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Al-Qaeda Is Losing The War Of Minds

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  • Al-Qaeda Is Losing The War Of Minds

    This oped provides a different context to Iraq and the concept of blowback which is bantered about. No doubt that it has motivated a new generation of irhabi, but I think it's fair to contrast this to the war within Islam and think through the short-term vs. long-term impacts.

    Financial Times
    March 5, 2008

    Al-Qaeda Is Losing The War Of Minds

    By Peter Wehner

    The US “surge” in Iraq has been so manifestly successful that no serious person can deny that gains have been made. Even Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have (grudgingly) conceded progress. Yet both Mrs Clinton and Mr Obama are quick to add that progress has been purely on the military side and that those gains are ephemeral. This fits with their broader narrative – that the war has been a disaster on every front.

    During a recent Democratic debate, for example, Mr Obama declared: “We are seeing al-Qaeda stronger now than at any time since 2001.” Mrs Clinton says President George W. Bush’s policies in Iraq have “emboldened our enemies”. We should leave Iraq, she says, so we can better focus on the threat of al-Qaeda.

    In fact, in large measure because of what is unfolding in Iraq, the tide within the Islamic world is beginning to run strongly against al-Qaeda – and this, in turn, may be the single most important ideological development in recent years.

    In November 2007 Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (“Dr Fadl”) published his book, Rationalizations on Jihad in Egypt and the World, in serialised form. Mr Sharif, who is Egyptian, argues that the use of violence to overthrow Islamic governments is religiously unlawful and practically harmful. He also recommends the formation of a special Islamic court to try Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s number two and its ideological leader, and calls the attacks on September 11 2001 a “catastrophe for all Muslims”.

    Mr Sharif’s words are significant because he was once a mentor to Mr Zawahiri. Mr Sharif, who wrote the book in a Cairo prison, is “a living legend within the global jihadist movement”, according to Jarret Brachman, a terrorism expert.

    Another important event occurred in October 2007, when Sheikh Abd Al-‘Aziz bin Abdallah Aal Al-Sheikh, the highest religious authority in Saudi Arabia, issued a fatwa prohibiting Saudi youth from engaging in jihad abroad. It states: “I urge my brothers the ulama [the top class of Muslim clergy] to clarify the truth to the public . . . to warn [youth] of the consequences of being drawn to arbitrary opinions and [religious] zeal that is not based on religious knowledge.” The target of the fatwa is obvious: Mr bin Laden.

    A month earlier Sheikh Salman al-Awdah, an influential Saudi cleric whom Mr bin Laden once lionised, wrote an “open letter” condemning Mr bin Laden. “Brother Osama, how much blood has been spilt? How many innocents among children, elderly, the weak, and women have been killed and made homeless in the name of al-Qaeda?” Sheikh Awdah wrote. “The ruin of an entire people, as is happening in Afghanistan and Iraq . . . cannot make Muslims happy.”

    These criticisms by prominent voices within the jihadist movement should be seen in the context of an even more significant development: the “Anbar Awakening” now spreading throughout Iraq. Just 18 months ago Anbar province was the stronghold of al-Qaeda in Iraq; today it is known as the birthplace of an Iraqi and Islamic grass-roots uprising against al-Qaeda as an organisation and bin Ladenism as an ideology. It is an extraordinary transformation: Iraqis en masse siding with America, the “infidel” and a western “occupying power”, to defeat Islamic militants.

    Not surprisingly, al-Qaeda’s stock is falling in much of the Arab and Islamic world. A recent survey found that in January less than a quarter of Pakistanis approved of Mr bin Laden, compared with 46 per cent last August, while backing for al-Qaeda fell from 33 per cent to 18 per cent.

    According to a July 2007 report from the Pew Global Attitudes Project, “large and growing numbers of Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere [are] rejecting Islamic extremism”. The percentage of Muslims saying suicide bombing is justified in the defence of Islam has declined in seven of the eight Arab countries where trend data are available. In Lebanon, for example, 34 per cent of Muslims say such suicide bombings are often or sometimes justified; in 2002, 74 per cent expressed this view. We are also seeing large drops in support for Mr bin Laden. These have occurred since the Iraq war began.

    Since General David Petraeus put in place his counter-insurgency strategy early last year, al-Qaeda has been dealt punishing military blows. Iraqis continue to turn against al-Qaeda and so does more of the Arab and Muslim world. In the past half-year an important new front, led by prominent Islamic clerics, has been opened. Militarily, ideologically and in terms of popular support, these are bad days for Mr bin Laden and his jihadist jackals.

    If we continue to build on these developments, the Iraq war, once thought to be a colossal failure, could turn out be a positive and even a pivotal event in our struggle against militant Islam. Having paid a high cost in blood and treasure and having embraced the wrong strategy for far too long, we stayed in the fight, proving that America was not the “weak horse” Mr bin Laden believed it to be. Having stayed in the fight, we may prevail in it. The best way to subvert the appeal of bin Ladenism is to defeat those who take up the sword in its name.

    We are a long way from winning in Iraq. It remains a traumatised nation and the progress made can be lost. But the trajectory of events is at last in our favour and a good outcome is within our grasp. If we succeed it will have enormously positive effects beyond Iraq.

    The writer, formerly deputy assistant to President George W. Bush, is a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center.
    "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

  • #2
    Shek Reply

    WAPO recently ran a story on a young, charismatic iman in Cairo. This article references key prose provided by al-Sharif from his Egyptian jail-cell. The Saudi fatwa . Somewhere else at WAB is an article on the Turkish Hadith project.

    There's movement afoot that, rationally, America can take credit for as catalyst. I think that it was always an implied task of our mid-east intervention to force Islam to confront itself.

    Perhaps we're slowly succeeding.
    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

    Comment


    • #3
      Originally posted by S-2 View Post
      WAPO recently ran a story on a young, charismatic iman in Cairo. This article references key prose provided by al-Sharif from his Egyptian jail-cell. The Saudi fatwa . Somewhere else at WAB is an article on the Turkish Hadith project.

      There's movement afoot that, rationally, America can take credit for as catalyst. I think that it was always an implied task of our mid-east intervention to force Islam to confront itself.

      Perhaps we're slowly succeeding.
      The fact that the most zealous tend to leave home and never return dying on a far away battlefield or in a bloody market place doesn't hurt. Neither does the fact that most of Al Quedas dead were non-combatants. I don't know if America can take credit for the latter, but the former is a claim we can make. The high death rate among jihadist reduces the long term recruiting pool. it's one thing if your going off to fight, and there is hope of victory and return. It is quite another thing to march off to certain death in a struggle that appears lost or whose morality does not jive with a persons own inner sense of direction.

      There was an article posted some time ago saying Lybians now made up the bulk of the volunteer jihadists. This is good news for Colonel Quadaffi, it gets them out of his hair. But more importantly I think it shows a trend. The population of willing suicide bombers in the Gulf and Syria seems to be depleted and so recruiters must search farther and farther afield.

      The people who live locally to the conflict have now been subjected to the two forces limiting thier enthusiasm for several years and they seem to have lost the stomach for the fight. I think America can be grateful for AQI's sheer bloodlust. They turned the message from fightign the American invader to fighting terror better than we ever could. The majority of Muslims recognize that the Sunni/Shia divide is secondary to the central principles that unite them. AQI's targeting the Shia sent a clear message that the war being waged by the jihadist was not against the west, but against Muslims.

      Hopefully this trending will continue, with recruiting pools drying up, denied religious, public, and moral support, facing insurmountable battlefield odds and unable to act effectively outside of the Islamic world is a recipe for defeat for Bin laden and his followers.

      Comment


      • #4
        Zraver Reply

        "The fact that the most zealous tend to leave home and never return dying on a far away battlefield or in a bloody market place doesn't hurt. Neither does the fact that most of Al Quedas dead were non-combatants. I don't know if America can take credit for the latter,..."

        I think we can take a dubious credit. A.Q.I. quickly learned that the pay-off to directly assaulting and/or confronting our forces from armed enclaves (i.e. Fallujah October, 2004) was a non-starter and a quick path to heaven to no functional effect.

        Stemming from it's inability to seize and hold key terrain, A.Q.I. then seeked cover for it's work. It did so by turning it's attention to igniting a sectarian civil war that would allow it's operations to be conducted unimpeded by the general malevolence sweeping the country. A.Q. was first defeated in a region in which it possessed little opportunity to create direct shia-sunni conflict. Al-Anbar is notoriously sunni, nearly exclusively so by comparison with the rest of the nation.

        Without a foil (shia enclaves) to provoke sectarian conflict, A.Q. could only starkly intimidate and subjugate the sunni tribes to seek cover from American forces within al-Anbar. The violence of sunni on sunni was profound.

        There's little doubt that among sunnis, this had a shocking emotional impact among the tribes and compelled them to a stark choice of temporal domination by American occupiers or perpetual subjugation by A.Q.I. Further, and more to Shek's point, A.Q.'s immoral choice of targets while cloaking itself in a green flag as the ultimate defender of the faith has contributed to the new awareness arising throughout Islam.

        A "western" Islam is our objective, but not transparently so. It must slowly arise of it's own accord and through it's own impetus. I remain convinced that, provided we stayed adequately long, that our presence would unleash sufficient demons to expose the internal doctrinal contradictions that prevent raising forth a modern Islam.

        This seems to be slowly happening.
        "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
        "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by S-2 View Post

          Stemming from it's inability to seize and hold key terrain, A.Q.I. then seeked cover for it's work. It did so by turning it's attention to igniting a sectarian civil war that would allow it's operations to be conducted unimpeded by the general malevolence sweeping the country. A.Q. was first defeated in a region in which it possessed little opportunity to create direct shia-sunni conflict. Al-Anbar is notoriously sunni, nearly exclusively so by comparison with the rest of the nation.
          I think this is the key that ultimately sealed thier fate in the eyes of the Islamic public. By striking not at the "infidels" but at fellow Moslems they lost thier green flag as you say. The term islamo-facist is fitting to these guys, they claim Islam but act facist. Like the Nazi's in Russia they proceeded on a course of action that ensured they would run out of welcome long before the other hated but less brutal group did. Like the Russian's embracing Stalin as the lesser of two evils, the Sunnis had a choice to make like you said. Temporary domination by the Americans or perpetual subjugation by the jihadist.

          Luckily for us AQI does not study history, it gave us the breathing room to dump Rumsfeld and his failed policies and switch to a new tack.

          Comment


          • #6
            Zraver Reply

            "Luckily for us AQI does not study history, it gave us the breathing room to dump Rumsfeld and his failed policies and switch to a new tack."

            Well, unfortunately it's my assessment that AQI has done it's work regardless of it's survival. Zarqawi was an inept fool but it didn't take much to bust the facade of Iraqi nat'lism within integrated neighborhoods. Instead, under extreme pressure from sunni and shia extremists on either side, the middle fissured and then cracked rather easily.

            We've a fractured Iraqi government that isn't inclusion-minded in the slightest. al-Maliki is an enemy of reconciliation reaching across religious lines. This, too, is an issue of an emerging modern interpretation of Islam. The face presented to the west need not be monolithic. That's hardly the case, of course, in judeo-christian religions. Since the end of the war in Northern Ireland, christianity has been able to avoid direct, sectarian conflict.

            Somehow, so must Islam. To me, it is the most difficult issue throughout the umma.
            "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
            "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by S-2 View Post
              Well, unfortunately it's my assessment that AQI has done it's work regardless of it's survival. Zarqawi was an inept fool but it didn't take much to bust the facade of Iraqi nat'lism within integrated neighborhoods. Instead, under extreme pressure from sunni and shia extremists on either side, the middle fissured and then cracked rather easily.
              I am not so sure, the key to unification is prosperity. No one wants to upset the apple cart as long as they see themselves and thier interests advancing. This trend will side line Maliki. The armed Sunnis are now thier own state in Iraq, he has lost US support vs Turkey and his Shia allies militias have imploded. While some of these may seem like bad things on the surface the reality I think is a drive towards greater political dialog in the coming months.

              1- Armed Sunnis able to operate as allies of the US have a much stronger political voice. The Iraqi government must take them seriously if it wants the oil to flow and power to reach Baghdad. Perhaps political power should not be based on the number of guns and an effective hostage situation but it will work.

              2- The refusal of the US to stop Turkey vs the PKK has told the Kurds they are not a state and that in the long run thier choice is Iraq and the rule of law or conflict and the PKK.

              3- Without powerful militias to counter the Sunnis and with the Sunnis hunting down the people guilty of near genocide against them the Shia will revert to the political processes like they did early in the war.

              All three of the major players now have reasons to buy in.

              Comment


              • #8
                Zraver Reply

                "...Without powerful militias to counter the Sunnis..."

                What do you know that suggests that SCIRI and JAM militia capabilities have diminished?
                "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                Comment


                • #9
                  Originally posted by S-2 View Post
                  "...Without powerful militias to counter the Sunnis..."

                  What do you know that suggests that SCIRI and JAM militia capabilities have diminished?
                  JAM? What I know right now is that in December the US said Iran had cut off the supply of weapons and funding to the militias groups it sponsors like SICI, Iran has apparently woken up to the fact that an unstable Iraq is not an asset. Also the Badr Milita seems to have either disbanded or gone underground with the SICI's leading role in the government. Also just recently Sadr extended his cease-fire despite followers urging him to renounce it. It seems lack of support, a bruising via the Badrs in Karbala and a general turn towards crime have crippled his ability to mobilize large numbers.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Zraver Reply

                    I've consistently read anecdotal stories over the last couple of months about difficulties enlisting sunni men into the I.A. or the nat'l police...even local police forces.

                    We know that the Ministry of the Interior is dominated by shia factions. So too the security elements of the ministry. I might be wrong but I believe that this is the case with the Iraqi Army as well, where arab sunnis have been diminished in favor of Kurdish and shias both at command levels and certainly within the ranks.

                    If the Iraqi Army continues to grow but exclusion or minimal integration to the security forces of sunnis persists, what sect would dominate the largest sectarian militia within Iraq- the Iraqi Army? As Badr brigade militiamen "disband", do they have opportunities in the government to compensate?

                    I don't know but suspect that we've sufficiently enfranchised the shias of Iraq that they feel comfortable inviting Ahmedinejad to Baghdad despite 80,000 sons of Iraq becoming royally pissed off.
                    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                    Comment

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