As They Ponder the Future
Zafar Hilaly
Friday, November 30, 2012
The writer is a former ambassador.
An unusual quiet descended on the normally animated and frazzled Pakistan-US relationship over for the past few weeks. The absence of hard talk and cancelled visits; complaints of the US withholding payments due (CSF) or pledged (Kerry-Lugar), and snubs, jibes and whatever else countries say or do to make known their ire was a welcome change from the earlier goings-on.
And the foreign minister took pride in personally conveying the good news that all was well with the relationship after “a fairly difficult patch.” In fact, she said, with the “resumption of intelligence and military contacts” relations were on an “upward trajectory” – so much so that the US and Pakistan were close to evolving “common positions” on Afghanistan.
Of course, all that is so much make-believe. Serious differences, on not only how the war should be pursued but to what end, remain very evident. And much of the damage done over the past year or two is, frankly, irreparable.
For example, the army will never quite be able to reconcile with the murder of our soldiers at Salala and the disgraceful American reaction that followed. No doubt, the Americans feel the same about the killing of US embassy personnel in Kabul, allegedly by the Haqqanis, in which Washington confidently accuses Pakistan of being involved. And, of course, prior to that there were other deeply wounding events, like Abbottabad and Raymond Davis, the pall of which lingers over relations.
Presently, what has got Ms Khar excited is that both sides seem to have tacitly agreed that differences should be set aside because the Afghan war is entering a decisive phase and it is in their mutual interest to get along.
Of course, it is always in Pakistan’s interest to get along with the US, and almost at any cost. Naturally, the compulsion for the US is far less, but having overdone the coercive diplomacy bit and discovering that ramped-up drone attacks and snarling and growling at Pakistan had not worked, the crassly inept Obama administration finds it has no option except to bend a little in our direction to enlist our cooperation to get out of the Afghan mess.
It’s basically a bit like what happened in the 1980s when, in order to give the Russian bear a drubbing, Washington found it convenient not to remember that Pakistan had an ambitious and ongoing nuclear-weapons programme. Of course, after the Soviets left, it lost no time in strenuously objecting to our nuclear programme and slapped sanctions on Pakistan. In all probability, history will repeat itself post-2014.
In fact, only a few days before Ms Khar gave us her rosy view of US-Pakistan relations, further evidence of the animus the Obama lot have for Pakistan was on display in Defence Secretary Panetta’s speech at the Centre for a New American Security in Washington.
When asked about the chances of America prevailing in Afghanistan. Panetta replied, “Success in Afghanistan is dependent on having a Pakistan that is willing to confront terrorism on their side of the border and prevent safe havens.”
Why on earth Pakistan should consider America’s enemies as its own when, in fact, seldom has either country considered the other’s enemy, or for that matter friend, as its own, is puzzling. And today, too, Pakistanis view the Haqqanis not as terrorists but Afghan nationalists fighting to be rid of American occupation, and rightly consider it a folly to take them on merely to please America.
Besides, if the Afghan Taliban, of which the Haqqanis are a leading element, are terrorists, why does America want to engage with them? And why do American envoys praise Pakistan for releasing a number of detained Afghan Taliban if they are “terrorists,” especially after having disparaged our policy of “good” and “bad” Taliban?
As for Panetta’s belief, also expressed in his speech at the American Centre, that America would by now have “completed its job” of eliminating the Taliban but for the safe havens in Pakistan, that’s even more absurd. There are no safe havens in the west, north and east of Afghanistan and yet Taliban activity has picked up. Nor near Kabul, which is nearly 200 kilometres from the Pakistani border, and where Taliban attacks are most frequent and intense.
Far better, then, that Panetta should heed his own advice and “focus on developing a force in Afghanistan that’s able to provide security and can establish operational capability to confront threats on the Afghan side of the border.” And, as he also said in his speech, “have a regime in Kabul that can govern itself, that can move away from the corruption, that can, in fact, have the capability to provide the kind of governance that you need in order to truly secure that country and govern that country for the future,” although, frankly, that is not remotely on the cards at present.
What Panetta did not touch on in his speech at the American Centre was what would happen if American forces were to hang on in Afghanistan after 2014, as they intend to – without any sort of an agreement with the other parties of the current conflict or Afghanistan’s neighbours, as also seems likely. That’s going to prove yet another cause for intense friction in the region.
American analysts Kimberly and Frederick Kagan, in a closely argued article, ‘Why US troops must stay in Afghanistan’, have fired the first salvo in what, I suspect, will be a fierce new debate between those, like India, who want America to retain a sizable presence in Afghanistan, and others, like Pakistan and Iran, who would be happier with a nominal American presence at best, although the US outing itself lock, stock and barrel is by far the preferred option.
Contending that for America to leave without retaining the option of conducting counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan would be irresponsible; the Kagans believe that America will have to retain 68,000 troops, at the very least, in Afghanistan after 2014. Failure to do so, they say, would render American bases and troops vulnerable and make America “irrelevant” in the fight against Al-Qaeda. They conclude: “We must either stabilise Afghanistan at this minimum level or abandon the fight against Al-Qaeda and its allies in South Asia. Any alternative light footprint strategy is a dangerous mirage.”
Actually, the contrary is probably true, because an American presence will not only foreclose the possibility of any agreement with the Afghan Taliban but also guarantee the continuation of an unwinnable war; enhance the prospects of a revival of Taliban-Al-Qaeda ties, as the Taliban traditionally welcome anyone wanting to help them in jihad, and to further destabilise Pakistan. The fact is that America can no more stabilise Afghanistan by hanging on there than anyone can stabilise a blob of mercury while riding a merry-go-round.
The better option for America, although it is one on which the window is fast closing, is to take advantage of the current Pakistani regime’s eagerness to preserve the American alliance – frayed and battered as it is. This is so because no future government, even if by some miracle it is another Zardari-led coalition, will be as well disposed to the US. In other words, no Pakistani government can withstand the haemorrhaging of its popularity by supporting a large US presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014, and thereby prolonging a war now considered the fount of all of Pakistan’s woes.
As they ponder the future, it would help if Panetta and his kind stopped blaming Pakistan for America’s failure in Afghanistan. Their mistake was to believe Petraeus, a phoney general who led them deeper into a phoney war.
Email: [email protected]
As they ponder the future - Zafar Hilaly
===========
I am just as skeptical as ZH about any lasting cooperation between Pakistan and the US post 2014, but recent events such as the US finally taking a clear and official position on the status of the Durand Line, the release of Taliban prisoners and the news today that Pakistan is considering releasing more Taliban prisioners (Pak agrees to release more Taliban - thenews.com.pk) do appear to bolster Khar's comments that cooperation with the US, if not the actual US-Pakistan relationship, is improving.
What positions/opinions do the members have on the size and scope of the US presence in Afghanistan post 2014, both in terms of what it will actually end up being and what it should ideally be?
Zafar Hilaly
Friday, November 30, 2012
The writer is a former ambassador.
An unusual quiet descended on the normally animated and frazzled Pakistan-US relationship over for the past few weeks. The absence of hard talk and cancelled visits; complaints of the US withholding payments due (CSF) or pledged (Kerry-Lugar), and snubs, jibes and whatever else countries say or do to make known their ire was a welcome change from the earlier goings-on.
And the foreign minister took pride in personally conveying the good news that all was well with the relationship after “a fairly difficult patch.” In fact, she said, with the “resumption of intelligence and military contacts” relations were on an “upward trajectory” – so much so that the US and Pakistan were close to evolving “common positions” on Afghanistan.
Of course, all that is so much make-believe. Serious differences, on not only how the war should be pursued but to what end, remain very evident. And much of the damage done over the past year or two is, frankly, irreparable.
For example, the army will never quite be able to reconcile with the murder of our soldiers at Salala and the disgraceful American reaction that followed. No doubt, the Americans feel the same about the killing of US embassy personnel in Kabul, allegedly by the Haqqanis, in which Washington confidently accuses Pakistan of being involved. And, of course, prior to that there were other deeply wounding events, like Abbottabad and Raymond Davis, the pall of which lingers over relations.
Presently, what has got Ms Khar excited is that both sides seem to have tacitly agreed that differences should be set aside because the Afghan war is entering a decisive phase and it is in their mutual interest to get along.
Of course, it is always in Pakistan’s interest to get along with the US, and almost at any cost. Naturally, the compulsion for the US is far less, but having overdone the coercive diplomacy bit and discovering that ramped-up drone attacks and snarling and growling at Pakistan had not worked, the crassly inept Obama administration finds it has no option except to bend a little in our direction to enlist our cooperation to get out of the Afghan mess.
It’s basically a bit like what happened in the 1980s when, in order to give the Russian bear a drubbing, Washington found it convenient not to remember that Pakistan had an ambitious and ongoing nuclear-weapons programme. Of course, after the Soviets left, it lost no time in strenuously objecting to our nuclear programme and slapped sanctions on Pakistan. In all probability, history will repeat itself post-2014.
In fact, only a few days before Ms Khar gave us her rosy view of US-Pakistan relations, further evidence of the animus the Obama lot have for Pakistan was on display in Defence Secretary Panetta’s speech at the Centre for a New American Security in Washington.
When asked about the chances of America prevailing in Afghanistan. Panetta replied, “Success in Afghanistan is dependent on having a Pakistan that is willing to confront terrorism on their side of the border and prevent safe havens.”
Why on earth Pakistan should consider America’s enemies as its own when, in fact, seldom has either country considered the other’s enemy, or for that matter friend, as its own, is puzzling. And today, too, Pakistanis view the Haqqanis not as terrorists but Afghan nationalists fighting to be rid of American occupation, and rightly consider it a folly to take them on merely to please America.
Besides, if the Afghan Taliban, of which the Haqqanis are a leading element, are terrorists, why does America want to engage with them? And why do American envoys praise Pakistan for releasing a number of detained Afghan Taliban if they are “terrorists,” especially after having disparaged our policy of “good” and “bad” Taliban?
As for Panetta’s belief, also expressed in his speech at the American Centre, that America would by now have “completed its job” of eliminating the Taliban but for the safe havens in Pakistan, that’s even more absurd. There are no safe havens in the west, north and east of Afghanistan and yet Taliban activity has picked up. Nor near Kabul, which is nearly 200 kilometres from the Pakistani border, and where Taliban attacks are most frequent and intense.
Far better, then, that Panetta should heed his own advice and “focus on developing a force in Afghanistan that’s able to provide security and can establish operational capability to confront threats on the Afghan side of the border.” And, as he also said in his speech, “have a regime in Kabul that can govern itself, that can move away from the corruption, that can, in fact, have the capability to provide the kind of governance that you need in order to truly secure that country and govern that country for the future,” although, frankly, that is not remotely on the cards at present.
What Panetta did not touch on in his speech at the American Centre was what would happen if American forces were to hang on in Afghanistan after 2014, as they intend to – without any sort of an agreement with the other parties of the current conflict or Afghanistan’s neighbours, as also seems likely. That’s going to prove yet another cause for intense friction in the region.
American analysts Kimberly and Frederick Kagan, in a closely argued article, ‘Why US troops must stay in Afghanistan’, have fired the first salvo in what, I suspect, will be a fierce new debate between those, like India, who want America to retain a sizable presence in Afghanistan, and others, like Pakistan and Iran, who would be happier with a nominal American presence at best, although the US outing itself lock, stock and barrel is by far the preferred option.
Contending that for America to leave without retaining the option of conducting counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan would be irresponsible; the Kagans believe that America will have to retain 68,000 troops, at the very least, in Afghanistan after 2014. Failure to do so, they say, would render American bases and troops vulnerable and make America “irrelevant” in the fight against Al-Qaeda. They conclude: “We must either stabilise Afghanistan at this minimum level or abandon the fight against Al-Qaeda and its allies in South Asia. Any alternative light footprint strategy is a dangerous mirage.”
Actually, the contrary is probably true, because an American presence will not only foreclose the possibility of any agreement with the Afghan Taliban but also guarantee the continuation of an unwinnable war; enhance the prospects of a revival of Taliban-Al-Qaeda ties, as the Taliban traditionally welcome anyone wanting to help them in jihad, and to further destabilise Pakistan. The fact is that America can no more stabilise Afghanistan by hanging on there than anyone can stabilise a blob of mercury while riding a merry-go-round.
The better option for America, although it is one on which the window is fast closing, is to take advantage of the current Pakistani regime’s eagerness to preserve the American alliance – frayed and battered as it is. This is so because no future government, even if by some miracle it is another Zardari-led coalition, will be as well disposed to the US. In other words, no Pakistani government can withstand the haemorrhaging of its popularity by supporting a large US presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014, and thereby prolonging a war now considered the fount of all of Pakistan’s woes.
As they ponder the future, it would help if Panetta and his kind stopped blaming Pakistan for America’s failure in Afghanistan. Their mistake was to believe Petraeus, a phoney general who led them deeper into a phoney war.
Email: [email protected]
As they ponder the future - Zafar Hilaly
===========
I am just as skeptical as ZH about any lasting cooperation between Pakistan and the US post 2014, but recent events such as the US finally taking a clear and official position on the status of the Durand Line, the release of Taliban prisoners and the news today that Pakistan is considering releasing more Taliban prisioners (Pak agrees to release more Taliban - thenews.com.pk) do appear to bolster Khar's comments that cooperation with the US, if not the actual US-Pakistan relationship, is improving.
What positions/opinions do the members have on the size and scope of the US presence in Afghanistan post 2014, both in terms of what it will actually end up being and what it should ideally be?
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