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CTC Sentinel Vol. 4

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  • CTC Sentinel Vol. 4

    http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss4.pdf

    Contents

    Feature article
    1 Jihad After Iraq: Lessons from the Arab Afghans Phenomenon By Mohammed M. Hafez

    Reports
    5 Combating Terrorist Financing at the Agency and Interagency Levels By Dennis M. Lormel
    7 Lessons Learned from the September 2007 German Terrorist Plot By Petter Nesser
    10 Mapping the Factional Structure of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq By Michael Gabbay
    13 Jihadists Target the American Dream By Brian Fishman
    15 The Growth of Militant Islamist Micro-Diaspora Communities: Observations from Spain By Kathryn Haahr
    19 Drawing the Right Lessons from Israel’s War with Hizb Allah By Andrew Exum
    20 Guest Commentary: Benazir Bhutto’s Doomed Return to Pakistan By James Rr. Ellis, Lt. Gen. U.S. Army (Ret.)
    21 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity
    28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts
    Last edited by Shek; 18 Mar 08,, 02:32.
    "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

  • #2
    Exum's article on page 19 about the 2006 Israel-Hizbollah War is quite an interesting look at the supposed lessons learned. Here are two passages to whet the appetite:

    The greatest mistake the U.S. military can make in studying the lessons of 2006, however, is to study the 34 days of fighting that took place in southern Lebanon in July and August of that year without any context. Nevertheless, this seems to be what is happening.
    The 2006 war was not evidence, then, that Israel had over-learned the lessons of counter-insurgency, but rather the opposite: Israel has never effectively learned counter-insurgency in the first place. Even in the West Bank and Gaza, the IDF continues to approach the fighting there as a counter-terrorism mission instead of a counter-insurgency mission. Moreover, while the presence of both a radicalized settler population and historical animosities might preclude the application of an effective counter-insurgency strategy in the Occupied Territories, Israel has never developed and applied counter-insurgency doctrine along the lines of FM 3-24 despite years of experience in irregular warfare dating back to Jewish guerrilla groups in pre-state Israel.
    "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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