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Rommel had acquired since World War II's hostilities a legendary reputation, especially in the west. The question is: was the North African Campaign a harder war to fight than any other operation in the same scale in the Eastern Front in the same period (1941-1943)? I am thinking about this as an intellectual exercize and I welcome everyone to give their thoughts.
My hypothesis is that Rommel's reputation is well-deserved because his adversary was the more formidable relative to his own powers than the Soviet Red Army to other Wehrmacht commanders in the East. The British Army during this period was better trained and equipped than the Red Army. Although the British Army lacked a good tank until they had been supplied with US-built Shermans for the El Alamein, the British cruiser tanks were leaps and bounds better than the Russian fast BT tanks that were the backbone of the Red Army. Their Matilidas was lacking in gunpower compared to KV-1s but just as well armored.
Relative to the British Army the Red Army was under-trained and under-equipped. Soviet industry was begining to pump out T-34-76's and KV's at 1941. But preparedness of the front-line units was wanting. The Red Army divisions at this period, especially true for 1941, was almost untrained by western standards. Vital supplies, such as fuel, ammunition, spare parts and radios were insufficient.
More importantly, perhaps, was that in spite of having an immense strategic reserve in manpower, the Red Army suffered so much casualities inflicted by the Wehrmacht that it failed to achieve a clear numeric superiority over the Red Army (an earlier post by either Bluesman or S-2 in WAB had referred to a study made this observation; anyhow the Wehrmacht as as likely to outnumber the Soviets than vice-versa at 1941-1942 according to public sources, at least until Stalingrad). In contrast, Rommel was poorly supported by the OKH, while the British almost always achieved a superiority in quantity and quality in equipment over Rommel, who depended on a large fleet of obsolescent Panzer Mark II's and third-rate Italian tanks to flesh out his numbers. The Soviets also never quite managed to put the kind of air power the Allied armies managed to deploy in Africa.
I could see how one could make the arguement that by 1942 T-34s were increasingly available, in significant numbers, on the Eastern Front. But then, El Alamein was not long in coming, and the Sherman and Grant tanks were as much trouble to the panzer crews as the T-34 was. The numeric superiority that the Allies enjoyed during Operation Torch was in any case quite significant. For those reasons, the Afrika Korps's war in North Africa was fought in an operational enviroment that was as challenging as, if not more so, then the Eastern Front.
Sort of a long post. Tell me what you think and hey, it's a web forum, so feel absolutely free to say that I am dead wrong.
My hypothesis is that Rommel's reputation is well-deserved because his adversary was the more formidable relative to his own powers than the Soviet Red Army to other Wehrmacht commanders in the East. The British Army during this period was better trained and equipped than the Red Army. Although the British Army lacked a good tank until they had been supplied with US-built Shermans for the El Alamein, the British cruiser tanks were leaps and bounds better than the Russian fast BT tanks that were the backbone of the Red Army. Their Matilidas was lacking in gunpower compared to KV-1s but just as well armored.
Relative to the British Army the Red Army was under-trained and under-equipped. Soviet industry was begining to pump out T-34-76's and KV's at 1941. But preparedness of the front-line units was wanting. The Red Army divisions at this period, especially true for 1941, was almost untrained by western standards. Vital supplies, such as fuel, ammunition, spare parts and radios were insufficient.
More importantly, perhaps, was that in spite of having an immense strategic reserve in manpower, the Red Army suffered so much casualities inflicted by the Wehrmacht that it failed to achieve a clear numeric superiority over the Red Army (an earlier post by either Bluesman or S-2 in WAB had referred to a study made this observation; anyhow the Wehrmacht as as likely to outnumber the Soviets than vice-versa at 1941-1942 according to public sources, at least until Stalingrad). In contrast, Rommel was poorly supported by the OKH, while the British almost always achieved a superiority in quantity and quality in equipment over Rommel, who depended on a large fleet of obsolescent Panzer Mark II's and third-rate Italian tanks to flesh out his numbers. The Soviets also never quite managed to put the kind of air power the Allied armies managed to deploy in Africa.
I could see how one could make the arguement that by 1942 T-34s were increasingly available, in significant numbers, on the Eastern Front. But then, El Alamein was not long in coming, and the Sherman and Grant tanks were as much trouble to the panzer crews as the T-34 was. The numeric superiority that the Allies enjoyed during Operation Torch was in any case quite significant. For those reasons, the Afrika Korps's war in North Africa was fought in an operational enviroment that was as challenging as, if not more so, then the Eastern Front.
Sort of a long post. Tell me what you think and hey, it's a web forum, so feel absolutely free to say that I am dead wrong.
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