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xinhui
15 Jun 11,, 07:13
While most of the folks in academic have a different view on the war (they tend to be on Henry's side), popular view of the war is also changing

Amazon.com: On China (9781594202711): Henry Kissinger: Books (http://www.amazon.com/China-Henry-Kissinger/dp/1594202710)

Henry writes "On China" page 3701 "touching the tiger's buttocks"

China achieved this objective in part by its military daring, in part by drawing the United States into unprecedentedly close cooperation. China's leader had navigated the third Vietnam war (1979) by meticulous analysis of their strategic choices, daring execution and skillful diplomacy (normalize relations with Japan, visit to Singapore) and skillful diplomacy, with all those qualities, they would not have been able to "touch the buttocks of the tigers" but for the cooperation of the United States.

The third Vietnam war ushered in the closest collaboration between China and the United States for the period of the Cold War. Tow trips to China by American emissaries established an extraordinary degree of joint action. Vice President Walter "Fritz" Mondale visited China in August 1979 to devise a diplomacy for the aftermath of the Deng visit, especially with respect to Indochina. it was a complex problem in which strategic and moral considerations were in severe conflict. The United States and China greed that it was in each country's national interest to prevent the emergence of an Indochinese Federation under Hanoi's control
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page 373

Beijing did impose heavy costs on Vietnam. Chinese diplomacy in SE Asia before, during, and after the war worked with great determination and skill to isolate Hanoi. China maintained a heavy military presence along the border, retained several disputed pieces of territory, and continued to hold out the threat of a 'second lesson' to Hanoi. For years afterword, Vietnam was forced to support considerable force on its northern border to defend against another possible Chinese attack. As Deng has told Mondale in August 1979.

page 374

"for a country of that size to keep a standing force of more than one million, where will you find enough work force? A standard force of one million needs a lot of logistical support. Now they depend on the Soviet Union. Some estimate say they are getting $2 million a day from the Soviet Union, some estimate say $2 1/2 million....[I]t will increase difficulties and this burden on the Soviet Union will grow heavier and heavier. Things will become more difficult. In time the Vietnamese will come to realize that not all their requests to the Soviet Union can be met. In those circumstance perhaps a new situation will emerge.

That situation did, in fact, occur over a decade later when the collapse of the Soviet Union and of Soviet financial support brought above a retrenchment in Vietnamese deployment in Cambodia. Ultimately over a time period more difficult to sustain for democratic societies, China achieved a considerable part of its strategic objectives in SE Asia. Deng achieved sufficient maneuvering room to meet his objective of thwarting Soviet domination of SE Asia and the Malacca Strait.

..
In retrospect, Moscow's relatives passivity in the third Vietnam war can be seen as the first symptom of the decline of the Soviet Union.

Page 375

The third Vietnam war may thus be counted as another example in which Chinese statesmen successed in achieving long-term, big-picture strategic objectives without the benefit of a military establishment comparable to that of their adversaries. Though providing breathing space for the remnants of the Khmer Rouge can hardly be counted as a moral victory, China achieved its larger geopolitical aims vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Vietnam-- both of whole militaries were better trained and equipped than China.

Page 376

Singapore's Prime Minister lee Kuan Yew has summed up the ultimate result of the war: "The Western press wrote off the Chinese punitive action as a failure. I believe it changed the history of East Asia.

Double Edge
15 Jun 11,, 09:54
Ah, you beat me to it xinhui. Wanted to start a thread in the book section about 'On China'. How to go about it is the challenge though.

So i looked for reviews in various newspapers. Lots of arguments pro & con. Some even against Kissinger himself because he was such a polarising figure and the left absolutely hates him. One needs to be aware of this bias and discount it to get at the essence of what he is saying.

What do you suggest ?

Maybe looking at small sections in narrow areas might be a better idea as you've done here. Better to have seperate threads on various parts of the book rather than one BIG thread on it ?

The main question to answer for me is how important is this book to non-americans or chinese in gaining an understanding of China. That would be the present day China rather than of the 70s where Kissinger made his mark.

xinhui
15 Jun 11,, 17:40
Henry has his bias that is for sure -- love to see how he kept referring how the Uber statesmen save the day, I can see that he is not talk about Deng or Zhou, but himself rather.

Some of the stuff in the first chapters are echoed by many historians, seriously students of history will gain little. That said, it is a ready enjoyable and easy read. he writes well. One thing for sure, he has a better understanding of Chinese strategic culture than most.

Double Edge
15 Jun 11,, 18:34
So, do you want to keep this thread strictly about 1979-soviet vietnam war or is it ok to introduce here other ideas from his book ?

Intend to get the book when its out in paperback.

Officer of Engineers
15 Jun 11,, 19:58
That situation did, in fact, occur over a decade later when the collapse of the Soviet Union and of Soviet financial support brought above a retrenchment in Vietnamese deployment in Cambodia. Ultimately over a time period more difficult to sustain for democratic societies, China achieved a considerable part of its strategic objectives in SE Asia. Deng achieved sufficient maneuvering room to meet his objective of thwarting Soviet domination of SE Asia and the Malacca Strait.

..
In retrospect, Moscow's relatives passivity in the third Vietnam war can be seen as the first symptom of the decline of the Soviet Union.

Page 375

The third Vietnam war may thus be counted as another example in which Chinese statesmen successed in achieving long-term, big-picture strategic objectives without the benefit of a military establishment comparable to that of their adversaries. Though providing breathing space for the remnants of the Khmer Rouge can hardly be counted as a moral victory, China achieved its larger geopolitical aims vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Vietnam-- both of whole militaries were better trained and equipped than China.

Page 376

Singapore's Prime Minister lee Kuan Yew has summed up the ultimate result of the war: "The Western press wrote off the Chinese punitive action as a failure. I believe it changed the history of East Asia.A lot of revisionism here. I remember that there were general low level panic on just how far behind the PLA was and by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, just how far ahead the Soviet Army was. The natural barriers the PLA was counting on were no match for Soviet engineers.

For 15 years, China let both USSR and Vietnam to have their way. It was only in 1984 that the PLA achieved some sort of military superiority over their Vietnamese foe but not enough to deny them their say in SE Asia.

Come 1990s, China was in no shape to dictate anything, having just suffer Tianamen and the resulting economic collapse. While both China and Afghanistan took their toll on the Soviet budget, there can be no denying that it was Reagan who posted the challenge that collapse them, not China.

xinhui
15 Jun 11,, 20:36
But Col, that won't fit into Henry's narrative, wouldn't it? Again, he is looking at this from the POV of a Uber statesman. That said, he idea that the Chinese strategic culture is not "event based" but rather long-term planned is on the mark.

Mihais
15 Jun 11,, 21:47
Sirs,I'm a bit in the dark here.I heard this idea from the Colonel about the fright the Soviet Army caused the PLA after '79 a few times.But was it justified considering the different context?
The Soviets had~50 divisions in the Far East.The Chinese had terrain ,the PLA and the People's War doctrine.The 40th Army had only terrain to conquer during initial stages.It was no mean feat,but still,nobody shot at them.

Officer of Engineers
15 Jun 11,, 23:08
The initial PLA defence lines were 100 miles into China. In other words, they were relying on that 100 miles to stretch and to delay the Soviet Army. Afghanistan showed that 100 miles might as well be 100 feet.

Also compared to their own advances in Vietnam, the Soviets not only managed to hide their axis of advance but did not suffer the delays the Chinese encountered.

The Chinese relied heavily on saturation fire which was not the case with the Soviets who had no qualms about human recce forces and thus enjoyed a superiority of accurate fire the Chinese had no clue on how to achieve.

The Soviets planned their operations so well that they never allowed the enemy to set up even a hasty defence. This in contrast that the Chinese were meeting ambushes left, right, and centred.

Soviet tanks drove right through the heart of Afghanistan. Chinese tanks were stung to death by RPG traps.

DOR
16 Jun 11,, 02:09
I remember watching the '79 invasion unfold while at Cal. One of the researchers in the Center for Chinese Studies was a serving military officer working on his PhD. He knew I was interested in military biographies and factions, so one day he asks me who I would have put in charge of the invasion.

I couldn't answer him.

So, he says, Who was the last guy to have huge success as an officer in combat?

I couldn't answer him.

Ever heard of General Xu Shiyou?

Ah. The penny dropped. The best fighting general available was last in combat in the Korean War !

drhuy
17 Jun 11,, 03:28
Soviet tanks drove right through the heart of Afghanistan. Chinese tanks were stung to death by RPG traps.

I never knew Afghan had any force as one-tenth effective as Vietnamese army

Officer of Engineers
17 Jun 11,, 04:17
I never knew Afghan had any force as one-tenth effective as Vietnamese armyThe point was the Soviet Army read their enemy. The Chinese did not ... or rather, don't know how to read their enemy. Even with warning, the Afghans could not put up a fight. The Chinese gave months of warning to the Vietnamese.

drhuy
17 Jun 11,, 05:50
The Chinese gave months of warning to the Vietnamese.

Exactly opposite. The Vietnamese was totally surprised.

Officer of Engineers
17 Jun 11,, 05:53
You could have fooled me. Those were not hasty defences that bled the first Chinese advance to a halt. The kill zones were too well defined for a surprised attack.

drhuy
17 Jun 11,, 05:57
You could have fooled me. Those were not hasty defences that bled the first Chinese advance to a halt. The kill zones were too well defined for a surprised attack.

Events interpretation could be wrong. The first waves of Chinese were countered only by local defense forces. The fact that one side sucked doesn't mean the other side was well-prepared, it's simply because they sucked. Period.

Officer of Engineers
17 Jun 11,, 06:03
Events interpretation could be wrong. The first waves of Chinese were countered only by local defense forces. The fact that one side sucked doesn't mean the other side was well-prepared, it's simply because they sucked. Period.Hardly. The AARs defined well established positions at the platoon and company level requiring superior weaponry to dislodge. These positions were well dug in and withstood army level indirect fire and required special weapons platoons to dislodge.

The failure of the Chinese was not the lack of determination, 30,000 casualties states just how determined they were. Given the lack of counter-battery operations by the Vietnamese, these casualties were suffered at the close quarters environment. This could only have had happened if the Vietnamese were just as determined (whether you accept the Chinese claims of 50,000 casualties or not) but it definitely meant superior Chinese fire could not dislodge the Vietnamese defenders and that could only have happened if they were dug in.

Officer of Engineers
17 Jun 11,, 06:25
And please, don't use that "local defence forces/barefoot militia" thing with us. Those formations were filled with combat veterans from the Saigon-Hanoi Wars. They were regforce in everyway but name.

drhuy
17 Jun 11,, 06:39
Hardly. The AARs defined well established positions at the platoon and company level requiring superior weaponry to dislodge. These positions were well dug in and withstood army level indirect fire and required special weapons platoons to dislodge.

I don't get it. The fact that they had their defense lines in place and the fact whether they knew in advance about the attack are totally different. Vietnam has fought China for thousands years, of course their border would look much different from let say the US-Canada border.

drhuy
17 Jun 11,, 06:39
And please, don't use that "local defence forces/barefoot militia" thing with us. Those formations were filled with combat veterans from the Saigon-Hanoi Wars. They were regforce in everyway but name.

lol, then name some of them?

Officer of Engineers
17 Jun 11,, 07:04
I don't get it. The fact that they had their defense lines in place and the fact whether they knew in advance about the attack are totally different. Vietnam has fought China for thousands years, of course their border would look much different from let say the US-Canada border.You've had border clashes since 1978. You've just conquered Cambodia. The Chinese mobilized eight group armies. The Chinese warned Moscow not to get involved. And you're telling me that the strategic thinkers who won the Saigon-Hanoi Wars had no clue the Chinese were coming?


lol, then name some of them?My friend Andy did that

Sino-Vietnam war 1979 orbat (http://orbat.com/site/history/historical/vietnam/war1979.html)

drhuy
17 Jun 11,, 07:20
You've had border clashes since 1978. You've just conquered Cambodia. The Chinese mobilized eight group armies. The Chinese warned Moscow not to get involved. And you're telling me that the strategic thinkers who won the Saigon-Hanoi Wars had no clue the Chinese were coming?

Doesn't matter. Like I said, Vietnam has fought China for thousands of years. China always is their biggest threat, every Vietnamese know that, don't need a strategist to figure that out. But we are not talking at institutional and strategic levels, arent we? You said Vietnam knew in advance about the attack and were waiting for the Chinese, didnt you? No, you're plain wrong.

drhuy
17 Jun 11,, 07:32
About the orbat,you should know that 3 out of 4 main Vietnamese Armies were still at Cambodia at the time the attack started. The only one left (1st Army) was kept around the Red River delta and remained there for the rest of the war. The 2nd Army later was moved north but never took part in any action.

Officer of Engineers
17 Jun 11,, 13:52
Doesn't matter. Like I said, Vietnam has fought China for thousands of years. China always is their biggest threat, every Vietnamese know that, don't need a strategist to figure that out. But we are not talking at institutional and strategic levels, arent we? You said Vietnam knew in advance about the attack and were waiting for the Chinese, didnt you? No, you're plain wrong.You mean to tell me that your strategic thinkers did not noticed the mobilization of 300,000 men (going both north and south)? What kind of idiots were they? That is warning plain and simple. There was plenty of warning and if you believe your strategic thinkers didn't noticed, then, they should have been fired.

Tell me, does the Vietnamese normally issued ammunition to troops during peacetime?


About the orbat,you should know that 3 out of 4 main Vietnamese Armies were still at Cambodia at the time the attack started. The only one left (1st Army) was kept around the Red River delta and remained there for the rest of the war. The 2nd Army later was moved north but never took part in any action.Does it changed the fact that your forces were combat veterans?

drhuy
18 Jun 11,, 05:38
You mean to tell me that your strategic thinkers did not noticed the mobilization of 300,000 men (going both north and south)? What kind of idiots were they? That is warning plain and simple. There was plenty of warning and if you believe your strategic thinkers didn't noticed, then, they should have been fired.

Tell me, does the Vietnamese normally issued ammunition to troops during peacetime?

Does it changed the fact that your forces were combat veterans?

which thinkers? what mobilization? which peace time?

Of course a part of Vietnamese army were combat veteran at that time. But like I said, most of them were still in Cambodia. 4 main Vietnamese Armies NEVER (N-E-V-E-R) took part in any action. Vietnam could never have enough resources, even with help from USSR, to maintain 2 huge conventional forces in 2 fronts. Most units stationed in the northern border at that time were not fully combat effective. Later in the war, the Russian had to help establish an airborne bridge to move forces from Cambodia. Sound like a well-prepared plan?

Again, and this time you'd better listen carefully: Vietnamese leaders were caught completely surprised by the TIME and SCALE of the attack. Anything other than that is just pure SPECULATION.

Officer of Engineers
18 Jun 11,, 08:08
which thinkers? what mobilization? which peace time?

Of course a part of Vietnamese army were combat veteran at that time. But like I said, most of them were still in Cambodia. 4 main Vietnamese Armies NEVER (N-E-V-E-R) took part in any action. Vietnam could never have enough resources, even with help from USSR, to maintain 2 huge conventional forces in 2 fronts. Most units stationed in the northern border at that time were not fully combat effective. Later in the war, the Russian had to help establish an airborne bridge to move forces from Cambodia. Sound like a well-prepared plan?

Again, and this time you'd better listen carefully: Vietnamese leaders were caught completely surprised by the TIME and SCALE of the attack. Anything other than that is just pure SPECULATION.And for the last time, you freaking lazy dumb ass! Your freaking Generals COULD NOT HAVE MISSED EIGHT CHINESE GROUP ARMIES BEING READIED FOR WAR. THIS IS NOT SPECULATION. THIS IS SIMPLE INTEL.

No, VIETNAM WAS NOT CAUGHT BY SURPRISED BY THE TIME AND SCALE. EIGHT CHINESE ARMIES WERE MOBILIZED. And you keep telling me that your Generals had absolutely no clue what that means, especially the same Generals who made similar mobilizations attacking south.

So, right now, you are trying to tell me that ~90,000 men just happened to be issued ammunition. Got to their assignments overnight. Had enough food and water prepared to last days. Yeah, tell that to someone else who had absolutely no clue about mobilization. Even if these were your secondary troops, ESPECIALLY IF THESE ARE YOUR SECONDARY TROOPS, you want to tell me that they had over 10,000 rounds of ammunition, marched overnight, and were issued proper orders when the Chinese attack.

I will give you that Hanoi had absolutely no clue about Chinese objectives but what the hell would they have thought 300,000 Chinese troops being mobilized meant? For a picnic?

Tell that to someone else who knows nothing about mobilization.

This is ain't speculation. This is getting men from beds from home to their front lines.

drhuy
21 Jun 11,, 17:20
And for the last time, you freaking lazy dumb ass! Your freaking Generals COULD NOT HAVE MISSED EIGHT CHINESE GROUP ARMIES BEING READIED FOR WAR. THIS IS NOT SPECULATION. THIS IS SIMPLE INTEL.

No, VIETNAM WAS NOT CAUGHT BY SURPRISED BY THE TIME AND SCALE. EIGHT CHINESE ARMIES WERE MOBILIZED. And you keep telling me that your Generals had absolutely no clue what that means, especially the same Generals who made similar mobilizations attacking south.

So, right now, you are trying to tell me that ~90,000 men just happened to be issued ammunition. Got to their assignments overnight. Had enough food and water prepared to last days. Yeah, tell that to someone else who had absolutely no clue about mobilization. Even if these were your secondary troops, ESPECIALLY IF THESE ARE YOUR SECONDARY TROOPS, you want to tell me that they had over 10,000 rounds of ammunition, marched overnight, and were issued proper orders when the Chinese attack.

I will give you that Hanoi had absolutely no clue about Chinese objectives but what the hell would they have thought 300,000 Chinese troops being mobilized meant? For a picnic?

Tell that to someone else who knows nothing about mobilization.

This is ain't speculation. This is getting men from beds from home to their front lines.

Guess what? We're gonna discuss this in a mature and civilized way. I'm tired of your SPECULATION. Give me some FACT unless you dont want me to take you seriously.

xinhui
22 Jun 11,, 00:03
drhuy
it is the other way around for those who follows this thread.

Doktor
22 Jun 11,, 01:35
Damn chew-toy and troll gods got better, now they have sleepers, too.

Officer of Engineers
22 Jun 11,, 05:43
Guess what? We're gonna discuss this in a mature and civilized way. I'm tired of your SPECULATION. Give me some FACT unless you dont want me to take you seriously.Fine. Let's do this the mature way. The Canadian SOP to get readied reserved brigade, ie a 1000 man militia, to a war footing is 30 days.

What is the Vietnamese standard for 90,000 men?

Whom is authorized in the Vietnamese militia during peacetime, ie not expecting a Chinese attack at all, is allowed to keep over 10,000 rounds of ammunition in their homes? IE, the ammunition expenditures encountered by the Chinese at various locations?

Repatriated Canuck
22 Jun 11,, 06:39
Guess what? We're gonna discuss this in a mature and civilized way. I'm tired of your SPECULATION. Give me some FACT unless you dont want me to take you seriously.

I'm really enjoying reading what you have to say. It's like a trainwreck only funny.

OOE is giving you facts over and over. He's also got years of experience in the Canadian military and correct me if I'm wrong Col. but isn't an engineers job very closely related to the construction of defense points? ;p

Officer of Engineers
22 Jun 11,, 07:00
Obstacles but the Bde Col decides the axis of approach and we decide the defence points.

Kansas Bear
24 Jun 11,, 02:21
Wow. I have been here how long and the Colonel is STILL schooling people? Classic.

Hang on, I need to fix me a scotch. :biggrin:

kyli
24 Jun 11,, 04:00
The colonel is very passionate about not allowing anyone to disgenerate this forum.:biggrin:
I will just grab my fritos chips and coke.

drhuy
03 Jul 11,, 14:19
Fine. Let's do this the mature way. The Canadian SOP to get readied reserved brigade, ie a 1000 man militia, to a war footing is 30 days.

What is the Vietnamese standard for 90,000 men?

Whom is authorized in the Vietnamese militia during peacetime, ie not expecting a Chinese attack at all, is allowed to keep over 10,000 rounds of ammunition in their homes? IE, the ammunition expenditures encountered by the Chinese at various locations?

Still no FACT. I get bored. Really!

Look, I will show my FACT as soon as you show yours. That's simple! I don't have time to BS around.

Officer of Engineers
05 Jul 11,, 03:46
Still no FACT. I get bored. Really!

Look, I will show my FACT as soon as you show yours. That's simple! I don't have time to BS around.I have shown you my facts why I believed the Vietnamese claims to be surprised to be horse crap. I've had an entire battalion under my command and I know how much time it needed to get them ready to receive an enemy, even if my battalion are all combat ready.

A Corps needs 72 hours to execute its orders and that time is based upon the US VII Corps, my Corps in the Kuwait War when they were advancing on the Iraqis, with the most modern communications systems in history.

You are trying to tell me that a foot army with foot communications was ready to receive 180,000 Chinese overnight.

Screw off!

Dreadnought
18 Jul 11,, 21:46
Interesting ghost from the past....

Jane Fonda: QVC axed my appearance over politics
Jul 18, 6:23 AM (ET)

By FRAZIER MOORE

NEW YORK (AP) - Jane Fonda says she's been banished from QVC amid concerns about her political past. The network says it was a routine programming change.

Fonda was set to appear on the home-shopping channel on Saturday to promote her new book on aging, "Prime Time." But the day before, she learned her segment had been cancelled.

In a statement posted on her website, Fonda says QVC told her of receiving "a lot of calls" from viewers criticizing her opposition to the Vietnam War and threatening to boycott the show if she was allowed to appear.

Fonda goes on to say she is "deeply disappointed that QVC caved to this kind of insane pressure" and declares, "I love my country."


Paul Capelli, a spokesman for West Chester, Pa.-based QVC, confirmed Fonda's cancelled appearance, but specified no reason.

"It's not unusual to have a schedule change with our shows and guests with little or no notice," he said in an e-mail. Fonda is not currently re-scheduled to appear, he said.

Fonda was dubbed "Hanoi Jane" nearly 40 years ago after visiting the North Vietnamese capital, where she made radio broadcasts critical of U.S. war policy. While there, she was photographed sitting on an anti-aircraft gun laughing and clapping.

Though she still defends her anti-war activism, Fonda has acknowledged that the photo incident was "a betrayal" of American forces.

"That two-minute lapse of sanity will haunt me until the day I die," she wrote in her 2006 autobiography.

The 73-year-old actress won Oscars for her films "Coming Home" and "Klute." Besides her books, she has also produced and starred in a number of bestselling exercise videos.

"Prime Time" will be released next month.


iWon News - Jane Fonda: QVC axed my appearance over politics (http://apnews1.iwon.com/article/20110718/D9OI0JE00.html)