operative in Madras (now Chennai), Duane Claridge, who was deputed to meet Sheikh Abdullah and told by him of the coming war. US authorities had, therefore, full knowledge about Operation Gibraltar and Pakistani plans to use American equipment against India as early as March 1965, but chose not to warn India.

This information is available in Claridge’s book A Man for All Seasons. Claridge rose high in the CIA and became deputy director. He was convicted during the Reagan presidency in the Iran-Contra affair, but pardoned.

Pakistan was suffering from an ammunition shortage within days of the war starting. India had 90 days of war wastage reserves. If the war had continued for another week, Pakistan would have been forced to surrender. But India agreed to a UN ceasefire Following all this, the Institute of Defence Analysis (IDA) in the Pentagon simulated a politico-strategic game with Harvard University. According to this game, ‘‘played’’ in March 1965, India lost the war with Pakistan and had to accept US mediation on Kashmir, after losing Srinagar. Though Shastri was advised in the game to counterattack, he was timid and refused.

The verbatim proceedings of this game were published in March 1965 by Doubleday and available in US bookshops. The book was titled Crisis Game, ascribed to author Sidney Giffin.

But our intelligence, civil and military, did not have a clue. In 1967, I picked up a second-hand copy on the pavement outside the London School of Economics. One wonders how much this book influenced President Ayub in initiating Operation Gibraltar.

Strangely enough, in the book Pakistan attacks India on September 1, 1966. In reality it happened on September 1, 1965.

Till today, the valour and skills of the officers and men of that armoured brigade commanded by Brigadier Theogaraj and the roles of Generals Harbaksh and Dhillon in defying General Chaudhuri have not received their due credit.

One American academic — an assistant secretary of state in the Kennedy administration who played a prominent role in preventing India getting combat equipment — ruefully told me that on the eve of the 1965 war he was planning to write a book on ‘the war that changed the fate of the subcontinent’.

Thanks to the valour and tactical skills of those men who confronted the Pakistani Pattons at Asal Uttar, he could never write that book.

I don't know what possessed Gen. Chaudhuri to simply ignore the Intelligence Bureau's information that Pakistan was raising a second Armored division, or for that matter his proposal to withdraw behind the Beas river. His other errors are equally if not more egregious.

The part about "Crisis Game" is quite interesting as well.

lemontree
06 Sep 13,, 08:02
Why the strong adherence to British practices when British was a symbol of colonialism and occupation?

Those practices made them a world power so it would'nt do any harm to follow them.
These militray tradtions build a cohesive fighting unit - nothing wrong in them.

Adopt best practices and dump what has out lived its usefullness.

Officer of Engineers
06 Sep 13,, 08:23
Adopt best practices and dump what has out lived its usefullness.Explain bagpipes.