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gunnut
11 Nov 11,, 02:43
Was this even a remote possibility?



The US would have neutralized Canadian contribution to the British war effort.

The US might have swayed Japan to exit the war, if not switch sides.

The Royal Navy would certainly have contained the US Navy in the Atlantic, but at what cost?

Kaiserliche Marine might have achieved local parity, or even superiority with a portion of the Royal Navy busy fighting the US Navy.

Most importantly, there would not be nearly 5 million doughboys fighting on the western front against Germany.

Parihaka
11 Nov 11,, 02:57
Then you'd all be speaking Canuck

S2
11 Nov 11,, 03:43
and eating Canadian bacon.

Which is o.k. That'd be pretty good.:biggrin:

BD1
11 Nov 11,, 06:09
but after the war Die Europa-Union would be run smoothly and efficiently, if a little boringly, unlike now

Stitch
11 Nov 11,, 06:32
I can't see the US entering WWI on the side of the Central Powers (the Triple Alliance), but I CAN see the US NOT entering the War at all, and letting the Eurpean powers slug it out on their own. There were too many historical & natural ties between the US and the Western European powers for us to consider siding with the Central/Eastern European Powers, but we could conceivably have stayed out of the War altogether, and let Europe immolate herself. Isolationism wasn't quite as prevalent then as it was pre-WWII in the US, but it was close; the US didn't really have a compelling reason to enter WWI, besides the fact that it was bad for business to NOT enter the War (most of our overseas economic markets, at that time, were in Europe). IMHO, if the US HADN'T entered WWI, the German border would've been REALLY close to Paris, and they would've kept Poland and Austria-Hungary after the War; maybe then WWII wouldn't have happened?

1979
11 Nov 11,, 08:53
but after the war Die Europa-Union would be run smoothly and efficiently, if a little boringly, unlike now
:biggrin:
yes but britain would be part of it, and more important would they use the same curency?

zraver
11 Nov 11,, 10:50
I can't see the US entering WWI on the side of the Central Powers (the Triple Alliance), but I CAN see the US NOT entering the War at all, and letting the Eurpean powers slug it out on their own. There were too many historical & natural ties between the US and the Western European powers for us to consider siding with the Central/Eastern European Powers, but we could conceivably have stayed out of the War altogether, and let Europe immolate herself. Isolationism wasn't quite as prevalent then as it was pre-WWII in the US, but it was close; the US didn't really have a compelling reason to enter WWI, besides the fact that it was bad for business to NOT enter the War (most of our overseas economic markets, at that time, were in Europe). IMHO, if the US HADN'T entered WWI, the German border would've been REALLY close to Paris, and they would've kept Poland and Austria-Hungary after the War; maybe then WWII wouldn't have happened?

For the sake of argument, lets say British predation on American shipping plus the voice of the sizable and vocal German immigrant community at least gets Wilson to take a true nuetral approach... The loss of financing through New York alone means the allies lose the war... In 1932 when the UK stoppedmaking payments the amount owed in 2011 dollars was 225 billion...

No loans means no Kansas wheat, Bethlemhelm Steel, Du Pont, southern cotton, Texas oil.... No support for Czarist Russia (England borrowed from the US to buy Russia supplies) so Russia falls early...

Doktor
11 Nov 11,, 11:11
For the sake of argument, lets say British predation on American shipping plus the voice of the sizable and vocal German immigrant community at least gets Wilson to take a true nuetral approach... The loss of financing through New York alone means the allies lose the war... In 1932 when the UK stoppedmaking payments the amount owed in 2011 dollars was 225 billion...

No loans means no Kansas wheat, Bethlemhelm Steel, Du Pont, southern cotton, Texas oil.... No support for Czarist Russia (England borrowed from the US to buy Russia supplies) so Russia falls early...

Are we talking the same war? Russia collapsed early.

Albany Rifles
11 Nov 11,, 17:08
I think he means earlier.

All of this could have happened....but if the Germans handled the rest of their hack handed diplomacy as thye actually did, the Zimmerman Telegram would still have been sent and then it would still have been game over.

Once the US became an imperial power there was no way for the US to stay out of WW 1 on the margins at first and then in for the shooting match. We had too much to lose by staying out and not being present at the dividing opf the spoils of influence afterward. Being in the war gave us freedom to influence the Pacific for the rest of the century.

USSWisconsin
11 Nov 11,, 19:57
How would those 5 million doughboys get to Europe? - with the RN sinking their transports. And then there's the war with Canada back home...

snapper
11 Nov 11,, 20:09
Certainly the war goes on longer. I think Germany still cannot win without achieving naval supremecy; even if France falls the UK remains. So a second Jutland would be needed with a clear German victory would be needed in the European theatre and this is improbable.

It would also depend on what the US did: Presumably Canada as a European commitment would, as Pari says, leave them open to Imperial Canadian attack and the at least temporary loss of some regions.

Presuming then that a US strategy would focus on Canada it would down to which side could resolve either theatre in order to support their allies in the other theatre.

For the US this would depend on finishing Canadian effective resistance as quickly as possible, which is unlikely, and then commiting to the European war, which again relies on at least temporary sea control for an effective supply of any troops. Also should France not be knocked out the war and the RN be undefeated it is unclear where US troops might land to support Germany. Too many 'ifs' here for me to bet on.

For the UK and France the defeat of Germany would become paramount to be able to send aid to Canada. You'd probably more tank thinking and early stage production and alot more gas on what would then be the 'Eastern Front'. Essentialy though all Britain and France have to do is maintain naval supremacy and not collapse, as long as some resistance continues in Canada the US can be dealt with AFTER Germany collapses.

In short I think no difference of outcome, barring a fast Canadian collapse.

YellowFever
11 Nov 11,, 20:20
Celine would've been born an American and we wouldn't have a reason to hate Canada as much...

gunnut
11 Nov 11,, 21:13
Celine would've been born an American and we wouldn't have a reason to hate Canada as much...

And the colonel wouldn't have to cross the border just to watch Celine in Vegas...:biggrin:

YellowFever
11 Nov 11,, 21:18
And the colonel wouldn't have to cross the border just to watch Celine in Vegas...:biggrin:

And we would have another Asian Redneck amongst our rank. :biggrin:

I swear, Colonel......Gunnut made me say that! :eek:

Doktor
11 Nov 11,, 21:23
Yello, have you qualified for a redneck title yet?

YellowFever
11 Nov 11,, 21:33
Ummm...no. :frown:

snipe is playing hard to get.

Just what the hell do I have to do?

Go to some boonies somewhere and shoot high velocity automatic rifle with the guy, or what? :mad:

zraver
11 Nov 11,, 22:14
Certainly the war goes on longer. I think Germany still cannot win without achieving naval supremecy; even if France falls the UK remains. So a second Jutland would be needed with a clear German victory would be needed in the European theatre and this is improbable.

Naval supremecy doesn't need a Jutland, unrestricted submarine warfare with friendly American ports for the U-boats will work just as well. Without American credit, merchant marine and industry the UK and France are in ahorrible bind... France still produces too much by workshop, and the Uk is maxed out and neither can afford the loss of manpower in the trenches- which Haig is steadily adding up.

If Russia falls in the spring of 1916 for example... the Germans given an identical treaty will have half a million fresh troops to send west and the Austro-Hungarian Empire gets a breather and can concentrate on Italy which is the mini-Russia of the West.

snapper
11 Nov 11,, 23:05
Naval supremecy doesn't need a Jutland, unrestricted submarine warfare with friendly American ports for the U-boats will work just as well. Without American credit, merchant marine and industry the UK and France are in ahorrible bind... France still produces too much by workshop, and the Uk is maxed out and neither can afford the loss of manpower in the trenches- which Haig is steadily adding up.

If Russia falls in the spring of 1916 for example... the Germans given an identical treaty will have half a million fresh troops to send west and the Austro-Hungarian Empire gets a breather and can concentrate on Italy which is the mini-Russia of the West.

Economicaly the US would be in a terrible bind also as their export markets are closed by the sea lanes. Whether by boat or by surface fleet naval supremecy remains the key for US/Germany. Britain/France have only to maintain this to win long term, US/Germany has to achieve it for either to support the other.

DOR
12 Nov 11,, 03:31
:biggrin:
yes but britain would be part of it, and more important would they use the same curency?

The euro developed out of the European Union, which was an economic response to the Cold War. If there was no second war in Europe, there might not be a reason for the EEC, EU and eventually euro.

Officer of Engineers
12 Nov 11,, 05:31
Then you'd all be speaking CanuckSomehow, the thought that Celine Dion would be borned American is extremely satisfying.

1979
12 Nov 11,, 08:49
The euro developed out of the European Union, which was an economic response to the Cold War. If there was no second war in Europe, there might not be a reason for the EEC, EU and eventually euro.

there would still be a cold war between a german dominated
Europäische Union and a russian dominated Soviet Union.

Mihais
12 Nov 11,, 17:26
Naval supremecy doesn't need a Jutland, unrestricted submarine warfare with friendly American ports for the U-boats will work just as well. Without American credit, merchant marine and industry the UK and France are in ahorrible bind... France still produces too much by workshop, and the Uk is maxed out and neither can afford the loss of manpower in the trenches- which Haig is steadily adding up.

If Russia falls in the spring of 1916 for example... the Germans given an identical treaty will have half a million fresh troops to send west and the Austro-Hungarian Empire gets a breather and can concentrate on Italy which is the mini-Russia of the West.

Russia falling in 1916 is definetely a possibility if the Germans continue to focus in the East,like in 1915.For a start,there's no Verdun,nor Romanian entry in the war on the Entente side,no Brusilov Offensive(this was the real back breaker for A-H ).With Russia gone,the Ottomans and the Germans have a free ride on Suez as well and there's no chance for the Entente to defeat the Ottomans in the ME.
The blockade ceases to be a real factor with Russian resources and it was hunger that caused the fall of the home front in 1918.With or without Americans,the Germans win the war.
With US neutral,the Germans also win the war.Worst case,they don't lose it,as well as the peace.

We'd probably have a fascist France as a result:biggrin:

zraver
12 Nov 11,, 19:49
Economicaly the US would be in a terrible bind also as their export markets are closed by the sea lanes. Whether by boat or by surface fleet naval supremecy remains the key for US/Germany. Britain/France have only to maintain this to win long term, US/Germany has to achieve it for either to support the other.

Under normal circumstances i'd agree with you, but your forgetting Haig. You can only win a seige (and thats what a blockade is) if at the end you have enough troops to accept the surrender... If Germany can knock Russia out in 15 or 16 and then Italy then the blockade becomes pointless. In real history Germany didn't have enough time to make use of the Ukrainian wheat, give them another year and they will. Knock Italy out of the war and turn the Adriatic into a central powers lake and the Allied posistion in Greece becomes untenable, which turn opens up the Bosphorus to ship said Ukrainian wheat to Europe via the Black Sea and Adriatic...

snapper
13 Nov 11,, 15:37
Let us say Russia gone by early 1916; armistace or watever. How far has Germany penetrated into Ukraine? My guess is NOT to ports and probably only what is now 'western ukraine' (Lwow - Smolensk line). Presumably with armistice they then leave these areas. IF 'Greater Russia' then disintegrates into civil war you can forget Ukrainian wheat exports. Your line of reasoning relies on a. converting a stable Russia/Ukraine into a trade partner and b. doing the same with Italy or fighting all the way down to southern Italian ports c. barring the Greek ports to the RN. Even then you would need a local supremecy in the Med. In the time you have before Central Powers collapse internaly without converting Russia/Ukraine, Greece and Italy into psedo-allies it's not do-able. To fight your way to such a position shortens the time until collapse becomes inevitable.

Mihais
13 Nov 11,, 21:35
Food this early is not so important.Relieving A-H army to deal with Italy,while the whole German army could be deployed in the west is good enough.

snapper
13 Nov 11,, 23:50
Point is breaking the blockade.

Mihais
14 Nov 11,, 00:05
Even that is not needed. Germany knocks the Rusian army out of the war,turns west and does the same with France then finally sorts the Russian civil war.With a victorious Germany,there's no way the civil war goes as bad in Russia as it happened historically.RN can be avoided.

zraver
14 Nov 11,, 02:08
Let us say Russia gone by early 1916; armistace or watever. How far has Germany penetrated into Ukraine? My guess is NOT to ports and probably only what is now 'western ukraine' (Lwow - Smolensk line). Presumably with armistice they then leave these areas. IF 'Greater Russia' then disintegrates into civil war you can forget Ukrainian wheat exports.

Was thinking a treaty similar to that signed at Brest-Livtosk which among other things gave the Ukraine its independence. However, since the Bolsheviks are not yet nearly powerful enough and I think Lenin is still in Finland in 16- grain exports are a good substitute for Ukrainian independence. But food is secondary to pressure.


Your line of reasoning relies on a. converting a stable Russia/Ukraine into a trade partner and b. doing the same with Italy or fighting all the way down to southern Italian ports c. barring the Greek ports to the RN. Even then you would need a local supremecy in the Med.

No my line of reasoning is based on relieving pressure. A- Knock russia out of the war so Germany and the AH empire can each fight a one front war. B- As happened at the Battle of Caporetto where for one offensive (to the let the AH Empire get a breather) after knocking Russia out of the war, Germany attacked Italy. This battle is where Rommel won his Blue Max. The offensive shattered the Italians and had the Germans been in it to win it and had a years less embargo on their supplies they could have chased the Italians all the way to the Mincio River where 11 British and French divisions waited... The Italians lost- 11,000 killed, 20,000 wounded and 265,000 taken prisoner and 350,000 deserters the Italian army was a hairs breadth away from ceasing to exist.....

Italy doesn't need to be occupied, just knocked out of the war. Without Russia and Italy in the fight its France and the United Kingdom vs Germany, Austria-Hungary and the ottoman Empire. That is 143 million central powers souls vs about 106 million (not counting colonials) for the Ente. With the Central Powers on the defensive and generally on the best ground that is a tall order...

Once the pressure on te AH Empire and Ottomans is releived France and the UK have a serious problem on the Western Front. After Verdun until 1918 the Germans simply sat still and let Haig and his French flavor of the month counter-part impale their men on German wire. Nothing change here except now the limited German supplies only have to go to one front plus good reserves of men and material can be built up. Remember even with the blockade and after two failed crops (Turnip Winter 1916/17 and the record cold of 1917/18) Germany still had enough supplies to launch 4-5 major offensive efforts in the Spring. So if this gets moved up even a year- the allies have few tanks, they don't dominate the air, they are outnumbered and the French army is nearing collapse. For the British, DLG is still minister of armaments, Asquith is PM and Kitchener is still feeding Haig bodies as fast as the German guns can eat them.


In the time you have before Central Powers collapse internaly without converting Russia/Ukraine, Greece and Italy into psedo-allies it's not do-able. To fight your way to such a position shortens the time until collapse becomes inevitable.[/QUOTE]

1979
14 Nov 11,, 11:41
The blockade ceases to be a real factor with Russian resources and it was hunger that caused the fall of the home front in 1918.

Without the comunists in charge whats the reasoning behind a treaty similar to B-L ?

zraver
14 Nov 11,, 20:40
Without the comunists in charge whats the reasoning behind a treaty similar to B-L ?

To keep the communist from being in charge. If Russia gets knocked out early the core problem for the Czar is keeping Russia free of Germans. He may allow the Ukraine to be at east partially occupied- and will likely cede some land to the Ottomans and AH as well. But there are all minor compared to keeping the Germans out of Russia. More likely however will be exports of grains to Germany rather than territory.

cape_royds
15 Nov 11,, 06:19
If the Republican Party had not suffered from an open split in 1912, then Theodore Roosevelt would probably have won the 1912 election. Instead Taft and Roosevelt split the Republican vote, which enabled Wilson to win.

TR was an early example of what would later be called an "Atlanticist." He was outspokenly pro-Entente, and would have tried to take the USA into the war on their side as early as possible. I don't know whether he would have succeeded in doing so, since he would have needed Congress to declare war.

There was never even the least possibility of the USA favouring the Central Powers, regardless of which political faction prevailed in Washington. Why:

1. The Entente were big customers. The USA did more business with the British Empire and its semi-autonomous dominions than with all of continental Europe. So why would the US gov't do anything that might undermine that trade relationship?

2. The UK and USA had already reached a pretty sound mutual understanding of their respective spheres of interest. In the years preceding the Great War, the UK had appeased the USA on every geopolitical question in the Western Hemisphere, from the Panama Canal to the Alaska Panhandle. So why would the USA do anything to undermine the geopolitical status quo in Europe? Now sure, a German hegemony in Europe might not have any ambitions overseas, but why take the risk, esp. when you already have good relations with Britain?

Therefore, even early in the war, the USA had little interest in a victory for the Central Powers.

It is true that certain ethnic groups in the USA tended to be anti-Entente for various reasons (e.g. Germans, Irish, Poles, etc.) But popular sentiments in the USA regarding the war were complex. There was still a traditional francophilia. There was traditional Yankee anglophobia. There were millions of recent British immigrants, too. It's all back and forth, depending on which group one examines. Overall the effect was to make neutrality the easiest political choice.

At any rate, reagardless of who wins, the war itself would weaken all those damned fool Europeans without any need for the USA to stick its neck out. Why not just wait and watch?

By later in the war, however, the USA had developed a strong interest in an Entente victory, because by that time American financiers had lent so much money to the British, that the only chance of avoiding a banking collapse and depression was to make sure that the Entente prevailed. There are limits to how much a neutral country can profit from a war without badly distorting its own internal economy, but there were no economists or politicians at that time in the USA, or anywhere else, who understood the limits of a mercantilist approach under such circumstances.

Indirectly the financial community thus played a role in dragging the USA into the Great War. The later popular revulsion at this was why the US gov't later passed laws forbidding arms sales or loans to belligerent nations (those "neutrality laws" eventually would pose serious problems of their own).

Of course, the USA never did collect much, at least in real terms, on most of those war loans in the end. Instead, the 1920's were a decade of "extend-and-pretend," causing a credit bubble and eventual market crash both in the USA and abroad. But at its height of sophistication in the mid to late 1920's, the USA loaned money to the Germans so that the Germans could pay reparations to the French, who could then repay the British so that the British could repay to the Americans the money everyone had all borrowed in order to blow people up.

zraver
15 Nov 11,, 06:57
There was never even the least possibility of the USA favouring the Central Powers, regardless of which political faction prevailed in Washington. Why:....

You are aware that the closest the US and UK have been to war since the Treaty of Ghent was march 1915 right? Had the US Sec State Bryan or Forgien Sec Sir Edward Grey misstepped the politely heated cables between Washington ad London could have spiraled out of control. The US was getting increasingly pissed off at the UK for violating the law of the seas- laws the UK was by and large responsible for. Laws America had adopted and which the UK now ignored seizing numerous American vessels and cargoes in violation of said laws. In the last six months of 1914 the UK seized 45 American ships bound for European neutrals and placed 8 of the ships and all of the cargoes in prize court.

if those numbers were a little bit higher say 10% of ships sailing.. the economic damage beign done may well have pushed the US into the central powers camp.

U.S. Protests Against Maritime Warfare - World War I Document Archive (http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/U.S._Protests_Against_Maritime_Warfare)

1979
15 Nov 11,, 07:24
To keep the communist from being in charge. If Russia gets knocked out early the core problem for the Czar is keeping Russia free of Germans. He may allow the Ukraine to be at east partially occupied- and will likely cede some land to the Ottomans and AH as well. But there are all minor compared to keeping the Germans out of Russia. More likely however will be exports of grains to Germany rather than territory.

If he had any grain to give, with close to 20 % of the male population mobilized
and little agricutural machinery i'm assuming he was pretty short of it himself.

zraver
15 Nov 11,, 10:29
If he had any grain to give, with close to 20 % of the male population mobilized
and little agricutural machinery i'm assuming he was pretty short of it himself.

The US State Department estimated the 1916 wheat crop was 595 million bushels (20+ million tons), Russia's central statistical committee estimated just under 16 million tons of wheat. Given an estimated consumption of 150lbs of wheat per person per annum, that leaves from 3.5 million tons to 7.5 million ton for export using 1914 population figures. Or enough bread to feed between 46.6 million and 100 million people for a year...

Mihais
15 Nov 11,, 11:18
Don't see whats the fixation with Russian grain.Germany needed in 1916 men and time.Russia out gives them both.There's also no reason for a B-L style treaty.For obvious reasons,harshness is not an option.
Also,if Russia is out,the rest won't wait for the full onslaught,but start negociations.That's at least the likely COA.Germany still dominates Europe at the end.

snapper
15 Nov 11,, 14:20
Was thinking a treaty similar to that signed at Brest-Livtosk which among other things gave the Ukraine its independence. However, since the Bolsheviks are not yet nearly powerful enough and I think Lenin is still in Finland in 16- grain exports are a good substitute for Ukrainian independence. But food is secondary to pressure.



No my line of reasoning is based on relieving pressure. A- Knock russia out of the war so Germany and the AH empire can each fight a one front war. B- As happened at the Battle of Caporetto where for one offensive (to the let the AH Empire get a breather) after knocking Russia out of the war, Germany attacked Italy. This battle is where Rommel won his Blue Max. The offensive shattered the Italians and had the Germans been in it to win it and had a years less embargo on their supplies they could have chased the Italians all the way to the Mincio River where 11 British and French divisions waited... The Italians lost- 11,000 killed, 20,000 wounded and 265,000 taken prisoner and 350,000 deserters the Italian army was a hairs breadth away from ceasing to exist.....

Italy doesn't need to be occupied, just knocked out of the war. Without Russia and Italy in the fight its France and the United Kingdom vs Germany, Austria-Hungary and the ottoman Empire. That is 143 million central powers souls vs about 106 million (not counting colonials) for the Ente. With the Central Powers on the defensive and generally on the best ground that is a tall order...

Once the pressure on te AH Empire and Ottomans is releived France and the UK have a serious problem on the Western Front. After Verdun until 1918 the Germans simply sat still and let Haig and his French flavor of the month counter-part impale their men on German wire. Nothing change here except now the limited German supplies only have to go to one front plus good reserves of men and material can be built up. Remember even with the blockade and after two failed crops (Turnip Winter 1916/17 and the record cold of 1917/18) Germany still had enough supplies to launch 4-5 major offensive efforts in the Spring. So if this gets moved up even a year- the allies have few tanks, they don't dominate the air, they are outnumbered and the French army is nearing collapse. For the British, DLG is still minister of armaments, Asquith is PM and Kitchener is still feeding Haig bodies as fast as the German guns can eat them.


In the time you have before Central Powers collapse internaly without converting Russia/Ukraine, Greece and Italy into psedo-allies it's not do-able. To fight your way to such a position shortens the time until collapse becomes inevitable.[/QUOTE]

With all due respect this is different arguement from the one you first suggested:


Under normal circumstances i'd agree with you, but your forgetting Haig. You can only win a seige (and thats what a blockade is) if at the end you have enough troops to accept the surrender... If Germany can knock Russia out in 15 or 16 and then Italy then the blockade becomes pointless. In real history Germany didn't have enough time to make use of the Ukrainian wheat, give them another year and they will. Knock Italy out of the war and turn the Adriatic into a central powers lake and the Allied posistion in Greece becomes untenable, which turn opens up the Bosphorus to ship said Ukrainian wheat to Europe via the Black Sea and Adriatic...

In the second case the Adriatic 'lake' idea is gone and presumably resources will come overland from Ukraine/Russia. Never mind... let us examine the 'relieving pressure' idea and dispense with the Adriadic/Bosphorous routes.

I see two factors as central to a Central Powers/US win in Europe in this case: A. The speedy 'knock out' of Italy and B. The Ottomans closing the Suez. In many ways these two factors would be inter dependant as the should Britain/France knock out the Ottoman threat to Suez quickly Allenby and Indian troops can be landed in Italy to prop them up. Had the war continued past 1918 (as is likely with the US on the opposite side) Allenby would have moved to support Italy and also into Greece and the Balkans.

The Battle of Caporetto was fought with units reinforced by troops from the Russian front yet the follow up offencive ended with the Battle of the Piave River (June 1918), where British and French forces fought with the Italians. Austrian casulties (dead) were around 50,000 and they were forced to withdraw. By this time the Ottomans were effectively out as a military threat to Suez (Jerusalem was taken Christmas 1917 and Bagdad before that) and Allenby was recieving fresh Divisions direct from India. The Ottomans also had Armenia revolts and large scale anti German sentiment to deal with.

I would question therefore the possibility of a quick Italian knock out when for all intents and purposes Allenbys army, with resupply from India, could have been deployed to bolster Italian defence and reopen the Balkan front. Possibly the Ottomans might have been offered slightly more lenient terms at the start of 1918 had this been felt necessary but as British and French troops were in Italy by June 1918 it may be they had already begun this redeployment. Furthermore the Suez and Iraq/Jordan/Israel were already in British hands, air supremacy was achieved: Suez was NOT threatened and fresh ANZAC and Indian troops and supplies could flow freely.

Which brings us to the need to close Suez... If, after the Russian collapse German troops had been sent to help the Ottomans they would have to go overland(ish) via Constantinople. If Russia had collapsed a year earlier such a redeployment may have delayed the British advance up through Palestine but the lines of supply are exceedingly stretched and must pass through the hostile Balkans and past the Arab irregulars of Lawrences 'gang'. With the Med being a British lake and Egypt suppliable from India, Australia and France/Britain I could only see German support for the Ottomans as delaying the march from Egypt to Jerusalem and Damascus. Certainly it could not have prevented Bagdad falling to the British/Arabs, nor the Ottoman loss of the Arabian peninsular. Such a move would also, evidently have weakened the western European front, though perhaps drawn off Entente forces also to the East.

So this 'relieving pressure' theory is fine, so far as it goes. The point then becomes where do the Central Powers apply pressure? Since you speak of the Battle of Caporetto in Autumn (I think) 1917 we are already assuming that pressure is relieved from Russia and is applied to Italy. Yet by Christmas 1917 it could be argued that pressure was also relieved on Suez/Egypt and by June 1918 we have British and French forces in Italy helping defeat Austria. Nor do I believe it would have been possible, even with German support, for the Ottomans to retake Suez/Egypt. The Ottoman Empire had, in any case, been in decline arguably since the second Seige of Vienna and was suffering serious internal disputes; in many ways WW1 was for them 'The War of the Ottoman Succession'. In short to win quickly in Italy you have close Suez and prevent/delay Ottoman retreat from Palestine to keep Allenby, ANZACs and Indians pinned on the canal, preventing them supporting Italy or re-opening the Balkans.

I welcome your thoughts.

1979
15 Nov 11,, 15:28
The US State Department estimated the 1916 wheat crop was 595 million bushels (20+ million tons), Russia's central statistical committee estimated just under 16 million tons of wheat. Given an estimated consumption of 150lbs of wheat per person per annum, that leaves from 3.5 million tons to 7.5 million ton for export using 1914 population figures. Or enough bread to feed between 46.6 million and 100 million people for a year...

it looks like my assumption was wrong.

1979
15 Nov 11,, 15:30
Also,if Russia is out,the rest won't wait for the full onslaught,but start negociations.That's at least the likely COA.Germany still dominates Europe at the end.

Even with Russia out, the central powers will only have parrity in manpower not superiority.

Mihais
15 Nov 11,, 15:34
Snapper,you seem to connect Italy with Suez/Ottomans.The 2 aren't.
If Russia is out by spring/summer 1916,A-H troops in Russia will redeploy by default.An Austrian offensive is possible in late summer and a decisive offensive is definetely possible in spring 1917 .There is hardly reason to believe Italy would have fared better faced with the entire KuK Armee supported by German mountain units.
Second,the Ottomans also faced Russia in the Caucasus.Those troops are enough to delay the Entente in Palestine and Irak,without any massive German reinforcements.Balkans weren't actually hostile.Bulgaria was in their camp,Serbia was occupied and Romania neutral(and with Russia gone,in their sphere or even entered on their side in the war).Also Black Sea becomes available for naval transport from Odessa/Constanta to Istanbul and beyond.
But Berlin-Baghdad rail was the real deal and there's no threat in this scenario to it.
We'd have Kaiserschlacht a year and half earlier,with more men and more resources on German side.Italy,ME,etc... are all secondary theaters.Securing those mean less German troops diverted and more A-H forces marching in France.Whether the Entente can hold is another issue.

Mihais
15 Nov 11,, 15:40
Even with Russia out, the central powers will only have parrity in manpower not superiority.

Allow me to have a subjective opinion about the superiority of German arms.:biggrin:

snapper
15 Nov 11,, 16:35
Mihais zraver refers to Battle of Caporetto in latish (October/November - ty wiki!) 1917 as indicating his period of time for 'relieving pressure' on the Italian front. You now wish to move it forwards 6-12 months! Very well but he's not going to get such good terms from the Czar and no food! If you wish to argue that with the US on side Russia could have been forced to the talking table in spring/summer 1916 please do. It is not in zravers plan and I was replying principly to him. I am not sure how having the US on side would hasten a Russian capitulation but I am happy to hear your thoughts.

As it was Russia was effectively out by the time of Caporetto and extra troops from the Russian front enabled a victory there. I am well aware that Ottomans and Turks also faought in the Caucasus. They were NOT sufficient to stop British Indian forces taking Baghdad in March 1917. The Turks were heavily defeated by the Russians in 1915 at Sarikamish and that lead to the later Armenia problems. So much for the Ottoman Caucasus front.

"Serbia was occupied" Precisely! An 'occupied' country is almost by definition 'hostile'; that is the difference between 'occupation' and 'liberation'. Romania was NOT neutral - they attacked the Austrians and were supported by Russians. I cannot regard this as 'neutral' in the sense of not killing Austro-Hungarian troops.

The Ottomans were effectively no longer a threat to Suez after Jerusalem was taken at the end of 1917. This means Italy and Egypt - and Greece - effectively become for Entente/Britain ONE theatre with re-supply from India and Australia no longer threatened. You might consider the events of WW2 when troops evacuated from Greece went to Alexandria and after Suez was no longer threatened Italy was invaded. The two are very much linked; if Suez is no longer threatened Italy and Greece become targets.

1979
15 Nov 11,, 18:07
Romania was NOT neutral - they attacked the Austrians and were supported by Russians. I cannot regard this as 'neutral' in the sense of not killing Austro-Hungarian troops.


With russia out, romania would be neutral as well, for obvious reasoons.
unlles the AH starts it but that was not going to happen.

snapper
15 Nov 11,, 18:52
Can't try to tell me 'Romania neutral' though. Like I say, pls show me how Russia is out a year earlier because of USA... If not then Romania is not neutral.

1979
15 Nov 11,, 19:18
Can't try to tell me 'Romania neutral' though. Like I say, pls show me how Russia is out a year earlier because of USA... If not then Romania is not neutral.

well zraver and mihais were sugesting it so it's really not my argument to defend.
however without AH overextended in 1916, the confidence is not really there
to take on someone 5 times our size.

Mihais
15 Nov 11,, 19:29
Well,I never mentioned the US.No matter on whose side they went,they weren't going to jump from the start.My point is that with Russia gone by 1916(a reasonable prospect) US is largely irrelevant,even if they enter thewar as it was historically.The show would be over by then,with the CP either victorious or in such a strong position that makes an entente victory unlikely.

Mihais
15 Nov 11,, 19:34
however without AH overextended in 1916, the confidence is not really there
to take on someone 5 times our size.

That and not only that.You know that the terms for joining the entente were many(and weren't respected,but that's another story).

cyppok
15 Nov 11,, 20:40
Let us say Russia gone by early 1916; armistace or watever. How far has Germany penetrated into Ukraine? My guess is NOT to ports and probably only what is now 'western ukraine' (Lwow - Smolensk line). Presumably with armistice they then leave these areas. IF 'Greater Russia' then disintegrates into civil war you can forget Ukrainian wheat exports. Your line of reasoning relies on a. converting a stable Russia/Ukraine into a trade partner and b. doing the same with Italy or fighting all the way down to southern Italian ports c. barring the Greek ports to the RN. Even then you would need a local supremecy in the Med. In the time you have before Central Powers collapse internaly without converting Russia/Ukraine, Greece and Italy into psedo-allies it's not do-able. To fight your way to such a position shortens the time until collapse becomes inevitable.

Also ignores the whole civil war going on. Black army, Green army, Red army, White army, everyone armed running around.

zraver
15 Nov 11,, 20:50
With all due respect this is different argument from the one you first suggested:....[/quote]

1. If Russia is knocked out in early 16 there is No Brusilov Offensive which preserves 400,000 AH troops for Italy and Salonika.
2. Allenby is in France not Egypt
3. In Iraq Maude is still trying to sort out and rebuild the shattered command he was given after the fall of Kut.
4. There is a shortage of machine guns in Britain and no men... Conscription has just been introduced.
5. The political crisis of 1916 is going to be made worse... Asquith is already doomed and Lloyd George is on his way in but more crisis's means it takes even longer to set the ship of state on a winning heading.
6. the strongest allied military force in the region other than Italy is the 6 divisions of the Serbian Army sitting on Corfu and the 4 allied divisions sitting in Salonika. In a Caparetto type German offensive this is what the Allies have to send- its all they have to send unless you want to take troops from Maube along the Tigris or Murray in Egypt since the new classes created by Conscription are not ready yet and the remnants of Kitchener's New Army and what little remains of the Old Contemptibles is shattered in France along the Somme.
7. Germany historically managed to free up 17 divisions to rescue AH after the Brusilov Offensive despite Verdun and the Somme so the German troops for this are available.
8. If Russia is out, Romania never comes in or comes in on the side of the CP. Thats another 100,000 or so CP troops freed up...

zraver
15 Nov 11,, 20:59
Like I say, pls show me how Russia is out a year earlier because of USA... If not then Romania is not neutral.

US loans financed British arms purchases for Czarist Russia from Russian, American, French and British factories.... No loans, no arms, no Russia after the disasters of 1915. By 1916 the Germans and AH occupied a line from Riga to Dvinsk and from there to Pinsk and south to Brody with about 120 divisions. The Russian army facing them was low on arms in particular artillery not just ammunition and even in 1916 the 180 Russian divisions had fewer guns and rifles than the 120 enemy divisions they faced.

zraver
15 Nov 11,, 21:03
Mihais zraver refers to Battle of Caporetto in latish (October/November - ty wiki!) 1917 as indicating his period of time for 'relieving pressure' on the Italian front. You now wish to move it forwards 6-12 months! Very well but he's not going to get such good terms from the Czar and no food!

No, I used Caparetto to show the inherent weakness of the Italian Army under Cardona. Such an attack is the obvious choice if Russia is knocked out early... get Italy knocked out to secure the Ottomans. Since without Italy the allied presence in Greece is untenable and the pro-German Greek King might jump in on Germany's side..

Mihais
15 Nov 11,, 21:12
Also ignores the whole civil war going on. Black army, Green army, Red army, White army, everyone armed running around.

Yeah,but the Czar might survive a defeat.Or at least the monarchy might.Without another year of losses the attrition may not reach the point where the fall of the Czar and all the rest becomes inevitable.

snapper
16 Nov 11,, 02:40
Deary me... I don't know where to start and is 1.38am here so will get back to this tomorrow and remember NOT to ask for opinions again! :eek:

Triple C
16 Nov 11,, 10:14
Have we solved the problem of US shipping raised by somebody earlier on? US soldiers went to France in British ships because the US lacked shipping capacity. Lloyd George even tried to blackmail Pershing into feeding Americans directly into the French and British armies with it. How would the US fight the Royal Navy and get the ships across the Atlantic?

cyppok
16 Nov 11,, 19:36
Yeah,but the Czar might survive a defeat.Or at least the monarchy might.Without another year of losses the attrition may not reach the point where the fall of the Czar and all the rest becomes inevitable.

Yes, but still doubtful. The grain exports wouldn't happen much either way.

I am tempted to do a what IF WW 1 scenario.

Mihais
16 Nov 11,, 19:51
If I hear anymore of the russian wheat,I'll replace bread with potatoes and meat:redface:

Tarek Morgen
16 Nov 11,, 19:56
I am tempted to do a what IF WW 1 scenario.

but this IS a 'what if WWI scenario'

1979
16 Nov 11,, 20:18
Have we solved the problem of US shipping raised by somebody earlier on? US soldiers went to France in British ships because the US lacked shipping capacity. Lloyd George even tried to blackmail Pershing into feeding Americans directly into the French and British armies with it. How would the US fight the Royal Navy and get the ships across the Atlantic?

nope, we are still trying to ship more cannon fodder...err manpower to the west .

Doktor
16 Nov 11,, 20:21
If I hear anymore of the russian wheat,I'll replace bread with potatoes and meat:redface:

To be more accurate it's Ukrainian wheat methinks

Mihais
16 Nov 11,, 21:04
nope, we are still trying to ship more cannon fodder...err manpower to the west .

You go to the railway station.Next you board the cattle wagon.6 horses or 40 men.You bid farewell to the love of your life that runs after the train with tears in her eyes,waving a handkerchief.Next stop,nothing new,the Western Front.Heil dir im Siegerkranz.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yTd2ibwiV9w&feature=related


Problem solved.:tongue:

1979
16 Nov 11,, 21:37
with the usual prussian discipline of course...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mwr2eCzXmX8&feature=related

BD1
16 Nov 11,, 21:54
unless you go to Brave soldier Schweik mode .....

cyppok
17 Nov 11,, 03:18
but this IS a 'what if WWI scenario'

we verved off the question in the title a long time ago.

Anyways my What if WW1 question would be fairly simple. What if the British managed to destroy half of German fleet and decided to do a landing in Northern Germany instead of Gallipoli. I am thinking a forced landing into Denmark (and it "compeled" to join the Allied side) Then selectively marine landings in weakpoints from Danish border with Germany through Stettin forcing Germans to stretch to thin or actually creating an active useful Northern Front, all of this in 1914-15 with the taking of major cities in North Germany and perhaps even pushing for Berlin. Basically knocking out Germany out of war by the end of 1915. Theoretically possible since Baltic Sea was dominated by Britain at that point already. Ergo 500k troops land in North Germany instead of Gallipoli. With perhaps 100k of it being mobile landings that would land destroy roam around damage go back to ships move on to a different area while Germans try to contain it in this one. Public outcry would collapse the war effort almost immediately I think if capital was in danger and population would be fearful where the next raid would come through.

The question is thus, if war ends before 1916 or perhaps at early 1916 both Russia and Austria-Hungary would have ability to survive. How would the world look and would this prevent WW2?...

snapper
17 Nov 11,, 14:25
Ok I apologise for not getting back to this yesterday... will have a go now.

Firstly the main question is what happens if the US joins on the side of the Central Powers? I take the point of the loss of financial cooperation between Britain and the US, but the investments went to two ways. US investors in the Britain made a profit but these markets would be closed as would any British investment in the US. The US would be vitualy blockaded in the Atlantic and Japan, while 'neutral', was certainly pro British and may even enter the war on the Entente side. This seems to be the only point raised to support a theory that Russia would collapse a year earlier and therefore the European theatre could be won by the Central Powers. IF Russia is going to collapse in 1916 it implies US interference in the European theatre and, in my opinion, the lack of investment ect is not sufficient alone to cause this. How else will the US help the Central Powers? This seems to me impossible without naval supremecy.

My very first comment on this subject was "Certainly the war goes on longer." Of course I was thinking at the time of a secondary US campaign after the Central Powers collapse. However it is clear that with the Entente Powers having naval supremecy the longer the war goes on the more the pendulum swings in their favour. zraver you seem to believe that the war will be shorter, thus increasing the CPs chances, because the US on their side. Aside from the two sided loss of financial resources I cannot see any reason why this should be so.

The rest of your arguement is based around a theory that Central Powers can win Europe once Russia collapses but Russia DID collapse, it did survive the 1915 defeats though they certainly helped the collapse. But even after Russia collapsed the Central Powers were unable to win in the West or in Italy. You then argue that Italy could be knocked out quickly but Italy DID survive after Caparetto and defeated Austria at the Pave River.

Basicly in WW1 NO country was fully defeated in the field (as for example France was in 1940); Russia collapsed from inside as did, in the end, the Central Powers. To 'knock out' a country in WW1 was done by military pressure leading to internal collapse. The 'quick knock out' was not an option as long as there was the political will to continue. Therefore the Entente Powers have only to keep their allies happy, their own Governments stable, and victory is nigh on inevitable.

The basic problem for the thesis is that the Entente Powers, having naval supremacy, can keep the two theatres seperate. Presumably they would decide to concentrate on European theatre first (the Frogs would demand it!). So the problems of the European/Middle Eastern/Caucasus campaigns would probably follow a similar course to those that happened. My guess is that ANZACS troops may have been sent to Canada or perhaps landing in Alaska and then south so Allenbys march north may have been delayed but he was capable of holding Suez anyway. For those who would suggest an alternative scenario it seems to me that you must prove: A. That the US can help the Central Powers to win in Europe faster - say end of 1917 start of 1918, before they start starving and B. That either the US or Central Powers can subsequently achieve naval supremecy. As yet I do not see this.

zraver
17 Nov 11,, 23:45
Ok I apologise for not getting back to this yesterday... will have a go now.

Firstly the main question is what happens if the US joins on the side of the Central Powers? I take the point of the loss of financial cooperation between Britain and the US, but the investments went to two ways. US investors in the Britain made a profit but these markets would be closed as would any British investment in the US. The US would be vitualy blockaded in the Atlantic

and Japan, while 'neutral', was certainly pro British and may even enter the war on the Entente side.


This seems to be the only point raised to support a theory that Russia would collapse a year earlier and therefore the European theatre could be won by the Central Powers. IF Russia is going to collapse in 1916 it implies US interference in the European theatre and, in my opinion, the lack of investment ect is not sufficient alone to cause this. How else will the US help the Central Powers? This seems to me impossible without naval supremecy.


My very first comment on this subject was "Certainly the war goes on longer." Of course I was thinking at the time of a secondary US campaign after the Central Powers collapse. However it is clear that with the Entente Powers having naval supremecy the longer the war goes on the more the pendulum swings in their favour. zraver you seem to believe that the war will be shorter, thus increasing the CPs chances, because the US on their side. Aside from the two sided loss of financial resources I cannot see any reason why this should be so.

The rest of your arguement is based around a theory that Central Powers can win Europe once Russia collapses but Russia DID collapse, it did survive the 1915 defeats though they certainly helped the collapse. But even after Russia collapsed the Central Powers were unable to win in the West or in Italy. You then argue that Italy could be knocked out quickly but Italy DID survive after Caparetto and defeated Austria at the Pave River.

Basicly in WW1 NO country was fully defeated in the field (as for example France was in 1940); Russia collapsed from inside as did, in the end, the Central Powers. To 'knock out' a country in WW1 was done by military pressure leading to internal collapse. The 'quick knock out' was not an option as long as there was the political will to continue. Therefore the Entente Powers have only to keep their allies happy, their own Governments stable, and victory is nigh on inevitable.

The basic problem for the thesis is that the Entente Powers, having naval supremacy, can keep the two theatres seperate. Presumably they would decide to concentrate on European theatre first (the Frogs would demand it!). So the problems of the European/Middle Eastern/Caucasus campaigns would probably follow a similar course to those that happened. My guess is that ANZACS troops may have been sent to Canada or perhaps landing in Alaska and then south so Allenbys march north may have been delayed but he was capable of holding Suez anyway. For those who would suggest an alternative scenario it seems to me that you must prove: A. That the US can help the Central Powers to win in Europe faster - say end of 1917 start of 1918, before they start starving and B. That either the US or Central Powers can subsequently achieve naval supremecy. As yet I do not see this.

uhmm... Japan declared war on Germany on Ag 27, 1914....

uhmm... Serbia, Romania and the Ottomans were defeated in the feild

Assuming the US enters on the side of the CP in 15 then some 500,000 Canadians including 3 crack divisions are not going to Europe, if the US enters later, those Canadians including 4 crack divisions need to leave Europe asap to face a multi-million man army forming in the US.... admittedly a later US entry delays the US offensive into Canada due to a shortage of materials...

Either way that is the loss of hundreds of thousands of bodies directly from the Western Theater as the CP gains a million- net+1.5 million to the CP.

Now on to financing

In the period from 1915-18 the UK ran up a war debt to the US of $5 billion dollars in 1918 dollars. That is 1/7th of total British spending. That money was used to buy arms and supplies from America that the UK could not produce itself (or not in enough numbers). The obvious place for the UK to cut spending is its aid to Russia. US, Dutch and French loans backed these UK loans to the point where in 1917 when Russia dropped out of the war her external debt had increased $11 billion dollars 9to 16 billion)- half her total war time spending of $22 billion. Without such aid (loans and materials) Russia won't recover from the disasters of 1915. She had given almost all of her artillery to the Germans and used up her ammunition and most of her rifles. The Ottoman Empire might have been the sickman of Europe, if so Czarist Russia was the Ottoman's half dead sister...

In 7 battles in 1914 and 15 (Tannenburg, 1st and 2nd Masurian Lakes, Warsaw and Lodz vs Germany plus Battle of Galicia vs the Austro-Hungarians ad the combined Gorliz-tarnow offensive) the Russians lost almost 1.2 million men to the Central Powers losses of half a million. Russia used up most of her small arms and artillery ammunition ad lost much of her artillery and many of her priceless machine guns...

Russia needed that foreign money to fight on in 15, 16 and 17, without it she dies early- no money means no arms. Lets look at what a Russian collapse in 1916 really means for the CP. The CP gets an additional 2 million men to use elsewhere. The extra million for the Austro-Hungarians are admittedly not that impressive unless your an Italian. But those million German troops are not the young, half starved boys of 17 and 18 but well fed well equipped men at the peak of German power. In 1918 half a million were sent west. The others had to be used for occupation duty. If Imperial Russia and Germany sign a treaty that provides food stuffs and removes the need for occupation that number might grow by an additional 50%

Those 750,000 men are enough to completely replace German losses in the West taken in 1916. While the British and French add half trained conscripts in 1917 the Germans add veterans... Also with no fight in the East daily allotments of shells to German guns in the West meets Allied totals. The shortage of shells was a persistent complaint of Ernst Junger a much decorated storm trooper who wrote "The Storm of Steel, From The Diary of A Storm Trooper"- which by the way should be required reading for anyone wanting to study WWI.

In Italy, the Austro-Hungarians were almost always outnumbered so the removal of Russia means the Austrians now have the numbers edge, plus terrain and artillery which they already enjoyed... Plus with no Russia, there is no Romanian entry into the war so that side war isn't a drain either. Italy: until Caparetto the Italians were lead by Cardona who seems to have felt that the Roman policy of decimation was how you make an army fight. His leadership was widely detested by the rank and file, which is why Italy lost more men to desertions in 17 than to enemy fire. On top of that he was insane... if the definition of insanity is trying the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result... 11 battles over roughly the same patch of ground.... Even Haig only did that 3 times... Give the Austro-Hungarians superior numbers and Italy is in trouble even without a German intervention.

For the Ottoman Empire the fall of Russia means an extra 190,000 men for use in Gallipolli, Egypt and Iraq... That's enough t swing the balance in at least contest, maybe in all three cases.

For France the loss of US backed loans by the UK has a negative impact as well. Although she can cut some funding to Russia, most of her cuts have to come out of spending on herself. This means fewer heavy guns, fewer machine guns, fewer aeroplanes.... The French went to war in 14 superbly equipped for mobile warfare. Lots of calvary, bayonets and quick firing 75mm's and only a few dozen 105mm and no 155mm's... from the fall of 14 onwards they were rapidly trying to convert to heavy guns which are expensive plus add machine guns... Without those loans she can't and the 75mm's are forced to soldier on... Britain was in a simialr problem and had to rapidly convert from 13lb to 18 and 25lb guns.

But the loss of loans to Russia is not the end of the UK's financial woes...

What we end up with in 16 so far is the Allies with half a million fewer men in the West, fewer planes, fewer guns, no money, battered armies, a political crisis in England leading to the fall of Asquith and facing a Germany now fighting a one front war... And 2 major factors you have ignored.

1- A Germany who does not fear unrestricted submarine warfare. In 1915 before it was called off the Germans were sinking 100,000 tons of merchant shipping a month and an average of 1.9 ships a day. The UK can not sustain those losses, especially as in 1917 when it resumed increased German numbers and expertise drove that number to 500,000 tons a month plus... a number reached in 1916 if the campaign is not called off. The only counter is increased spending on naval escorts and merchant ships which is going to take steel and men away from the Army, this after all munitions workers were recently exempted from conscription and even denied volunteering without their employers permission. In April 1917 Britain had only 6 weeks worth of wheat left in England... move that forward a year and as Adm Beatty observed in 1917, "The real crux lies in whether we blockade the enemy to his knees, or whether he does the same to us." If Germany has friendly US ports to use with high quality US supplied petrol...

2- OK and finally sending the Anzacs to the US West Coast and British naval supremacy... Alaska is out... in the period of WWI there are no roads and the gold fields n the Yukon are already Canadian. The obvious targets for such an expedition are Guam, the Phillipines, Hawaii or California. Puget Sound is a giant protected bay ringed by three forts so its out. The Anzacs are not up for Gallipolie Part Duex which is what Western Washington with its narrow coastal plain and steep mountains to the east, and mile wide Columbia to the South is. I would know that is where I grew up. Most of the Anzacs would see Rainier, St Helens, Adams and Baker and try and swim home. If they made it to the Columbia they would probably mutiny and try and shoot who ever ordered the invasion- the terrain is that bad.

However landing farther south on the West Coast has its own problems... Los Angeles lets them seize a major urban center but then what? The San Fransisco Bay Area is the real gem at the time and is heavily protected. Plus the US has 14 dreadnoughts, 13 pre-dreadnoughts and 3 coastal battleships in 1916 with 3 dreadnoughts under construction. Assuming a 50/50 split that is 7 modern battleships, 6 older ships and a coastal ship. Unless the Royal navy wants to detail ships off of the Grand Fleet, since Japan can't offer much 11 pre-dreadnoughts, 1 semi dreadnought, 2 dreadnoughts- most of Japan's pre-dreadnoughts are former Imperial Russian ships (pre-1904) and are more closely related to coastal ships. So if the RN does detail some of its 28 ships off the Grand fleet for operations in the pacific, and details more off to blockade the US coast... Suddenly the German disadvantage in numbers is gone and Jutland may turn out very badly indeed for the Royal Navy given the German ships were better gunnery platforms and didn't stack cordite in the open...

zraver
18 Nov 11,, 07:26
Also in the period after Jutland the US adds 4 new battleships between 16-18 and Germany adds 2, the UK adds 3, France 0 as best I can tell. this means a Royal navy divided by the need to blockade the German and American coasts and support an invasion of the US West Coast is is going to be eager to force three battles before June 1916, but if the US and Germany refuse battle until 17 or 18 then the odds are actually stacked against the Royal navy numbers wise (she still has battle cruisers to add throw weight but they are vulnerable)

1979
18 Nov 11,, 09:59
In Italy, the Austro-Hungarians were almost always outnumbered so the removal of Russia means the Austrians now have the numbers edge, plus terrain and artillery which they already enjoyed... Plus with no Russia, there is no Romanian entry into the war so that side war isn't a drain either. Italy: until Caparetto the Italians were lead by Cardona who seems to have felt that the Roman policy of decimation was how you make an army fight. His leadership was widely detested by the rank and file, which is why Italy lost more men to desertions in 17 than to enemy fire. On top of that he was insane... if the definition of insanity is trying the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result... 11 battles over roughly the same patch of ground.... Even Haig only did that 3 times... Give the Austro-Hungarians superior numbers and Italy is in trouble even without a German intervention.


As long as the italians are on the offensive Cardona gets credit no matter how much attrition does he sustain , however if the Italian suffer a major reversal in the field as they historically did , i have no reason to believe they would keep betting on a losing horse.

Tarek Morgen
18 Nov 11,, 10:55
unless you go to Brave soldier Schweik mode .....

He was Czech serving in the AH-army.

Chogy
18 Nov 11,, 15:24
we verved off the question in the title a long time ago.

Anyways my What if WW1 question would be fairly simple. What if the British managed to destroy half of German fleet and decided to do a landing in Northern Germany instead of Gallipoli.

I've often pondered similarly. One thing us simplistic air-power people never quite understood was the amazingly brutal, static nature of WW1. The obvious questions... "Why not attack somewhere, ANYWHERE, in the rear of the enemy, in some decent force?" Both sides tried a frontal assault followed by "the breakthrough that would roll up the enemy rear, and win the war", and they all petered out after a couple of miles with horrendous losses. Was it a problem of logistics? Lack of any decently mobile units that could carry supplies sufficient for more than just 3 days of combat?

Obviously, men like Guderian pondered the maneuver war in later years, and more modern panzers permitted it, but you'd have thought that the sheer mass of a British landing, protected by naval guns, could have created a potent beachhead that would have done the job... cut the German supply to the main front, and forced a massive redistribution of forces in France & Belgium.

Gallipoli failed for a number of reasons, but the obvious one was a terrible location, trapped onto a rocky peninsula, rather than more open terrain with perhaps rail that could be exploited.

zraver
18 Nov 11,, 15:58
I've often pondered similarly. One thing us simplistic air-power people never quite understood was the amazingly brutal, static nature of WW1. The obvious questions... "Why not attack somewhere, ANYWHERE, in the rear of the enemy, in some decent force?"

they did.... the race to the sea, Gallipolli, Salonika, Tigris, East Africa... the problem is the rear was not the center of gravity which was Germany.



Both sides tried a frontal assault followed by "the breakthrough that would roll up the enemy rear, and win the war", and they all petered out after a couple of miles with horrendous losses. Was it a problem of logistics? Lack of any decently mobile units that could carry supplies sufficient for more than just 3 days of combat?

lack of an ability to move supplies forward over shattered terrain. Massive artillery barrages turned the ground into mud and moon scape and supplies had to be manhandled forward from the attackers rail heads to the start line, across no man's land and then across the shattered landscape of the enemy trenches. Meanwhile the defenders were blessed with only having to move from their rail head to the penetration and inherent advantage.

zraver
18 Nov 11,, 16:00
As long as the italians are on the offensive Cardona gets credit no matter how much attrition does he sustain , however if the Italian suffer a major reversal in the field as they historically did , i have no reason to believe they would keep betting on a losing horse.

yes, but that one historic reversal almost knocked Italy out of the war. If Caparetto happens in late 16 there are no British and French divisions to ride to the rescue.

BD1
18 Nov 11,, 20:34
He was Czech serving in the AH-army.
the book, although there´s much hyperbole and jokes, still shows just how strained were the relations between the A-H nations, classes etc.

Mihais
18 Nov 11,, 20:53
we verved off the question in the title a long time ago.

Anyways my What if WW1 question would be fairly simple. What if the British managed to destroy half of German fleet and decided to do a landing in Northern Germany instead of Gallipoli.

Then their army would be really arrested by the Berlin police,like the Kaiser boasted.

zraver
19 Nov 11,, 07:46
we verved off the question in the title a long time ago.

Anyways my What if WW1 question would be fairly simple. What if the British managed to destroy half of German fleet and decided to do a landing in Northern Germany instead of Gallipoli. I am thinking a forced landing into Denmark (and it "compeled" to join the Allied side) Then selectively marine landings in weakpoints from Danish border with Germany through Stettin forcing Germans to stretch to thin or actually creating an active useful Northern Front, all of this in 1914-15 with the taking of major cities in North Germany and perhaps even pushing for Berlin. Basically knocking out Germany out of war by the end of 1915. Theoretically possible since Baltic Sea was dominated by Britain at that point already. Ergo 500k troops land in North Germany instead of Gallipoli. With perhaps 100k of it being mobile landings that would land destroy roam around damage go back to ships move on to a different area while Germans try to contain it in this one. Public outcry would collapse the war effort almost immediately I think if capital was in danger and population would be fearful where the next raid would come through.

The question is thus, if war ends before 1916 or perhaps at early 1916 both Russia and Austria-Hungary would have ability to survive. How would the world look and would this prevent WW2?...

1 majr flaw in your reasoning- destroying half the German fleet. For that to happen the Germans had to be willing to give battle and they weren't. Whle this helped Britain by keeping a powerful enemy fleet out of action and her own massively expensive fleet safe, it also preserved the High Seas Fleet as a fleet in being so no invasion was possible.

zraver
19 Nov 11,, 08:38
US Navy early 1916

69x destroyers
11x merchant cruisers
22x protected cruisers
12x armored cruisers
3x scout cruisers
3x monitors
0x battle cruisers (7)
4x coastal battleships
20x pre-dreadnoughts (22)
8x dreadnoughts (15)
2x super dreadnoughts (1)
34 coastal submarines (+8 in the Philippines)
(German High Seas Fleet)

In early 1916 the USN had a battle fleet comparable to the German High Seas Fleet. By the end of 1916 the USN would add 4 more super dreadnoughts with 14" guns (Germany had 1 x 15" super dreadnought and her early dreadnoughts were 11" gunned.

The maximum US battle line could in theory call upon the firepower of 218 guns 10" or larger or the equal to 20 dreadnoughts. Granted not all guns are created equal but the Royal navy did not have the numbers to blockade both the US with its 3 three coasts and Germany.

12x 10" guns
144x 12" guns
32x 13" guns
20x 14" guns

The US naval build up following the Spanish American war was actually comparable to what Germany was doing if less threatening to the UK. Regardless the US battle fleet in 1916 even if split among both major coasts and a few over seas deployments presents serious problems to any RN plans to blockade the US where the number of harbors and the sheer length of the coast do not allow easy choke points like the North Sea.
vs 9 battle cruisers


Here is a surprise- The British were are outgunned at sea in a US/German vs UK in WWI what if... all together the US and German navies had 3 super dreadnoughts, 23 dreadnoughts, 7 battle cruisers and 42 pre-dreadoughts vs 1 super dreadnought, 22 dreadnoughts,9 battle cruisers, 29 pre-dreadnoughts. What this shows and it is surprising is that the British naval building was unable to keep pace and actually maintain a 2 war navy as required by the Naval Defense Act of 1899. Granted the British could concentrate but to try and face both means the are facing either even up of a slight edge in one contest at the risk of a disadvantage in the other.

Mihais
19 Nov 11,, 09:17
You need to add the French to the RN.Granted they focused on the Med historically,but with US against the Entente all previous calculations would be turned up.
Italians were too small and busy in the Adriatic to have any say in the oceans,but the French definetely could.

Doktor
19 Nov 11,, 20:19
US Navy early 1916

69x destroyers
11x merchant cruisers
22x protected cruisers
12x armored cruisers
3x scout cruisers
3x monitors
0x battle cruisers (7)
4x coastal battleships
20x pre-dreadnoughts (22)
8x dreadnoughts (15)
2x super dreadnoughts (1)
34 coastal submarines (+8 in the Philippines)
(German High Seas Fleet)

In early 1916 the USN had a battle fleet comparable to the German High Seas Fleet. By the end of 1916 the USN would add 4 more super dreadnoughts with 14" guns (Germany had 1 x 15" super dreadnought and her early dreadnoughts were 11" gunned.

The maximum US battle line could in theory call upon the firepower of 218 guns 10" or larger or the equal to 20 dreadnoughts. Granted not all guns are created equal but the Royal navy did not have the numbers to blockade both the US with its 3 three coasts and Germany.

12x 10" guns
144x 12" guns
32x 13" guns
20x 14" guns

The US naval build up following the Spanish American war was actually comparable to what Germany was doing if less threatening to the UK. Regardless the US battle fleet in 1916 even if split among both major coasts and a few over seas deployments presents serious problems to any RN plans to blockade the US where the number of harbors and the sheer length of the coast do not allow easy choke points like the North Sea.
vs 9 battle cruisers


Here is a surprise- The British were are outgunned at sea in a US/German vs UK in WWI what if... all together the US and German navies had 3 super dreadnoughts, 23 dreadnoughts, 7 battle cruisers and 42 pre-dreadoughts vs 1 super dreadnought, 22 dreadnoughts,9 battle cruisers, 29 pre-dreadnoughts. What this shows and it is surprising is that the British naval building was unable to keep pace and actually maintain a 2 war navy as required by the Naval Defense Act of 1899. Granted the British could concentrate but to try and face both means the are facing either even up of a slight edge in one contest at the risk of a disadvantage in the other.

Sounds like Battle of Trafalgar :red:

zraver
20 Nov 11,, 01:34
You need to add the French to the RN.Granted they focused on the Med historically,but with US against the Entente all previous calculations would be turned up.
Italians were too small and busy in the Adriatic to have any say in the oceans,but the French definetely could.

The combined combined battle lists of hulls afloat on 1 Jan 1916 minus 1 RN battleship sunk 7 Jan 1916. I count all battleships laid down before 1900 as coastal battleships for simplification though some are ocean going and some pre-1900 designs were laid down after 1900. I do this becuase most use older styles of guns that while having impressive bore sizes have decidedly inferior gun power and ranges. Generally a battleship built before 1900 is limited to about 5000m engagement ranges or 1/4 the range of the battleships of the period immediately prior to and then after HMS Dreadnought. I also count the US monitors as coastal battleships. There are a few more battleships out there on each side but they are already serving permanent dockside duties or are laid up and obsolete and were never returned to service. (+/-) indicates the Allied lead of deficit in a particular type. Also becuase the Allies need to blockade the CP and not vice versa the Allied side has a double hull count- with and without coastal battleships. The CP on the defensive so to speak would be more likely to use these ships to help break a blockade against a RN that divided itself and didn't have its Grand Fleet concentrated in a force on force engagement. Likely- NO but its a rough comparison of overall naval strength in 1916 if the US was a CP ally. I also don't account for crews quality generally speaking RN, USN and KM will have the best sailors in the open ocean. Italy and France bring up the second tier and the Russians, Austro-Hungarians and Ottomans bring up the rear- excepting of course the SMS Goeban come Yavuz. Also I fished around for the minor naval powers and its amazing how between the combatants of WWI half of the coastal battleships, all battle cruisers and super dreadnoughts and all but 2 pre-dreadnoughts and 7 dreadnoughts were at war.

Combined Allied naval battle line (UK, France, Italy, Russia, Japan)

coastal battleships 34 (+14)
pre-dreadnoughts 37 (-5)
dreadnoughts 34 (+7)
super dreadnoughts 1 (-2)
battle cruisers 13 (+5)
total hulls 119 (+29)
total hulls minus coastal ships 85 (-5)

Combined CP+US naval battle line (Germany, US, AH, Ottoman)
coastal battleships 10
pre-dreadnoughts 42
dreadnoughts 27
super dreadnoughts 3
battle cruisers 8
total hulls 90

Austro-Hungarian navy

3 coastal battleships
9 pre-dreadnoughts
4 dreadnoughts

Ottoman Navy

1 pre-dreadnought
1 battle cruiser

Italian navy

7 coastal battleships
5 pre-dreadnoughts
4 dreadnoughts

French Navy

6 coastal battleships
10 pre-dreadnoughts
5 dreadnoughts

Imperial Russian Navy

5 coastal battleships
6 pre-dreadnoughts
3 dreadnoughts

neutrals

coastal battleships 41
pre-dreadnoughts 2
dreadnoughts 7
super dreadnoughts 0
battle cruisers 0

Global Battle Line 1916

coastal battleships 85
pre-dreadnoughts 81
dreadnoughts 68
super dreadnoughts 4
battle cruisers 21
total hulls 251

zraver
20 Nov 11,, 02:01
Sounds like Battle of Trafalgar :red:

Maybe, but only three navies have pulled that type of a feat off- the UK, US and Japan and the US did it to Japan and Spain, the UK did it to Spain and France, Japan did it to Russia. So you would have arguably the worlds 2 most skilled navies with the likely 4th place entrant colliding. The rest of the navies are not really impressive when it comes to the clash of giants. In terms of skill, I'd rate the US the highest (barely) as in 1916 there were still veterans of Santiago de Cuba and Manila Bay- Adm Dewy (died 1917) Adms Fiske and Benson and Mahan had just recently died (1914). The British haven't had a major naval battle in a hundred years until Dogger Bank which was a wash. British innovation by Fisher in HMS Dreadnought may actually have been preceeded by the US with the USS South Carolina and Japan with the Satsuma. The IJNS Satsuma would have been the world first dreadnought but Japan had to cut corners becuase of funding.

zraver
20 Nov 11,, 04:21
OK as near as I can tell by the end of WWI

US was owed $10 billion
UK owed $5 billion and was owed $9 billion
France owed $5 billion and was owed $5 billion
Italy owed $7 billion
Russia owed $11 billion

Total allied debt in 1918 - $42 billion of the $65 billion in total global public debts in 1918. Total debt would climb after the treaty of Versailles. Post war German reparations were set at $33 billion and Bolshevik Russia renounced all Czarist war debt. These two factors alone drove global debt from $65 billion to $87 billion and total war debt to $65 billion.

Almost none of that non-German or non-Italian debt was ever paid back. That is $301 Billion in CPI adjusted 2010 dollars, but the actual figures if adjusted by spending as a percentage of GDP are much larger. The US spent around 30% of GDP in WWI, Britain spent 50% with military spending reaching 22% of GDP. Total UK direct military spending was $35 billion- figuring rough division by 4 or spending of roughly $8 billion a year of $32 billion a year in total in 2010 dollars for the UK that would be $300 billion a year. The US ended up being owed the equivalent of $150 billion by the UK in 2010 GDP adjusted dollars. Surprisingly Germany paid off her WWI debt last year.

Total WWI spending was $186 billion in direct costs and $151 billion in indirect cots for a total cost of $337 billion in 1918 dollars or $4.8 trillion in 2010 GDP spending adjusted dollars.

cyppok
20 Nov 11,, 04:46
Zraver the Germans were willing to give battle they just didn't know it. When they ventured out their communications were intercepted so the British knew where they were going and the attempt to strike. The British could have been more aggressive at intercepting naval communications and attritioning the German fleet as it breathed outside the harbors where it was posted.

So I am not wrong. I am assuming that if at least half the fleet was destroyed and someone more rational thought about landing in North Germany instead of Greece to know Germany out of the war it would have been a wiser move to use those 500k troops then Gallipoli. Notice I also said they would compel Denmark to join and thus gain base of operations and a small front in the North so in essence any other landing in North Germany would be a 4th front. In addition to the Denmark/German one. But even without compelling Denmark it would have been a viable option. Post landing and establishing an operating front a semi-destroyed German fleet would be hard pressed to engage to disrupt operations to give time for ground troops to reposition, especially with Berlin under threat.

The curious thing would be the peace provisions if it succeeded. I am assuming Bosnia goes to Serbia with reperations on Germany in the form of Alsalsce Lorraine and the Schleswig region going to France/Denmark respectively. Perhaps even a Poland established out of Posen, perhaps Russia getting to annex Eastern Prussia. Austria-Hung would loose some land but might survive.

1979
20 Nov 11,, 08:38
Zraver the Germans were willing to give battle they just didn't know it. When they ventured out their communications were intercepted so the British knew where they were going and the attempt to strike. The British could have been more aggressive at intercepting naval communications and attritioning the German fleet as it breathed outside the harbors where it was posted.

So I am not wrong. I am assuming that if at least half the fleet was destroyed and someone more rational thought about landing in North Germany instead of Greece to know Germany out of the war it would have been a wiser move to use those 500k troops then Gallipoli. Notice I also said they would compel Denmark to join and thus gain base of operations and a small front in the North so in essence any other landing in North Germany would be a 4th front. In addition to the Denmark/German one. But even without compelling Denmark it would have been a viable option. Post landing and establishing an operating front a semi-destroyed German fleet would be hard pressed to engage to disrupt operations to give time for ground troops to reposition, especially with Berlin under threat.

The curious thing would be the peace provisions if it succeeded. I am assuming Bosnia goes to Serbia with reperations on Germany in the form of Alsalsce Lorraine and the Schleswig region going to France/Denmark respectively. Perhaps even a Poland established out of Posen, perhaps Russia getting to annex Eastern Prussia. Austria-Hung would loose some land but might survive.


Since in terms of capital ships the british lost 3 to every german sunk at Jutland destroying half of the german fleet would leave no british fleet at all.

zraver
20 Nov 11,, 09:43
Zraver the Germans were willing to give battle they just didn't know it. When they ventured out their communications were intercepted so the British knew where they were going and the attempt to strike. The British could have been more aggressive at intercepting naval communications and attritioning the German fleet as it breathed outside the harbors where it was posted.

Really.... they made 2 sorties past their own minefields in force- Dogger Bank and Jutland. Dogger Bank was a perfect ambush but battle damage and misunderstanding had the British chasing an armored cruiser letting the German battle cruisers escape. naval intercepts can't change that. Ditto at Jutland, the German escape was a tour de force in fleet maneuvers to save the fleet. The German battleships sortied on two other occasions and only one offered a chance for intercept which was taken and the HMS Repulse ended up trading fire with 2 German dreadnoughts. The high seas fleet et al only sortied once- Jutland.


So I am not wrong.

Yes You are

Dogger Bank- 5 Uk vs 3 German battle cruisers- no battle ships
2nd Heglioland Blight- 3 UK battle cruisers, 2 Uk fast battleships vs 2 German dreadnoughts with Zeppelin support giving Germany the tactical intelligence edge

Those are the capitol ship engagements near Germany in WWI.


I am assuming that if at least half the fleet was destroyed and someone more rational thought about landing in North Germany instead of Greece to know Germany out of the war it would have been a wiser move to use those 500k troops then Gallipoli. Notice I also said they would compel Denmark to join and thus gain base of operations and a small front in the North so in essence any other landing in North Germany would be a 4th front. In addition to the Denmark/German one. But even without compelling Denmark it would have been a viable option. Post landing and establishing an operating front a semi-destroyed German fleet would be hard pressed to engage to disrupt operations to give time for ground troops to reposition, especially with Berlin under threat.

1. The German fleet did not offer battle and thus could not be destroyed
2. Gallipolli cost the allies several pre-dreadnoughts to mines- same problem vs the Germans.
3. The Jade can only br crossed with the tides... if the RN enters and suffers a serious reversal it cannot escape until the tide turns.
4. The Zeppelins gave the Germans an absolute tactical intelligence edge.
5. German U-boat bases in Belgium
6. Kiel Canal 1*
7. Kiel Canal 2*
8. rail roads


The curious thing would be the peace provisions if it succeeded. I am assuming Bosnia goes to Serbia with reperations on Germany in the form of Alsalsce Lorraine and the Schleswig region going to France/Denmark respectively. Perhaps even a Poland established out of Posen, perhaps Russia getting to annex Eastern Prussia. Austria-Hung would loose some land but might survive.

How do you account for the above listed 7 obstacles

KC1- the German fleet could rapidly transfer itself between Keil (east) and Williamnshaven (west) without setting to sea.
KC2- The canal is 110m wide and cuts the entire Jutland Peninsula. land anywhere in Denmark and you have to cross the canal.

the Bulk of the German army was in Belgium and the areas of France adjacent to it- only about 600km from Kiel and linked by excellent rail lines. The Germans can shift divisions by train faster than the UK can land regiments...

snapper
20 Nov 11,, 11:50
uhmm... Japan declared war on Germany on Ag 27, 1914....

uhmm... Serbia, Romania and the Ottomans were defeated in the feild

Assuming the US enters on the side of the CP in 15 then some 500,000 Canadians including 3 crack divisions are not going to Europe, if the US enters later, those Canadians including 4 crack divisions need to leave Europe asap to face a multi-million man army forming in the US.... admittedly a later US entry delays the US offensive into Canada due to a shortage of materials...

Either way that is the loss of hundreds of thousands of bodies directly from the Western Theater as the CP gains a million- net+1.5 million to the CP.

Now on to financing

In the period from 1915-18 the UK ran up a war debt to the US of $5 billion dollars in 1918 dollars. That is 1/7th of total British spending. That money was used to buy arms and supplies from America that the UK could not produce itself (or not in enough numbers). The obvious place for the UK to cut spending is its aid to Russia. US, Dutch and French loans backed these UK loans to the point where in 1917 when Russia dropped out of the war her external debt had increased $11 billion dollars 9to 16 billion)- half her total war time spending of $22 billion. Without such aid (loans and materials) Russia won't recover from the disasters of 1915. She had given almost all of her artillery to the Germans and used up her ammunition and most of her rifles. The Ottoman Empire might have been the sickman of Europe, if so Czarist Russia was the Ottoman's half dead sister...

In 7 battles in 1914 and 15 (Tannenburg, 1st and 2nd Masurian Lakes, Warsaw and Lodz vs Germany plus Battle of Galicia vs the Austro-Hungarians ad the combined Gorliz-tarnow offensive) the Russians lost almost 1.2 million men to the Central Powers losses of half a million. Russia used up most of her small arms and artillery ammunition ad lost much of her artillery and many of her priceless machine guns...

Russia needed that foreign money to fight on in 15, 16 and 17, without it she dies early- no money means no arms. Lets look at what a Russian collapse in 1916 really means for the CP. The CP gets an additional 2 million men to use elsewhere. The extra million for the Austro-Hungarians are admittedly not that impressive unless your an Italian. But those million German troops are not the young, half starved boys of 17 and 18 but well fed well equipped men at the peak of German power. In 1918 half a million were sent west. The others had to be used for occupation duty. If Imperial Russia and Germany sign a treaty that provides food stuffs and removes the need for occupation that number might grow by an additional 50%

Those 750,000 men are enough to completely replace German losses in the West taken in 1916. While the British and French add half trained conscripts in 1917 the Germans add veterans... Also with no fight in the East daily allotments of shells to German guns in the West meets Allied totals. The shortage of shells was a persistent complaint of Ernst Junger a much decorated storm trooper who wrote "The Storm of Steel, From The Diary of A Storm Trooper"- which by the way should be required reading for anyone wanting to study WWI.

In Italy, the Austro-Hungarians were almost always outnumbered so the removal of Russia means the Austrians now have the numbers edge, plus terrain and artillery which they already enjoyed... Plus with no Russia, there is no Romanian entry into the war so that side war isn't a drain either. Italy: until Caparetto the Italians were lead by Cardona who seems to have felt that the Roman policy of decimation was how you make an army fight. His leadership was widely detested by the rank and file, which is why Italy lost more men to desertions in 17 than to enemy fire. On top of that he was insane... if the definition of insanity is trying the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result... 11 battles over roughly the same patch of ground.... Even Haig only did that 3 times... Give the Austro-Hungarians superior numbers and Italy is in trouble even without a German intervention.

For the Ottoman Empire the fall of Russia means an extra 190,000 men for use in Gallipolli, Egypt and Iraq... That's enough t swing the balance in at least contest, maybe in all three cases.

For France the loss of US backed loans by the UK has a negative impact as well. Although she can cut some funding to Russia, most of her cuts have to come out of spending on herself. This means fewer heavy guns, fewer machine guns, fewer aeroplanes.... The French went to war in 14 superbly equipped for mobile warfare. Lots of calvary, bayonets and quick firing 75mm's and only a few dozen 105mm and no 155mm's... from the fall of 14 onwards they were rapidly trying to convert to heavy guns which are expensive plus add machine guns... Without those loans she can't and the 75mm's are forced to soldier on... Britain was in a simialr problem and had to rapidly convert from 13lb to 18 and 25lb guns.

But the loss of loans to Russia is not the end of the UK's financial woes...

What we end up with in 16 so far is the Allies with half a million fewer men in the West, fewer planes, fewer guns, no money, battered armies, a political crisis in England leading to the fall of Asquith and facing a Germany now fighting a one front war... And 2 major factors you have ignored.

1- A Germany who does not fear unrestricted submarine warfare. In 1915 before it was called off the Germans were sinking 100,000 tons of merchant shipping a month and an average of 1.9 ships a day. The UK can not sustain those losses, especially as in 1917 when it resumed increased German numbers and expertise drove that number to 500,000 tons a month plus... a number reached in 1916 if the campaign is not called off. The only counter is increased spending on naval escorts and merchant ships which is going to take steel and men away from the Army, this after all munitions workers were recently exempted from conscription and even denied volunteering without their employers permission. In April 1917 Britain had only 6 weeks worth of wheat left in England... move that forward a year and as Adm Beatty observed in 1917, "The real crux lies in whether we blockade the enemy to his knees, or whether he does the same to us." If Germany has friendly US ports to use with high quality US supplied petrol...

2- OK and finally sending the Anzacs to the US West Coast and British naval supremacy... Alaska is out... in the period of WWI there are no roads and the gold fields n the Yukon are already Canadian. The obvious targets for such an expedition are Guam, the Phillipines, Hawaii or California. Puget Sound is a giant protected bay ringed by three forts so its out. The Anzacs are not up for Gallipolie Part Duex which is what Western Washington with its narrow coastal plain and steep mountains to the east, and mile wide Columbia to the South is. I would know that is where I grew up. Most of the Anzacs would see Rainier, St Helens, Adams and Baker and try and swim home. If they made it to the Columbia they would probably mutiny and try and shoot who ever ordered the invasion- the terrain is that bad.

However landing farther south on the West Coast has its own problems... Los Angeles lets them seize a major urban center but then what? The San Fransisco Bay Area is the real gem at the time and is heavily protected. Plus the US has 14 dreadnoughts, 13 pre-dreadnoughts and 3 coastal battleships in 1916 with 3 dreadnoughts under construction. Assuming a 50/50 split that is 7 modern battleships, 6 older ships and a coastal ship. Unless the Royal navy wants to detail ships off of the Grand Fleet, since Japan can't offer much 11 pre-dreadnoughts, 1 semi dreadnought, 2 dreadnoughts- most of Japan's pre-dreadnoughts are former Imperial Russian ships (pre-1904) and are more closely related to coastal ships. So if the RN does detail some of its 28 ships off the Grand fleet for operations in the pacific, and details more off to blockade the US coast... Suddenly the German disadvantage in numbers is gone and Jutland may turn out very badly indeed for the Royal Navy given the German ships were better gunnery platforms and didn't stack cordite in the open...

zraver you are again relying on the economics of the US not supporting Entente. The loss would work both ways as the US was the net profiteer of these loans, so whatever is invested in Britain by the US counts in the 'assets columns' on the US books and thus alows them to raise money on the basis of these assets. Thus US production potential is also hit. The simple fact is that Britain was in no danger of brankruptcy.

You assume that in the Middle East the Entente must take the offencive and say another 190,000 troops may be needed. On the contrary I would argue that sole priority of Entente forces in the Middle East is to keep Suez open. A series of defencive victories in Sinai would have been just crippling for Ottoman power as Allenbys advance on Jerusalem/Damascus.

As for landings in the US I am quite sure that a suitable candidate could have been found to raise the Confederate flag, which may force the northern states out of the war sooner rather than later and would certainly hamper their naval forces.

In my opinion Gallipoli failed because it was telegraphed. 12 weeks before the main landing the Gallipoli peninsular was virtualy unoccupied.

zraver
20 Nov 11,, 11:54
US vs Canada based on historical information.

In 1917 the US went to war and got 4 divisions to France before the end of the year- 1st, 2nd, 26th and 42nd. All were about half trained with massive cadres having been pulled out to train the follow on units. Rifles were plentiful in the US but the units lacked modern artillery and machine guns. These are American big divisions of about double the size those used by Canada. By June 1918 the US 1 million men in 19 divisions in France- 9 fully trained and blooded, 2 just completing training and 8 new establishments. If kept in North America those divisions would still lack adequate numbers of machine guns and modern artillery but 1,000,000 men is a strength all its own when Canada only managed 300,000 from 1914-16 (and only 2 complete divisions by the end of 1915).

For artillery early in the war the US has abundant but unusable heavy coast artillery most in Endicott batteries. For the field army there are 30 companies of field artillery (est 60-120 batteries). This included 120x British made 2.95" guns (75mm) + 12 in the Phillipines. 60x US designed 4.7inch (120mm) field guns and an unknown number of M1902 3" (76mm) field guns. However between April 1917 and November 1918 the US manufactured at least 1050 75mm guns. The US also has M1903 3" and 5 and 7' guns in coastal units that were small enough to be made field artillery in a pinch. The Endicott batteries could also provide the Us with plenty of siege and railway guns.

Canada was hamstrung by a population of only 8 million with few major population centers and little industry, but she was plumb full of lots of vital resources (gold, timber, grain etc) and strategic locations (Vancouver Island, Labrador, St Lawrence River). Also Canada would likely be short of machine guns and modern artillery as much as or more than the US. And there would be few British infantry regiments to form a nucleus for a Canadian army. The UK could help in the artillery department by shipping plenty of OQF 13 pounders which were too light for trench warfare but are well suited for battles of movement which would be more common across the vast width of North America. Canada would also likely receive QF 15 pounders, Bl 15 pounders and BL 12 pounders which were obsolete/semi obsolete types of field artillery capable of firing modern shells. The mainstay Canadian rifle is the 303 Ross. A finicky weapon n the trenches, but perhaps reliable out of the mud.

Mihais
20 Nov 11,, 12:07
Gallipoli failed because those in charge knew nothing about fighting and leading men in combat.the concept was sound,but everything from the operational planning to tactical level was a fiasco.

The idea of Entente landing in the US while being pummeled by the Germans in France isn't even worth talking about.Even if they do that,they'll be killed or captured after the first 100km,by the local ranchers.By then the Confederacy was not something that could move people.Heck,the Germans could not start a rebellion by Boers,under much favourable conditions.Not really the Germans fault.Simply the conditions on the ground did not favored the thing.

zraver
20 Nov 11,, 14:12
zraver you are again relying on the economics of the US not supporting Entente. The loss would work both ways as the US was the net profiteer of these loans, so whatever is invested in Britain by the US counts in the 'assets columns' on the US books and thus alows them to raise money on the basis of these assets. Thus US production potential is also hit. The simple fact is that Britain was in no danger of brankruptcy.

uhm no... the liquid assets of Europe (gold and securities) were used up by mid 1915. By the end of the war the Us had gone from a 3.5 billion per annum trade deficit to a 7 billion per annum trade surplus. The loss of European trade means a 3.5 billion per annum hole for Us companies to fill. Also as Europe used up its gold the US via the Federal Reserve increasingly had to issue loans to cover the balance of payments as this bypassed the gold standard since the money never left the US. The Federal reserve would "create" fiat money and loan it to the US government and then sell liberty bonds to cover the loans. This system was created before WWI- 1913 IIRC so its already in place. The economic impacts will not be as severe as you think.

Oh, and British was in danger of bankruptcy do you bother to read and research? In 1914 the BoE had the smallest gold reserves at 250mt. They then doubled it when the war started by buying up the South African production. They also made bank notes legal tender for all debts and any denomination and began exchanging notes for sovereigns. By the end of the war BoE gold reserves stood at 500mt but that was with years of South African production and pulling 732mt of gold in coin (out of 900mt total) out of the domestic market.

The UK ended the war with a debt of 4.5 billion US dollars. Gold was worth 553,881 dollars a ton. British debt which by prevailing law had to be paid in gold or goods thus amounted to 8100 tons of Gold: 16X what the BoE had on hand. By the end of the war there was 15,500mt of monetary gold, the US held 45% of it, the BOE 7%, global gold production had fallen from 700mt/yr to 500mt/yr.


You assume that in the Middle East the Entente must take the offensive and say another 190,000 troops may be needed.

No I don't, I say with Russia out the Ottomans have another 190,000 troops to use against the British and French.


On the contrary I would argue that sole priority of Entente forces in the Middle East is to keep Suez open. A series of defencive victories in Sinai would have been just crippling for Ottoman power as Allenbys advance on Jerusalem/Damascus.

Without the US, the UK is dependent on Persian oil and Burmese oil. With the Ottomans in Iraq and Palestine with Russia out the potential flood of Ottoman troops means the UK cannot afford to sit on the defensive. if the US is a belligerent and the Canadians are not on the Western front the situation in man power is even more critical.


As for landings in the US I am quite sure that a suitable candidate could have been found to raise the Confederate flag, which may force the northern states out of the war sooner rather than later and would certainly hamper their naval forces.

Thats a joke right? Such divides as existed in 1914+ were not near enough to lead to a new civil war. The Southern democrats were in firm political control and white supremacy was the law of the land. The South had plenty of small arms but no artillery to speak of, no industry and little food and is out numbered 4:1 or more if you count blacks for the North...

I assume that since your tacking towards civil war duex you've given up on the idea of the British invading the US? However, on the subject of civil war although using much smaller numbers overall- did the Irish revolt of 1916 knock Britain out of the war? Of 170,000 Irishmen involved in paramilitary activities 160,000 joined the British Army... Why do you think the American South would be different given historical Southern volunteer rates both before and after the US civil war.

For example in the Spanish American war the federal government asked Arkansas to supply 2 of it 4 state guard infantry regiments for service. The two regiments were created from all 4 to create a state-wide representative sample. Neither actually saw service being unfit (a problem for a new rebellious south as well) but they show two important things- 1. plenty of Arkansas willing to go die for a Yankee (Ohio) Republican (party of Lincoln) President and a Republican dominated congress. 2. Gov Daniel Webster Jones was a former CSA colonel and infantry regiment commander in the Civil War who fought in 3 battles was wounded in battle and taken Prisoner twice... Post war he was a democrat elector for president and as a member of the state house helped pass laws virtually disenfranchising the Republican and populist parties. he most definitely was NOT a scalawag (quisling). Yet when McKinley called Jones and Arkansas quickly sent their best... I picked Arkansas as illustrative becuase it was the most devastated of the Southern states population was, it was the poorest economically and was the most demographically isolated (so old wounds could fester) because of the Mississippi River and the transcontinental rail road naturally diverted people around the state. Arkansas had the least reason to go fight for the North.... but did so without hesitation.

The same thing is seen again in 1916 when the Entire Arkansas National Guard is mobilized and sent to the Mexican Border as part of the punitive efforts against Pancho Via. In 1919 these and other troops returning from WWI were turned loose on the black population in Elaine and killed an estimated 200 blacks so they were not peaceniks and closet Republicans. Again with the Central High desegregation crisis known as "The Little Rock 9", Gov Fabus called out the Guard to keep 9 black students out of Central High, then president Eisenhower federalized them and they then protected the 9 students against the Arkansas State Police and White Citizen's councils and did not fight the deployment of the 101st Airborne.

So who exactly is going to fight for the new confederacy?


In my opinion Gallipoli failed because it was telegraphed. 12 weeks before the main landing the Gallipoli peninsular was virtualy unoccupied.

The force sent in Feb 1915 was enough to do the job having bombarded the area from 19 Feb (my b-day) to 17 march. The Ottoman defenders were stove up and low on ammo- but then the allied fleet hit the mines losing 3 coastal battleships and 3 damaged. Adding more infantry to the occupation troops present at the time doesn't change the outcome. And what ever the delay cost the British was more than made up for by Von Sanders guessing wrong on where the allied landings a bit more than 4 not 12 weeks later occurred and thus mis-deploying his troops.

zraver
20 Nov 11,, 14:34
US Invasion Targets In Canada In 1916.

In the postulated what if- where would the US invade. Hisotircally the US was drawn like a moth to a flame to Toronto and Montreal/Quebec City. The importance of these two targets does not decrease in 1914-18 but increases.

Toronto- taking the city removes its threat to the ore trade and thus almost all US heavy industry. If relations were headed south in 1915 headed for war in 1916 an aggressive RN mining squadron on the Great Lakes (submarines?) could seriously hamper the entire US economy until they were hunted down and cleared out.

Taking Montreal/Quebec City and the St Lawrence Sea Way leading to Labrador, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island- cost the UK the Atlantic Cod fisheries, Canadian Wheat, the protected bays of the Gulf of St Lawrence, shipping lanes and naval depth, plus it costs Canada the bulk of the Canadian population. It also cuts a huge amount off of open ocean running for German sub freighters, U boats and commerce raiders.

Vancouver B.C, Vancouver Island and Victoria- American seizure of these two cities and one big island uncorks Puget Sound and denies the US an awesome protected bay. Complete American control of Puget Sound in 1916 with America on the side of the CP is a loaded .357 with a hair trigger pressed up against the temple of Japan

cyppok
20 Nov 11,, 19:22
Really.... they made 2 sorties past their own minefields in force- Dogger Bank and Jutland. Dogger Bank was a perfect ambush but battle damage and misunderstanding had the British chasing an armored cruiser letting the German battle cruisers escape. naval intercepts can't change that. Ditto at Jutland, the German escape was a tour de force in fleet maneuvers to save the fleet. The German battleships sortied on two other occasions and only one offered a chance for intercept which was taken and the HMS Repulse ended up trading fire with 2 German dreadnoughts. The high seas fleet et al only sortied once- Jutland.



Yes You are

Dogger Bank- 5 Uk vs 3 German battle cruisers- no battle ships
2nd Heglioland Blight- 3 UK battle cruisers, 2 Uk fast battleships vs 2 German dreadnoughts with Zeppelin support giving Germany the tactical intelligence edge

Those are the capitol ship engagements near Germany in WWI.



1. The German fleet did not offer battle and thus could not be destroyed
2. Gallipolli cost the allies several pre-dreadnoughts to mines- same problem vs the Germans.
3. The Jade can only br crossed with the tides... if the RN enters and suffers a serious reversal it cannot escape until the tide turns.
4. The Zeppelins gave the Germans an absolute tactical intelligence edge.
5. German U-boat bases in Belgium
6. Kiel Canal 1*
7. Kiel Canal 2*
8. rail roads



How do you account for the above listed 7 obstacles

KC1- the German fleet could rapidly transfer itself between Keil (east) and Williamnshaven (west) without setting to sea.
KC2- The canal is 110m wide and cuts the entire Jutland Peninsula. land anywhere in Denmark and you have to cross the canal.

the Bulk of the German army was in Belgium and the areas of France adjacent to it- only about 600km from Kiel and linked by excellent rail lines. The Germans can shift divisions by train faster than the UK can land regiments...

If the commander of one of the squadrons of the British ships relayed their sightings properly and/or opened fire when they sighted the capital ships during nightfall most of the fleet could have bore fire on the German ships.

Having 3/4 fronts instead of 2 would reduce troop concentration. Compelling Danes to engage would give a ready and able front-line while giving port access and ability to have harbors and minesweepers for the job to have freedom of action in the baltic sea. If the British land in Eastern Prussia behind the front line and cut off supplies your basically telling me this will have no effect on troops fighting Russia if they stop getting food/ammunition etc?... Canal can be closed and means nothing without a fleet to clear the enemy. Zeppelins burn and explode...

Mihais
20 Nov 11,, 20:31
There is a reason RN did not went after the HSF,and that's because the combined combat power of the coastal artillery,minefields and the fleet itself was far superior to anything available then.All German ports were heavily defended and there was no way anyone could have landed there.End of the story.
Attacking Denmark worked in Napoleon's favor.There's every chance that British troops landing in Denmark would die faster than at Gallipoli.

zraver
20 Nov 11,, 21:45
If the commander of one of the squadrons of the British ships relayed their sightings properly and/or opened fire when they sighted the capital ships during nightfall most of the fleet could have bore fire on the German ships.

The problem was a battle damaged wireless system and a signals book that could not accurately send the order given which was the same order Nelson gave at Trafalgar. As a result the order. Beatty ordered two things and they got flown at the same time,"Course NE" to limit the turn to 45°, and then added "Engage the enemy′s rear", this turned his battle cruisers on Blucher, and Beatty then tried Nelson's order of "engage the enemy more closely" which do the the updated signals book could only be sent as "keep nearer to the enemy" ie the Blucher. Superb British code breaking set the trap but the RN flubbed it and there is nothing to suggest they wouldn't flub it in a do over since they did flub it over and over again.


Having 3/4 fronts instead of 2 would reduce troop concentration. Compelling Danes to engage would give a ready and able front-line while giving port access and ability to have harbors and minesweepers for the job to have freedom of action in the baltic sea.

Seriously... Denmark had a population of 2 million which based on the size of the force they have fielded since 1864 to today (30-40,000 men consistent) and that Belgium (6 div) and Canada (4 div) fielded in or built in 1914/15 corresponds to a Royal Danish Army with roughly 2 divisions worth of troops. Germany had 98 divisions in 1914, 168.5 in 1915, 175 in April 1917 and spiked at 251 in 1918.

What useful front? Denmark had given up on military adventurism after 1864 and so had little war stocks. Those 2 divisions are not going to drive the German's out of South Jutland and cross the Kiel Canal. Not unless you give them massive British army reinforcements, which will tickle France and Belgium in all the right places...

What ports? Copenhagen? The Germans had sub bases in Belgium and two imperial naval ports linked by canal one on either side of Denmark... What does Copenhagen offer except sending slow vulnerable merchies directly past the German sub bases in Belgium?

British mine warfare assets in WWI were weak at best. When the Americans jumped in in 1917 along with a new electrically detonated promixity mine the US dropped 70% of the mines in the North Sea Barrage that was 234 miles long and 15 miles wide in 5 months... Not counting sinkings the RN went from 0 to 265 hulls by 1919. Assuming all flower class vessels but 1 were launched in 1914 and 1 in 1918 the maximum RN minesweeper strength in until the next class started adding to the fleet in 1916 was 111 hulls and probably much much less more like 25 hulls per year so roughly 50 minesweepers minus sinking going into 1916. Germany is not much better in 1914 but she has a much smaller area to worry about. But the Germans had 119 destroyers and torpedo boats in and around Germany in 1914. The UK has 200 destroyers but has convoys to escort, trade to protect, fleet scouting... So the numbers edge actually goes to the Germans.


If the British land in Eastern Prussia behind the front line and cut off supplies your basically telling me this will have no effect on troops fighting Russia if they stop getting food/ammunition etc?... Canal can be closed and means nothing without a fleet to clear the enemy. Zeppelins burn and explode...

You know that 9/10ths of the German Coast is unusable for landings via natural bars, reefs and other natural hazards right? And that in 1914 the German Coast was the most heavily defended coast in the world. Until 1885 the bulk of German naval relates spending went into forts not ships... The British had a history of launching pre-emptive strikes on enemy navies (Battle of Copenhagen 1807) and Imperial Germany was determined to avoid this. German coast defenses were so stout the Royal chose to patrol the 20 mile wide English Channel and 200 mile wide North Sea Gap rather than blockade the North Sea and Baltic directly. the RN wanted nothing to do with the German Coast, well Fisher did but he was over ruled and rightly so and the admiralty chose Gallipolli which offered much greater rewards and lower risks. had the English tried to invade Germany it would have been a disaster.

zraver
20 Nov 11,, 23:05
Examples of German coastal forts

Borkum a frisian island located at the mouth of the Ems river 12 miles off the coast and 60 miles from Holland 2x 10" batteries 2x 11" batteries 1x 15 or 16" battery. it guarded Emden and was the westernmost German gate- closest to France and the UK.

Cuxhaven- secondary naval base located at the mouth of the Elbe guarded by the sea forts Nuewerk, Kugelbake, and Grimmerhorn, and the batteries at Neues Fort, Dose, and Groden. Some extremely heavy metal was mounted here. On the northern shore there were lighter batteries at Neufeld and Brunsbüttel, to deal with any hostile ships which might have escaped the main defenses and were aiming for the canal locks at Brunsbüttel.

Konigsberg- ringed with a great rampart, 12 forts 6 east and 6 west of the city and 2 great forts between them- work on the fortifications only completed in 1905. 2 infantry brigades totaling 4 regiments,

Danzig- one of the three great naval ports of Imperial Germany- able to be flooded all around and guarded by 20 bastions and a garrison of 6000 army troops.

The entire German coast where landings can be made and supported is gibraltared up...

USSWisconsin
21 Nov 11,, 19:19
Maybe, but only three navies have pulled that type of a feat off- the UK, US and Japan and the US did it to Japan and Spain, the UK did it to Spain and France, Japan did it to Russia. So you would have arguably the worlds 2 most skilled navies with the likely 4th place entrant colliding. The rest of the navies are not really impressive when it comes to the clash of giants. In terms of skill, I'd rate the US the highest (barely) as in 1916 there were still veterans of Santiago de Cuba and Manila Bay- Adm Dewy (died 1917) Adms Fiske and Benson and Mahan had just recently died (1914). The British haven't had a major naval battle in a hundred years until Dogger Bank which was a wash. British innovation by Fisher in HMS Dreadnought may actually have been preceeded by the US with the USS South Carolina and Japan with the Satsuma. The IJNS Satsuma would have been the world first dreadnought but Japan had to cut corners becuase of funding.

As much as I would like to, I can't see the Spanish American war's big naval engagements as comparable to Trafalgar or Tsushima, the enemy "fleets" were pathetic compared to the forces the Americans brought to the battle, the outcome was very predictable - annhilation of the Spanish Armada. The other two examples were expected to go the other way. I don't beleive the USN was up to facing the RN in 1915, though they would have made a formidable reinforcement to the German HSF. Another point, the USN monitors were not battleships by most definitions, too slow, too unseaworthy, too small...

BD1
21 Nov 11,, 20:05
z, this belongs to separate thread!

Mihais
21 Nov 11,, 20:13
It's anyway excellent.

Tarek Morgen
21 Nov 11,, 22:08
Z, do you want me to move your scenario/story into a seperate thread or keep it here?

zraver
22 Nov 11,, 00:22
Z, do you want me to move your scenario/story into a seperate thread or keep it here?

move it- the title is: The Twist, The US Jumps Into The War In 1915.

Tarek Morgen
22 Nov 11,, 00:30
move it- the title is: The Twist, The US Jumps Into The War In 1915.

done. The story can now be found here:

http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/world-wars/61801-twist-us-jumps-into-war-1915-a.html

zraver
22 Nov 11,, 02:47
As much as I would like to, I can't see the Spanish American war's big naval engagements as comparable to Trafalgar or Tsushima, the enemy "fleets" were pathetic compared to the forces the Americans brought to the battle, the outcome was very predictable - annhilation of the Spanish Armada. The other two examples were expected to go the other way. I don't beleive the USN was up to facing the RN in 1915, though they would have made a formidable reinforcement to the German HSF. Another point, the USN monitors were not battleships by most definitions, too slow, too unseaworthy, too small...

I included the US action at Santiago de Cuba for the simple reason is that it was among if not the first clashes of post-iron clad all steel armor modern warships

cyppok
22 Nov 11,, 03:16
Zraver...

WW1 static defense Danish front could be opened and held and perhaps even pushed down due to not having concentrated defense.

Ergo if the British Land 200k troops and push southwards from Denmark they would be largely unopposed and with naval support for a while. If they establish line of control at the Canal and simply entrench, leave the forces enough to keep the defense strong and move on.

There are coastal stretches where the landing wouldn't have been opposed and if the British were smart they would encourage a Polish national uprising in addition to pushing to severe the Eight Army (in East Prussia) from supplies. The British would have two options attempt to push for Berlin (massive panic in Germany as the 'undefended capital is under attack) or establish Beachheads and maraud then move on until a tactical objective is set to either sever the Eastern front from supplies or take the capital.

zraver
22 Nov 11,, 15:14
Zraver...

WW1 static defense Danish front could be opened and held and perhaps even pushed down due to not having concentrated defense.

Static defense doesn't get them to Berlin... If the UK lands 200k, the Germans can hold them off forever with 120k....

Ergo if the British Land 200k troops and push southwards from Denmark they would be largely unopposed and with naval support for a while.[/quote]

The only naval support will be from the direct north.


If they establish line of control at the Canal and simply entrench, leave the forces enough to keep the defense strong and move on.

Why do you think the plodding British New Army will be able to the drive farther into the heat of the German responce than the superbly trained, highly motivated and well led Old Contempables?


There are coastal stretches where the landing wouldn't have been opposed

where?

[quotre]and if the British were smart they would encourage a Polish national uprising[/quote]

Until the treaty of Brest Polish nationalism was at low ebb and many Poles suported thier Imperial German masters.


In addition to pushing to severe the Eight Army (in East Prussia) from supplies. ]The British would have two options attempt to push for Berlin (massive panic in Germany as the 'undefended capital is under attack) or establish Beachheads and maraud then move on until a tactical objective is set to either sever the Eastern front from supplies or take the capital.

pipedream, the germans can shift divisions internally faster by rail than England can unload them by boat...

Skywatcher
22 Nov 11,, 17:04
The only significant number of Poles that would be willing to rebel at that time frame were in... Congress Poland. And the Germans were quite willing to give them their own state.

It would have been interesting to see what a Polish nation state would have looked like in the event of a WWI German victory (early on in the war, Berlin apparently wanted to attach Lithuania too).

tgbyhn
24 Nov 11,, 12:09
The entry of the United States into WWI on the side of the Central Powers would ensure a victory over France and Britain.

Let's assume the US enters in April 1917.

Slightly over 70% of Britain's grain consumption alone was imported in 1913, mainly from the US, Canada, Australia, India, and Russia. I'm going to assume that there was already close to a 100% disruption to imports from Russia due to there being less labor to farm due to conscription, and lack of suitable ports (the land and Baltic Sea routes being effectively blockaded).

The two largest sources of British grain imports in this time period were the US and Canada. US as an enemy entails the complete loss of imports from the US. The US would have had the capability to sever the Canadian railroads relatively quickly. The capture of Winnipeg would have completely severed railroad access to every point in Canada west of there, an immediate loss of grain production of the prairie provinces. The capture of Toronto would have likewise severed railroad access to every point west of there as well. Any shipping from Vancouver would be completely defenseless against the US Navy, the RCN being almost non-existent at this time. So Britain loses all imports from Canada as well.

Historically, the RN blockade of Germany had severe effects. The loss of US and Canadian exports would have had a much more devastating impact on Britain.

The main Canadian defense against a possible invasion at the time were their flying columns, to carry out preemptive attacks against cities such as Seattle, Minneapolis, and Buffalo, followed by a tactical retreat, destroying railroads and other infrastructure to delay an invasion. Given deployments to Europe at this time, I doubt the Canadians would have had the capability to mount successful attacks of this nature, and the US would sever these vital arteries within weeks.

With regards to the naval war... the Panama Canal would be shut down to Allied traffic. RN bases in Halifax, Bermuda, Hong Kong, and Singapore would be under threat. All commerce between Canada and Britain would be completely disrupted. If the RN were to counter the threats from the United States in the Atlantic and from the Pacific, the blockade against Germany would be weakened. Granted, RN ships doing convoy duties would be freed from protecting the merchant fleet from North America (due to the cessation of shipping), but the U-Boat fleet would also be freed to target the RN, or re-deploy significant forces to the Mediterranean and potentially cut off the Suez Canal. The RN and minor French Navy (and yet smaller Japanese Navy) are now facing off the German High Seas fleet (whom inflicted double their losses at Jutland) and the US Navy.

The US entry is a perfect storm for Britain. I don't think the US would even need to carry the war to Europe. Notwithstanding all the other factors, Britain would be facing a famine on the scale of the Irish Famine.

My hypothesis: Britain sues for peace within a few months of US entry into the war. Domino effect on France and Italy. If they decided to carry on the war, with mass starvation (maybe 700 calories a day of mainly oats and barley), millions of deaths, and a massive decline in resources for the war industries in the home isles, a strengthened German spring offensive of 1918 against a weakened France and Britain knocks them out of the war.

Whether Britain sued for peace in 1917 or was routed in spring 1918, the outcome is the same: a decisive German-US victory. There's just really no way Britain and France could have possibly won given the grave and dire economic and logistical situation with the US on the side of the Central Powers.

Doktor
24 Nov 11,, 12:42
Hello tgbyhn,

Would you like to introduce yourself? I was told not to show the way towards intro thread to the newcomers in order not to spoil them, so you will have to find it yourself ;)

zraver
24 Nov 11,, 23:38
With regards to the naval war... the Panama Canal would be shut down to Allied traffic. RN bases in , Hong Kong, and Singapore would be under threat.

The RN bases in the pacific would likey be safe, as the Japanese navy even with its deployments to the Indian Ocean, Med and Atlantic is still the dominant battle force by a huge margin. The US only has 1 pre-dreadnought permanently stationed in the Pacific. The US Pacific and Asiatic fleets have no modern submarines or destroyers, no scout cruisers.... The defenses in the Philippines are obsolete except for Ft Drum (from Mid 1916).

Pearl Harbor is not much better defended with its smaller area and two Endicott period forts (Weaver and Kamehameha) Weaver although constructed in 1899 is not re-armed with 16" guns until 1924. Although it might have had smaller guns of 10-14".

Kamehameha and its attached batteries add 8x 12" mortars, 2x 12" DC guns, 2x 6" DC guns and some lighter pieces.

Likewise the West Coast has a number of forts from the Endicott period but WWII showed that whole concept to be flawed.

tgbyhn
25 Nov 11,, 09:44
The issue of RN bases in Asia is an ant to the mountain of consequences the loss of imports from North America has on Britain.

But, OK.

USN vs. IJN, WWI:

Dreadnoughts & Battlecruisers: 16 USN, 9 IJN
Pre-dreadnoughts: 23 USN, 10 IJN
Cruisers (all types): 39 USN, 33 IJN
Destroyers: 114 USN, 77 IJN
Submarines: 79 USN, 15 IJN

The Japanese fleet in 1917 is very spread out. It's picking up the RN's slack in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, at the Cape of Good Hope and Singapore, and doing escort duty for Australia and New Zealand. And despite a few dozen engagements with German U-Boats, the Japanese sank exactly 0 U-Boats.

Furthermore, the Japanese fleet can't defend Winnipeg and it can't defend Toronto. Britain has a six-week supply of wheat in April 1917.

Britain still starves.

Britain still loses.

If Japan wants to fight a war one-on-one with the US after the Allied war effort in Europe collapses due to a devastating British famine and a lack of resources for war material, that's their prerogative. I'll bet Japan licks their finger to see what way the wind's blowing.

Some resources:
United States Navy, USN, World War 1 (http://www.naval-history.net/WW1NavyUS.htm)
Japanese Navy, IJN, World War 1 (http://www.naval-history.net/WW1NavyJapanese.htm)
http://www3.ocn.ne.jp/~y.hirama/yh_e_papers_Italy.html

zraver
25 Nov 11,, 18:12
The issue of RN bases in Asia is an ant to the mountain of consequences the loss of imports from North America has on Britain.

But, OK.

USN (Pacific and Asiatic fleets) vs. IJN, WWI:

Dreadnoughts & Battlecruisers: 0 USN, 9 IJN
Pre-dreadnoughts: 1 USN, 10 IJN
Cruisers (all types): 10 USN, 33 IJN
Destroyers: 14 USN, 77 IJN
Submarines: 9 USN, 15 IJN


The Japanese fleet in 1917 is very spread out. It's picking up the RN's slack in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, at the Cape of Good Hope and Singapore, and doing escort duty for Australia and New Zealand. And despite a few dozen engagements with German U-Boats, the Japanese sank exactly 0 U-Boats.

The USN is concentrated in along the Atlantic Coast and in the Gulf of Mexico. Although it can rapidly transit the Panama Canal that means a much weaker force to blockade Canada.


If Japan wants to fight a war one-on-one with the US after the Allied war effort in Europe collapses due to a devastating British famine and a lack of resources for war material, that's their prerogative. I'll bet Japan licks their finger to see what way the wind's blowing.

The US power in Asia is based on 2 locations: Hawaii and the Philippines. With out those 2 locations to provide oil and coal its going to be a hell of a stretch to get a US fleet to Asia to challenge Japan.


Some resources:
United States Navy, USN, World War 1 (http://www.naval-history.net/WW1NavyUS.htm)
Japanese Navy, IJN, World War 1 (http://www.naval-history.net/WW1NavyJapanese.htm)
http://www3.ocn.ne.jp/~y.hirama/yh_e_papers_Italy.html

other sources of wheat existed besides the US. Historically US abundance kept other countries production suppressed through nearness to the import markets and price suppression but that does not mean other countries can't step up. Canadian wheat doesn't register in WWI. India and Australia do however.

There are also other foods the Empire can import in a pinch by introducing rationing in the colonies. So six weeks is a not a hard number. Although admittedly Britain would be much worse off than Germany.


The Magazine of Wall Street and ... - Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=j2LPAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA937&lpg=PA937&dq=indian+wheat+exports+1915&source=bl&ots=CO8RQm7vYN&sig=ajBpNiErNyARbO1EWosP-WrUYd4&hl=en&ei=dsjPTuu-Jc3yggf0w_zCDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=indian%20wheat%20exports%201915&f=false)

Tarek Morgen
25 Nov 11,, 18:20
Quck question..might Britain be willing to starve Ireland to feed it's main isle & troops? If yes, would it affect the Easter Uprising?

zraver
25 Nov 11,, 21:29
Quck question..might Britain be willing to starve Ireland to feed it's main isle & troops? If yes, would it affect the Easter Uprising?

Ireland no, India yes, they did so in WWII. Putting India on a rationing system would likely free up a huge amount of grains. 300 million or so people each giviing up just 10 pounds of wheat use per annum will feed 115,000+ people in the British isles for a year


Of interest, from 1915-19 the Nile River area enjoyed near perfect conditions after a drought in 1914. Sudan alone exported 89,000 tons of wheat in 1915- enough to feed 6850 people in England. Not much but some. Using the various small producers plus India (wheat), South Africa (corn), Siam (rice) and Australia (wheat).

So England won't starve in 6 weeks, with some grain imports coming in, severe rationing and increased imports of other food stuffs like whale meat, fish etc they can easily make 3 months without major social or health impacts and like Germany probably a year or more before famine sets in.

The obvious solution for the UK in such a scenario is to hit the US hard quick and hopefully force a bearable peace and that means putting the Grand Fleet off the US coast. The Grand Fleet shelling New York City, Boston, Savannah etc is a threat the US navy can't ignore and it will have to give battle. So how much of the Grand Fleet has to sail to deal with 16 US dreadnoughts backed by 22 pre-dreadnoughts?

Of course the Royal navy has to leave a blocking force behind to try and at least contain the High Seas Fleet. Britain with a pre-dreadnought strength of 43-44 hulls can pull a lot of older battleships from other areas and create a mini-grand fleet. These ships are slower, lighter and less well armed but numbers have their own advantage.

tgbyhn
25 Nov 11,, 21:43
zraver,

A USN blockade is not necessary to effect the complete cessation of Canadian exports. The loss of Winnipeg, again, cuts off the production of the prairie provinces. The loss of Toronto cuts off most Canadian industry. The US can cut the Canadian railroad at any number of points it wishes.

other sources of wheat existed besides the US. Historically US abundance kept other countries production suppressed through nearness to the import markets and price suppression but that does not mean other countries can't step up.
As far as grain exports are concerned, yes, other sources are available, namely: India, Argentina, and Australia. However, with the cessation of shipping from North America, the U-Boat fleet is free to re-deploy the majority of its submarines to interdict this shipping in the Mediterranean and Atlantic.

Agricultural labor is being conscripted and slaughtered on the battlefields of Europe. Besides, if that were the case - the RN blockade of Germany would have had little impact. Germany had 270,000 sq. km. of arable land vs. Britain's 70,000 sq km. Germany had 244 people per arable sq. km., while Britain had 600 people per arable sq km. The earliest any possible increased agricultural production would have been felt would be August 1918 for Britain, January 1919 for Australia and Argentina, April 1918 for India.


Canadian wheat doesn't register in WWI. India and Australia do however.

There are also other foods the Empire can import in a pinch by introducing rationing in the colonies. So six weeks is a not a hard number. Although admittedly Britain would be much worse off than Germany.
False on the first three counts, true to a devastatingly greater degree than you imply on the fourth.

The yearly average for the 1910-1914 period: Canadian wheat exports to the UK averaged 1.05 million tons, second only to US exports of 1.14 million tons. India and Australia are 0.95 and 0.64 million tons (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=Mh_YuHaONo4C&pg=PA18&lpg=PA18&dq=sources+of+uk+wheat+imports+1828-1914&source=bl&ots=9v3hE75wVS&sig=GoycSTGBJcEAFzH8itKpKq9YJF4&hl=en&ei=Fv3PToeDKse-2wWnyYmWDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=sources%20of%20uk%20wheat%20imports%201828-1914&f=false). Furthermore, in 1917, the volume of Argentina's exports (almost entirely agricultural) fell 30% from 1916, and 40% from 1915 (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=FHTczGi4sv4C&pg=PR17&lpg=PR17&dq=argentina+grain+production+1915&source=bl&ots=3dvQTcFGEv&sig=knuttmhhHDiRqqlyGCwuPxNuLnA&hl=en&ei=Ku_PTqbbHpLo2gX3g_ioDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CEwQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=argentina%20grain%20production%201915&f=false). The Australian wheat crop declined 27% in 1917 from the 1915 production (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=WS0XAQAAIAAJ&pg=RA1-PA33&dq=Monthly+crop+reporter+1917&hl=en&ei=8_HPToW0Mc_-2QXr-82xDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CEMQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=Monthly%20crop%20reporter%201917&f=false). Worldwide production as a whole fell 25% in 1917 from 1916 (last source).

Less than 1% of world oat production (30,000 bushels), 9% for corn (274,000 bushels), 8% of the barley crop (117,000 bushels), 8% of the world's corn crop (266,000 bushels) and virtually no rye outside the British isles is produced in non-warring states of the world states Britain can trade with. Certainly not all of that is available to export anyways.

To reiterate, in 1917:
Canadian and American wheat exports (50% of British imports 1910-1914) are completely eliminated.
Russian exports of 696,000 tons were eliminated in World War I -- Russia did not export.
Argentinian agricultural exports fell 40% in 1917 from 1915.
Australian wheat production fell 27% in 1917 from 1915.
In April 1917, Britain has a six-week supply of wheat.
The supply lines to scant available sources of grain are increased by a factor of several.
The number of U-Boats per ton of British import shipping are increased by a factor of several.
Exacerbating the previous point, 79 American U-Boats join the 105 German.
No naval blockade of Canada is necessary for the US to eliminate Canadian exports, as the Canadian railroad (yes, on a east-west axis, overwhelmingly singular) can be severed at any number of points.
Thanks to Churchill's forward looking approach, the Royal Navy is mostly oil-burning by 1917 as well - the US is the source of much of that oil, having produced 70% of the world's oil in 1917 (source). (http://books.google.com/books?id=euENAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA524&lpg=PA524&dq=us+share+of+world+oil+production+1914&source=bl&ots=FBycO6nmra&sig=64ZPNCNpP0o6TZjv_D9r2RDAIqs&hl=en&ei=jwfQTojhCeXo2gW09smPDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CDwQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=us%20share%20of%20world%20oil%20production%20191 4&f=false)Iranian supplies are vastly more vulnerable to interdiction due to previously stressed points (more U-Boats in total and per ton of British shipping).

The obvious solution for the UK in such a scenario is to hit the US hard quick and hopefully force a bearable peace and that means putting the Grand Fleet off the US coast.
The Grand Fleet is positioned off of Germany in World War I for a good reason: it's necessary to bottle up the High Fleet. The RN in World War I is already stretched thin - the miniscule by comparison IJN is covering for them in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Pacific in 1917. Moving around RN ships at this time is almost akin to Herr H moving imaginary units around Berlin from his bunker in April 1945. Meanwhile the U-Boat fleet has almost doubled and the US fleet is in play. Britain cannot afford to let the genie out of the bottle with the High Fleet as well.

Furthermore, for a large majority of the RN's ships, it would be a one-way trip. The shortest possible round-trip distance between the nearest RN port in Ireland and New York is 5730 nautical miles.

With regards to the Pacific theater, it's insignificant to the point of almost being irrelevant.
The Japanese fleet cannot resolve the inevitable logistical and economic catastrophe that will hit Britain.
The temporary loss of any US Pacific territories poses no real burden in any way to the US.
Furthermore, 30% of Japanese trade was with the US during World War I. Less than 5% of US trade was with Japan during this same period (source) (http://salempress.com/Store/samples/american_business/american_business_japanese.htm).
The US can trade space for time. Canada does not have time, territorially. Britain does not have time with regards to food and the war economy. In a few short months, it is starving, lacking resources for war production, and credit has evaporated.
Japan is utterly screwed as soon as the fall of the British domino leads to a collapse on the Western Front. They'd be wise to lick their finger and stick it in the wind.

tgbyhn
25 Nov 11,, 22:03
Quck question..might Britain be willing to starve Ireland to feed it's main isle & troops? If yes, would it affect the Easter Uprising?
Britain has some 40 million people in 1914. The whole of Ireland has 4.3. Ireland was even more dependent on food imports than Britain during World War I. They'd be literally be trying to squeeze blood from a turnip.

zraver
26 Nov 11,, 00:17
zraver,

A USN blockade is not necessary to effect the complete cessation of Canadian exports. The loss of Winnipeg, again, cuts off the production of the prairie provinces. The loss of Toronto cuts off most Canadian industry. The US can cut the Canadian railroad at any number of points it wishes.

Never said it was


As far as grain exports are concerned, yes, other sources are available, namely: India, Argentina, and Australia. However, with the cessation of shipping from North America, the U-Boat fleet is free to re-deploy the majority of its submarines to interdict this shipping in the Mediterranean and Atlantic.

The majority of the U boats could not get any farther than they did. They didn't have the range. Plus the med and Adriatic didn't have the facilities to support an overly large number of u-boats.


False on the first three counts, true to a devastatingly greater degree than you imply on the fourth.

Then my source was mistaken on the first three.

As to the fourth, perhaps, perhaps not since the bulk of Germany's problem was an abject failure of that famed German organizational efficiency.


Iranian supplies are vastly more vulnerable to interdiction due to previously stressed points (more U-Boats in total and per ton of British shipping).[/LIST]

Again perhaps since I disagree they are more vulnerable to interdiction.

[qute]The Grand Fleet is positioned off of Germany in World War I for a good reason: it's necessary to bottle up the High Fleet. The RN in World War I is already stretched thin - the miniscule by comparison IJN is covering for them in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Pacific in 1917. Moving around RN ships at this time is almost akin to Herr H moving imaginary units around Berlin from his bunker in April 1945. Meanwhile the U-Boat fleet has almost doubled and the US fleet is in play. Britain cannot afford to let the genie out of the bottle with the High Fleet as well.[/quote]

That is absurd, so you think Jellico is going to stay parked and let Britain starve when he posses the only means to effect a quick resolution to a war with America? Although we disagree on how much time Britain has, we agree she has at least six weeks. Her only hope is the destruction of the American battle fleet followed by the destruction of one or more large American coastal cities to try and knock the US out of the war.


Furthermore, for a large majority of the RN's ships, it would be a one-way trip. The shortest possible round-trip distance between the nearest RN port in Ireland and New York is 5730 nautical miles.

The Royal navy has a major fleet facility in Bermuda with coaling stations at St Lucia and Jamaica. She also has the now Canadian Navy Yard at Halifax which also offers dry dock faculties. Both Halifax and Bermuda have dry docks in fact. The dock in Halifax can 9according to Irving shipbuilders which runs it now) handle vessels up to Pannamax size for repairs L- 289m x36m and new build up to 115m x 23m which will handle battleships and battle cruisers.

These are the 14 major global coaling stations

There were 14 main coaling stations in British possessions, at which vessels could refuel. Spinning your globe anti-clockwise from the international date line, the 14 were King George Sound and Thursday Island in Australia; Hong Kong and Singapore in the Far-East; Trincomalee and Colombo in Ceylon; Mauritius in the Indian Ocean and Aden at the mouth of the Red Sea; Simon’s Bay and Table Bay in South Africa; Sierra Leone in West Africa and St Helena in the South Atlantic; and, finally, Jamaica and Castries Bay, St Lucia in the Caribbean.


With regards to the Pacific theater, it's insignificant to the point of almost being irrelevant.
[list] The Japanese fleet cannot resolve the inevitable logistical and economic catastrophe that will hit Britain.
The temporary loss of any US Pacific territories poses no real burden in any way to the US.

Trading space for time isn't the problem in the US, trading coastal cities is. The Japanese fleet isn't large compared to the big three, but its as much bigger than the combined US Asiatic and pacific fleets the Royal navy was to the IJN. From Victoria the Japanese can raid down the US West Coast and there is precious little to stop them. Puget Sound and the San Franscico Bay area are the only areas with real protection. San Diego, Portland and Los Angeles are low hanging fruit.

tgbyhn
26 Nov 11,, 03:12
The majority of the U boats could not get any farther than they did. They didn't have the range. Plus the med and Adriatic didn't have the facilities to support an overly large number of u-boats.
The range of the U-Boats were far greater than any ship in the RN surface fleet.

U-Boat ranges:
UC II (64 built): 8000 mi
UB II (30 built): 6650 mi
Mittel U (46 built): 11220 mi
UB III: 8500 miles

Again perhaps since I disagree they are more vulnerable to interdiction.
There ratio of U-Boats to British ton of shipping increases severalfold. The US has 80 U-Boats covering the western Atlantic - the further frees German U-Boats to target shipping in the Mediterranean, Bay of Biscay, Atlantic, English Channel, Irish Sea.

On what basis is the remaining British shipping not more vulnerable?

That is absurd, so you think Jellico is going to stay parked and let Britain starve when he posses the only means to effect a quick resolution to a war with America? Although we disagree on how much time Britain has, we agree she has at least six weeks. Her only hope is the destruction of the American battle fleet followed by the destruction of one or more large American coastal cities to try and knock the US out of the war.
Jellico's fleet isn't exactly an atomic bomb here.

Rough numbers for the respective fleets:
Dreadnoughts/Battlecruisers: RN 50, USN/KM 42
Pre-dreadnoughts: RN 41, USN/KM 47
Armored/protected cruisers cruisers: RN 58, USN/KM 53
Lighter cruisers: RN 119, USN/KM 42
Destroyers: RN 350-400, USN/KM 250-300
Submarines: RN 117, USN/KM 200
So the RN has a slight edge in battleships, heavy cruisers, and destroyers and a large advantage in light cruisers. USN/KM has a slight edge in pre-dreadnoughts and a large advantage in submarines.

Not exactly the kind of numbers that's going to give the RN the edge it needs to bring the US to its knees. The two sides are almost at parity, if every single British ship in the world deploys to the Atlantic for operations against the US.

Let's be realistic - the Royal Navy isn't going to arrive en masse on the US seaboard the next day and catch the US unprepared. The Grand Fleet is likely going to have to sail around the north of Britain, down to Queenstown and other British ports, there's going to be a traffic jam of fueling and taking on supplies, followed by a weeks journey across the Atlantic.

The Gallipoli campaign, for comparison, commenced 5 weeks after preparations had begun in earnest.

The logistics involved probably entail a couple of months of preparation and sail time. Meanwhile the High Seas Fleet is raising all kinds of hell.

There were 14 main coaling stations in British possessions
Only four of them are of any use in naval operations against the US. Two of these at minimum (Halifax and Jamaica) are extremely vulnerable given their distance from Gitmo and the US northeast.

At least three of these coaling stations receive all of their coal from the US (Bermuda, Jamaica, St. Lucia - source (http://books.google.com/books?id=4zQwAAAAYAAJ&pg=RA3-PA12&lpg=RA3-PA12&dq=coaling+station+jamaica&source=bl&ots=rFUgkYJdiV&sig=PSxw6X1Rf23Y6vsCFWQa-_KJNE0&hl=en&ei=rzzQTtW_B6a-2AX1w_irDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CDEQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=coaling%20station%20jamaica&f=false)). If Britain is able to retain all four coaling stations, and that's if, it's going to have to undertake a herculean effort to supply all of them with coal from the British Isles.

If Halifax receives coal from the US or Canada - it's cut off too. What about oil-powered ships? There's no oil for Britain in the Western Hemisphere.

Trading space for time isn't the problem in the US, trading coastal cities is. The Japanese fleet isn't large compared to the big three, but its as much bigger than the combined US Asiatic and pacific fleets the Royal navy was to the IJN. From Victoria the Japanese can raid down the US West Coast and there is precious little to stop them. Puget Sound and the San Franscico Bay area are the only areas with real protection. San Diego, Portland and Los Angeles are low hanging fruit.
Precious little to stop them except the width of the Pacific and the reality of the logistics involved. The Japanese face a logistical nightmare in attacking the US West Coast. For the ships that do have the range to reach the west coast in a perfectly straight line - it's a one way trip. This operation would be months in the making, and necessitate the taking of Honolulu.

Victoria? I could hit Victoria with a slingshot from the US shore. A bunch of civilians with rifles could paddle over in canoes and rowboats and take the city. Not a chance.

You run into that problem alot when speaking of a hypothetical US invasion of Canada - everything important is within a 3 day march or 2 hour drive.

And again, it's not as if these strategies are atom bombs that are going to be delivered overnight. They'd involve careful, lengthy preparation with a better chance of failing than succeeding.

zraver
26 Nov 11,, 08:24
The range of the U-Boats were far greater than any ship in the RN surface fleet.

U-Boat ranges:
UC II (64 built): 8000 mi
UB II (30 built): 6650 mi
Mittel U (46 built): 11220 mi
UB III: 8500 miles

Your either full of the brown stuff or stupid... which is it? That nice fat range of the UC II for example is at 5knts on the surface. Compared to a QE class at 8500nm at 12knts or an Iron Duke class 14000nm at 10knts... You have to step down to the Orion class to get under 7000nm at 10knts.


There ratio of U-Boats to British ton of shipping increases severalfold. The US has 80 U-Boats covering the western Atlantic - the further frees German U-Boats to target shipping in the Mediterranean, Bay of Biscay, Atlantic, English Channel, Irish Sea.

On what basis is the remaining British shipping not more vulnerable?

Fewer convoy routes means a higher density of escorts...


Jellico's fleet isn't exactly an atomic bomb here.

No, but its as close as the world got before Trinity. lets say the fleet you listed below averages to 8 guns per hull each firing a 1200lb shell. Thats a Grand Fleet (just dreadnoughts) single salvo throw weight of 240 tons.... The fleet will very quickly approach A bomb levels of destruction.


Rough numbers for the respective fleets:
Dreadnoughts/Battlecruisers: RN 50, USN/KM 42
Pre-dreadnoughts: RN 41, USN/KM 47
Armored/protected cruisers cruisers: RN 58, USN/KM 53
Lighter cruisers: RN 119, USN/KM 42
Destroyers: RN 350-400, USN/KM 250-300
Submarines: RN 117, USN/KM 200
So the RN has a slight edge in battleships, heavy cruisers, and destroyers and a large advantage in light cruisers. USN/KM has a slight edge in pre-dreadnoughts and a large advantage in submarines.

Not exactly the kind of numbers that's going to give the RN the edge it needs to bring the US to its knees. The two sides are almost at parity, if every single British ship in the world deploys to the Atlantic for operations against the US.

The Grand Fleet is big enough to take on the USN and present a real risk of crushing it. Comparing the combined fleets only works if the USN and Germany can link up. Plus by 1917 due to a variety of reasons the KM's pre-dreadnoughts were mothballed except for 6 hulls.

As for subs... US submarines were mostly junk. 9 of our boats were in the Philippines and were not much better than harbor sbubs 7knts submerged and only 1 tube and 4 torpedoes(A class) or 2 tubes and 6 torpedoes (B class). You have to get to the K class to get real ocean going range and that removes the first 31 US subs...


Let's be realistic - the Royal Navy isn't going to arrive en masse on the US seaboard the next day and catch the US unprepared. The Grand Fleet is likely going to have to sail around the north of Britain, down to Queenstown and other British ports, there's going to be a traffic jam of fueling and taking on supplies, followed by a weeks journey across the Atlantic.

2806 miles from Derry Ireland to Halifax Nova Scotia or 305 (13 days) hours of sailing time at 8 knots (9.2mph) not counting time added for zig-zagging and other moves until clear of the submarine threat.

As for the US being caught with its pants down, no, but where is the fleet going to show up? The British controlled the bulk of the trans-Atlantic cables and was quite adept at cutting those belonging to the others.


The Gallipoli campaign, for comparison, commenced 5 weeks after preparations had begun in earnest.

Yup five weeks, similar distances involved and the fleet had to be assembled which it would not have to be in if the Grand Fleet's dreadnought force was sent en masse leaving the pre-dreadnoughts to bottle the HSF. In a pinch and need to catch the US napping the HSF can be in Halifax on D+14.


The logistics involved probably entail a couple of months of preparation and sail time. Meanwhile the High Seas Fleet is raising all kinds of hell. The GF's dreadnoughts were kept ready, only a few hulls missed Jutland for example. And what HSF hell?


Only four of them are of any use in naval operations against the US. Two of these at minimum (Halifax and Jamaica) are extremely vulnerable given their distance from Gitmo and the US northeast.



[quote]If Halifax receives coal from the US or Canada - it's cut off too. What about oil-powered ships? There's no oil for Britain in the Western Hemisphere.

Why would Halifax be cut off?


Precious little to stop them except the width of the Pacific and the reality of the logistics involved. The Japanese face a logistical nightmare in attacking the US West Coast. For the ships that do have the range to reach the west coast in a perfectly straight line - it's a one way trip. This operation would be months in the making, and necessitate the taking of Honolulu.

Victoria? I could hit Victoria with a slingshot from the US shore. A bunch of civilians with rifles could paddle over in canoes and rowboats and take the city. Not a chance.

Benedict Arnold said that too you know... I am guessing your not from Washington I am. You want to paddle to Victoria Island go for it...

1x 6" gun
4x 12 pounder QF
2x 9.2" gun
2x 4" naval guns


You run into that problem a lot when speaking of a hypothetical US invasion of Canada - everything important is within a 3 day march or 2 hour drive.

well in 1917 you won't be driving or marching to Victoria unless you want to wait until 1960 which is a bit more than 3 days...


And again, it's not as if these strategies are atom bombs that are going to be delivered overnight. They'd involve careful, lengthy preparation with a better chance of failing than succeeding.

.... becuase the military never rushes things...

tgbyhn
26 Nov 11,, 12:27
Your either full of the brown stuff or stupid... which is it? That nice fat range of the UC II for example is at 5knts on the surface. Compared to a QE class at 8500nm at 12knts or an Iron Duke class 14000nm at 10knts... You have to step down to the Orion class to get under 7000nm at 10knts.
Of the 415-odd submarines Germany built from 1906-1918, 366 would have been capable of reaching the US with ease, the overwhelming majority at speeds of 10 knots. Only 49 German U-Boats would have been incapable of reaching the US.

Wilhelmshaven to New York - 3500nmi around the north of the British Isles.

German U-Boat class, range/speed - (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=V2r_TBjR2TYC&pg=PA134&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false)
U-17, 6700nmi/8kn - max 14.9kn
U-19, 7600nmi/8kn - max 15.4kn
U-23, 7620nmi/8kn - max 16.7kn
U-27, 7900nmi/8kn - max 16.7kn
U-31, 7800nmi/8kn - max 16.4kn
U-43, 8100nmi/8kn - max 15.2kn
U-51, 9000nmi/8kn - max 17.1kn
U-57, 7730nmi/8kn - max 14.7kn
U-63, 8100nmi/8kn - max 16.5kn
U-66, 6500nmi/8kn - max 16.8kn
U-71, 5800nmi/7kn - max 10.6kn (minelayer)
U-81, 8100nmi/8kn - max 16.8kn
U-87, 8000nmi/8kn - max 15.6kn
U-93, 8300nmi/8kn - max 16.8kn
U-115, 9800nmi/8kn - max 16kn
U-117, 9400nmi/8kn - max 14.7kn (minelayer)
U-127, 10,000nmi/8kn - max 16.8kn
U-139, 17,750nmi/8kn - max 15.3kn
U-142, 20,000nmi/8kn - max 17.5kn
U-151, 25,000nmi/5.5kn - max 12.4kn
U-158, 12,370nmi/8kn - max 16kn
U-213, 12,000nmi/8kn - max 18kn
U-229, 11,400nmi/8kn - max 16.5kn
UB-II, 6650-8150nmi/5kn - max 9kn ("coastal")
UB-III, 7200-9040nmi/6kn - max 13.5kn ("coastal")
UC-II, 7280-10,000nmi/7kn - max 11.6kn (minelayer)
UC-III, 9850nmi/7kn - max 11.5kn (minelayer)

tgbyhn
26 Nov 11,, 14:45
Fewer convoy routes means a higher density of escorts...
Indeed, I pointed that out in my first post: "Granted, RN ships doing convoy duties would be freed from protecting the merchant fleet from North America (due to the cessation of shipping)."

“The Allies floated to victory on a wave of oil.” - Lord Curzon

The US supplied 80% of this oil. RN convoys from Iran going to have to travel around the Arabian peninsula, through the Red and Mediterranean Sea to get to France, around Spain to Britain, and across the Atlantic for your Grand Fleet against the US eastern seaboard.

The oil situation is as follows:
The US supplied 80% of the oil consumption of the Allied nations, historically (source (http://books.google.com/books?id=7gkoAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA77&lpg=PA77&dq=uk+petroleum+consumption+1917&source=bl&ots=fbKJKnSgzu&sig=FpGUn8o2j0jYsmxndHNAvxOF44c&hl=en&ei=oOrQTsOtG8_TgQfz5szODQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=uk%20petroleum%20consumption%201917&f=false)).
US oil exports were 61,000,000 barrels in 1917, 93% of it refined (source (http://books.google.com/books?id=3fdbalH7f8oC&pg=PA14&lpg=PA14&dq=us+refined+oil+exports+allies+wwi&source=bl&ots=wuY_GWP9Xp&sig=89rwySkWkM5CTn8g2Y0zfuCm9N4&hl=en&ei=QtrQTojxH8zxggfstciHBA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=us%20refined%20oil%20exports%20allies%20wwi&f=false)).
Iranian oil production in 1918 was 8.6 million barrels, with a capacity to refine 7.3 million barrels. (source (http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/oil-industry-ii))
To maintain current levels of consumption, the Allies are going to need to find 58.3 million barrels of oil per year, and expand refining capacity by nearly 60 million barrels per year (source (http://books.google.com/books?id=7gkoAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA77&lpg=PA77&dq=uk+petroleum+consumption+1917&source=bl&ots=fbKJKnSgzu&sig=FpGUn8o2j0jYsmxndHNAvxOF44c&hl=en&ei=oOrQTsOtG8_TgQfz5szODQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=uk%20petroleum%20consumption%201917&f=false)).
The British will need to ensure adequate oil supplies for RN operations at all necessary RN fueling stations.
The RN will need to dedicate many ships to safeguard oil convoys to all necessary ports fueling stations. These ships will not be available to strike the US eastern seaport.
Initial RN operations against the US are going to be limited to coal-burning vessels.
The shortage of fuel for motor vehicle transport and tanks in France is going to have a negative impact on Allied offensive and defensive capabilities against Germany.
Needless to say - the Allies face an impossible situation.


The Grand Fleet is big enough to take on the USN and present a real risk of crushing it. Comparing the combined fleets only works if the USN and Germany can link up. Plus by 1917 due to a variety of reasons the KM's pre-dreadnoughts were mothballed except for 6 hulls.
The US Navy would be rather outnumbered. But what's to stop elements of the KM from sailing for North America? Nobody in the way. You have the British completely withdrawing from the North Sea, resolved to undertake a do-or-die operation before their war effort collapses.

I'm going to assume the KM can get them operational within a few weeks - they haven't been mothballed for long and there's nothing to suggest they're in poor condition.

As for subs... US submarines were mostly junk. 9 of our boats were in the Philippines and were not much better than harbor sbubs 7knts submerged and only 1 tube and 4 torpedoes(A class) or 2 tubes and 6 torpedoes (B class). You have to get to the K class to get real ocean going range and that removes the first 31 US subs...
If the British fleet is going to be within 15km in US homewaters to bombard an American city, they'd be a threat. The RN certainly never dared to get that close to the German coastline.

2806 miles from Derry Ireland to Halifax Nova Scotia or 305 (13 days) hours of sailing time at 8 knots (9.2mph) not counting time added for zig-zagging and other moves until clear of the submarine threat.
First there's the 750nm from the Grand Fleet's deployment in the North Sea around the north of Britain to Derry. I'm sure the KM is going to be playing a few tricks on the RN with U-Boats and the High Seas fleet. Add 5-6 days.

Are there any British ports capable of simultaneously refitting, resupplying, and refueling the entire Grand Fleet? If not, it's going to have to split up among several ports.

When the Grand Fleet arrives in their respective ports, the coal-powered ships are going to have to have a coal barge pull up and coal them up. Any oil-powered and oil-sprayed ships are going to need to go where there is oil to fill up from what remains of Britain's few precious weeks of oil stockpiles.

Every ship is going to need to be resupplied with ammunition, food, water, and other provisions. They're going to have to be stocked well given they're sailing into waters where there are no ports where they can resupply. No doubt there will be ships that need to be refitted and have maintenance done. Any crew members unfit for duty due to injury or illness will need to be swapped out for new crew members. This doesn't happen overnight - it takes several weeks.

After the debate dies down in Parliament and the War Ministries, the Grand Fleet is going to need to regroup, which could take several days. Then it's going to sail off into the yonder. Zig-zagging and no doubt coming across a few U-Boats along the way, it's two weeks sail from Derry to Halifax. And when they get there, refueling stations will have little to no fuel due to being cut off by the US. Boston's two days out from Halifax, a city severed by rail from any re-supply from the rest of Canada.

What's the disposition of the US fleet? Have any elements of the KM arrived in US waters? U-Boats, US submarine screens?

In the precious few minutes that remain before the British war effort collapses, the British are going to have to pray that they can bombard a major US city, and that this will force the Americans out of the war, notwithstanding the fact if successful, that it's a war crime beyond the pale of any grievance the US had with Germany historically, that it won't have the effect of the impressment of US sailors, the Maine, 20 Lusitanias, Pearl Harbor, or 9/11 with Britain being in the distinct position of being at the absolute end of her ropes.


Why would Halifax be cut off?
The only two railways that connect the Maritimes to the rest of Canada pass within 20 miles of Maine on the east bank of the St. Lawrence for a 100-mile stretch. There's numerous other points the railways can be cut further south and west.


Benedict Arnold said that too you know... I am guessing your not from Washington I am. You want to paddle to Victoria Island go for it...

1x 6" gun
4x 12 pounder QF
2x 9.2" gun
2x 4" naval guns
Singapore 1942. The US doesn't need to engage any naval defenses at Victoria or Kingston.

Kingston: the US has Marines and Army deployed in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Panama and Guantanamo Bay. I think we can take it for granted they have sea transport. It can pick a suitable landing spot(s), ferry troops, and take the city by land.
Victoria: ferry US troops over undefended waters to an undefended beach. March into the city.
Halifax: invest it from the east bank of the St. Lawrence.

USSWisconsin
26 Nov 11,, 17:55
The oil issue is a big one, without American oil, the British effort no doubt would have suffered, and possibly even failed (the post Queen Elizabeth, Revenge class battleships were intended to be coal burning due to concern over oil supplies). The oil issue has consequences far beyond the effects on the battleships. But on the subject of WWI battlefleets, the RN GF was much more battle ready than the USN, and still held the place of the the world's foremost navy, it wasn't until after the end of WWI that the USN was in a position to rival the GF, most of her good battleships had just been completed at the beginning of WWI, and weren't yet worked up or debugged - her first dreadnoughts (the South Carolinas and Delawares) were quite troublesome and were soon scrapped since their problems were too hard to fix. The Floridas and Wyomings were marginal, and stayed around longer as training vessels, with the last of these being pressed into service as a NGFS ship in WWII (USS Arkansas). The super dreadnought hulls (starting with the New York Class) were the first world class post dreadnoughts the US built. A lot of attention has been given to the superb WWII battleships the USN fielded, the USN was not in that position at the start of WWI. Her policy of building slow battleships during this period was always questionable. My point being that the USN was not a contender to defeat the RN with its battleship fleet during WWI, though in WWII it could have easily done this.

zraver
26 Nov 11,, 20:16
The US supplied 80% of this oil. RN convoys from Iran going to have to travel around the Arabian peninsula, through the Red and Mediterranean Sea to get to France, around Spain to Britain, and across the Atlantic for your Grand Fleet against the US eastern seaboard.

oil et al... like food, the tap is blocked but the tank isn't empty yet... More reason to knock the US out quick if possible.

As for the impact on the Western Front, if Allied offesnes get forestalled this actually leaves them in a stronger position than if they go forward... 1917 was ruinous for them.



The US Navy would be rather outnumbered. But what's to stop elements of the KM from sailing for North America? Nobody in the way. You have the British completely withdrawing from the North Sea, resolved to undertake a do-or-die operation before their war effort collapses.

No, I had the RN stop up the North Sea with the pre-dreanoughts.


I'm going to assume the KM can get them operational within a few weeks - they haven't been mothballed for long and there's nothing to suggest they're in poor condition.

The relative inactivity of the HSF led to increasing numbers of sailors volunteering for U-boats to be where the action was so those crews don't exist anymore. They are either on more modern ships, in a u boat or dead. You might be able to pull in cadres but the crews need to be trained up.


If the British fleet is going to be within 15km in US homewaters to bombard an American city, they'd be a threat. The RN certainly never dared to get that close to the German coastline.

shipboard mounted 12" had an effective range of 22,000m

The German coast was much smaller, had far fewer port cities and much more extensive mine belts.


First there's the 750nm from the Grand Fleet's deployment in the North Sea around the north of Britain to Derry. I'm sure the KM is going to be playing a few tricks on the RN with U-Boats and the High Seas fleet. Add 5-6 days.

If the HSF knows... even money at best.

Then you got transit times from the German or Belgian submarine bases to the area of operations.

Other subs except for those operating around Ireland to intercept incoming merchant ships are out of position.

The RN is going to swamp the area with escorts, mines and torpedo nets.


Are there any British ports capable of simultaneously refitting, resupplying, and refueling the entire Grand Fleet? If not, it's going to have to split up among several ports.

Belfast (Ireland), Firth of Clyde (Western Scotland), Liverpool, Barrow in Furness, Barry in Wales, Cardiff in Wales, Fleetwood, Garston, Newport (Wales), Plymouth, Port Talbot, Silloth, Southhampton, Swansea, Exeter-Teignmouth-Shaldon-Ringmore, Troon (SW Scotland), Berehaven (Ireland RN base), Queenstown (RN base Ireland), Lough Swilly (RN Base Ireland), Rosslare (Ireland), Arklow (Ireland), Dublin (Ireland), Holyhead (Wales).....

The United Kingdom in 1917 is still the Worlds biggest maritme powerr ports are not a problem. That list isn't even close to complete BTW... with the interior rail network the ports no longe rhad to be close to the population so any deep water access could be built up and was. The GF can get in and get out with minimal disruption and minimal delay if they are willing to split up


When the Grand Fleet arrives in their respective ports, the coal-powered ships are going to have to have a coal barge pull up and coal them up. Any oil-powered and oil-sprayed ships are going to need to go where there is oil to fill up from what remains of Britain's few precious weeks of oil stockpiles.

Again I refer to the interior rail net works, the oil will be there.


Every ship is going to need to be resupplied with ammunition, food, water, and other provisions.

Why? why ship ammo and food and water from Royth and Scapa Flow?


They're going to have to be stocked well given they're sailing into waters where there are no ports where they can resupply.

Iceland, Halifax, Labrador.... they might get sick of fish but food and water can be had.


No doubt there will be ships that need to be refitted and have maintenance done. Any crew members unfit for duty due to injury or illness will need to be swapped out for new crew members. This doesn't happen overnight - it takes several weeks.

Yup, of 33 dreadnoughts in British service in may 16 HMS Dreadnought (the oldest) and HMS Royal Sovereign and Resolution (the newest 2, May 16) missed the Battle of Jutland, plus 1 other. The other 28 including the brandnew HMS Royal Oak did not.

Since the UK would only add 1 dreadnought after 1916, and since the battle of Jutland was not planned by the British but sprung on them by the HSF, I think that wastage rate of 10% is probably a good bell weather.


Plus the RN has 9 battle cruisers in 1917 plus the possibility of up to 7 French Dreadnoughts since by 1917 its obvious the AH navy is a non-entity.

Total big gun platforms (maximum effort with French support) is 49 with 44-45 deployable. Assume the same escort force as Jutland which adds 8 cruisers, 26 light cruisers, 78 destroyers and a sea plane carrier. Possibly more sea plane carriers given the nature of the mission.



After the debate dies down in Parliament and the War Ministries, the Grand Fleet is going to need to regroup, which could take several days. Then it's going to sail off into the yonder. Zig-zagging and no doubt coming across a few U-Boats along the way, it's two weeks sail from Derry to Halifax. And when they get there, refueling stations will have little to no fuel due to being cut off by the US. Boston's two days out from Halifax, a city severed by rail from any re-supply from the rest of Canada.

There is a British cruiser squadron in North America plus some lighter escort vessels. I don't think the Maine national Guard can cut Halifax given the number of armed Canadians there preparing to sail for France and the RN squadron.


What's the disposition of the US fleet? Have any elements of the KM arrived in US waters? U-Boats, US submarine screens?

Much of the US fleet is likely off Vera Cruz or split between Newport News, Philidelphia, Boston navy yard, Washington Navy Yard, Gitmo, Brooklynn Navy yard, New London, Goat Island, Portsmouth Naval Yard (ME), Charleston Naval Yard (MA), Curtiss Bay USCG, Indian Head, Norfolk, Pennsacola.


In the precious few minutes that remain before the British war effort collapses, the British are going to have to pray that they can bombard a major US city, and that this will force the Americans out of the war, notwithstanding the fact if successful, that it's a war crime beyond the pale of any grievance the US had with Germany historically, that it won't have the effect of the impressment of US sailors, the Maine, 20 Lusitanias, Pearl Harbor, or 9/11 with Britain being in the distinct position of being at the absolute end of her ropes.

No... the threat to the US is the loss of a city or two which forces the USN to give battle in a do or die attempt. If the USN fails then the bulk of the US population is suddenly under the guns of the Royal Navy.


The only two railways that connect the Maritimes to the rest of Canada pass within 20 miles of Maine on the east bank of the St. Lawrence for a 100-mile stretch. There's numerous other points the railways can be cut further south and west.

see above


Singapore 1942. The US doesn't need to engage any naval defenses at Victoria or Kingston.

Kingston: the US has Marines and Army deployed in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Panama and Guantanamo Bay. I think we can take it for granted they have sea transport. It can pick a suitable landing spot(s), ferry troops, and take the city by land.
Victoria: ferry US troops over undefended waters to an undefended beach. March into the city.
Halifax: invest it from the east bank of the St. Lawrence.

I guess you missed the point that ships or no ships those are trained troops and Canadians in 1917 were just as well armed as Americans...

zraver
27 Nov 11,, 01:13
US battle fleet April 1917

6x super dreadnoughts
6x dreadnoughts
2x semi dreadnoughts
5x pre-dreadnought 12/45
8x pre-dreadnought 12/40
1x pre-dreadnought 13BP
7x pre-dreadnought 13BP (in reduced commission)
15 knot fleet- 16 hulls
20 knot fleet 12 hulls

The seniors...

USS Indiana BB1 (Indiana class 1895 4x 13"/35 black powder 15knts, 10288tn, low freeboard) recommissioned 1917 to serve as a gunnery training ship.
USS Massachusetts BB2 (Indiana class 1896 4x 13" black powder 15knts, 10288 tn, low freeboard) recommissioned 1917 as a training ship.
USS Iowa BB4 (Imp Indiana class 1897 4x 13"/35, Harvey armor, 18knt, 11346tn) 1917 serving as receiving and guard ship Chesapeake bay
USS Kearsarge BB5 (Kearsarge class, 1900, 4x 13"/35, 16kn, 11540 tnt) Training ship Massachusetts and Maine Naval Militia.
USS Kentucky BB6 (Kearsarge class, 1900, 4x 13"/35 16knt, 11520tn) starts year at Brooklyn Naval yard, in Virginia in May 1917 for duty as a training ship.
USS Illinois BB7 (Illinois class, 1901, 4x 13"/35 16knt, 11565tn) in service in Atlantic fleet as at sea training vessel location unknown
USS Alabama BB8 (Illinois class, 1900, 4x 13/35", 16knts, 11565tn) receiving and training ship Philadelphia

Active duty pre-dreadnoughts
13" blackpowder
USS Wisconsin BB9, (Illinois class 1901, 4x 13/35", 16knts, 11565tn) active duty and midshipman's training ship

12/40" cordite
USS Maine BB10 (Maine class, 1902, 4x 12/40" guns, 18knts 12500tn) active duty and training ship
USS Missouri BB11 (Maine class, 1903 4x 12/40", 18knts 12500tn) recommissioning April 1917 at Philadelphia.
USS Ohio BB12 (Maine class, 1904, 4x 12/40", 18knts) recommissioning April 1917 Philadelphia
USS Virginia BB13 (Virginian class, 1906, 4x 12/40", 19knt, 15000tn) in overhaul in Boston until Aug 17, 1917
USS Nebraska BB14 (Virginia class, 1907, 4x 12/40", 19knt, 15000tn) finishing repairs in Boston, gunnery training ship for merchant crews.
USS Georgia BB15 (Virginia class, 1907, 4x 12/40", 19knt, 15000tn), gunnery training ship for merchant seamen
USS New Jersey BB16 (Virginia class, 1906, 4x 12/40", 19knt, 15000tn) gunnery training ship in the Chesapeake Bay
USS Rhode Island BB17 (Virginia class, 1906, 4x 12/40", 19knt, 15000tn) full commission March 1917 flagship batdiv 3 Hampton Roads

12/45"
USS Connecticut BB18 (Connecticut class, 1906, 4x 12/45, 18knt, 16000tn) flagship batdiv 5 York River Virginia
USS Louisiana BB19 (Connecticut class, 1907, 4x 12/45, 18knt, 16000tn) gunnery and engineering training ship
USS Vermont BB20 (Connecticut class, 1907, 4x 12/45, 18knt, 16000tn) under repair and overhaul in Philadelphia until Aug 1917
USS Kansas BB21 (Connecticut class, 1907, 4x 12/45, 18knt, 16000tn) bat div 4 from July 1917, engineering training ship
USS Minnesota BB22 (Connecticut class, 1907, 4x 12/45, 18knt, 16000tn) bat div 4, engineering training ship
USS New Hampshire BB25 (Connecticut class, 1908, 4x 12/45, 18knt, 16000tn) in overhaul, gunnery and engineering training ship

Semi-Dreadnoughts
USS South Carolina BB26 (South Carolina class, 1910, 8x 12/45 super firing, 18knt, 16000tn) active duty
USS Michigan BB27 (South Carolina class, 1910, 8x 12/45 super firing, 18knt, 16000tn) active duty

Dreadnoughts
USS Delaware BB28 (Delaware class, 1910, 10x 12/45, 21knt, 20300tn) bat div 9
USS North Dakota BB29 (Delaware class, 1910, 10x 12/45, 21knt, 20300tn) York River gunnery and engineering training ship
USS Florida BB30 (Florida class, 1911, 10x 12/45, 21knt, 21,800tn) bat div 9
USS Utah BB31 (Florida class, 1911, 10x 12/45, 21knt, 21800tn) engineering ad gunnery training ship
USS Wyoming BB32 (Wyoming class, 1912, 12x 12/50, 21knt, 27240tn) bat div 9
USS Arkansas BB33 (Wyoming class, 1912, 12x 12/50, 21knt, 27240tn) bat div 7 York River

Super Dreadnoughts

14"
USS New York BB34 (New York Class, 1914, 10x 14", 21knt, 27200tn) flagship bat div 9
USS Texas BB35 (New York Class, 1914, 10x 14", 21knt, 27200tn AA guns, directors and rangefinders) Hampton Roads, gunnery training ship for merchant seamen

Standard Type
USS Nevada BB36 (Nevada class, 1916, 10x 14, 20knt, 27500tn, triple gun turrets, oil fired, all or nothing armor) bat div 9
USS Oklahoma (Nevada class, 1916, 10x 14, 20knt, 27500tn ) active duty
USS Pennsylvania BB38 (Pennsylvania class, 1916, 12x 14", 21knt, 31400tn, oil only) flagship Atlantic fleet
USS Arizona BB39 (Pennsylvania class, 1916, 12x 14", 21knt, 29,500tn) bat div 8, gunnery training ship for merchant seamen.

13" black powder guns limited to 12,000yrds range. AP round 1130lbs at 1340fps
12"/50 23900 yards, AP round 870lbs @ 2900fps
12"/45 range 22000 yards AP round 870lbs @2400fps
12"/40 range 19,000 yards AP round 870lbs @2100fps
14/45" 21,000 yards AP round 1400lbs @2600fps

USSWisconsin
27 Nov 11,, 01:52
Semi-Dreadnoughts
USS South Carolina BB26 (South Carolina class, 1910, 8x 12/45 super firing, 18knt, 16000tn) active duty
USS Michigan BB27 (South Carolina class, 1910, 8x 12/45 super firing, 18knt, 16000tn) active duty
Why are you calling these semi-dreadnoughts? They are dreadnoughts, although they are pretty slow for this type. A semi dreadnought is like the Lord Nelson or Satsuma, with an intermediate battery of heavy guns (9.2" to 10"). The US never built any semi-dreadnoughts.

zraver
27 Nov 11,, 02:21
Why are you calling these semi-dreadnoughts? They are dreadnoughts, although they are pretty slow for this type. A semi dreadnought is like the Lord Nelson or Satsuma, with an intermediate battery of heavy guns (9.2" to 10"). The US never built any semi-dreadnoughts.

Because they can't fight in the battle line without dangerously slowing it down. They have the all big gun armament of the Dreadnought but not the speed. So does it matter if its armament or speed? A dreadnought is a fast (by 1906 standards) all big gun battleship and the South Carolina class doesn't meet that criteria. For example after taking a torpedo hit at Jutland the HMS Malbourough saw her battle speed reduce to 16-17knts from 18knts as reported by Sir Cecil Burney Vc Adm first battle squadron at 6:02pm. That is still faster than the South Carolinas... limit the US fleet to 15 knots in the open ocean vs the Grand fleet and it will be the end of the United States as a naval power. However, putting those ships in line with the pre-dreadnoughts greatly increases the power of the near shore 2nd class battle fleet as each one is effectively 2 battle ships worth of firepower.

First Battle Squadron (divisions 5 and 6)
Div 6 (Vc Adm Burney)
HMS Marlborough
HMS Revenge
HMS Hercules
HMS Agincourt
Div 5 (Vc Adm Guant)
Colossus
Collingwood
Neptune
st Vincent

zraver
27 Nov 11,, 02:40
Of note, Beatty entered the fight at Jutland at a speed of 25 knots (maximum speed) and the Grand Fleet at 18 knots (3 knot reserve).

zraver
27 Nov 11,, 11:09
The throw weights of the competing open ocean high speed battle fleets. Of note the British has 4 gun classes in service, 3 of those classes each throws more steel than the entire US dreadnought fleet. Once of the classes (13.5) throws more steel than the US dreadnought and pre-dreadnought fleets combined. Max feasible Grand Fleet Broadside was 241.6 tons of steel per minute sent down range..... Theoretical maximum down range fire is 24,160 tons sent down range at 100 rounds per gun..... that is equal to the combined weight of the USS Maine BB10 and USS Missouri BB11...


US Navy

40 x 12/45 round 870lbs @2400fps
24 x 12/50 AP round 870lbs @ 2900fps
64x 14/45 1400lbs @2600fps

12" combined throw weight 55680lbs
14" combined throw weight 89600lbs
Combined US throw weight 145280lbs per combined broad side
With 12" pre-dreadnoughts thrown in (for an extra 62640lbs) 207,920

Royal Navy

76 x 12/45 850lb AP @ 2725fps
40x 12/50 850lb AP shell @ 2850fps
164 x13.5/45 firing 1265lb AP shell at 2582fps (note the 10 guns on the HMS Erin fire a lighter shell)
10x 14/45 1586lb AP @ 2500fps
84x 15/42 1920lb AP @ 2575fps

combined 12" throw weight 98600lbs
combined 13.5" throw weight 207460lbs
combined 14" throw weight 15860lbs
combined 15" throw weight 161280lbs
combined Grand Fleet throw weight 483,200lbs per combined broadside
Grand Fleet throw weight -10% 398880lbs
Grand Fleet throw weight -20% 350560lbs.

British numbers are for the Battle of Jutland OOB minus battle and post battle sinkins plus post battle commissions. British numbers are a tiny bit off becuase of HMS Erin but we are taking a portion of 1%.

zraver
27 Nov 11,, 11:17
You know if they kept 1 reload per ship on hand and the equiv from 1906-1917 of one reload per ship in training shells thats equal to 3 more dreadnoughts- HMS Abundance Of Steel, HMS Downrange and HMS Donation To The Enemy.....

That is just for the dreadnoughts and battlecruisers....

tgbyhn
27 Nov 11,, 12:17
I'm going to take several posts to address your last post.

We've taken a solid look at the dire food and oil situation based on hard facts facing the UK.

I've taken care to take the time to make heavily detailed posts accurately depicting the cold, hard realities of the situation thus far (e.g. the severe food and oil crises).

In the first post, I'm going to address your North Sea pre-dreadnought strategy. Withdrawing the Grand Fleet from the North Sea:


No, I had the RN stop up the North Sea with the pre-dreanoughts.

You have 8 pre-dreadnoughts available in April 1917. This element of your strategy is impossible to implement. Even I was dead wrong in quoting the total of these pre-dreadnoughts as having been part of RN strength in previous posts.

Pre-dreadnoughts (48 completed 1892-1908)
8 mothballed (Jupiter, Prince George [sickbay], Vengeance [partially disarmed], London, Venerable [undergoing refit until Jan 1918], Duncan [undergoing refit until Jan 1918], Ablemarle, Prince of Wales)
6 scrapped before war (Royal Sovereign, Ramillies, Royal Oak, Repulse, Resolution, Empress of India)
5 sunk at Gallipoli (Goliath, Irresistible, Majestic, Ocean, Triumph)
4 sunk by U-Boats or mines (Formidable, Cornwallis, Russell, King Edward VII)
3 deployed in Aegean Squadron, bottling up Goeben and Breslau (Implacable, Lord Nelson, Agamemnon)
2 converted into a depot ship (Illustrious, Mars)
2 in the South Atlantic (Africa, Brittania)
1 ran aground 1906 (Montagu)
1 converted into a troop ship (Hannibal)
1 converted to depot ship (Queen)
1 converted into an ammunition ship (Magnificent)
1 converted to anti-aircraft ship (Canopus)
1 deployed to Barents sea (Glory)
1 mothballed, under conversion to accommodation ship (Swiftsure)
1 in the Indian Ocean (Exmouth)
1 converted to repair ship (Victorious)
1 under refit (New Zealand)
source (http://www.worldwar1.co.uk/pre-dread.htm)

tgbyhn
27 Nov 11,, 12:20
deleted

zraver
27 Nov 11,, 14:23
below I identify 18-19 pre-dreadnoughts and a source of crews that can be rushed into service. The Italians and French might have to do a bit more work but they massively outgun the AH/Ottoman navies anyway. To those old war wagons are what ever dreadnoughts do not sail with the Grand Fleet likely 3-4 hull using Jutland as a guide. That gives the Home Fleet a force of 15-16 pre-dreadnoughts and 3-4 dreadnoughts at anyone time. Plus the French can provide 1 or 2 to give the North sea at least 1 full division of dreadnoughts. An ideal force to fend off the High Seas Fleet.... of course not, but when the course is do something and maybe lose the war or do nothing and definitely lose the war... Plus given the sheer size advantage of the Grand Fleet over the USN it might be able to spare an extra couple of dreadnoughts for the home waters. Generally speaking 2.5 pre-dreadnoughts equal 1 dreadnought in fore power. Home Fleet would thus be 9-10 dreadnought equiv, if the Grand Fleet left an extra 2 behind and France provided 2 that is a force of 14 dreadnought equiv against 24 dreadnought equiv of the KM. Again not ideal, but what do you do unless your advocating that that Britain would just surrender and walk away from her dead and her allies.

HMS Cornwallis is still afloat on 1 Jan 1917 so whens the war start?
HMS Jupiter in reserve
HMS Prince George.
HMS Ablemarle will refit in march and can likely be rushed back to service.
HMS Duncan is not in refit until April 17
HMS Prince of Wales not converted to an accommodation ship until march 17
HMS Queen still has her big guns until October 17
HMS Vengeance does not begin to be de-armed until 1918
HMS Glory in commission in Russia
HMS Albion in service as a guard ship
HMS Canopus not used as a depot ship until 1918 and is reserve in ordinary in 1917
HMS Caesar is in North America (doomed in this scenario)
HMS Commonwealth Nore command
HMS Dominion Nore command
HMS Hindustan Nore Command
HMS Britannia is in the West Indies until May 17 (doomed in the this scenario)
HMS Africa is at Gibraltar undergoing a refit of her secondary armament
HMS Hibernia Nore command
HMS Swiftsure is in Freetown
HMS Lord Nelson
HMS Agamemnon

To this can be added some RN sea monitors designed to block narrow passages or to provide crews for the mothballed vessels.
HMS Abercrombie
HMS Raglan
HMS Havelock
HMS Roberts
HMS Lord Clive
HMS Gen Crauford
HMS Earl of Peterbourogh
HMS Sir Thomas Picton
HMS Prince Eugene
HMS Prince Rupert
HMS Sir John Moore
HMS Gen Wolfe
HMS Terror
HMS Erebus

Italy
5x pre-dreadnoughts
5 dreadnoughts

France
14-15x pre-dreadnoughts (1 goes boom in march 17)
7x dreadnought

Greece

2x pre-dreadnought (from June 1917)

vs

Ottoman
1x pre-dreadnought
1x battle cruiser

AH
9x pre-dreadnought
4x dreadnought

tgbyhn
27 Nov 11,, 15:56
The Grand Fleet has an 18-day sail of 3500nm to the environs of Boston from the North Sea, if it takes the shortest possible route, without stopping to take on any fuel, food, or ammunition or encountering any problems. You've been saying 13 days with all of that and zigzagging. It's going to take more than 18 days, and certainly more than 13.

I maintain it's going to take the RN at least 5 weeks of preparation and travel. I'd be floored if anybody with expertise on naval issues and/or period history supported your numbers and disputed mine.


Plus the RN has 9 battle cruisers in 1917 plus the possibility of up to 7 French Dreadnoughts since by 1917 its obvious the AH navy is a non-entity.
All those French dreadnoughts at this point are based at Salonika in the Aegean, 11-15 days sail from Gibraltar. They're likely there because their presence is necessary, and they're under French, not British control.

Allied oil imports have plummeted by 90% - you're going to withdraw warships from the Mediterranean where the only remaining Allied oil is passing through? If I recall, you already stated that there would be an increase in remaining convoy protection.

Allied shipping losses in the Mediterranean in 1917 were 1.5 million tons, the peak year. There's obviously some kind of entity there. Shipping losses reached their peak in April - the same time you're saying warships could be withdrawn from the Med. Or strengthening naval presence. It seems you're of two minds on this point. You've gone back and forth on this a number of times.


As for the impact on the Western Front, if Allied offesnes get forestalled this actually leaves them in a stronger position than if they go forward... 1917 was ruinous for them.
1917 gets more ruinous. It takes some twisted logic to turn this into a plus for the Allies. The Russian war effort has practically all but collapsed, with one last catastrophic offensive in July. The US has entered the war on the side of Germany. French morale is at its absolute low with the mutinies of 54 French divisions right around the corner. No reinforcements coming from overseas. Immediate cessation of shipping from virtually all overseas resources the Allies are dependent on.

And now apparently the Western Front is frozen in place without a shot or shell being fired until the RN completes the far-fetched strategy you've proposed, which, even if it were possible, would do nothing to restore fuel exports or the greater portion of food exports.


Much of the US fleet is likely off Vera Cruz or split between Newport News, Philidelphia, Boston navy yard, Washington Navy Yard, Gitmo, Brooklynn Navy yard, New London, Goat Island, Portsmouth Naval Yard (ME), Charleston Naval Yard (MA), Curtiss Bay USCG, Indian Head, Norfolk, Pennsacola.
So the vast majority of the US fleet is within two days sail of it's northernmost major city.


The relative inactivity of the HSF led to increasing numbers of sailors volunteering for U-boats to be where the action was so those crews don't exist anymore. They are either on more modern ships, in a u boat or dead. You might be able to pull in cadres but the crews need to be trained up.
You've got 8 dreadnoughts blockading Germany. Eight.


Then you got transit times from the German or Belgian submarine bases to the area of operations.
In your last reply, I was either "full of the brown stuff or stupid" for implying the U-Boats could even reach the United States. Which I disproved after citing evidence 88% of U-Boats the Germans built were capable of reaching the US with ease. They're just about as far as the Grand Fleet, and have much less serious logistical issues.


If the HSF knows... even money at best.
The High Seas Fleet is certainly going to know. Something as dramatic as the withdrawal of the entire Grand Fleet is going to be obvious.


The RN is going to swamp the area with escorts, mines and torpedo nets.

You've got eight dreadnoughts facing 46 U-Boats and the High Seas Fleet. The ever-cautious Jellicoe didn't believe that the U-Boats could be defeated, yet he's supposed to instantaneously deploy mass countermeasures.


Iceland, Halifax, Labrador.... they might get sick of fish but food and water can be had.
Reykjavik is further from Halifax than Queenstown, Ireland is. Iceland has 90,000 people, dirt poor.


There is a British cruiser squadron in North America plus some lighter escort vessels. I don't think the Maine national Guard can cut Halifax given the number of armed Canadians there preparing to sail for France and the RN squadron.
The railway runs between within 15-20 miles of the Maine border for 100 miles, at distances between 375 to 500 miles from Halifax. Besides, there's any of number of points Canadian rail can be disrupted. The Canadian border is 4000 miles long. The overwhelming majority of Canadian transport infrastructure and population is precariously close to the US border.

Going back to your atom bomb argument.

In every contemporary and postwar assessment of Jellicoe, one word surfaces repeatedly, cautious. Your strategy is many things, but certainly not Jellicoe.
A fleet nearly the equal of the Grand Fleet of Jutland bombarded the Dardanelles for 11 months to almost no effect.
Conventional bombing raids of cities never forced Britain, Germany, or Japan out of the war in WWII.
Every historical attack against the US has never demoralized her, but instead whipped its populace into a frenzy and provoked a mass war effort.
RN salvos against coastal targets can't be specifically targeted.
They're certainly unlikely to cause many civilian casualties as the approach of a large naval fleet is extremely obvious. There's a lot of time to get out of the way.
A quick calculation of British dreadnought shell weight and storage capacity comes to about 25-30,000 tons for the 12-15 inch guns, doing less damage per ton compared to bombs dropped in WWII. You don't have enough ammunition for the job.

I guess you missed the point that ships or no ships those are trained troops and Canadians in 1917 were just as well armed as Americans...
The US doesn't need to besiege Halifax to cut it off. Winnipeg eliminates food. Points in Ontario and Quebec eliminate industrial goods. The US, obviously, is not supplying Halifax anymore. Victoria isn't garrisoned, and I doubt Kingston is either. Singapore, 1942.

The vast majority of Canadian forces in April 1917 were already deployed to Britain and France. There was no conscription yet at this point either.

When a country's transport infrastructure and population is strung out across 4000 miles within 50-75 miles of the enemy's border, there's going to be problems.

Doktor
27 Nov 11,, 16:16
I must admit, I am lost. Tho, it's good beef, pardon read :pop:

tgbyhn
27 Nov 11,, 17:45
Striking Caesar and Brittania, I'll go over your list.

Pre-dreadnoughts
HMS Cornwallis is still afloat on 1 Jan 1917 so whens the war start?
--US entered war April 1917, as previously stated, sunk Jan 1918
HMS Jupiter in reserve
--several weeks to prepare
HMS Prince George.
--several weeks to prepare
HMS Ablemarle will refit in march and can likely be rushed back to service.
--undergoing replacement of guns until May 1917, several weeks to prepare
HMS Duncan is not in refit until April 17
--dubious a ship about to go a 9 month refit historically is going to be fit for duty
HMS Prince of Wales not converted to an accommodation ship until march 17
--US entered war April 1917, as previously stated
HMS Queen still has her big guns until October 17
--12 six-inch guns removed prior to April, left with 4 12-inch guns. Unlikely to be re-deployed within several weeks if even deemed fit for service.
HMS Vengeance does not begin to be de-armed until 1918
--several weeks to prepare
HMS Glory in commission in Russia
--at least two weeks out from nearest UK port, refuel, resupply, then sail to the North Sea
HMS Albion in service as a guard ship
--among the eight originally ready for duty
HMS Canopus not used as a depot ship until 1918 and is reserve in ordinary in 1917
--several weeks to prepare
HMS Commonwealth Nore command
--among the eight originally ready for duty
HMS Dominion Nore command
--among the eight originally ready for duty
HMS Hindustan Nore Command.
--among the eight originally ready for duty
HMS Africa is at Gibraltar undergoing a refit of her secondary armament
--performing convoy duty between Sierra Leone and Cape Town April 1917. 3500-6500nmi from North Sea.
HMS Hibernia Nore command
--among the eight originally ready for duty
HMS Swiftsure is in Freetown
--not paid off until Apr 12. You can have that one.
HMS Lord Nelson
--3500nmi from North Sea, not including refuel and resupply. Guarding the Goeben and Breslau.
HMS Agamemnon
--3500nmi from North Sea, not including refuel and resupply. Guarding the Goeben and Breslau.

So you have 9 available for service immediately. The rest will take several weeks to recrew, refuel, and resupply, or several weeks to transit to Britain to refuel and resupply before deploying to the North Sea.


To this can be added some RN sea monitors designed to block narrow passages or to provide crews for the mothballed vessels.

7 monitors are engaged off Belgium against the German U-Boat port (Lord Clive, General Crauford, Prince Eugene, Prince Rupert, Sir John Moore, General Wolfe, Terror, Erebus). Redeploying or taking them out of service to crew pre-dreadnoughts is going to have consequences.
2 monitors are at Yarmouth (Roberts, General Wolfe)
The crews from these 9 monitors can staff 2 pre-dreadnoughts.
5 monitors are in the east Mediterranean, mainly at the Dardanelles, some 3200nmi from Britain, a sail of at minimum 23 days to England using the shortest possible route running into no problems (Abercrombie, Raglan, Havelock, Earl of Peterbourogh, Sir Thomas Picton)



Italy
--5x pre-dreadnoughts, 5 dreadnoughts
France
--14-15x pre-dreadnoughts, 7x dreadnought
Greece
These ships aren't at the disposal of the Royal Navy. The French and Italians aren't going to sacrifice their interests and needs for the sake of an unrealistic British gamble. Furthermore, the Mediterranean would be almost completely denuded of naval forces. Suez is cut off, the Dardanelles are opened up, and there would be a cessation of shipping activity in the Mediterranean.

And again, despite your previous claims of the Mediterranean being a non-factor - 1.5 million tons of shipping were lost there in 1917, April being the peak month.

You can't play some numbers game as if there's no consequences.

USSWisconsin
27 Nov 11,, 18:40
Because they can't fight in the battle line without dangerously slowing it down. They have the all big gun armament of the Dreadnought but not the speed. So does it matter if its armament or speed? A dreadnought is a fast (by 1906 standards) all big gun battleship and the South Carolina class doesn't meet that criteria. For example after taking a torpedo hit at Jutland the HMS Malbourough saw her battle speed reduce to 16-17knts from 18knts as reported by Sir Cecil Burney Vc Adm first battle squadron at 6:02pm. That is still faster than the South Carolinas... limit the US fleet to 15 knots in the open ocean vs the Grand fleet and it will be the end of the United States as a naval power. However, putting those ships in line with the pre-dreadnoughts greatly increases the power of the near shore 2nd class battle fleet as each one is effectively 2 battle ships worth of firepower.

First Battle Squadron (divisions 5 and 6)
Div 6 (Vc Adm Burney)
HMS Marlborough
HMS Revenge
HMS Hercules
HMS Agincourt
Div 5 (Vc Adm Guant)
Colossus
Collingwood
Neptune
st Vincent

Good analysis of these ship's capabilities, I see you are using a different definition of semi dreadnought than the one I am familiar with (but this is only sematics, and doesn't change the tactical situation at all). I agree that those slow dreadnoughts would seriously impare the already slow USN battleline, it is sad that the US built such advanced ships (superfiring main turrets fore and aft, matching HMS Dreadnoughts broadside with two fewer guns) early in the dreadnought period, but crippled them with inadequate engines and low freeboard. This helps explain the South Carolina's short service lives, being scrapped as treaty consessions early in the game, when they were still quite young, though they were probably destined to suffer this fate regardless of the treaty, since they were never successful in their intended role (and they didn't have room for upgrades to turbines due to their compact size). The Delawares were much better in terms of engine upgradability, but still had many flaws, including being lousy sea boats (the Floridas were only marginally better). The fact that all four classes of US dreadnoughts were designed and laid down before any of them got to sea and permitted experience with the designs, made them all troublesome, and none of them were very good compared to their European counterparts. Had the treaty not been signed, they all probably would have been scrapped much sooner.
http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/battleships-board/55157-how-many-battleships-were-built-8.html#post826975

This has evolved into a very interesting thread, thank you.

zraver
27 Nov 11,, 19:32
The Grand Fleet has an 18-day sail of 3500nm to the environs of Boston from the North Sea, if it takes the shortest possible route, without stopping to take on any fuel, food, or ammunition or encountering any problems. You've been saying 13 days with all of that and zigzagging. It's going to take more than 18 days, and certainly more than 13.

No I did not, do you know how to read? I said it was 13 days sailing from Derry at 12-13knots IIRC. if they bump it to 14knots they don't need to zig-zag (as much) as that was considered torpedo safe speed under normal conditions (HMS Marlborough was hit at 18 knots during Jutland but from a cruiser fired torpedo)


I maintain it's going to take the RN at least 5 weeks of preparation and travel. I'd be floored if anybody with expertise on naval issues and/or period history supported your numbers and disputed mine.

5 weeks.... it didn't take them 5 weeks to deploy to Dogger Bank or Jutland... Jellico had 48 hours from the warning from Room 40 to when the Grand Fleet left Scapa Flow and Cromaty 2.5 hours before the HSF. In 1990 the National Defense Reserve Fleet had ships activated, inspected, crewed, loaded and enroute within 2 weeks.



All those French dreadnoughts at this point are based at Salonika in the Aegean, 11-15 days sail from Gibraltar. They're likely there because their presence is necessary, and they're under French, not British control.

And if Britain starves France learns German....


Allied oil imports have plummeted by 90% - you're going to withdraw warships from the Mediterranean where the only remaining Allied oil is passing through? If I recall, you already stated that there would be an increase in remaining convoy protection.

The only battleship to sink a submarine was HMS Dreadnought and she did it by accident. You don't need battleships for convoy escoprt after the destruction of the KM true warships turned surface raiders.


Allied shipping losses in the Mediterranean in 1917 were 1.5 million tons, the peak year. There's obviously some kind of entity there. Shipping losses reached their peak in April - the same time you're saying warships could be withdrawn from the Med. Or strengthening naval presence. It seems you're of two minds on this point. You've gone back and forth on this a number of times.

1 mind, I'm talking about battleships. Escorts stay, the escort fleet for the Grand Fleet can be made up of the ships fleeing North American waters.



1917 gets more ruinous. It takes some twisted logic to turn this into a plus for the Allies. The Russian war effort has practically all but collapsed, with one last catastrophic offensive in July. The US has entered the war on the side of Germany. French morale is at its absolute low with the mutinies of 54 French divisions right around the corner. No reinforcements coming from overseas. Immediate cessation of shipping from virtually all overseas resources the Allies are dependent on.

But no Haig wasting men like they were grown like corn.


And now apparently the Western Front is frozen in place without a shot or shell being fired until the RN completes the far-fetched strategy you've proposed, which, even if it were possible, would do nothing to restore fuel exports or the greater portion of food exports.

There will be fighting and trench raids but no big offensives.


So the vast majority of the US fleet is within two days sail of it's northernmost major city.

no its not, its a lot closer than the GF but the US battle fleet is spread hither and yon from Gitmo to Maine


You've got 8 dreadnoughts blockading Germany. Eight.

and....?



In your last reply, I was either "full of the brown stuff or stupid" for implying the U-Boats could even reach the United States. Which I disproved after citing evidence 88% of U-Boats the Germans built were capable of reaching the US with ease. They're just about as far as the Grand Fleet, and have much less serious logistical issues.

They have much more serious logistical issues. Its 3700 miles from Belgium to New York in a straight short line, but the u-boats wanting to hunt in North America need to get off the main shipping lanes so they can run on the surface lets say that adds 15% so 4250 each way. At 5 knots that is 740 hours of sailing time or 30 days each way. That leaves 30 days for much slower patrolling and lurking as 90 days is the normal maximum for a patrol before stores run out.



The High Seas Fleet is certainly going to know. Something as dramatic as the withdrawal of the entire Grand Fleet is going to be obvious.

Knowing something is going on, and knowing what is going on are different things


You've got eight dreadnoughts facing 46 U-Boats and the High Seas Fleet. The ever-cautious Jellicoe didn't believe that the U-Boats could be defeated, yet he's supposed to instantaneously deploy mass countermeasures.

a bit more than that...

ya the ever cautious Jellico who started later with more units to move and still beat Scheer out of port.. Who during the night of the Battle of Jutland tried aggressively to get in front of the HSF to cut them off from Germany...



Reykjavik is further from Halifax than Queenstown, Ireland is. Iceland has 90,000 people, dirt poor.

Reykjavik to halifax Nova Scotia 2092 miles its 2900 miles from Halifax to Dublin, 2120 from Queens town.



The railway runs between within 15-20 miles of the Maine border for 100 miles, at distances between 375 to 500 miles from Halifax. Besides, there's any of number of points Canadian rail can be disrupted. The Canadian border is 4000 miles long. The overwhelming majority of Canadian transport infrastructure and population is precariously close to the US border.

And the Canadians won't defend themselves or repair rail lines? Its funny you seem to argue a fully staffed battle fleet needs 5 weeks but the US national Guard can deploy for operations in a foreign country and sustain operations and conduct force protection within hours of the guardsmen getting their call phone call ups... hate to tell you but there are no cell phones and those units need to assemble, drill, arm and train.


Going back to your atom bomb argument.

In every contemporary and postwar assessment of Jellicoe, one word surfaces repeatedly, cautious. Your strategy is many things, but certainly not Jellicoe.

dissagree


A fleet nearly the equal of the Grand Fleet of Jutland bombarded the Dardanelles for 11 months to almost no effect.

not even close 1 dreadnought with 8x 15" and 16 pre-dreadnoughts with a guessed at average of 4 12"-13.5" guns each. That is 72 heavy tubes or the striking power of 6-7 dreadnoughts.


Conventional bombing raids of cities never forced Britain, Germany, or Japan out of the war in WWII.

But they or the threat of them did force Holland, Poland, Spain and Denmark...


Every historical attack against the US has never demoralized her, but instead whipped its populace into a frenzy and provoked a mass war effort.

And the US has just as long a history of freaking out over perceived threats.


RN salvos against coastal targets can't be specifically targeted.

So they can hit an enemy ship traveling at 25 knots but not a building standing still....


They're certainly unlikely to cause many civilian casualties as the approach of a large naval fleet is extremely obvious.

true, it will be all over fox news and people will jump in their SUV's and drive away. How many bridges did NYC have in 1917, what was the ferry capacity? so do people in Baltimore head South or in Washington North? They can't both do it or they meet in the middle...


There's a lot of time to get out of the way.

Assume the average person had about the same mobility (shoe leather express) as the citizens of the ninth ward in NOLA in 2005... still think there is plenty of time?


A quick calculation of British dreadnought shell weight and storage capacity comes to about 25-30,000 tons for the 12-15 inch guns, doing less damage per ton compared to bombs dropped in WWII. You don't have enough ammunition for the job.

and how many 12" HE shells do you think it takes to bring down a building, break the water mains, start fires, knock out power, bridges and sewer? The Great San Fransisco Earthquake did its damage in breaking the water mains and starting fires. A fleet can do that to- or target pumping stations for the same effect.


The US doesn't need to besiege Halifax to cut it off. Winnipeg eliminates food. Points in Ontario and Quebec eliminate industrial goods. The US, obviously, is not supplying Halifax anymore.

Your really taking the whole minuteman concept a bit too far...

Victoria isn't garrisoned, and I doubt Kingston is either. Singapore, 1942.

Victoria or more accurately Vancouver Island is garrisoned, I already gave you the listing of the coastal defenses to which there is also a Japanese pre-dreadnought 2 modern crusers, the RNWMP (Mounties), militia, volunteers and recruits.


The vast majority of Canadian forces in April 1917 were already deployed to Britain and France. There was no conscription yet at this point either.

The Canadians deployed 500,000 men (and 150,000 women) to Europe in 5 divisions... so are you going to tell me those divisions were 100k each or there was a stead stream of volunteers?


When a country's transport infrastructure and population is strung out across 4000 miles within 50-75 miles of the enemy's border, there's going to be problems.

Ya, but that works both ways.


Pre-dreadnoughts
HMS Cornwallis is still afloat on 1 Jan 1917 so whens the war start?
--US entered war April 1917, as previously stated, sunk Jan 1918

True enough but depending on when tensions build she may not have been at the place and time...


HMS Jupiter in reserve
--several weeks to prepare
HMS Prince George.
--several weeks to prepare
HMS Ablemarle will refit in march and can likely be rushed back to service.
--undergoing replacement of guns until May 1917, several weeks to prepare
et al...

And you base this on?

HMS Lion took 14 heavy caliber hits during Dogger Bank requiring reconstruction not just repair and she went from towed hulk to flagship between 9 Feb and 7 April. At Jutland she took 14 heavy hits and was laid up from 2 June to 19 July...

As for the ships on station elsewhere, its funny you claim the GF needs 5 weeks to even get underway, but doesn't have 2 weeks for pre-dreadnoughts to arrive...

And I will say it again for the French- if Britain starves, France learns German. The French navy will do what it is asked to do since its not just a hail mary pass for Rue Britannia but one for viva la France as well.

The monitors provide cadres, and the ones not near England can be docked and fast troop ships used... there were a number of those in WWI you know.

1.5 million tons lost to submarines.... which battleships spectacularly suck at stopping.

tgbyhn
27 Nov 11,, 20:24
An analysis of British cruiser strength (99 available):

Light cruisers (117 completed between 1891 and June 1917):

Out of this total, 69 out of 117 are unavailable, 1 is in the West Indies.

21 scrapped, sunk, or wrecked prior to April 1917
Aeolous, Indefatigable, Melampus, Pique, Retribution, Scyla, Terpischore, Tribune, Sybille, Forte, Gladiator, Hermes, Pandora, Perseus, Pegasus, Prometheus, Pathfinder, Falmouth, Amphion, Nottingham, Arethusa

2 under repair or laid up due to damage:
Charbydis (collision, laid up), Penelope (torpedoed, return to service 1918)

18 converted to minelayer, depot, or accomodation ship prior to April 1917:
Apollo, Andromache, Brilliant, Intrepid, Iphigenia, Latona, Naiad, Rainbow, Sirius, Thetis, Bonaventure, Cambrian, Forte, Eclipse, Furious (hulked), Pelorus, Pyramus, Blanche

2 mothballed prior to April 1917
Sappho, Pioneer

30 overseas April 1917:
Aegean: Forward, Foresight
Adriatic: Glasgow, Gloucester, Weymouth, Dartmouth, Bristol
Cape Station: Astraea, Hyacinth
East Africa: Minerva, Talbot, Prosperine, Challenger
East Indies: Doris, Venus, Sapphire, New Castle, Brisbane
Mediterranean: Sentinel, Skirimsher, Liverpool, Lowestoft
Elsewhere: Highflyer (West Indies), Psyche (Australia), Encounter (Pacific), Topaze (Red Sea), Ameythyst (South America), Fox (Red Sea), Diana (China Station/Red Sea)

Armored Cruisers (51 built between 1890 and 1909):

Out of this total, 30 out of 51 are not available. 11 are in the West Indies and under threat where they are or if they break out.

11 sunk or wrecked prior to April 1917:
Hawke, Cressy, Aboukir, Hogue, Good Hope, Bedford, Argyle, Hampshire (Lord Kitchener), Black Prince, Warrior, Natal,

9 converted to minelayer, depot, hospital, or accommodation ship prior to April 1917:
Gibraltar, St. George, Crescent, Royal Arthur, Argonaut, Amphitirite, Ariadne, Sutlej, Essex

2 mothballed prior to April 1917:
Diadem, Spartiate (stoker's training ship)

19 overseas prior to April 1917:
Aegean: Edgar, Endymion, Grafton
Mediterranean: Theseus
Cape Station: Kent
East Indies: Euryal
Pacific: Lancaster,
West Africa: Bacchante
West Indies: King Alfred, Drake, Leviathan, Cumberland, Cornwall, Suffolk, Devonshire, Antrim, Carnarvon, Roxburgh, Cochrane

zraver
27 Nov 11,, 21:21
Elsewhere: Highflyer (West Indies), Ameythyst (South America)
et al.

The US has the following vessels that can catch the British ships on the East Coast

USS Olympia C-6
USS Columbia C-12
USS Chester SCR-1
USS Birmingham SCR-2

Of those 4 ships the Chester and Birmingham are super destroyers and all of the British cruiser classes in the West Indies horribly outgun them. The Olympia is the only ship with a comparable throw weight to the British ships but she is out ranged by many of them.

Assuming the British know war is coming as much as the American's do those ships will be headed South, then east to meet up and coal before crossing the Atlantic likely from South America to Africa then headed North.

zraver
27 Nov 11,, 21:36
Good analysis of these ship's capabilities, I see you are using a different definition of semi dreadnought than the one I am familiar with (but this is only sematics, and doesn't change the tactical situation at all). I agree that those slow dreadnoughts would seriously impare the already slow USN battleline, it is sad that the US built such advanced ships (superfiring main turrets fore and aft, matching HMS Dreadnoughts broadside with two fewer guns) early in the dreadnought period, but crippled them with inadequate engines and low freeboard. This helps explain the South Carolina's short service lives, being scrapped as treaty consessions early in the game, when they were still quite young, though they were probably destined to suffer this fate regardless of the treaty, since they were never successful in their intended role (and they didn't have room for upgrades to turbines due to their compact size). The Delawares were much better in terms of engine upgradability, but still had many flaws, including being lousy sea boats (the Floridas were only marginally better). The fact that all four classes of US dreadnoughts were designed and laid down before any of them got to sea and permitted experience with the designs, made them all troublesome, and none of them were very good compared to their European counterparts. Had the treaty not been signed, they all probably would have been scrapped much sooner.
http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/battleships-board/55157-how-many-battleships-were-built-8.html#post826975

This has evolved into a very interesting thread, thank you.

Thanks, figure multi-dimensional thinking works at sea too... its not all gun power as the Graff Spee discovered at the River Platte, and not all speed as the HMS Indefatigable discovered at Jutland. Of all the treaty legal ships and as a native Washingtonian I like the North Carolina class the best good speed, massive broadside, good protection.

The Kirishima found out a 2 knot speed advantage wasn't enough to save her and Admiral Lee handled the ship like a magician. Though the South Dakota did prove the wisdom of all or nothing armor.

tgbyhn
27 Nov 11,, 21:55
I think you missed the broader point.

You're taking 78 cruisers with you to North America. That means you have 9 pre-dreadnoughts and 9 cruisers in the North Sea after the Grand Fleet withdraws.

7 pre-dreadnoughts (1 Med, rest mothballed) and 15 cruisers (entire Med/Adr/Aeg deployment) available in several weeks.

That's next to nothing.

I'll be addressing your previous post in more detail.

zraver
27 Nov 11,, 22:24
I think you missed the broader point.

You're taking 78 cruisers with you to North America. That means you have 9 pre-dreadnoughts and 9 cruisers in the North Sea after the Grand Fleet withdraws.

7 pre-dreadnoughts (1 Med, rest mothballed) and 15 cruisers (entire Med/Adr/Aeg deployment) available in several weeks.

That's next to nothing.

I'll be addressing your previous post in more detail.

I also modified that claim so no I am not taking 78 cruisers, the Jutland fleet was 78 destroyers, 34 cruisers (non-battle cruisers) the US is so cruiser week I don't need to take many of the light cruisers. the 8 armored cruisers reenfroced with the ships coming out of the West Indies likely via the Faroes then Gibraltar give me near two dozen of the fastest longest ranged platforms for flying columns to harass the coast and to act as fleet scouts.

IIRC the US has somewhere between 30-50 destroyers on the east Coast out of 68ish total or nearby. The RN has many times more than that starting with 200, losing 64 and building kmore than 200 for a end strength near 350 in 1918 and the destroyers that were doing ASW work between North America and England can be swapped out for GF platforms 1:1

Oh, and a lot of those ships you keep saying are mothballed are not, they are laid up in ordinary with care taker crews they are not mothballed. They likely have shells (not cordite) and coal on board. They can be manned and returned to service in days not weeks. The National Defence Reserve Fleet uses three categories- 5, 10 and 20 day return to service. Days not weeks using machinery to replace care taker crews... but the effect of dehumidifiers vs care taker crews are the same vessels that can be recommissioned quickly. Like any tool, a reserve warship is useless if you need it and don't have it or can't get it.

USSWisconsin
28 Nov 11,, 01:04
1.5 million tons lost to submarines.... which battleships spectacularly suck at stopping.

True, but an interesting (but quite atypical) side note: HMS Dreadnought's only combat kill was a U-boat (U-29) she sunk by ramming it. The RN battleships suffered substantial losses at the hands of those subs.

British battleships lost to submarines and mines in WWI (11 losses in 5 years. 10 were predreadnoughts)
Super dreadnought HMS, Audacious, Lost to a submarine laid naval mine Oct 27, 1914 in the Irish sea
HMS, Irresistible, Lost to a naval mine in the Mediterranean sea, March 18, 1915
HMS Ocean, Lost to a naval mine in the Mediterranean sea, March 18, 1915
HMS King Edward VII, Lost to a submarine laid naval mine in the Atlantic, Jan 6, 1916,
HMS Russel, Lost to a naval mine in the Mediterranean sea, April 27, 1916
HMS Formidable, Lost to torpedo from U24 in the English Channel, Jan 1, 1915
HMS Goliath, Lost to torpedo from Turkish Torpedo boat in the Mediterranean sea, May 13, 1915
HMS Triumph, Lost to torpedo from U21 in the Mediterranean sea, May 23, 1915
HMS Majestic, Lost to torpedo from U21 in the Mediterranean sea, May 27, 1915
HMS Cornwallis, Lost to torpedo from U32 in the Indian Ocean Jan 9, 1917
HMS Britannia, Lost to torpedo from U50 off Cape Trafalgar Nov 9, 1918

Their speed helped prevent a dreadnought or super dreadnought class submarine torpedo sinking in WWI (Austrio Hungary did suffer the loss of a dreadnought to torpedoes, though they were fired by a MTB). This situation was temporary, since a number of these ships were sunk by torpedoes in WWII (submarines and their torpedoes had improved greatly). Their superior compartmentalization of the dreadnought and super dreadnought classes did help considerably compared to most of the predreadnought types, which as losses show, were very vulnerable to underwater attack. Speed was no defense against mines.

tgbyhn
28 Nov 11,, 01:21
I'm going to throw this in before I go on to your last unreplied post. On top of the grain and oil situation - it's not as if exports are going to be restored if your dubious strategy of "atom bombing" the US coast.

US exports 1917 - we can assume most of these are to the Allies (source (http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1917-06.pdf))

Non-Grain Food Exports (3.2 million tons)
1,182,934 tons of meat and dairy products
862,230 tons oil cake/oil cake meal
624,454 tons sugar
139,272 tons fruits and nuts
107,486 tons corn syrup
100,000+ tons of fish
84,445 tons vegetable oils
73,211 tons starch
and 97,075 tons salt
and 415,787 tons of fertilizer
Non-Oil Fuel - British production 19.1 million tons
24,168,839 tons coal
1,170,824 tons coke
Iron/Steel (7.2 million tons + additional $577 million other manufactures)
3,175,852 tons of iron ores, sheet/plate, ingots, bars, etc.
1,935,026 tons of bolts, ingots, and blooms
610,797 tons of wire (55% barbed)
594,389 tons of rail
339,486 tons of structural iron and steel
260,930 tons tin plate/products
273,690 tons of pipe and fittings
221,196 tons of nails, spikes, bolts, and rivets
53,826 tons of hoops, band, and scroll
$261 million in misc. iron/steel machinery
$84 million in metal-working machinery
Additional $232 million of iron and steel manufactures not listed
Other metals (total 1.07 million tons)
485,916 tons of copper
258,016 tons of zinc products
201,866 tons of brass (+$260 million brass products)
89,466 tons lead
18,945 tons bauxite
15,503 tons of nickel
Military
1.6 million barrels rosin
210,000 tons of dynamite/gunpowder
$65 millon cartridges
$95 million in firearms
Vehicles and Engines
23,375 automobile engines
9,815 marine engines
32,527 stationary engines
8,499 traction engines
1,442 steam locomotives
80,785 automobiles
Misc.
$51 million electrical machinery
$187 million in chemicals
$153 million in leather products

zraver
28 Nov 11,, 01:22
The cruiser gap

US Cruisers in 1917

USS Chicago CL-14 (1885 protected cruiser, 4x 8" 14knt 4500tn) placed in full commission 6 April 1917 at Philadelphia, flagship Atlantic submarine force
USS New Orleans CL-22 (1895, protected cruiser, 6x 6", 20knts, 3770tn) being overhauled in Puget Sound arrive east Coast August 1917
USS Albany CL-23 (1899, protected cruiser, 6x 6", 19.5knts, 3428tn) Atlantic fleet
USS New York CA-2(Rochester CA-2-2) (1893, armored cruiser, 8x 6" 21knt, 8150tn) Pacific fleet, arrive east Coast November 1917
USS Brooklyn CA-3(armored cruiser, 1896, 8x 8", 20knt, 9215tn) Flagship Asiatic Fleet
USS Pittsburgh CA-4 (Pennsylvania class armored cruiser, 1905, 4x 8", 22knt, 13680tn) Flagship Pacific Fleet
USS Hunnington CA-5 (Pennsylvania class armored cruiser, 1905, 4x 8", 22knt, 13680tn) Pacific Fleet, arrive Florida 28 May 1917
USS San Deigo CA-6 (Pennsylvania class armored cruiser, 1907, 4x 8", 22knt, 13680tn) Pacific Fleet, arrive east coast 4 August 1917
USS Pueblo CA-7 (Pennsylvania class armored cruiser, 1908, 4x 8", 22knt, 13680tn) Flagship Patrol Force South Atlantic (off coast of Brazil)
USS Frederick CA-8 (Pennsylvania class armored cruiser, 1908, 4x 8", 22knt, 13680tn) Pacific fleet, arrive east in May, 1917 assigned to Patrol Force South
USS Huron CA-9 (Pennsylvania class armored cruiser, 1908, 4x 8", 22knt, 13680tn) Pacific Fleet, patrol Force South off coast of Brazil.
USS Seattle CA-11 (Tennessee class armored cruiser, 1906, 4x 10", 22knt, 14500tn) flagship Atlantic Destroyer force
USS Charlotte CA-12 (Tennessee class armored cruiser, 1906, 4x 10", 22knt, 14500tn) appears to be in commission but in overhaul at Boston until August 1917
USS Missoula CA-13 (Tennessee class armored cruiser, 1906, 4x 10", 22knt, 14500tn) York River area
USS Baltimore C-3 (British built protected cruiser, 1890, 4x 8", 4143tn) in service unknown location or speed
USS San Fransisco C-5 (protected cruiser, 1890, 12x 6", 19knt, 4088tn) East Coast
USS Olympia C-6 (protected cruiser 1892, 4x 8", 21.75knt, 5586tn) flagship Patrol Force East- runs aground in Long island June 1917 and out of service for the next 8 months
USS Cincinnati C-7 (Cincinnati class protected cruiser, 1894 1x 6" 10x5", 19knt, 3183tn) San Diego at start of war delayed East Coast arrival becuase of earthquake relief
USS Raleigh C-8 (Cincinnati class protected cruiser, 1894 1x 6" 10x5", 19knt, 3183tn) Pacific Fleet, join Patrol Force Atlantic June 17
USS Montgomery C-9 (Montgomery class protected cruiser, 1894, 9x 5", 17knt, 2094tn) militia ship in Maryland
USS marblehead C-11 (unarmored cruiser, 1894, 9x 5", 18knt, 2072tn) Pacific Patrol Force
USS Columbia C-12 (Columbia class protected cruiser, 1894, 1x 8", 2x 6", 23knts, 7375tn) flagship Atlantic sub force then Patrol Force Atlantic
USS Minneapolis (Columbia class protected cruiser, 1894, 1x 8", 2x 6", 23knts, 7375tn) won't recommission until 2 July 1917
USS Denver CL-16 (Denver class protected cruiser 1904, 10x 5", 16knt, 3200tn) enroute from Pacific Fleet, arrive Florida 10 April
USS Des Moines CL-17 (Denver class protected cruiser 1904, 10x 5", 16knt, 3200tn) Middle Eastern Station, Join Ottoman fleet April 1917
USS Chattanooga CL-18 (Denver class protected cruiser 1904, 10x 5", 16knt, 3200tn) Pacific Fleet until May
USS Galveston CL-19 (Denver class protected cruiser 1905, 10x 5", 16knt, 3200tn) Asiatic Fleet
USS Tacoma CL-20 (Denver class protected cruiser 1905, 10x 5", 16knt, 3200tn) East Coast in service
USS Cleveland CL-21 (Denver class protected cruiser 1905, 10x 5", 16knt, 3200tn) Pacific Fleet, arrive Hampton Roads 31 march
USS St Louis C-20 (St. Louis class protected cruiser, 1906, 14x 6", 22knt,) Hawaii, arrive Philadelphia 29 May
USS Charelston C-22 ((Denver class protected cruiser 1904, 10x 5", 16knt, 3200tn) patrol Force Carribean
USS Chester CL-1 (Chester class scout cruiser, 1908, 2x5", 24knt, 3750tn) East Coast
USS Birmingham CL-2 (Chester class scout cruiser, 1908, 2x5", 24knt, 3750tn) North East Coast
USS Salem CL-3 (Chester class scout cruiser, 1908, 2x5", 24knt, 3750tn) out of commission for turbine replacement until 1918

Triple C
28 Nov 11,, 02:07
Wow, hard to keep up with you guys. :-0

I am going to suggest, though, that without US financial and industrial support for the UK, it would be quite difficult for the UK (and by implication the Allied Powers) to prosecute war after 1917.

USSWisconsin
28 Nov 11,, 02:15
I posted my revised British Battleships book section, this one includes armored cruisers.
http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/battleships-board/55157-how-many-battleships-were-built-9.html#post847167

This along with the similarly revised USN section (linked above), they might offer some heavy additional reading for those inclined to study this subject in greater depth.

USSWisconsin
28 Nov 11,, 02:27
Thanks, figure multi-dimensional thinking works at sea too... its not all gun power as the Graff Spee discovered at the River Platte, and not all speed as the HMS Indefatigable discovered at Jutland. Of all the treaty legal ships and as a native Washingtonian I like the North Carolina class the best good speed, massive broadside, good protection.

The Kirishima found out a 2 knot speed advantage wasn't enough to save her and Admiral Lee handled the ship like a magician. Though the South Dakota did prove the wisdom of all or nothing armor.

It was fortunate that the two ships roles in that battle were not reversed, while the North Carolinas were fine ships, and I like them just as much as the South Dakota's - the heavier armor on the South Dakota probably helped her steam away from that beating, it is less certain the Washington could have done so had it recieved the same hits.

tgbyhn
28 Nov 11,, 04:01
5 weeks.... it didn't take them 5 weeks to deploy to Dogger Bank or Jutland... Jellico had 48 hours from the warning from Room 40 to when the Grand Fleet left Scapa Flow and Cromaty 2.5 hours before the HSF. In 1990 the National Defense Reserve Fleet had ships activated, inspected, crewed, loaded and enroute within 2 weeks.
Plugging in the coordinates of the ports and location of the Battle of Jutland, Jellicoe at Scapa Flow was 150nmi out, Beatty at Firth of Forth was at 180nmi. Their fleets left their ports at speeds between 14kn and 19kn. Travel time 9-12 hours.

From what we can assume is a nearly ready position, more than 96 hours from Jellicoe's order to the battle's commencement to a location 9-12 hours away.

Meanwhile you're sailing the entire blockading fleet 3500nmi, not 180nmi. If it takes the Grand Fleet from a relatively ready position 96 hours to carry out this action, it's going to take much longer for the fleet to ready after arriving in port from the blockade.

And if Britain starves France learns German....
Cliched and hackneyed. The Germans made compromise peace overtures during this period. If they can get France out of the war, they're going to be fairly concessionary. Those peace overtures are starting to look pretty damned good.

The only battleship to sink a submarine was HMS Dreadnought and she did it by accident. You don't need battleships for convoy escoprt after the destruction of the KM true warships turned surface raiders.
Allied pre-dreadnoughts are doing convoy duty. The ones you want to plug the North Sea with.

no its not, its a lot closer than the GF but the US battle fleet is spread hither and yon from Gitmo to Maine
13 out of the 15 ports you listed where "most of the US fleet is" are 2 days sail. You haven't cited any proof there's a naval presence off Veracruz 3 years later, the other two bases are Gitmo and Pensacola.

and....?
8 pre-dreadnoughts blockading Germany are going to get torpedoed shortly.

They have much more serious logistical issues. Its 3700 miles from Belgium to New York in a straight short line, but the u-boats wanting to hunt in North America need to get off the main shipping lanes so they can run on the surface lets say that adds 15% so 4250 each way. At 5 knots that is 740 hours of sailing time or 30 days each way. That leaves 30 days for much slower patrolling and lurking as 90 days is the normal maximum for a patrol before stores run out.
5 knots? 366 German U-Boats that were built can make it to the US at 8 knots with ease. Even 10 or better. And even most of the coastal ones. You need to take a look back at the ranges I cited from Conway's.

So that argument falls flat on its face.

The U-Boats have far less personnel, need less fuel and supplies. Hence less complex logistics.

Knowing something is going on, and knowing what is going on are different things
The High Seas Fleet had orders to stay in port unless they could be assured of victory. Withdrawing the RN naval blockade means that it can be assured of victory, and at very least venture out into the North Sea and start making all kinds of trouble.

ya the ever cautious Jellico who started later with more units to move and still beat Scheer out of port.. Who during the night of the Battle of Jutland tried aggressively to get in front of the HSF to cut them off from Germany...
The RN fought cautiously at Jutland. Jellicoe was universally criticised for - caution, not least Beatty. Jellicoe's naval strategy in WWI is characterized as cautious by the majority of scholars, naval experts, and historians who write on the subject.

I did a Google search for fun, Jellicoe + cautious. 267,000 results. Beatty + cautious, the results state that Jellicoe was cautious compared to Beatty. Hilarious.

Reykjavik to halifax Nova Scotia 2092 miles its 2900 miles from Halifax to Dublin, 2120 from Queens town.
Why are you using miles? If you're talking naval, nautical miles.

So Queenstown is 33 nautical miles closer than Reykjavik. Iceland is still an impoverished island of 90,000 people. They're not much good for anything, and it's 4+ weeks round trip.

And the Canadians won't defend themselves or repair rail lines? Its funny you seem to argue a fully staffed battle fleet needs 5 weeks but the US national Guard can deploy for operations in a foreign country and sustain operations and conduct force protection within hours of the guardsmen getting their call phone call ups... hate to tell you but there are no cell phones and those units need to assemble, drill, arm and train.
A flying column of 25 men can sever a rail line or derail a train to effect the same. One man could derail a train. Let's say 2500 men. Not hard. Let's say 1 operation per week for 5 weeks. They can hit 500 times. Not to mention, telegraph lines run along train tracks at this period, those get cut too.

Canadians have 4000 miles to cover. So yes.

not even close 1 dreadnought with 8x 15" and 16 pre-dreadnoughts with a guessed at average of 4 12"-13.5" guns each. That is 72 heavy tubes or the striking power of 6-7 dreadnoughts.
So there's a dreadnought, 17 pre-dreadnoughts, and 3 battlecruisers and a couple dozen cruisers engaging the Ottomans for around 11 months. That's a lot of shelling. And yeah, 6 pre-dreadnoughts were sunk, but it's still a massive amount of shelling.

But they or the threat of them did force Holland, Poland, Spain and Denmark...
Poland didn't surrender, it disintegrated in a land conquest. Spanish civil war? 3 years, Republicans disintegrated in a land conquest.

Denmark? 1/10 the size of Germany, borders it, defenseless. Started and ended the same hour, occupation of Copenhagen. Never any threat of bombing.

Netherlands? 1/10 the size of Germany, borders it, no chance of defeating the invasion, miniscule military.

You're comparing the Netherlands to the US? Come on.

And the US has just as long a history of freaking out over perceived threats.
The response to the United States to every attack on her is to get whipped up in a frenzy and undertake a mass war effort. Even fabricated attacks like Tonkin or accidents like the main. And it's never surrendered.

So they can hit an enemy ship traveling at 25 knots but not a building standing still....
Sure. But they're not going to know if the building their shelling is causing any casualties. How about the US evacuating 10 blocks and turning off the lights everywhere else.

How many bridges did NYC have in 1917, what was the ferry capacity? so do people in Baltimore head South or in Washington North? They can't both do it or they meet in the middle...
Assume the average person had about the same mobility (shoe leather express) as the citizens of the ninth ward in NOLA in 2005... still think there is plenty of time?
and how many 12" HE shells do you think it takes to bring down a building, break the water mains, start fires, knock out power, bridges and sewer? The Great San Fransisco Earthquake did its damage in breaking the water mains and starting fires. A fleet can do that to- or target pumping stations for the same effect.
You're not going to be hitting Manhattan. The RN ain't going to sail up the Chesapeake. Too risky. At no point would the RN be more than 5 miles from shore. Anywhere within 18km of Baltimore you've got less than 1500-2000 yards from shore. You can't even sight Baltimore unless your within a few miles of it. Philadelphia you're going to have to sail up 60 miles right up the Delaware Bay with 800 yards on either side past the third bend. New York (except south Brooklyn), Providence, Norfolk pose similar problems. You can't sight Charleston until you're four miles up on it.

How many battleships are you deploying per city? Are you aware you're going to have to be hugging the coast on both flanks for nearly of them?

Your really taking the whole minuteman concept a bit too far...
I've already addressed that.

Victoria or more accurately Vancouver Island is garrisoned, I already gave you the listing of the coastal defenses to which there is also a Japanese pre-dreadnought 2 modern crusers, the RNWMP (Mounties), militia, volunteers and recruits.
OK. You're grand strategy of bombarding the US into submission is still broken.

The Canadians deployed 500,000 men (and 150,000 women) to Europe in 5 divisions... so are you going to tell me those divisions were 100k each or there was a stead stream of volunteers?
Are you going list every Canadian battalion raised that hasn't sailed for Britain before April 1917, or am I going to have to?

Ya, but that works both ways.
No, it doesn't. The US has a mountain of rail redundancy, Canada doesn't. The only east-west railroad of any large significance at similar risk runs through northern Montana and North Dakota. And again, a mountain of redundancy.

True enough but depending on when tensions build she may not have been at the place and time...
You've got your 1915 thread. Britain ain't going to purposefully provoke a war with the US, and no candidates going to run on a war platform and win in 1916.

And you base this on?
Reality.

As for the ships on station elsewhere, its funny you claim the GF needs 5 weeks to even get underway, but doesn't have 2 weeks for pre-dreadnoughts to arrive...
Britain isn't going to snap it's fingers and have them out lickety-split. 2 weeks is jet speed in a single-prop world.

tgbyhn
28 Nov 11,, 04:33
I also modified that claim so no I am not taking 78 cruisers, the Jutland fleet was 78 destroyers, 34 cruisers (non-battle cruisers) the US is so cruiser week I don't need to take many of the light cruisers. the 8 armored cruisers reenfroced with the ships coming out of the West Indies likely via the Faroes then Gibraltar give me near two dozen of the fastest longest ranged platforms for flying columns to harass the coast and to act as fleet scouts.
You've modified a dozen or so major claims by now.

Britain isn't going to starve if the US enters the war. But now, Britain is going to starve and the British navy has 6 weeks to knock the US out of the war with an unrealistic strategy using every Allied dreadnought before it starves.

I was either stupid or full of the brown stuff when I stated German U-boats could even reach the US. After citing hard proof from Conway's that 90% fleet can reach the US within ease at 8kn or even 10kn, "what makes you think the U-boats can get there any sooner than the RN?"

You implied that only a portion of Britain's dreadnoughts were going to sail to the US, given the supposed lack of a threat posed by USN. Now you've got every dreadnought, and you've even impressed the French and Italians.

You stated that Britain could create a mini-grand fleet with its 43-44 dreadnoughts, which outnumbers the KM. Now that 60% of them don't exist, you've got a mini-grand fleet of 18-19, with all but 8 several weeks ready to be deployed in the North Sea.

You pasted a bit from another website about the RN's 14 coaling stations, touting the RN's fueling capabilities, with only 4 anywhere near the US cut off and not getting supplied with coal or oil, at a time when many of the RNs fueling stations were down to a six-day supply or less. There's still gas in the tank though.

I'll address the rest of the post after I research.

In the meantime, I'm going to repose a question from my last post - virtually every major city in the US, the RN is going to be flanked by coastline or in a chokepoint anywhere from a few hundred to a couple thousand yards. There's two major cities you can target without being in a chokepoint are Boston and Brooklyn (but not the rest of NYC).

zraver
28 Nov 11,, 05:49
Plugging in the coordinates of the ports and location of the Battle of Jutland, Jellicoe at Scapa Flow was 150nmi out, Beatty at Firth of Forth was at 180nmi. Their fleets left their ports at speeds between 14kn and 19kn. Travel time 9-12 hours.

From what we can assume is a nearly ready position, more than 96 hours from Jellicoe's order to the battle's commencement to a location 9-12 hours away.

Its now how far they had to go, but how fast they got started.


Meanwhile you're sailing the entire blockading fleet 3500nmi, not 180nmi. If it takes the Grand Fleet from a relatively ready position 96 hours to carry out this action, it's going to take much longer for the fleet to ready after arriving in port from the blockade.

The fleet is already in port...


Cliched and hackneyed. The Germans made compromise peace overtures during this period. If they can get France out of the war, they're going to be fairly concessionary. Those peace overtures are starting to look pretty damned good.[/quote[

Not to the Germans who are suddenly tits over aces.

[quote]Allied pre-dreadnoughts are doing convoy duty. The ones you want to plug the North Sea with.

yup, they are not needed for convoy duty... its a waste.


13 out of the 15 ports you listed where "most of the US fleet is" are 2 days sail. You haven't cited any proof there's a naval presence off Veracruz 3 years later, the other two bases are Gitmo and Pensacola.

Veracruz was just one operation....


8 pre-dreadnoughts blockading Germany are going to get torpedoed shortly.

Then why didn't the dreadnoughts?


5 knots? 366 German U-Boats that were built can make it to the US at 8 knots with ease. Even 10 or better. And even most of the coastal ones. You need to take a look back at the ranges I cited from Conway's.

Uboat net lists 9430 @ 7 wiki 8000 @ 5 both might be right given typical class improvements given so many hulls produced. Either number however means a slow journey to North America with very little time on station.


So that argument falls flat on its face.

No it doesn't, they need to make it back too since sub conversation was independent of a US/UK war.


The U-Boats have far less personnel, need less fuel and supplies. Hence less complex logistics.

wow did you really just say that.... 366 boats at an average of 350 tons is 128100 tons of ship building or the same as 5 dreadnoughts but way more slips are needed compensated for by faster production times. That is also almost 6000 men or the crews of those 5 dreadnoughts.... so where is the savings? those 6000 men still need the same calories or more as they would on a battle wagon under sea doesn't mean under fed, in fact it meant better food- hams as opposed to pork fat... And while submarine steel is much easier to work than krupp armor, the sheer amount of lead in a submarine will have impacts in other parts of the German economy.


The High Seas Fleet had orders to stay in port unless they could be assured of victory. Withdrawing the RN naval blockade means that it can be assured of victory, and at very least venture out into the North Sea and start making all kinds of trouble. withdraw and replace, not just withdraw and hat about the British subs?


The RN fought cautiously at Jutland. Jellicoe was universally criticised for - caution, not least Beatty. Jellicoe's naval strategy in WWI is characterized as cautious by the majority of scholars, naval experts, and historians who write on the subject.

really, sounds like arm chair quarter backings.... what could he have done different?


Why are you using miles? If you're talking naval, nautical miles.

google


So Queenstown is 33 nautical miles closer than Reykjavik. Iceland is still an impoverished island of 90,000 people. They're not much good for anything, and it's 4+ weeks round trip.

becuase it has good harbors and is easily seized and is on the direct line to Labrador.


A flying column of 25 men can sever a rail line or derail a train to effect the same. One man could derail a train. Let's say 2500 men. Not hard. Let's say 1 operation per week for 5 weeks. They can hit 500 times. Not to mention, telegraph lines run along train tracks at this period, those get cut too.

and what a force field keeps the Canadians north? Imagine the impact 25 men will have on Buffalo when they sabotage the 75mw hydroelectric plant at Niagra Falls.... tit for tat raiding favors the side with fewer targets...


Canadians have 4000 miles to cover. So yes.

vs the US... with the bridges over the Mississippi, the locks of the Erie canal, the aqueducts to NYC.... I mean really....


So there's a dreadnought, 17 pre-dreadnoughts, and 3 battlecruisers and a couple dozen cruisers engaging the Ottomans for around 11 months. That's a lot of shelling. And yeah, 6 pre-dreadnoughts were sunk, but it's still a massive amount of shelling.

a lot of shelling against hardened positions mounted higher than the guns so no plunging fire, no load bearing structures.... light population density


Poland didn't surrender, it disintegrated in a land conquest. Spanish civil war? 3 years, Republicans disintegrated in a land conquest.

Warsaw and thus Poland capitulated after 8 days of bombardment, the bombing of Guernica secured the entire north of Spain and cut off Republican forces near the Bay of Biscay...


Denmark? 1/10 the size of Germany, borders it, defenseless. Started and ended the same hour,occupation of Copenhagen. Never any threat of bombing.

The threat had been there since Spain


Netherlands? 1/10 the size of Germany, borders it, no chance of defeating the invasion, miniscule military.


Yet like tiny Belgium in WWI, the Duthc fought.... until Rotterdam....


You're comparing the Netherlands to the US? Come on.

Nope apples to apples- shock is shock...


The response to the United States to every attack on her is to get whipped up in a frenzy and undertake a mass war effort. Even fabricated attacks like Tonkin or accidents like the main. And it's never surrendered.

Vicksburg, Charleston, New Orleans, Savannah, Dolly Madison grabbing the portrait of Washington.... USS Chesapeake, USS President, Task Force Smith....

Americans break too


Sure. But they're not going to know if the building their shelling is causing any casualties. How about the US evacuating 10 blocks and turning off the lights everywhere else.

Who cares how many die and it will be a lot, the destruction of property.... Wall Street, Federal Reserve of NYC, GW Bridge, Brooklyn Navy Yard.... Turnout the lights, the RN can read maps


You're not going to be hitting Manhattan. The RN ain't going to sail up the Chesapeake. Too risky. At no point would the RN be more than 5 miles from shore. Anywhere within 18km of Baltimore you've got less than 1500-2000 yards from shore. You can't even sight Baltimore unless your within a few miles of it. Philadelphia you're going to have to sail up 60 miles right up the Delaware Bay with 800 yards on either side past the third bend. New York (except south Brooklyn), Providence, Norfolk pose similar problems. You can't sight Charleston until you're four miles up on it.[quote]

Wait so the RN will try and force the Dardanells but not the Chesapeake Bay....

[quote]How many battleships are you deploying per city? Are you aware you're going to have to be hugging the coast on both flanks for nearly of them?

Hit them in line, a few shells here, a few shells there and pretty soon your talking real panic. Ht the docks, the refineries, the chemical works...


I've already addressed that.

no you didn't, you keep acting like the Canadians are unarmed pacifists... when they are the only ones to have never fallen to us.


OK. You're grand strategy of bombarding the US into submission is still broken.

Different part of the conversation, you ckaimed a few guys in row boats could seize Victoria and Vancouver Island... I simply showed it is not low hanging fruit.


Are you going list every Canadian battalion raised that hasn't sailed for Britain before April 1917, or am I going to have to?


don't need to, Canada used a system not unlike the US prior to the National Guard Act, though usually in under strength battalions not regiments.


No, it doesn't. The US has a mountain of rail redundancy, Canada doesn't. The only east-west railroad of any large significance at similar risk runs through northern Montana and North Dakota. And again, a mountain of redundancy.

US is invulnerable, she has a large concentrated population that is increasingly dependent on increasing stressed electrical, sewage and water treatment technologies. Te Bridges over the major rivers to carry rail traffic are limited and there are endless other targets.


You've got your 1915 thread. Britain ain't going to purposefully provoke a war with the US, and no candidates going to run on a war platform and win in 1916.

Reality.

It is fairly obvious your a 2 dimensional thinker.....

zraver
28 Nov 11,, 05:51
It was fortunate that the two ships roles in that battle were not reversed, while the North Carolinas were fine ships, and I like them just as much as the South Dakota's - the heavier armor on the South Dakota probably helped her steam away from that beating, it is less certain the Washington could have done so had it recieved the same hits.

same crews on each vessel its unlikely the Washington would have too. At under 10,000yrds the Japanese never landed a hit on her while she ripped the Kirishima apart at the seams Pitbull vs Akita.... that fight only ends one way.

USSWisconsin
28 Nov 11,, 06:47
same crews on each vessel its unlikely the Washington would have too. At under 10,000yrds the Japanese never landed a hit on her while she ripped the Kirishima apart at the seams Pitbull vs Akita.... that fight only ends one way.

The Washington surprized the Kirishima - which was target fixated on the South Dakota and delivering quite a beating, the Japanese ship didn't manage to return fire on her assailant - the Washington struck quickly, with deadly radar guided accuracy and shattered her abiity to fight back. By the time she realized she was under attack from another battleship, it was too late, the massive 2700# 16" projectiles had done their work, her searchlights were shattered, and she was burning end to end - subsequent salvos only served to sink her hulk. It was a savage attack and Kirishima was utterly wrecked. My point was if the Washington had broken down and been caught in the position South Dakota was in, with her thinner protection, she might have suffered considerably more damage. South Dakota was designed to resist 16" gunfire (2240# projectiles), Washington was only designed to be protected from 14" gunfire, and these Japanese guns were very good, their 14" projectiles nearly penetrated the South Dakota's barbette, the thinner Washington might have suffered a magazine explosion from the same hit.

zraver
28 Nov 11,, 07:45
You've modified a dozen or so major claims by now.

Nope, I keep correctign your changes to what I said however...


Britain isn't going to starve if the US enters the war. But now, Britain is going to starve and the British navy has 6 weeks to knock the US out of the war with an unrealistic strategy using every Allied dreadnought before it starves.

I never said any of that... I said Britain is not going to starve in 6 weeks and if its war the only option the British have is a quick battle on the US coast using the GF leaving behind a screen of pre-dreadnoughts and what ever dreadnoughts don't sail with the GF supplemented by what the French can lend to the North Sea. I was very clear that in throw weight the GF will crush the US effort.


I was either stupid or full of the brown stuff when I stated German U-boats could even reach the US. After citing hard proof from Conway's that 90% fleet can reach the US within ease at 8kn or even 10kn, "what makes you think the U-boats can get there any sooner than the RN?"

You've coaimed Conway at 10knt which I find doubtful given your demonstrated inability to read. Uboat.net claims 7 knots which results in a war patrol once on station of just 1700 miles The faster a ship travels, the shorter the time the fuel supplies last. Assuming a perfect 1:1 an increase of 38% to the speed results in a range of just 6600 or so miles- enough to reach the US and do a war patrol before opening the seacocks and taking to the boats...


You implied that only a portion of Britain's dreadnoughts were going to sail to the US, given the supposed lack of a threat posed by USN. Now you've got every dreadnought, and you've even impressed the French and Italians.

No I haven't, you need some adult literacy classes either that or your a troll. I said the GF minus waste would sail, that has not changed. I added a dreadnought of 3 from France to help bolster the North Sea.


You stated that Britain could create a mini-grand fleet with its 43-44 dreadnoughts, which outnumbers the KM. Now that 60% of them don't exist, you've got a mini-grand fleet of 18-19, with all but 8 several weeks ready to be deployed in the North Sea.

You've yet to support your claim that its several weeks to take a ship out of ordinary, why I have provided examples that the time needed in a pinch is days not weeks.


You pasted a bit from another website about the RN's 14 coaling stations, touting the RN's fueling capabilities, with only 4 anywhere near the US cut off and not getting supplied with coal or oil, at a time when many of the RNs fueling stations were down to a six-day supply or less. There's still gas in the tank though.

I'll address the rest of the post after I research.

for once please do research and look at something other than fanboy numbers... For example, why were they down to six days? was it a shortage of coal, or an increase in traffic and vessel size?

Can the Royal navy bring coalliers with it?


In the meantime, I'm going to repose a question from my last post - virtually every major city in the US, the RN is going to be flanked by coastline or in a chokepoint anywhere from a few hundred to a couple thousand yards. There's two major cities you can target without being in a chok epoint are Boston and Brooklyn (but not the rest of NYC).

And you still don't get it, the threat to a major city is going to force the US navy to come out and fight.... and die. Then all that is left are the forts which are not much of a threat at long range. its the threat of a couple old Endicott period DC guns getting swamped. The GF can for example fire over the top of Brooklyn or portions of Long Island with the splashes/explosions observed by sea planes. Thats when Wilson faces a political crisis- deal or no deal...

tgbyhn
28 Nov 11,, 10:40
Its now how far they had to go, but how fast they got started.
The fleet is already in port...
On 28 May 1918, the Grand Fleet days takes 4 days and change to meet the German fleet, at positions almost 150-180nmi out.

The Grand Fleet dreadnoughts are going out on regular patrols in the North Sea. These ships are going to have to return to port. Any dreadnoughts based at other ports are going to have to rejoin the Fleet. All ships are going to be brought up to deep load. I don't see this happening in 4 days.

With the exception of the five Ironduke-class dreadnoughts (outliers at 14,000nmi/10kn, 30 of 35 dreadnoughts have an average cruising range of about 6000nmi/10kn. Cruising at 14kn isn't realistic given the exponential increase fuel use per knot increase.

For the sake of argument, let's say an 18-day sail. I think you can agree with that. At 10kn 30 dreadnoughts have burned at least half their fuel. Many of the RN fueling stations are down to a six-day supply of fuel in April 1917, and Halifax has already been cut off from US sources for several weeks. Worst case scenario, those 30 dreadnoughts have 10 days sail time left, and have reached the point of no return.

Not to the Germans who are suddenly tits over aces.
The expression "they'd be speaking German by now" is a hyperbole akin to "my dinner tastes like crap", or "she's as big as an elephant", or "I'm bored to death". Likely the Germans are going to want to keep some of the iron mines adjacent to Alsace, but as in 1871 and 1940 not the whole thing. The Germans were making overtures with a somewhat concessionary attitude at this time historically.


You've coaimed Conway at 10knt which I find doubtful given your demonstrated inability to read. Uboat.net claims 7 knots which results in a war patrol once on station of just 1700 miles The faster a ship travels, the shorter the time the fuel supplies last. Assuming a perfect 1:1 an increase of 38% to the speed results in a range of just 6600 or so miles- enough to reach the US and do a war patrol before opening the seacocks and taking to the boats...Uboat net lists 9430 @ 7 wiki 8000 @ 5 both might be right given typical class improvements given so many hulls produced. Either number however means a slow journey to North America with very little time on station.
I didn't claim Conway at 10kn - I listed all of the ranges as listed in Conway's at 8kn - the vast majority of U-Boats had more than double the range necessary to reach America at 8kn. I believe that, in my opinion, 10kn is doable. I listed every single class and sub-class the Germans except for a handful of early coastal models. Virtually all of ranges listed in Conway's at are 8kn.

Conway is an authoritative source. Uboat.net is the work of one man and uncited.

No it doesn't, they need to make it back too since sub conversation was independent of a US/UK war.
Their U-Boats refueled at RI at least once historically. Allied to the US, German U-Boats are free to refuel in US waters. Every post I've made is part of the same scenario. I put forth a scenario completely independent of every preceding post when I entered this thread - there are no "independent conversations" or separate arguments. You're in the position of rebutting my scenario.

Then why didn't the dreadnoughts?
The U-Boats have much less to be afraid of. Much more latitude to come out to play. Pre-dreadnoughts are weak compared to dreadnoughts, and 10 of 11 battleships sunk by the Germans were pre-dreadnoughts. They're certainly nowhere near a match for a German dreadnought either.


Veracruz was just one operation....
Feel free to list all USN deployments in these operations. If you make an argument, back it up. Cite sources.


wow did you really just say that.... 366 boats at an average of 350 tons is 128100 tons of ship building [....]
If you look back, 366 U-Boats are the number the Germany built from the first U-Boat through the end of the war, with the capability to reach the United States. Nowhere did I state that Germany has 366 on hand, and nowhere did I state every German U-Boat capable of sailing to the US does so. I've made statements about U-Boats becoming more active in the North Sea and deploying the US.


withdraw and replace, not just withdraw and hat about the British subs?
Sure, they're a threat. They're lesser in numbers (certainly less than the 171 on naval-history.net) and not the quality of German U-Boats, but I reckon it's a factor to be taken into account.

Wait so the RN will try and force the Dardanells but not the Chesapeake Bay....

The British spent 11 months trying to force the Dardanelles, maybe got 10 miles in max for brief periods? Meanwhile the British have to pass a major naval base at the mouth of the Chesapeake, and sail 160 miles to Baltimore flanked on both sides by coast. Then they have to fire on Baltimore from distances of less than 5 miles due to line of sight issues, flanked by 3 coasts 1500 yards to the north, east, and south west. You can form a line of 12 dreadnoughts bow to stern with the outer ships touching the beaches.

Is this your scenario? Sail 35 dreadnoughts and 20 cruisers up the Chesapeake and attack Baltimore?


becuase it has good harbors and is easily seized and is on the direct line to Labrador.
OK. Seize Iceland with scarce food, and maybe you're at war with Denmark now? How are the other neutrals going to react?

and what a force field keeps the Canadians north? Imagine the impact 25 men will have on Buffalo when they sabotage the 75mw hydroelectric plant at Niagra Falls.... tit for tat raiding favors the side with fewer targets...
vs the US... with the bridges over the Mississippi, the locks of the Erie canal, the aqueducts to NYC.... I mean really....
First of all - there's 4000 miles of border and a whole lot of points to sever Canadian rail. I take it you've conceded the point on the massive US rail redundancies.

Catskill Mountain is 250 miles from Buffalo as the crow flies. The nearest bridge on the Mississippi is at Minneapolis, 230 miles.

The only population centers within 75 miles of the Canadian land border are Detroit, Buffalo, Rochester, and Seattle (90 miles land, 70 miles water). What's that compared to SE Ontario up to Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Quebec City, Winnipeg, Thunder Bay, Ottawa, St. John, Kingston, Windsor, London all within 30-60 miles of the US border?

The US has fewer targets, not Canada. If you look at a map, you can see a clear concentration of Canadian cities and infrastructure and cities within 60 miles of the US. In both absolute and relative terms, the US has far less such concentration, even within 150 miles of the Canadian border.


really, sounds like arm chair quarter backings.... what could he have done different?
How else do you suggest I characterize Jellicoe's career, characterized as cautious in virtually every contemporary and post-war account?


Warsaw and thus Poland capitulated after 8 days of bombardment, the bombing of Guernica secured the entire north of Spain and cut off Republican forces near the Bay of Biscay...
Poland was invaded by 93 divisions.
North Spain March 1937: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Frente_del_Norte_-_Spanish_Civil_War_%28March-Sept_1937%29.svg


Yet like tiny Belgium in WWI, the Duthc fought.... until Rotterdam....
Netherlands before bombing of Rotterdam: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Duitse_inval.png


Vicksburg, Charleston, New Orleans, Savannah, Dolly Madison grabbing the portrait of Washington.... USS Chesapeake, USS President, Task Force Smith....

Americans break too
Those targets are pretty danged far south for you. What's your order of battle in the DC campaign? You've got to sail halfway down the coast of the US, pass a major naval base at the entrance of the Chesapeake, you ain't going up the Potomac, and you have no troops.

I'm done at this point on this post. Find one person here to support your ideas, and I'll be shocked.

tgbyhn
28 Nov 11,, 12:04
Everything you have proposed has to a) be possible, b) be carried out to perfection. You have a thousand variables at work which have to be perfect, my strategy has one variable that needs to be successful: refusal to export. Everything on top of that is icing on the cake.


I never said any of that... I said Britain is not going to starve in 6 weeks and if its war the only option the British have is a quick battle on the US coast using the GF leaving behind a screen of pre-dreadnoughts and what ever dreadnoughts don't sail with the GF supplemented by what the French can lend to the North Sea. I was very clear that in throw weight the GF will crush the US effort.

So England won't starve in 6 weeks, with some grain imports coming in, severe rationing and increased imports of other food stuffs like whale meat, fish etc they can easily make 3 months without major social or health impacts and like Germany probably a year or more before famine sets in

That is absurd, so you think Jellico is going to stay parked and let Britain starve when he posses the only means to effect a quick resolution to a war with America? Although we disagree on how much time Britain has, we agree she has at least six weeks. Her only hope is the destruction of the American battle fleet followed by the destruction of one or more large American coastal cities to try and knock the US out of the war.
Just pointing out you've gone from over a year to play with (extremely non-urgent), to the British fleet's only hope is to sail post-haste and knock the US out of the way by bombarding cities (extremely urgent).


You've coaimed Conway at 10knt which I find doubtful given your demonstrated inability to read. Uboat.net claims 7 knots which results in a war patrol once on station of just 1700 miles The faster a ship travels, the shorter the time the fuel supplies last. Assuming a perfect 1:1 an increase of 38% to the speed results in a range of just 6600 or so miles- enough to reach the US and do a war patrol before opening the seacocks and taking to the boats...

The majority of the U boats could not get any farther than they did. They didn't have the range. Plus the med and Adriatic didn't have the facilities to support an overly large number of u-boats.

No it doesn't, they need to make it back too since sub conversation was independent of a US/UK war.
Again, I quoted Conway's at 8kn (speed listed for virtually every U-Boat). Virtually every U-Boat listed has more than double the range necessary at 8kn. 10kn was just my opinion.


You've yet to support your claim that its several weeks to take a ship out of ordinary, why I have provided examples that the time needed in a pinch is days not weeks.
You've provided your opinions on how long it takes to unmothball a sub, and something about three categories, but you haven't listed any specific pre-dreadnoughts that were done so with citations. Or any other period ship for that matter.


Britain with a pre-dreadnought strength of 43-44 hulls can pull a lot of older battleships from other areas and create a mini-grand fleet.

below I identify 18-19 pre-dreadnoughts and a source of crews that can be rushed into service.


for once please do research and look at something other than fanboy numbers... For example, why were they down to six days? was it a shortage of coal, or an increase in traffic and vessel size?

C.G. Jones, "The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: A Search for an Oil Policy." The Historical Journal, Volume 20 Issue 3, 1977. link (http://www.jstor.org/pss/2638433)
"At the onset of the campaign there were reserves of 5.1 months' consumption; by May the reserve level had been reduced to 2.9 months, with some bases down to only six days' supply."

"Owing to the dire situation the Admiralty had to send what one commentator has called urgent and humiliating telegrams to the United States saying that the Royal Navy would be immobilized unless more American tonnage became available to carry oil across the Atlantic. Despite its control of APOC the shortage of its own tankers forced Britain to draw about 80 percent of its oil supplies from North America. The Admiralty director of stores noted in September 1917 that, "without the aid of oil fuel from America our modern oil-burning fleet cannot keep the seas."

"Despite these measures, however, the Allies barely managed to meet their oil needs. The situation was sometimes so critical that the shipping controller suggested to the war cabinet in August 1917 that the Royal Navy should stop building ships fueled by oil and revert to coal. Furthermore, the tonnage used to ship oil across the Atlantic resulted in cutbacks in other vital commodities -- most notably foodstuffs. By December 1917 approximately 900,000 tons of wheat originally destined for Britain remained at American ports owing to the shortage of vessels for shipping."

As far as research is concerned, I've cited the following publications:
Naval-History.net link (http://www.naval-history.net)
The International Grain Trade, by Michael Atkin, 1992. link (http://books.google.com/books?id=Mh_YuHaONo4C&pg=PA18&lpg=PA18&dq=sources+of+uk+wheat+imports+1828-1914&source=bl&ots=9v3hE75wVS&sig=GoycSTGBJcEAFzH8itKpKq9YJF4&hl=en&ei=Fv3PToeDKse-2wWnyYmWDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=sources%20of%20uk%20wheat%20imports%201828-1914&f=false)
The Price Current-Grain Reporter Year, by Eaton Osman, 1917. link (http://books.google.com/books?id=WS0XAQAAIAAJ&pg=RA1-PA33&dq=Monthly+crop+reporter+1917&hl=en&ei=8_HPToW0Mc_-2QXr-82xDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CEMQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=Monthly%20crop%20reporter%201917&f=false)
Argentina, 1516-1987: from Spanish colonization to Alfonsín, by David Rock, 1985. link (http://books.google.com/books?id=FHTczGi4sv4C&pg=PR17&lpg=PR17&dq=argentina+grain+production+1915&source=bl&ots=3dvQTcFGEv&sig=knuttmhhHDiRqqlyGCwuPxNuLnA&hl=en&ei=Ku_PTqbbHpLo2gX3g_ioDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CEwQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=argentina%20grain%20production%201915&f=false)
Business Digest, July-December 1918. link (http://books.google.com/books?id=euENAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA524&lpg=PA524&dq=us+share+of+world+oil+production+1914&source=bl&ots=FBycO6nmra&sig=64ZPNCNpP0o6TZjv_D9r2RDAIqs&hl=en&ei=jwfQTojhCeXo2gW09smPDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CDwQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=us%20share%20of%20world%20oil%20production%20191 4&f=false)
Historical Encyclopedia of American Business, Richard Wilson, 2009. link (http://salempress.com/Store/samples/american_business/american_business_japanese.htm)
Conway's All The World's Fighting ships, 1906-1921, Gardiner et. al., 1985. link (http://books.google.com/books?id=V2r_TBjR2TYC&pg=PA134&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false)
The Encyclopedia Brittania, 12th ed., Volume 23, 1922. link (http://books.google.com/books?id=7gkoAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA77&lpg=PA77&dq=uk+petroleum+consumption+1917&source=bl&ots=fbKJKnSgzu&sig=FpGUn8o2j0jYsmxndHNAvxOF44c&hl=en&ei=oOrQTsOtG8_TgQfz5szODQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=uk%20petroleum%20consumption%201917&f=false)
United States Foreign Oil since World War I: for Profits and Security, by Stephen Randall, 2005. link (http://books.google.com/books?id=3fdbalH7f8oC&pg=PA14&lpg=PA14&dq=us+refined+oil+exports+allies+wwi&source=bl&ots=wuY_GWP9Xp&sig=89rwySkWkM5CTn8g2Y0zfuCm9N4&hl=en&ei=QtrQTojxH8zxggfstciHBA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=us%20refined%20oil%20exports%20allies%20wwi&f=false)
The Encyclopedia Brittania, 12th ed., Volume 22, 1922. link (http://books.google.com/books?id=7gkoAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA77&lpg=PA77&dq=uk+petroleum+consumption+1917&source=bl&ots=fbKJKnSgzu&sig=FpGUn8o2j0jYsmxndHNAvxOF44c&hl=en&ei=oOrQTsOtG8_TgQfz5szODQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=uk%20petroleum%20consumption%201917&f=false)
WorldNavalShips.com - largest online directory of naval ships. link (http://www.worldnavalships.com)
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1917, Bureau of the Census (twice). link (http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1917-01.pdf)
Encyclopedia Iranica, IRAN’S OIL AND GAS RESOURCES (article cites 4 sources). link (http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/oil-industry-ii)

You have one citation (link) (http://books.google.com/books?id=j2LPAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA937&lpg=PA937&dq=indian+wheat+exports+1915&source=bl&ots=CO8RQm7vYN&sig=ajBpNiErNyARbO1EWosP-WrUYd4&hl=en&ei=dsjPTuu-Jc3yggf0w_zCDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=indian%20wheat%20exports%201915&f=false), used one of my sources and didn't cite it, and copied-pasted the following from somebody else's blog verbatim without citing or quoting: Uncategorized « ancestorsonboard (http://ancestorsonboard.wordpress.com/category/uncategorized/)


There were 14 main coaling stations in British possessions, at which vessels could refuel. Spinning your globe anti-clockwise from the international date line, the 14 were King George Sound and Thursday Island in Australia; Hong Kong and Singapore in the Far-East; [......]

Can the Royal navy bring coalliers with it?
Sure. Does seem you're going more long-haul campaign that you previously implied was necessary.
of course no flatirons, barges, hulks, unconverted vessels, or ships with insufficient range.
the RN is of course going to practice common sense and not use any oil-powered colliers.
your coal comes from Cardiff.
you're unlikely to have much if any oil at Halifax.
once without oil, your remaining ships lose the following amount of range, given their respective coal and oil capacities, and coal/oil energy equivalents: Erin, Canada & Bellerophon-class 35%, Ironduke-class 37%, King George V-class 32-37%, Orion-class 31% , Colossus-class 36%, Neptune & St. Vincent-class 38%, Dreadnought 41%.
of your cruisers, the same as above as follows: Cochrane 35% (figures for dreadnoughts and cruiser available from Conway's, Naval-History.net, worldnavalships.com, google conversion ratio).
9 of your dreadnoughts are entirely dependent on oil (Queen Elizabeth and Revenge classes)
you're going to have to protect colliers as they transit the Atlantic.
your non-Ironduke class dreadnoughts are going to burn through at least half their fuel on the way to Halifax.
the source I have states it takes 500 men 5 days to coal a dreadnought, per Admiral Fisher (source) (http://www.scribd.com/doc/63434141/Coleman-We-Fight-for-Oil-A-History-of-US-Petroleum-Wars-2008), something to take into consideration with logistics, both in Britain and in Halifax. If there are other statistics available, please feel free to cite them.
dreadnoughts have a "normal load" and "full load" of coal - "normal load" is generally 1/3 of "full load". We're going to have to reasonably determine coal load norms in British waters and take into account coaling times if necessary.

And you still don't get it, the threat to a major city is going to force the US navy to come out and fight.... and die. Then all that is left are the forts which are not much of a threat at long range. its the threat of a couple old Endicott period DC guns getting swamped. The GF can for example fire over the top of Brooklyn or portions of Long Island with the splashes/explosions observed by sea planes. Thats when Wilson faces a political crisis- deal or no deal...
Why would a naval force sail into the face of certain defeat? The High Seas Fleet historically stayed in Wilhelmshaven with much greater strength. Provided your strategy is workable, why would warships sally out to get sunk if it makes no difference or not if they sally out or not?

We still have to take into account a number of factors: RN preparation and transit times, assess US preparedness and possible defenses put in place in the meantime, USN naval movements, U-Boat and possible KM movements to US waters, analyze military forts and if they can be reinforced, possible mining, and so on. Ark Royal is at Murdos, about 4400nmi out from Halifax. She's going to have to sale through the entire Med during the worst month of shipping losses at a time you're withdrawing dreadnoughts and cruisers. If it gets to the US, you have eight seaplanes.

I'm still perplexed as to your actual strategy. How many and what cities do you plan to bombard? Are you planning for one city, or a succession of cities? You were talking about forcing the Chesapeake earlier. What is your distance and positions off shore? What is your battle line for bombardment?

With regards to bombarding a major US city - I still think its preposterous that what you propose is possible is going to force the US to surrender. I think it's going to have the exact opposite effect - galvanize the US consistent with every attack she's experienced before or after. If, and if this strategy could be implemented, I would never agree and never concede that it would have such an effect. I would be surprised if you can find one person who agrees with you.

Furthermore, everything you have proposed has to a) be possible, b) be carried out to perfection. You have a thousand variables at work which have to be perfect, my strategy has one variable that needs to be successful: refusal to export. Everything on top of that is icing on the cake.

1979
28 Nov 11,, 15:44
I must admit, I am lost. Tho, it's good beef, pardon read :pop:

I was lost when they started sending the British fleet west to bring the american's back to her majesty rule.

tgbyhn
28 Nov 11,, 16:35
I was lost when they started sending the British fleet west to bring the american's back to her majesty rule.
You can sum up my premise in one sentence:

Refuse to export to the UK, France, and Italy, and disrupt Canadian rail at minimum to cut off the Prairie Provinces, as Britain has a six week stock of food and about as much oil.

It's actually very simple.

1979
28 Nov 11,, 16:43
So to whom does it export than ?
Or do you cease to drill or harvest simply to make Britain look somewhere else?

tgbyhn
28 Nov 11,, 17:17
So to whom does it export than ?
Or do you cease to drill or harvest simply to make Britain look somewhere else?
A cessation of exports to the Allies is a given, given the subject of the scenario and thread.

The Central Powers are going to be all but impossible to export to. The US is going to have more resources to invest in domestic war production, and one thing I hadn't though of before -- use resources to leverage influence among countries it can export to. France and Britain conducted economic blackmail through WWI - the US can flood nations with resources to join or support the US and Central Powers while maintaining de facto neutrality. I suspect there are going to be neutral powers in Europe that are very upset with France and Britain about their lack of access to American goods.

My point has been all along - Britain doesn't has barely anywhere else to look. They've got six weeks worth of food, as much oil. The US is supplying most of their food, can cut off Canadian grain. The Allies have 8.3 million barrels a year from Iran, lost 58 million barrels from the US, and need to find 60 million barrels worth of refining capacity even if they can replace US oil - which they cannot. Nearly 100% of their foreign credit has evaporated - absolutely vital to funding the war.

Check out these threads to grasp the enormity of the scale I'm talking about, and the imminent catastrophe facing the Allies:
Wheat: http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/world-wars/61727-what-if-us-entered-wwi-side-central-powers-8.html#post846773 (middle portion)
Oil: http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/world-wars/61727-what-if-us-entered-wwi-side-central-powers-8.html#post846863 (top third)
Non-grain food, coal, metals, industrial manufactures: http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/world-wars/61727-what-if-us-entered-wwi-side-central-powers-10.html#post847161

1979
28 Nov 11,, 17:45
A cessation of exports to the Allies is a given, given the subject of the scenario and thread.

nevermind that , i'm asking you how is the US going to benefit from the sudden loss of their previous trading partners
and what a alliance with the central powers would bring to the table.

tgbyhn
28 Nov 11,, 18:11
I took the time to review the thread.

Until I joined the thread, you were on the exact opposite side of the issue.

Credit:

Oh, and British was in danger of bankruptcy do you bother to read and research? In 1914 the BoE had the smallest gold reserves at 250mt. They then doubled it when the war started by buying up the South African production.

For the sake of argument, lets say British predation on American shipping plus the voice of the sizable and vocal German immigrant community at least gets Wilson to take a true nuetral approach... The loss of financing through New York alone means the allies lose the war... In 1932 when the UK stoppedmaking payments the amount owed in 2011 dollars was 225 billion...
Russia:

No loans means no Kansas wheat, Bethlemhelm Steel, Du Pont, southern cotton, Texas oil.... No support for Czarist Russia (England borrowed from the US to buy Russia supplies) so Russia falls early...

Russia needed that foreign money to fight on in 15, 16 and 17, without it she dies early- no money means no arms.
Food Situation:

In the time you have before Central Powers collapse internaly without converting Russia/Ukraine, Greece and Italy into psedo-allies it's not do-able. To fight your way to such a position shortens the time until collapse becomes inevitable.

The US State Department estimated the 1916 wheat crop was 595 million bushels (20+ million tons), Russia's central statistical committee estimated just under 16 million tons of wheat. Given an estimated consumption of 150lbs of wheat per person per annum, that leaves from 3.5 million tons to 7.5 million ton for export using 1914 population figures. Or enough bread to feed between 46.6 million and 100 million people for a year...
Western Front:

For France the loss of US backed loans by the UK has a negative impact as well. Although she can cut some funding to Russia, most of her cuts have to come out of spending on herself. This means fewer heavy guns, fewer machine guns, fewer aeroplanes....
Naval Situation:

Unless the Royal navy wants to detail ships off of the Grand Fleet, since Japan can't offer much 11 pre-dreadnoughts, 1 semi dreadnought, 2 dreadnoughts- most of Japan's pre-dreadnoughts are former Imperial Russian ships (pre-1904) and are more closely related to coastal ships. So if the RN does detail some of its 28 ships off the Grand fleet for operations in the pacific, and details more off to blockade the US coast... Suddenly the German disadvantage in numbers is gone and Jutland may turn out very badly indeed for the Royal Navy given the German ships were better gunnery platforms and didn't stack cordite in the open...

this means a Royal navy divided by the need to blockade the German and American coasts and support an invasion of the US West Coast is is going to be eager to force three battles before June 1916, but if the US and Germany refuse battle until 17 or 18 then the odds are actually stacked against the Royal navy numbers wise (she still has battle cruisers to add throw weight but they are vulnerable)

Here is a surprise- The British were are outgunned at sea in a US/German vs UK in WWI what if... all together the US and German navies had 3 super dreadnoughts, 23 dreadnoughts, 7 battle cruisers and 42 pre-dreadoughts vs 1 super dreadnought, 22 dreadnoughts,9 battle cruisers, 29 pre-dreadnoughts.

Naval supremecy doesn't need a Jutland, unrestricted submarine warfare with friendly American ports for the U-boats will work just as well. Without American credit, merchant marine and industry the UK and France are in ahorrible bind... France still produces too much by workshop, and the Uk is maxed out and neither can afford the loss of manpower in the trenches- which Haig is steadily adding up.

In terms of skill, I'd rate the US the highest (barely) as in 1916 there were still veterans of Santiago de Cuba and Manila Bay- Adm Dewy (died 1917) Adms Fiske and Benson and Mahan had just recently died (1914). The British haven't had a major naval battle in a hundred years until Dogger Bank which was a wash.

Ditto at Jutland, the German escape was a tour de force in fleet maneuvers to save the fleet.

British mine warfare assets in WWI were weak at best. When the Americans jumped in in 1917 along with a new electrically detonated promixity mine the US dropped 70% of the mines in the North Sea Barrage that was 234 miles long and 15 miles wide in 5 months... Not counting sinkings the RN went from 0 to 265 hulls by 1919. Assuming all flower class vessels but 1 were launched in 1914 and 1 in 1918 the maximum RN minesweeper strength in until the next class started adding to the fleet in 1916 was 111 hulls and probably much much less more like 25 hulls per year so roughly 50 minesweepers minus sinking going into 1916. Germany is not much better in 1914 but she has a much smaller area to worry about. But the Germans had 119 destroyers and torpedo boats in and around Germany in 1914. The UK has 200 destroyers but has convoys to escort, trade to protect, fleet scouting... So the numbers edge actually goes to the Germans.
Canada:

In 1917 the US went to war and got 4 divisions to France before the end of the year- 1st, 2nd, 26th and 42nd. All were about half trained with massive cadres having been pulled out to train the follow on units. Rifles were plentiful in the US but the units lacked modern artillery and machine guns. These are American big divisions of about double the size those used by Canada. By June 1918 the US 1 million men in 19 divisions in France- 9 fully trained and blooded, 2 just completing training and 8 new establishments. If kept in North America those divisions would still lack adequate numbers of machine guns and modern artillery but 1,000,000 men is a strength all its own when Canada only managed 300,000 from 1914-16 (and only 2 complete divisions by the end of 1915).

Canada was hamstrung by a population of only 8 million with few major population centers and little industry

In the postulated what if- where would the US invade. Hisotircally the US was drawn like a moth to a flame to Toronto and Montreal/Quebec City. The importance of these two targets does not decrease in 1914-18 but increases.

Toronto- taking the city removes its threat to the ore trade and thus almost all US heavy industry.

Taking Montreal/Quebec City and the St Lawrence Sea Way leading to Labrador, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island- cost the UK the Atlantic Cod fisheries, Canadian Wheat, the protected bays of the Gulf of St Lawrence, shipping lanes and naval depth, plus it costs Canada the bulk of the Canadian population. It also cuts a huge amount off of open ocean running for German sub freighters, U boats and commerce raiders.

Vancouver B.C, Vancouver Island and Victoria- American seizure of these two cities and one big island uncorks Puget Sound and denies the US an awesome protected bay. Complete American control of Puget Sound in 1916 with America on the side of the CP is a loaded .357 with a hair trigger pressed up against the temple of Japan

tgbyhn
28 Nov 11,, 18:19
A cessation of exports to the Allies is a given, given the subject of the scenario and thread.

nevermind that , i'm asking you how is the US going to benefit from the sudden loss of their previous trading partners
and what a alliance with the central powers would bring to the table.
Given that the US enters into war on the side of the Central Powers, I don't have a choice in this matter. There's no purpose in discussing it. The US is going to have to take the good and bad to her trade balance sheet. Maybe the US government can guarantee payments to resource producers out of its previous trade surpluses while manufacturers change to war production.

We have a saying here in the US - "it is what it is."

1979
28 Nov 11,, 18:28
Sorry i do not follow.
are you arguing for the US to go to war against her national interest ?

sorry but that's just like asking yourself " What would happen to that guy skull if I smack him over the head with a shovel ? "
while refusing to ask yourself first " why the hell would I do it? "

tgbyhn
28 Nov 11,, 19:03
Sorry i do not follow.
are you arguing for the US to go to war against her national interest ?

sorry but that's just like asking yourself " What would happen to that guy skull if I smack him over the head with a shovel ? "
while refusing to ask yourself first " why the hell would I do it? "
I'm conforming to the confines imposed by the subject matter.

To be honest, as an American putting myself in the shoes of a 1910s American - I don't see good guys or bad guys. This war is morally ambiguous. The UK propaganda press was extremely successful in the US historically, but the Germans aren't any morally worse than the British or French in my opinion. The French and British do have a lesser moral high ground when it comes to colonies, however.

As far as the way history would play out... the US is going to actually come out much stronger, probably the lead great power if it wanted to be. Whether it wants to be or not, it will have the capacity to emerge as such at any time of its choosing. If the US is looking at "peace with victory" (not Wilson's thing) it could annex Canada, possibly territories in the West Indies. It's going to be stronger in the Pacific than it was.

Elsewhere in the world, eastern Europe is going to be made up of puppet states of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Baltic Duchy under a Hohenzollern, small Kingdom of Poland under a Hapsburg or Hohenzollern. Romania might rapproche with Germany given their Hohenzollern king. Serbia is annexed into Austria-Hungary, perhaps Albania and Montenegro as client states. However, I think ethnic nationalism is going to be a very serious issue in AH after the war. Greece may emerge intact - it entered the war after the US did historically and it may be discouraged from joining the Allies and remain neutral.

I think the White czarists will probably be restored in Russia minus Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltics, and Finland. Turkey is running amok in Central Asia and the Caucasus in 1917-18 historically - pushing into Turkic lands and the British advance in the Arab-populated areas. But whether it's Reds or Whites, it's going to be chaotic between the Turks and Russians. Austria-Hungary may see benefit in playing them off against each other.

Germany is going to get its colonies back and expand them a bit. It wanted Morocco. South Africa's pro-German Boer faction may triumph and emerge independent and German-aligned. Germany is going to get back its Pacific territories and China area.

I don't know what conditions are going to be imposed on the UK and France after the war, but there's going to be reparations and disarmament. France could go anywhere politically - far left, far right. Whatever conditions are imposed on the UK, I think there's going to be a hell of a shock, but that it will recover and stabilize in a couple years. I think it starts to ignore/violate any treaty conditions after several years.

There's never going to be a Hitler. There's going to be a much longer period of great power multipolarity. Any scenario where bipolarity, if it were to arise, is beyond the horizon from my view.

snapper
28 Nov 11,, 21:24
"This war is morally ambiguous." Who started it? Jus Bellum for Entente I believe!

"small Kingdom of Poland under a Hapsburg or Hohenzollern" What? Poland was partioned in 1914... Why would a victorious Central Powers alow a Polish 'Kingdom'/Puppet?

zraver
28 Nov 11,, 22:23
Congress Poland, the part ruled by Russia in 1914

zraver
29 Nov 11,, 00:10
grrr... I've tried twice now to reply and my tokens have expired....

Tgb... thought exercise for you.

You are Woodrow Wilson,
1.the US fleet has just been smashed
2. over the previous 4 weeks over 1000 American merchant ships have been seized.
3. There are riots in the major steel towns because of the loss of work supplying the allies
4. A few of those riots have turned racial
5. the crowd outside your window lead by Eugene Debs the new presumptive next president is protesting YOU- you are really annoyed by the ones that read "he got us into war"
6. The major industrialist are furious at you.
7. 40 million people are under British guns- Boston and New York in particular are in near panic.
8. there is nothing to stop them- no mines, and a few obsolete forts backed by 3" and 4.7" field artillery.
9. France has jumped in and is promising 10 divisions to Canada to assist the soon to return Canadian corps.
10. The Japanese Ambassador is waiting for an appointment- likely to jump in so Japan can seize the Philippines and Hawaii.
11. over the next couple of years the sudden massive surplus of grain is going to turn into famine as the soon to collapse grain prices ruin farmers.
12. Most banks have collapsed or are collapsing taking American's private savings and the Federal Reserve System with them with the sudden loss of billions in foreign loans you told them to make.
13. The border governors are already reporting shadowy Canadian saboteurs crossing the border.
14. The Coastal governments are demanding you do the impossible and stop the British.
15. rumors abound.... did you here the one about poison gas shells for the dreadnoughts?
16. The whaling and fishing fleets are bottled up
17. The Portuguese Ambassador the designated "charge de affairs" for the UK has just handed you a note from King George V's government offering terms not terribly unfavorable to the US. A billion in reparations to be paid in gold and another billion in credits, lower interest rates and longer terms on the loans already issued, return of prize hulls after the war.... just accept the offered peace treaty...
18. Of course you still have to get it past the Republicans who have rallied behind TDR and want to make you bleed to set the stage for the upcoming campaign season.

what do you do?

zraver
29 Nov 11,, 06:02
Everything you have proposed has to a) be possible, b) be carried out to perfection. You have a thousand variables at work which have to be perfect, my strategy has one variable that needs to be successful: refusal to export. Everything on top of that is icing on the cake.

Now put yourself in the shoes of Britain... a loss to Germany threatens the entire Empire becuase she loses the political legitimacy of might makes right. Also dependign on the terms imposed by the US and Germany, she may lose her Grand Fleet as both the US and Germany want a British navy strong enough to police the seas, but not strong enough to police them...


Just pointing out you've gone from over a year to play with (extremely non-urgent), to the British fleet's only hope is to sail post-haste and knock the US out of the way by bombarding cities (extremely urgent).

stop conflating please, having 6 weeks of wheat doesn't imply I only have six weeks to win, and having six weeks of wheat doesn't mean I only have six weeks of food. it means there is a national crisis bordering on national disaster but bordering on and being are different.



Again, I quoted Conway's at 8kn (speed listed for virtually every U-Boat). Virtually every U-Boat listed has more than double the range necessary at 8kn. 10kn was just my opinion.

8kn having to go out of route to avoid the Royal Navy destroyers means over 4000 miles to the US, with a range of 9700 miles 9/10ths of the fuel is gone on the trip there and the reserve for the home trip. This is why in WWI, the war off the American coast was limited to Bloody Sunday and 2 more failed attempts using u cruisers.


You've provided your opinions on how long it takes to unmothball a sub, and something about three categories, but you haven't listed any specific pre-dreadnoughts that were done so with citations. Or any other period ship for that matter.

BS, I gave you the time frame for both times HMS Lion was laid up after taking 14 heavy caliber hits... Moving a ship from reserve status to full commission is much less intensive than putting her up on skegs in a dray dock to replace her dynamo, distiller, armor, flush her tanks, clean her coal bins.... In fact the very close to the size of a battleship 9first pocket battleships?) USS Sandeigo (ex USS California) went into reserve status on Feb 17, 1917, through April 6 1917 she was a receiving ship and placed back into full commission on April 7. Why so fast? Because RESERVE DOES NOT MEAN MOTHBALL. Reserve is short term storage from days to several years, maintenance, or even simply moving the crew to another hull to cut peace time crew costs and preserve service length. Ships in reserve have care taker crews to facilitate quick re-activation. They paint, they sand, they clean, they monitor. Ship in short reserve may not even have shells unloaded... just cordite and perishables.


C.G. Jones, "The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: A Search for an Oil Policy." The Historical Journal, Volume 20 Issue 3, 1977. link (http://www.jstor.org/pss/2638433)
"At the onset of the campaign there were reserves of 5.1 months' consumption; by May the reserve level had been reduced to 2.9 months, with some bases down to only six days' supply."

The only number there worth a crap is the 2.9 months since that likely reflects the national pool, the bases down to six days is worthless. Is that six days with a design capacity of 30 ships a month or 300? All it indicates is either unusally heavy traffic at a base recently, normal operating protocols (maybe normal was only 7 days...) or long term low use and thus a reduction in supply priority.


"Owing to the dire situation the Admiralty had to send what one commentator has called urgent and humiliating telegrams to the United States saying that the Royal Navy would be immobilized unless more American tonnage became available to carry oil across the Atlantic. Despite its control of APOC the shortage of its own tankers forced Britain to draw about 80 percent of its oil supplies from North America. The Admiralty director of stores noted in September 1917 that, "without the aid of oil fuel from America our modern oil-burning fleet cannot keep the seas."

Interesting the US flag fleet in 1914 9100 GT or greater) was 1692 vessels totaling 4.28 million tons. In 1919 it had almost doubled in hulls to 3611 hulls but had almost tripled to 11.99 million gt. So splitting the difference is around 2500 vessels and 7.5-8 million gt. If we divide divide that flag fleet into 5ths (loading, unloading, coming, going, repair) there should be around 1000 US ships at sea when war breaks out and 500 or so in non-US ports.... how many can the Royal navy put prize crews on? I'd say half is doable.... 750 free hulls for the British

Relative Size of the U.S. and World Fleets (http://shipbuildinghistory.com/today/statistics/wldflt.htm)


"Despite these measures, however, the Allies barely managed to meet their oil needs. The situation was sometimes so critical that the shipping controller suggested to the war cabinet in August 1917 that the Royal Navy should stop building ships fueled by oil and revert to coal. Furthermore, the tonnage used to ship oil across the Atlantic resulted in cutbacks in other vital commodities -- most notably foodstuffs. By December 1917 approximately 900,000 tons of wheat originally destined for Britain remained at American ports owing to the shortage of vessels for shipping."

which goes to show wheat while important was not critically short...


As far as research is concerned, I've cited the following publications:

And admitting to piggy-backing your opinions on to them...


You have one citation (link) (http://books.google.com/books?id=j2LPAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA937&lpg=PA937&dq=indian+wheat+exports+1915&source=bl&ots=CO8RQm7vYN&sig=ajBpNiErNyARbO1EWosP-WrUYd4&hl=en&ei=dsjPTuu-Jc3yggf0w_zCDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=indian%20wheat%20exports%201915&f=false), used one of my sources and didn't cite it, and copied-pasted the following from somebody else's blog verbatim without citing or quoting: Uncategorized « ancestorsonboard (http://ancestorsonboard.wordpress.com/category/uncategorized/)

Sorry, prof, you want end note or footnotes?


Sure. Does seem you're going more long-haul campaign that you previously implied was necessary.
of course no flatirons, barges, hulks, unconverted vessels, or ships with insufficient range.
the RN is of course going to practice common sense and not use any oil-powered colliers.
your coal comes from Cardiff.
you're unlikely to have much if any oil at Halifax.

Destroyers need fuel, fleets need replenishment and it has nothing to do with how long the campaign will last.


once without oil, your remaining ships lose the following amount of range, given their respective coal and oil capacities, and coal/oil energy equivalents: Erin, Canada & Bellerophon-class 35%, Ironduke-class 37%, King George V-class 32-37%, Orion-class 31% , Colossus-class 36%, Neptune & St. Vincent-class 38%, Dreadnought 41%.
of your cruisers, the same as above as follows: Cochrane 35% (figures for dreadnoughts and cruiser available from Conway's, Naval-History.net, worldnavalships.com, google conversion ratio).

Got source saying they sprayed continuously or only when extra power was needed?


9 of your dreadnoughts are entirely dependent on oil (Queen Elizabeth and Revenge classes)

And.... your source gives me 11 weeks of oil at then current operating tempos...


you're going to have to protect colliers as they transit the Atlantic.

I've got 78 destroyers


your non-Ironduke class dreadnoughts are going to burn through at least half their fuel on the way to Halifax.

No they will per below use half a normal load or 1/6th of a full load...


the source I have states it takes 500 men 5 days to coal a dreadnought, per Admiral Fisher (source) (http://www.scribd.com/doc/63434141/Coleman-We-Fight-for-Oil-A-History-of-US-Petroleum-Wars-2008), something to take into consideration with logistics, both in Britain and in Halifax. If there are other statistics available, please feel free to cite them.

2 weeks to transit to the North Sea for the most distant battleships, a week to refuel is three weeks, the dreadnoughts each need 10 days to go to full load (2/3 added to 1/3 on board) they got the time...


dreadnoughts have a "normal load" and "full load" of coal - "normal load" is generally 1/3 of "full load". We're going to have to reasonably determine coal load norms in British waters and take into account coaling times if necessary.

Normal likely doesn't mean working at night so real time when pressed can likely be cut by a third.


Why would a naval force sail into the face of certain defeat? The High Seas Fleet historically stayed in Wilhelmshaven with much greater strength. Provided your strategy is workable, why would warships sally out to get sunk if it makes no difference or not if they sally out or not?

1. the German Navy didn't have to protect the German Coast, wasn't built to do it either. Its a much different situation in the US where a massive East Coast shore line is home to the bulk of the country's population.
2. Duty... its what we do. Its why Spee told German expats that the flowers they gave him after the battle of Coronel would do nicely for his funeral, why he went down with both his sons. Why the firefighters went up the towers, and why the Dutch Army went into battle in 1940. Warrior or rescuer we put our selves between the beast we face and the hearth and home we protect.
3. to do otherwise would collapse the government.
4. You have to try, the only true hopeless situation is one where you refuse to act.


We still have to take into account a number of factors: RN preparation and transit times,

3 weeks prep, 3 weeks transit, 1 week refuel 1 week to US= 8 weeks.


assess US preparedness

Most of the US fleet assembled in Philly, Brooklyn and Boston fully crewed if not trained, fully stocked and supplied.


and possible defenses put in place in the meantime,

Little if any... the army can add some 3" and a few 4.7" field artillery units to the shore defenses. But they are not trained to engage ships... whats the difference between a 1500 ton freighter and a 4000 ton vessel? Mistake one for the other and your shots are going to be long or short...


USN naval movements,

see above


U-Boat

few if any... the Royal navy is still at sea catching US ships. The only u-boats to make America would have to leave by war+15 days to reach the US ahead of the GF and still have time to refuel and re-arm. U-boats at sea unless just arrived are likely to stay put and act as a picket force- though the German attempt at that at Jutland was a boondoggle.


and possible KM movements to US waters,

none


analyze military forts and if they can be reinforced, possible mining, and so on.

The forts are obsolete, the only modern fort in the US isn't in the US but the Philippines where Ft Drum mounts 4x 14" guns in two battleship turrets. In the US the best of the designs are the Endicotts but the DC gun concept was proven in WWII to be worthless. To re-enforce them the US can add dubious field artillery. In 1917 until the development of the antenna mine in July 1917 the US has few mines. The US Army controlled submerge command detonated mines are retired by 1906 and all the navy has are a few Naval Defense Mines which they found to be worthless. the US has 1 mine warfare ship the ex USS San Fransisco.


Ark Royal is at Murdos, about 4400nmi out from Halifax. She's going to have to sale through the entire Med during the worst month of shipping losses at a time you're withdrawing dreadnoughts and cruisers. If it gets to the US, you have eight seaplanes.

LOL, wrong ship HMS Engadine was on permanent station with the GF and saw action at Jutland (4-6 planes), and HMS Riviera is at Dover (4 planes), HMS Manxman (8 planes), HMS Vindex (7 planes), and HMS Campania (10 planes) are with the Grandfleet as well. Total maximum aircraft is thus 35 planes.


I'm still perplexed as to your actual strategy. How many and what cities do you plan to bombard? Are you planning for one city, or a succession of cities? You were talking about forcing the Chesapeake earlier. What is your distance and positions off shore? What is your battle line for bombardment?

The obvious targets are the ones that will do the most for the war effort and the post war British economy. Dockyards, factories, chemical plants, Wall Street, refineries, fuel depots, wharves etc. Plus my presence in North America means the fishing and whaling fleets aint sailing, which will throw almost as many people out of work as the lost trade with Europe does.

I am going to come in from the East North East on a line with New York City. This put my potential target list in a cone from Portland Maine to Savannah. I am not barrelling in, I want to be seen so the US comes to me. The US wants to fight an offshore- inshore where the older slower ships back stop the faster ships. Not unlike Jutland.... the US dreadnoughts dart out and then try and set up a running gun battle at long range as they pull back towards the 2nd line of older ships and pass the fight off to them as they make their escape. Ideally the 3rd line is a bunch of shoals and barriers the slow ships can retreat behind or a protected harbor or sound they can retreat into. That way the British have to detail off ships to blockade them, and if American gunnery out performed the British and the hull trade favored the the US then the next fight is on closer to even numbers.... risky the Royal navy has numbers and speed... but I don't see another option.

as the Jellico if I can cut the American dreadnoughts off and sink most of them and maul the 2nd class fleet the American coast become the worlds biggest plumb.


With regards to bombarding a major US city - I still think its preposterous that what you propose is possible is going to force the US to surrender. I think it's going to have the exact opposite effect - galvanize the US consistent with every attack she's experienced before or after. If, and if this strategy could be implemented, I would never agree and never concede that it would have such an effect. I would be surprised if you can find one person who agrees with you.

Do the mental exercise as Wilson please. The guns of the Grand Fleet ( and i will make a demonstration attack sat Nantucket) won't put HE on to US soil until after the USN is broken, scattered, and bottled up some 8 weeks after war breaks out, its not Pear Harbor. in that 8 weeks the US has entered a depression, hundreds of thousands or millions of factory workers are idle, the massive surplus to be harvested in the fail means in a couple years the soon too collapse grain prices will bankrupt most farmers and famine is on the horizon, racial tensions are flaring....


Furthermore, everything you have proposed has to a) be possible, b) be carried out to perfection. You have a thousand variables at work which have to be perfect, my strategy has one variable that needs to be successful: refusal to export. Everything on top of that is icing on the cake.

Your solution means the Great Depression of 1917....

tgbyhn
29 Nov 11,, 14:16
I have a thought experiment for you. Reconcile every contradiction you've made in the first 7 posts of this thread with everything you've said in the last 4, which are the exact opposite.


stop conflating please, having 6 weeks of wheat doesn't imply I only have six weeks to win, and having six weeks of wheat doesn't mean I only have six weeks of food. it means there is a national crisis bordering on national disaster but bordering on and being are different.
What are these other magical sources of food you've got?
US meat to the United Kingdom were 10,000 tons per week out of a total of 18,000 tons in March 1917 (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=_F3EljBXbeQC&pg=PA208&lpg=PA208&dq=uk+lard+consumption+1917&source=bl&ots=TnjxbGOORo&sig=H7vUobSZZ6HJtWHP7cPm-PKNmoQ&hl=en&ei=6MDUTrfLKanz0gH-5qDbAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CD0Q6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=uk%20lard%20consumption%201917&f=false) against 50,000 tons weekly consumption 1917, a decline of 600 calories per week per person (source) (http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~idjlaw/PDF/18-1/18-1%20Seidman.pdf).
In addition, US total live exports of animals were 13,387 cattle, 21,926 hogs, 58,811 sheep, and 160,000 fowl (source) (http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1917-06.pdf).
US exports of lard to Britain were 1100 tons per week (first source) against 4300 tons of consumption per week (second source), a decline of 200 calories per person per week.
US total exports of condensed milk were equivalent to 20 million pints of fresh milk per week (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=5QZgAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA38&lpg=PA38&dq=britain+oats+production+1917&source=bl&ots=0iznaORYB-&sig=mfZJukuSz4YnZT2XiNVYJLVRW8c&hl=en&ei=CsvUTqvgIKTy0gH9_5mBAg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=britain%20oats%20production%201917&f=false) against a British consumption of 140 million pints per week (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=_F3EljBXbeQC&pg=PA208&lpg=PA208&dq=uk+lard+consumption+1917&source=bl&ots=TnjxbGOORo&sig=H7vUobSZZ6HJtWHP7cPm-PKNmoQ&hl=en&ei=6MDUTrfLKanz0gH-5qDbAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CD0Q6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=uk%20lard%20consumption%201917&f=false).
US yearly barley exports 16.4 million bushels of barley to Britain and France (source) (http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1917-06.pdf) against a production of 60 million bushels in France and Britain (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=K2UMAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=british+bushels+oats++production+1917&source=bl&ots=fMBE29PuLN&sig=eSOsQXYuxVM321AgwQz1aKwTyss&hl=en&ei=g8vUTpDtDcXn0QGnv9yGAg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=british%20bushels%20oats%20%20production%201917&f=false).
US total corn exports of 65 million bushels of corn (former source) against a British and French production of none. (latter source)
US total exports of 90,000 tons of rice (former) against production of none (latter).
US total exports of 300 million eggs a year against (source) (http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1917-06.pdf) a British consumption of 877 million eggs per year (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=_F3EljBXbeQC&pg=PA208&lpg=PA208&dq=uk+lard+consumption+1917&source=bl&ots=TnjxbGOORo&sig=H7vUobSZZ6HJtWHP7cPm-PKNmoQ&hl=en&ei=6MDUTrfLKanz0gH-5qDbAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CD0Q6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=uk%20lard%20consumption%201917&f=false).
US total exports of 700 tons of oleo per week (source) (http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1917-06.pdf) against a British consumption of 6450 tons per week (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=_F3EljBXbeQC&pg=PA208&lpg=PA208&dq=uk+lard+consumption+1917&source=bl&ots=TnjxbGOORo&sig=H7vUobSZZ6HJtWHP7cPm-PKNmoQ&hl=en&ei=6MDUTrfLKanz0gH-5qDbAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CD0Q6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=uk%20lard%20consumption%201917&f=false).
US total exports of sugars were 14,000 tons per week (source) (http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1917-06.pdf) against UK consumption of 21,500 tons per week (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=_F3EljBXbeQC&pg=PA208&lpg=PA208&dq=uk+lard+consumption+1917&source=bl&ots=TnjxbGOORo&sig=H7vUobSZZ6HJtWHP7cPm-PKNmoQ&hl=en&ei=6MDUTrfLKanz0gH-5qDbAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CD0Q6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=uk%20lard%20consumption%201917&f=false).
US total exports of 12,000 tons per week of cheese per week (source) (http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1917-06.pdf) against UK consumption of 3000 tons per week (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=_F3EljBXbeQC&pg=PA208&lpg=PA208&dq=uk+lard+consumption+1917&source=bl&ots=TnjxbGOORo&sig=H7vUobSZZ6HJtWHP7cPm-PKNmoQ&hl=en&ei=6MDUTrfLKanz0gH-5qDbAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CD0Q6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=uk%20lard%20consumption%201917&f=false).
US total exports of 260 tons per week of butter (source) (http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1917-06.pdf) against UK consumption of 4300 tons per week (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=_F3EljBXbeQC&pg=PA208&lpg=PA208&dq=uk+lard+consumption+1917&source=bl&ots=TnjxbGOORo&sig=H7vUobSZZ6HJtWHP7cPm-PKNmoQ&hl=en&ei=6MDUTrfLKanz0gH-5qDbAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CD0Q6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=uk%20lard%20consumption%201917&f=false).
All the consumption figures are based on 43 million working-class man (largest rations). They're actually less due to lower rations for non-working class men, women, and children.

tgbyhn
29 Nov 11,, 14:21
8kn having to go out of route to avoid the Royal Navy destroyers means over 4000 miles to the US, with a range of 9700 miles 9/10ths of the fuel is gone on the trip there and the reserve for the home trip. This is why in WWI, the war off the American coast was limited to Bloody Sunday and 2 more failed attempts using u cruisers.
Remember this?:

Naval supremecy doesn't need a Jutland, unrestricted submarine warfare with friendly American ports for the U-boats will work just as well.
30-50% of their fuel, nearly all at 8kn.

Wilhelmshaven to New York - 3500nmi around the north of the British Isles.

German U-Boat class, range/speed - (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=V2r_TBjR2TYC&pg=PA134&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false)
U-17, 6700nmi/8kn - max 14.9kn
U-19, 7600nmi/8kn - max 15.4kn
U-23, 7620nmi/8kn - max 16.7kn
U-27, 7900nmi/8kn - max 16.7kn
U-31, 7800nmi/8kn - max 16.4kn
U-43, 8100nmi/8kn - max 15.2kn
U-51, 9000nmi/8kn - max 17.1kn
U-57, 7730nmi/8kn - max 14.7kn
U-63, 8100nmi/8kn - max 16.5kn
U-66, 6500nmi/8kn - max 16.8kn
U-71, 5800nmi/7kn - max 10.6kn (minelayer)
U-81, 8100nmi/8kn - max 16.8kn
U-87, 8000nmi/8kn - max 15.6kn
U-93, 8300nmi/8kn - max 16.8kn
U-115, 9800nmi/8kn - max 16kn
U-117, 9400nmi/8kn - max 14.7kn (minelayer)
U-127, 10,000nmi/8kn - max 16.8kn
U-139, 17,750nmi/8kn - max 15.3kn
U-142, 20,000nmi/8kn - max 17.5kn
U-151, 25,000nmi/5.5kn - max 12.4kn
U-158, 12,370nmi/8kn - max 16kn
U-213, 12,000nmi/8kn - max 18kn
U-229, 11,400nmi/8kn - max 16.5kn
UB-II, 6650-8150nmi/5kn - max 9kn ("coastal")
UB-III, 7200-9040nmi/6kn - max 13.5kn ("coastal")
UC-II, 7280-10,000nmi/7kn - max 11.6kn (minelayer)
UC-III, 9850nmi/7kn - max 11.5kn (minelayer)

tgbyhn
29 Nov 11,, 16:42
Selected excerpts from the first 7 pages - when you argued a US-German victory before turning on a dime:

The loss of financing through New York alone means the allies lose the war...

Here is a surprise- The British were are outgunned at sea in a US/German vs UK in WWI what if...

Naval supremecy doesn't need a Jutland, unrestricted submarine warfare with friendly American ports for the U-boats will work just as well.

this means a Royal navy divided by the need to blockade the German and American coasts and support an invasion of the US West Coast is is going to be eager to force three battles before June 1916, but if the US and Germany refuse battle until 17 or 18 then the odds are actually stacked against the Royal navy numbers wise

British mine warfare assets in WWI were weak at best. When the Americans jumped in in 1917 along with a new electrically detonated promixity mine the US dropped 70% of the mines in the North Sea Barrage that was 234 miles long and 15 miles wide in 5 months... Not counting sinkings the RN went from 0 to 265 hulls by 1919.

Now back to the "Britain's only hope bombarding the US with 2-3 hours worth of ammunition":

BS, I gave you the time frame [...]
I'm going to need some citations from historical or academic sources for all of your numbers. I'm not going to take your word for anything. You've already switched every single argument you've made in the last 7 pages to the last 4.


The only number there worth a crap is the 2.9 months since that likely reflects the national pool, the bases down to six days is worthless.
2.9 months (12.5 weeks) at some point in May 1917 - a loss of 4-8 weeks of oil imports already. Six days is worthless? That's your opinion - my citation is academic and you're not exactly an expert.


there should be around 1000 US ships at sea when war breaks out and 500 or so in non-US ports.... how many can the Royal navy put prize crews on? I'd say half is doable.... 750 free hulls for the British
Using your "wash", 16% of the world's merchant fleet is US. How much of its Allied? (psst, most) How many of those are in US ports? (psst, more than vice-versa) Those 250 hulls - that's a lot of work cut out for the RN considering you have her going to the ends of the Earth already.


which goes to show wheat while important was not critically short...
Six week supply in April 1917 - according to every academic source. You're going to cite this statistic when you were on the other side of the argument citing the exact same thing? Britain's on the brink of starvation in April 1917 and it's not a matter of dispute. 900,000 tons on US docks in Dec 1917 has nothing to do with anything, furthermore, it was a major problem.

Let me cite a British government website, in addition to prior citations:
"The situation got much worse in 1917 when the Germans adopted a tactic of unrestricted submarine warfare. They had done this for short periods in 1915 and 1916, but in 1917 it became a concerted attack. The tactic was simple - all ships supplying Britain were sunk, whether they were British, American or any other country.

The effects were devastating. Essential supplies began to run short and in April 1917 Britain was six weeks away from running out of wheat. Prices began to soar. People got very fed up with queuing, especially when the shops often ran out of food. " (source) (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/britain1906to1918/g5/background.htm)


In April 1917 Britain had only 6 weeks worth of wheat left in England... move that forward a year and as Adm Beatty observed in 1917, "The real crux lies in whether we blockade the enemy to his knees, or whether he does the same to us." If Germany has friendly US ports to use with high quality US supplied petrol...


And admitting to piggy-backing your opinions on to them...
I put forth my position, and then consistently proceeded to back it up with factual information. Informed opinions are critical to any debate. My arguments are backed by facts. So it's informed opinion vs. "truthiness".


Sorry, prof, you want end note or footnotes?
If you put forth an argument that is based on facts, figures, and statistics for a point of contention, you need to provide evidence for your claim. For example, the statement "the Earth makes a complete rotation in 1 hour." Otherwise there's no proof they are true. Given the contradictions between your first 7 pages and last 4, I certainly ain't taking your word on anything.


Got source saying they sprayed continuously or only when extra power was needed?
Yes. According to British Battleships of World War One by Robert Burt, the HMS Erin has a range of 3400nmi with coal only, 5300nmi with coal and oil, using the same Babcock boilers as every other coal-oil dreadnought.


And.... your source gives me 11 weeks of oil at then current operating tempos...
My source at an unspecified date in May 1917, means the loss of 4-8 weeks of oil imports.


I've got 78 destroyers
According to Conway's, every destroyer in the British fleet built since 1905 are pure oil-burning, except 16 Beagle-class. Which is the vast majority destroyers by April 1917. You're going to have to scrape.


No they will per below use half a normal load or 1/6th of a full load...
All dreadnoughts ranges are at full load, period. For example, the previously cited Erin's range is 5300nmi with a full load 2,120 tons of coal and 710 tons of fuel oil. Rest of the RN fuel-oil dreadnoughts use the same Babcock boilers.

As for the rest of your argument, you have a maximum of 35 dreadnoughts distributed among the entire US coast, with 25-30,000 tons of shells (each ship with a supply of 2-3 hours of consistent shelling), with the vast majority of the destroyer fleet oil-burning. This Savannah to Boston campaign seems like a multi-week campaign to me, with supply lines reaching back to Britain.

You can't prove the US is going to surrender if it gets a city shelled. Or multiple. It's an opinion based on what you suppose a population is going to think. You don't even have any evidence from US history to support this hypothesis. All historical evidence points to the opposite effect, impressment, Alamo, the Maine, the Lusitania, Pearl Harbor, Gulf of Tonkin, Berlin discotheque/Lockerbie, messing with our oil in Kuwait, 9/11. I can prove my assertions of starvation and war effort collapse.

According to you, a bombardment campaign is the absolute only hope the British have. US cessation of exports to the Allies is a given.

As far as this 'mindset' - if US enters war, Congress wants this war badly. The US population wants this war badly. They're angry and they want to stab the ever-loving crap out of any Briton they can get their hands on. And if you mess with them, it's only going to get worse. The typical American's mindset in war is on the brink of genocidal. You're not going to scare them. They're not going to surrender to a few dozen ships.

Your foreign examples aren't even examples, they only hastened the inevitable at best.

Guernica the Reps holding onto a strip of coast already cut off for months and surrounded. Like the Nats are going to lose.

30 German divisions occupying 65% of Netherlands prior to Rotterdam. Like the Germans are going to lose.

93 German/Soviet divisions that overran Poland occupying 95% of it, but supposedly - the bombing of Warsaw is decisive in German/Soviet victory. Like the Germans and Soviets are going to lose.

Absolute hogwash.

Do the mental exercise as Wilson please. The guns of the Grand Fleet ( and i will make a demonstration attack sat Nantucket) won't put HE on to US soil until after the USN is broken, scattered, and bottled up some 8 weeks after war breaks out, its not Pear Harbor. in that 8 weeks the US has entered a depression, hundreds of thousands or millions of factory workers are idle, the massive surplus to be harvested in the fail means in a couple years the soon too collapse grain prices will bankrupt most farmers and famine is on the horizon, racial tensions are flaring....
Your solution means the Great Depression of 1917....
US exports were $2.1 billion in 1914 and $4.2 billion in 1916 source (http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1920-06.pdf) against a $60 billion economy, and it's supposed to go into a depression when it's ramping up to go to war? Meanwhile - Britain is about to starve - oh, no problem.

You spent 7 pages arguing that the US and Germany win. You're really something. How can you completely contradict every major point you made in the first 7 pages with these last 4?

Oh, and British was in danger of bankruptcy do you bother to read and research? In 1914 the BoE had the smallest gold reserves at 250mt.

The loss of financing through New York alone means the allies lose the war...

1979
29 Nov 11,, 17:22
have you actually read this
http://www.amazon.com/Upheaval-War-Family-Welfare-1914-1918/dp/0521525152
or did you just Google it ?:tongue:
since frankly the book conclusion is very different from your own to say the least.

tgbyhn
29 Nov 11,, 17:47
have you actually read this
Amazon.com: The Upheaval of War: Family, Work and Welfare in Europe, 1914-1918 (9780521525152): Richard Wall, Jay Winter: Books (http://www.amazon.com/Upheaval-War-Family-Welfare-1914-1918/dp/0521525152)
or did you just Google it ?:tongue:
since frankly the book conclusion is very different from your own to say the least.
I'm not sure what you're talking about - I'm merely citing a rationing table. They're available elsewhere as well.

It's available scanned and uploaded online on Google Books.

zraver
29 Nov 11,, 19:31
Remember this?:

30-50% of their fuel, nearly all at 8kn.

Wilhelmshaven to New York - 3500nmi around the north of the British Isles.

No its not since the short line distance through the channel is 3246 nautical miles.

Wilhelmshaven to the Orkney Islands is 554 nautical miles and from there around the Orkey islands is another 104 nautical miles and then to new York New York is an additional 2800 nautical miles for a total of 3450 using the shortest possible distances and near shore. If you add distance to avid patrols and mine barrages (+15%) the distance jumps to 3970 nmi for a round trip of 7940nmi

Zeebrugge which avoids some of the Royal navy but adds distance to the Orkney Islands is about 723 nautical miles with a total to New York of 4171 if adding 15%.

I was also on a different side of the debate, stop trolling, stop conflating and answer my though experiment please.



I have a thought experiment for you. Reconcile every contradiction you've made in the first 7 posts of this thread with everything you've said in the last 4, which are the exact opposite.

Easy, I was on a different side of the debate... its called mental agility. Your turn, answer my thought experiment.



What are these other magical sources of food you've got?

Sub-Saharan African Exports minus South Africa amounted to 8% of British imports prior to 1914. I think its safe to say a good percentage of that is agricultural products, the rest raw materials.

Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960 ... - Peter Duignan, Lewis H. Gann - Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=-e88AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA9&lpg=PA9&dq=african+exports+in+1914&source=bl&ots=NYoC5OyBiE&sig=onfgVK2INp5gHo2Y_immYVBAZ50&hl=en&ei=RQPVTvWGJIP6tgfj0Yn9AQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBwQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=african%20exports%20in%201914&f=false).

African owned cattle in Rhodsia alone have doubled from 1908-1914 to 406,000 head as opposed to 341,000 European owned.

466,000 cattle allowing 10% wastage is 419,400 head of cattle of about 200,000 calves. Since the war is startign early in the year that means the meat from 200,000 cows can be exported from Rhodesia alone. Average yeild for a slaughtered cow is 741lbs of meat- 740 tons pe rannum. That is just Rhodesia mind you.

The main Rhodesian non-food cash crop in 1914 was tobacco- 3 million pounds per annum and this land can be converted to food stocks which would add roughly 15% to the 20,200 tons of maize exported from Rhodesia to the UK in 1914

The Roots of rural poverty in ... - Robin H. Palmer, Neil Parsons - Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=wz6lKAI9Gp0C&pg=PA236&lpg=PA236&dq=african+agriculture+1915&source=bl&ots=7KVNwGsKhb&sig=HkvpeXQ9GfvMXugz_vcNR5ePYqU&hl=en&ei=ogTVTuqwCpO-tgeeiNyBAg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CCgQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=african%20agriculture%201915&f=false)

China is producing 285 billion pounds/ 129.7 billion kilos of rice with a population of 465,000,000 each eating 100 kilos a year for a potential surplus of 83 billion kilos or 8.3 million metric tons before wastage and seed stock.

Economic world - Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=KGsgAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA661&lpg=PA661&dq=China+rice+production+1915&source=bl&ots=OsnFcDblXl&sig=ocGAyvsbazvhkeiOllaw9xkIBsM&hl=en&ei=BgnVTvfQJZKJtweMroGEAg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=China%20rice%20production%201915&f=false)

CHINA: population growth of the whole country (http://www.populstat.info/Asia/chinac.htm)

And its not going to Japan who after 1914 begins to rely on Korea.

Landownership under colonial rule ... - Edwin H. Gragert - Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=Z1sw3zcrNK4C&pg=PA112&lpg=PA112&dq=japan+rice+imports+1914&source=bl&ots=ufmtp1VMeF&sig=ZIT1jUUDbEZaJTdnQc86AoLvj6w&hl=en&ei=awvVTqDeJ5PMtgfbwoiOAg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=japan%20rice%20imports%201914&f=false)

Combined Asian rice exports in 1914 were 4.3 million tons mostly to India/China and other Asian locations. Mostly from India, China and Siam. No its not a contradiction for rice surplus countries/ global rice reserve countries to import rice. you buy cheap sell high, import improved strains, export industrial strains etc... of that 4.3 million tons 1.1 million tons left Asia. However with Japan switching to Korea and the increase there the report for 1924 shows rice exports having grown to
5.8 million tons with almost all of the increase going to non-Asian markets. Since it doesn't take long to put rice under cultivation and Japan started in 1914 I am going to guess there is a exportable reserve in Asia of between 2 and 6 million tons of rice per annum.

Siam was exporting 1.2 million tons of rice per annum in 1915 and exports to Europe actually declined from 263,000 tons to 188,000 tons which shows a a reserve of exportable rice there of 80,000 tons.


I'm going to need some citations from historical or academic sources for all of your numbers. I'm not going to take your word for anything. You've already switched every single argument you've made in the last 7 pages to the last 4.

If I switched sides, why wouldn't I switch arguments?


2.9 months (12.5 weeks) at some point in May 1917 - a loss of 4-8 weeks of oil imports already. Six days is worthless? That's your opinion - my citation is academic and you're not exactly an expert.

If you knew how to reason...

11-12.5 weeks worth of oil on hand (2.9 months) is likely the number for the entire United Kingdom minus dominions and colonies. That is a solid usable number.

6 days is worthless becuase we don't what a days consumption is for the location being discussed becuase we don't even have the location. Locations are not built to cookie cutter spec but to expected traffic and need. Do you think 6 days fuel stocks in Kingston Jamaica will last 6 days at the Firth of Roysth? Or reserve it, do you think 6 days at the Firth of Roysth will only last 6 days in Jamaica?

We also don't know which if any bases and stations are also fueling merchant men... If some are, then use per day likely varies a great deal. A station at the Cape of Good Hope is probably steadily busy while one serving a region that is primarily agricultural in nature has peaks and valleys that coincide with the harvesting.


Using your "wash", 16% of the world's merchant fleet is US. How much of its Allied? (psst, most) How many of those are in US ports? ([i]psst, more than vice-vera[i]) Those 250 hulls - that's a lot of work cut out for the RN considering you have her going to the ends of the Earth already.

I was pointing out that there was a source of replacement merchant hulls. and no I don't have the RN scattering to the four corners of the Globe but concentrating in 2 areas. North Sea and Atlantic.


Six week supply in April 1917 - according to you and I.

And.... that is at then current ration levels and wheat is hardly the only food. At the end of 6 weeks wheat might be critically depleted and having an impact on daily calories but is not by itself an indicator of famine beginning on week 6 + 1 day. In part becuase the US/Canada is not the only source of wheat. Forced exports from other areas won't make up the short fall in wheat but they will stretch it out a bit. As will a further reduction in bread rations.


Informed opinions are critical to any debate. My arguments are backed by facts. So it's informed opinion vs. "truthiness".

Your opinions are not formed on a factual basis becuase you manipulate numbers and wear blinders. You've been busted out trying to use someone else's source to justify your claim of 10knts to America HO!

I haven't found the size of a WWI u-boats fuel bunker size yet but...

WWII type VIIc42 1050 tons with 180 tons of fuel for a range of 1000 @ 7 knots miles or 55.5 miles per ton and 47.2 miles per ton at 10 knots with a max range of 8500 miles. Assuming identical hydrostatic and engine efficiency (we both know its not) the UC II type would carry 80-90 tons of fuel and have have a range of only 8000 nautical miles at 10 knots.


Germany U-Boat History; U- (http://www.sharkhunters.com/UBoatHistory.htm)
Type UC II boats - German U-boat Types - U-boat War in WWI - uboat.net (http://uboat.net/wwi/types/?type=UC+II)


If you put forth an argument that is based on facts, figures, and statistics to a point of contention, you need to provide evidence for your claim. For example, the statement "the Earth makes a complete rotation in 1 hour." Otherwise there's no proof they are true. Given the contradictions between your first 7 pages and last 4, I certainly ain't taking your word on anything.

zero contradictions....

I am arguing from a different perspective... two totally different arguments... contradictions are things inside of a single argument that oppose each other.


Yes. According to British Battleships of World War One by Robert Burt, the HMS Erin has a range of 3400nmi with coal only, 5300nmi with coal and oil, using the same Babcock boilers as every other coal-oil dreadnought.

Thanks, good thing I am bring colliers... maybe leave the Erin behind as one of the dreadnoughts left.


My source at an unspecified date in May 1917, means the loss of 4-8 weeks of oil imports.

It also means the loss of 4-8 weeks of consumption exceeding imports due to submarine losses in real history so actual reserves in the UK in April 17 are probably a wee bit higher.


All dreadnoughts ranges are at full load, period. For example, the previously cited Erin's range is 5300nmi with a full load 2,120 tons of coal and 710 tons of fuel oil. Rest of the British fuel-oil dreadnoughts use the same Babcock boilers -- this is up there among flat out dead wrong things I've seen thus far.

kinda like the lets add 30% to a uboats speed with no reduction in range and claim its based on fact... I took the info you provided and extrapolated after letting you know I don't have a vast naval library. it is perfectly reasonable to assume listed range reflects normal loads of fuel.

As for the rest of your argument, you have a maximum of 35 dreadnoughts distributed among the entire US coast, with 25-30,000 tons of shells, with the vast majority of the destroyer fleet oil-burning. This Savannah to Boston campaign seems like a multi-week campaign to me, with supply lines reaching back to Britain.


You can't prove the US is going to surrender if it gets a city shelled. Or multiple. It's an opinion based on what you suppose a population is going to think.

No its an informed opinion on what i think one man Woodrow Wilson is going to do based on a number of other factors acting in synergy with the arrival of the grand fleet.


You don't even have any evidence from US history to support this hypothesis.

yes I do


All historical evidence points to the opposite effect, impressment, Alamo, the Maine, the Lusitania, Pearl Harbor, Gulf of Tonkin, Berlin discotheque/Lockerbie, messing with our oil in Kuwait, 9/11. I can prove my assertions of starvation and war effort collapse.

No you can't...

Grant and Sherman laid waste to the South with actions the South still feels bitter about (in some parts) but there was no post-appomattox insurrection...a few gangs like the KotGC, KKK but nothing organized and large scale.

The US did didly squat but retreat after the Marine Barracks got blown up in Beruit.

North Korea still has the USS Pueblo

The Soviets shot down something like 20 multi-crew surveillance aircraft during the Cold War.

China rammed one of recon planes and harrassed a hydrographic/recon ship.

AQ hit us at the khobar Towers, USS Cole, 2 African embassies, tried to blow up LA-X and the WTC before 9-11.

Iran seized our embassy and held Americans for 441 days.

Israel sank a US ship

Japan attacked a US gunboat in China in the 1930's

Do I need go on?

[quite]As far as this 'mindset' - if US enters war, Congress wants this war badly. The US population wants this war badly. They're angry and they want to stab the ever-loving crap out of any Briton they can get their hands on. [/quote]

Or they want to go back to work before they starve...


And if you mess with them, it's only going to get worse. The typical American's mindset in war is on the brink of genocidal. You're not going to scare them. They're not going to surrender to a few dozen ships.

I don't care what the typical American's mindset is, it is immaterial. What is more important is the economic impacts of a war on the US and what that means for the population as a whole and for the political class in particular...

you are a fan boi and a troll.... that takes work.



Your foreign examples aren't even examples, Guernica the Reps holding onto a strip of coast already cut off for months and surrounded. Like the Nats are going to lose.

They why hadn't they taken the town earlier?


30 German divisions occupying 65% of Netherlands prior to Rotterdam. Like the Germans are going to lose.

And.... it was still the bombing that made the Dutch government throw in the towel.


93 German/Soviet divisions that overran Poland occupying 90% of it, but supposedly - the bombing of Warsaw is decisive in German/Soviet victory. Like the Germans and Soviets are going to lose.

The battle of Warsaw pitted 175,000 Germans against 120,000 Polish defenders. the movement phase of the war was over and early German attempts to take the city by storm and keep Polish units in the field from breaking in had failed disastrously. whole German regiments had been cut off and wiped out to a man. Then the bombardment and bombing started and 8 days later it was over.


Seems the US has a super-cool mine to put in their waters too.

Not ready for production until July 1917.

zraver
29 Nov 11,, 19:32
Now do the Wilson thought experiment with the conditions listed and reason out your answer or forever stay under the bridge.

zraver
29 Nov 11,, 19:49
HMS Audacious carries 3180 tons of coal/ 1590 tons per side. 2.5 days per side

if each chain gang is adding 100 lbs of coal per minute (5 tons per hour) that is 318 man hours per side or 5-6 chain gangs on a straight 60 hour pull using 2 crews on 12 hour shits 250 men per shift. If actual work time is 15 hours a day then its 37 hours total work time and 8-9 chain gangs.

This is important becuase 8 chain gangs working round the clock load 40 tons per hour and 960 tons per day which will cut down the time in an emergency to 3 days from 5 with a ships bunkers nearly empty and only require a day and a half to load a ship that is still at half capacity.

1979
29 Nov 11,, 20:06
US meat to the United Kingdom were 10,000 tons per week out of a total of 18,000 tons in March 1917 against 50,000 tons weekly consumption 1917, a decline of 600 calories per week per person
or 85 calories/day ?

In addition, US total live exports of animals were 13,387 cattle, 21,926 hogs, 58,811 sheep, and 160,000 fowl
the point ?

US exports of lard to Britain were 1100 tons per week (first source) against 4300 tons of consumption per week (second source), a decline of 200 calories per person per week.
or 28 calories per day (if your calories equivalent is correct. )

US total exports of condensed milk were equivalent to 20 million pints of fresh milk per week against a British consumption of 140 million pints per week 14 percent

US yearly barley exports 16.4 million bushels of barley to Britain and France against a production of 60 million bushels in France and Britain
without beer the war as good as lost.

US total corn exports of 65 million bushels of corn (former source) against a British and French production of none.
really :rolleyes:

US total exports of 90,000 tons of rice (former) against production of none (latter).
not even in India.

US total exports of 300 million eggs a year againsta British consumption of 877 million eggs per year
10 percent and your math is wrong.

US total exports of 700 tons of oleo per week against a British consumption of 6450 tons per week
11 percent ?

US total exports of sugars were 14,000 tons per week against UK consumption of 21,500 tons per week
possible

US total exports of 12,000 tons per week of cheese per week against UK consumption of 3000 tons per week
:biggrin: you have no problem with that figure ?

US total exports of 260 tons per week of butter against UK consumption of 4300 tons per week
8 percent ?


btw total exports mean total exports to uk or do they include nicaragua, guatemala and honduras ? ;)

tgbyhn
29 Nov 11,, 20:44
or 85 calories/day ?
I think the figure for the British working class man was 2200 calories per day.

So if you add 600 + 200 + milk + sugar + beer + fruits & vegetables, you're going to get a day's worth of food per week or more.

Keep in mind that a day is 14.3% of a week. :)

They're going to have to eat more wheat, which further reduces that six week supply.

If it's a day loss of other food per week from the US, you're down to close to 5 weeks of wheat.

I can cite the exact proportions of US foreign trade from the US statistical abstract later if you wish.

tgbyhn
29 Nov 11,, 21:26
Continuing the reply to the Royal Navy bombarding the US coast with 2-3 hours worth of ammunition:


Wilhelmshaven to the Orkney Islands is 554 nautical miles and from there around the Orkey islands is another 104 nautical miles and then to new York New York is an additional 2800 nautical miles for a total of 3450 using the shortest possible distances and near shore. If you add distance to avid patrols and mine barrages (+15%) the distance jumps to 3970 nmi for a round trip of 7940nmi
There is no round-trip for the Germans.


I was also on a different side of the debate, stop trolling, stop conflating and answer my though experiment please.
If I switched sides, why wouldn't I switch arguments?
I am arguing from a different perspective... two totally different arguments... contradictions are things inside of a single argument that oppose each other.
Which of your two arguments do you believe would be true?


Your turn, answer my thought experiment.
No. I'm not your monkey.


Sub-Saharan African Exports minus South Africa amounted to 8% of British imports prior to 1914. I think its safe to say a good percentage of that is agricultural products, the rest raw materials.
Britain isn't any better off. They were already importing those. Eight percent is a drop in the bucket, and you haven't cited or listed actual imports.


The main Rhodesian non-food cash crop in 1914 was tobacco- 3 million pounds per annum and this land can be converted to food stocks which would add roughly 15% to the 20,200 tons of maize exported from Rhodesia to the UK in 1914
You can't change crops after they've been planted. You can change plantings later in 1917 or in 1918, with a harvest in 1918.


466,000 cattle allowing 10% wastage is 419,400 head of cattle of about 200,000 calves. Since the war is startign early in the year that means the meat from 200,000 cows can be exported from Rhodesia alone. Average yeild for a slaughtered cow is 741lbs of meat- 740 tons pe rannum. That is just Rhodesia mind you.
So you're going to slaughter every cow in Rhodesia which gives you 6175 tons of meat per month against a loss of 10,000 tons per week from the US. On wheat alone Britain is going to starve.


China is producing 285 billion pounds/ 129.7 billion kilos of rice with a population of 465,000,000 each eating 100 kilos a year for a potential surplus of 83 billion kilos or 8.3 million metric tons before wastage and seed stock.
The British are eating 137kg of wheat per year per person. (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=_F3EljBXbeQC&pg=PA208&lpg=PA208&dq=uk+lard+consumption+1917&source=bl&ots=TnjxbGOORo&sig=H7vUobSZZ6HJtWHP7cPm-PKNmoQ&hl=en&ei=6MDUTrfLKanz0gH-5qDbAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CD0Q6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=uk%20lard%20consumption%201917&f=false) in 1917 plus more foods. The Chinese are eating almost nothing but rice. There's nothing to export.


11-12.5 weeks worth of oil on hand (2.9 months) is likely the number for the entire United Kingdom minus dominions and colonies. That is a solid usable number.
No, you've lost 4-8 weeks worth of imports. 2.9 months because you like that number, not because it would be true.


6 days is worthless
You know what, I don't care. I'm not going to sit here and argue with you about what stations may or may not have 6 days of fuel. You just don't have much, or enough.

And every destroyer built since 1905 except 16 from the Beagle-class are oil-powered. How many more colliers you bringing over?


We also don't know which if any bases and stations are also fueling merchant men...
The numbers quoted were Royal Navy stocks.


I was pointing out that there was a source of replacement merchant hulls. and no I don't have the RN scattering to the four corners of the Globe but concentrating in 2 areas. North Sea and Atlantic.
And you've got 84% of the world's merchant fleet non-US, mostly Allied. How much you want to bet there's more Allied shipping at US ports than the other way around? If you want to press this point - I'll school you.


No you can't... Do I need go on?
The US is already at war.

So you've listed a bunch of things the US got pissed about but didn't go to war over - but wait, the US is at war already.

So the US response to all the incidents listed is 50% war, 50% pissed off but no war, and 0% surrender.


Grant and Sherman laid waste to the South
Good point - they did more than you propose the RN is going to do - and the Americans in the South didn't surrender until they couldn't defend their capital anymore.


I haven't found the size of a WWI u-boats fuel bunker size yet but...
The ranges I quoted were at 8 knots with full fuel load. Look in Conway's. It lists them and I've linked two it two or three times now.


WWII type VIIc42 1050 tons with 180 tons of fuel for a range of 1000 @ 7 knots miles or 55.5 miles per ton and 47.2 miles per ton at 10 knots with a max range of 8500 miles. Assuming identical hydrostatic and engine efficiency (we both know its not) the UC II type would carry 80-90 tons of fuel and have have a range of only 8000 nautical miles at 10 knots.
I've already posted the ranges at 8kn from Conways. It's an authoritative source, but you don't like it.


Thanks, good thing I am bring colliers... maybe leave the Erin behind as one of the dreadnoughts left.
OK.


No its an informed opinion on what i think one man Woodrow Wilson is going to do based on a number of other factors acting in synergy with the arrival of the grand fleet.
Your argument premises on what you think people's feelingsare going to be. So you have an opinion about what people's feelings could be, after the decision was made to go to war no doubt having considered this risk.


I don't care what the typical American's mindset is, it is immaterial. What is more important is the economic impacts of a war on the US and what that means for the population as a whole and for the political class in particular...
Don't you think the US would calculate the risks before even making the decision? Not exporting, risk of RN in US waters - that's obvious when war is declared yet in this scenario they do it anyways.


They why hadn't they taken the town earlier?
And.... it was still the bombing that made the Dutch government throw in the towel.
Battle of Warsaw
Your examples are hastening the inevitable against overwhelming enemy superiority involving land forces in small countries.

This is the last time I'm responding to this point because it's so ridiculous it's not worth wasting my time on.


Not ready for production until July 1917.
The US has got all kinds of explosives and multi-million tons of metal not going to Britain. I'm just saying.


Now do the Wilson thought experiment with the conditions listed and reason out your answer or forever stay under the bridge.
No, I'm not your monkey. I don't give two hoots about your little thought experiment. Why don't we just spend 10 hours a day making and replying to thought experiments for each other?

zraver
29 Nov 11,, 21:30
US yearly barley exports 16.4 million bushels of barley to Britain and France against a production of 60 million bushels in France and Britain
without beer the war as good as lost.

African sorghum stands as a good replacement


US total corn exports of 65 million bushels of corn (former source) against a British and French production of none.
really :rolleyes:

lol, lets look at what South Africa can add just be ending trade with the US

$7.6 million dollars worth of food and drink (other)
$4 million worth of CORN, grain and meal
$.643 million in fish
.091 million in fruit.

Not a lot but strangely the US a food exporter is importing $12.3 dollars worth of food in 1915 from South Africa.

Exporters' encyclopaedia - Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=67Q63j6cqnAC&pg=PA353&lpg=PA353&dq=south+african+corn+exports+1914&source=bl&ots=YBjP6tBjtN&sig=lGeLZ52CbyHrhoOTbJIl6Mg_1b0&hl=en&ei=5TfVTr6PBseftwfI4fTuBA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CEAQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=south%20african%20corn%20exports%201914&f=false)


US total exports of 90,000 tons of rice (former) against production of none (latter).
not even in India. [/quote\

I blew that one up earlier. He is abusing stats- if it snot grown in blightley it doesn't exist unless its imported from the US seems to be his argument..

[quote] US total exports of 300 million eggs a year againsta British consumption of 877 million eggs per year
10 percent and your math is wrong.

Cut eggs from the diet and you don't need chickens which can be slaughtered for meat and greatly reduce the strain on the grain supply.


US total exports of sugars were 14,000 tons per week against UK consumption of 21,500 tons per week
possible

Sumatra and Java are exporting over a million tons of sugars in 1914....

1917 export figures for Java
$85,300,0000 in sugar (400,000 acres under cultivation and 187 sugar factories)
$8,800,000 in Rubber

Modoera 1917
Sugar $73,500,000
Rubber $11,500,000

Total

sugar $158,500,000
Rubber $20,300,000

The British are now also the only market for Dutch rubber the only other large source for Rubber.... bet Henry Ford is not to happy...

The Americas - National City Bank of New York - Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=F27UAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA28&lpg=PA28&dq=sugar+exports+1914+sumatra&source=bl&ots=KKh3pmY1YW&sig=CgT0wEUXzamQ6lZ834q6AU52MT8&hl=en&ei=uTnVTtfWO5KTtwf09sSIAg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=sugar%20exports%201914%20sumatra&f=false)

tgbyhn


I think the figure for the British working class man was 2200 calories per day.

So if you add 600 + 200 + milk + sugar + beer + fruits & vegetables, you're going to get a day's worth of food per week or more.

Keep in mind that a day is 14.3% of a week.

They're going to have to eat more wheat, which further reduces that six week supply.

If it's a day loss of other food per week from the US, you're down to close to 5 weeks of wheat.

I can cite the exact proportions of US foreign trade from the US statistical abstract later if you wish.

I've provided alternate sources for millions of tons of rice, hundreds of thousands of head of cattle... and the reduction of the British poultry industry (50 million birds) to meat stocks will reduce the daily strain on grain supplies by 10,000,000lbs (5000 tons) a day, 35,000 tons a week, while adding 31250 tons of meat to the supply. Assuming you can get the slaughter done in 5 weeks for a 20% reduction in drain per week and 0 drain on week seven you save: 7000 tons week 2, 14000 tons week 3, 21000 tons week 4, 28,000 tons week 5 and 35000 tons week 6. Total savings are 105,000 tons of grains. Pre-war per capita wheat consumption in the UK is 6 bushels

The Price current-grain reporter ... - Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=WS0XAQAAIAAJ&pg=RA6-PA10&lpg=RA6-PA10&dq=british+grain+consumption+1914&source=bl&ots=waHgFxKj0x&sig=Sf9qxJCbHew5OExdmJ3tK1oMiNI&hl=en&ei=ZD_VTrGcCoS2twfB7_CvAg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CDkQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=british%20grain%20consumption%201914&f=false)

So 1 ton of wheat will meet 36 people's grain consumption for one year 55.5lbs of milled but otherwise dry, unprepared and natural wheat per person or about 1lb per week per person. With a population of 40,000,000 the UK needs 40,000,000 lbs of wheat per week or 20,000 tons per week. The reduction of the poultry industry thus offers savings of an extra 5 weeks worth of grains... Now we are at 11 weeks before imports and substitutions....

zraver
29 Nov 11,, 22:29
There is no round-trip for the Germans.


Which of your two arguments do you believe would be true?

Depends on who wins what argument in the Admiralty and Parliament.


No. I'm not your monkey.

Admission of defeat


Britain isn't any better off. They were already importing those. Eight percent is a drop in the bucket, and you haven't cited or listed actual imports.

Don't need to, I was asked to provide alternate sources.


You can't change crops after they've been planted. You can change plantings 1917 or in 1918, with a harvest in 1918.

April is early spring- planting time. The gap between planting and harvesting is 2 weeks (with the chicken slaughter) plus however much the seed stock takes away from total wheat reserves. Seeding in medium yield areas needs 30 seeds per square foot and there are 7000 seeds per pound so a pound of wheat will seed 233.3 square feet or 187 pounds per acre which will yield 30 bushels per acre (medium yield dry irrigation) or 1800lbs of wheat for a net gain of 1623lbs of wheat.

UK yearly wheat consumption is 1,460,000,000,000lbs or 7.3 billion tons which needs 8,111,111 acres of medium yield farmland which means 1,525,000,000lbs of seed or 762,500 tons of seed.



USING PROPER WHEAT SEEDING RATES (http://www.uky.edu/Ag/Wheat/seedrate.html)


So you're going to slaughter every cow in Rhodesia which gives you 6175 tons of meat per month against a loss of 10,000 tons per week from the US. And ship it to Britain in time to prevent starvation.

No, I gave very precise numbers of 200,000 mature cows slaughtered per year which allows the overall herd to maintain its size.



The British are eating 178kg of wheat per year (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=_F3EljBXbeQC&pg=PA208&lpg=PA208&dq=uk+lard+consumption+1917&source=bl&ots=TnjxbGOORo&sig=H7vUobSZZ6HJtWHP7cPm-PKNmoQ&hl=en&ei=6MDUTrfLKanz0gH-5qDbAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CD0Q6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=uk%20lard%20consumption%201917&f=false) in 1917 plus more foods. The Chinese are eating almost nothing but rice. There's nothing to export.

yearly consumption of rice in China per person in 1914 was 92 kilos, I did my math at 100 kilos and there is a ton to export. India and China are the worlds historic rice reserves (now over taken by the US). Both historically kept years worth on hand.


No, you've lost 4-8 weeks worth of imports. 2.9 months because you like that number, not because it would be true.

I've not consumed most of April's or any of May's oil that exceeded imports either. April was also the worse month for shipping losses 860,000 tons but that is likely to be affected as the Royal navy repositions and ships get scarce in the Atlantic.


You know what, I don't give a crap. I'm not going to sit here and argue with you about what stations have 6 days of fuel. You just don't have much, or enough.

That was never in question, I simply pointed out that the figure of 6 days is meaningless becuase we can't quantify how much fuel for how many ships a day is.


The numbers quoted were Royal Navy stocks.

Which doesn't tell us if they are fueling merchantmen of not.


And you've got 84% of the world's merchant fleet non-US, mostly Allied. How much you want to bet there's more Allied shipping at US ports than the other way around? If you want to press this point - I'll school you.

And.... the US is going to seize those ships anyway, the RN seizure are simply a counter that reduces the severity of the hit.


The US is already at war.

Ya hence no pearl harbor effect


So you've listed a bunch of things the US got pissed about but didn't go to war over - but wait, the US is at war already.

You said attacking America would lead to a halfway genocidal rage.... I simply pointed out that no it would not.


So the US response to all the incidents listed is 50% war, 50% pissed off but no war, and 0% surrender.

Iran-Hostage- surrender- paid a ransom
Beirut barracks- surrender- retreated and left Lebanon entirely
USS Pueblo- surrender- paid a ransom
Soviet Shootdowns- surrender- we never said a peep
China plain ramming- surrender- we paid to get it back


Good point - they did more than you propose the RN is going to do - and the Americans in the South didn't surrender until they couldn't defend their capital anymore.

Wow... Sherman reached the outskirts of Savannah on Dec 10th, he completed his encirclement and and linked with the USN by Dec 17 whe he sent this message to the Confederate commander Hardee.

I have already received guns that can cast heavy and destructive shot as far as the heart of your city; also, I have for some days held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison of Savannah can be supplied, and I am therefore justified in demanding the surrender of the city of Savannah, and its dependent forts, and shall wait a reasonable time for your answer, before opening with heavy ordnance. Should you entertain the proposition, I am prepared to grant liberal terms to the inhabitants and garrison; but should I be forced to resort to assault, or the slower and surer process of starvation, I shall then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and shall make little effort to restrain my army—burning to avenge the national wrong which they attach to Savannah and other large cities which have been so prominent in dragging our country into civil war.

— William T. Sherman , Message to William J. Hardee, December 17, 1864, recorded in his memoir

Hardee and his men fled across the Savannah river on Dec 20th and on the morning of the 21st Savannah mayor R.D. Arnold surrendered the city without a fight 3.5 months before Appomattox.


The ranges I quoted were at 8 knots with full fuel load. Look in Conway's. It lists them and I've linked two it two or three times now.

You tried to bump it to 10knts with no reduction in range and got called on it.



I've already posted the ranges at 8kn from Conways. It's an authoritative source, but you don't like it.

Got no problem with it, you do.. you tried to bump it to 10.


Your argument premises on what you think people's feelingsare going to be. So you have an opinion about what people's feelings could be, after the decision was made to go to war no doubt having considered this risk.

no doubt having considered the risk... can you supply any examples of such careful consideration that still ended up in defeat? I can...



Don't you think the US would calculate the risks before even making the decision? Not exporting, risk of RN in US waters - that's obvious when war is declared yet in this scenario they do it anyways.

It depends on how the war starts, they have a war of spreading without control from very small sparks. Nations also bluff... feeling a mobalization, embargo etc will force the other side to accede to its will. How well did an embargo work on Japan?


Your examples are hastening the inevitable against overwhelming enemy superiority. Brits don't have troops on the ground in the US.

Bet they can get more troops in the US faster than the US can lol.... From April 7, 1917 to June 1, 1917 the US got 14,000 men to Europe a non-combat advance party. It will be october before the US has a trained division for the feild and they only have 4 (100,000 men) by the end of December 1917. In Contrast Canada has its 5th Division trained and sitting in England (it will be broken up later in the year) as does the British Army as DLG and Haig squabble over the buthchers bill.


To make it an apt comparison, you're going to need British Isles have a land border with the US, invade the US at most the size of Poland with overwhelming superiority in numbers and have it down to its last city.

The British can have 2+ divisions in North America at the same time the GF arrives in Halifax....


This is the last time I'm responding to this point because it's so ridiculous it's not worth wasting my time on.

Another concession of defeat. My examples all got to what is called the shock effect. Where people, even those inured to the ravages of war can be quickly broken by a new threat they do not know how deal with emerges. Over time this shock effect lessens which is why Germany got pounded for years and much harder than Rotterdam and didn't break. bombing wasn't new anymore and had little shock effect. But Japan which had been getting burned out was shocked by the A-bombs- shock effect is what I am talking about.


The US has got all kinds of explosives and multi-million tons of metal not going to Britain. I'm just saying.

As far as I know they were not making sea mines for which the British had little need.


No, I'm not your monkey. I don't give two hoots about your little thought experiment. Why don't we just spend 10 hours a day making and replying to thought experiments for each other?

A concession of defeat and admission of mental petrification.... You ask of others but do not give in return, you have a demonstrable inability to read or reason.... get under the bridge where you belong.

tgbyhn
29 Nov 11,, 22:59
African sorghum stands as a good replacement
How much is available to be had?

lol, lets look at what South Africa can add just be ending trade with the US

$7.6 million dollars worth of food and drink (other)
$4 million worth of CORN, grain and meal
$.643 million in fish
.091 million in fruit.
The US is exporting $1.23 billion in food. So that's 1% of the US figure.

$89 million in live animals, $588 million in grains, $7.6 million in eggs, $20 million in fish, $39 million in fruits and nuts, $403 million in meat and dairy, $31 million in vegetable oils, $18.5 million in spirits, $82 million in sugar, $22 million in vegetables (source) (http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1917-06.pdf)


Sumatra and Java are exporting over a million tons of sugars in 1914....
Indonesia's sugar is being 100% consumed as well. Even if you took 50% of the 1914 figure, that's 23 pounds per year per person in the UK, or about 7 ounces per week. That's not going to do anything. And you've got 17000nmi round-trip to Java using the Suez.


I've provided alternate sources for millions of tons of rice
The British are consuming 138kg of wheat per year plus other foods, yet you expect there to be Chinese rice when they're eating 100kg per year and not much else. There is no Chinese rice.


hundreds of thousands of head of cattle
Using your statistics, slaughter every cow in Rhodesia gives you 1544 tons of meat per week against a loss of 10,000 tons per week from the US, which has to be shipped 12,000nmi from Cape Town.


and the reduction of the British poultry industry (50 million birds)
A chicken yields 2 pounds of meat. 50 million birds yields 7 ounces per week for five weeks of chicken per person, and now you have no chickens or eggs.


and the reduction of the British poultry industry (50 million birds) to meat stocks will reduce the daily strain on grain supplies by 10,000,000lbs (5000 tons) a day, 35,000 tons a week,
10 million pounds per day means 80 to 160 to 240 to 320 to 400 calories per day.

Against the loss from the US of 600 calories per week in meat, 200 in lard + cheese + oleo + fruits & nuts + vegetables + vegetable oils + dairy + sugar + milk + eggs + butter + fish. Maybe you're at parity with non-grain imports from the US in 5 weeks.

So, the situation is worse. It'll take you 5 weeks to make up for the losses in calories from US non-grain exports.

tgbyhn
29 Nov 11,, 23:10
A concession of defeat and admission of mental petrification.... You ask of others but do not give in return, you have a demonstrable inability to read or reason.... get under the bridge where you belong.
If that were the case, I could post anything I want and demand that you reply or concede defeat.

I haven't conceded anything.

Furthermore, the difference is you demanded twice I reply, you did not ask or leave it open.

Not only have I not had time to reply to on top of the time I've had to reply to the core of the debate, it's additional and somewhat extraneous to the core of the debate.

After you twice rudely demanded a reply, I chose not to.

I think I've amply demonstrated my ability to read and reason.

Just going over my posts, do you really take me to be an unintelligent person?

Making the same case, compare your first argument in the first seven pages of this thread with the one I've been making in the last five. Who has made a better case between your original argument and mine?

zraver
30 Nov 11,, 01:31
How much is available to be had?

The US is exporting $1.23 billion in food. So that's 1% of the US figure.

and, you only need as many 1% locations as the percentage loss from the US.


Indonesia's sugar is being 100% consumed as well. Even if you took 50% of the 1914 figure, that's 23 pounds per year per person in the UK, or about 7 ounces per week. That's not going to do anything. And you've got 17000nmi round-trip to Java using the Suez.

see above



The British are consuming 138kg of wheat per year plus other foods, yet you expect there to be Chinese rice when they're eating 100kg per year and not much else. There is no Chinese rice.

I provided the source for Chinese rice productio where its lsited to the 1/4 pound and population but lets do it again.

285,000,000,000 pounds of rice is rounded up for easy math 130,000,000,000 kilos of rice. A population of 465,000,000 needs 46,500,000,000 kilos of rice for a surplus of 83,500,000,000 kilos of surplus. That so little enterd the world market on a regualr basis does not detract from the fact that it exists...

Siam, Indochina and burma combined to export 5.7 million tons of rice only 30% of which was consumed in Asia. There is no shortage of rice....



Using your statistics, slaughter every cow in Rhodesia gives you 1544 tons of meat per week against a loss of 10,000 tons per week from the US, which has to be shipped 12,000nmi from Cape Town.

using my stats 200,000 head of cattle will yield 741lbs of beef per carcass on average or 148,200,000lbs of beef 74100 tons or 7 weeks of consumption or over the course of a year 13.45% of what was bought from the US. But again, that is just from Rhodesia.



A chicken yields 2 pounds of meat. 50 million birds yields 7 ounces per week for five weeks of chicken per person, and now you have no chickens or eggs.

Most English birds were layers not fryers or 1.25lbs of meat per bid on average. That is 75,000,000lbs of meat bt the real savings are in the reduced need to feed the chicken where 105,000 tons of grain are saved. Total food savings are 142,500 tons.



10 million pounds per day means 80 to 160 to 240 to 320 to 400 calories per day.

Against the loss from the US of 600 calories per week in meat, 200 in lard + cheese + oleo + fruits & nuts + vegetables + vegetable oils + dairy + sugar + milk + eggs + butter + fish. Maybe you're at parity with non-grain imports from the US in 5 weeks.

So, the situation is worse. It'll take you 5 weeks to make up for the losses in calories from US non-grain exports.

No beginning week 7, diversion of food resources to non-human production has declined 105,000 tons that is not worse, it stretches on hand reserves of wheat from 6 to 11 weeks..

Also since the war begins in the planting season globally 760,000 tons of wheat needs to be found to be seeded to replace US production in the fall. While that seems like a lot, globally its not. Astraila is out, its production is declining becuase of weather but its extremely low yield dry farming anyway. Argentinian wheat is growing 4.6% per year before the war and with no American competition may be able to make massive gains. Africa offers another area for widespread cultivation.


If that were the case, I could post anything I want and demand that you reply or concede defeat.

I haven't conceded anything.

Furthermore, the difference is you demanded twice I reply, you did not ask or leave it open.

You have conceded, you spending too much time avoiding it becuase the answer is obvious. Given the number of replies since i posted it, you have had the time and have chosen not to answer.


I think I've amply demonstrated my ability to read and reason.

Really... where?

When you said the US verged on a desire for genocide in war?

When you added 30+% to a u-boats speed but did not penalize range at all?

When asserted repeatedly that men in row boats could take Vancouver island becuase it wasn't garrisoned even after being told it was?

When you assumed Canadians are not armed?

When you had to ask why would a military sallie forth to certain defeat?

When you assumed that British gunnery could not fire over the top of Brooklyn to hit Manhattan?

When you assumed that Americans are somehow genetically different than other humans are are immune to shock?

When you claimed the US never surrendered?

When you assumed that the US economy could absorb the loss of the allied markets?

When you have given no public consideration to the effect of the apparent loss of most of the US public's cash to now worthless bonds sold by the Federal Reserve and pushed by the US government to finance the allies?

When despite being given sources as asked you replied: "there is no Chinese rice"?

When you claimed the US was shoving 8,000 tons a week of excess or surplus cheese on to the British isles?

When you lied about the distance from Wilhelmshaven to New York?

When you assumed the sea plane carrier assigned to the GF was HMS Arc Royal?

Or when you assumed HMS Arc Royal was it for sea going sources of aviation for the GF?


I think I've amply demonstrated my ability to read and reason.

You asked, so I will answer.... yes.

You have paid zero attention to the effect the war would have on the US political and industrial establishment, the damage to the banking sector, or the fact that the US Army can with the arrival of the GF be outnumbered in terms of manpower and totally outclassed in terms of equipment and experience. You also think that Canadian raiders are going to stop at X miles from the border or not hit certain targets just becuase.... I provided multiple examples of potential targets that could cripple major American cities... you response was silence.

You've given no credit and assumedly no thought to the sheer size and scope of the British intelligence operation in the Us in WWI, it was massive. You assume that in a period of building tensions allied vessels would remain in American ports but American ships would not be in allied ports... You think France and Italy are not going to follow the British lead and instead walk blissfully forward to certain defeat.

You assume that an American entry into the war and the very real chance of total victory it presents would not have Kaiser Wilhelm yank his peace offers, or at least up the ante. Historically until his abdication he was not known for modesty or restraint.

When asked to explain what Jellicoe could have done differently at Jutland you went silent.

When told that Jellico and the Grand Fleet left port enroute to the battle of Jutland ahead of the Germans by 2.5 hours you tried to spin it into over zealous cautiousness.

When provided example after example of the difference between reserve and mothball you kept using the term mothball.

When provided the example of the HMS Lion's repair following Dogger bank and Jutland you still insisted that it takes weeks to load and crew an otherwise fit ship sitting in reserve.

You claimed the u-boats needed less logistical support than the dreadnoughts implying that somehow u boat crews eat less, need less fuel to move an equivalent mass of steel etc... and when called on it went silent.... overall WWI German u boat building used up 5 dreadnoughts worth of steel, men and food and more than that in fuel since the u boats actually got used.

zraver
30 Nov 11,, 01:33
Making the same case, compare your first argument in the first seven pages of this thread with the one I've been making in the last five. Who has made a better case between your original argument and mine?

me, you try and use your numbers as absolutes while I proffer factors to be considered. Absolutism is not debating.

tgbyhn
30 Nov 11,, 03:53
April is early spring- planting time. The gap between planting and harvesting is 2 weeks (with the chicken slaughter) plus however much the seed stock takes away from total wheat reserves. Seeding in medium yield areas needs 30 seeds per square foot and there are 7000 seeds per pound so a pound of wheat will seed 233.3 square feet or 187 pounds per acre which will yield 30 bushels per acre (medium yield dry irrigation) or 1800lbs of wheat for a net gain of 1623lbs of wheat.
Can you clarify this? You're not seeding to consume the seed grain, or that there's food seed to plant that matures in two weeks?


No, I gave very precise numbers of 200,000 mature cows slaughtered per year which allows the overall herd to maintain its size.
using my stats 200,000 head of cattle will yield 741lbs of beef per carcass on average or 148,200,000lbs of beef 74100 tons or 7 weeks of consumption or over the course of a year 13.45% of what was bought from the US. But again, that is just from Rhodesia.
Your figures for pounds and tons are exactly the same as mine. You've replaced 600 calories per week with 81. Where else are you slaughtering cattle?


Most English birds were layers not fryers or 1.25lbs of meat per bid on average. That is 75,000,000lbs of meat bt the real savings are in the reduced need to feed the chicken where 105,000 tons of grain are saved. Total food savings are 142,500 tons.
I weighed the chickens at 100 million pounds. 1.25lbs is 62.5 million pounds. So instead of 7 ounces of chicken per week, for 5 weeks, it's 4.4 ounces. As far as your grain is concerned, it's going to give yoiu enough calories to reach parity in caloric loss from US non-grain exports to the UK in 5 weeks.

If your reaching parity to non-grain caloric losses in 5 weeks, with no eggs or chicken meat thereafter, you're worse off.


No beginning week 7, diversion of food resources to non-human production has declined 105,000 tons that is not worse, it stretches on hand reserves of wheat from 6 to 11 weeks..
The average Briton is eating 5.8lbs wheat per week. 43 million Britons, 294.4 million pounds per day. At 5.8 pounds per person per day, Britain is eating 124,700 tons of wheat per day. Your 105,000 tons over 5 weeks is less than Britain eats in a day. You've added less than a day to reserves at the end of five weeks, and have still only reached parity with caloric losses from US non-grain exports.


Also since the war begins in the planting season globally 760,000 tons of wheat needs to be found to be seeded to replace US production in the fall.
So you have a loss of 760,000 tons of wheat. That's a 7-day decline in reserves.


Astraila is out, its production is declining becuase of weather but its extremely low yield dry farming anyway. Argentinian wheat is growing 4.6% per year before the war and with no American competition may be able to make massive gains.
As previously posted and cited, Argentinian wheat production fell 40% from 1915 to 1917. So Australia and Argentina are out. On top of there's going to increased competition for what remains.


You have conceded, you spending too much time avoiding it becuase the answer is obvious. Given the number of replies since i posted it, you have had the time and have chosen not to answer.
I'm still here. Like I said, I didn't have the time to address a bunch of injected argument in addition to the core of the debate, and you rudely demanding 2 or 3 times I do so doesn't incline me to do so.

When you said the US verged on a desire for genocide in war?
I said the mindset of Americans. "Kill 'em all, nuke Arabia into glass". That's a common sentiment individuals have when the US is attacked or at war. I also stated the US has never committed any genocides (unless you consider the Native American experience as a genocide).


When you added 30+% to a u-boats speed but did not penalize range at all?
I said given that the U-Boats have twice or better the range at 8kn, they ought to be able to 10kn. Penalization was implied.


When asserted repeatedly that men in row boats could take Vancouver island becuase it wasn't garrisoned even after being told it was?
I still think the US could pull a Singapore. Land at an undefended point across undefended waters and avoid all things naval or naval defense. I seem to recall you arguing the US could take Vancouver earlier in the thread.


When you assumed Canadians are not armed?
I'd really like you to find where I stated that. I haven't said a word about Canadian arms.


When you had to ask why would a military sallie forth to certain defeat?
I still think your argument is bunk and I always will.


When you assumed that British gunnery could not fire over the top of Brooklyn to hit Manhattan?
They can't. The distance between the beaches of Brooklyn and Manhattan is more than the range of the RN dreadnoughts. So no, they can't fire over the top of Brooklyn. It's too wide.


When you assumed that Americans are somehow genetically different than other humans are are immune to shock?
The US is certainly not immune to shock. It was shocked on 9/11, and went to war. It was shocked at Pearl Harbor, and went to war.


When you claimed the US never surrendered?
What wars has the US surrendered in? There's an status quo armistice in Korea and the Paris Peace Accords, but I've yet to know of any wars the US has surrendered in.


When you assumed that the US economy could absorb the loss of the allied markets?
$4.2 billion in exports against a $60 billion economy, in an economy that's about to go to war (economic boost). You argued that the British would collapse on the lack of credit alone.

Furthermore, if the US economy collapses due to war, they're not going to go to war, which pretty much destroys the whole point of this thread.


When you have given no public consideration to the effect of the apparent loss of most of the US public's cash to now worthless bonds sold by the Federal Reserve and pushed by the US government to finance the allies?
They'll get them plus interest after Britain loses the war.


When despite being given sources as asked you replied: "there is no Chinese rice"?
and, you only need as many 1% locations as the percentage loss from the US.[
You argued that you can reduce Chinese consumption to 100kg per year (at a time when nearly all of their diet is rice) against 138kg of wheat per year for the British (plus other foods), starving the Chinese and getting it to Britain fast enough to offset their own starvation.

China isn't going to give you the food, and you're not going to take it. You're not going to take it out of Chinese mouths. You've cited no real figures on food that available to export in any Asian countries, or even Africa. Historically 100% of this food is going to be either consumed or exported elsewhere already. There is no pie to grow in the world food supply within 6 weeks, planting to harvest is the better part of a year. The only way Britain is getting more food is if it slaughters livestock, takes food out of the mouths of others, or takes other people's imports out of their hands.

Furthermore, the loss of US exports to the Allies going to trigger panic buying, which was already a problem in Britain in 1917. This food panic could grip the world outside North America. There have been food panics where millions of people have died when there was no shortage of food - just a false perception of shortages.


When you claimed the US was shoving 8,000 tons a week of excess or surplus cheese on to the British isles?
I stated total US cheese exports were 12,000 tons per week. Total US exports means to everybody in the world. Most US exports at this time were to Europe. Of which Britain is getting a chunk.


When you lied about the distance from Wilhelmshaven to New York?
I stated the distance around the north of the British Isles. You stated the distance through the English channel. Citing a different route is not lying.


When you assumed the sea plane carrier assigned to the GF was HMS Arc Royal?

Or when you assumed HMS Arc Royal was it for sea going sources of aviation for the GF?
I don't know what seaplane carriers are attached to the Grand Fleet, and I don't really care. I think your strategy is preposterous.


You have paid zero attention to the effect the war would have on the US political and industrial establishment, the damage to the banking sector, or the fact that the US Army can with the arrival of the GF be outnumbered in terms of manpower and totally outclassed in terms of equipment and experience. You also think that Canadian raiders are going to stop at X miles from the border or not hit certain targets just becuase.... I provided multiple examples of potential targets that could cripple major American cities... you response was silence.
I've paid zero attention because you have 2-3 hours worth of shells. A response isn't even justified. No, I don't think the Canadian raiders are going to advance 250 miles into the United States.


You've given no credit and assumedly no thought to the sheer size and scope of the British intelligence operation in the Us in WWI, it was massive. You assume that in a period of building tensions allied vessels would remain in American ports but American ships would not be in allied ports... You think France and Italy are not going to follow the British lead and instead walk blissfully forward to certain defeat.
I didn't dispute US vessels in Allied ports could be seized. I didn't even dispute 250 ships at sea is prizes. What I did say is 84% of the world merchant fleet in 1917 is non-US, most of it Allied, and there are going to be more Allied ships in US ports than vice-versa, so the balance is against the Allies.


You assume that an American entry into the war and the very real chance of total victory it presents would not have Kaiser Wilhelm yank his peace offers, or at least up the ante. Historically until his abdication he was not known for modesty or restraint.
You've said it yourself - very real chance of total victory. How about, as you've said, Russia collapses without US credit and German and Austro-Hungarian undertake a mass attack on the Western and Italian fronts, pouring soldiers from the Eastern Front with reserves due from the East, and the fronts break?


When asked to explain what Jellicoe could have done differently at Jutland you went silent.
So over a thousand or so sentences typed, I've missed a few things. I'm only human. Jellicoe, according to nearly every contemporary or postwar account, is characterized as cautious. Your RN strategy isn't Jellicoe. Beatty, maybe.

Realistically, I think Britain and France are going to sue for an armistice and the RN isn't even going to sail for the US.


When told that Jellico and the Grand Fleet left port enroute to the battle of Jutland ahead of the Germans by 2.5 hours you tried to spin it into over zealous cautiousness.
Nearly every contemporary and postwar account of Jellicoe's performance during the battle was characterized as cautious. As well as his attitude throughout the war. He was eventually sacked for it. He wasn't just characterized as cautious - he was characterized as very cautious. Beatty, Churchill ("he could lose the war in an afternoon") - Lloyd George sacked him precisely for adopting a very cautious and defensive strategy.

If this 2.5 hours to cautiously engage the High Seas Fleet once in battle is your definition of non-cautious, you're scraping the barrel.

You strategy may be Churchill or possibly Beatty, but it's certainly not Jellicoe.


When provided example after example of the difference between reserve and mothball you kept using the term mothball.
The definition of mothball is to put something "out of operation but maintain it so that it can be used in the future". That's the same thing as reserve.


When provided the example of the HMS Lion's repair following Dogger bank and Jutland you still insisted that it takes weeks to load and crew an otherwise fit ship sitting in reserve.
The HMS Lion was under repairs for 7 weeks and out of commission for nearly 11.


You claimed the u-boats needed less logistical support than the dreadnoughts implying that somehow u boat crews eat less, need less fuel to move an equivalent mass of steel etc... and when called on it went silent.... overall WWI German u boat building used up 5 dreadnoughts worth of steel, men and food and more than that in fuel since the u boats actually got used.
I stated the Germany built a total of 366 U-Boats that could easily reach the US before the end of WWI. You went onto think the Germans had 366 U-Boats, and that I said they would all sail the US.

What does boat building have to do with anything? If a ship or U-Boat exists and is active, the only factors to take into consideration are supplies.

I stated 50 U-Boats to the US.


me, you try and use your numbers as absolutes while I proffer factors to be considered. Absolutism is not debating.
Your premise is "the Royal navy is going to sail to the US, and it is going to bombard the US into surrendering. Your entire argument absolutely rests on that, and you've never once taken into consideration whether or not the UK would actually do such a thing. It absolutely has no choice. The US is absolutely going to surrender. Jellicoe is not cautious and absolutely is going to carry out this strategy.

The only factors you've proffered are on the basis of your absolutes.

UK dependence on food and fuel is a factor to consider. U-Boats sailing to the US is a factor to consider. The High Seas Fleet making trouble in the North Sea is a factor to consider. Imminent starvation in Britain is a factor to consider. The fact that every morsel of food you take is a morsel out of the mouths of those who would have been consuming it or out of the hands of those who would have been importing it is a factor to consider.

The odds are clearly stacked against the Allies in this scenario. You've got 2-3 hours worth of shells, and you're quickly running out of time. That is objective.

All of them are hurting badly with trade from the US cut off. Their war industries are going to be on the verge of collapse. That is objective.

Your whole "mental agility" argument is lacking. You've claimed that my argument is completely unrealistic, yet my argument makes just about every decent point you made in the first seven pages, several times as many additional solid points, and is backed by a mountain of sources.

You can't say things such as:
German U-Boats can reach the US
that the USN/KM has a numbers advantage over the RN and odds are against the RN in 1917 and 1918
that Britain has six weeks of wheat
then say these are false when you change your argument.

These are statements presented as facts. If you present a statement as a fact, it isn't mental agility if you argue otherwise - it's contradiction.

German U-Boats can reach the US cannot be true and untrue - it is one or the other.

tgbyhn
30 Nov 11,, 05:05
I'm going to take an independent post to clarify my thoughts on armistice. I think any reasonable person would agree this is a reasonable outcome given the circumstances.

Britain naturally has had a very advantageous position that makes invasion difficult. It's been invaded by the Romans, Anglo-Saxons, Danes, Normans, and if you count William in what was more a political revolution, 6 times in the past 2000 years. The invasion of American men of English women twice last century is a separate case.

I believe Britain has very favorable circumstances to seek a separate peace, come off somewhat close to the status quo. To do so it has to screw over France.

The Germans aren't in any position to invade, or in any position to demand the Royal Navy. Neither is the US.

If the United States is to go to war with the Allies, and Britain faces the extreme challenges and adversities it would, I think it screws over France, gives back the German colonies, keeps its navy, and withdraws its army back to Britain. Given Wilson's "peace without victory" mantra he maintained prior to and after entry into the war, the US may make limited demands based on popular and congressional demand (Wilson went to war on such demand).

France has a hell of a reckoning ahead of it. It's going to have to surrender if the British make a separate peace. If Britain undertakes the strategy you've laid out and doesn't succeed - it's going to have a hell of a reckoning ahead of it.

I think this is the most worthwhile option Britain has.

tgbyhn
30 Nov 11,, 05:41
When you lied about the distance from Wilhelmshaven to New York?
I stated the distance around the north of the British Isles. You stated the distance through the English channel. Citing a different route is not lying.

I'm going to have to redact this - not only is the 3500nmi route around the north of Britain 3500nmi, through the Channel 3500nmi.

The only way to get to New York in 3250 nmi as you've claimed is as the crow flies.

Chuck Norris may be able to swim through land, but a U-Boat cannot sail through Scotland, Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine.

zraver
30 Nov 11,, 06:49
Can you clarify this? You're not seeding to consume the seed grain? The loss of American exports is goign to spur other wheat producers to increase production= seed not from British stocks.


Your figures for pounds and tons are exactly the same as mine. Where else are you slaughtering every cow?

I never said slaugter every cow... go back and reread... 400,000 allotted to meat production can turn out 200,000 calves a year so that there are 200,000 cows for slaughter


I weighed the chickens at 100 million pounds. So instead of 7 ounces of chicken per week, for 5 weeks, it's 5.25 ounces. As far as your grain is concerned, you reach that figure in 5 weeks, and it still at most is parity for caloric loss in US non-grain exports to the UK.

Better off than they would be if feeding chickens...


If your reaching parity to non-grain caloric losses in 5 weeks, with no eggs or chicken meat thereafter, you're worse off.

No, the closer to the sun the food source the more calories you get. 187 pounds of wheat in a feild gives you a renewwable surplus 1623lbs of harvested grain and 187lbs of seed stock on a 30 bushel per acre farm. 187 pounds of wheat will feed 10 fryer chickens from chicks to maturity at 24 weeks giving you 11.25lbs of meat or 2-3 already adult layer chickens for a year laying 300-520ish eggs and then 2.75-4lbs of meat.


The average Briton is eating 5.8lbs wheat per week. 43 million Britons, 294.4 million pounds per day. Britain is eating 124,700 tons of wheat per day. Your 105,000 tons is less than Britain eats in a day. You've added less than a day to reserves, and have still only reached parity with caloric losses from US non-grain exports.

So you have a loss of 760,000 tons of wheat. That's a 7-day decline in reserves.

NO NO NO, 5.8 pounds of bread is not 5.8lb of wheat. A 60lbs Bushel of wheat milled to flour will produce 90-150lbs of bread. Living on bread alone you need roughly 2.5lbs a day so a Bushel of wheat making 100 loaves equals enough raw food requirement to feed 5.7 people for a week.


As previously posted and cited, Argentinian wheat production fell 40% from 1915 to 1917. So Australia and China are out. On top of that going to increased competition for what remains due to falling US food exports elsewhere.

bad use of numbers as usual, 1915 was a bumper year not a normal year. Argentina produced 109.6 million bushels in 1913.

From a single seed Tracing the Marquis wheat success story in Canada to its roots in the Ukraine - Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) (http://www4.agr.gc.ca/AAFC-AAC/display-afficher.do?id=1181310933006)

A look at Argentina's exports April 1915 v April 1916 reveals that while wheat fell from 570,000 tons to 285,000 tons, Corn increased from 67,000 tons to 114,000 tons and oats from 38,000 tons to 62,000 tons.

The Americas - National City Bank of New York - Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=geQIAQAAIAAJ&pg=RA8-PA18&lpg=RA8-PA18&dq=argentina+wheat+exports+1915&source=bl&ots=mSMa9B5uTW&sig=yNtazYyXBjKHO1TJVXEzKrr8EKE&hl=en&ei=waPVTseBHMeKgwfh8oCaAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CDoQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=argentina%20wheat%20exports%201915&f=false)

Wheat 1 pound= 1400 recverable calories
oats 1 pound= 1800 recoverable calories
Corn 1 pound= 1500 recverable calories.

So the actual caloric loss isn't as great as the declien in wheat production would suggest without context.


I'm still here. Like I said, I didn't have the time to address a bunch of injected argument in addition to the core of the debate, and you rudely demanding 2 or 3 times I do so doesn't incline me to do so.

Its critical to the entire debate...


I said the mindset of Americans. "Kill 'em all, nuke Arabia into glass". I also stated the US has never done so.

Why haven't we?


I said given that the U-Boats have twice or better the range at 8kn, they ought to be able to 10kn. Penalization was implied.

No, at least not obviously so.


I still think the US could pull a Singapore. Land at an undefended point across undefended waters and avoid all things naval or naval defense. I seem to recall you arguing the US could take Vancouver earlier in the thread.

could= might not will.


I'd really like you to find where I stated that. I haven't said a word about Canadian arms.

Exactly!


I still think your argument is bunk and I always will.

which is why you won't play Wilson...


They can't. The distance between the beaches of Brooklyn and Manhattan is more than the range of the RN dreadnoughts. So no, they can't fire over the top of Brooklyn. It's too wide.

Try again...

Coney Island to lower manhatten centered on the NYSE is 17600 yards

15"/42- 25000 yards
14"/45- 19900 yards
13.5"/45- 22500 yards
12"/45- 20450 yards


Where did I say that?

Every time you say American's wont surrender.


What wars has the US surrendered in? There's an status quo armistice in Korea and the Paris Peace Accords, but I've yet to know of any wars the US has surrendered in.

Now your trying to change the parameters.... but a surrender is a surrender... that we haven't surrendered in war is due more to geography than anything else.


$4.2 billion in exports against a $60 billion economy, an economy that's about to go to war (economic boost). You argued that the British would collapse on the lack of credit alone.

4.2 billion is exports gone may not seem like a lot until you realize that in AUG 1914 the US had 8% unemployment and in march 1917 that rate was 3%. The loss of the European trade is going to throw that 5% back out of work and more as a domino effect takes over. its not just 4.2 billion in trade lost, but 10+ billion in money and material. You claim the US can pull itself up by its bootstraps how.... the industrialists who just got screwed are not going to take paper ever again. The banks who did the screwing while getting the Uncle Sam/ Fed Reserve Reach around are collpasing as people make a run on them to try and convert paper bank notes to specie. The Only option is to flood the domestic market with federal specie which will cause inflation.

Plus that loss relflects not money that won't be made, but that is now gone. the money not spent buying bonds to make loans to the allies got loaned to industrialists to expand facilties and payrolls, to farms to buy seed (already bought) and tractors, was waged on the commodities exchange and stock market. On Black Thursday the US lost an estimated 4 billion dollars in stock market value (1.96% of GDP) and the 1929 high of 203.6 billion GDP would fall 17 billion by 1930 It dropped a total of 62.2 billion by 1933. Yet in 1917 we are talking about a 2.95% hit primarily to the financial sector first.

http://econ.duke.edu/webfiles/arg/data/npdata.dat


Furthermore, if the US economy collapses due to war, they're not going to go to war, which pretty much destroys the whole point of this thread.

Broke countrie are the ones who go to war the most often... And the US is not immune

Prior to the civil war the US was in a recession.
prior to the Spanish American war the US had a recession in 1897....
They'll get them plus interest after Britain loses the war.


You argued that China has rice to export, that you can reduce Chinese consumption to 100kg per year (and not much else) against 138kg of wheat per year for the British (plus other foods).

I never said reduce chinese consumption, Chinese consumption is 92kg a year and I allotted 100kg a year roughyl a 10% surplus. Nor are the British eating 138kg a wheat per year per capita in breads. That number also refelcts grains diverted to feeds for the production of meat.


China isn't going to give you the food, and you're not going to take it. The Chinese down to 100kg per would mean a famine.

No famine, and no take, I'll buy it by traty concession and trade. China needs manufactired goods, weapons and technology. Plus does China really want to piss Britain off with the UK allied to Japan....


I stated total US cheese exports were 12,000 tons per week. Total US exports means to everybody in the world. Most US exports at this time were to Europe. Of which Britain is getting a chunk.

you implied it was all going to England.


I stated the distance around the north of the British Isles. You stated the distance through the English channel. Citing a different route is not lying.

The distance you stated for the route you gave was wrong



I don't know what seaplane carriers are attached to the Grand Fleet, and I don't really care. I think your strategy is preposterous.

oxymoron... generally speaking not caring requrings not thinking not the opposite. Those who think care, those who don't- don't. Hence the Wilson thought experiment.


I've paid zero attention because you have 2-3 hours worth of shells. A response isn't even justified.

I have 30-70 shells per gun depending onHE shells loaded, plus what ever the replenishment fleet brought along. Roughly 370 big guns or 11100 shells minimum. thats before the cruisers that will do the bulk of the work if it needs to be done, the battle wagons are for things like Ft Hamilton and its 10" guns the only sea coast fort in Brooklyn that can protect Lower Manhatten. New Jersey has nothing.


No, I don't think the Canadian raiders are going to advance 250 miles into the United States.

There is that pesky don't think again... instead of not thinking about something, do think about it. Why won't raiders travel 250 miles? In 1916 Pershing went 300 miles into Mexico, the most famous of the wild west gangs travelled 250 miles with ease, the redlegs, jayhawkers and bushwackers travelled that far... So why exactly will feircly loyal and suprisingly anti-American Canadians not do it?


I didn't dispute US vessels in Allied ports could be seized. I didn't even dispute 250 ships at sea. What I did say is 84% of the world merchant fleet in 1917 is non-US, most of it Allied, there are going to be more Allied ships in US ports than vice-versa, so the balance is against the Allies.

Again not in dispute, it was simply showing the loss wasn't as bad as it might be portrayed.


You've said it yourself - very real chance of total victory. How about, as you've said, Russia collapses without US credit and German and Austro-Hungarian mass forces on the Western and Italian fronts, pouring soldiers from the Eastern Front with reserves due from the East, and the fronts break?

yup, all of that holds true but its also time consuming. The shift in the balance of continental power, the threat to food and fuel stocks, the threat to imperial control of the colonies, the threat a treaty with Germany will leave the UK vulnerable to future japanese, American or German domination are all reasons for the RN to try and win whule it can.


So over a thousand or so sentences typed, I've missed a few things. I'm only human. Jellicoe, according to nearly every contemporary or postwar account, is characterized as cautious. Your RN strategy isn't Jellicoe. Beatty, maybe.

Please pretty ptretty please tell me what Jellico could ahve done differently. Historians are good people, but we are not admirals for the most part.


Realistically, I think Britain and France are going to sue for an armistice and the RN isn't even going to sail for the US.

Possibly, but FDR thought Japan would back off China... can we say oops....


Nearly every contemporary and postwar account of Jellicoe's performance during the battle was characterized as cautious. As well as his attitude throughout the war. He was eventually sacked for it. He wasn't just characterized as cautious - he was characterized as very cautious. Beatty, Churchill ("he could lose the war in an afternoon") - Lloyd George sacked him precisely for adopting a very cautious and defensive strategy.

1. He was fired over u-boats not his handling of the GF.
2. DLG didn't fire him


If setting sail in 2.5 hours to cautiously engage the High Seas Fleet once in battle is your definition of non-cautious, you're scraping the barrel.

WTF? Seriouslty WTF? And you wonder why I think your stupid.... The Grand Fleet left Scapa Flow and the Firth Of Roysth 2.5 hours before the German HSF left thier bases... They sailed within 48 hours of Jellico learning there was a move planned by the HSF. Thats not caution.... not in anyway shape or form.


The definition of mothball is to put something "out of operation but maintain it so that it can be used in the future". That's the same thing as reserve.

really lets compare using the free dictonary for both

Mothball

1. A marble-sized ball, originally of camphor but now of naphthalene, stored with clothes to repel moths.
2. mothballs
a. A condition of long storage for possible future use: put the battleship into mothballs.
b. A condition of being set aside or discarded: have put the plan into mothballs.
tr.v. moth·balled, moth·ball·ing, moth·balls
1. To remove (a ship, for example) from active service or use and put into protective storage.
2. To defer indefinitely; shelve: mothball a project.

Reserve

. To keep back, as for future use or for a special purpose.
2. To set or cause to be set apart for a particular person or use. See Synonyms at book.
3. To keep or secure for oneself; retain: I reserve the right to disagree. See Synonyms at keep.
n.
1. Something kept back or saved for future use or a special purpose.
2. The act of reserving.
3. The keeping of one's feelings, thoughts, or affairs to oneself.
4. Self-restraint in expression; reticence: "One feels it everywhere, a quality of reserve, something held back" (Rollene W. Saal).
5. Lack of enthusiasm; skeptical caution.
6. An amount of capital held back from investment in order to meet probable or possible demands.
7. A reservation of public land: a forest reserve.
8. An amount of a mineral, fossil fuel, or other resource known to exist in a particular location and to be exploitable: the discovery of large oil reserves.
9.
a. A fighting force kept uncommitted until strategic need arises. Often used in the plural.
b. The part of a country's armed forces not on active duty but subject to call in an emergency.

Do you see anything about long storage in reserve?


The HMS Lion was under repairs for 7 weeks and out of commission for nearly 11.

Yup, made damage from 14 large caliber hits and only 7 weeks to repair... so explain 5 weeks to get a possibly tired ut otherwise functioning ship fromr eserve to commissioned status.


I stated the Germany built a total of 366 U-Boats that could easily reach the US before the end of WWI. You went onto think the Germans had 366 U-Boats, and that I said they would all sail the US.

No, you claimed the u-boats required less logistics.


What does boat building have to do with anything? If a ship or U-Boat exists and is active, and the only factors to take into consideration are supplies.

You don't build them out of air... Germany started with 29 so those 366 boats built represent choices on the allotment of steel, copper, rubber, lead, diesel, man power (crew) man power (builders) etc. Once built the materials and crew allotted equal about 5 dreadnoughts but more fuel.


I stated 50 U-Boats to the US.

In reality 7 u cruisers made war patrols to the Us and 1 was sunk...


Your premise is "the Royal navy is going to sail to the US, and it is going to bombard the US into surrendering.[/quite]

No, my premis is that the GF sailing to North America under the threat of doing that will force the USN to fight, where I can destroy it and then use the thrat of bombardment and its effect on the population, financial, political and industrial sectors to force the Wilson Administration to accept a peace.

[quote]Your entire argument absolutely rests on that, and you've never once taken into consideration whether or not the UK would actually do such a thing.

Would the UK shell NYC? Hrmmmm... Desden, blockade of Germany, Tea laws in India.... No moral reservation as part of the English character would seem to suggest that they wouldn't.


It absolutely has no choice. [/quite]

If America jumps in on the side of the CP the UK has two choices- capitulation or a quick strike. 2 choices is not an absolute.

[quote]The US is absolutely going to surrender.

Never said the US would absolutely surrender, but its a winning bet.


Jellicoe is not cautious and absolutely carry this strategy.

I never said he was or wasn't I asked you what he could have done differenlty at Jutland.


The only factors you've proffered are on the basis of your absolutes.

learn how to read and reason please.


UK dependence on food and fuel is a factor to consider. U-Boats sailing to the US is a factor to consider. The High Seas Fleet making trouble in the North Sea is a factor to consider. Imminent starvation in Britain is a factor to consider.

kaiser Willie going for broke is a factor, long term consequences to France is she loses need to be considered, German domination of Eastern Europe, treaty enforced dismantling of the Grand Fleet, loss of the colonies loyalty, the Dominions breaking away, Japan's ambitions, the post war economy.... lots of things to consder and the only way to try and avoid them is to knock the US out quick. Germany when faced with a similar problem launched the Spring Offensive of 1918.... it failed but thats what desperate nations do. Japan attacked when it was in a very similar posistion....


The odds are clearly stacked against the Allies in this scenario. You've got 2-3 hours worth of shells, and you're quickly running out of time. That is objective.

No thats bean counting... 2-3 hours worth of shells is a 5 shot revolver when facing 6 attackers... are you somewhere between 1 and 5 or are you lucky number 6? Do you want to findout or are you going to decide the fight an't worth it?


All of them are hurting badly with trade from the US cut off. Their war industries are going to be on the verge of collapse.

If the Royal Navy does nothing then Britain, France and Itaky lose the war, while Serbia, Luxemberg and Belgium lose their very existence.
If the Royal Navy does act, those things still might happen, but they might not.

zraver
30 Nov 11,, 07:00
I stated the distance around the north of the British Isles. You stated the distance through the English channel. Citing a different route is not lying.

I'm going to have to redact this - not only is the route around the north of Britain 3500nmi (even with going around Shetland, as I avoid Orkney to avoid Scapa Flow), through the Channel it's 3500nmi.

The only way to get to New York in 3250 nmi as you've claimed is as the crow flies.

Chuck Norris may be able to swim through land, but a U-Boat cannot sail through Scotland, Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine.

Tell you what bet me... you prove I said Germans u boats only had to sail 3250 nautical miles from their base to New York via direct quote and I'll concede defeat, if I didn't say it, you stipulate to my economic conditions for the purpose of the Wilson thought exercise and you play Wilson.

deal?

tgbyhn
30 Nov 11,, 07:06
Tell you what bet me... you prove I said Germans u boats only had to sail 3250 nautical miles from their base to New York via direct quote and I'll concede defeat, if I didn't say it, you stipulate to my economic conditions for the purpose of the Wilson thought exercise and you play Wilson.
Here.

But I'll bet you pick a bone over me reading it, and having chosen to round it up 4nmi, or that you didn't cite 3246nm as "sailing distance" but only as "short line distance."

If that's the case, no deal.

Doktor
30 Nov 11,, 07:30
Z,

Let's suppose you are right, there are vast reserves of food and oil elsewhere and they are all willing to be handed to the Brits.

Are there secure sea routes for those goods, with RN concentrated on US? - What are Ze Germans doing?
2. What's the cost of these? Can UK pay those supplies? For how long? Is it enough?

Bombardment of US cities...

Are you sure US will surrender after let's say 6 months bombardment of NY? Or they will get more determined to regroup?
Are there supplies of ammo on RN side support that campaign?
Do you have enough infantry to land on US shores? Assuming you can make the landings fom subs and DNs:confused:

Finally, being so focused on US front... what happens on the land in Europe? In terms of reinforcements and supplies.

zraver
30 Nov 11,, 07:37
Direct quote from you, "The only way to get to New York in 3250 nmi as you've claimed is as the crow flies."

1. Or you can check the distance from Zeebrugge to NYC.... pssst it is 3246 nautical miles by sea not air don't need chuckie....

2. My bet involved the world "only" and I clearly add distance to avoid the Royal Navy in your copy and paste.

3. My claim of distance is just that distance: u-boat specific sailings are not mentioned.

1979
30 Nov 11,, 07:47
I think the figure for the British working class man was 2200 calories per day.

So if you add 600 + 200 + milk + sugar + beer + fruits & vegetables, you're going to get a day's worth of food per week or more.

Keep in mind that a day is 14.3% of a week. :)

you need to make a stronger case if you are arguing that Britain cant replace 1/7
of their imports if needed.


I can cite the exact proportions of US foreign trade from the US statistical abstract later if you wish.

since so far you have enlighten us on what fraction of British consumption , us exports to the whole world mean , perhaps you should.

zraver
30 Nov 11,, 08:04
Z,

Let's suppose you are right, there are vast reserves of food and oil elsewhere and they are all willing to be handed to the Brits.

I don't need vast reserves, I need enough extra to last 12-14 weeks of war and 3 weeks sailing. If its not over by then famine in the UK. Since I am pretending to be British famine elsewhere will gets lots of hand wringing but little else until the famine is over and I can appoint a commision.


Are there secure sea routes for those goods, with RN concentrated on US? - What are Ze Germans doing?

Those sea routes are covered by the same number of small escorts as before, the German surface raiders are gone by 17. The HSF might try a breakout, but as I said earlier a might is a lot better bet than a sure thing when the only sure thing is defeat if I don't act.


2. What's the cost of these? Can UK pay those supplies? For how long? Is it enough?

what ever the price its cheaper than defeat.


Bombardment of US cities...

Are you sure US will surrender after let's say 6 months bombardment of NY? Or they will get more determined to regroup?

no 6 month bombardment of NYC...

1. defeat USN at sea as brutally as possible... send as many hulls down as possible and chase the retreating fleet on to the rocks. At sea is where I want 10,000 dead. I want to rub America's nose into the fact they have no battle fleet anymore and no Farraguaght or Decatuer to save them.... just the sons of Nelson and Hood smugly sailing where they please beciase the Britannia rules the waves...
2. shell Nantucket hard with cruisers and destroyers as the Island has a special place in America's self image of herself at sea. Maybe occupy it and burn its industrial facilities.
3. shell and silence Ft Hamilton.
4. Put 1 15" shell into Wall Street as a door knocker
5. Ask President Wilson if he is ready for terms yet....
6. rely on the fear of a bigger shelling, the shock of the naval defeat and the fate of Nantuckett and the crashing American economic and financial sectors to force him to terms.
7. This is when I want France to declare war and promise troops to North America to aid the returned Canadian Corps... add shock pressure and now the fear of invasion. In 1917 the french Army is still held in awe in the US.
8. If he delays hit point targets that are designed to inflict political pressure- Brooklyn Navy Yard, Occupy Staten Island to fly the Union Jack from the Statue of Liberty, shell the Hamptdens, raid Boston or Savannah, shell the GW and Brooklyn Bridges..... or have London papers start talking about how a US defeat means no debt to the US... those rumors will be in NYC before the ink dries... American papers will give me the pulse of the nation and guide the strikes, though to be honest I think Wilson will fold like a kicked dog....


Are there supplies of ammo on RN side support that campaign?

see above, if all goes well I fire one dreadnought shell at a land based target.
Do you have enough infantry to land on US shores? Assuming you can make the landings fom subs and DNs:confused:[/quote]

Easily on the troops, bringing the Canadian Corps of 3-4 divisions with me on fast liners turned troop transports.


Finally, being so focused on US front... what happens on the land in Europe? In terms of reinforcements and supplies.

Haig gets told to sit tight and no 2nd Arras with its 158,000 casualties, Neville hopefully does the same and his offensive never goes in and saves France 187,000 casualties or the french poulis still mutiny. Germany is gonna smash Italy on schedule but until autumn they are not able to do much becuase she s still chasing Russians around yelling, "zitting inzee here and zign thiz dam treaty..." while Lenin's cronies yell, "neyt nyet nyet" at the kaiser and, "nuk nuk nuk" at Kerensky

If I can force Wilson to throw in, I've saved the allies 345,000 casualties....

tgbyhn
30 Nov 11,, 13:07
rec
The loss of American exports is goign to spur other wheat producers to increase production= seed not from British stocks.
You're not going to have any extra production in time. From the following (source) (http://www.spectrumcommodities.com/education/commodity/statistics/wheat.html):

Argentina plants in May-June, next harvest in mid-November 1917 through mid-January 1918.
India grows winter wheat and the next possible increased harvest in October through December 1918.
Australia plants in May through July and and the next harvest is available in October through the end of December 1917.
Egypt plants in fall 1916 and acreage can't be increased until fall 1917, next possible increased harvest April through August 1918.
Chinese winter wheat (most) is planted in the fall next possible harvest increase May-June 1918. Chinese spring wheat is not available until July or August.

I never said slaugter every cow... go back and reread... 400,000 allotted to meat production can turn out 200,000 calves a year so that there are 200,000 cows for slaughter
Slaughter them all or not - you've got an increase in meat consumption of 80 calories a week against a loss of 600 calories per day in meat from the US.

No, the closer to the sun the food source the more calories you get. 187 pounds of wheat in a feild gives you a renewwable surplus 1623lbs of harvested grain and 187lbs of seed stock on a 30 bushel per acre farm. 187 pounds of wheat will feed 10 fryer chickens from chicks to maturity at 24 weeks giving you 11.25lbs of meat or 2-3 already adult layer chickens for a year laying 300-520ish eggs and then 2.75-4lbs of meat.

So your talking about increased grain allotted for the next harvest?


NO NO NO, 5.8 pounds of bread is not 5.8lb of wheat. A 60lbs Bushel of wheat milled to flour will produce 90-150lbs of bread. Living on bread alone you need roughly 2.5lbs a day so a Bushel of wheat making 100 loaves equals enough raw food requirement to feed 5.7 people for a week.

Thanks for pointing that out - I did make a mistake the bread/flour figure with what.

According to this source) (http://www4.agr.gc.ca/AAFC-AAC/display-afficher.do?id=1181310933006), British grain consumption is 7 sixty pound bushels per person per year (5.5 imported, 1.5 produced). That 5.5 bushel per person figure (236 million total Britain) corresponds perfectly with 231.8 million bushels Britain imported in 1916 according to do The Price Grain Reporter 1917 (http://books.google.com/books?id=WS0XAQAAIAAJ&pg=RA6-PA10&lpg=RA6-PA10&dq=britain+wheat+consumption+per+person+1917&source=bl&ots=waHgGsDm3v&sig=5JoGOuwLAlceLpKjaJXuo6SUdXA&hl=en&ei=pOjVTo7jG8OBgAeqtNmmAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=wheat&f=false). That's 190kg per capita.

British consumption is 174,000 tons per week. So the 105,000 tons over five weeks is 21,000 tons per week. So that's +12% to your stock of grain


bad use of numbers as usual, 1915 was a bumper year not a normal year. Argentina produced 109.6 million bushels in 1913.

According to the Argentina, 1516-1987: from Spanish ... - David Rock - Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=FHTczGi4sv4C&pg=PR17&lpg=PR17&dq=argentina+grain+production+1915&source=bl&ots=3dvQTcFGEv&sig=knuttmhhHDiRqqlyGCwuPxNuLnA&hl=en&ei=Ku_PTqbbHpLo2gX3g_ioDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CEwQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=wheat&f=false) I previously cited, Argentina wheat production fell 30% from 1916 to 1917? Is that better?

100% of production are accounted for historically, whether consumption or export. Corn, oats, or wheat, any extra for Britain is taking it out of the mouths of the natives or those importing.

I never said reduce chinese consumption, Chinese consumption is 92kg a year and I allotted 100kg a year roughyl a 10% surplus. Nor are the British eating 138kg a wheat per year per capita in breads. That number also refelcts grains diverted to feeds for the production of meat.
No famine, and no take, I'll buy it by traty concession and trade. China needs manufactired goods, weapons and technology. Plus does China really want to piss Britain off with the UK allied to Japan....
British per capita consumption of wheat is actually 190kg of wheat.
"China is producing 285 billion pounds/ 129.7 billion kilos of rice with a population of 465,000,000 each eating 100 kilos a year"
129.7 billion kg / 465 million comes to 279kg. At 1650 calories per pound, that comes to 2767 calories per day per person in China. Figures for the average Chinese laborer per day are at 3400 calories per day (http://books.google.com/books?id=6GIcAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA1057&lpg=PA1057&dq=calories+consumption+per+day+china+1917&source=bl&ots=QIUT3ChRMY&sig=2rLy4_YMKdx6rV_MIWxMosKQc9c&hl=en&ei=VwHWTtjFJMnTgQfZm6G-AQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false), in a population that almost entirely consists of laborers, overwhelmingly rural, with a diet based almost entirely on rice.

I was surprised at the figure for the US laboring man ate, 6485 calories per day. I knew people ate way more food before we were sedentary, but not that much. Must be 12 hours a day/6 days per week.

Back to the China subject, I don't think the Chinese have anything to export. The Japanese laborer next door is eating 4400 calories per day. British children in school age 9-14 eat 3400 calories per day, and the Chinese kids that age are laboring.

As is the case with all consumption and exports, it's historically accounted for, and whatever Britain on top of what they did historically is food out of the mouths of the natives or nations importing.

Grain-fed livestock (cattle, sheep) besides oats are a post-WWII innovation and pretty much unheard of at this time. Livestock would be eating mostly grass and hay in 1917.


Its critical to the entire debate...
I don't think it is.


Why haven't we?
Despite the immediate mindset of many Americans when we're attacked, we're not Nazis.


No, at least not obviously so.

Given the ranges at 8kn are fact, if 10kn is "my opinion" there's obviously another variable at work, and there's only one candidate: increased fuel consumption.


Exactly!
Not mentioning Canadian arms is not the same as assuming they don't have any. There's guns in Canada is a given like the Pope is Catholic is a given.


which is why you won't play Wilson...

You're asking me to play Wilson, when the Jellicoe you have would be akin to the Jimmy Carter turning into Stalin on the turn of a dime.


Every time you say American's wont surrender.

Now your trying to change the parameters.... but a surrender is a surrender... that we haven't surrendered in war is due more to geography than anything else.

The Korean Armistice and Paris Peace Accords were not surrenders. Period.

4.2 billion is exports gone may not seem like a lot until you realize that in AUG 1914 the US had 8% unemployment [....]

Broke countrie are the ones who go to war the most often... And the US is not immune

If the US enters the "Great Depression of 1917", than this thread is a catch-22.

The US will not enter the war if that is true. Then there's no point to this thread. It's a catch-22.

I still think the depression argument is BS.


you implied it was all going to England.
For exports that went to Britain, or France or Britain, they were included by name. Totals didn't. Most of those exports are going to Europe.


The distance you stated for the route you gave was wrong

Are you serious? Really? OK, 4000nmi to the US. Add 500 for whatever. You're just splitting hairs. At 4000nmi, the German subs are still within reach.

I have 30-70 shells per gun depending onHE shells loaded, plus what ever the replenishment fleet brought along. Roughly 370 big guns or 11100 shells minimum. thats before the cruisers that will do the bulk of the work if it needs to be done, the battle wagons are for things like Ft Hamilton and its 10" guns the only sea coast fort in Brooklyn that can protect Lower Manhatten. New Jersey has nothing.
British dreadnoughts carried 2-3 hours worth of ammunition at a steady firing rate.


There is that pesky don't think again... instead of not thinking about something, do think about it. Why won't raiders travel 250 miles? In 1916 Pershing went 300 miles into Mexico, the most famous of the wild west gangs travelled 250 miles with ease, the redlegs, jayhawkers and bushwackers travelled that far... So why exactly will feircly loyal and suprisingly anti-American Canadians not do it?
Every major city in Canada is 30-60 miles from the US except Calgary and Winnipeg (70 and 90), versus Seattle, Buffalo, and Detroit for the US. Yet the Canadians have a leg up with these 250 mile raids.

This is like arguing the Allies have an advantage of in 750 ships seized, when there are more Allied ships in US ports.


Again not in dispute, it was simply showing the loss wasn't as bad as it might be portrayed.
We've gone from a net +750 in Allied seizures to the Allies recouping a portion of their losses.


yup, all of that holds true but its also time consuming. The shift in the balance of continental power, the threat to food and fuel stocks, the threat to imperial control of the colonies, the threat a treaty with Germany will leave the UK vulnerable to future japanese, American or German domination are all reasons for the RN to try and win whule it can.
I still think Britain is in a great position to screw over their Allies by making peace with the US and Germany, and maintain their status quo antebellum. They're isolated from invasion, and nobody can make demands on their fleet.

The bombardment strategy has a multitude of unforeseen variables that could undermine, and a very real chance (I believe total chance) of failing. If they fail in their bombardment strategy, they're going to utterly collapse and be at the mercy of their enemies. If I were the British, I would go for option one. It is a choice, and it's a better choice.


Please pretty ptretty please tell me what Jellico could ahve done differently. Historians are good people, but we are not admirals for the most part.
When Jellicoe crossed their T the first time, he had a unbelievable advantage. Scheer was completely shocked to even see the Grand Fleet. I think he could have inflicted a serious defeat on the German fleet. From what I understand, most of his dreadnoughts didn't even open fire despite being favored by the position of the sun. I think he failed to capitalize on this advantage when victory was within his grasp due to his cautious nature.

Furthermore, having headed the Atlantic and subsequently the Grand Fleet since 1910, I believe he bears a strong degree of responsibility over the lack of innovation and modernization of practices. Clearly he knew of the innovations in German naval practices, and pushed for some early on, but, for example, the British clung to flags and lamps instead of radio which had serious consequences at Jutland, among several other practices. So I don't think it's just a mistake of the day (the first T) but a sum of 6 years of mistakes.


Possibly, but FDR thought Japan would back off China... can we say oops....
The US isn't China. It's not backward and politically fragmented among warlords.


1. He was fired over u-boats not his handling of the GF.
2. DLG didn't fire him
OK, technically the First Lord of the Admiralty sacked him. With Jellicoe, I believe there were a history of problems. He was pessimistic about Britain's chances of winning the war, he was overly cautious, his U-Boat strategy, criticism about Jutland, and so on. And I don't think that the First Lord was alone in his decision - others were involved.


WTF? Seriouslty WTF? And you wonder why I think your stupid.... The Grand Fleet left Scapa Flow and the Firth Of Roysth 2.5 hours before the German HSF left thier bases... They sailed within 48 hours of Jellico learning there was a move planned by the HSF. Thats not caution.... not in anyway shape or form.
Jellicoe was cautious at Jutland, and he was cautious the rest of the time he was commander of the Grand Fleet. So he sailed about 2.5 hours ahead of the Germans - and fought a battle that by any objective standard could have been to at least some degree better fought.


really lets compare using the free dictonary for both
I just don't really care about splitting hairs. If you want your pre-dreadnoughts in 5 minutes, you've got 'em.

Yup, made damage from 14 large caliber hits and only 7 weeks to repair... so explain 5 weeks to get a possibly tired ut otherwise functioning ship fromr eserve to commissioned status.
My exact quote:

7 pre-dreadnoughts (1 Med, rest mothballed) and 15 cruisers (entire Med/Adr/Aeg deployment) available in several weeks.
That entire force is going to take several weeks, at a time you were withdrawing your entire cruiser fleet form the North Sea. I pressed you on a timeframe for the pre-dreadnoughts, and you quoted the HMS Lion. I know the HMS Lion is 7 weeks - but how long does a dreadnought take to take out of reserve?


No, you claimed the u-boats required less logistics.
I never said Germany had 366 U-boats at her disposal, or they were all going to the US. I never envisioned 366 U-boats going to the US. There are less logistics involved in 50 U-Boats than 35 dreadnoughts, 20 cruisers and however many oil-burning destroyers your bringing along.


You don't build them out of air... Germany started with 29 so those 366 boats built represent choices on the allotment of steel, copper, rubber, lead, diesel, man power (crew) man power (builders) etc. Once built the materials and crew allotted equal about 5 dreadnoughts but more fuel.
I could talk about how much material, manpower and builder it takes to build 35 RN dreadnoughts - but I only ever meant U-Boats that exist in April 1917. It's maniacal to think I meant 415 or 366 and ones that haven't been constructed.


In reality 7 u cruisers made war patrols to the Us and 1 was sunk...
In reality, the US was never a friendly neutral, then an enemy. But in this scenario, the US is a friend, German U-Boats are welcome and wanted in US waters, and they can easily get there. Even you argued that U-Boats would be going to the US when you were on this side of the argument.

Come on, this is akin to saying the US would be akin to somebody arguing that the US is going to lay 70% of the North Sea mine barrage on behalf of the RN in this scenario. Because in reality it did so.


No, my premis is that the GF sailing to North America under the threat of doing that will force the USN to fight, where I can destroy it and then use the thrat of bombardment and its effect on the population, financial, political and industrial sectors to force the Wilson Administration to accept a peace.
I disagree that the US is going to be forced to fight, I disagree that this scenario would be plausibly considered by the British, I disagree that with 2-3 hours worth of shells you can force a surrender, and I disagree that the US is going to experience a depression.

tgbyhn
30 Nov 11,, 13:46
I'll be back later to wrap up a few unaddressed points from the last post. Tonight or tomorrow. I've been spending way too much time on this.

zraver
01 Dec 11,, 06:29
ditto a reply I've been working on all day just nuked...

tgbyhn
01 Dec 11,, 09:21
A more comprehensive picture of the logistical situation.

Weekly Caloric Decline for Losses of Non-Wheat Imports from US (all figures are US exports to Britain exclusively)
Meat: US exports to Britain were 10,000 tons per week (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=_F3EljBXbeQC&pg=PA208&lpg=PA208&dq=uk+lard+consumption+1917&source=bl&ots=TnjxbGOORo&sig=H7vUobSZZ6HJtWHP7cPm-PKNmoQ&hl=en&ei=6MDUTrfLKanz0gH-5qDbAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CD0Q6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=uk%20lard%20consumption%201917&f=false). Of this 3220 tons are bacon (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=UM8KAQAAMAAJ&pg=RA1-PA47&lpg=RA1-PA47&dq=US+hams+export+britain+1917&source=bl&ots=TpAJjclvgZ&sig=Dh19yknkqqLeZ2QWicpjNMR7gxE&hl=en&ei=hS3XTq-XK6vH0AHWw7WKDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=US%20hams%20export%20britain%201917&f=false) for a loss of 317 calories per day and the remainder ham and beef for 335 calories per day.
Lard: 1100 tons per week imported by Britain from the US (first source), a decline of 200 calories per person per week.
Butter: 142 tons per week imported from the US by Britain (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=G2PfsWATo7oC&pg=PA409&lpg=PA409&dq=great+britain+butter+imports+1917&source=bl&ots=pZnNDYctz-&sig=xDHeeBCaYqxa-CkdGOJNn30I8EQ&hl=en&ei=dv_WTsa0IKKs2gWqzai7Dg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CEoQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=great%20britain%20butter%20imports%201917&f=false), a decline of 22 calories per week per person.
Sugar: the British was dependent on Cuba, a client/puppet state of the US, for 50% of its sugar imports, a total of 784,000 tons (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=MqMSAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=united+kingdom+sugar+imports+1917&source=bl&ots=20pzHACh69&sig=aTuu_UxJffUxmFpIm8s6fPGalyo&hl=en&ei=8xDXTsfXLsT50gHg_5WCDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=united%20kingdom%20sugar%20imports%201917&f=false), a loss of 1234 calories per week per person. An additional 41,000 tons per year from the US is an additional 66 calories per week for a total of 1300 calories per week per person lost.
Molasses: The UK imported 140,000 tons in 1917 (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=0q9KAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA67&lpg=PA67&dq=british+molasses+imports+1917&source=bl&ots=mRSda8cfRH&sig=vwJ7Fsa07XaixLlqmDSJPjwVQHU&hl=en&ei=DBbXToZVqNjRAefmjPMN&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CDkQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=british%20molasses%20imports%201917&f=false), of which 75.3% is from the US and Cuba (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=MqMSAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=united+kingdom+sugar+imports+1917&source=bl&ots=20pzHACh69&sig=aTuu_UxJffUxmFpIm8s6fPGalyo&hl=en&ei=8xDXTsfXLsT50gHg_5WCDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=united%20kingdom%20sugar%20imports%201917&f=false), for a loss of 124 calories per week per person.
Milk: Britain imported 191 million pints of condensed milk a year in 1917, 54% from the US (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=GIcUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=united+kingdom+molasses+imports+1917&source=bl&ots=ANDitdPOlE&sig=4FQdXBCZ2hiQrgsbk47k7rpHrDk&hl=en&ei=RhXXTrWdO8jf0QGD97nKDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=united%20kingdom%20molasses%20imports%201917&f=false) for a loss of 29 calories per week per person.
Apples: Imports of 28,000 tons in 1917 from the US (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=GIcUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=united+kingdom+molasses+imports+1917&source=bl&ots=ANDitdPOlE&sig=4FQdXBCZ2hiQrgsbk47k7rpHrDk&hl=en&ei=RhXXTrWdO8jf0QGD97nKDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=united%20kingdom%20molasses%20imports%201917&f=false) for a loss of 6 calories per week per person.
Flour: 84% of British imports are from the US and Canada. Imports of 451,250 tons in 1917 from the US (59.2% of total) (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=GIcUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=united+kingdom+molasses+imports+1917&source=bl&ots=ANDitdPOlE&sig=4FQdXBCZ2hiQrgsbk47k7rpHrDk&hl=en&ei=RhXXTrWdO8jf0QGD97nKDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=united%20kingdom%20molasses%20imports%201917&f=false), for a loss of 662 calories per person per week.***
Canned salmon: Imports of 25,000 tons per year from the US (source 1, source 2) (http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1917-06.pdf) , for a loss of 14 calories per week.
Dried Peas: Britain imported 77 tons of dried peas per week from the US (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=SppKAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA274&lpg=PA274&dq=us+margarine+export+destinations+1917&source=bl&ots=VWA6FGUh5A&sig=Rh_fehmCQVgRY7N1xzkDrAEQyuk&hl=en&ei=sWXXTqfvOpTTgQep88mADw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=us%20margarine%20export%20destinations%201917&f=false), a loss of 6 calories per week.
Corn: The British are eating 50 million bushels per year (page 76) (http://books.google.com/books?id=6dU-AAAAYAAJ&pg=PA337&lpg=PA337&dq=livestock+population+britain+1917&source=bl&ots=ZOfdkGjbKv&sig=4fUVtZAytEpEYvKi3_WqTrAEI20&hl=en&ei=OhLYTuynMKfLsQLck7G3AQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBwQ6AEwADgK#v=onepage&q=cattle&f=false), their entire import, of which 42.7% if from the US (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=MqMSAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=united+kingdom+sugar+imports+1917&source=bl&ots=20pzHACh69&sig=aTuu_UxJffUxmFpIm8s6fPGalyo&hl=en&ei=8xDXTsfXLsT50gHg_5WCDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=united%20kingdom%20sugar%20imports%201917&f=false) for a loss of 1283 calories per week per person.
Dried Fruit: 213 tons per week from the US (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=XGtRAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA6&lpg=PA6&dq=great+britain+imports+oranges+lemons+fruit+1917&source=bl&ots=YJGu4nSrp-&sig=UyxfE22rGWhfE8PhFCQNGYbyL2U&hl=en&ei=EB7YTvO0N5T1sQKG-tDLDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CCkQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=great%20britain%20imports%20oranges%20lemons%20f ruit%201917&f=false) for a loss of 30 calories per week per person.
Between just these foods, there is a drop of 4311 calories per week. There are numerous other foods that were imported by Britain from the US, and all of this leaves the British even more dependent on what remains of their food supply.

The Wheat Situation in 1917 (source (http://books.google.com/books?id=GIcUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=united+kingdom+molasses+imports+1917&source=bl&ots=ANDitdPOlE&sig=4FQdXBCZ2hiQrgsbk47k7rpHrDk&hl=en&ei=RhXXTrWdO8jf0QGD97nKDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=united%20kingdom%20molasses%20imports%201917&f=false), not including flour imports***)
Consumption: 237 million bushels (150kg per person per year)
Imports from US: 101 million bushels (+34 million Canada)
Loss: 135 million bushels raw wheat
With a consumption of 237 million bushels per year, Britain's remaining stock of wheat for all purposes should be about 27.4 million bushels.

British Wheat Reserve

With 100% of that wheat used for human consumption, that leaves 38lbs per person, total, 0.9lbs per day for six weeks, or 1483 calories per day for each person in Britain.

On March 26, 1917, Argentina placed an embargo on wheat exports (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=GyXnAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA393&lpg=PA393&dq=butter+egg+and+cheese+journal+1917&source=bl&ots=vLy9d1oQUk&sig=8IWbRhH9p9zPT0JLps3kUMLzyX8&hl=en&ei=5mLXTtL0KIby0gGOhdXVDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=export&f=false). It supplied 7.3% of Britain's wheat supply in 1917, or 240,000 bushels a week.

Given that Britain's next harvest is in August, and assuming a steady flow of wheat imports from remaining suppliers, Britain is importing 548,000 bushels of wheat per week, enough to provide only 164 calories per day per person.

With the loss of 4311 calories per day (from just the US imports listed) and addition of 164 calories per day from remaining sources of wheat, and 235 calories per day from chicken, the British are going to have to take an extra 2.4lbs per week each from their remaining wheat supply to make up for it. This is at a time when food shortages and high prices were generally at their worst.

Britain will run out of wheat in 30.5 days, after which point starvation ensues.

Other Sources of Food in the United Kingdom
Oats: The British are consuming 46.7 million bushels per year of their oat production, out of a total (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=6dU-AAAAYAAJ&pg=PA337&lpg=PA337&dq=livestock+population+britain+1917&source=bl&ots=ZOfdkGjbKv&sig=4fUVtZAytEpEYvKi3_WqTrAEI20&hl=en&ei=OhLYTuynMKfLsQLck7G3AQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBwQ6AEwADgK#v=onepage&q&f=false) out of a production of 170.7 million bushels per year (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=GIcUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=united+kingdom+molasses+imports+1917&source=bl&ots=ANDitdPOlE&sig=4FQdXBCZ2hiQrgsbk47k7rpHrDk&hl=en&ei=RhXXTrWdO8jf0QGD97nKDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=united%20kingdom%20molasses%20imports%201917&f=false). There are 32lbs of oats in a bushel, which means Britain would have 92lbs of oats per capita a year in 1917. Any significant increases in oat consumption will have serious consequences on livestock nutrition. The British would have to eat 3.3 pounds of oats per week instead of increasing wheat consumption to make up for the loss in American calories, and the supply of oats would last 28 days. Britain will run out of wheat in 38 days.
Cattle: the modern steer has a dress weight of 714lbs (as you cited), however, the average British cattle has a dress weight of 510lbs in 1917 (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=r_sfAQAAMAAJ&pg=RA10-PA35&lpg=RA10-PA35&dq=cattle+dressed+weight+1917+britain&source=bl&ots=ZMNOdGj8aQ&sig=62LqI-iHn5TvBJwyYsaX1_SDXcc&hl=en&ei=sgzYTu2TMq6FsgLTjdXgDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCAQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=dressed%20weight&f=false), very lean. Given an average of 63% yield dressed, and the 140 pound skeleton removed from the carcass, there's going to be a meat yield of 370lbs per cattle. At a 1000 calories per pound 85% lean, the slaughter of 2 million cattle would offset losses from the US for 4.4 days. Combined with oats, the British will run out of wheat in 43 days.
So now Britain has completely exhausted its supply of oats, wheat, chickens, and two million cattle, and its at 37 days.

Challenges to increasing imports from other nations and increasing food production
All Allied nations, colonies, and many neutrals will be cut off from US supply, of which they'll have to make up from remaining stocks of food they have.
Any increase in production in food crops would be seen at earliest in fall of 1917, with most of the increase well off in 1918.
Any increased imports to Britain would be taking food out of other people's mouths, as all of this consumption would be historically accounted for. This problem would be especially aggravated in any Allied nations, colonies, or neutrals effectively embargoed that were importing food from the US.
In addition to taking food out of other people's mouths, any hypothetical increased British imports from other countries would need to be transported to a port for shipping.
British merchant ships would then need to make a round-trip journey of several weeks, and it would be folly to use oil-powered ones.
It's a mistake to assume that if a given nation has X amount of production of food Y in a given year, that it's seasonally available, or 100% available at any given point in time, or if exported that it wouldn't cause starvation before a future harvest in given nation.
France, Italy, and Japan, as well as neutral nations in Europe effectively embargoed are going to be hit hard and are going to compete for exports from other nations.
Food prices were reaching record and rather extreme highs in 1917. Now they're going to be rocketing in price further, and Britain does not have the credit to pay for much if anything at all.
For the Rhodesian beef example, the cattle are going to have to be brought to Cape Town and slaughtered, or have their meat shipped there in refrigerated rail cars. The meat will have to be loaded onto refrigerator ships (of which there won't be enough) that have to make a journey to get there, and a journey to get back. This isn't logistically possible on a time-frame of several weeks. A miniscule proportion, if any, will reach Britain in time.
In 1917, US food imports were $679 million, while exports were $1529 million. Instead of freeing up imports destined to the US to instead go to Britain (e.g. South Africa), there is going as much as a net 70% loss in the balance of imports and exports, further increasing internal demand in other countries on their own existing food supplies.
To repeat the first point, any food imported from other nations would be taking out of the mouths of others, as all the consumption of all production would have been historically accounted for.

British Oil Stocks
In May 1917, the oil consumption of patrolling waters off Britain was 7 million barrels per month (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=ZnkYAQAAIAAJ&pg=PA77&lpg=PA77&dq=british+oil+stocks+1917+world+war+I&source=bl&ots=2QsQ1I9K8U&sig=_bET7HkyLSRm3D5k-a7jwULSTIs&hl=en&ei=8YTXTs-GHemKsAKB15yCDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=british%20oil%20stocks%201917%20world%20war%20I&f=false).
In May 1917, total stocks of oil in the entirety of Great Britain were 900,000 tons, or 5.85 million barrels (^)
If used for naval patrol of domestic waters alone, 25 days supply.
If used for a trans-Atlantic naval operation, much less.
Due to difficulties in the scant oil supply, "the fleet was unable to exercise properly." (^).
If they're unable to exercise properly, one can only imagine the difficulties in a trans-Atlantic campaign.
Every Royal Navy destroyer built since 1905 (except for 16 Beagle class) were oil-burning. Dreadnoughts lose on average 35% of their range unless they have oil.

Logistical Circumstances of Importing from the East
Most of the ships are going to be in the North Atlantic, with many seized in US ports, and would need to be gathered up beforehand.
There would have to be enough fuel along the way - which would involve sending hundreds if not a thousand or more colliers out in advance to stock up various fueling stations at Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria, Aden, Oman, Bombay, Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai to handle 3-5 times normal shipping tonnage.
None of these ships could be oil powered - there just isn't any oil to fuel them.
A fast convoy in World War II would take 15 days to reach Britain from Halifax. At that speed, it would take 20 days to reach the Suez Canal from Britain.
After that, they have to reach India or China, which lie at distances of 2.5 to over 4 times greater than the trans-Atlantic crossing from Britain.
The food would need to be brought to port to be able to ship it.
After they return to the Mediterranean from India or China, it would be 20 more days in a convoy back to Britain.
To give an idea of the sheer scale involved, the British would need the cargo capacity of 115,000 C-130 cargo planes making one round-trip flight per day each to bring in enough grain to offset wheat from North America alone.
We're talking three to five months before the food shortage would really start to begin to have been partially relieved.

Ship Seizure Disparity and Trade Imbalances (source) (http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1917-05.pdf)
In 1917, 20.7 million tons of Allied shipping were cleared at US ports.
In 1917, 11.3 million tons of American shipping were cleared at US ports.
Britain imported $2 billion from the US in 1917, while the US imported imported $300 million from Britain. Full ships in American ports, empty ones in Allied.
American shipping is coming and going from across the entire world, not just Allied countries.
The logistics involved in the time-frame necessary make this strategy impossible.

I really can't see how this operation could be successful with less than 28 days before starvation sets in en masse, and a 25 day supply of oil suitable for patrolling duties near Britain.

I still think Britain sues for peace, screws over France, and maintains for the vast part a status quo antebellum. With your strategy, the US only has to wait 4 weeks until the bankrupt British completely collapse. Meanwhile, a lot of things are going to go badly within that four weeks if they decide not to hang their hat up right away. Of course, they'll start collapsing the first day - four weeks maximum to complete collapse.

Doktor
01 Dec 11,, 09:34
What happened with the maps of US shallow waters denying Z's ships to bombard US cities?

1979
01 Dec 11,, 16:39
To repeat the first point, any food imported from other nations would be taking out of the mouths of others, as all the consumption of all production would have been historically accounted for.[/list]


360 million people tgbyhn, in order to feed 43 mil .
do the math .

Doktor
01 Dec 11,, 19:06
360 million people tgbyhn, in order to feed 43 mil .
do the math .

You can't make it proportional, making that 1 day a week without food being 1 day in 10 weeks. Especially 95 years ago.

tgbyhn
01 Dec 11,, 19:40
360 million people tgbyhn, in order to feed 43 mil .
do the math .
I have done the math. Look back at my post.

1979
01 Dec 11,, 21:54
I have done the math. Look back at my post.

let me spell it out , it takes 2% lees food for each of 360 million people to ofsett the loss of US food imports.
It is by no means a drastic loss especially in times of war.

wrt to your post , please do no edit it after I replied to it , if you have something to add , make new one.

Doktor
01 Dec 11,, 22:03
let me spell it out , it takes 2% lees food for each of 360 million people to ofsett the loss of US food imports.
It is by no means a drastic loss especially in times of war.
The shortages tend to occur in most weird ways. For instance to help Britain, some country will wake up with 1 week shortage of one of the commodities, let's say wheat. That will lead to overconsumption of let's say rice and the spiral will keep, well, spinning - Murphy Law.
Tho the people are used to have shortages during war, army morale isn't ;)


wrt to your post , please do no edit it after I replied to it , if you have something to add , make new one.
Add that to the failure to find the intro thread and tell us something about himself :red:

tgbyhn
01 Dec 11,, 22:19
let me spell it out , it takes 2% lees food for each of 360 million people to ofsett the loss of US food imports.
It is by no means a drastic loss especially in times of war.

wrt to your post , please do no edit it after I replied to it , if you have something to add , make new one.
The post was a work in progress.

But, here you go:

Logistical Circumstances of Importing from the East
Most of the ships are going to be in the North Atlantic, with many seized in US ports, and would need to be gathered up beforehand.
There would have to be enough fuel along the way - which would involve sending hundreds if not a thousand or more colliers out in advance to stock up various fueling stations at Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria, Aden, Oman, Bombay, Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai to handle 3-5 times normal shipping tonnage.
None of these ships could be oil powered - there just isn't any oil to fuel them.
A fast convoy in World War II would take 15 days to reach Britain from Halifax. At that speed, it would take 20 days to reach the Suez Canal from Britain.
After that, they have to reach India or China, which lie at distances of 2.5 to over 4 times greater than the trans-Atlantic crossing from Britain.
The food would need to be brought to port to be able to ship it.
After they return to the Mediterranean from India or China, it would be 20 more days in a convoy back to Britain.
To give an idea of the sheer scale involved, the British would need the cargo capacity of 115,000 C-130 cargo planes making one round-trip flight per day each to bring in enough grain to offset wheat from North America alone.
And by the way, Indian rice production in 1917 was 1167 million bushels (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=KGsgAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA661&lpg=PA661&dq=indian+rice+production+1917&source=bl&ots=OsnFeCbp_n&sig=MagXV2OvGl-9LaxtR85c6LpnZd4&hl=en&ei=5vDXTt2ZGazCsQKAs-SKDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=indian%20rice%20production%201917&f=false), while wheat was 318 million (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=7roQAQAAMAAJ&pg=RA11-PA50&lpg=RA11-PA50&dq=indian+grain+production+1917&source=bl&ots=egBhR1e3eH&sig=MD9TQcOs5T2ZlxmCab4tELzziRw&hl=en&ei=ifDXTsP-JKKGsAKxmfHRDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=9&ved=0CEcQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q&f=false). Given total US grain exports (wheat, barley, oats, corn, wheat, rye) to Britain are 164.5 million, it's actually 12%, not 2%. Not to mention Canadian imports cut off if the US severs the Canadian railroad stretching 2000 miles from the Prairie Provinces hugging the US border. If you add 65 million bushels of Canadian grain exports, it's 16%. If you add only the US non-grain exports that were listed (there are much more), you're at 25% against Indian grain.

Against the loss of US food alone, you're off by a factor of more than 10.

Virtually none of it would get to Britain within 4 weeks, and the overwhelming majority months away given the previously addressed logistical problems.

zraver
02 Dec 11,, 03:36
The food argument is overblown.

lets look at some facts.

Grains 1oz= 87.5-100 calories generally

1917 UK caloric consumption per day was 3320
Plenty and want: a social history of ... - John Burnett - Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=TlIFy8jEppYC&pg=PA250&lpg=PA250&dq=UK+1917+calories+per+day&source=bl&ots=rbLxUYrODk&sig=gwDWZRI6Zd9alKXvi787IqS_PRw&hl=en&ei=rB3YTqukBe7EsQLb6sDpDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CCQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false)

In India caloric intake was 1780 in 1906 rising to 1970 in 1918, almost all grain.
Studies in Indian agricultural economics - Jyotiprasad Bhattacharjee - Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=zRnArhf6co4C&pg=PA197&lpg=PA197&dq=India+1906+calories+per+day&source=bl&ots=bsN3glZBH6&sig=AtxW2MbGrE2N5IFJICOjYccucbE&hl=en&ei=sB7YTtCHFIqKsgL74ZX3DQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=India%201906%20calories%20per%20day&f=false)

Post WWII, Germans in the American zone from April 45 to Feb 47 on a 1000-1550 calorie per day diet showed a loss of 5lbs weight per age group in children, and 19lbs in working aged males with elderly mortality climbing 40% above normal and infant mortality at 65% in some areas. A horrible disaster- yes, famine no, but very very close. During the same period in the UK daily caloric intake was down to 2900.
Truman Library: Report, "German Agricultural and Food Requirements",*February 26, 1947. Official File, Truman Papers. (http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/index.php?pagenumber=11&documentdate=1947-02-26&documentid=5166)

Daily minimums considered necessary to sustain work- base male 5'6' tall, 150lbs 30years old is 2241 calories per day. For a woman 5'0" tall. 120lbs, 30 years old the minimum calories is 2031 per day. That is a rough average of 2136 calories per day

Calories Intake Calculator - Recommended Daily calorie intake for Adult males, females & Children & Pregnant Women - HealthyCalculators.com (http://www.healthycalculators.com/calories-intake-requirement.php)

So if we assume 6 weeks grain is analogous for 6 weeks of all food stocks at 3320 calories per day...

cutting rations to 1650 calories per day equals 12 weeks on hand, no famine, little loss of work for some time. Cutting rations to 2200 calories equals no famine and 1100 calories per day saved or +2 weeks to the 6 week base and no loss of work.

Even on the starvation diet of 1000 calories a day, it took German's 9 months to reach Famine's doorstep and the semi starvation diet of 1200-1550 calories per day held the door closed (barely) for another year.

Reducing Indian grain intake by 1/2 ounce per capita per day (100 calories) x 290,000,000 people equals 145,000,000oz of grain a day or over a little bit over 13,500 tons a month with no famine risk in India (if food distribution doesn't blow in like it did in Bengal in 1943.)

13,500 tons a month almsot completely replaces losses from the US and given British over feeding is more than enough to sustain the United Kingdom indefinitely.

Oil,

With the US Navy destroyed or bottled up countries like Mexico can resume their historic oil trade with the UK. In 1917 that is about 40 million barrels that get exported. British India (Burma Oil) is about 10 million, Iran about 5 million, Netherlands about 15 million, Iraq about 3 million. So roughly 78 million barrels available with other sources probably pushing it to 80 million barrels to the non-central powers and neutrals after a royal Navy enforced blockade of the US. Thats a loss of about 2/3rds of the oil supply- very painful but perhaps not ruinous.

Royal Navy and oil,
1.The Grand fleet starts with fuel tanks per your own claims that it takes 5 days to coal a dreadnought and Jellico leaving Scapa Flow within 96 hours for Jutland.
2. You have two diametrically opposed claims 2.9 months of oil on hand vs 25 days oil on hand. I have confirmed 2.9 months so lets use this number. However that 2.9 months is for May 1917. In February 1917 before the scourge of the U-boat the UK had 5.1 months consumption on hand (151 days using 30 day months +3 ). The admiralty estimated that if the u boat sink rate continued that the UK would be down to 1.25 months by Christmas. So in April UK oil supplies are probably at least 91 days or 3.25 months (13 weeks)on April 7th. Plus some oil will get through between now and then.

http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/690.pdf

US Ports (after defeat or neutralization of forts in some cases)

That can be directly shelled by a dreadnought: Boston, Nantuckkett, Plymouth MA, Charelston SC, Portland Maine, Hartford Ct, NYC (part)
That can be shelled by cruisers: NYC (all), Savannah and much of the coast of Long Island north and south.

US Economy

Savings rate
private debt- $75 billion
privately held war bonds- $25 billion
Total privately held debt- $100 billion
factory jobs added 1914-17 4 million
savings institutions 9919
Asset to liability ratio for the banking system 1:5
depositors 14.93 million (1 of 3 workers)
Total deposits and assets all institutions 10,000,000 (more than the amount of all printed money in circulation at the time)

other factors- excess food grown to feed the UK and France

why depression?

1. At the very least the 4 million factory workers are out of a job.

2. the US is facing a 3 billion+ economic hit (2% of GDP) plus the loss of 20+ billion in loans made to the allies.

3. what ever part of the 2.9 billion in export trade (1913 non-war exports) trde that is left is also gone.

4. Black Thursday in 1929 was only a 1.25% hit to GDP.

5. Most private savings are tied up in bonds that cannot be redeemed, the newly unemployed have no means to cope.

6. The US is already producing specie as fast as it can and any increase in specie production will devalue gold.

7. Until 1935 commerical banks could print bank notes backed by gold using fractional reserve accounting. Roughly speaking $10,000 in gold per $1,000,000 in obligations, often less rarely more. A run on these commercial banks will collapse them as it did during the Great Depression.

8. Total Us losses are much higher when companies like Du Pont, US Steel, Standard Oil... etc announce lower earnings and lay offs and investors sell on the stock market. In real life market value went from 840 to 804 when Congress declared war and no one lost jobs. In March 1917 the NYSE is worth 18.4 billion. United States investor - Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=JzpOAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA509&lpg=PA509&dq=stock+market+value+april,+1917&source=bl&ots=EDtLSQfNul&sig=mVgZYI-WEEZguk9xnuyjMxd9b6A&hl=en&ei=JDbYTsTGBaL5sQKryaSBDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=stock%20market%20value%20april%2C%201917&f=false)
Economic world - Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=fGogAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA520&lpg=PA520&dq=NYSE+value+april+6+1917&source=bl&ots=9l4GCR9oUv&sig=IcpZ3Yozsi70kuCpClxfqKP-wvs&hl=en&ei=wjbYTrG4FNKGsAK_4KTMDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CD4Q6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false)
9. Investors who don't like stocks are likely to be in the commodities market which now knows it massively over produced. Or making loans with interest to persons and firms now unemployed and without orders...

1979
02 Dec 11,, 08:02
You can't make it proportional, making that 1 day a week without food being 1 day in 10 weeks. Especially 95 years ago.

It would not be fully proportional but the point was that the british had plenty of colonies left to squeeze, in order to maintain a steady suply of the home islands.

zraver
02 Dec 11,, 09:33
It would not be fully proportional but the point was that the british had plenty of colonies left to squeeze, in order to maintain a steady suply of the home islands.

Half ounce per capita per day in India....

1979
02 Dec 11,, 10:40
Half ounce per capita per day in India....

Since the argument seams to have shifted to logistical concerns , how many uk merchant vessels were actually oil powered in 1917 ?

1979
02 Dec 11,, 11:05
To give an idea of the sheer scale involved, the British would need the cargo capacity of 115,000 C-130 cargo planes making one round-trip flight per day each to bring in enough grain to offset wheat from North America alone.[/list]
.
according to my math teacher
115,000 c-130 times 33,000 kg divided by 43 millions =88 kg :rolleyes:

Doktor
02 Dec 11,, 11:26
according to my math teacher
115,000 c-130 times 33,000 kg divided by 43 millions =88 kg :rolleyes:

Well... they were seriously hungry :biggrin:

1979
02 Dec 11,, 11:30
tell you something, even during Dessert Shield 80 % of the supply came by sea.
it is slow and it is old fashioned but works.

Doktor
02 Dec 11,, 11:48
I have no problem with ships.

I had problem with Z's idea to block US east coast while still able to protect merchant ships, fight in Europe and eventually force US capitulation in 3 months period.

And I still think that loading a ships with food that was planned for the colonies will have effects for the local population there.

1979
02 Dec 11,, 12:19
It will definitely have a impact on the local population but how big or how small in the end depends on how efficient is the British administration in redistributing the burden of the war across it.
wrt to sending the British war fleet west, i'm just a observer to that discussion but i think that at a minimum ,they would commit to the defense of Canada.

tgbyhn
02 Dec 11,, 18:48
according to my math teacher
115,000 c-130 times 33,000 kg divided by 43 millions =88 kg :rolleyes:
Your math is right. I forgot to divide by 365.

tgbyhn
03 Dec 11,, 02:03
Food Situation


The food argument is overblown.
No, it's not. Britain was historically on the brink of starvation with US imports - the loss of US imports is going to bring them to it.


1917 UK caloric consumption per day was 3320
Daily minimums considered necessary to sustain work- base male 5'6' tall, 150lbs 30years old is 2241 calories per day. For a woman 5'0" tall. 120lbs, 30 years old the minimum calories is 2031 per day. That is a rough average of 2136 calories per day
So if we assume 6 weeks grain is analogous for 6 weeks of all food stocks at 3320 calories per day...
1) As detailed in a post below, consumption after the US entry into the war would be less than 1775 calories per day, so reductions must be made from that, not 3320 calories per day.
2) I don't see the point talking about modern minimums when we're talking about an age when most men are laborers, women are replacing many men in factories, with many laborers engaged in heavy physical labor 10-16 hours a day, 6 days a week, children work, and women engage in home labors much more strenuous than in modern times.
3) Caloric needs by men in the military are great.


So if we assume 6 weeks grain is analogous for 6 weeks of all food stocks at 3320 calories per day...
I'm not going to assume, because I have a fairly accurate idea. British stocks are at 0.92lbs per day per person, about 1509 calories per day.

Furthermore, with a net loss of 4311 calories a week from non-wheat US exports increases the reliance on the wheat supply that wheat supply is down is 10.5 days to 31.5 days.


13,500 tons a month almsot completely replaces losses from the US and given British over feeding is more than enough to sustain the United Kingdom indefinitely.
13,500 x 2000lbs x 1640 calories divided by 43 million people = 1030 calories per person per month, or about 34 calories per day. I think you made an error in your calculation.

US exports of wheat to Britain were 252,500 tons per month alone.

Furthermore, the additional 4311 calories per week (among non-wheat imports from the US listed), requires the equivalent of another 11.4 pounds of wheat per month per person, or another 245,000 tons. Wheat losses from Canada would require the import of an additional 20,000 tons per month.

In addition:
Cheese: 51 million pounds (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=INJIAAAAYAAJ&pg=PT167&dq=britain+egg+imports+1917&hl=en&ei=ayTaTqqpLcXm0QHP9tTQDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=9&ved=0CFUQ6AEwCDgy#v=onepage&q&f=false), 41 calories per week per person

If the average civilian consumption in 1917 is 3320 calories per day, based on losses in US/Canadian wheat and listed US non-wheat exports alone, rationing to extend the food supply must be made from a base of 1850 calories per day.

This doesn't include imports from the US of fresh fruit, fresh and canned vegetables, poultry, eggs, margarine, potatoes, confectionery, non-salmon fish, barley, spirits, beer/ale, livestock for slaughter, and other foods. If those foods supplied just 500 calories per week per person, rationing to extend existing food stocks must be made from a base of 1775 calories per day.

So, Britain is at less than 1775 calories per day, with food imports from India at least two months away. The chicken strategy would add 34 calories per day, and all figures assume a 100% consumption of remaining wheat supply by people.

Import Logistics from India

Given that a fast convoy in WWII took 15 days from Halifax to Britain, the equivalent for Britain to the Suez is 20 days, and an 11 knot freighter would take 11 days to get from the Suez to Mumbai, then make the return journey for a total of 62 days if there are no problems. Most of the tonnage need is going to have to come from shipping of the disused North Atlantic merchant fleet. There will need to be greatly increased fuel supplies along the route from Britain to India to fuel the drastic expansion in shipping.

Meanwhile every enemy is going to know your Achilles heel, and there's going to be a surge in Allied merchant shipping in the Mediterranean with less naval presence - more targets, less protection. You're withdrawing eight British cruisers from the Mediterranean to go to the US and who knows how many of the 78 destroyers. The four French Courbet-class dreadnoughts you plan to move to the North Sea are tied up at Corfu with their crews manning anti-submarine ships, and the other three are going back and forth between the Adriatic and Greece being used to intimidate the pro-German Greek government prior to the pro-allied Venezilist coup.

Sending the dreadnoughts, battlecruisers, and 78 destroyers to US waters leaves the Germans with a clear qualitative and quantitative superiority of what remains of the RN in British waters (read below).

Oil Issue


With the US Navy destroyed or bottled up countries like Mexico can resume their historic oil trade with the UK. In 1917 that is about 40 million barrels that get exported. British India (Burma Oil) is about 10 million, Iran about 5 million, Netherlands about 15 million, Iraq about 3 million.
You're definitely not getting any tankers to Mexico given US presence in the Caribbean. If the US thinks you might even get one ounce to even Jamaica, Marines can land in Veracruz in two days and seize the port.

And you're still going to have to figure out your whole oil problem before you can start even thinking of "destroying the US Navy".

Iran, Burma, Iraq -- Britain is already consuming that output and the situation spring 1917 was worsening at a time when Britain received 80% of its oil from the US. This output that Britain was historically consuming can't make things better.

Put it this way. British oil supplies are a six-pack of beer. America takes five, Britain drink its last one, and you're thinking right now the one Britain just finished off is still full.

The Netherlands isn't producing oil - its East Indies are. Again, it's impossible to get that oil back in time, and it was already consumed historically.

It seems every time you see a figure for resources, you think that it isn't being consumed already, that Britain can have that resource home in the time it takes to turn on a faucet, that there isn't going to be increased competition for scarcer resources, and that these resources aren't going to be ten days late and a dollar short.


1.The Grand fleet starts with fuel tanks per your own claims that it takes 5 days to coal a dreadnought and Jellico leaving Scapa Flow within 96 hours for Jutland.
I'm really confused. I'm not really sure what the connection is between the first figure, and Jellico steaming 180nm to reach the site of the battle.


2. You have two diametrically opposed claims 2.9 months of oil on hand vs 25 days oil on hand. I have confirmed 2.9 months so lets use this number. However that 2.9 months is for May 1917. In February 1917 before the scourge of the U-boat the UK had 5.1 months consumption on hand (151 days using 30 day months +3 ). The admiralty estimated that if the u boat sink rate continued that the UK would be down to 1.25 months by Christmas. So in April UK oil supplies are probably at least 91 days or 3.25 months (13 weeks)on April 7th. Plus some oil will get through between now and then.
I've done further research and there aren't any sources that corroborate it. I've skimmed over a dozen or so authoritative sources that contradict it.

January 1917: "Oil reserves in Great Britain have run so low, the conference disclosed, that many British warships have been forced to remain inactive" (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=uDIfAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA2614&dq=britain+oil+supplies+1917&hl=en&ei=QmDYTrrwIMjvgge10-D9Dg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6&ved=0CEUQ6AEwBTg8#v=onepage&q&f=false).
February 1917: 8 weeks (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=LUSXbXK-Ue8C&pg=PT418&lpg=PT418&dq=british+fuel+oil+supply+tons+1917+royal+navy&source=bl&ots=fCL8KKszWj&sig=B_HYWa-HomE19vWvX7mcUrwr-fE&hl=en&ei=jlfYTtKiLsK-2gXX_uTmDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CDkQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=british%20fuel%20oil%20supply%20tons%201917%20ro yal%20navy&f=false), the Grand Fleet to cruise at no more than 2/3 normal speed except in emergencies (6.7 knots).
May 1918: 25 days (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=ZnkYAQAAIAAJ&pg=PA77&lpg=PA77&dq=british+oil+stocks+1917+world+war+I&source=bl&ots=2QsQ1I9K8U&sig=_bET7HkyLSRm3D5k-a7jwULSTIs&hl=en&ei=8YTXTs-GHemKsAKB15yCDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=british%20oil%20stocks%201917%20world%20war%20I&f=false), the Royal Navy effectively unable to carry out exercises.
"...for some considerable time after the US entered World War I, the most modern U.S. battleships, all of which were oil-burners, could not be assigned to British waters." (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=Y41Ha_3HsrYC&pg=PA105&dq=britain+oil+supplies+1917&hl=en&ei=D1_YTrO_A8WMgwfY2_nxDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=9&ved=0CFgQ6AEwCDgo#v=onepage&q=britain%20oil%20supplies%201917&f=false)
US SecNavy Daniels, testifying June 1917 on the situation in spring 1917: "But this oil shortness made it impossible that the American North Atlantic Fleet should move into European waters, at least at that time. Since most oil supplies were brought from America we could not have fueled our superdreadnoughts in Europe in the spring and summer of 1917." - impossible to fuel five ships for a total of 10,000 tons across the Atlantic.. (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=LXxLAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA65&dq=british+oil+reserves+april+1917+war&hl=en&ei=p2PYTq_DFoTwggeN6dSZDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CDIQ6AEwADgU#v=onepage&q&f=false)
US Sec Navy Daniels, testifying June 1917 on situation in spring 1917: "It was lucky for us that the Germans knew nothing about the scarcity of this indispensable fuel. Had they been aware of it they would have taken pains to see that the Grand Navy was constantly steaming at sea, and in this way they might have so exhausted its oil supplies as to possibly threaten the actual command of the surface." (^)
In July 1917 Admiral Sims wrote a letter stating he wanted to send four US coal-burning battleships to Britain because, given the circumstances the British planned to take five King Edward class pre-dreadnoughts out of commission due to the oil supply problem. (^)
All of this and many pages more I've skimmed over that directly contradict the 5.1 and 2.9 month figures, with the only figure he actually cited was the supply for December 1917. I messed up on that one.

So the Grand Fleet is down to 6.7 knots and unable to effectively even carry out exercises, ships are forced to remain inactive, there isn't even enough fuel for 5 American dreadnoughts (which carry the oil of 10 British coal/oil burners) to operate across the Atlantic historically, Admiral Sims wants to send 4 American coal-burning dreadnoughts to replace the ones the King Edwards the British are planning to take out of commission, the Germans just keeping the RN steaming a bit would have given them command of the seas in spring 1917 according to SecDef Daniels, and there's a 25-day supply in May.

Naval Situation in the North Sea

Like it or not - the Germans will be able to make trouble in the North Sea. A lot of it. The fleet you propose to leave behind to "bottle up" the Germans, isn't sufficient for the task.

"Mini-Grand Fleet" vs High Seas Fleet:
1 RN dreadnought vs. 19KM dreadnoughts
18 RN pre-dreadnoughts vs. 0 KM dreadnoughts
0 RN battlecruisers vs. 5 KM battlecruisers
48 RN cruisers vs. 33 KM cruisers
190 RN destroyers vs. 225 KM destroyers
116 RN submarines vs. 181 U-Boats
I can't confirm all the remaining 190 destroyers in the RN are around Britain, or the 116 RN submarines.

The KM has a clear quantitative and qualitative edge over the Royal Navy. The North Sea is basically surrendered to the Germans. The raison d'etre of the Grand Fleet being stationed at Scapa Flow was to bottle up the KM. The North Sea Mine Barrage doesn't exist yet, and what's left behind of the fleet couldn't bottle up their own emotions.

As far as your atomic bomb theory goes, the total explosive damage caused by 28,000 13.5" shells is roughly the equivalent the damage of bomb loads carried by 70 WWII B-29 bombers. To get new shells is a 23 day round trip non-stop with no difficulties or delay between Boston and Queenstown. Six dreadnoughts have a barrel life of 80 shells, after which the guns will have to be replaced (capacity is 80 shells per gun).

US Economy


2. the US is facing a 3 billion+ economic hit (2% of GDP) plus the loss of 20+ billion in loans made to the allies.
The US has made only $2.263 billion in loans to the Allies before the war started (page 88) (http://books.google.com/books?id=fNFh1i97ZGAC&pg=PA86&lpg=PA86&dq=united+states+foreign+investment+britain+1917&source=bl&ots=yGUHOr4_yV&sig=-obOq24WY196kripu69_8Somf4Y&hl=en&ei=Bj7ZTtnGDo7hsQK-krnoDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false). Treasury loans were not made to the Allies until after the US entered the war, historically. Meanwhile, British foreign investment in the US totaled £688 million (page 427) (http://books.google.com/books?id=edFAAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA421&lpg=PA421&dq=united+states+private+loans+great+britain+1917&source=bl&ots=9w0EfKHqvM&sig=LNdziT2rAEZzbM_i6qjJXtBg1GM&hl=en&ei=vTvZTriJPMaJsgLEvazpDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CD4Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=united%20states%20private%20loans%20great%20brit ain%201917&f=false), a nice seizure of $3.277 billion to pay back those loans with an extra $1 billion to play around with.

US investments in Europe totaled only $692 million (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=fNFh1i97ZGAC&pg=PA86&lpg=PA86&dq=united+states+foreign+investment+britain+1917&source=bl&ots=yGUHOr4_yV&sig=-obOq24WY196kripu69_8Somf4Y&hl=en&ei=Bj7ZTtnGDo7hsQK-krnoDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false), against European investments of $6750 billion in the US, that will probably yield a couple billion dollars more in assets.


1. At the very least the 4 million factory workers are out of a job.
The US enlisted 4 million men in all branches of the US military during World War I, historically (as many males of all ages there are in Canada). There's also going to be increased war production, with increased amounts of resources with which to manufacture arms.

US GDP grew 27% from 1917 to 1918, before falling to 3.3% growth from 1918 to 1919. There's alot of wiggle room, and the economy isn't going to belly up on a $3.6 million in imports on a historical increase of $16 billion, and no losses from loans to the Allies.

I don't see a depression. On a macro level a transition to a wartime economy and military enlistments against a combined with the loss of exports should provide some level of balance. I think farmers are going to be in some trouble, and there are going to need to be price controls or other assistance, but I think the US economy should do just fine.



This is what I'm getting from what you've been telling me.
the strategy you've been talking about is the only thing Britain would do.
that it's the only strategy, response, or measure Lloyd George, Jellicoe, the war cabinet, and Parliament, or anybody else with a say on the matter and any political influence would settle on, and they'd do it with no delay.
that there is absolutely no other strategy, response, or measure that they could possibly think of, or would be worth even considering.
that it could absolutely be successfully carried out, that it is flawless, and there is no possible way that Britain couldn't fail in any way, whether it comes to food, oil, or any other severe difficulty she would be facing.
that the US is completely defenseless, with Germany and the US incapable of any competent measure to counteract anything that Britain would do, or cause harm to her in anyway.
that there is no hardship that Britain couldn't overcome despite being nearly at the end of their rope in many ways at this time even with US help historically.
that the United States would absolutely surrender the when shells started falling on a city.
Further, general problems that I see for Britain:
The United States did not enter into war with Austria-Hungary until December 7, 1917, and was never at war with the Ottoman Empire or Bulgaria. On the flip side, it is very well possible that any one of the several Allies do not go to war with the US.
The US entry into the war was followed by a mass bandwagoning effect among other nations in the Americas. Cuba, Brazil, Panama, Bolivia severed ties or went to war with Germany in the immediate aftermath of the US declaration of war, with six other American nations doing the same before the war's end. There's a likelihood that Britain finds itself with less friends and a few new enemies, which would have further implications.
There are likely to be a few neutrals in Europe unhappy with being cut off from US trade by Britain - especially those that profited from serving as transshipment points of American goods to Germany. They could decide to punish Britain economically.
US extension of credit to the Allies after April 1917 was massive in scale, dwarfing previous private credit. On the flip side, this credit being extended to Germany would allow it to out-compete the Allies for important sources of fish, butter, margarine, milk, cheese, meat, and other food imports from nearby neutral nations such as the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, and Sweden, thus further aggravating the British food supply problem.
Besides previously stated critical losses in food and oil imports - huge losses imports of raw materials, machinery, industrial manufactures, etc. from the US are going to have a major negative impact on their war industry.
The United States has fairly anti-colonial mindset at this time - it has absolutely nothing to lose and everything to gain by promising support to British colonial populations in independence struggles. Even if the US is not immediately available to provide support, the mere promise of such support by the most populous and wealthy Western great power in the world would have a huge impact on colonies such as India.

snapper
03 Dec 11,, 05:26
Just wow.

1979
03 Dec 11,, 09:21
No, it's not. Britain was historically on the brink of starvation with US imports - the loss of US imports is going to bring them to it.

according to the book you used as a reference on British consumption they were much better of than the French or Germans .


13,500 x 2000lbs x 1640 calories divided by 43 million people = 1030 calories per person per month, or about 34 calories per day. I think you made an error in your calculation.

US exports of wheat to Britain were 252,500 tons per month alone.

yes he did but it is not helping your case.
1/2 ounce times 290 millions times 30 days = rougly 124.000 tons /month

if it's a full ounce, it replaces US wheat exports and he did not really squeezed the rest of the colonies.
edit to add:
how does a ounce of rice look like ? :tongue:

tgbyhn
03 Dec 11,, 15:08
according to the book you used as a reference on British consumption they were much better of than the French or Germans .


yes he did but it is not helping your case.
1/2 ounce times 290 millions times 30 days = rougly 124.000 tons /month

if it's a full ounce, it replaces US wheat exports and he did not really squeezed the rest of the colonies.
edit to add:
how does a ounce of rice look like ? :tongue:
Between US wheat and non-wheat exports listed (there are many more), the Indians would have to give up over a 5/8 days worth of calories a week, and it wouldn't even get to Britain for at least two months.


according to the book you used as a reference on British consumption they were much better of than the French or Germans .
After caloric losses from US wheat and listed non-wheat imports, reductions would have to be made from a basis of less than 1800 calories per day, not 3320.

1979
03 Dec 11,, 16:33
Between US wheat and non-wheat exports listed (there are many more), the Indians would have to give up over a 5/8 days worth of calories a week, and it wouldn't even get to Britain for at least two months.


Tgbyhn it is tiring to go over simple math again and again to prove something
common sense should tell you.
290 millions times 1970 calories= 571 300 000 000 calories daily
43 millions times 3320 calories = 142 760 000 000 calories daily

struck out those 142 760 000 000 calories needed for the British
and the average Indian diet is down at 1477 calories daily.

As loss of 1/4 not 5/8 and they replace ALL food needed by the British
not just the fraction of it, imported from abroad.
on top of that i did not touched the rest of the colonies (which mind you were extensive ) at all .

Your 2 months time frame is also wrong because it assumes there was was no
ongoing trade between England and India ,when in fact it was.

1979
03 Dec 11,, 16:39
After caloric losses from US wheat and listed non-wheat imports, reductions would have to be made from a basis of less than 1800 calories per day, not 3320.

You are basically claiming 45% of British food came from US.
care to defend that argument ?

tgbyhn
03 Dec 11,, 17:32
Your 2 months time frame is also wrong because it assumes there was was no
ongoing trade between England and India ,when in fact it was.
You're operating from a FedEx overnight express mindset.

290,000 tons of British shipping cleared all ports in India in 1917 per month (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=JFxMAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA339&lpg=PA339&dq=british+india+port+clearances+1917&source=bl&ots=wMO5IeQbmM&sig=tlaibVutSIB5poiR4zI97me5DFs&hl=en&ei=F0baTsP8Is6r2AWC8_2lDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CCMQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=british%20india%20port%20clearances%201917&f=false), which is about 9,700 tons of shipping per day, 100% of which was already being used historically.

So there's about 280,000 tons of shipping anywhere up to a month out from arriving in India, a good part of which is already being used for food exports to Britain, and all of which was already being used for something else historically. And 520,000 tons of grain need to be moved.

Does this make sense to you at all? A non Fed-Ex express overnight world?


As loss of 1/4 not 5/8 and they replace ALL food needed by the British
I said 5/8lb of grain per capita from India per week, not 5/8 of all grain.

tgbyhn
03 Dec 11,, 17:56
You are basically claiming 45% of British food came from US.
care to defend that argument ?
I don't need to defend my figures. I already stated and cited them pages back (http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/world-wars/61727-what-if-us-entered-wwi-side-central-powers-13.html#post847992) with authoritative sources.

British reliance on US:
42% of total wheat consumption
59% of wheat flour imports
53% of total sugar consumption (from US and its client state Cuba, Britain produced no sugar)
54% of total condensed milk consumption
52% of bacon imports
94% of ham imports
14% of beef imports
16% of total barley consumption
43% of total corn consumption (all corn was consumed by people in Britain in 1917)
Most of these figures are available here (http://books.google.com/books?id=GIcUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=united+kingdom+molasses+imports+1917&source=bl&ots=ANDitdPOlE&sig=4FQdXBCZ2hiQrgsbk47k7rpHrDk&hl=en&ei=RhXXTrWdO8jf0QGD97nKDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=united%20kingdom%20molasses%20imports%201917&f=false).

1979
03 Dec 11,, 19:07
I said 5/8lb of grain per capita from India per week, not 5/8 of all grain.

that is about 40 grams /capita/day and there is not a pound symbol in your original post .
fell free to edit it and claim that is what you meant all along.




290,000 tons of British shipping cleared all ports in India in 1917 per month

More than the tonnage of US wheat exports to the UK ? i'm sure you are correct.
it also means that in any given month 290.00 tons are en route and 290.000 tons
are making the return trip.

Just calling back ships en route to Us gives the British another 700.000 tons/month
capacity.
As for those "crucial" months until exports pick up steam, 20 days after you ceased all exports to uk
ships will continue to arrive loaded with goods because ;
a) they already left american waters.
b)we are not operating from a FedEx overnight express mindset.

1979
03 Dec 11,, 19:20
I don't need to defend my figures. I already stated and cited them pages back (http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/world-wars/61727-what-if-us-entered-wwi-side-central-powers-13.html#post847992) with authoritative sources.

British reliance on US:
42% of total wheat consumption
59% of wheat flour imports
53% of total sugar consumption (from US and its client state Cuba, Britain produced no sugar)
54% of total condensed milk consumption
52% of bacon imports
94% of ham imports
14% of beef imports
16% of total barley consumption
43% of total corn consumption (all corn was consumed by people in Britain in 1917)
Most of these figures are available here (http://books.google.com/books?id=GIcUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=united+kingdom+molasses+imports+1917&source=bl&ots=ANDitdPOlE&sig=4FQdXBCZ2hiQrgsbk47k7rpHrDk&hl=en&ei=RhXXTrWdO8jf0QGD97nKDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=united%20kingdom%20molasses%20imports%201917&f=false).

your authoritative sources did not claim those percentages ,
you did.
may i remind you that imports do no equal consumption ?

tgbyhn
03 Dec 11,, 21:13
that is about 40 grams /capita/day and there is not a pound symbol in your original post .
fell free to edit it and claim that is what you meant all along.
1167 million bushels of rice per year at 45lbs per bushel is 2.9 million tons consumption per month.
318 millions bushels of wheat per year at 60lbs per bushel is 800,000 tons consumption per month.

Taking 520,000 tons of wheat per month is 13% of that, and comes out to 0.66lbs per Indian per capita per week (5/8 = 0.625), so actually, 2/3 pound per capita each week.


More than the tonnage of US wheat exports to the UK ? i'm sure you are correct.
The US is exporting 252,000 tons of wheat per month. Britain would also need an additional 245,000 tons of wheat per month to make up for listed non-wheat losses, and 20,000 for lost Canadian wheat. The figure of required grain is at minimum 520,000 tons per month, or even as much as 600,000 tons with foods from the US not outright listed (which were very substantial).

Just calling back ships en route to Us gives the British another 700.000 tons/month
capacity. .
Which is over 30 days from reaching India, and 30 days from returning.


As for those "crucial" months until exports pick up steam, 20 days after you ceased all exports to uk
ships will continue to arrive loaded with goods because ;
a) they already left american waters.
b)we are not operating from a FedEx overnight express mindset.
This isn't a 747 Fed-Ex world, but it is a Marconi wireless world for most Atlantic merchant ships in 1917. Radio telegraph: ATTN ALL SHIPS USMM. WAR WITH ENGLAND. RETURN HOME.

25% of British shipping tonnage was sunk in April 1917 (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=P3kaKzD37SsC&pg=PA129&lpg=PA129&dq=tons+shipping+sunk+april+1917+north+atlantic&source=bl&ots=wnQRKJft6L&sig=GpkWABsUzHjOK7pcCGyEZ9VGjJY&hl=en&ei=14faTpj6LoHE2wW56L2FDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CDgQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=tons%20shipping%20sunk%20april%201917%20north%20 atlantic&f=false), and with a bunch of American ships turning west that figure is going to go up.

Allied ships in US ports are going to be seized and those exports are lost. American ships in British ports are going to be empty.

Some of those exports will reach Britain. Between port seizures in US ports, American ships turning around, and Germans focusing only on remaining ships sailing east, I estimate less than half.


your authoritative sources did not claim those percentages ,
you did.
If I have two figures for a food item, American exports, British consumption I can calculate the portion of consumption that comes from US imports by division. For example, this source (http://books.google.com/books?id=GIcUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=united+kingdom+molasses+imports+1917&source=bl&ots=ANDitdPOlE&sig=4FQdXBCZ2hiQrgsbk47k7rpHrDk&hl=en&ei=RhXXTrWdO8jf0QGD97nKDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=united%20kingdom%20molasses%20imports%201917&f=false) lists 59.3% of 170,678,000 bushels of wheat imported in 1917 came from the US. 101 million bushels of American wheat divided by 237 million bushels (171 imports, 60 domestic production, both also listed) of British wheat consumption in a year is 43.7% of the total.

Some of the percentages I've cited are outright listed. If I have a figure for an American food commodity export to Britain, I can compute caloric values.

Food is something that it eaten. Put it in your mouth, chew it up, swallow it. Eventually it comes out as poop.

1979
03 Dec 11,, 22:34
1167 million bushels of rice per year at 45lbs per bushel is 2.9 million tons consumption per month.
318 millions bushels of wheat per year at 60lbs per bushel is 800,000 tons consumption per month.

Taking 520,000 tons of wheat per month is 13% of that, and comes out to 0.66lbs per Indian per capita per week (5/8 = 0.625), so actually, 2/3 pound per capita each week.


your arguing with your own figures now ? :biggrin:

I just translated this : I said 5/8lb of grain per capita from India per week, not 5/8 of all grain.
in grams /capita/ day for you

the only person your managing to confuse is yourself .

1979
03 Dec 11,, 22:41
The US is exporting 252,000 tons of wheat per month. Britain would also need an additional 245,000 tons of wheat per month to make up for listed non-wheat losses, and 20,000 for lost Canadian wheat. The figure of required grain is at minimum 520,000 tons per month, or even as much as 600,000 tons with foods from the US not outright listed (which were very substantial.

they have a total shipping capacity that exceeds that by a large margin,
only question is how much time to reroute them.

tgbyhn
03 Dec 11,, 22:50
your arguing with your own figures now ? :biggrin:

I just translated this : I said 5/8lb of grain per capita from India per week, not 5/8 of all grain.
in grams /capita/ day for you

the only person your managing to confuse is yourself .
The difference 0.625 and 0.66 is not that great. The midpoint is 0.6458.

If you're going to split hairs over minute rounding differences in the one time I've ever used fractions, I'll stop bothering to respond to you. That's like criticizing a post for a single spelling error.


they have a total shipping capacity that exceeds that by a large margin,
only question is how much time to reroute them.
Yes, they do have total shipping capacity that exceeds that margin. The question is travel time to India and back. Mind you, 62 days is to Mumbai convoyed in the Med, and 11kn the rest. There's Calcutta, Madras, etc. on the other side of India.

1979
03 Dec 11,, 22:54
Which is over 30 days from reaching India, and 30 days from returning.

yes but not mandatory .
you can reroute empty ships bound for North America to Africa.
and ships bound for Africa to India.




This isn't a 747 Fed-Ex world, but it is a Marconi wireless world for most Atlantic merchant ships in 1917. Radio telegraph: ATTN ALL SHIPS USMM. WAR WITH ENGLAND. RETURN HOME. .

you can do that and loaded British vessels would still sail home because they already left...loaded.

1979
03 Dec 11,, 23:04
The difference 0.625 and 0.66 is not that great. The midpoint is 0.6458.

If you're going to split hairs over minute rounding differences in the one time I've ever used fractions, I'll stop bothering to respond to you. That's like criticizing a post for a single spelling error.

you missed the pound symbol (lb) it changes the meaning of the whole sentence.
without everyone that reads it (bar yourself ) thinks you meant 5/8 of the whole grain.

hence my first reply.

tgbyhn
03 Dec 11,, 23:09
yes but not mandatory .
you can reroute empty ships bound for North America to Africa.
and ships bound for Africa to India.
The complexities inherent even in the modern age of satellite communications would make this extremely difficult to coordinate and execute, and even if flawlessly executed using what would be modern Japanese "just-in-time" practices would have a very negligible impact.

you can do that and loaded British vessels would still sail home because they already left...loaded.
Besides increased U-Boat sinkings (perhaps an increase of the historical 25% to 40% of British shipping), the loss of food exports to Britain from other nations who suddenly have to re-adjust due to the lack of American food imports would more than offset all of those imports.


you missed the pound symbol (lb) it changes the meaning of the whole sentence.
without everyone that reads it (bar yourself ) thinks you meant 5/8 of the whole grain.
A typo. It happens.

Doktor
03 Dec 11,, 23:32
I must say i have a "data overload error" at the moment.

Few thoughts:

The difference between 0,625 and 0,660 is just above 5%, which equals roughly 20 days/year.

Even if Brits don't starve, there will be shortages, at least at the start of US involvement.

Brits were already importing food from their colonies, however, I am sure there was something that could've been done noone to starve in the next 6 months until the food production is reorganized in the colonies.

Vessels bringing goods to UK were mainly off game for German subs and might not need heavy engagement from RN to protect them. Switch the tables and UK vessels shipping goods would need additional engagement in terms of protection. Something that would require more oil, coal, vessels and crew. Something Britain would lack even at current consumption.

Assuming that all the loaded ships heading for England at the moment US enters the wars will reach British shores is very optimistic, there should be heavy losses calculated. Since US Navy will surely sink vast numbers close to their shores.

Am still curious about Z's plan to siege US east coast. I fail to see it happening, at least that decisive as in his plans.

Canada was <8 million people and USA was >100 at the time, I have a problem seeing Canada being a problem for USA, especially with their conscripts and volunteers already engaged in Europe.
Is there any good reason Canadians not to declare neutrality the moment US enters the war?

zraver
03 Dec 11,, 23:58
Food Situation


No, it's not. Britain was historically on the brink of starvation with US imports - the loss of US imports is going to bring them to it.

No they are not, I already provided proof that it takes 9 months to reach famine at 1000 calories a day per Capita and 1550 calories per day can hold that famine off for another year. Losing US imports means long term malnutrition setting in with in a couple of months, not starvation, ad that is without any replacement.



1) As detailed in a post below, consumption after the US entry into the war would be less than 1775 calories per day, so reductions must be made from that, not 3320 calories per day.

No six weeks on hand is six weeks at 3320...


2) I don't see the point talking about modern minimums when we're talking about an age when most men are laborers, women are replacing many men in factories, with many laborers engaged in heavy physical labor 10-16 hours a day, 6 days a week, children work, and women engage in home labors much more strenuous than in modern times.

Because modern minimums to sustain work are actually higher than they were then. Certain trades do need more calories, but most don't. Germany had a pre-war consumption less than 3000 calories per day. During the winter of 1917-18 the German home front consumption was 1376, reduced to 1100 that spring. The spectre of famine reared its head, but by November had still not set in.

Britain's economic blockade of ... - Eric W. Osborne - Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?id=ghHC7Bf1hIYC&pg=PA161&lpg=PA161&dq=german+army+1917+calories+per+day&source=bl&ots=fgITSbxtyY&sig=iHp4WIIVHW0fB8mIQMJjoQG6u4A&hl=en&ei=w43aTu27MY_qtgfj9_XwAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCgQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=german%20army%201917%20calories%20per%20day&f=false)

How many examples of half rations slowing the threat of starvation by a year or more do you want?


3) Caloric needs by men in the military are great.

And... the bulk of the British population isn't in the trenches.


I'm not going to assume, because I have a fairly accurate idea. British stocks are at 0.92lbs per day per person, about 1509 calories per day.

Furthermore, with a net loss of 4311 calories a week from non-wheat US exports increases the reliance on the wheat supply that wheat supply is down is 10.5 days to 31.5 days.

You keep changing your numbers... et al.



13,500 x 2000lbs x 1640 calories divided by 43 million people = 1030 calories per person per month, or about 34 calories per day. I think you made an error in your calculation.

Yup, oops, left off a zero but that was for a half ounce out of an Indian diet of 21. ounces per day. Increase the take to 1 ounce per day.

93.75 calories per ounce (1500/16) x 290,000,000= 27,187,500,000 calories divided by 1500 to convert to pounds equals 18,125,000lbs. double checks 290,000,000 / 16= 18125000lbs 18125,000lbs/2000= 9062.5 tons a day x 30= 271,875 tons per month... food issue over blown


US exports of wheat to Britain were 252,500 tons per month alone.

see above et al.



If the average civilian consumption in 1917 is 3320 calories per day, based on losses in US/Canadian wheat and listed US non-wheat exports alone, rationing to extend the food supply must be made from a base of 1850 calories per day.

really how so, since half rations is based on daily minimum, not previous over feeding...


Import Logistics from India


Given that a fast convoy in WWII took 15 days from Halifax to Britain, the equivalent for Britain to the Suez is 20 days, and an 11 knot freighter would take 11 days to get from the Suez to Mumbai, then make the return journey for a total of 62 days if there are no problems. Most of the tonnage need is going to have to come from shipping of the disused North Atlantic merchant fleet. There will need to be greatly increased fuel supplies along the route from Britain to India to fuel the drastic expansion in shipping.

1. not increased fuel supplies, redirected. Most of the mercheis are coal anyway which is often locally provided.


Meanwhile every enemy is going to know your Achilles heel, and there's going to be a surge in Allied merchant shipping in the Mediterranean with less naval presence - more targets, less protection. You're withdrawing eight British cruisers from the Mediterranean to go to the US and who knows how many of the 78 destroyers. The four French Courbet-class dreadnoughts you plan to move to the North Sea are tied up at Corfu with their crews manning anti-submarine ships, and the other three are going back and forth between the Adriatic and Greece being used to intimidate the pro-German Greek government prior to the pro-allied Venezilist coup.

But the naval ports of the CP are already full up on submarines, so there isn't room for more.


Sending the dreadnoughts, battlecruisers, and 78 destroyers to US waters leaves the Germans with a clear qualitative and quantitative superiority of what remains of the RN in British waters (read below).

but enough of an edge...? In 1917 the sailors are already on half rations and have been for some time. So workout put will be low


Oil Issue


You're definitely not getting any tankers to Mexico given US presence in the Caribbean. If the US thinks you might even get one ounce to even Jamaica, Marines can land in Veracruz in two days and seize the port.

I was talking after the destruction of the US fleet, so how exactly is the US going to land in Vera Cruz with no navy?


And you're still going to have to figure out your whole oil problem before you can start even thinking of "destroying the US Navy".

The dreadnoughts are already fueled...


Iran, Burma, Iraq -- Britain is already consuming that output and the situation spring 1917 was worsening at a time when Britain received 80% of its oil from the US. This output that Britain was historically consuming can't make things better.

No, but that 20% only has 2 uses that can't be reduced- merchant shipping and ASW patrols. Everything else is subject to rationing. The Army and the RFC included. Switching to the defensive in 1917 will greatly reduce the fuel consumed by the army, and oil used in the production of shells and other war material.


Put it this way. British oil supplies are a six-pack of beer. America takes five, Britain drink its last one, and you're thinking right now the one Britain just finished off is still full.

Nope, more like a half rack (12), America took 10, but put 1 back (the oil past the half way point that is seized and hurried on to England), England just got to the party thirsty and only brought 3 (imports) to supplement the 2 they already had that America didn't take.


The Netherlands isn't producing oil - its East Indies are. Again, it's impossible to get that oil back in time, and it was already consumed historically.

ya becuase consumption can never be modified...


It seems every time you see a figure for resources, you think that it isn't being consumed already, that Britain can have that resource home in the time it takes to turn on a faucet, that there isn't going to be increased competition for scarcer resources, and that these resources aren't going to be ten days late and a dollar short.

No, I assume that every means of consumption has a percentage that can be diverted, and that many sources of supply are located a lot closer to need that you seem to realize. For example a ship with a load of coal headed for Y can be redirected back to England or continued on to stock X for the increased traffic that will be coming its way.



I'm really confused. I'm not really sure what the connection is between the first figure, and Jellico steaming 180nm to reach the site of the battle.

1. You claimed it took 5 days to fuel a dreadnought. 5days = 120 hours.
2. Jellico set sail for Jutland between 48-96 after learning of the German plan
3. the obvious inference is the dreadnoughts were kept fueled.



I've done further research and there aren't any sources that corroborate it. I've skimmed over a dozen or so authoritative sources that contradict it.

we will see


January 1917: "Oil reserves in Great Britain have run so low, the conference disclosed, that many British warships have been forced to remain inactive" (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=uDIfAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA2614&dq=britain+oil+supplies+1917&hl=en&ei=QmDYTrrwIMjvgge10-D9Dg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6&ved=0CEUQ6AEwBTg8#v=onepage&q&f=false).

not a number and forced by a physical lack of feul or an admiralty desire to husband reserves?


February 1917: 8 weeks (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=LUSXbXK-Ue8C&pg=PT418&lpg=PT418&dq=british+fuel+oil+supply+tons+1917+royal+navy&source=bl&ots=fCL8KKszWj&sig=B_HYWa-HomE19vWvX7mcUrwr-fE&hl=en&ei=jlfYTtKiLsK-2gXX_uTmDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CDkQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=british%20fuel%20oil%20supply%20tons%201917%20ro yal%20navy&f=false), the Grand Fleet to cruise at no more than 2/3 normal speed except in emergencies (6.7 knots).

I'll let you correct your mistake there... Plus if the refrence to April is the end of the month then 8 weeks in not out of line with 2.9 months at the beginningsince April is the worst month.


May 1918: 25 days (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=ZnkYAQAAIAAJ&pg=PA77&lpg=PA77&dq=british+oil+stocks+1917+world+war+I&source=bl&ots=2QsQ1I9K8U&sig=_bET7HkyLSRm3D5k-a7jwULSTIs&hl=en&ei=8YTXTs-GHemKsAKB15yCDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=british%20oil%20stocks%201917%20world%20war%20I&f=false), the Royal Navy effectively unable to carry out exercises.

Your source above claims combined services (military only) need 3.5 million tons per month. You claim earlier the RN needs 36000 tons a day or 1,008,000 tins a month. 8 weeks oil at the low point is over 10 million tons if we only count military users and not civilian supplies. The 25 day number is 2.91 million tons only counting military supplies.


"...for some considerable time after the US entered World War I, the most modern U.S. battleships, all of which were oil-burners, could not be assigned to British waters." (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=Y41Ha_3HsrYC&pg=PA105&dq=britain+oil+supplies+1917&hl=en&ei=D1_YTrO_A8WMgwfY2_nxDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=9&ved=0CFgQ6AEwCDgo#v=onepage&q=britain%20oil%20supplies%201917&f=false)

100% BS, were not does not automatically translate to could not.


US SecNavy Daniels, testifying June 1917 on the situation in spring 1917: "But this oil shortness made it impossible that the American North Atlantic Fleet should move into European waters, at least at that time. Since most oil supplies were brought from America we could not have fueled our superdreadnoughts in Europe in the spring and summer of 1917." - impossible to fuel five ships for a total of 10,000 tons across the Atlantic.. (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=LXxLAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA65&dq=british+oil+reserves+april+1917+war&hl=en&ei=p2PYTq_DFoTwggeN6dSZDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CDIQ6AEwADgU#v=onepage&q&f=false)

His claims do not match the record of imports


US Sec Navy Daniels, testifying June 1917 on situation in spring 1917: "It was lucky for us that the Germans knew nothing about the scarcity of this indispensable fuel. Had they been aware of it they would have taken pains to see that the Grand Navy was constantly steaming at sea, and in this way they might have so exhausted its oil supplies as to possibly threaten the actual command of the surface." (^)

so as long as the GF wasn't constantly at sea... constantly implying quite a a bit more than a sortie...


In July 1917 Admiral Sims wrote a letter stating he wanted to send four US coal-burning battleships to Britain because, given the circumstances the British planned to take five King Edward class pre-dreadnoughts out of commission due to the oil supply problem. (^)

preventive measures to husband reserves, not a real number


All of this and many pages more I've skimmed over that directly contradict the 5.1 and 2.9 month figures, with the only figure he actually cited was the supply for December 1917. I messed up on that one.

rebutted using your own sources.


So the Grand Fleet is down to 6.7 knots and unable to effectively even carry out exercises, ships are forced to remain inactive, there isn't even enough fuel for 5 American dreadnoughts (which carry the oil of 10 British coal/oil burners) to operate across the Atlantic historically, Admiral Sims wants to send 4 American coal-burning dreadnoughts to replace the ones the King Edwards the British are planning to take out of commission, the Germans just keeping the RN steaming a bit would have given them command of the seas in spring 1917 according to SecDef Daniels, and there's a 25-day supply in May.

1. how do you get just a bit from constantly?


Naval Situation in the North Sea

Like it or not - the Germans will be able to make trouble in the North Sea. A lot of it. The fleet you propose to leave behind to "bottle up" the Germans, isn't sufficient for the task.

"Mini-Grand Fleet" vs High Seas Fleet:
1 RN dreadnought vs. 19KM dreadnoughts
18 RN pre-dreadnoughts vs. 0 KM dreadnoughts
0 RN battlecruisers vs. 5 KM battlecruisers
48 RN cruisers vs. 33 KM cruisers
190 RN destroyers vs. 225 KM destroyers
116 RN submarines vs. 181 U-Boats
I can't confirm all the remaining 190 destroyers in the RN are around Britain, or the 116 RN submarines.

Actually I was leaving 3-4 dreadnoughts and adding 2-4 so there will be 5-9 dreadnoughts and 18 pre-dreanoughts for a total of 132 to 162 big guns to oppose the German's 190 bigs guns. If I leave behind those 5 oil burning super dreadnoughts and rely on numbers -1 to deal with the US the numbers are 144- 182 big guns vs 190 German...


The KM has a clear quantitative and qualitative edge over the Royal Navy. The North Sea is basically surrendered to the Germans. The raison d'etre of the Grand Fleet being stationed at Scapa Flow was to bottle up the KM. The North Sea Mine Barrage doesn't exist yet, and what's left behind of the fleet couldn't bottle up their own emotions.

try again...


As far as your atomic bomb theory goes, the total explosive damage caused by 28,000 13.5" shells is roughly the equivalent the damage of bomb loads carried by 70 WWII B-29 bombers. To get new shells is a 23 day round trip non-stop with no difficulties or delay between Boston and Queenstown. Six dreadnoughts have a barrel life of 80 shells, after which the guns will have to be replaced (capacity is 80 shells per gun).

1. dishonest much? 70 B-29's carry 520,800lbs or .52 kiloton of HE using 500lb bombs (if they could fit 40 of them inside the plane) The HE bursting charge of a 13.5" HE shell was 176.5lbs. 14,000 shells (half load out in HE) equals 2,471,000lbs of HE or 1.235 kiloton

2. barrels can fire after barrel life is exceeded, accuracy simply goes down.


US Economy


The US has made only $2.263 billion in loans to the Allies before the war started (page 88) (http://books.google.com/books?id=fNFh1i97ZGAC&pg=PA86&lpg=PA86&dq=united+states+foreign+investment+britain+1917&source=bl&ots=yGUHOr4_yV&sig=-obOq24WY196kripu69_8Somf4Y&hl=en&ei=Bj7ZTtnGDo7hsQK-krnoDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false). Treasury loans were not made to the Allies until after the US entered the war, historically. Meanwhile, British foreign investment in the US totaled £688 million (page 427) (http://books.google.com/books?id=edFAAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA421&lpg=PA421&dq=united+states+private+loans+great+britain+1917&source=bl&ots=9w0EfKHqvM&sig=LNdziT2rAEZzbM_i6qjJXtBg1GM&hl=en&ei=vTvZTriJPMaJsgLEvazpDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CD4Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=united%20states%20private%20loans%20great%20brit ain%201917&f=false), a nice seizure of $3.277 billion to pay back those loans with an extra $1 billion to play around with.[/quote]

go back and re-reard your source OK


US investments in Europe totaled only $692 million (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=fNFh1i97ZGAC&pg=PA86&lpg=PA86&dq=united+states+foreign+investment+britain+1917&source=bl&ots=yGUHOr4_yV&sig=-obOq24WY196kripu69_8Somf4Y&hl=en&ei=Bj7ZTtnGDo7hsQK-krnoDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false), against European investments of $6750 billion in the US, that will probably yield a couple billion dollars more in assets.

And.... how do idle assets put people to work?


The US enlisted 4 million men in all branches of the US military during World War I, historically (as many males of all ages there are in Canada). There's also going to be increased war production, with increased amounts of resources with which to manufacture arms.

Those 4 million are not the same 4 million working in the factories, and the US government is broke...


US GDP grew 27% from 1917 to 1918, before falling to 3.3% growth from 1918 to 1919. There's alot of wiggle room, and the economy isn't going to belly up on a $3.6 million in imports on a historical increase of $16 billion, and no losses from loans to the Allies.

2.63 billion in lost loans is a psychological shock and will be felt, 4 billion in lost orders, 4 million unemployed.... and the economy didn't grow by 27%... the annual inflation rate in 1916 was over 10% and over 15% in 1917...

United States Inflation Rate (http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/inflation-cpi)

US GDP in 1916 was roughly $50 billion (49.6) and roughly 60 billion (59.7) in 1917 and would need to be 63 billion to hit your 27% mark.
Government Spending Details: Federal State Local for 1916 - Charts (http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/year_spending_1916USbn_13bs1n#usgs302)


I don't see a depression. On a macro level a transition to a wartime economy and military enlistments against a combined with the loss of exports should provide some level of balance. I think farmers are going to be in some trouble, and there are going to need to be price controls or other assistance, but I think the US economy should do just fine.

adjust your numbers to the truth and think about it some more.


This is what I'm getting from what you've been telling me.
the strategy you've been talking about is the only thing Britain would do.
that it's the only strategy, response, or measure Lloyd George, Jellicoe, the war cabinet, and Parliament, or anybody else with a say on the matter and any political influence would settle on, and they'd do it with no delay.

if you have another option besides capitulation I've asked for it before, the best you can come up with is the UK will stab France in the back...


that there is absolutely no other strategy, response, or measure that they could possibly think of, or would be worth even considering.

if there is I am listening...


that it could absolutely be successfully carried out, that it is flawless, and there is no possible way that Britain couldn't fail in any way, whether it comes to food, oil, or any other severe difficulty she would be facing.

never said any of that...


that the US is completely defenseless, with Germany and the US incapable of any competent measure to counteract anything that Britain would do, or cause harm to her in anyway.

never said that either


that there is no hardship that Britain couldn't overcome despite being nearly at the end of their rope in many ways at this time even with US help historically.

I didn't say history did, just how far limited resources can be stretched is shown by Germany and Japan in WWII.


that the United States would absolutely surrender the when shells started falling on a city.

Still waiting on you do to do the thought experiment and come up with an alternative response from Wilson...


Further, general problems that I see for Britain:
The United States did not enter into war with Austria-Hungary until December 7, 1917, and was never at war with the Ottoman Empire or Bulgaria. On the flip side, it is very well possible that any one of the several Allies do not go to war with the US.

And.... my think has France jumping after the RN wins so that is a non-issue.


The US entry into the war was followed by a mass bandwagoning effect among other nations in the Americas. Cuba, Brazil, Panama, Bolivia severed ties or went to war with Germany in the immediate aftermath of the US declaration of war, with six other American nations doing the same before the war's end. There's a likelihood that Britain finds itself with less friends and a few new enemies, which would have further implications.

They went to war to seize German assets, it was a money grab and they had the US backing them with no possible threat from Germany, not the threat of the RN showing up and asking why they did that.


There are likely to be a few neutrals in Europe unhappy with being cut off from US trade by Britain - especially those that profited from serving as transshipment points of American goods to Germany. They could decide to punish Britain economically.

So after taking a hit from the loss of US trade they are going to shoot themselves again willingly...


US extension of credit to the Allies after April 1917 was massive in scale, dwarfing previous private credit. On the flip side, this credit being extended to Germany would allow it to out-compete the Allies for important sources of fish, butter, margarine, milk, cheese, meat, and other food imports from nearby neutral nations such as the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, and Sweden, thus further aggravating the British food supply problem.

How? The money is in the US, the fish are in Europe...


Besides previously stated critical losses in food and oil imports - huge losses imports of raw materials, machinery, industrial manufactures, etc. from the US are going to have a major negative impact on their war industry.

as previously stated throw millions of Americans out of work


The United States has fairly anti-colonial mindset at this time - it has absolutely nothing to lose and everything to gain by promising support to British colonial populations in independence struggles. Even if the US is not immediately available to provide support, the mere promise of such support by the most populous and wealthy Western great power in the world would have a huge impact on colonies such as India.

US anti-colonial mindset....you got your decades wrong... From 1890- 1930 was the period of American colonialism- Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, Cuba, expeditions to Mexico, Haiti, Nicaragua, Honduras, the Panama Canal...

tgbyhn
03 Dec 11,, 23:58
The difference between 0,625 and 0,660 is just above 5%, which equals roughly 20 days/year.
The figures were rounded for Indian grain consumed per person per week (the amount that would need to be taken per capita), rounded down to the first from something like 0.645 and the second up something like 0.658. The difference between those would be 512,890 tons or 523,227 tons per month needed from India per month to offset caloric losses.

Anyways, I'm certainly not going to use fractions anymore.


Canada was <8 million people and USA was >100 at the time, I have a problem seeing Canada being a problem for USA, especially with their conscripts and volunteers already engaged in Europe.
Is there any good reason Canadians not to declare neutrality the moment US enters the war?
Canada at the time didn't have independence in foreign affairs. Maintaining neutrality would be tantamount to declaring independence. Regardless of control over foreign affairs, it did constitute a nation at the time, had distinct national interests, and was very economically dependent on the US. A large portion of its trade was dependent on transshipment via US rail, and the rest of it hugged the border which the US could sever at any number of points across 4000 miles.

The US enlisted more men in its military by war's end historically than Canada had males of all ages. Given gun ownership rates in 1917 US, most of the able-bodied US male population are effectively francs-tireurs at this point as well.

So, things look very bad for Canada indeed.

1979
04 Dec 11,, 18:58
If I have two figures for a food item, American exports, British consumption I can calculate the portion of consumption that comes from US imports by division. For example, this source (http://books.google.com/books?id=GIcUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=united+kingdom+molasses+imports+1917&source=bl&ots=ANDitdPOlE&sig=4FQdXBCZ2hiQrgsbk47k7rpHrDk&hl=en&ei=RhXXTrWdO8jf0QGD97nKDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCEQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=united%20kingdom%20molasses%20imports%201917&f=false) lists 59.3% of 170,678,000 bushels of wheat imported in 1917 came from the US. 101 million bushels of American wheat divided by 237 million bushels (171 imports, 60 domestic production, both also listed) of British wheat consumption in a year is 43.7% of the total.

Some of the percentages I've cited are outright listed. If I have a figure for an American food commodity export to Britain, I can compute caloric values.

Food is something that it eaten. Put it in your mouth, chew it up, swallow it. Eventually it comes out as poop.


Nice try but you cant , Britain in 1917 was purchasing wheat for France and Italy under the Wheat Executive Agreement.

tgbyhn
04 Dec 11,, 21:55
Food Situation


No they are not, I already provided proof that it takes 9 months to reach famine at 1000 calories a day per Capita and 1550 calories per day can hold that famine off for another year. Losing US imports means long term malnutrition setting in with in a couple of months, not starvation, ad that is without any replacement.
A famine is a scarcity of food. Maybe the word you're looking for is starvation?


No six weeks on hand is six weeks at 3320...
I've already established how much wheat Britain has on hand. You're making an assumption and extrapolating, and you have no evidence whatsoever with regards to stocks of remaining foods. For most other foods, Britain is just as dependent on imports as she is for wheat.

Assumptions and extrapolations are not a basis for credible debate.

Your 3320 calories per day consumption are not average intake: they are for a "man" defined as: "a 'man' being an average workman [b]doing an average day's work" (source) (http://books.google.com/books?id=qUrNpREpG14C&pg=PA70&lpg=PA70&dq=a+%27man%27+being+an+average+workman+doing+an+a verage+day%27s+work+3400+calories&source=bl&ots=-zT2FL9MYX&sig=hWJVie0V-W9WA3U2OnABgN522Hw&hl=en&ei=MQXbTu76Kon2ggfuiaXpDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=a%20%27man%27%20being%20an%20average%20workman%2 0doing%20an%20average%20day%27s%20work%203400%20ca lories&f=false). Not for the average British civilian, or even for the average British man.


Yup, oops, left off a zero but that was for a half ounce out of an Indian diet of 21. ounces per day. Increase the take to 1 ounce per day.

93.75 calories per ounce (1500/16) x 290,000,000= 27,187,500,000 calories divided by 1500 to convert to pounds equals 18,125,000lbs. double checks 290,000,000 / 16= 18125000lbs 18125,000lbs/2000= 9062.5 tons a day x 30= 271,875 tons per month... food issue over blown
see above et al.
The loss in wheat imports from the US are 4445 calories per week alone. I listed several foods, which alone added up to 4311 calories per week. From just those you need to double that figure.

The loss of Canadian imports, the embargo by Argentina, loss of other foods from the US, and lessened exports from other nations because of increased dependence on domestic sources due to lack of US food imports aggravates the situation even further.

really how so, since half rations is based on daily minimum, not previous over feeding...
3320 calories for the average British workman doing an average days work. A workman. A laborer. A factory worker, railroad worker, coal miner, etc.

Not a woman or child, not a man in an office position.

With loss of US imports, caloric consumption for a workman would fall to less than 1850 calories per day unless made up from remaining stocks. The average Briton is going to see far less than 1850 calories per day.

Logistics


1. not increased fuel supplies, redirected. Most of the mercheis are coal anyway which is often locally provided.
Fuel needs to be brought to fueling stations for a route that is much longer. Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria, Aden, Oman do not produce their own coal. It has to be brought from Britain or France.


But the naval ports of the CP are already full up on submarines, so there isn't room for more.
The point is in your scenario there is less protection for much more ships. You're withdrawing cruisers, destroyers, and even want to withdraw French and Italian ships from the Mediterranean. April 1917 was the worst month for Allied shipping in the Med, and in your scenario it would go up drastically. They don't need more submarines to sink more ships. Sinkings by U-Boats are a result of opportunity, and there are more and better opportunities.


but enough of an edge...? In 1917 the sailors are already on half rations and have been for some time. So workout put will be low
Actually I was leaving 3-4 dreadnoughts and adding 2-4 so there will be 5-9 dreadnoughts and 18 pre-dreanoughts for a total of 132 to 162 big guns to oppose the German's 190 bigs guns. If I leave behind those 5 oil burning super dreadnoughts and rely on numbers -1 to deal with the US the numbers are 144- 182 big guns vs 190 German...
try again...
Rations can be increased. A RN pre-dreadnought is absolutely no match whatsoever for a KM dreadnought, the Germans have a quantitative edge in most other categories of ship. Furthermore, the Germans can concentrate numbers. The RN do not have that ability given their deployments and the waters they have to defend.

The German ships are also technically superior, with more innovative and advanced practices, as evidenced at Jutland when they inflicted more than double their losses against a fleet with 150% their strength that crossed their T twice. A decisive edge.


I was talking after the destruction of the US fleet, so how exactly is the US going to land in Vera Cruz with no navy?
There are US forces in Nicaragua, Haiti, Cuba, Panama with vessels on hand on April 4, 1917. April 6th, seize Veracruz. If necessary, destroy all oil infrastructure. Not difficult.


1. You claimed it took 5 days to fuel a dreadnought. 5days = 120 hours.
2. Jellico set sail for Jutland between 48-96 after learning of the German plan
3. the obvious inference is the dreadnoughts were kept fueled.
It was only 180nmi to the battle sight - we don't have any hard information on how much coal was stored in British dreadnoughts anticipating actions in the North Sea.

The HMS Dreadnought for example burned some 17.5 tons coal (plus oil) per hour at maximum speed - if it had left with that Grand Fleet from Scapa Flow, and if it had spent those 39 hours at max speed (21 knots) from the time the fleet left Scapa Flow and returned, it would have burned 680 tons.


not a number and forced by a physical lack of feul or an admiralty desire to husband reserves?
If you stop to consider that U-Boat sinkings were topping out at this period in 1917 - the RN certainly could have afforded to be more active.

Taking a harder look at the oil numbers:

Your source above claims combined services (military only) need 3.5 million tons per month. You claim earlier the RN needs 36000 tons a day or 1,008,000 tins a month. 8 weeks oil at the low point is over 10 million tons if we only count military users and not civilian supplies. The 25 day number is 2.91 million tons only counting military supplies.
British oil stocks in May 1917 were 900,000 tons for all purposes, military and civilian. There are 6.6 barrels of fuel oil per ton of oil, so that works out to a 5.94 million barrel reserve.
The military uses 292,000 tons per month (3.5 million tons per year), 23,000 of which are by the Army, a total of 1.9 million barrels per month.
British civilian uses are consuming 80 million gallons from US imports alone in March 1917, 1.9 million barrels per month (source)
Total oil use for dreadnoughts is 51,000 tons of oil, or about 340,000 barrels of oil. 78 destroyers carrying an average of 300 tons of oil would be 23,400 tons, or 155,000 barrels, for a total of nearly a half-million barrels.
Military oil usage (nearly all of which is Royal Navy) is for a relatively inactive position at 1.775 million barrels. Actively engaging the US and KM is going to dramatically increase usage - double, triple historical usage.


The dreadnoughts are already fueled...
Yes - they are. But eventually that fleet is going to run out. Meanwhile German U-Boats are going to have a field day targeting logistical support ships given the collapse of shipping in the Atlantic and the weak fleet left to protect British waters against an enemy with a qualitative and quantitative edge, and you need to get those ships more fuel and oil to have any sort of prolonged operations against the US. The US may very well turn out to be a "roach motel", the RN checks in but does not check out (dead in the water).


No, but that 20% only has 2 uses that can't be reduced- merchant shipping and ASW patrols. Everything else is subject to rationing. The Army and the RFC included. Switching to the defensive in 1917 will greatly reduce the fuel consumed by the army, and oil used in the production of shells and other war material.
As cited previously, the RN was using over 90% of oil used by the military - when it was fairly inactive. You cannot squeeze the remainder enough to make a difference.


Nope, more like a half rack (12), America took 10, but put 1 back (the oil past the half way point that is seized and hurried on to England), England just got to the party thirsty and only brought 3 (imports) to supplement the 2 they already had that America didn't take.
I think the idea of seizing half of American shipping in the Atlantic is pushing it a bit, given the most of the Royal Navy in the North Sea and English Channel.


ya becuase consumption can never be modified...
No, I assume that every means of consumption has a percentage that can be diverted, and that many sources of supply are located a lot closer to need that you seem to realize. For example a ship with a load of coal headed for Y can be redirected back to England or continued on to stock X for the increased traffic that will be coming its way.
It's not just the British, but the entire world dependent on decreased supplies. The US supplied most of European continent, and supplied Japan as well. Increased competition for remaining resources means less of what is left goes to Britain.




1. dishonest much? 70 B-29's carry 520,800lbs or .52 kiloton of HE using 500lb bombs (if they could fit 40 of them inside the plane) The HE bursting charge of a 13.5" HE shell was 176.5lbs. 14,000 shells (half load out in HE) equals 2,471,000lbs of HE or 1.235 kiloton
A British dreadnought typically carried 5% high explosive rounds - and you're assuming Britain had enough in stockpile to supply enough. It took the British several months to manufacture even 12,000 of the new armor piercing shells in 1917-1918 to replace the extremely defective AP shells used until 1918.


go back and re-reard your source OK
2.63 billion in lost loans is a psychological shock and will be felt, 4 billion in lost orders, 4 million unemployed.... and the economy didn't grow by 27%... the annual inflation rate in 1916 was over 10% and over 15% in 1917...
Those 4 million are not the same 4 million working in the factories, and the US government is broke...
US GDP in 1916 was roughly $50 billion (49.6) and roughly 60 billion (59.7) in 1917 and would need to be 63 billion to hit your 27% mark.
I cited 1917-1918, not 1916-1917.

Total loans to the Allies before the US entered the war were $2.263 billion - you cited $20 billion. Who are you to say if seized assets are worthless?

The US economy grew more than $3.6 billion in 1917 in real terms -- the loss of that in the balance of trade is dwarfed by the economic catastrophe that's about to hit Britain. The US has a speck in its eye, but you're ignoring the plank in Britain's.

4.25 million men in the military, and 7.2 million were employed in factories producing for the war industry alone [URL="http://books.google.com/books?id=yQcoAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA1024&dq=britain+naval+ordnance+production+1917+thousand +tons+shells&hl=en&ei=T7XbTqyIJdTDgAeymOSRCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CD8Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q&f=false"](page 1027) (http://books.google.com/books?id=4vJYAAAAYAAJ&pg=RA5-PA28&dq=imports+into+united+kingdom+petroleum+products+ 1917&hl=en&ei=iZPbTtGqJYHtggff28TpDA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CEIQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=imports%20into%20united%20kingdom%20petroleum%20 products%201917&f=false). So even if your "4 million" number is accurate - there's a lot of room to absorb that.


if you have another option besides capitulation I've asked for it before, the best you can come up with is the UK will stab France in the back...
With your strategy - if Britain does not succeed in an exceedingly short timeframe, it loses everything. Again, if they do not succeed, they lose everything. Seeking a separate peace and preserving their own position versus a gamble, with no chances of guarantee, seems like something a reasonable government would choose.

The reason why the British and Jellicoe were so cautious in their naval strategy was because even with superior strength - it was not worth gambling control over the North Sea if there were even a 10% chance it would mean loss of the command of the sea. With your strategy, they have surrendered the North Sea on an off-chance to see if shelling a few cities in what I see as a "War to Force America to Resume Vital Exports before Britain Collapses". It's desperate and the odds are not in Britain's favor.


They went to war to seize German assets, it was a money grab and they had the US backing them with no possible threat from Germany, not the threat of the RN showing up and asking why they did that.
There's alot more British assets to be seized, and the Royal Navy is stretched so thin it's more of a threat to itself than it is to anyone else.


So after taking a hit from the loss of US trade they are going to shoot themselves again willingly...
How? The money is in the US, the fish are in Europe...
It isn't difficult to place money in an account in the US for a neutral nation for German consumption. Most neutral nations in Europe have access to the German market, and they are not going to be hurt if they choose to re-direct an export to another market that wants it and needs it.


US anti-colonial mindset....you got your decades wrong... From 1890- 1930 was the period of American colonialism- Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, Cuba, expeditions to Mexico, Haiti, Nicaragua, Honduras, the Panama Canal...
Yes, the US does have a limited colonial presence and interventionism, but it can be hardly characterized as having an expansionist colonial agenda. Wilson was ferociously anti-colonial, renowned and seen as a hero by nationalist leaders seeking independence in colonies. The Indians, Chinese, Ho Chi Minh, Iranians, etc. worshiped the guy.

He didn't succeed in his anti-colonial agenda at Versailles and was forced to back down, but as soon as Britain enters in a war against the US in this time period he's going to make pronouncements that will shock the world and have massive propaganda effect.

tgbyhn
05 Dec 11,, 01:33
Another look at the naval situation.

US Atlantic waters
15 USN dreadnoughts vs. 30 RN dreadnoughts
14 USN pre-dreadnoughts vs. 0 RN pre-dreadnoughts
0 USN battlecruisers vs. 3 RN battlecruisers
21 USN cruisers vs. 24 RN cruisers
51 USN destroyers vs. 78 RN destroyers
37 USN submarines vs. 0 RN submarines
The USN doesn't exactly look impotent here. It gains 9 interned submarines built for the RN but interned until April 1917.

North Sea and British waters
5 RN dreadnought vs. 19KM dreadnoughts
18 RN pre-dreadnoughts vs. 0 KM dreadnoughts
0 RN battlecruisers vs. 5 KM battlecruisers
48 RN cruisers vs. 33 KM cruisers
190 RN destroyers vs. 225 KM destroyers
63 RN submarines vs. 181 U-Boats
Within a few weeks 4 French dreadnoughts join, and maybe a month later the other 3 after they re-man their ships up from skeleton crews at Corfu from the anti-submarine ships they're patrolling.

These ships are being used as part of the blockade of Greece, to intimidate the pro-German Greek royal government, and undermine their support.

I still haven't gone over the Royal Navy destroyers. 190 is the total number available in British waters, the Mediterranean, Indian/Pacific Oceans/Asia, etc.

zraver
05 Dec 11,, 02:05
Another look at the naval situation.

US Atlantic waters
15 USN dreadnoughts vs. 30 RN dreadnoughts
14 USN pre-dreadnoughts vs. 0 RN pre-dreadnoughts
0 USN battlecruisers vs. 3 RN battlecruisers
21 USN cruisers vs. 24 RN cruisers
51 USN destroyers vs. 78 RN destroyers
37 USN submarines vs. 0 RN submarines
The USN doesn't exactly look impotent here. It gains 9 interned submarines built for the RN but interned until April 1917.

13 US dreadnoughts, the 2 South carolina's are too slow add them to the main US battle line and the RN enjoys a speed as well as numbers and throw weight advantage. Add the RN's 9 battlecruisers and its 39 dreadnoughts worth of fire vs 13 or 3:1 The 13 US pre-dreadnoughts (USS Oregon BB-3 is on the west coast) are slow and mount the guns of just 4 British dreadnoughts- 6 if you add the SC's to the second class battle line.

You also give the US 100% readiness, assuming the same 10% down rate as for the RN its now 11-12 USN platforms....

I love how you left off the cruisers... so its more like 24 cruisers and 78 destroyers vs 44-48 US destroyers.

Why doesn't the RN have any subs? I specifically mentioned them several pages ago. You also leave out the RN's ability to enjoy superb and vastly superior scouting through the use of faster vessels and air planes.


North Sea and British waters
5 RN dreadnought vs. 19KM dreadnoughts
18 RN pre-dreadnoughts vs. 0 KM dreadnoughts
0 RN battlecruisers vs. 5 KM battlecruisers
48 RN cruisers vs. 33 KM cruisers
190 RN destroyers vs. 225 KM destroyers
63 RN submarines vs. 181 U-Boats
Within a few weeks 4 French dreadnoughts join, and maybe a month later the other 3 after they re-man their ships up from skeleton crews at Corfu from the anti-submarine ships they're patrolling.

the HSF is weak from hunger, many of the subs are out on patrol- its april 1917 after all


These ships are being used as part of the blockade of Greece, to intimidate the pro-German Greek royal government, and undermine their support.

The troops in Salonika do a good job of that as well.


I still haven't gone over the Royal Navy destroyers. 190 is the total number available in British waters, the Mediterranean, Indian/Pacific Oceans/Asia, etc.

In 1917 the British had over 300 destroyers...

USSWisconsin
05 Dec 11,, 02:28
My take on the RN vs USN thing (My Opinion): I don't believe the USN was in a position to challenge the GF at sea in WWI (a Jutland style battle). I don't believe the RN was in a position to systematically bombard or effectively blockade the mainland US in WWI (they might have pulled off some raids, but IMO they would have quicky become quite costly - as the ships the USN had were very well suited to making it so). I find this discussion very interesting, and the facts that Zraver and Tgbyhn have presented have both been very illuminating. Thanks for the suberb discussion, it has kept me interested.

tgbyhn
05 Dec 11,, 04:17
My take on the RN vs USN thing (My Opinion): I don't believe the USN was in a position to challenge the GF at sea in WWI (a Jutland style battle). I don't believe the RN was in a position to systematically bombard or effectively blockade the mainland US in WWI (they might have pulled off some raids, but IMO they would have quicky become quite costly - as the ships the USN had were very well suited to making it so).
I think the battleship vet makes a very solid point.

American Waters


13 US dreadnoughts, the 2 South carolina's are too slow add them to the main US battle line and the RN enjoys a speed as well as numbers and throw weight advantage. Add the RN's 9 battlecruisers and its 39 dreadnoughts worth of fire vs 13 or 3:1 The 13 US pre-dreadnoughts (USS Oregon BB-3 is on the west coast) are slow and mount the guns of just 4 British dreadnoughts- 6 if you add the SC's to the second class battle line.
It's a bit strange that you put British pre-dreadnought at parity with a German dreadnought, but you pick a bone over the speed of the South Carolinas (when they on the defense).

The US dreadnoughts have 156 big guns, against 352 big guns of the British dreadnoughts + battlecruisers (USN capital ships were a bit gun heavy). Actually a 2.25 to 1 ratio.

Pre-dreadnoughts would add 72. That would make it 352 vs. 228 (1.5 to 1).

As far as readiness goes - it's mostly the pre-dreadnoughts that are in reserve, and it's not as if they don't have over a month to prepare, and thousands of experienced ex-Navy sailors in the merchant marine who can be called on in a pinch (who were needed more historically in the merchant marine). Battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines - I looked over their service history in April 1917 and it looks pretty good, especially more so when the Grand Fleet is a month or more out.


I love how you left off the cruisers... so its more like 24 cruisers and 78 destroyers vs 44-48 US destroyers.
I included US cruisers that were active duty in the Atlantic and Gulf in April 1917. I literally read the service histories of every ship in the US fleet at the time.


Why doesn't the RN have any subs? I specifically mentioned them several pages ago. You also leave out the RN's ability to enjoy superb and vastly superior scouting through the use of faster vessels and air planes.
I read the service history of every RN submarine in April 1917, and there are 63 in British waters. Up against 181 U-Boats. There are a few more pulling duty in the Mediterranean. What are you taking with?

As far as your seaplanes go - I'm just really skeptical of the strategy overall, and I may not address every point. My sentiment all along is what USSWisconsin just said - Britain can undertake some raids, but they would have quickly become costly.

What happens if the US adds a bunch of merchant ships as decoys in battle? The British fired over 8000 large shells at Jutland, and scored 100 hits, a slightly better than 1% hit ratio. At distance the British, the British are going to assume every ship they see is a warship. The US could put 500 merchant ships with skeleton crews to cause mass confusion and redirect British fire. They could load them full of explosives and have skeleton crews sail them into the British battle line rigged to explode and jump off. Or even bluff them to make Jellicoe even more cautious then he normally was.

Close into shore the US could sink merchant ships in strategic locations to cause collisions and damage/founder RN ships.

British Waters


the HSF is weak from hunger, many of the subs are out on patrol- its april 1917 after all
This hunger issue is a pretty weak argument, in my opinion. They're not Ethiopian hungry and it'd take a couple days to get their energy levels up.


In 1917 the British had over 300 destroyers...
I looked at the service history of every British destroyer built since the 1890s with calculator in hand, and there were 268 in service in April 1917, active, reserve, or otherwise. Your scenario takes 78, and there are 190 remaining between the North Sea, English Channel, Atlantic, Mediterranean, Far East, Indian Ocean, and all other seas.

zraver
05 Dec 11,, 06:41
I think the battleship vet makes a very solid point.

except I don't think he is... IIRC he isn't a mil-vet. Jay is by far one of the smartest people I know and he knows battleships right up there with Rusty, and is the boards resident expert on physics. But I am not at all sure how familiar he is with Mahan- who BTW just died a few years before the date we are talking about.


American Waters
It's a bit strange that you put British pre-dreadnought at parity with a German dreadnought, but you pick a bone over the speed of the South Carolinas (when they on the defense).

I don't equate them, I use a 3:1 ratio for both.


The US dreadnoughts have 156 big guns, against 352 big guns of the British dreadnoughts + battlecruisers (USN capital ships were a bit gun heavy). Actually a 2.25 to 1 ratio.

Earlier in the thread I added up throw weights, the British 13.5" guns alone have more than double the US throw weight if the US combines both battle lines.


Pre-dreadnoughts would add 72. That would make it 352 vs. 228 (1.5 to 1).

pre-dreads add 52, 72 is with the SC class added to them.


As far as readiness goes - it's mostly the pre-dreadnoughts that are in reserve, and it's not as if they don't have over a month to prepare, and thousands of experienced ex-Navy sailors in the merchant marine who can be called on in a pinch (who were needed more historically in the merchant marine). Battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines - I looked over their service history in April 1917 and it looks pretty good, especially more so when the Grand Fleet is a month or more out.

so you concede taking a ship from reserve as opposed to mothballs to active is not a long term affair?


I included US cruisers that were active duty in the Atlantic and Gulf in April 1917. I literally read the service histories of every ship in the US fleet at the time.

so did I.... most are 15 knot hulk with 6" guns. The big American pocket battleships aka the armored cruisers are the West Coast fleet aka v Japan.



I read the service history of every RN submarine in April 1917, and there are 63 in British waters. Up against 181 U-Boats. There are a few more pulling duty in the Mediterranean. What are you taking with?

20-30 or so


As far as your seaplanes go - I'm just really skeptical of the strategy overall, and I may not address every point. My sentiment all along is what USSWisconsin just said - Britain can undertake some raids, but they would have quickly become costly.

Can you support that? The threat the RN poses to the US coast forces the USN to give battle. My strategy isn't blockade, its the threat of hammer blows on major population centers.


What happens if the US adds a bunch of merchant ships as decoys in battle? The British fired over 8000 large shells at Jutland, and scored 100 hits, a slightly better than 1% hit ratio.

decoy what....? they are too slow to be destroyers, to small to be capitol ships... Merchant cruisers aka armed liners have a very poor record against actual warships.


At distance the British, the British are going to assume every ship they see is a warship.

1. remember that comment about planes....?

2. that is what destroyers are for

3. they are not cave men, the have good optics and range finders...


The US could put 500 merchant ships with skeleton crews to cause mass confusion and redirect British fire. They could load them full of explosives and have skeleton crews sail them into the British battle line rigged to explode and jump off. Or even bluff them to make Jellicoe even more cautious then he normally was.

Or block USN lines of sight letting the much faster GF move to advantage...


Close into shore the US could sink merchant ships in strategic locations to cause collisions and damage/founder RN ships.

most merchants are not as tall as the big RN ships are deep... except for a few locations the near shore depths go from 20-50m to 100+ fanthoms pretty quick.


British Waters



This hunger issue is a pretty weak argument, in my opinion. They're not Ethiopian hungry and it'd take a couple days to get their energy levels up.

Their ability to sustain work is a problem... as an example, weak stokers mean slow ships



I looked at the service history of every British destroyer built since the 1890s with calculator in hand, and there were 268 in service in April 1917, active, reserve, or otherwise. Your scenario takes 78, and there are 190 remaining between the North Sea, English Channel, Atlantic, Mediterranean, Far East, Indian Ocean, and all other seas.

kk

USSWisconsin
05 Dec 11,, 14:19
Zraver is right - I am a Battleship Historian, not a Battleship vet (I've been aboard an active battleship, but not as a crewman). I am quite familar with A. T. Mahan, and have read quite a few of his books, including The Influence of Seapower on History, I have also made extensive studies of both of the fleets in this discussion. This discussion is a thought experiment, I am just stating my opinion, unlikely things have happened throughout history, and neither position being advanced in this debate is impossible or even implausable.

zraver
05 Dec 11,, 18:15
Zraver is right - I am a Battleship Historian, not a Battleship vet (I've been aboard an active battleship, but not as a crewman). I am quite familar with A. T. Mahan, and have read quite a few of his books, including The Influence of Seapower on History, I have also made extensive studies of both of the fleets in this discussion. This discussion is a thought experiment, I am just stating my opinion, unlikely things have happened throughout history, and neither position being advanced in this debate is impossible or even implausable.

Ahh, well since you've read Mahan, how do you think the USN would respond with the Grand Fleet barreling in towards the North East?

Unlike Germany with Denmark-Sweden acting as a plug and the Kiel Canal linking the 2 primary naval bases and ports, the US has an extensive coastline with major population centers above and below the Chesapeake open to the sea. The major US naval and maritime ports inside the Chesapeake are easily blockaded if the supply problems can be overcome.

tgbyhn
05 Dec 11,, 19:03
except I don't think he is... IIRC he isn't a mil-vet. Jay is by far one of the smartest people I know and he knows battleships right up there with Rusty, and is the boards resident expert on physics. But I am not at all sure how familiar he is with Mahan- who BTW just died a few years before the date we are talking about.
From what I understand, he worked on them as a defense civilian.


I don't equate them, I use a 3:1 ratio for both.
Earlier in the thread I added up throw weights, the British 13.5" guns alone have more than double the US throw weight if the US combines both battle lines.
pre-dreads add 52, 72 is with the SC class added to them.
Even if you take away the South Carolinas, it's 2.5 to 1.

Throw Weights:
USN 12"/45: 870 lbs - 64 guns - 28 tons per salvo
USN 14"/45: 1400lbs - 72 guns - 50 tons per salvo

RN 12"/45/50: 850lbs - 138 guns - 59 tons per salvo
RN 13".5/45: 1250lbs - 134 guns - 84 tons per salvo
RN 15"/42: 1910lbs - 52 guns - 50 tons per salvo

So, not including the South Carolinas, the ratio 2.5 to 1 in throw weight between US dreadnoughts and RN dreadnoughts + battlecruisers.

With the South Carolinas and pre-dreadnoughts:
USN 12"/45 - 870lbs - 80 guns - 35 tons per salvo
USN 13"/35 - 1130 lbs - 24 guns - 14 tons per salvo

Including those, 1.5 to 1.


so you concede taking a ship from reserve as opposed to mothballs to active is not a long term affair?
The US has a month plus -- the RN is going to be facing down an immediate threat with a superior KM in British waters. At the outset you have 8-9 pre-dreadnoughts and 5 dreadnoughts facing down 19 KM dreadnoughts and 5 KM battlecruisers.


so did I.... most are 15 knot hulk with 6" guns. The big American pocket battleships aka the armored cruisers are the West Coast fleet aka v Japan.
I did a count-up of cruisers in general - light, armored, and protected.


20-30 or so
Then there would be 33-43 RN submarines in British waters. Given that the RN is outnumbered and outgunned at the outset in dreadnoughts, battlecruisers, and destroyers, there would now be a 5-6 to 1 ratio in submarines (of which the KM are much superior).


Can you support that? The threat the RN poses to the US coast forces the USN to give battle. My strategy isn't blockade, its the threat of hammer blows on major population centers.
I think all the RN would be capable of is raids, with increasingly heavy losses. They're at the end of a very long logistical supply line. There's just too many factors working against this - the USN, a critically weakened situation in the North Sea where the Germans have a good edge, a critically weakened situation in the Mediterranean, the logistics involved in carrying out such an operation in hostile waters, the extremely prolonged nature of such an operation, the difficult obstacles the RN has to overcome, and so on.

If you take a look at the relative strength of the NK vs. USN-PF after Pearl Harbor:
13 NK carriers vs. 3 USN carriers
10 NK battleships vs. 1 USN battleship
18 NK heavy cruisers vs. 12 USN heavy cruisers
20 NK light cruisers vs. 8 USN light cruisers
108 NK destroyers vs. 50 USN destroyers
68 NK fleet submarines vs. 33 USN submarines
Given this massive disparity - the Japanese should have been able to do wonders. Conquer Oahu, beat the US back to the West Coast, etc.


decoy what....? they are too slow to be destroyers, to small to be capitol ships... Merchant cruisers aka armed liners have a very poor record against actual warships.
The question isn't merchant ships in action against RN warships. Never said that or meant to imply it (except fire ships). The question I posed is if the US has a few hundred merchant ships with skeleton crews in the area, at long range distances the RN is not going to be able to distinguish what is a legitimate target or not. It would not be difficult to attach a destroyer per 20 skeleton crewed merchant ships and create 20 fake flotillas - sea battles are rife with confusion. One Danish merchant ship at Jutland tied down two RN destroyers, for example.

I.E. the USN can get the RN to waste most of its ammunition on merchant ships with such a strategy. 8000 heavy shells were fired at Jutland in a relatively brief action - with a 1.25% hit rate.


1. remember that comment about planes....?

2. that is what destroyers are for

3. they are not cave men, the have good optics and range finders...
I'm just not really seeing it. Night-fighting, smoke from ships and guns, inclement weather, RN's track record for sloppy and ineffective coordination and communications in battle, hostile waters, what few seaplanes there are getting barraged by sheets of 4-6" gun fire. Even if the RN has seaplanes, they're not some killer app even if used flawlessly. It's not as if the 1917 Grand Fleet has the capabilities of a modern USN carrier fleet with reconnaissance satellites.

The US could literally get the Grand Fleet to expend every last shell (95% AP for naval battles, AP shells being faulty and not replaced until 1918, only 12,000 manufactured over several months) for relatively minimal USN losses. Then there would be the issue of bringing more shells, coal, and oil in from Britain to Halifax for resupply in the west Atlantic, leaving waters where the Germans have 181 U-Boats and a superior KM facing the British fleet.

The timeframes involved even in the best of circumstances would be heavily be against the RN's favor in conducting what would be the most enormous naval operation ever conducted in world history, before or since.


Their ability to sustain work is a problem... as an example, weak stokers mean slow ships
This is something that literally has hours to a couple days impact. The average German worker in the war industry was eating 3400 calories per day in 1917-18. If the KM puts out to sea, rations are upped against what they were eating when inactive.

USSWisconsin
05 Dec 11,, 21:50
Ahh, well since you've read Mahan, how do you think the USN would respond with the Grand Fleet barreling in towards the North East?

Unlike Germany with Denmark-Sweden acting as a plug and the Kiel Canal linking the 2 primary naval bases and ports, the US has an extensive coastline with major population centers above and below the Chesapeake open to the sea. The major US naval and maritime ports inside the Chesapeake are easily blockaded if the supply problems can be overcome.

The USN was not short of confidence - if anything they were over confident, I suspect they would have been quite ready to fight. But I would be more concerned about the consequences if they locked horns on the open sea. I beleive they would have had a greater advantage closer to home. Their heavily gunned predreadnoughts and monitors could have more effectively gotten into the frey if they chose to engage the British near their own coastal waters. If they engaged while at far out at sea the GF probably would have been able to out manuever them due to their greater speed (the GF had a big advantage in longer range guns in 1915, and the USN had no battlecruisers). The USN had a significant number of submarines which would have been a greater threat to the GF in US home waters. Given the US's self sufficency in steel, fuel and food, a distant blockade would have been less of a threat than it was to Germany. I still see this as quite unlikely, since the British Home Islands would have been much more exposed to the HSF if the GF were diverted to attack the US, the Germans might have been able to complete more ships with some of the British naval pressure removed and increase their threat from the East. The British also had lots of coastline to defend. The British landing substantial numbers of troops on the CONUS would have been very difficult for them, at the time the average US citizen would have been armed and quite proficent with their arms. It would probably have been a very costly expidition for the British. IMO, the historical division among the US factions would have evaporated quickly if the CONUS came under attack and full scale mobilization and cooperation with the defense of America would have occured quickly. It is still hard for me to imagine the British doing this.

Mahans principles were being actively applied to colonial endeavors - primarily in their own hemisphere and in the South Pacific, but at this time - I don't see the US as materially ready to challenge GB for control of the open seas. Following the naval treaties they were much more ready to attempt this (their new super dreadnought battleships were fully worked up, had been conducting exercises together for a long time and were fully combat ready by this time, and they had parady with the GF in numbers by the mid 20's).

USSWisconsin
06 Dec 11,, 00:03
From what I understand, he worked on them as a defense civilian.


Most of my work with battleships has been as a historian, I had a brief period of civilian engineering assessment at the end of the battleship era, they were being retired from the last time. I was on the final cruise of USS Wisconsin as part of the final evaluation of her conditon. My primary defense work was done in supercomputers. I have been interested in battleships for many years and have studied them from their inception to their last days of service. Our WAB experts like Rusty had a career of hands on work with them at LBNSY, and Dreadnought who still works with USS New Jersey regularly as a museum ship - these are WWII battleships). I am well read on WWI battleships and their fleets like the ones we are discussing in this thread.

zraver
06 Dec 11,, 00:21
The USN was not short of confidence - if anything they were over confident, I suspect they would have been quite ready to fight. But I would be more concerned about the consequences if they locked horns on the open sea.

Ditto, the RN's speed, throw weight and numbers would be given full weight.


I beleive they would have had a greater advantage closer to home. Their heavily gunned predreadnoughts and monitors could have more effectively gotten into the frey if they chose to engage the British near their own coastal waters.[/quote]

Something I pointed out earlier.


If they engaged while at far out at sea the GF probably would have been able to out manuever them due to their greater speed (the GF had a big advantage in longer range guns in 1915, and the USN had no battlecruisers). The USN had a significant number of submarines which would have been a greater threat to the GF in US home waters. Given the US's self sufficency in steel, fuel and food, a distant blockade would have been less of a threat than it was to Germany.

Thats why I never pressed blockade but pressed the threat of bombardment.


I still see this as quite unlikely, since the British Home Islands would have been much more exposed to the HSF if the GF were diverted to attack the US, the Germans might have been able to complete more ships with some of the British naval pressure removed and increase their threat from the East.

But with the tap turned off the choice of a hail mary pass or catipulation...


The British also had lots of coastline to defend. The British landing substantial numbers of troops on the CONUS would have been very difficult for them, at the time the average US citizen would have been armed and quite proficent with their arms.

Not in the North East... been anti-gun for a 100 years... The ruling class of the NE states didn't want strikers to have guns.... On Long Island for example a single coastal at either end and the Brooklyn Navy Yard is it for defenses on the island itself. Also The US uses a lot of protected waterways which make mining easier. Not sure if the RN subs are or can lay mines, but Brooklyn, Philly, DC, Norfolk, Baltimore would all be vulnerable to mining operations.



It would probably have been a very costly expedition for the British. IMO, the historical division among the US factions would have evaporated quickly if the CONUS came under attack and full scale mobilization and cooperation with the defense of America would have occurred quickly. It is still hard for me to imagine the British doing this.

I've never said it wasn't a desperation measure, but with the US in the war, given kaiser Wilhelm's propensity to over reach, the British are facing disaster. They have a few months to beat the US or starve and face Germany and US imposing terms that gut the GF and thus the ability of the British to maintain their empire.

The only hope is to force an engagement of the US Navy, crush it, then present a credible threat of a massive bombardment so that Wilson already under other pressures sues for a return of a mostly ante-bellum status.


Mahans principles were being actively applied to colonial endeavors - primarily in their own hemisphere and in the South Pacific, but at this time - I don't see the US as materially ready to challenge GB for control of the open seas. Following the naval treaties they were much more ready to attempt this (their new super dreadnought battleships were fully worked up, had been conducting exercises together for a long time and were fully combat ready by this time, and they had parady with the GF in numbers by the mid 20's).

Ditto

USSWisconsin
06 Dec 11,, 10:06
The Two Enemy Capable RN was slipping by 1917, if the threat of the two combined navies (USN& HSF) was real, and France was not working with her - I wonder how solidly Italy and Japan (Japan might be looking to be on the winning side) would stay in with her. If those two or three navies stood with Britain, she might have had a better chance of this scenario - but if all the others all fell away (Italy switching sides would unbottle the Austrio Hungarian Fleet), I wonder if she might even have sought an armistance with possible concessions - perhaps she could afford to give up enough to end the war with out loosing her empire.

tgbyhn
06 Dec 11,, 11:45
Taking another look at the food argument.

British 'working man' (e.g. railway, munitions, factory worker) consumption is 3320 calories a day in 1917. Realistically, average British consumption is 2500 calories per day or less taking into consideration women, children, non-'working man', etc.

4400 calories per week are lost from American wheat. 250,000 tons of wheat per month would be needed to offset this loss.
4350 calories per week would be lost from listed non-wheat US food exports. 245,000 tons of wheat per month would needed to offset this loss.
Loss in Canadian wheat exports alone would amount to 1500 calories per week. 85,000 tons per month would be needed to offset this.
The Argentinians placed an embargo on wheat exports on March 26, 1917. 200,000 tons of annual exports to England were agreed upon in late April, in exchange for 200,000 tons in Australian and Canadian wheat exports to Argentina (a zero-sum agreement). Given the current realities in this scenario, such an agreement would difficult to come to, given the circumstances.
Imports of food any neutral European nation would be curtailed as they would need to consume domestic sources previously earmarked for export to offset losses in imports from the US.
We're looking at least 700,000 tons of wheat/rice per month needed to offset caloric losses.. Given the time-frame until British supplies are exhausted, and the logistics involved in unexpectedly moving 700,000-900,000 tons of grain (2+ months round-trip to India).

I don't think Britain can dodge the bullet on this one.

Doktor
06 Dec 11,, 12:34
Taking another look at the food argument.

British 'working man' (e.g. railway, munitions, factory worker) consumption is 3320 calories a day in 1917. Realistically, average British consumption is 2500 calories per day or less taking into consideration women, children, non-'working man', etc.

4400 calories per week are lost from American wheat. 250,000 tons of wheat per month would be needed to offset this loss.
4350 calories per week would be lost from listed non-wheat US food exports. 245,000 tons of wheat per month would needed to offset this loss.
Loss in Canadian wheat exports alone would amount to 1500 calories per week. 85,000 tons per month would be needed to offset this.
The Argentinians placed an embargo on wheat exports on March 26, 1917. 200,000 tons of annual exports to England were agreed upon in late April, in exchange for 200,000 tons in Australian and Canadian wheat exports to Argentina (a zero-sum agreement). Given the current realities in this scenario, such an agreement would difficult to come to, given the circumstances.
Imports of food any neutral European nation would be curtailed as they would need to consume domestic sources previously earmarked for export to offset losses in imports from the US.
We're looking at least 700,000 tons of wheat/rice per month needed to offset caloric losses.. Given the time-frame until British supplies are exhausted, and the logistics involved in unexpectedly moving 700,000-900,000 tons of grain (2+ months round-trip to India).

I don't think Britain can dodge the bullet on this one.

What are the UK stocks at the time?

tgbyhn
06 Dec 11,, 13:05
Not in the North East... been anti-gun for a 100 years... The ruling class of the NE states didn't want strikers to have guns....
The only substantive gun control law on the books in this period is the Sullivan Act which required a license to possess handguns in New York City. Rifles and shotguns were not included, and I'm willing to bet there were more firearms in New York City in 1917 than there were people.

This is the age of the $2.50 pistol or $6 rifle from the Sears-Roebuck catalog.

If sailors or marines from the RN landed on US shores - their life expectancy would be measured in minutes to hours. The NYPD alone making a stop at Montgomery Ward or Abercrombie & Fitch would outnumber and outgun anybody who could potentially land from the Grand Fleet.

The large majority of able-bodied American men in this time period would be what the Europeans would term a "francs-tireur". Gun ownership in the Northeast is not universal as it is in the Midwest, South, or West in this period, but it is still fairly ubiquitous.

tgbyhn
06 Dec 11,, 13:21
What are the UK stocks at the time?
It was estimated six weeks worth in April 1917.

Britain was some 70% dependent on imported food in 1917. The harvest had also failed in summer/fall 1917 as well.

1979
06 Dec 11,, 15:29
It was estimated six weeks worth in April 1917.
from first of April until the wheat harvesting begins is also 6 weeks.


Britain was some 70% dependent on imported food in 1917. The harvest had also failed in summer/fall 1917 as well.
:pari: