Just finished reading Mark Grimsley's The Hard Hand of War this past week (Google books link). The book was an outstanding treatment of the evolution of Union military policy towards Southern civilians from 1861-65, and dispels numerous myths surrounding the final "hard war" policy that the Union settled upon.
Grimsley clearly draws a distinction between the the "hard war" policy that inflicted "directed severity" upon the economy of the South, and the total war that the world would see in World War 2 with carpet bombing. While both sought to bring the war to the enemy's economic home front, and while the rhetoric of LeMay and Sherman would be comparable, LeMay would find Sherman a pansy. Anything but total war, the Union's "hard war" policy clearly "exempted" poor Southerners, neutrals, and Unionists from economic devestation, instead only directing severe damage against public property or that of the "Secesh" plantation class (this isn't to say that destruction outside of these boundaries didn't occur, but when it did happen, it did so without sanction and under the threat of punishment if caught).
The evolution of policy towards "hard war" found its roots in the Union military reversals of 1862, stemming both from a feeling that Confederacy wouldn't simply fade away, as well as from the fact that the territorial gains in early 1862 were made against largely Unionist sections of the South. The original "conciliation" policy would find itself at home with COIN theory in its prescription to do no harm in order to bring neutrals off the fence (the book was originally written in 1995, so the COIN like similarities is coincidental). During this period, Sherman wrote often about the depravity of the actions of some of his soldiers, who would conduct behavior that would later be within the bounds of "hard war" policy. With the failure of McClellan's Richmond campaign in the summer of 1862 and his fading star, conciliation gave way to pragmatism, which allowed for reprisals in response to guerilla attacks. Soon, in order to cut ties to supply lines and reduce the number of occupation troops to swell the fighting ranks, "hard war" policy emerged, which encouraged supplementing supplies from rich "Secesh." Grant's Vicksburg campaign highlighted the potential in moving to a "hard war" policy.
However, even with a "hard war" policy in place, the evidence regarding directed severity is clear. While South Carolina burned in large part, the way that the destruction wrought by Sherman's column ramped up from GA to SC and then ramped down from SC to NC is a testament to the fact that the destruction was calibrated. He ranges over several other examples, making compelling the case that the Lost Cause description of burning everything is a falsehood, and providing the evidence to reject any claim that Sherman was the first person to resort to "total war."
I'd recommend the book to anyone who is either has an interest in the Civil War or the ethics/morality of war (Grimsley also explores how the "hard war" policy was in keeping with the law of land warfare of the day). For more on the book, you can look at Grimsley's outline of the book (probably lecture notes), a series of blog posts reflecting on his book, or another book review:
http://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/...ilhis/acw4.htm
Civil Warriors Hard Warrior – Pt 1
Thoughts on The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865 by Mark Grimsley | TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog
Grimsley clearly draws a distinction between the the "hard war" policy that inflicted "directed severity" upon the economy of the South, and the total war that the world would see in World War 2 with carpet bombing. While both sought to bring the war to the enemy's economic home front, and while the rhetoric of LeMay and Sherman would be comparable, LeMay would find Sherman a pansy. Anything but total war, the Union's "hard war" policy clearly "exempted" poor Southerners, neutrals, and Unionists from economic devestation, instead only directing severe damage against public property or that of the "Secesh" plantation class (this isn't to say that destruction outside of these boundaries didn't occur, but when it did happen, it did so without sanction and under the threat of punishment if caught).
The evolution of policy towards "hard war" found its roots in the Union military reversals of 1862, stemming both from a feeling that Confederacy wouldn't simply fade away, as well as from the fact that the territorial gains in early 1862 were made against largely Unionist sections of the South. The original "conciliation" policy would find itself at home with COIN theory in its prescription to do no harm in order to bring neutrals off the fence (the book was originally written in 1995, so the COIN like similarities is coincidental). During this period, Sherman wrote often about the depravity of the actions of some of his soldiers, who would conduct behavior that would later be within the bounds of "hard war" policy. With the failure of McClellan's Richmond campaign in the summer of 1862 and his fading star, conciliation gave way to pragmatism, which allowed for reprisals in response to guerilla attacks. Soon, in order to cut ties to supply lines and reduce the number of occupation troops to swell the fighting ranks, "hard war" policy emerged, which encouraged supplementing supplies from rich "Secesh." Grant's Vicksburg campaign highlighted the potential in moving to a "hard war" policy.
However, even with a "hard war" policy in place, the evidence regarding directed severity is clear. While South Carolina burned in large part, the way that the destruction wrought by Sherman's column ramped up from GA to SC and then ramped down from SC to NC is a testament to the fact that the destruction was calibrated. He ranges over several other examples, making compelling the case that the Lost Cause description of burning everything is a falsehood, and providing the evidence to reject any claim that Sherman was the first person to resort to "total war."
I'd recommend the book to anyone who is either has an interest in the Civil War or the ethics/morality of war (Grimsley also explores how the "hard war" policy was in keeping with the law of land warfare of the day). For more on the book, you can look at Grimsley's outline of the book (probably lecture notes), a series of blog posts reflecting on his book, or another book review:
http://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/...ilhis/acw4.htm
Civil Warriors Hard Warrior – Pt 1
Thoughts on The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865 by Mark Grimsley | TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog
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