Soft Muslim Underbelly, Soft American Power - Review - Complex Terrain Lab
By Brigitte L. Nacos
The latest edition of The Washington Monthly carries an interesting article on the underlying softness of public support for Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda in Muslim countries. Based on surveys in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and several other Muslim countries, Kenneth Ballen concludes that although there is a high level of support for bin Laden in the Muslim world, this support is soft and can be made softer still with the right policies. Ballen is the president of the non-profit organization Terror Free Tomorrow. Posted on the organization’s web site, the polls reflect significant resentment toward the United States but also the potential for a dramatic turnaround in anti-American sentiments without drastic policy adjustments.
Take the example of Pakistan, where 80% of respondents in June of this year said that al-Qaeda’s top goal was standing up to America. A total of 57% agreed with that objective. The same survey revealed that one-third of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of bin Laden and al-Qaeda. But when asked what would improve their opinion of the United States, the vast majority considered educational scholarships and visas to the U.S., free trade between the two countries, American disaster relief, medical aid, and resources to build schools and train teachers as measures to improve America’s esteem in Pakistan.
The most surprising result was that a larger percentage of bin Laden supporters than of non-supporters considered all six U.S. measures as improving Pakistanis' attitudes to America. With similar results in other Muslim countries in mind, Ballen wrote on the op-ed page of The Los Angeles Times,
The most problematic finding of the Pakistan survey is the strong public support for Pakistani government negotiation with al-Qaeda and Taliban militants, set against the opposition to Pakistani and, even more so, American military actions against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It is not likely that al-Qaeda and Taliban militants will change their positions in such negotiations; they have the upper hand in the tribal border areas essential for strengthening their influence in Afghanistan.
Soft power, including public diplomacy with an emphasis on people-to-people relations and generous aid for disaster relief, is more likely to change the hearts and minds of a resentful population than hard power. The reaction to the U.S. after its contribution to tsunami relief is an excellent example. Terrorists need community support to sustain their activities. When that support diminishes, terrorists’ effectiveness and operational freedom also decline.
Yet, as I have written elsewhere, shifting U.S. aid from military to non-military aid earmarked for construction of schools, hospitals and roads in Pakistan’s tribal area will not break the Taliban’s and al-Qaeda’s dominance. In this particular case, unfortunately, soft power alone will not bring about changes.
By Brigitte L. Nacos
The latest edition of The Washington Monthly carries an interesting article on the underlying softness of public support for Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda in Muslim countries. Based on surveys in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and several other Muslim countries, Kenneth Ballen concludes that although there is a high level of support for bin Laden in the Muslim world, this support is soft and can be made softer still with the right policies. Ballen is the president of the non-profit organization Terror Free Tomorrow. Posted on the organization’s web site, the polls reflect significant resentment toward the United States but also the potential for a dramatic turnaround in anti-American sentiments without drastic policy adjustments.
Take the example of Pakistan, where 80% of respondents in June of this year said that al-Qaeda’s top goal was standing up to America. A total of 57% agreed with that objective. The same survey revealed that one-third of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of bin Laden and al-Qaeda. But when asked what would improve their opinion of the United States, the vast majority considered educational scholarships and visas to the U.S., free trade between the two countries, American disaster relief, medical aid, and resources to build schools and train teachers as measures to improve America’s esteem in Pakistan.
The most surprising result was that a larger percentage of bin Laden supporters than of non-supporters considered all six U.S. measures as improving Pakistanis' attitudes to America. With similar results in other Muslim countries in mind, Ballen wrote on the op-ed page of The Los Angeles Times,
What our surveys uncovered is that the U.S. would witness dramatic improvements in the view of the United States among the overwhelming majority of Muslims, including those who express support for al Qaeda and Bin Laden, if we demonstrate respect and caring for people in their daily lives through practical, relatively achievable steps such as increasing direct humanitarian assistance (medical, education, food), visas and better trade terms.
(For The Los Angeles Times op-ed and The Washington Monthly article, see PDF).
(For The Los Angeles Times op-ed and The Washington Monthly article, see PDF).
Soft power, including public diplomacy with an emphasis on people-to-people relations and generous aid for disaster relief, is more likely to change the hearts and minds of a resentful population than hard power. The reaction to the U.S. after its contribution to tsunami relief is an excellent example. Terrorists need community support to sustain their activities. When that support diminishes, terrorists’ effectiveness and operational freedom also decline.
Yet, as I have written elsewhere, shifting U.S. aid from military to non-military aid earmarked for construction of schools, hospitals and roads in Pakistan’s tribal area will not break the Taliban’s and al-Qaeda’s dominance. In this particular case, unfortunately, soft power alone will not bring about changes.
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