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  • Grant and the Operational Art

    I'm doing research to write a paper that will argue that Grant was the first commander to practice the operational art (the actual doctrinal conceptualization wouldn't be put to paper until after the Russian Revolution about six decades later), and will use current joint doctrine to frame the Overland and Petersburg Campaigns as an illustration of his practice of the operational art. Along the way, I will also demonstrate that he understood the practice of the strategic art as well.

    Here's my bibliography thus far; if anyone else has some sources that I've missed that you've read and think would contribute to looking at Grant's practice of the operational and strategic art, I'd appreciate it.

    Books
    Amazon.com: And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, May-June 1864 (Great Campaigns of the Civil War) (9780803271197): Mark Grimsley: Books
    Amazon.com: The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 (9780521800792): MacGregor Knox, Williamson Murray: Books (Grimsley's article)
    Amazon.com: The Battle Of The Wilderness, May 5-6, 1864 (9780807130216): Gordon C. Rhea: Books
    Amazon.com: The Battles For Spotsylvania Court House And The Road To Yellow Tavern, May 7-12, 1864 (9780807130674): Gordon C. Rhea: Books
    Amazon.com: To the North Anna River: Grant And Lee, May 13-25, 1864 (Jules and Frances Landry Award Series) (9780807131114): Gordon C. Rhea: Books
    Amazon.com: Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26-June 3, 1864 (9780807132449): Gordon C. Rhea: Books
    Amazon.com: The Last Citadel: Petersburg, Virginia, June 1864-April 1865 (9780807118610): Noah Andre Trudeau: Books
    Amazon.com: The Final Battles of the Petersburg Campaign: Breaking the Backbone of the Rebellion (9781572336100): A. Wilson Greene: Books
    Amazon.com: Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee: Field Fortifications in the Overland Campaign (Civil War America) (9780807831540): Earl J. Hess: Books
    Amazon.com: In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications and Confederate Defeat (Civil War America) (9780807832820): Earl J. Hess: Books
    Amazon.com: The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Reality and Myth (Modern War Studies) (9780700616077): Earl J. Hess: Books
    Amazon.com: Campaigning with Grant (9780803287631): Horace Porter, Brooks D. Simpson: Books
    Amazon.com: Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship (9780253202888): Major General J.F.C. Fuller: Books
    Amazon.com: The Generalship Of Ulysses S. Grant (Da Capo Paperback) (9780306804502): J. F. C. Fuller: Books

    Journal Articles/Monographs
    http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/p...0schneider.pdf
    Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library : Item Viewer
    http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf
    http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf
    http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/downlo...s/overland.pdf
    "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

  • #2
    The Overland and Petersburg campaign occurred inside of three other important factors. The first is Grant's mind- his mental abilities and skill at using them to frame the war and figure out how to prosecute it. Since Grant didn't spring fully formed from the mind of Zeus, your probably going to need to show either an early use of his mastery, or its evolution over time as he learned and refined. Some references to how X mimicked Vicksburg, or differed significantly in concept etc.

    Secondly, since Grant was not a field commander but occupied a role more like Ike in WWII in many ways, your going to need to reference his planning with Sherman and other Union commanders to created a system where the Confederacy was never able free up and shift reserves and achieve and then sustain even a local reversal of the Union tide.

    Finally, a reference to Scott's Anaconda plan and how or if this vision shaped the way he framed the prosecution of the war. Combined Operations of the Civil War by Reed and Milligan argue that Plan was ineffectual since the Union was not able to brign its commanders to hell. Grant did bring them to heel and then did conduct an organized campaign to reduce the South.

    Comment


    • #3
      Z,

      Thanks for the thoughts. For the purposes of what I'm writing, I don't need to trace Grant's evolution as a commander, although Forts Henry and Donelson and Vicksburg both provide examples of some earlier actions where you can see components of the operational art. However, it wasn't until he was at a level as a quasi-group commander in the East that you can trace an actual conceptualization of a strategy that is distilled into a campaign.

      What I will do is develop an argument that it took until the levee en masse to potentially see an operational level of war, and then it took the technology to C2 at this level to see the characteristics of the operational art (as well as seeing a shift away from the "decisive battle").

      As far as his strategy, he chose to attack the CoG directly in the East while using an indirect approach in the West. However, after the failure of the Overland Campaign to bring about decision, he shifted to an indirect approach in the East as well. This differs from the the Anaconda plan which was a grand scale slow squeeze - Grant's pulling of forces from peripheral operations that would amount to a slow squeeze is a visible example of where he didn't see the Anaconda Plan as getting the job done quick enough (notwithstanding that his earliest operations would be consistent with the Anaconda Plan, but he was executing and not devising the concept here).
      "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

      Comment


      • #4
        shek,

        However, after the failure of the Overland Campaign to bring about decision, he shifted to an indirect approach in the East as well. This differs from the the Anaconda plan which was a grand scale slow squeeze - Grant's pulling of forces from peripheral operations that would amount to a slow squeeze is a visible example of where he didn't see the Anaconda Plan as getting the job done quick enough (notwithstanding that his earliest operations would be consistent with the Anaconda Plan, but he was executing and not devising the concept here).
        i always figured that grant was looking at a high opstempo during the overland campaign simply to keep lee occupied and unavailable to shift reinforcements west. while he pushed lee hard, i'm not sure he tried to "set up" a decisive battle in the whole campaign.
        There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by astralis View Post
          shek,

          i always figured that grant was looking at a high opstempo during the overland campaign simply to keep lee occupied and unavailable to shift reinforcements west. while he pushed lee hard, i'm not sure he tried to "set up" a decisive battle in the whole campaign.
          That's my point ;). Operational art is about tying together major operations to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. It rejects the notion of a "decisive battle." This is what made Grant different than his peers - he conceptualized a campaign to achieve the destruction of Lee's ANV, and while he wanted to force Lee into a position where he'd have to fight Grant on his terms/terrain to make the job easier, he wasn't seeking a single, decisive battle.
          "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

          Comment


          • #6
            shek,

            i was looking at this sentence:

            However, after the failure of the Overland Campaign to bring about decision,
            so was he already conceptualizing the operational art prior to the overland campaign? it seems to me this conceptualizing was in response to his setbacks there-- i am not sure, for instance, why he would want to fight the Battle of Cold Harbor if not to seek out that decisive battle.
            There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by astralis View Post
              shek, why he would want to fight the Battle of Cold Harbor if not to seek out that decisive battle.
              It pinned Lee and kept him from being able to send meaningful help to Johnston vs Sherman. He was also running out of room, Lee was able to slide faster than the Union army and Grant was rapidly approaching the James river, if he wanted Richmond it was now or never. A crushing defeat of Lee would work wonders to end the war but attritional warfare favored the Union and and so even a defeat could be a win if Lee lost enough men.

              Comment


              • #8
                Shek,
                Sir,I'll argue that Grant was the first Industrial Age(with the advent of rail and communications networks that allow effective C2) commander to practice operational art.You can find otherwise examples of operational art from Alexander through Romans,Byzantines,Mongols to Napoleon.
                Those who know don't speak
                He said to them, "But now if you have a purse, take it, and also a bag; and if you don't have a sword, sell your cloak and buy one. Luke 22:36

                Comment


                • #9
                  Originally posted by Mihais View Post
                  Shek,
                  Sir,I'll argue that Grant was the first Industrial Age(with the advent of rail and communications networks that allow effective C2) commander to practice operational art.You can find otherwise examples of operational art from Alexander through Romans,Byzantines,Mongols to Napoleon.
                  Subutai yes, but not so sure about the others.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by Mihais View Post
                    Shek,
                    Sir,I'll argue that Grant was the first Industrial Age(with the advent of rail and communications networks that allow effective C2) commander to practice operational art.You can find otherwise examples of operational art from Alexander through Romans,Byzantines,Mongols to Napoleon.
                    Mihais,

                    How did they operate at the operational level of war? The operational art is a very specific conceptualization, and the first of prerequisites is to be at the operational level or war.
                    "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Actually, Major, the first person to try to avoid a decisive battle was Fabius Maximus, aka as the Fabian Strategy. The other person who comes to mind is Julius Caesar who had a knack for refusing battle.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by Shek View Post
                        Mihais,

                        How did they operate at the operational level of war? The operational art is a very specific conceptualization, and the first of prerequisites is to be at the operational level or war.
                        The early Mongol tumens certainly used operational concepts using not just tactics to win local battles, but fighting those local battles for the benefit of "national" objectives and to secure the advantage of other tumens working towards a unified goal at great distance. The mongols unified will and ability to coordinate its units over vast distances to pursue its objectives wouldn't be successfully seen again until Grant/Sherman/Farraguat in the summer of 64. Although British efforts in the American Revolution to coordinate its efforts across the Eastern seaboard seem to be based on concepts similar to the operational arts

                        The pacing, audacity, and C2 of the mongol armies were perhaps more important to their victories than their mobility and bows. They also moved past the pure physicalness of war and waged it in their opponents minds as well. Mongols are past masters at fighting and winning the recon battle, using deception, combined arms, using intelligence gained by non-military means, politics, and using terror to create both open cities and clogged roads.

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by Shek View Post
                          Mihais,

                          How did they operate at the operational level of war? The operational art is a very specific conceptualization, and the first of prerequisites is to be at the operational level or war.

                          Sir,I'm thinking of several elements of operational art that existed long before ACW:
                          -understanding conditions for victory before the engagements
                          -look beyond current situation
                          -create the most favorable conditions for the subordinates at tactical levels.
                          Just a few that come to my mind now:Alexander's Bactrian campaigns,Hamilcar Barca in Sicily,Pompeius vs the pirates,Ulm campaign in 1805 etc...
                          Now,is obvious that many wars in ancient or medieval times were decided in one battle/siege (or a few not directly linked to each other).The fact that these are a majority should not cloud the fact that there were exceptions.
                          Also I think the Napoleonic practice of decisive battle had aquired an infamous reputation,because nobody was really capable of emulating Napoleon.In his best days the battle occurred after the enemy was already in an impossible situation.Much like Grant would have liked to do to Lee if given the chance.
                          Those who know don't speak
                          He said to them, "But now if you have a purse, take it, and also a bag; and if you don't have a sword, sell your cloak and buy one. Luke 22:36

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by Mihais View Post
                            Sir,I'm thinking of several elements of operational art that existed long before ACW:
                            -understanding conditions for victory before the engagements
                            -look beyond current situation
                            -create the most favorable conditions for the subordinates at tactical levels.
                            This isn't operational art.
                            "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Not yet at that level,but those were considered attributes of operational commander in FM3-0 last time I checked.Maybe I need to re-read it.
                              Thinking a bit harder,sinchronization(as allowed by communications),direct/indirect approach,center of gravity(although not recognized as such),tempo and timing(again limited by technology),engaging the enemy in depth, were all known and practiced with various degrees of success before the Industrial Revolution.If I get some time I'll check deeper,because the subject is surely fascinating.
                              Those who know don't speak
                              He said to them, "But now if you have a purse, take it, and also a bag; and if you don't have a sword, sell your cloak and buy one. Luke 22:36

                              Comment

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