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  • The Evolution of Taiwan’s Military Strategy

    single - The Jamestown Foundation[tt_news]=35748&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=27fc163208

    The Evolution of Taiwan’s Military Strategy: Convergence and Dissonance
    Publication: China Brief Volume: 9 Issue: 23
    November 19, 2009 01:01 PM Age: 47 min
    Category: China Brief, Featured, Home Page, Military/Security, China and the Asia-Pacific
    By: York W. Chen

    Taiwan's National Defense Report 2009

    On October 19, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) released the National Defense Report 2009. This is the first NDR issued by President Ma Ying-jeou’s administration since it won the March 2008 presidential election. Under the sanction of the National Defense Act, Taiwan’s MND has published the NDR biannually since 1992 and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) since March 2009. The NDR and QDR are the most important policy documents published by the MND as they are the only open sources available for understanding Taiwan’s evolving military strategy [1].

    Neither President Ma's original vision of a “Hard ROC (Republic of China),” a military strategy that was first articulated during the 2008 presidential campaign, nor his predecessor's “Decisive Campaign Outside the Territory,” were assimilated in the NDR without some resistance and modification. A careful reader of Taiwan’s military strategy should pay attention to these implications. Even a slight alteration in the word order, as the author will deliberate in the following sections, such as Fang Wei Gu Shou, You Siao He Zu (resolute defense and effective deterrence, 1996-2000; 2008-present) and You Siao He Zu, Fang Wei Gu Shou (effective deterrence and resolute defense, 2000-2008) represent major conceptual differences in Taiwanese military strategy.

    Akin to the previous Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration under Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008), the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) administration came into office with the belief that their predecessor had made critical mistakes in military strategy with regard to the defense of Taiwan. The newcomers, eager to encode their new ideas into military strategy, set forth to change the directives of the previous administration within the QDR and the NDR. Thus, both documents provide a good point of reference for understanding different doctrinal preferences between the DPP and the KMT.

    While the current civilian executives are pushing to change Taiwan’s military strategy, the military establishment appears to be pushing back—preferring to maintain consistency in military strategy and reduce uncertainties over existing plans and programs. After all, the military views the business of military strategy as better left in the hands of professionals. The extensive internal edits and reviews that are built into the standard protocols for formulating these high-level policy documents reflect a consensus among the different services. As a result, the NDR and the QDR may be seen as the product of a political tug-of-war between civilian and military authorities.

    From Offensive Defense, Forward Defense, to Defense-in-Depth (1949-2000)

    From 1949 to 2000, Taiwan’s military strategy underwent three stages of evolution. In the beginning, the military's overall goal under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was to retake Mainland China by force; however, Chiang did not have the military capabilities to carry out such a military adventure nor complete U.S. support. As a result, Taiwan’s military strategy at the time was an “Offensive Defense” strategy (1949-1966), which was executed by increasing military presence on Taiwan-controlled offshore islands and conducting frequent raids on China’s coastal area.

    In the mid-1960s, Chiang abandoned the plan to use military force in retaking the Mainland after the United States repeatedly rejected his proposal. The raids along China's coastline gradually ceased. No military engagement occurred between both sides since the naval battle off Wu Chiou Island in 1965. Instead, Taiwan concentrated on fortifying its offshore islands and, at its peak, increased the force level to 170,000 troops on the tiny outposts. This was the era of “Forward Defense” (1966-1979).

    For Taiwanese military planners, the withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed on Taiwan following the break of diplomatic relations between Taiwan and the United States in 1979 implied that they would need to take over completely the responsibilities of rearguard (the defense of Taiwan). In so doing, the first division-level redeployment from Kimmen Island to Taiwan took place in 1983 and marked the beginning of a continuous troop reduction on its offshore islands. Taiwan’s military strategy thus entered the stage of “Defense-in-Depth” (1979-2000), which was heavily influenced by Army General Hau Pei-tsun’s (as Chief of the General Staff during 1981-1989) operational concept of “Decisive Campaign at the Water’s Edge.”

    The tactical depth that Hau proposed encompasses a three-layered defense:
    1) to check the enemy on his shore,
    2) to strike the enemy in transit, and
    3) to destroy the enemy on Taiwan’s beachhead.

    Yet Hau argued that there was no hope for Taiwanese forces to sustain its command of air and sea power over the Taiwan Strait. In addition, according to Hau’s concepts, China could not conquer Taiwan without first landing on Taiwan and in doing so would suffer great casualties when trying to defeat Taiwan’s ground forces. That, according to Hau, would deter China from invading Taiwan or, at least, buy sufficient time for U.S. intervention. Thus, Hau argues that to maintain “strategic sustainability,” Taiwan’s air and naval assets should avoid being committed in full strength during the initial stages of the campaign. All forces should be preserved in order to concentrate on the decisive campaign of engaging the enemy at the water’s edge [2].

    All of Taiwan’s NDRs prior to 2000 adopted Hau’s concepts. In NDR 1996, the MND first introduced “resolute defense and effective deterrence” as the overarching principles of Taiwan’s national military strategy. It stated:

    Based upon the guidance of “strategic sustainability and tactical decisiveness,” our strategy is to fight the enemy vehemently with coordinated manpower and firepower, to let the enemy pay the unbearable price as to deter the enemy from invasion and ensure our national security. Should the enemy dare to land, we will gradually annihilate the enemy in the prepared positions by destroying the enemy on the beachhead, firmly defending our strongholds, and striking the enemy via our mobile forces. We will also mobilize the reserves to wear down the enemy. The enemy’s attrition will be so high as to contribute to our final victory [3].

    The concept of “resolute defense and effective deterrence” was defined in NDR 1998 as “a kind of defensive deterrence.” Its purpose is “to dissuade the opponents that the cost of using military forces will outweigh the gain” [4]. In short, “resolute defense and effective deterrence” represents a model of “deterrence by denial” with "resolute defense" as the means to achieve effective deterrence.

    Active Defense (2000-2008)

    Yet, the Taiwan Strait missile crisis in 1995-96 exposed critical shortfalls in the “Defense-in-Depth” strategy. China's missile tests over Taiwan demonstrated that its ballistic missiles could penetrate Taiwan’s layered defense without much difficulty and could inflict considerable damage on Taiwan. In the late 1990s, many civilians including then-Legislator Chen Shui-bian began questioning the validity of the “Defense-in-Depth” strategy. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s military rushed to build up its missile defense capabilities and, under the instruction of then-President Lee Teng-hui, initiated several clandestine programs for developing indigenous cruise and ballistic missiles in order to check China’s missiles at its source.

    During the 2000 presidential campaign, Chen proposed the new operational concept of “Decisive Campaign outside the Territory” to replace Hau’s “Decisive Campaign at the Water’s Edge,” and called for radical changes in Taiwan’s military strategy that could be labeled as the “Active Defense" strategy (2000-2008) [5]. Chen’s original concept of “Decisive Campaign outside the Territory” inferred two operational options: First, when deterrence is about to fail and enemy attack is imminent, Taiwan should employ pre-emptive measures to neutralize enemy military targets. The capabilities of deep strike against the enemy at its source would be the key factor for success in defending Taiwan. Second, given that the Army was seen to have no significant role in the fulfillment of “Decisive Campaign outside the Territory,” it was imperative to develop deep strike capabilities and strong air and naval forces [6].

    After Chen was elected president in 2000, the first option was abandoned and the second option was refined [7]. Yet, what remained unchanged was the emphasis on checking the enemy on its shore and striking the enemy in transit rather than on destroying the enemy on Taiwan’s beachhead. During Chen’s first term, his ideas received considerable resistance from the Army, but the strategy of “Active Defense” gradually took shape [8]. In NDR 2000, though the term “Decisive Campaign outside the Territory” was omitted, some of Chen’s ideas were clearly visible:

    After our force modernization and the continuous upgrade of our weaponry, we have already had active capabilities to conduct counter-measure operations and to achieve some deterrence effects. Therefore, traditional concept of “resolute defense and effective deterrence” is adjusted to “effective deterrence and resolute defense.” In addition to a compact, responsive, and efficient modernized force, [we are] to build an appropriate effective deterrent force [9].

    It was not merely a change of word order. Implicit in NDR 2000 was a redefining of the relationship between “effective deterrence” and “resolute defense.” Both effective deterrence and resolute defense are means to achieve the purpose of defending Taiwan. The latter refers to the traditional concepts of ground war while the former specifically refers to air, naval and information counter-measure capabilities in general, and Hsiung Feng 2E (HF-2E, 600 kilometers range) cruise missiles in particular. NDR 2004 offered the most comprehensive description of the “Active Defense” strategy:

    In order to fulfill the concepts of “effective deterrence and resolute defense,” … [t]o cope with the changing strategic environment in the future and maintain our military superiority, [we will] actively develop, research and acquire the precision stand-off weapon systems and establish electronic counter-measure forces in order to augment our deep strike capabilities. Through the buildup of defensive counter-measure capabilities, [we hope to] deter the enemy from initiating hostility by complicating its probability of success [10].

    Under the “Active Defense” strategy, the tactical significance of Taiwan’s outpost islands was reduced. The troops deployed on Kimmen, Mastu and other offshore islands were reduced to below 20,000 in 2008. Meanwhile, the first unit of HF-2E was operationalized and the MND programmed the budget for the mass production of HF-2E. The longer version HF-2E BLOCK II (estimated 1,000 kilometers in range) was also developed and tested (United Daily News, April 26, 2007) [11].

    Toward Fortification Defense? (2008-Present)

    Before 2008, most KMT politicians were not in disagreement with the “Active Defense” strategy or those counter-measure weapons such as HF-2E. Rather, they were opposed to having them under Chen Shui-bian’s command on grounds that Chen might abuse them. Then-Legislator Su Chi (now Ma Ying-jeou’s Secretary General of the National Security Council), however, fundamentally rejected the “Active Defense” strategy and stated openly that the KMT would never consider developing any weapon that could strike Mainland China (China Radio International, September 12, 2007). Su believed that Chen’s “Decisive Campaign outside the Territory” was irrelevant to defending Taiwan and a dangerous idea that might provoke military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. As a result, then-Legislator Su Chi boycotted the MND budget for the HF-2E production. As an alternative, Su proposed the idea of the “Hard ROC” during Ma's 2008 presidential campaign, which has become the mantra of Ma’s military strategy. Under the “Hard ROC,” Su argued that the imperatives of defending Taiwan were “… the capabilities to sustain China’s surprise attack and maintain air superiority in order to deprive China from landing and occupying Taiwan. If China can not ensure its swift victory and create a fait accompli before the U.S. intervention, then China’s incentive of invasion is naturally decreased” (United Daily News, January 24, 2006).

    By exclusively focusing on the defense of Taiwan Island, Su’s “Hard ROC” strategy ignored the tactical depth of Hau’s “Defense-in-Depth” strategy. Under the concept of a “Hard ROC,” Su argued that Taiwan’s arms procurement should be redirected to those items that could contribute to hardening the political or military assets on Taiwan Island. Rather than big ships and fast planes, Su preferred runway repair kits (for maintaining local air superiority), sea mines (to deny the enemy’s command of the sea), and troop transport helicopters (for rapid force redeployment within Taiwan Island) (Liberty Times, October 20, 2007). The concept of the “Hard ROC” appears to be no more than a strategy for fortification defense—and to some extent even a relegation of the traditional “Defense-in-Depth” strategy.

    Thus, it is not surprising that the new idea of a “Hard ROC” encountered some resistance within the military. Moreover, the passivity of the KMT administration toward the MND's existing procurement programs invited considerable criticism. As Chen’s case in 2000, despite the fact that the MND highlights Ma’s term of “Hard ROC” in QDR 2009 and NDR 2009, many concepts of “Active Defense” strategy from the previous DPP administration in fact remain unchanged. For example, in QDR 2009, it suggests that Taiwan should “keep strengthening and developing the defensive counter-measure and asymmetric capabilities” in order to strike “against the enemy’s center of gravity and vital weak points … as to utilize favorable time and space, to paralyze and delay the enemy’s offensive, and to defeat the enemy’s invading forces” [12].

    Also, while QDR 2009 and NDR 2009 reaffirm the return of Taiwan’s military strategy to “resolute defense and effective deterrence” [13], the line of argument is not necessarily the same as before. Though responsible for different branches [14], both use nearly identical language to emphasize the importance of checking the enemy on its shore and striking the enemy in transit.

    According to [our] defense plans, after the enemy commences its offensive, [we will] utilize favorable opportunities and use [our] defensive counter-measure capabilities to strike the enemy’s vital military targets and the enemy’s amphibious forces while assemble and upload at [the enemy’s] ports. Later, depending on the situation development, [our military actions] will place emphasis on two critical phases of “joint [sea] interdiction operations” and “joint anchorage attack” as to destroy the enemy at its weakest when in transit across the Strait [15].

    QDR 2009 makes the clear distinction that effective deterrence, comprised exclusively of those deep strike weapons such as HF-2E cruise missiles “is the means to achieve the goal of resolute defense” [16]. Thus, the positions expressed in QDR 2009 and NDR 2009 resemble the concept of “Active Defense” rather than “Defense-in-Depth” strategy.

    In spite of the military's apparent concern about returning to the traditional concept of “Decisive Campaign at the Water's Edge” under the “Hard ROC” strategy, there have been no indications from the Ma administration that it will compromise their views encapsulated in the term “Hard ROC.” For instance, even though the KMT finally agreed to appropriate the budget for the production of HF-2E, which is already a mature and operational system, Ma ceased the development of the HF-2E BLOCK II, which has scored several successful records during the tests (China Times, September 1, 2008) [17]. QDR 2009 and NDR 2009 do not mark the end of this saga. Considering the widening gulf in threat perception presented by the civilian and military authorities, the publication of the two documents represents only the beginning.

    Notes

    1. In Taiwan’s military terminology, the definition of military strategy is slightly different from the American usage. The term of military strategy in this article was adopted the American usage which focused on the employment of the armed forces – an operational art oriented definition. In Taiwan, the equivalent term is field strategy (Ye Jhan Jhan Lyue).
    2. `Hau Pei-tsun Eight-Year Diary as the Chief of General Staff (Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing Co., 2000), Vol. 1, p. 238.
    3. National Defense Report (NDR), 1996, pp. 63.
    4. NDR, 1998, p. 53.
    5. In Chen’s campaign pamphlet. It claimed that “The concept of “Decisive Campaign at the Water’s Edge” should be abandoned. The attrition style of warfare should be replaced by paralysis warfare. [We should] deprive the enemy’s capabilities for waging war against us in order to prevent it from bringing war into our homeland and putting the lives and property of our population in danger.” See Headquarters for Chen Shui-bian’s Presidential Campaign, Chen Shui-bian’s Blueprint for the State: Vol. 1, National Security (Taipei: Headquarters for Chen Shui-bian’s Presidential Campaign, 1999), pp. 50-51.
    6. Chen Shui-bian’s Blueprint for the State: Vol. 1, National Security, pp. 37 and 51.
    7. In June 2000, Chen first officially declared his ideas of “Decisive Campaign outside the Territory” in front of the military. The first argument referred to pre-emptive strike was totally deleted from his speech and the second one that exclusively highlighted the importance of air and naval forces was moderately modified.
    8. Yet old ideas die hard. In Chen’s first term, some notions embedded in the traditional “Decisive Campaign at the Water’s Edge” were still kept in the NDR. For example, in NDR 2002, in addition to sustaining information, air and naval superiority, it still highlighted that “based upon the principle of annihilation of invading enemy and safeguard the homeland, [we will] concentrate precision firepower of all our Services in combination with Air-Land mobile strike capabilities, through continual counter-offensive, destroy the enemy on the beachhead and at the air-drop zone.” The “Active Defense” strategy was fully implemented only after Admiral Lee Jei assumed the position of defense minister in 2004.Quotation from NDR, 2002, p. 81.
    9. NDR, 2000, p. 64.
    10. NDR, 2004, p. 63,
    11. In order to ease U.S. suspicion over Taiwan’s indigenous development of cruise missiles, the MND affirmed in the NDR 2004 that these missiles serve a defensive purpose and will be used against China’s military targets only. See NDR, 2004, p. 63.
    12. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 2009, p. 42 and 49.
    13. QDR, 2009, p. 47. NDR, 2009, p. 79.
    14. The NDR and the QDR are responsible by the Strategic Planning Department and the Integrated Assessment Office of the MND respectively.
    15. QDR, 2009, p. 48. The NDR 2009 also makes an almost identical statement, see NDR, 2009, p. 80.
    16. QDR, 2009, p. 42.
    17. There are significant strategic and operational implications between HF-2E and HF-2E BLOCK II for the latter has the range of striking China’s inland targets while the former can only reach China’s coastal area.
    “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

  • #2
    As someone who's served in Taiwan's military, I feel that the DDP logic is completely flawed and basically just putting ideals over reality.

    the truth is, Taiwan faces a tough challenge, there is no way it can destroy it's enemy, so the question is not IF they can survive but HOW LONG it can survive. the US does not sell offensive capable weapons to Taiwan, and development of such weapons domestically have been limited. so in the advent of war. it's simply a war of survival. the key would be to hold on for as long as possible and hope for international intervention or inflicting a price so high that the PRC would reconsider it's options.

    So the idea that you can just hope to beat them before they cross is just wishful thinking, that would be ideal of course, but it's very unlikely. if anything the 1997 crisis should have proved that the DPP method is even less applicable than the old existing strategy. retaining air superiority for that long when the opponent have a huge ballistic advantage on you is impossible.

    The truth is, Taiwan needs weapons like submarines. and requires more anti personal weapons. in addition to continued upgrades in the airforce.

    Taiwan's current leader is seen as pro China, and is obviously trying to play diplomacy first. but they're not foolish in believing that the threat isn't real.

    On the US's part , they need to be more practical in their accessment, and not just sell Taiwan a bunch of junk . (like their more recent sell was the Kidd class destroyers. an expensive oversized ship that doesn't fit in with modern warfare concept all that well, especially for a country without aircraft carriers.)


    In the end, the biggest defense strategy on Taiwan's part is not military. but diplomatic, it's best course is probably to play their position into the key piece of struggle between the US and China, one that can side with either side, instead of a unwavering pawn of just one side. That way it can gain more leverage to both, instead of having no leverage to either.

    Comment


    • #3
      A shout to Astralis and Xinhui: Have you observed any indication that the Ma administration is in fact attempting to procure weapons at this time? The last time we talked about this subject was a year ago, and I have been served a particularly unpleasant revelation.

      RollingWaves, as one Taiwanese to another, what do you mean by "playing a key piece in the struggle between China and the US", in the light of the global recession and the Sino-American financial interdependence? What leverage do you think we currently possess or can reasonably expect to possess in the future, that is valuable enough for us to play one against the other or dictate the terms of our interaction with either state?

      I do not see the US as having any reason to defend Taiwan except national honor. Having observed American politics and defense issues from America, I see no military or strategic necessity in retaining Taiwan other than the damage to US creditability if it fails to honor a pledge to protect a friend. If Taiwan cease to be an American ally, what guarantee do we have against the probability that America would simply lose interest in Taiwan, as its obligation to protect Taiwan as a friend would have vanished and its ability to project power would be by no means diminished?

      Furthermore, what advantage can we gain by frustrating US agenda in Asia with China, when it is China that wants to terminate Taiwan's sovereignty, not US?
      Last edited by Triple C; 23 Nov 09,, 16:31.
      All those who are merciful with the cruel will come to be cruel to the merciful.
      -Talmud Kohelet Rabbah, 7:16.

      Comment


      • #4
        triple C,

        see no military or strategic necessity in retaining Taiwan other than the US pledge to protect a nominal friend. If Taiwan cease to be an American ally, America would have lost its incentive to defend it and would not be unduly concerned as its ability to project power will be by no means diminished.
        won't comment on the first.

        regarding this paragraph, though, just look at where taiwan is situated and the locations on the first/second island chains. what effects does this have on PRC force projection?
        There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

        Comment


        • #5
          The PRC stands to gain the Taiwan straight. But, is there any way for Taiwan to translate that into a leverage? In other words, I don't see how we can threaten the US with giving the straight away.
          All those who are merciful with the cruel will come to be cruel to the merciful.
          -Talmud Kohelet Rabbah, 7:16.

          Comment


          • #6
            Triple C,

            The following should answer your question and there are rumors of a possible submarine sales to Taiwan via Germany also.



            Taiwan says U.S. stalling on arms sales because of China
            Thu Oct 29, 2009 3:41pm IST

            TAIPEI (Reuters) - Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou said on Thursday the U.S. government was stalling in replying to Taiwan's request for F-16 jet fighters because of displeasure from China, which claims sovereignty over the self-ruled island.

            Taiwan is seeking a $4.9 billion deal for 66 advanced F-16s to modernise its military as China's armed forces grow. The U.S. government has said it is reviewing Taiwan's defence needs and has made no commitment to a sale.

            "We still hope to acquire F-16 jet fighters to replace the ageing fighters we have, but so far we haven't received a positive answer from the United States, partly because of the opposition from the Chinese," Ma told reporters.

            China has claimed self-ruled Taiwan as its own since 1949, when Mao Zedong's forces won the Chinese civil war and Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists (KMT) fled to the island. Beijing has vowed to bring Taiwan under its rule, by force if necessary.

            The United States switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China 30 years ago, recognising "one China", though it remains Taiwan's biggest ally and arms supplier and is obliged by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to help with its defence.

            Since his election in 2008, Ma has sought to ease tension with China through trade and transit talks. But he has denounced the 1,000 to 1,500 short-range and medium-range missiles China is believed to have aimed at the island.

            Taiwan first asked to buy new F-16s in 2007 after approving substantial funding for the aircraft.

            China opposes all U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, a position Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu reaffirmed on Thursday, though without saying if Beijing had formally taken up the F-16s case with Washington.

            "We adamantly oppose the United States, or any other country, selling weapons to Taiwan," Ma told a regular news briefing.

            The commanding officer of the U.S. aircraft carrier, USS George Washington, said in Hong Kong the United States wanted improved communications with the Chinese navy in the Pacific following minor skirmishes in the South China Sea.

            Five times this year, Chinese vessels have confronted U.S. surveillance ships in Asian waters, the U.S. Defense Department said in May. China said the U.S. vessels had intruded into its territory and in August called on the United States to halt all air and sea surveillance.

            "Some of the skirmishes might be a slight misunderstanding of 'I don't know what each other's doing'," said Captain David Lausman, who heads the 100,000-tonne flagship of the Seventh Fleet.

            Lausman said improved bilateral naval ties could be brought about in "small steps" like co-operating on anti-piracy and rescue missions, rather than through big exercises alone.

            (Reporting by Kevin Plumberg; Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in Beijing and James Pomfret in Hong Kong; Editing by Nick Macfie)

            http://in.reuters.com/article/worldN...43519620091029
            “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

            Comment


            • #7
              for those who are interested in this topic, I highly recommend Bill's best work "Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy" published by the US naval war college. His suggestion of a "porcupine strategy" has been debated in great length by the ROC military.



              Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
              William S. Murray
              If, as was long presumed, Taiwan could fend off a Chinese bombardment, invasion, or blockade, it
              probably can no longer. But in a wholly new defense posture Taiwan might prevent such an attack
              from achieving the goals for which it was mounted—and perhaps deter it from being made at all.

              http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a...---William-S--
              Last edited by xinhui; 23 Nov 09,, 18:37.
              “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

              Comment


              • #8
                http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_...nQuYgJMIaPhZ6g


                Taiwan needs caution in military reform
                Taiwan News
                Page 6

                Recently, the Ministry of National Defense has begun to promote a fully "voluntary" and "professional" military service system in order to turn the country's armed forces into a "lean and mean" fighting force in line with Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) President Ma Ying-jeou's concept of a "hard R.O.C." (Republic of China).

                A symposium held at the Institute of International Relations in Taipei City earlier this month was held evidently to test the waters of public opinion for this plan, but turned into a site for heated debate over the so-called "porcupine strategy" proposed by United States Naval War College Professor William Murray.

                Murray assumes that the key facilities and equipment of Taiwan's air and naval forces would be destroyed at the beginning of a cross-strait conflict and suggests a shift in Taiwan's defense strategy to emphasize the strengthening of ground forces and the conservation of combat capabilities.

                Murray's position dovetails with Ma's own abandonment of the "active defense" philosophy adopted by the previous Democratic Progressive Party administration of ex-president Chen Shui-bian.

                Taiwan's degree of freedom in building up its defense force or military strategy is structurally very limited, but the situation will become even worse if the Taiwan government adopts self-imposed constraints on its already constrained manoeuvring room.

                Risky myths

                Ma's criticism of Chen's concept of "active defense," which aimed to ensure that at least the initial stages of a cross-strait conflicts took place offshore Taiwan's densely populated territory, as "provocative" and his adoption of a strategy that would ensure that any conflict takes place on Taiwan is making Taiwan and our 23 million people even more vulnerable to threats from the PRC.

                In general, Ma's national defense strategy is a passive defense with only very limited scope of military deterrence which is predicated on his wishful assumption that the PRC's "opening-up" policy will bring about tremendous changes in the Taiwan Strait situation.

                While former president Chen emphasized the need to ensure Taiwan's national security and building up defenses to protect our people from the PRC's growing military threat, Ma believes that, despite China's rapid military build-up, cross-strait relations are moving toward peace and mutual benefit and that his mission as president of the "Republic of China" is to help Taiwan gain more opportunities.

                From this perspective, Ma maintains that the former DPP government's "active defense" approach is too "provocative" to Beijing and has opted for a "solid defense" or "hard ROC" stance which highlights defensive concepts such as "cannot be intimidated, cannot be blockaded, cannot be occupied and cannot be vanquished."

                In line with this notion, the restored KMT government plans to replace today's partial conscripted armed forces with a fully "volunteer" military within four to six years.

                On the surface, Ma's approach appears to be less provocative and cheaper as ground defense systems are generally less expensive than fighter aircraft or submarines and Aegis destroyers and the concept of a fully volunteer military would seem to reduce the burden of supporting a large military force on our society and economy.

                However, there are worrisome flaws in Ma's defense concept.

                First, the KMT president's calls for a "diplomatic truce" or a reduction or elimination of the over 1,000 missiles deployed by the PRC military across from Taiwan have gone unheeded and Beijing continues to insist on its "one China principle" which arrogantly posits that Taiwan is part of the PRC and refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan to ensure "unification."

                Second, China's economic rise may be creating business opportunities but it is also fuelling the continued double-digit expansion of the PRC's military budget that is spurring the exacerbation of a dangerous imbalance in military force capabilities in the Taiwan Strait.

                Moreover, there is no certainty that China's economic development will lead to political democratization or social stability in the PRC itself. There are also no guarantees that future Chinese governments, democratic or otherwise, will respect the independence of Taiwan or the right of free choice of Taiwan's 23 million people to determine their own national identity or destiny.

                Moreover, Taiwan's military development and defense strategy are deeply intertwined with democratic allies such as the U.S. and Japan and their security partners in the Asia-Pacific region, all of whom will be shocked and discomfited if Taiwan does not consult with them before retreating from "active defense" to "passive defense."

                Combined with the spreading of illusions that "peace is breaking out" in the Taiwan Strait, such an unilateral decision could well reduce the willingness of Washington and Tokyo to assist Taiwan defend itself from possible PRC intimidation or active threats if the touted cross-strait reconciliation falters.

                Hence, while it is fine for Ma to express goodwill to Beijing, the KMT government's military strategy should be based on reality and not ideological myths or wishful fantasies if it aims to fulfill its responsibility to defend the interests of the 23 million citizens who elected it.
                “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

                Comment


                • #9
                  So does active defense entail buying cruise missiles to shoot at China?

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Of course, remember the China military report 2005 edition incident?
                    “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by Triple C View Post
                      .
                      RollingWaves, as one Taiwanese to another, what do you mean by "playing a key piece in the struggle between China and the US", in the light of the global recession and the Sino-American financial interdependence? What leverage do you think we currently possess or can reasonably expect to possess in the future, that is valuable enough for us to play one against the other or dictate the terms of our interaction with either state?

                      I do not see the US as having any reason to defend Taiwan except national honor. Having observed American politics and defense issues from America, I see no military or strategic necessity in retaining Taiwan other than the damage to US creditability if it fails to honor a pledge to protect a friend. If Taiwan cease to be an American ally, what guarantee do we have against the probability that America would simply lose interest in Taiwan, as its obligation to protect Taiwan as a friend would have vanished and its ability to project power would be by no means diminished?

                      Furthermore, what advantage can we gain by frustrating US agenda in Asia with China, when it is China that wants to terminate Taiwan's sovereignty, not US?
                      I generally feel that it is even more risky to look to "honors" of another country, for our own survival.

                      It is obviously a risky high wire act, but basically the only real option Taiwan has. we could just seperate this into the outlook of each country and see.

                      China: for China, Taiwan is the gate way to the blue seas. right now China's bluewater fleet is still near non-existent of course, and even it's carrier project have stalled. eventually though, if it gets to that point they certainly want to have the capacity to project fleets around the world, the definition of a superpower, right not they're pretty much locked in from all sides. Japan and S Korea and Taiwan area ll pro US and even if they weren't is definately wary of China. Phillipines and SE Asia in general is still largely controlled by the US (either have men stationed or have borowed facilities) so in essence, China is completly locked in by the US presense.

                      Taking Taiwan is obviously a lot less interntaionally problematic than say.. taking Japan or SE Asia. the excuse is better , the diplomatic trap were all set up a long time ago. the question of course, is that if the time is riped or not?

                      Of course, this is long term, for the shorter to medium term, China's real goal is to keep it's economic growth, to bring it's entire country out of poverty (something that is still a problem in much of the vast rural areas). they are certainly aware that military power is useless if not backed by similarly powerful economic powers. and they're still a ways from that.

                      So for them, while Taiwan would surely always we their long term goal, for the short term their civilian administrators sees no point in pushing the envelope this fast and risk all the economic development they achieved over the last 2 decade. however, obviously hawks in the military who sees war as a path to advancements and over zelous youths who have bought into the properganda of the CCP government could end up forcing their hands.


                      US: for the US , obviously the reverse is true, keeping Taiwan out of CCP hands means they'll never be able to really project military presence in the world at will. so as long as the US want to remain the world's only super power they probably would want to keep the first chain island net in place.

                      on the shorter term of coruse, economic reliance, issues elsewhere in the world is more pressing, and more importantly. the rise of a stable and sensible China isn't really against the US interest either. the PRC is nowhere as uncooperative as the USSR was. so in the current stage there is no point for the US to do more than it already have.


                      Taiwan: on Taiwans' part. they're already stuck in the middle of a giant wargame setup over the past few 50 years. the UN doesn't admit their existence so we're stuck at the mercy of the US, the fact that the island exist where it is and the history background means that dealing with China is inevitable and will always be the center of our focus.

                      The long term survival of Taiwan depends really on keeping the rise of China a peaceful one, in this sense. economic ties, culture exchangse are all positive . one of the key worries of Taiwan really is the rise of Chinese nationalism amoung it's youth. who see's their country's prosperity growing but is often clouded from the outside world, or even it's own country's past.

                      Having a new generation of Chinese youth grown up with a better understanding and appriciation of Taiwans society and democracy is almost surely helpful in the long term. Most of the world's authoritarian regimes that gotten rich since WW2 eventually turned democratic and peaceful, Taiwan itself is a very good example of this. much of China's current development shadows that of Taiwan's during the 70s-90s. , so for Taiwan, their real key would be hoping to hasten the process to a peaceful and more democratic China.

                      On a more realistic end, Taiwan should understand that the current balance isn't going to break just yet. so the biggest risk is that they unilaterally tick off China and send them into irrational decisions. to this end, they need to take the most advantage of this period and both increase it's own economic strength. and give more reasons for China to remain peaceful. at the same time, China is the most obvious natural busniess partner for Taiwan, Taiwan's busniessman over the last 2 decade have taken the advantage that they are more chinese than the foreigners and more foreigners than the Chinese. but at the same time, they have a huge problem in securing loans, or properly utilizing their homebase to help expand their busniess on the mainland. so whle they hold a pretty significant stake in China, it's not AS LARGE of a stake they probably could have if they were working under normal circumstancse.

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                      • #12
                        Also, while I was aganist Chen's silly strategy, I think Ma's attempt to go all professional is just as bad. it is pure politics at the expense of security. if war does come, the best hope of Taiwan into delaying and inflicting serious damage on the CCP remains on the ground. in he fact that most of it's male civilians recieved at least basic military trainings.

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                        • #13
                          RollingWaves,

                          My point about US national honor is that we need the US far more than they need us. China on the other hand is our national security threat and I do not see any reason why cooperating with China will pressure the US to strengthen their ties with us; I fear that the result might be just the opposite.

                          It may create the impression in Washington and Tokyo that Taiwan had decisively aligned itself with China. And given China's strategy to constraint other nations' freedom of maneuver by economic ties, I worry that we will not be able to change course if ties with China no longer works in our favor.

                          Militarily I do not see the abdication of sea and air to China as a realistic strategy. China defense watchers on this forum had been highly skeptical of China's ability to project power across the straight through air and naval assets. Why concede inferiority when we are in fact stronger in those areas? Is fighting house-to-house really playing our strengths when our ground forces are small, conscript training low, and is about to be made even weaker?

                          Additionally, China's burgeoning of military power had nothing to do with Taiwan's defense policy. China's military grows because of China. It is China's policy set in the 80s that after 20 years of projected economic growth money will be funneled to modernize the military, regardless of any external factors from Taiwan. Their ability and will to attack us is not dependent on provocation on our part.
                          All those who are merciful with the cruel will come to be cruel to the merciful.
                          -Talmud Kohelet Rabbah, 7:16.

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                          • #14
                            Originally posted by RollingWave View Post
                            Having a new generation of Chinese youth grown up with a better understanding and appriciation of Taiwans society and democracy is almost surely helpful in the long term. Most of the world's authoritarian regimes that gotten rich since WW2 eventually turned democratic and peaceful, Taiwan itself is a very good example of this. much of China's current development shadows that of Taiwan's during the 70s-90s. , so for Taiwan, their real key would be hoping to hasten the process to a peaceful and more democratic China.
                            Here is where I am more pessimistic. The average well-educated Chinese youth is as nationalistic as ever, generally takes a very hard line on Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan, and furthermore is not convinced of the superiority of democratic forms of government.
                            All those who are merciful with the cruel will come to be cruel to the merciful.
                            -Talmud Kohelet Rabbah, 7:16.

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                            • #15
                              Originally posted by Triple C View Post
                              RollingWaves,

                              My point about US national honor is that we need the US far more than they need us. China on the other hand is our national security threat and I do not see any reason why cooperating with China will pressure the US to strengthen their ties with us; I fear that the result might be just the opposite.

                              It may create the impression in Washington and Tokyo that Taiwan had decisively aligned itself with China. And given China's strategy to constraint other nations' freedom of maneuver by economic ties, I worry that we will not be able to change course if ties with China no longer works in our favor.

                              Militarily I do not see the abdication of sea and air to China as a realistic strategy. China defense watchers on this forum had been highly skeptical of China's ability to project power across the straight through air and naval assets. Why concede inferiority when we are in fact stronger in those areas? Is fighting house-to-house really playing our strengths when our ground forces are small, conscript training low, and is about to be made even weaker?

                              Additionally, China's burgeoning of military power had nothing to do with Taiwan's defense policy. China's military grows because of China. It is China's policy set in the 80s that after 20 years of projected economic growth money will be funneled to modernize the military, regardless of any external factors from Taiwan. Their ability and will to attack us is not dependent on provocation on our part.
                              I don't think we should just out right give up the air and sea. but let's face the reality of the problem here, air power is only projectable if your airbase is operational. similarly, sea based power would be useless if your air defense is knocked out (and I know first hand from serving on a junky Knox class frigate how poor Taiwan navy's air defense is)

                              China has a huge ballistic arsenal pointed at us. even if we assume that their quality and accuratcy and general effectiveness isn't high. sooner or later they will be able to disable a good portion of our airfield and naval operation capacity. I was a radarman on that ship, and really, Taiwan's navy rely on just a few key radar station. even one direct hit probably will knock those stations out of operation. and all it takes is to take out about 5 stations and the the ships be out of long range radar. (the ships' own radar is only good for about 20 nautical miles)

                              Also, with the rate that China's airforce is improving at, and it's existing numerical advantage anyway. we'd be hard pressed to keep them out forever. the Taiwan airforce is better than your everyday small country airforce of course. but is it really enough to keep a much larger airforce, based so close, with constant ballistic threats on your own air fields and radar system, out?


                              Also, having served on the Knox and been at the center of all the exercises during that time, I'm highly skeptical of the ships's capacity in pretty much every aspect. we had trouble consistently locating even crude WW2 subs, our anti ship arsenal is limited to about 4 harpoon missiles (that is slow to reload. only 2 is ready at a given time.) and a 5 inch gun. the air defense was non-exisitent at the time though now it is equipped with a couple of SAM. i'm not sure how we are suppose to deal with the massive threat of PRC subs in the event of war. and the knox is supposedly the best anti sub ship in our arsenal!

                              I'm not suggesting that we give up on air and sea. but we need to face the prospect that there's a good chance we can't keep it up and must fight on the island itself. we can not have a strategy that seem to suggest we would surrender the moment anyone lands on our shore.


                              Originally posted by Triple C View Post
                              Here is where I am more pessimistic. The average well-educated Chinese youth is as nationalistic as ever, generally takes a very hard line on Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan, and furthermore is not convinced of the superiority of democratic forms of government.
                              From my own experience. most of that is because they were educated in China, those educated aboard tend to eventually develop a broader view of things (unless they're completely tied to the ruling establishment back home). and more over, we need to remember that those with such views are adverse to let them self being known right now. where as the brash nationalistic youths are the onces banging the drums .

                              We could look back to Taiwan's own experience and often draw striking similarity to China's own situation. in the 70s and early 80s, plenty of Taiwanese were educated in the US, but at the the time the general voice in the island was still the old school pro KMT properganda . when in fact many people held a different view but only a few brave souls made them self known. so then you see a sudden explosion of the democratic movement from the late 80s onward. many of the highly educated remained on the KMT side. but they were far more sympathetic to the democratic cause. and gradually let the process take place. if you look back to the figures invovled. the seeds were laid over a long period of time from many different sources. Taiwan should try to actively be one of that source. slowly generating a larger crowd in China that is much more understanding of Taiwan's real situation.

                              A closer inspection into China would reveal that hardly everyone is on the same page as the CCP properganda. but to really make serious political changes in a peaceful matter over the long term. it's going to take time and effort. Taiwan still have a little time. it needs to make good use of it.

                              We need the US more than they need us, that can't be helped. how they weigh their geopolitics is really out of our hands. one could hope that closer ties with China would either lower China's general hostility and international pressure towards us (Which is one of the key issues in the arms deal as well, see the submarine deal that has been passed around the world like a hot potato.) or make the US more wary of the prospect that Taiwan would just switch sides and they would lose their net against China. and thus force them to be more active and careful on this relationship instead of the situation now. where everything from arms deal to economic deal is virtually treated as a federal order to a colony at times (see recent beef import deal. where the AIT head dimissed local fear off handedly as a "non-issue" and bluntly stated that they would not re-negotiate or make any comprimises to anything short of an all out open import with no strings attached)

                              At the end of the day. if China really truly surpass the US as a world superpower, then it will get what it wants. in the long run, unless China really collapses (not impossible, but not exactly good news for next door neighbors either), in the long run it's military strength will surely be enough to take Taiwan even if it is not yet there. Taiwan's best shot is to hope to make their economic status as strong as possible, and hope it can at gradually influence the heart and minds of the next generation of Chinese youth. it is doing that right now more or less. Taiwan's trends and pop culture have a huge influence on China, Taiwan's news channals are all airing on nearby coastal provinces. and it's media influence is seeping into China all the time.

                              At the same time, we should certainly stand for our own soverignty, and certainly not underscore the potential of a Chinese invasion. but the first step for the US and USSR to lower the tension of the cold war began with the hotlines too, understanding each other usually offers a lower reason to attack. more modern societies in solid economic conditions are less likely to go to war with each other.

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