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Tronic
24 Jun 11,, 08:04
Seized Phone Offers Clues to Bin Ladenís Pakistani Links (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/world/asia/24pakistan.html?_r=1)



ISLAMABAD, Pakistan ó The cellphone of Osama bin Ladenís trusted courier, which was recovered in the raid that killed both men in Pakistan last month, contained contacts to a militant group that is a longtime asset of Pakistanís intelligence agency, senior American officials who have been briefed on the findings say.

The discovery indicates that Bin Laden used the group, Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen, as part of his support network inside the country, the officials and others said. But it also raised tantalizing questions about whether the group and others like it helped shelter and support Bin Laden on behalf of Pakistanís spy agency, given that it had mentored Harakat and allowed it to operate in Pakistan for at least 20 years, the officials and analysts said.

In tracing the calls on the cellphone, American analysts have determined that Harakat commanders had called Pakistani intelligence officials, the senior American officials said. One said they had met. The officials added that the contacts were not necessarily about Bin Laden and his protection and that there was no ďsmoking gunĒ showing that Pakistanís spy agency had protected Bin Laden.

But the cellphone numbers provide one of the most intriguing leads yet in the hunt for the answer to an urgent and vexing question for Washington: How was it that Bin Laden was able to live comfortably for years in Abbottabad, a town dominated by the Pakistani military and only a three-hour drive from Islamabad, the capital?

ďItís a serious lead,Ē said one American official, who has been briefed in broad terms on the cellphone analysis. ďItís an avenue weíre investigating.Ē

The revelation also provides a potentially critical piece of the puzzle about Bin Ladenís secret odyssey after he slipped away from American forces in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan nearly 10 years ago. It may help answer how and why Bin Laden or his protectors chose Abbottabad, where he was killed in a raid by a Navy Seals team on May 2.

Harakat has especially deep roots in the area around Abbottabad, and the network provided by the group would have enhanced Bin Ladenís ability to live and function in Pakistan, analysts familiar with the group said. Its leaders have strong ties with both Al Qaeda and Pakistani intelligence, and they can roam widely because they are Pakistanis, something the foreigners who make up Al Qaedaís ranks cannot do.

Even today, the groupís leader, Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, long one of Bin Ladenís closest Pakistani associates, lives unbothered by Pakistani authorities on the outskirts of Islamabad.

The senior American officials did not name the commanders whose numbers were in the courierís cellphone but said that the militants were in South Waziristan, where Al Qaeda and other groups had been based for years. Harakatís network would have allowed Bin Laden to pass on instructions to Qaeda members there and in other parts of Pakistanís tribal areas, to deliver messages and money or even to take care of personnel matters, analysts and officials said.

Wielding a Militant Tool

Harakat is one of a host of militant groups set up in the 1980s and early í90s with the approval and assistance of Pakistanís premier spy agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, to fight as proxies in Afghanistan, initially against the Soviets, or against India in the disputed territory of Kashmir. Like many groups, it has splintered and renamed itself over the years, and because of their overlapping nature, other groups could have been involved in supporting Bin Laden, too, officials and analysts said. But Harakat, they said, has been a favored tool of the ISI.

Harakat ďis one of the oldest and closest allies of Al Qaeda, and they are very, very close to the ISI,Ē said Bruce O. Riedel, a former Central Intelligence Agency officer and the author of ďDeadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad.Ē

ďThe question of ISI and Pakistani Army complicity in Bin Ladenís hide-out now hangs like a dark cloud over the entire relationshipĒ between Pakistan and the United States, Mr. Riedel added.

Indeed, suspicions abound that the ISI or parts of it sought to hide Bin Laden, perhaps to keep him as an eventual bargaining chip, or to ensure that billions of dollars in American military aid would flow to Pakistan as long as Bin Laden was alive.

Both the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Representative Mike Rogers, Republican of Michigan, and the panelís ranking Democrat, Representative C. A. Dutch Ruppersberger of Maryland, said this month that they believed that some members of the ISI or the Pakistani Army, either retired or on active duty, were involved in harboring Bin Laden.

Bin Laden himself had a long history with the ISI, dating to the mujahedeen insurgency that the Americans and Pakistanis supported against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

Two former militant commanders and one senior fighter who have received support from the ISI for years said they were convinced that the ISI played a part in sheltering Bin Laden. Because of their covert existence, they spoke on the condition that their names not be used.

One of the commanders belonged to Harakat. The other said he had fought as a guerrilla and trained others for 15 years while on the payroll of the Pakistani military, until he quit a few years ago. He said that he had met Bin Laden twice.

Meetings in Tribal Areas

In the spring of 2003, Bin Laden, accompanied by a personal guard unit of Arab and Chechen fighters, arrived unexpectedly at a gathering of 80 to 90 militants at a village in the Shawal mountain range of North Waziristan, in Pakistanís tribal areas, the former commander said. He met Bin Laden briefly inside a house; he said he knew it was him because they had met before, in Afghanistan before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

The encounter in North Waziristan occurred before the American campaign of drone aircraft strikes, which began in 2004, made it unsafe for militants to gather in the area in large numbers. For about three years before the American drone campaign, Bin Laden was moving from place to place in Pakistanís mountainous tribal areas, the commander said.

The United States had small Special Operations units and C.I.A. operatives working with Pakistani security forces to track Qaeda members at that time. At some point Bin Laden went deeper underground. That is when the commander speculated that the Qaeda leader was moved to a safe house in a city, though he did not say he knew that Bin Laden had gone to Abbottabad.

He and the other commander, who spent 10 years with Harakat, offered no proof of their belief that Bin Laden was under Pakistani military protection. But their views were informed by their years of work with the ISI and their knowledge of how the spy agency routinely handled militant leaders it considered assets ó placing them under protective custody in cities, often close to military installations.

The treatment amounts to a kind of house arrest, to ensure both the security of the asset and his low profile to avoid embarrassment to his protectors.

Art Keller, a former C.I.A. officer who worked in Pakistan in 2006, said he had heard rumors after he left Pakistan in 2007 that Harakat was providing ďbackgroundĒ assistance with logistics in moving and maintaining the Qaeda leader in Pakistan. That did not necessarily mean that members of the group were aware of the role they played or knew of Bin Ladenís whereabouts, another American intelligence official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the nature of his work.

It remains unclear how Bin Laden arrived in Abbottabad, where American officials say he and his family lived for five years, beginning in 2006. The city is home to one of the nationís top military academies, which sits less than a mile from the compound where Bin Laden was killed.

It is also a transit point for militants moving between Kashmir and the tribal areas. The region is the prime recruitment base of Harakat, whose training camps and other facilities still exist nearby in Mansehra.

Through the late 1990s, Harakat collaborated closely with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, sharing training camps and channeling foreign fighters to Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.

The groupís leader, Mr. Khalil, was a co-signer of Bin Ladenís 1998 edict ordering attacks against America. The group even organized press trips for journalists to see Bin Laden in Afghanistan before 9/11 and was used to pass messages to him, said Asad Munir, a retired brigadier and former intelligence official.

Such were the links between the groups that when the United States fired cruise missiles at Bin Ladenís camps in Afghanistan, after the 1998 American Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, 11 Harakat fighters were killed. Some of the groupís fighters were also killed in the bombings of one of Bin Ladenís bases in Afghanistan at the start of the American invasion in October 2001.

Driven Underground

Under strong American pressure, Harakat and similar groups were officially banned and driven underground by the government of President Pervez Musharraf in 2002. Harakat just renamed itself and continued to run camps unencumbered by Pakistani authorities and to train militants, some of whom have been caught while fighting American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, the commanders said.

After 2007, many of its fighters left to join the Taliban, but its leadership and network have remained intact, if reduced, the commanders said. Indeed, Bin Ladenís courier appears to have used a camp in Mansehra that belonged to a Harakat splinter group, Jaish-e-Muhammad, as a transit stop, said an American government official familiar with the analysis of the Bin Laden material.

The Pakistani Army continued its links with the Harakat leadership, in particular Mr. Khalil, Pakistani officials and analysts said. In 2007, Mr. Khalil was used by the Musharraf government as a member of a group of clerics who tried to negotiate an end to a siege by militants at the Red Mosque in Islamabad.

ďThey can find him when they want him,Ē said Muhammad Amir Rana, the director of the Pak Institute of Peace Studies, who has written a book on militant groups.

What role if any Mr. Khalil may have played in helping Bin Laden in Abbottabad, or whether he even knew he was living there, is still not clear. It is also the case that hard-liners within the ranks of his organization may had become disillusioned with their ISI handlers over the years, broke from them and operated more independently.

Another Pakistani militant leader closely connected to Bin Laden is Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the leader of Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami. Mr. Akhtar stopped in South Waziristan on the way to Afghanistan just months ago, a militant interviewed by phone said.

The presence in Waziristan of Mr. Akhtar ó who is wanted in connection with the attack that killed Benazir Bhutto, a former prime minister, in 2007 ó demonstrated that he could still move freely without ISI interference.

A report by the Pakistani Interior Ministry said that Mr. Akhtar had visited Bin Laden in August 2009 near the border with Afghanistan to discuss jihadist operations against Pakistan, according to an account that was published in the Pakistani newspaper The Daily Times in 2010.

It is the only recorded episode showing that Bin Ladenís presence inside Pakistan was known to Pakistani intelligence, until the American raid that killed him.


Carlotta Gall reported from Islamabad, and Eric Schmitt from Washington. Jane Perlez and Salman Masood contributed reporting from Islamabad, and Mark Mazzetti from Washington.

S2
24 Jun 11,, 15:29
So?

The link would have sufficed. I'd prefer YOUR commentary over a re-iteration of the article. A useless waste of space IMV if readers are adept at clicking a link. Please offer YOUR thoughts as a basis for promoting discussion.

What's valuable here is the long-linkage of Harakat-ul-Mujahideen to both the ISI and Al Qaeda. Also interesting is the continued operations despite an ostensible banning by Musharraf early last decade. The article clearly debunks A.M.'s assertion that OBL was an isolated entity devoid of influence with local A.Q./insurgent circles. It also makes clear the geographic importance Abbottabad has played in the increasing transit of insurgents from POK to FATAville and beyond into Afghanistan.

Dreadnought
24 Jun 11,, 16:53
So?

The link would have sufficed. I'd prefer YOUR commentary over a re-iteration of the article. A useless waste of space IMV if readers are adept at clicking a link. Please offer YOUR thoughts as a basis for promoting discussion.

What's valuable here is the long-linkage of Harakat-ul-Mujahideen to both the ISI and Al Qaeda. Also interesting is the continued operations despite an ostensible banning by Musharraf early last decade. The article clearly debunks A.M.'s assertion that OBL was an isolated entity devoid of influence with local A.Q./insurgent circles. It also makes clear the geographic importance Abbottabad has played in the increasing transit of insurgents from POK to FATAville and beyond into Afghanistan.

It also makes one wonder who else is being hidden close to military establishments inside of Pakistan and with their knowing. The US would be smart to continue operations inside of Pakistan via the drones.

Tronic
24 Jun 11,, 18:55
So?

The link would have sufficed. I'd prefer YOUR commentary over a re-iteration of the article. A useless waste of space IMV if readers are adept at clicking a link. Please offer YOUR thoughts as a basis for promoting discussion.

There is nothing which surprises me about all this. I recall having a discussion with you few years back where you put the onus on India to stop the alleged proxy activities in Afghanistan against Pakistan, and drawback forces from the Pakistani border to allow the Pakistanis to divert. After all these years, I think it is ample clear that the Indian bogeyman was exaggerated and merely an excuse, and these chaps are not serious about taking the fight to these militants or even seeking a divorce with them. I had told you than that time will tell, and I believe time has told.

If anyone is currently watching the internal politics of Pakistan, that nation hardly looks like it has learnt its lessons. Zardari seems to have turned into the official mouthpiece of the Pakistani army, staunchly defending them and shooting down any criticism against them. They are still running along with the contention of Pakistan as a national security state (terming the Pakistani army as the saviour of not just geographical boundaries but the ideological saviour of Islam), rather than a national welfare state. Full speech for those who understand urdu: (YouTube - ‪Asif Ali Zardari Speech 21 June 2011 Full Video‬‏ (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TDB3KP8NCfg)).

Another more serious remark came from the Pakistani PM Yousaf Gillani, who, in a political rally stated that, 'Pakistan will fight India for a 1000 more years'. That speech was made yesterday.

Don't know after the army, and the civilian leadership, where else to turn to for hope in that country. They both seem utterly irresponsible players.



It also makes clear the geographic importance Abbottabad has played in the increasing transit of insurgents from POK to FATAville and beyond into Afghanistan.

Mansehra and suburbs of Rawalpindi are also traditional insurgent training hubs. Hope the CIA is digging into those aswell.

Dreadnought
24 Jun 11,, 19:26
Another more serious remark came from the Pakistani PM Yousaf Gillani, who, in a political rally stated that, 'Pakistan will fight India for a 1000 more years'. That speech was made yesterday

And another idiot that should not be in power anymore. Might be easy for him to say, Im pretty sure he lives quite comfortably but what about the people that will be effected by that 1000 more year war and are piss poor. Idiot.:rolleyes:

Double Edge
24 Jun 11,, 20:24
Another more serious remark came from the Pakistani PM Yousaf Gillani, who, in a political rally stated that, 'Pakistan will fight India for a 1000 more years'. That speech was made yesterday

And another idiot that should not be in power anymore. Might be easy for him to say, Im pretty sure he lives quite comfortably but what about the people that will be effected by that 1000 more year war and are piss poor. Idiot.:rolleyes:
If the Pak Army has its back to the wall it could use a diversion to get the ppl of its back. We'll just have to be vigilant.

S2
24 Jun 11,, 22:17
"...I recall having a discussion with you few years back where you put the onus on India to stop the alleged proxy activities in Afghanistan against Pakistan..."

For the record, I don't. I've been pretty damned consistent with Pakistanis that India holds no unique edge AS YET in Afghanistan. There's been not one independant report from third-nation forces, NGOs or independant media about Indian cross-border activity. Nor does India hold any more consulates than Pakistan. Moreover, Indian consulates and embassy are in the exact same cities as Pakistani.

As such, you've nothing of which I'm aware that needs stopping.

Tronic
24 Jun 11,, 23:23
"...I recall having a discussion with you few years back where you put the onus on India to stop the alleged proxy activities in Afghanistan against Pakistan..."

For the record, I don't. I've been pretty damned consistent with Pakistanis that India holds no unique edge AS YET in Afghanistan. There's been not one independant report from third-nation forces, NGOs or independant media about Indian cross-border activity. Nor does India hold any more consulates than Pakistan. Moreover, Indian consulates and embassy are in the exact same cities as Pakistani.

As such, you've nothing of which I'm aware that needs stopping.

S2, I apologize if that conversation wasn't with you, I may be mistaken.

S2
24 Jun 11,, 23:41
"S2, I apologize if that conversation wasn't with you..."

tronic, it's a sad part of the narrative taken on by many Pakistanis. Of course, the narrative involves outside forces. It's suitable to a mindset precluding the notion of infected home-grown terror and finds roots in the assumption that Indians and Afghans share a duality of hatred for Pakistan's use of proxy armies. As such it seeks to divert attention away Pakistan's long-standing effort to de-stabilize the nascent Afghan government.

Of course, this has little effect upon Afghans, Indians and western powers but, then again, it's not intended as such. Simply, this perverted narrative intends to absolve Pakistan from the bloody results in Afghanistan arising from sponsorship and sanctuary to the Afghan taliban leadership and their men.

A.M., in particular, has recently taken up this cry regarding both the terror activities within Pakistan of Al Qaeda's amir of Kunar, Qari Ziaul Rehman along with Afghanistan's brief hosting of Brahamdagh Bugti. He conveniently ignores past and ongoing combat operations against Rehman's forces by U.S. and Afghan troops that disspell any notion of "sanctuary". A.M. also ignores the intense discomfort within the Afghan government caused by Bugti's presence and, thus, his subsequent immigration to Switzerland. In both cases, most of all, A.M. ignores the long elapsed time (nearly a decade) predating Rehman's operations and Bugti coupled with the immense size of the anti-afghan effort conducted by proxy taliban forces of Pakistani state policy.

Tronic
25 Jun 11,, 05:42
"S2, I apologize if that conversation wasn't with you..."

tronic, it's a sad part of the narrative taken on by many Pakistanis. Of course, the narrative involves outside forces. It's suitable to a mindset precluding the notion of infected home-grown terror and finds roots in the assumption that Indians and Afghans share a duality of hatred for Pakistan's use of proxy armies. As such it seeks to divert attention away Pakistan's long-standing effort to de-stabilize the nascent Afghan government.

Of course, this has little effect upon Afghans, Indians and western powers but, then again, it's not intended as such. Simply, this perverted narrative intends to absolve Pakistan from the bloody results in Afghanistan arising from sponsorship and sanctuary to the Afghan taliban leadership and their men.

A.M., in particular, has recently taken up this cry regarding both the terror activities within Pakistan of Al Qaeda's amir of Kunar, Qari Ziaul Rehman along with Afghanistan's brief hosting of Brahamdagh Bugti. He conveniently ignores past and ongoing combat operations against Rehman's forces by U.S. and Afghan troops that disspell any notion of "sanctuary". A.M. also ignores the intense discomfort within the Afghan government caused by Bugti's presence and, thus, his subsequent immigration to Switzerland. In both cases, most of all, A.M. ignores the long elapsed time (nearly a decade) predating Rehman's operations and Bugti coupled with the immense size of the anti-afghan effort conducted by proxy taliban forces of Pakistani state policy.

I think highsea described it best. Cognitive dissonance. No better way to put it. It is better for the regional powers to sit down and figure out how they will contain the extremists within Pakistan. To think that something will change internally, or that peace can be negotiated with people who themselves don't have total control over their lands is a frail and hopeless rationale.

The Pakistan army is heavily infected and influenced by extremists. Ofcourse this charge will again be vehemently denied and opposed, though, I'll point out here that the recent arrest of a major in GHQ Rawalpindi for extremist connections is only a tip of the iceberg. A window to Pakistan's future was seen after the assassination of Salman Taseer by his own bodyguard. The chap was turned into a hero with highly educated people, lawyers flocking to represent and defend him, his admirers tossing flower petals on him, kissing him, garlanding him. So what happened to the chap? Its been 6 months, and he's yet to be tried, even though he has proudly confessed to pulling the trigger. Pakistan's institutions are sympathetic to this wave of extremism or, more probably the case, they are scared. This fight is a lost one, and AM, Asim and co's assurances, denials and justifications will only last until the ship finally sinks below them.

Officer of Engineers
25 Jun 11,, 07:14
Ofcourse this charge will again be vehemently denied and opposed, though, I'll point out here that the recent arrest of a major in GHQ Rawalpindi for extremist connections is only a tip of the iceberg.It will change when Pakistan and China goes to war.

Double Edge
25 Jun 11,, 09:16
I think highsea described it best. Cognitive dissonance. No better way to put it. It is better for the regional powers to sit down and figure out how they will contain the extremists within Pakistan. To think that something will change internally, or that peace can be negotiated with people who themselves don't have total control over their lands is a frail and hopeless rationale.

The Pakistan army is heavily infected and influenced by extremists. Ofcourse this charge will again be vehemently denied and opposed, though, I'll point out here that the recent arrest of a major in GHQ Rawalpindi for extremist connections is only a tip of the iceberg. A window to Pakistan's future was seen after the assassination of Salman Taseer by his own bodyguard. The chap was turned into a hero with highly educated people, lawyers flocking to represent and defend him, his admirers tossing flower petals on him, kissing him, garlanding him. So what happened to the chap? Its been 6 months, and he's yet to be tried, even though he has proudly confessed to pulling the trigger. Pakistan's institutions are sympathetic to this wave of extremism or, more probably the case, they are scared. This fight is a lost one, and AM, Asim and co's assurances, denials and justifications will only last until the ship finally sinks below them.
Pakistanis are Getting Tired | SAAG | 22 June 2011 (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers46/paper4563.html)

Somewhat echoes what Asim had been saying recently.

Things may change when the ppl realise that the extremists that the army uses for strategic depth are also quite useful at keeping their own ppl caged in like with Taseer's & Shezad's death. There was one quote mentioned that got my attention


The choice before us is very clear: show sincerity in wiping out terrorism from Pakistan and help Afghanistan and the US to do the same on the other side of the Durand Line. Once that strategic shift is put in place, relations with India will also start improving. The problem with our military's thinking since Zia-ul-Haq's time was that it went about securing the western border because it wanted to bring India to its heels when its emphasis should have been securing the eastern border first and foremost by building confidence and trust with New Delhi. Doing so would have resulted in acquiring strategic depth in India with many dividends to reap from it

:biggrin:

The Pak army itself isn't doing too well with perceptions amongst the public showing it failed to protect the country after the OBL affair & PNS Mehran. It's also doubtful how reliable its two biggest supporters -- the US & the Pakistani public will be in the future.

Pakistan Army : The Schisms Within | SAAG | 21 Jun 2011 (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers46/paper4559.html)


The Pakistani public was the strongest admirers and supporters of the Pakistan Army so far. Today the Pakistan Army has lost the trust and respect of the Pakistani nation so much so that the Generals have been forced to state in their communique that it is not good for the Pakistan Army to be maligned and disrespected.

The United States has irrationally bolstered successive Pakistan Army military regimes overthrowing civilian governments. The United States unquestioned support for the Pakistan Army encouraged the growth of Pakistan Army's illusions of strategic grandeur far outweighing its true military worth. The Pakistan Army was led to believe that that it could box much above its true worth.

Today when nemesis has finally caught up with the Pakistan Army, the Pakistani Generals are for the first time confused as to how to deal with the challenges that now stare squarely in its face.

The Pakistan Army Generals can issue strong condemnations and warnings to the United States over what has happened in the last two months, but what condemnation and warnings can the Pakistan Army issue against the Pakistani public?

Tronic
26 Jun 11,, 06:13
It will change when Pakistan and China goes to war.

Sir, China is pleased so long the Pakistanis don't allow the mess to spill over into Xinjiang. And the Pakistanis have been very willing to crack down on anti-Chinese insurgents on their land. Moreover, China's citizens feel very disconnected with this war on terror. China's state owned media reports: Poll tracks Chinese view of US after Bin Laden's death - GlobalTimes (http://world.globaltimes.cn/americas/2011-05/655840.html)
China Times (Taiwan based) says this: Many Chinese 'saddened' by death of Bin Laden (http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID=&id=20110506000008)

With the commentary in both giving off that Taliban, AQ, and other insurgents are also perceived in China as a boon. Keeping the Americans busy, away from China. I don't think China would give two hoots about Pakistan being hijacked by extremists, so long they stay oriented towards India, Afghanistan, the West, and keep their gaze away from China.

Vinod2070
26 Jun 11,, 07:45
It will change when Pakistan and China goes to war.

What circumstances do you see for such an eventuality to happen?

Also Pakistan is now a nuclear weapon state courtesy China. So the same constraints that apply to India would apply to China? No?

Double Edge
26 Jun 11,, 10:10
What circumstances do you see for such an eventuality to happen?
OOE mentioned this some time back, the circumstance are when India & Pakistan makes peace with each other :)

vsdoc
26 Jun 11,, 10:13
According to OOE, when India & Pakistan makes peace with each other :)

There will only be true peace between India and Pakistan when one of them is no longer able or fit to wage war.

In such a case, war with China becomes a non-issue.

Wayfarer
26 Jun 11,, 10:28
It will change when Pakistan and China goes to war.


OOE mentioned this some time back, the circumstance are when India & Pakistan makes peace with each other :)

Apart from the Uighurs in Xinjiang, I can't see any rationale or reason why China would invade Pakistan OOE sir.

Double Edge
26 Jun 11,, 15:29
Start reading from here (http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/middle-east-north-africa/50967-siege-mecca-4.html#post754706)


if India wants to see a war between Pakistan and China, make peace with Pakistan.


OoE first made this observation based on Chinese strategic outlook, which for example led them to collaborate with the Viets against the US... but promptly turned to mutual war once Americans made peace with Vietnam and got out. If a GoP made peace with India, the Chinese would intervene on behalf of a hawkish-party in Pakistan; if that failed it may turn to war to punish Pakistan for their betrayal.. Also one must consider that Pakistan would probably be making this peace with external (read US) backing - so it would be logical for China to fear encirclement and lash out against Pakistan to warn off the US against further interference in its backyard (shades of its strategy against USSR). Do you begin to see the big picture? India is the wildcard


You don't even have to look very hard to see the foundations of a Sino-Pak War. Pakistan helped created and supported the Taliban. The Taliban spread their violence into China ... and Russia and Iran. While Pakistan thus far has refused to support the Uyghar rebels, the Taliban had no such qualms.

Take away India and you will see Pakistan asserting its traditional leadership rights ... and that means extending protection over its clients and while not outright support, you will see the same kind of support Pakistan is currently giving Indian terror groups. The Uyghars will be able to establish humanitarian offices in Pakistan and outright bases in Afghanistan.

Really, India is the only glue between the two countries and that's only because Pakistan is blinded by it.

Betrayal = Changing Sides. Vietnam did it (de facto) and the Sino-Vietnam War was the result; it was based on this event and study of Chinese strategic outlook that OoE predicted such a war in the first place.

The Chinese supplied the Pak nuke program, so presumably they know a thing or two about controlling it. Tibet indeed acts as a buffer-zone in this case, as few Pak capabilities reach beyond this zone. And the US would certainly not have signed a treaty to come to Pak's defense so early in its peace bid with India, given Pak's propensity for loose cannon action.

The above comes with a disclaimer


Not going to happen anytime soon. The honest strategic read is that China can play Pakistan against India for the foreseeable future.

I'd be careful predicting furture wars. What I and Cactus did was to show you that outside of India, Pakistan and China has more friction than commonality. Pakistan views herself as a regional power but her policies are often contradict other superior powers. Simply put Pakistan hates India far more than she loves China.