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Debunking The 10:1 Ratio of Forces in COIN

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  • Debunking The 10:1 Ratio of Forces in COIN

    Major Joshua Thiel U.S.A. offers this analysis regarding the commonly-held axiom that counter-insurgent forces must outnumber insurgents by a ratio of 10:1. Using a variety of cases studies drawn from successful and unsuccessful insurgencies reaching back to 1938, Thiel concludes differently.

    To determine his conclusions read here-

    COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking The 10 To 1 Ratio and Surges-SWJ
    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

  • #2
    Pity it does not include Kashmir where if i'm not mistaken the ratio was 24:1.

    Successful COIN depends on manpower, commitment by the govt and budget.

    When it became apparent to the opponent that the insurgency would not succeed there was a rethink and talks were the result. The state of affairs there is much improved compared to the 90s but the army will still not signficantly drawdown and risk its hard won gains.

    The conclusion also states that Iraq could have been won without a surge, that a surge isn't always required. I'm under the impression that each situation is unique, just because a surge was not required elsewhere does not necessarily imply the same in another scenario and vice versa.

    Yes, the job could be done with a lower ratio but its not a given. Ratios rise because results were lacking earlier or a surge would not have been required to begin with.

    That, its not possible to generalise for all insurgencies just that there are a few basic principles that could be followed and the rest is seat-of-your pants stuff :)
    Last edited by Double Edge; 16 Jan 11,, 09:51.

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    • #3
      Originally posted by Double Edge View Post
      Pity it does not include Kashmir where if i'm not mistaken the ratio was 24:1.
      I would be interested to know where you got that number from?


      On the topic,

      The ratio will always be clouded with political motivation. It becomes very convient for a opponent to shout "millions of troops prosecuted ......" etc.

      The definition of "involved in COIN" varies. If a region having border with another nation, is been infiltrated, then a logical conclusion would be try to seal the border with men and material. Now would these men be defined as "involved in COIN"?

      The longer the border, more the men and higher the ratio!

      The objective is to provide security over a geographical area, there by denying militants usage of that space(IA in Kashmir calls this as Security Grid). Needless to say larger the area, more the troops. It is possible that troops in certain areas will never see action, but still be part of the "ratio".


      As far as Kashmir is concerned, IA's true COIN unit RR number around 50K. I dont think they are all deployed in Kashmir(someone correct me if wrong).
      The bulk of the troops are deployed on borders with Pakistan & China.
      IA COIN units are not deployed in cities. They are only present in villages and remote areas.

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      • #4
        Originally posted by n21 View Post
        I would be interested to know where you got that number from?
        I think it was an article or post I read on BRF some years back.

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        • #5
          Interesting study. I wouldn't argue with his data although I've always been a bit suspicious of any concrete assertions about such a fluid, fickle and frustrating type of warfare, especially if its prosecution is controlled by the type of people who need concrete assertions-- i.e. assurances, time tables, force limits, budget restrictions, poll results, exit strategies and restrictive ROE and all the rest of the CYA data-- before they can make a decision.
          Last edited by Red Seven; 17 Jan 11,, 18:01.

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          • #6
            2. questions from an outsider:

            1. Are the insurgencies from the timeframe used in the study really that simple to compare? Is there not a huge difference in the success chance of those insurgencies after automatic weapon become widely and cheaply available?

            2. Would not the first answer to the 10:1 ratio be: "You might not need so much manpower, but it certainly helps?"

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            • #7
              Excellent post S-2

              Finally got time to sit down and not only read but digest.

              These documents never seem to relate to me the training/skill level/ability of the COIN troops, which I think is paramount in determining the levels needed as can be seen (IMO) from some of the data in the report;
              e.g. Ethiopia (73-76)
              and to some extent Algeria (54-62), (yes I know DeGaule made all the right noises when withdrawing, but still I cannot see it as a successful mission, even with the Foriegn Legion present.)

              Never will we be 100% accurate in these estimations, but meticulous planning combined with excellent training IMO can indeed reduce the numbers required to defeat an insurgency.
              That said how do we measure the big variable?
              "THE WILL NOT TO BE DOMINATED AT ANY COST ......and there are a few groups out there with this will to survive.
              sigpicFEAR NAUGHT

              Should raw analytical data ever be passed to policy makers?

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              • #8
                1. Statistical analysis cannot "prove" anything. It can be used to conduct hypothesis testing and at determined thresholds, and you then either reject or fail to reject the hypothesis.

                2. The author's choice to exclude 2 data points is extremely questionable. Both observed data points are within 2 standard deviations, which is typically the point at which you can start to think about classifying them as outliers, and by excluding them, you are cutting an already small sample size by 20%.

                3. When the two data points are included, the "magical" ratio of 10:1 falls within the 95% confidence interval of the observed mean of the data set, meaning that you would reject the hypothesis that the ratio is < 10:1.

                4. By controlling for only troops #s (with no analysis of how solid these #s are or potential biases), the study is not robust.

                Bottomline, it does not prove that the 10:1 ratio - it actually rejects a hypothesis that the ratio is less than 10:1. However, these results are very fragile.
                "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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                • #9
                  Shek Reply

                  "Both observed data points are within 2 standard deviations, which is typically the point at which you can start to think about classifying them as outliers, and by excluding them, you are cutting an already small sample size by 20%."

                  Korea was excluded from the "Insurgent" category while El Salvador was excluded from the "Counter-Insurgent" category. With twenty-two total data points, isn't that only about 9%?
                  "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                  "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by S-2 View Post
                    "Both observed data points are within 2 standard deviations, which is typically the point at which you can start to think about classifying them as outliers, and by excluding them, you are cutting an already small sample size by 20%."

                    Korea was excluded from the "Insurgent" category while El Salvador was excluded from the "Counter-Insurgent" category. With twenty-two total data points, isn't that only about 9%?
                    Steve,
                    He tries to establish both a floor (the threshold at which you will fail) and a ceiling (the threshold above which you don't need more manpower to win). In evaluating the statistical validity, you have to evaluate each calculation. For the ceiling, both El Savador and Sri Lanka are dropped from the sample. To be exact, you're cutting the sample size by 18% (2/11), which is quite a large number to drop as outliers.
                    "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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                    • #11
                      For any other stats buffs out there, here's some Stata output of the counterinsurgent cases.
                      Attached Files
                      "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Shek Reply

                        "For the ceiling, both El Savador and Sri Lanka are dropped from the sample."

                        This is correct. My error. I don't know how I counted Sri Lanka as part of the sample total yet missed that Thiel had excluded it as an outlier. Selective color-blindness I guess.
                        "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                        "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by S-2 View Post
                          "For the ceiling, both El Savador and Sri Lanka are dropped from the sample."

                          This is correct. My error. I don't know how I counted Sri Lanka as part of the sample total yet missed that Thiel had excluded it as an outlier. Selective color-blindness I guess.
                          Steve,
                          No sweat. I like the paper's logic in trying to find a floor and ceiling, but it's statistical application and inferences is simply wrong. Also, I'm not familiar enough with the Correlates of War dataset to know why he chose a random sample instead of the full population of post-1938 insurgencies, but it appears like it doesn't contain the size of the two forces - having more observations would help make the findings more robust, although I doubt by very little because the findings wouldn't control for other variables that would impact the results. Also, what's interesting is that 2/3rds of the references he provides to the 10:1 ratio aren't specific to manpower, but to a more general "expenditure."
                          "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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                          • #14
                            I'm not a statistics guy but I am a COIN guy. It seems to me that if you try to put any "reliable" data on COIN operations, opposing force levels are just one column on a chart of many. Some of you have pointed out variables. Skill, weapons, equipment, terrain, climate, logistics, money, leadership, local politics, national politics, tribal and religious influences, morale, the role of border states or supporting governments, determination and commitment, etc...Some of these are hard to measure but have impact. Pretty sure I left out a few things out.

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                            • #15
                              Originally posted by Red Seven View Post
                              I'm not a statistics guy but I am a COIN guy. It seems to me that if you try to put any "reliable" data on COIN operations, opposing force levels are just one column on a chart of many. Some of you have pointed out variables. Skill, weapons, equipment, terrain, climate, logistics, money, leadership, local politics, national politics, tribal and religious influences, morale, the role of border states or supporting governments, determination and commitment, etc...Some of these are hard to measure but have impact. Pretty sure I left out a few things out.
                              This is what I meant by the fact that the results are fragile - there's just so many other variables to consider. I don't think that coming up with a ratio as a rule of thumb is a bad idea, but it's not a panacea that can replace good strategy that attacks the reasons for an insurgency.
                              "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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