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  • The Chinese Civil War.

    Originally posted by xinhui View Post
    Osirishotep,

    I also disagree with your notion of a PLA "basically ill-equipped and undersupplied peasants", They destroyed the 3 KMT Armies during the battle of Huaihai, and one of them the 5th, was all American trained and equipped army who fought with honor in Burma. PLA wiped out 500,000 to 750,000 KMT troops during that battle. The PLA fourth field Army, while under equipped with captured IJA and KMT weapons during the initial phase of the Korean war, were professionals who saw years of conventional warfare during the Chinese civil war.
    Sir, the KMT army may be well equiped, but did they have the will to fight? Did the leadership have the will to fight? I've heard that a lot of KMT units simply melted away. Some larger units surrendered en masse.

    The UN forces in Korea certainly had the will to fight and were battle hardened from WW2 campaigns. They were an entirely different beast than what the PLA was used to during the Chinese civil war.
    "Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb.

  • #2
    The Chinese Civil War.

    Originally posted by gunnut View Post
    Sir, the KMT army may be well equiped, but did they have the will to fight? Did the leadership have the will to fight? I've heard that a lot of KMT units simply melted away. Some larger units surrendered en masse.
    Did the Iraqi collapse take anything away from the USArmy and the British Army?

    Originally posted by gunnut View Post
    The UN forces in Korea certainly had the will to fight and were battle hardened from WW2 campaigns.
    That is debatable. There is no doubt that MacArthur misread the Chinese both before and during their campaigns. Had he just stood his ground, he could have destroyed 2 Chinese Armies and united Korea. After that, Truman never wanted to past the 38th Parallel again.

    Originally posted by gunnut View Post
    They were an entirely different beast than what the PLA was used to during the Chinese civil war.
    They adapted.

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    • #3
      Originally posted by gunnut View Post
      Sir, the KMT army may be well equiped, but did they have the will to fight? Did the leadership have the will to fight? I've heard that a lot of KMT units simply melted away. Some larger units surrendered en masse.

      The UN forces in Korea certainly had the will to fight and were battle hardened from WW2 campaigns. They were an entirely different beast than what the PLA was used to during the Chinese civil war.
      Yes and no, some units had the will and fought to the last man, for an example, the KMT Second Army during battle of Huaihai and its commander Qiu Qingquan committed suicide after being trapped and isolated for almost two months. In fact, the list of KMT generals committed suicide is rather long. But, the reality is that while some put up heroic fights, other units simply malted away or surrendered in large numbers as you cited. The situation is somewhat similar to some of the ROK units during the first phase of the PVA “Intervention”, and left large gaps in the line for PLA/PVA to slip-through.
      Last edited by xinhui; 09 Dec 08,, 23:53.
      “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

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      • #4
        The Chinese Civil War.

        gunnut:

        Enjoy.


        Leavenworth Paper Number 22


        Moving the Enemy:
        Operational Art in the Chinese
        PLA’s Huai Hai Campaign

        by Dr. Gary J. Bjorge


        Abstract : This extensive and detailed study of the Huai Hai Campaign addresses a doctrinal concept that is of growing importance to the US Army -- operational art. It does so by looking at a campaign that occurred over a half century ago on a relatively unsophisticated battlefield on the other side of the world. For some, that distance from the so-called modern battlefield may make this study seem almost irrelevant. I would argue that, to the contrary, it increases its relevance to the challenges we face today. This study has great relevance because in this time of expanding commitments and deployments around the world, it is more and more important that we increase our understanding of how other people think. This is important politically, socially, economically, and, of course, militarily. As Dr. Bjorge correctly points out, operational art is not about technology. It is a product of imagination and creative thought, and this is where we can learn from the Huai Hai Campaign. This campaign contains examples of commanders who were imaginative and creative. More important even, the campaign, as the author argues, shows non-Western classical Chinese military thought as an important inspiration for that creativity. Reading Sun Tzu's (Sunzi's) "The Art of War" has been in vogue in the Army for years. For too many readers, however, this book never becomes more than a collection of aphorisms -- pithy to some, trite to others, but without much applicability to their real-life challenges. This study looks at the Huai Hai Campaign from the perspective of "The Art of War" and shows that many of Sunzi's concepts and precepts were part of the campaign vision and the operations that were conducted during the campaign. By doing this, the study not only increases our understanding of the nature of operational art, it increases our understanding of the thought contained in one of China's great military classics. We commend it to you for your education and enjoyment.
        “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

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        • #5
          col yu,

          taking away nationalist incompetence, from your own estimation, how well did the PLA do in the Civil War? more importantly, how/when did they begin to show such acumen which was absent during WWII?

          it always seemed pretty amazing to me how a chinese national army, having gotten their clocks cleaned by second/third-tier japanese forces as late as 1944, could even be in a possible position to sweep the Eighth Army to the sea little more than six years later. even taking into account captured KMT/japanese stocks, the forces wielded by both KMT/CCP in 1948 had extraordinary variety in terms of quality of training/equipment...
          There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

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          • #6
            Originally posted by astralis View Post
            col yu,

            taking away nationalist incompetence, from your own estimation, how well did the PLA do in the Civil War? more importantly, how/when did they begin to show such acumen which was absent during WWII?

            it always seemed pretty amazing to me how a chinese national army, having gotten their clocks cleaned by second/third-tier japanese forces as late as 1944, could even be in a possible position to sweep the Eighth Army to the sea little more than six years later. even taking into account captured KMT/japanese stocks, the forces wielded by both KMT/CCP in 1948 had extraordinary variety in terms of quality of training/equipment...
            Was that the same force? I thought the commies avoided direct confrontation with the Japanese during WW2, instead electing to gather their strength for the oncoming civil war.
            "Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb.

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            • #7
              gunnut,

              Overall, yes, but no one likes a loosing team, Commies needed victories to draw recruits, especially those from the urban area and educated to fill technical slots, so they do "go out" once a while.
              “the misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not being exploited at all” -- Joan Robinson

              Comment


              • #8
                gunnut,

                the PLA after 1947 was largely made up of defeated/bribed KMT armies.
                There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

                Comment


                • #9
                  on another note, gunnut,

                  Was that the same force? I thought the commies avoided direct confrontation with the Japanese during WW2, instead electing to gather their strength for the oncoming civil war.
                  operation ichigo broke the back of the nationalists. the levels of taxation and conscription on an ever-smaller resource base caused by the 1944 japanese invasion almost destroyed nationalist legitimacy altogether. ironically, the anti-communist japanese advanced the communist cause considerably by wiping out local elites whom were against communism (but also anti-japanese).

                  the communists, having both smaller armies, lesser demands, and having escaped the brunt of the japanese attack, were well situated to take advantage of public discontent. this was where their organizational and propaganda superiority showed.
                  There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by xinhui View Post
                    gunnut,

                    Overall, yes, but no one likes a loosing team, Commies needed victories to draw recruits, especially those from the urban area and educated to fill technical slots, so they do "go out" once a while.
                    Got it. Thanks.

                    Originally posted by astralis View Post
                    gunnut,

                    the PLA after 1947 was largely made up of defeated/bribed KMT armies.
                    I guess morale goes a long way toward victory (or fighting prowess). My guess is under the nationalist rule the army had little fighting spirit. Under "new management" the same army fought harder and was more motivated. It's the "change" they fought for. Something new and exciting after x years of failed policies of the previous administration.

                    Wow, I guess the democrats are commies. :))
                    "Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb.

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      gunnut,

                      My guess is under the nationalist rule the army had little fighting spirit. Under "new management" the same army fought harder and was more motivated. It's the "change" they fought for. Something new and exciting after x years of failed policies of the previous administration.
                      yup, and actually some of my current reading is to why that was the case. chiang had tried his hardest to put this "fighting spirit" in his own troops- he actually exhorted his own troops to follow the communist example in this. he had a propaganda department, executed corrupt officers left and right, in short, tried to imitate the commies.

                      but he failed, and it seems like the biggest reason why was because his army (especially senior officers, aka ex-warlords) never believed in the propaganda. so they continued their corrupt business-as-usual ways.

                      but what i want to see now is how the chinese OPERATIONAL ART changed. when did the commies get so good at tactics, strategy, and logistics? after the hundred-regiments offensive in 1940 the commies stopped doing major combat operations, while CKS was still busy fighting in 1944. so how did they get good and why did CKS still suck?
                      There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

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                      • #12
                        I'm surprised no one took notice of the obvious answer - AUGUST STORM. The Soviets departed more than weapons. The CCP would have had to noticed just how fast the Soviets routed an enemy that they themselves could do nothing about.

                        As we saw in the Burma campaigns, there is absolutely nothing wrong with the Chinese fighting man. It was their leaders who were lacking both in the military art, inspired leadership, and the fine eye for detail. What the Soviets had shown that it is possible for a bright few to lead the many instead of running around like headless chickens trying to do everything themselves.

                        The most important lesson the Soviets had emparted on the Chinese Red Army is the concept of the schedule. Fire occurred at X hours and ends at X+Y hours no matter what, even if the target is not destroyed. After that, the infantry goes in no matter if the enemy has been soften up enough or not.

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                        • #13
                          col yu,

                          I'm surprised no one took notice of the obvious answer - AUGUST STORM. The Soviets departed more than weapons. The CCP would have had to noticed just how fast the Soviets routed an enemy that they themselves could do nothing about.
                          i'm sure of it, but the difference in capability demonstrated went beyond the concept of the schedule and even elements of deep battle (although i see the Red Army went for something akin to that in the encirclement campaigns in the North). the KMT had US trainers, weaponry, and even air superiority, how did the CCP learn to adapt and neutralize these advantages faster than the KMT? up until 1947 the KMT had a good deal more experience in conventional ops, while the CCP was concentrating more heavily on guerilla ops.
                          There is a cult of ignorance in the United States, and there has always been. The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that "My ignorance is just as good as your knowledge."- Isaac Asimov

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            You're talking about a system that made use of penal battalions, the most unmotivated troops in the world. The key is organization and planning and for that, you need fewer trained men than you would an American organization that required good sergeants as well as officers at all echelons.

                            For the educated (or lack of) level of the Chinese back then, this maximized the effectiveness of those men who can organize and plan while demanding fewer of them which in the Chinese case is all that they can afford.

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                            • #15
                              I still think it's the leadership of KMT that was the problem. The guy at the top was corrupt. The generals were either incompetant or corrupt, or both. They might be loyal, but that didn't mean they were capable. They could be yes-men to Chiang so they got the job. The rank and file soldiers just didn't care for corrupt leadership and incapable generals. If the leaders demonstrated a tendency to march men into a meat grinder, repeatedly, then the men would look for the first chance to desert.

                              As far as the commies operation was concerned, I remember a saying that I heard when I was growing up in Taiwan (describing CCP's strategy in WW2): 70% growth, 20% busy work (loose translation), 10% fighting Japanese. How they actually figured out how to fight without actually getting involved in campaigns, I am not clear.
                              "Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb.

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