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Coin Of The Realm: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy

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  • Coin Of The Realm: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy

    This is an article collaborated on by the Brookings Institution and the Strategic Studies Institute.
    Here are the key insights to the discussion:

    KEY INSIGHTS:
    • Regardless of whether counterinsurgency (COIN) will be the dominant form of military activity in the future
    or simply one of several, the United States needs an effective national strategy which explains when, why, and
    how the nation should undertake it.
    • The basic assumptions of the current approach need revisited, especially those dealing with the role of the state,
    the strategic framework for American involvement, and the whole-of-government approach.
    • Given the demands placed upon the armed forces by the current campaigns, most of the effort has been on tactics,
    training, and doctrine. Ultimately strategic transformation is at least as important if not more so.
    • Rather than thinking of counterinsurgency and warfighting as competing tasks, the military and other government
    agencies must pursue ways to integrate them, thus assuring that the United States can address the multidimensional
    threats which characterize the contemporary security environment.

    The document is located here:
    COIN OF THE REALM: U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

    I thought this would be a good discussion generator on the merits of COIN and how the US is implementing the COIN strategy and its effect on our operational capabilities for modern conventional warfare.

    The impact COIN operations have on the OPTEMPO of our forces is high. If you add another element to the mix, say Iran, what impact would transitioning back to a conventional war would our forces have to endure, if necessary?
    Last edited by 1idvet; 15 Jan 08,, 02:29. Reason: Error in the Title

  • #2
    1 idvet Reply

    Nice article. Metz has posted here occasionally. What's missing is a strategic doctrine shaping our use of COIN as a military art. Our predilection to see COIN as an element of state-craft may be an issue in the absence of nation-states worthy of the name with which to partner. Iraq and Afghanistan are proving that successful COIN ops will require, likely, decades of close involvement. We seem unprepared to do so with those two nations and show less eagerness to add to that list.

    That's good because our energies remain mis-directed for various reasons above the military-operational level. "M" dominates diMe, and that's not good.

    The greater questions, to me, seem if the future portends an absence of viable nation-states with which to partner, what should our strategic objectives/expectations be and how must we re-configure to attain them? Is it feasible to actively seek local (and marginal) solutions that provide no unifying payoff for the effort extended?

    Witness Iraq. What will connect local successes generated by U.S. forces to a national reconciliation or even a more closely-focused sunni-shia rapproachment? We still miss the strategic dimension with little foreseeable hope on the horizon.

    Nice find.:)
    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

    Comment


    • #3
      Thanks.
      Just looking to get smarter myself.
      I used to be more directly involved in this stuff when I worked at the NTC, but since moving on, I can only keep up on my own.
      This looks like a good place to do that.

      Comment


      • #4
        More on COIN

        America's enemies at present, and likely in the future, will be irregular fighting forces and they will fight in an unconventional manner. Our forces have to adapt to this type of warfare and still maintain the ability to fight a conventional war.

        Where to strike a balance on this issue is the problem. Invest heavily in special operations forces, or continue to feed the conventional forces from the same coffer and sacrifice the needed capability? Or, train our conventional forces in irregular tactics and sacrifice their ability to fight a conventional war?

        In my opinion, units such as the 82nd Airborne, 101st Airborne, and 173rd Airborne can be transitioned to units that are more adaptable to special operations. They are already doing a lot of missions that could be considered a part of the special operations realm in Afghanistan and have also done so in Iraq. Maybe if they were more dedicated to this type of fighting, we would be better prepared for irregular warfare and our conventional forces would be able to adapt to the style after the conventional part of the war is over with the support of those units already proficient at it.

        Just thinking.

        Here's an interesting article from the Strategic Studies Institute:

        The article discusses irregular forces and strategy.

        IRREGULAR ENEMIES AND THE ESSENCE OF STRATEGY:
        CAN THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR ADAPT?



        Here's the summary:

        Can the traditional American way of war adapt so as to be
        effective against irregular enemies? An endeavor to answer that
        question shapes and drives this inquiry. In order to address the
        question constructively, the author is obliged to explore and explain
        the nature and relations among three elements fundamental to our
        problem. Those elements are strategy, irregular enemies, and the
        American way of war. Carl von Clausewitz offered his theory of war
        in terms of a “remarkable trinity composed of primordial violence,
        hatred, and enmity . . . the play of chance and probability . . . and
        subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to
        reason alone.” He defined his task as a need “to develop a theory that
        maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object
        suspended between three magnets.” The theoretical analogy may be
        imperfect, but still it is useful. Just as Clausewitz sought to explain
        war, and wars, as the product of inherently unstable relations among
        passion, chance, and reason, so this monograph has at its core the
        unstable interactions among irregular enemies, strategy, and the
        American way of war. Unlike Clausewitz, however, our purpose is
        not to develop or improve on general theory. Instead, the intention is
        to confront and try to answer the very specific question with which
        this summary began. To that end, strategic theory is deployed here
        pragmatically, as an aid to soldiers and officials who face challenges
        of a most pressing and serious character.
        This inquiry defines and explains the essence of strategy. Next,
        it identifies what is distinctive about irregular enemies and the
        kinds of warfare they wage. Then the analysis proceeds to outline
        the fairly long-enduring traditional American way of war, and
        considers critically the fit between the many separate elements of
        that “way” and the requirements of sound practice in the conduct of
        warfare against irregulars. It concludes with a three-point argument
        which binds together the otherwise somewhat disparate topics and
        material.
        The purpose of this monograph, beyond the commitment to offer
        some useful education, includes a desire to help explain better to the
        defense community both what it ought to know already, and—most
        vi
        especially—how the separate pieces of the trinitarian puzzle relate to
        each other. Much, probably most, of the content of the monograph is
        already familiar to many people, but it is not really familiar enough.
        Everyone interested in security affairs, surely, believes he/she
        understands strategy, irregular warfare, and the American way in
        war, but just how well are these elements comprehended, and are
        the consequences of their unstable interaction grasped securely? We
        think not. The monograph should make it difficult, not impossible,
        of course, for its readers to remain confused about the basics. These
        pages lay out in explicit detail the nature of strategy, irregular
        warfare, and—last, but not least—the long-preferred American way.
        But what does it all mean?

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by S-2 View Post
          What's missing is a strategic doctrine shaping our use of COIN as a military art. Our predilection to see COIN as an element of state-craft may be an issue in the absence of nation-states worthy of the name with which to partner. Iraq and Afghanistan are proving that successful COIN ops will require, likely, decades of close involvement. We seem unprepared to do so with those two nations and show less eagerness to add to that list.
          ...

          The greater questions, to me, seem if the future portends an absence of viable nation-states with which to partner, what should our strategic objectives/expectations be and how must we re-configure to attain them? Is it feasible to actively seek local (and marginal) solutions that provide no unifying payoff for the effort extended?
          What do you mean by worthy nation-state partners? From the Cold War paradigm, you can have a number of different types of allies:

          1. Allies who can pull their own weight, given some initial help. For example: Western European countries, Germany and Japan.

          2. Allies that may come to pull their own weight, but investments are risky - some may pay-off, while others collapse. Ex. South Korea vs. Vietnam.

          3. Allies not much more useful than bogging down a conflict - the enemy preferably, sometimes the allied effort itself in worst-case scenario. Ex. Afghanistan.

          Every type of ally has its own worth: so the question is, what type of worth are you looking for? Where?

          Comment


          • #6
            Cactus Reply

            My comments began w/ my mini-thesis of a useful strategic doctrine. I don't see a functional difference in our desires given your examples even though I disagree that Afghanistan is a completely counter-productive endeavor distracting from some greater purpose.

            Iraq and Afghanistan are irrelevancies in any case with respect to future applications except as laboratories for techniques. We're committed in some form or fashion for the foreseeable future and may yet achieve some reasonable modicum of local stability and security. So long as graft, crime, corruption, and chronically poor ethically-driven governance prevail, there's a natural limit to our utility. Useful nonetheless.

            Identification of successful candidates for future interventions of similar ilk is my desire. Doing so requires a substantive re-organization of our nat'l instruments of power to assure our optimal performance should we do so. Done correctly, we should be able to ascertain whether we've the means to intervene and whether local conditions would be receptive to our interposition.

            Both Afghanistan and Iraq suffered from our inability to rapidly and incisively focus all elements of our nat'l power at decisive moments. We were, and largely remain, unprepared at the inter-cabinet level of government to make lucid decisions of intervention and then to execute with vigor.

            I hope not to do so again so haphazardly.
            "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
            "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by S-2 View Post
              My comments began w/ my mini-thesis of a useful strategic doctrine. I don't see a functional difference in our desires given your examples even though I disagree that Afghanistan is a completely counter-productive endeavor distracting from some greater purpose.
              The US support to Afghan allies in the Soviet-Afghan War was a productive endeavour; its worth was in the distractive and irritating effect it had on the Soviets. That chapter was closed in 1988. I was referring to different types of US allies in the Cold War time-frame.

              Comment


              • #8
                Cactus Reply

                My misunderstanding of your example. Sorry.:)
                "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                Comment

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