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ISAF's Vision For COIN

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  • ISAF's Vision For COIN

    Here's a series of six videos explaining ISAF's vision for COIN operations as presented by ISAF Command Sergeant Major Michael Hall. This is the first of six videos. The others are also located within Youtube-



    I haven't watched these yet but I can't imagine that they're not worthy viewing-at least to understand the message that ISAF wishes to impart upon arriving troops.
    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

  • #2
    COIN: The more you know, the more dynamic and uncertain the reality becomes.

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    • #3
      I watched. A good elementary COIN primer from CSM Hall--and I don't mean that in a derogatory way--for troops headed to Afghanistan. It's all good, especially for units who are being given a crash course in COIN, which, of course, is impossible, but nevertheless something the military continues to attempt.

      There are a lot of misconceptions about COIN ops, most of them having to do with the importance of Civic Action (CA) in winning hearts and minds. Civic Action is pointless without security and security is impossible without a continuous presense in the area of operation. It does no good at all to have a team of soldiers and their indigenous counterparts visit a village and hand out school supplies if there A) is no school and/or B) if there is a chance that the enemy will return to administer retribution.

      Security is accomplished by keeping the team in the AO, 24/7. Note I did not write "keeping the team in the village." The team must stay mobile, never lingering longer than 8 hours in one place within the AO, lying low during the day and conducting aggressive operations at night, setting up ambush sites on likely approach trails to the village and make incursion into the AO a dangerous and uncomfortable prospect for the enemy. The team has good comm, is resupplied by helo whenever necessary and has access to air/arty support on-call.

      Building a rapport with the locals comes during and after the establishment of security and once security is established civic action can be pressed forward, but, like the CSM says, the team has to know what the people and the village really need, not what some guys in Washington or at Bagram think they need.

      The most important and simple lesson I learned about COIN is "if they like you they won't kill you." Obviously, there are shades of treachery this simple maxim does not address--such as the "trusted" counterpart who is secretly committed to the Jihad and is waiting for the chance to blow you up (and for this reason you must learn to spot the clues)--but by and large, people, whatever their culture, want to be liked and respected and respond accordingly. This is the golden nucleus of COIN ops and unfortunately, one of the most difficult lessons to impress upon young American and Western soldiers, particularly those who've been cycled through a crash course in COIN, as mentioned above. The cultural/religious/societal gap is enormous, there are innate predjudices and preconceptions, there is immaturity, there is the potential for enormous frustration working FID and COIN that one must be prepared to accept. It can be very much like working with children. It requires immense patience that many young soldiers simply do not possess. But acts of teenage mischief, tomfoolery or loss of temper can end with your team shot to pieces on a hillside.

      There is another aspect of COIN that makes its chance for success even riskier, and that is the impatience on the part of the commanders, the politicians and the voters of the countries supplying the troops for COIN. Successful COIN ops take years. Period. There's no silver bullet. It is like a crop that is difficult to germinate and nurture and grow and may never harvest, even in the best soil and under the best conditions, regardless of the blood, sweat and tears shed. It requires committment.
      Last edited by Red Seven; 07 Jan 10,, 16:54.

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      • #4
        I think I love you.

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        • #5
          Originally posted by Bluesman View Post
          I think I love you.
          Hahahaha, in a manly sort of way, no doubt. ;)

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          • #6
            To expand a bit on my last:

            The enemy has the advantage. He shares a language and culture with the population, he is, to paraphrase Mao, the fish that swims in the ocean of the people. Time is one of his most potent weapons. He can win by outlasting you. He doesn't necessarily need to achieve an objective as long as he prevents you from achieving yours.

            COIN campaigns cannnot be won militarily, only politically, and every tactical action should have a political end. If your enemy is politically strong in a particular AO, the best you can do sometimes is tread water and watch for openings to drive a wedge between him and the local civilians. In COIN at the village/tribal level, a fair degree of political finesse is required and, as fond as I am of junior NCO's, some young corporals and sergeants may find themselves a bit over their heads. This is why I am a proponant of civilian agencies, like DoS and USAID, offering lucrative salaries and incentives to hire risk-taking civilian field reps who will ruck up, leave the green zone and go live the good life with COIN teams in the hinterland.

            Speaking of winning, in COIN, winning is not everything. A limited victory or partial defeat should sometimes be accepted as the end stage of our participation; and this threshold is reached when going beyond it will serve no positive purpose. If the host nation has evolved sufficiently to control the insurgency then it's not required that we stay to kill the last bad guy.

            Better we GTFO, in fact, because nobody in ISAF is ever going to win anybody's heart or mind. It's not going to happen. We may have a few T.E. Lawrence-type individuals in our ranks, but not enough to go around or stay in theater the rest of their lives. The Afghan authorities however, the government, the military, are there to stay and, ultimately, winning the hearts and minds of their own people is exclusively their responsibility.
            Last edited by Red Seven; 08 Jan 10,, 14:46.

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            • #7
              The cultural/religious/societal gap is enormous, there are innate predjudices and preconceptions, there is immaturity, there is the potential for enormous frustration working FID and COIN that one must be prepared to accept. It can be very much like working with children. It requires immense patience that many young soldiers simply do not possess. But acts of teenage mischief, tomfoolery or loss of temper can end with your team shot to pieces on a hillside.

              I'd imagine that a lot of the problem would be that it would be an absolute minority of young soldiers who join an Army with becoming a police officer/social worker/diplomat in mind. I know I didn't and I can't think of any of my mates who looked like they did either. In fact when I think back to my basic training I find it hard to imagine how the Australian Army has maintained its skills in COIN operations. The catchcry in basic that the Recruit Training Instructors used to shoot at us was "do you want to kill somebody recruit? Of course you do, otherwise why would you be doing all of this training!
              "There is no such thing as society" - Margaret Thatcher

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              • #8
                Aussiegunner Reply

                "I'd imagine that a lot of the problem would be that it would be an absolute minority of young soldiers who join an Army with becoming a police officer/social worker/diplomat in mind."

                I think you're probably on the mark here. Some of our best troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq have been national guardsmen with police careers as background. Whether filling an actual M.P. slot or simply as members of infantry battalions their contributions have been enormous.

                They bring a unique set of professional skills and a perspective that stems from both prior active duty service, police service, and the maturity which comes with age. Most are older than our active duty enlisted troops of comparable rank, sometimes considerably so.
                "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

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                • #9
                  Aussie and S2

                  I agree. With the need for counter-insurgency troops escalating in two theaters--and not enough Special Forces COIN experts to go around--"non-experts" had to be seconded into COIN duties...and getting a very rudimentary run up prior to deployment.

                  I know of one particular case personally that can serve as an example, and that is of a Marine Recon platoon that had been doing MFF and static line jumps out of Ospreys at Camp Lejeune--who ended up in Ramadi having soccer matches with their Iraqi counterparts to offset the boredom. Very difficult to take these high speed kids who want to get into the fight and expect them to have the patience for FID or COIN.
                  Last edited by Red Seven; 12 Jan 10,, 14:48.

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                  • #10
                    On a related note, how have generally you found guardsmen (the non-police ones) at picking up COIN compared to regular soldiers? The reason that I asked is that in the Ready Reserve scheme that I joined the Army as part of, we did regular army training for the first year and then 4 years of reserve service. When I did my all arms promotion course for bombadier I did it with the general reserve, strictly a part time part of the Army. Despite the deregatory comments that they get from the Regular Army soldiers and despite the fact that there was definately quite a bit to be desired in terms of things like attention to detail and sense of urgency, I found the willingness to think outside the square a refreshing change from those of us who had been subjected to the Regular Army indoctrinaton. I've wondered if that would translate into better problem solving skills in the field?
                    "There is no such thing as society" - Margaret Thatcher

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                    • #11
                      Originally posted by S-2 View Post
                      "I'd imagine that a lot of the problem would be that it would be an absolute minority of young soldiers who join an Army with becoming a police officer/social worker/diplomat in mind."

                      I think you're probably on the mark here. Some of our best troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq have been national guardsmen with police careers as background. Whether filling an actual M.P. slot or simply as members of infantry battalions their contributions have been enormous.

                      They bring a unique set of professional skills and a perspective that stems from both prior active duty service, police service, and the maturity which comes with age. Most are older than our active duty enlisted troops of comparable rank, sometimes considerably so.
                      I think you've brought up an important point there. I have heard it said that COIN often resembles policing more than conventional military operations. There are overlaps in the skillset, but they are not the same. I once heard someone point out that Israel's first rate army made a tenth rate police force.

                      Back to the main point, however, COIN is often low intensity & long time frame. A lot of it is about providing security & tacking a persistent problem that won't be 'defeated' soon, if ever. The goal is not necessarily 'victory' in a traditional military sense, but marginalizing the threat. I get the impression military organizations are often very 'mission oriented' in a way that does not always suit some of the more mundane day to day aspects of COIN. As you point out, more mature soldiers may well be better suited to this sort of task.

                      Obviously there are occasions where more traditional military skills & tactics are necessary, but they have to be employed carefully in most circumstances.
                      sigpic

                      Win nervously lose tragically - Reds C C

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                      • #12
                        B.F. Reply

                        "I get the impression military organizations are often very 'mission oriented' in a way that does not always suit some of the more mundane day to day aspects of COIN. As you point out, more mature soldiers may well be better suited to this sort of task."

                        COIN ops in Afghanistan will prove long and tiresome. They will also prove to be self-fulfilling dead-end for most career-minded military professionals who've often got their eyes cast at the NEXT BIG THING.

                        Being relegated to dedicated, focused, local expertise-building in Afghanistan is a sure path to rendering yourself irrelevant to those career opportunities that come when the next big problem hits DoD's desk.

                        Guardsmen could give a sh!t about a lot of that and might be best suited. Still, there are career ambitions there also, if not as pronounced. There's also the question of how badly states wish to see their guard units abused while the active service shines up its tanks for the great PRC-U.S. dustup.

                        I don't know if the west has the cultural and professional temperment for this nation-building crap. Best we get back to good ol' kinetics and let God sort em' out...:))
                        "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                        "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by S-2 View Post
                          "I get the impression military organizations are often very 'mission oriented' in a way that does not always suit some of the more mundane day to day aspects of COIN. As you point out, more mature soldiers may well be better suited to this sort of task."

                          COIN ops in Afghanistan will prove long and tiresome. They will also prove to be self-fulfilling dead-end for most career-minded military professionals who've often got their eyes cast at the NEXT BIG THING.

                          Being relegated to dedicated, focused, local expertise-building in Afghanistan is a sure path to rendering yourself irrelevant to those career opportunities that come when the next big problem hits DoD's desk.

                          Guardsmen could give a sh!t about a lot of that and might be best suited. Still, there are career ambitions there also, if not as pronounced. There's also the question of how badly states wish to see their guard units abused while the active service shines up its tanks for the great PRC-U.S. dustup.

                          I don't know if the west has the cultural and professional temperment for this nation-building crap. Best we get back to good ol' kinetics and let God sort em' out...:))
                          :)):)):))
                          sigpic

                          Win nervously lose tragically - Reds C C

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by S-2 View Post
                            [B]" Best we get back to good ol' kinetics and let God sort em' out...:))
                            I know you are joking but based on recent history that is a statement to be very afraid of. We don't want our military's to spend 10 or more years in a challenging theatre learning how to do COIN well, only to forget again, like we did after Vietnam. Otherwise the next time we have to do it in 15 or 20 years time we will just repeat the mistakes. Perhaps there is some further culture change to be driven at the political level to ensure that militaries see COIN as their core business. Rewarding good COIN operators with better career progression might be a start.
                            "There is no such thing as society" - Margaret Thatcher

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                            • #15
                              AussieGunner Reply

                              "I know you are joking..."

                              Not really. Remember your drill sergeants?

                              "The catchcry in basic that the Recruit Training Instructors used to shoot at us was "do you want to kill somebody recruit? Of course you do, otherwise why would you be doing all of this training!"

                              Soldiers are in the business of mobilizing and applying firepower efficiently to achieve national objectives. The core competencies required to conduct a Corps mechanized attack are, by themselves, staggering.

                              The core competencies required to execute nat'l objectives of nation-building are equally daunting and span (probably) a greater overall portion of governance. The two above scenarios sit on the opposite ends of the conflict spectrum and aren't reconcilable today IMV.

                              We are fast approaching in America a point where there'll be a need for the Dept. of Nation-Buiilding. We'll quite likely be at this for some centuries. Right now I can think of three more nations that are immediate candidates for something similar-Somalia, Yemen, and Sudan. Most of sub-Saharan Africa frankly may qualify as time marches on. You've got an enduring problem with PNG that persists despite your best "kinder, gentler" efforts and a near equally disturbing climate in the Solomons. That doesn't even address Indonesia/E. Timor.

                              I'm not so sure that all elements of civil-military assistance, foreign military purchases, cooperative efforts, and more shouldn't be housed under one roof in America. Maybe then we meet the personnel management dilemma of career paths while also mobilizing and synchronizing resources better to match needs. Right now I'm uncertain whether America, even at this late date, fully understands all the relevant elements that might already exist within our own government much less how to deploy those resources effectively.

                              I don't believe that a switch can be flipped easily from the mindset needed in COIN to that required for clearing a trenchline with flamethrowers and cold steel. I also don't believe that full-blown combat ops are a thing of the past but do believe there are many latent enemies hoping we shall.
                              "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                              "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

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