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View Full Version : USArmy's bold risky plan in putting a fuel/ammo depot in front of force



Blademaster
18 Jul 08,, 19:39
This is a carryover topic from the closed topic of http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/south-asian-defense-topics/45576-drdo-tries-ram-arjun-tanks-down-army-throat-2.html#post518219

where OOE, Brigadier, Deltacomelately, and I were discussing a tangential topic regarding Desert Storm.

Here are the pertinent quotes.





Originally Posted by Ray View Post
I sure would like to have the After Action Report.

Brigadier Ray, Colonel TJ, and Major Delta,

I believe this is of interest to you all

On Point - The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/onpoint/intro.htm) Please follow the links at the bottom of the page for subsequent chapters.






colonel,
thank you. makes intresting reading. will have to go over it in leisure.i wish we could evolve a doctrine close to what the americans have.tell me i had come arcross the word mandate a couple of times . are these doctrines passed as a law? i like the concept of having an idependent lessons learnt centre. is this centre an official army org or a think tank?






Sir,
Thank you. Indeed an interesting read.
Sir, as far as the parameters are concerned, does it applies to NATO standards as well?








tell me i had come arcross the word mandate a couple of times . are these doctrines passed as a law?
No, but they are defined as policy and reflected in the training. The best example I can think of is the American National Traning Centre where the brigades are expected to meet a Soviet style opponent head on.

These policies are usually written into the Field Manuals (of which the most important is FM 3.0 Operations). Two other fundamental publications are the BATTLE BOOKS. All of these are extremely hard reads and would put the novice to sleep. However, I can provide links if you would like.



i like the concept of having an idependent lessons learnt centre. is this centre an official army org or a think tank?
CALL is a USArmy insitution at the Carisle Barracks. They usually solicit articles and pieces from Officers who have time to do these articles, ie those who are furthering their educational requirements.



Thank you. Indeed an interesting read.
Sir, as far as the parameters are concerned, does it applies to NATO standards as well?
The concepts applies to NATO but the execution is of unequal terms. You will note that the British limited themselves to Basra namely because that was the limit of their operational reach. I don't think any other country on earth had the resources to commit to the battle as the Americans do (satellite followed fixed wing followed by hellos followed artillery followed by tanks followed by infantry followed by logistics).

I have not seen it during the Iraq War but during the Kuwait War, the Americans came up with a most ingenius logistical tactic. They dropped a fuel depot in FRONT of an attacking column. The fuel and ammo was waiting for the tanks as the tank forces advanced.

This time around, I saw a whole battle group escourting the convoys through.

Still, while there are a lot of operational similarities between the NATO countries and especially ABCA (American-British-Canadian-Australian), there are a lot of cultural differences that spring up from time to time.

Read this,
http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/land-forces/1182-operation-thunder-run.html, and see the cultural difference detailed.

Gentlement, for your reading pleasures.

http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/world-wars/894-last-stand-tawakalna.html
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aar-jul03.pdf
http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/field-mess/866-aar-2-7-inf-3id.html








I have not seen it during the Iraq War but during the Kuwait War, the Americans came up with a most ingenius logistical tactic. They dropped a fuel depot in FRONT of an attacking column. The fuel and ammo was waiting for the tanks as the tank forces advanced.
And damn risky for doing so. This could only be done against the likes of the Republican Guards or Iraqi Divisions.






And damn risky for doing so. This could only be done against the likes of the Republican Guards or Iraqi Divisions.

Hitesh, no doubt that it was a very bold tactic but it was also a very unthoutht of tactic but in hindsight, it was a very obvious tactic. Why did no one thought of it before.





Hitesh, no doubt that it was a very bold tactic but it was also a very unthoutht of tactic but in hindsight, it was a very obvious tactic. Why did no one thought of it before.
They did think of it before and realized the weaknessess and flaws and the extreme risk of doing so. This thing could not be done against Warsaw Pacts or any 1st World class armies.

Against a foe that was completely blinded, you can pull it off but still it is risky. All it takes is for one platoon recon to stumble on it and that platoon recon can call in the arty and rain steel and fire on those depots and the depots would be sitting ducks. And the person who thought of this tactic will no longer be a "genius" but a "blinded stupid idiotic fool" such as like Gen. Custer after his last stand or Mountbatten after the Dieppe raid, or Montgomery after the Operation Market Garden's failure.


Ok there I have finally put all the worthy posts from the now closed thread. I would like to continue this tangential topic and explore this subject.

Officer of Engineers
19 Jul 08,, 03:43
They did think of it before and realized the weaknessess and flaws and the extreme risk of doing so. This thing could not be done against Warsaw Pacts or any 1st World class armies.I don't think we would ever thought of that against the Warsaw Pact for the very reason we never thought of going on the offensive. Still, there were plans to drop battalion size task forces against their assembly points. Don't ask me who and how. To this day, no one can tell me which units were involved in this affair.


Against a foe that was completely blinded, you can pull it off but still it is risky. All it takes is for one platoon recon to stumble on it and that platoon recon can call in the arty and rain steel and fire on those depots and the depots would be sitting ducks. And the person who thought of this tactic will no longer be a "genius" but a "blinded stupid idiotic fool"Have to think of this within context. The Hail Mary strike was a complete surprise to the Iraqis. They were both physically and psychologically disoriented. So, we know that they were not ready to meet VII Corps. They were busy re-orienting themselves and did not have time to go hunting.

S2
19 Jul 08,, 04:32
This was the 101st Airborne, executing a 160km air-assault (world's largest combat air-assault in history) by, initially, a brigade into FOB COBRA. When one considers the optimal shooting environ for Apaches that Iraq/Kuwait presented and total air-dominance (established very early), these forces and logisticians were hardly without serious bite.

Entirely appropriate and ingenuitive under the circumstances and helps define success. Risk is an element of planning and, clearly, was correctly evaluated.

You suggest key differences in quality of forces with Warsaw Pact forces? Perhaps, except to say that if it's our intention to execute a brigade air-assault 300 km upon W.P forces, then the situation has turned exceedingly favorable (as it had during ODS). That so, the operation would be as appropriate.

Finally, I'd say that the Soviet Union maintained more dedicated air-assault infantry brigades AND the lift than any nation in the world. It was their operational intent to invade western Europe using just those forces coupled with operational manuever groups to achieve a rapid and massive sundering of CENTAG's front. We reasonably expected, even in a incredibly high-density NATO IADS, to see Soviet BATTALIONS air-assaulted throughout our army zone and perhaps further.

Our ops at FOB COBRA and beyond in ODS were prudently considered and admirably executed. Any professional would have great reason to admire the conduct.

S2
19 Jul 08,, 05:34
They leapt another 110 km forward from COBRA, but that wasn't a log hub. They were just raising hell in the lower Euphrates valley.:))

sourkraut115
19 Jul 08,, 22:00
After Cobra, we were doing anti-armor ambushes and dismounted patrols all the way to the Euphrates. We stopped at Cobra long enough to refuel, then hopped north. Every time we made contact, the Iraqi Army melted away (in the middle of their own country, against dismounted Infantry with minimal staying power, who just happened to pop up everywhere). Of course, we were so far north that after the cease-fire, when the weather worsened, we couldn't get birds in with fresh water and food for a couple of days, but we carried through that pretty well. After a couple of wild, sleepless days and nights, we sat for a month, running patrol after patrol without contact.

It was a heck of a time to be a teen-aged rifleman, but I will carry those few days in AO EAGLE with me for life.

That, by the way, was the RAKKASSAN Regiment, the 187th Air Assault Regimental Combat Team (or 3rd Brigade, if you prefer, of the 101st).