This is an article collaborated on by the Brookings Institution and the Strategic Studies Institute.
Here are the key insights to the discussion:
The document is located here:
COIN OF THE REALM: U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY
I thought this would be a good discussion generator on the merits of COIN and how the US is implementing the COIN strategy and its effect on our operational capabilities for modern conventional warfare.
The impact COIN operations have on the OPTEMPO of our forces is high. If you add another element to the mix, say Iran, what impact would transitioning back to a conventional war would our forces have to endure, if necessary?
Here are the key insights to the discussion:
KEY INSIGHTS:
• Regardless of whether counterinsurgency (COIN) will be the dominant form of military activity in the future
or simply one of several, the United States needs an effective national strategy which explains when, why, and
how the nation should undertake it.
• The basic assumptions of the current approach need revisited, especially those dealing with the role of the state,
the strategic framework for American involvement, and the whole-of-government approach.
• Given the demands placed upon the armed forces by the current campaigns, most of the effort has been on tactics,
training, and doctrine. Ultimately strategic transformation is at least as important if not more so.
• Rather than thinking of counterinsurgency and warfighting as competing tasks, the military and other government
agencies must pursue ways to integrate them, thus assuring that the United States can address the multidimensional
threats which characterize the contemporary security environment.
• Regardless of whether counterinsurgency (COIN) will be the dominant form of military activity in the future
or simply one of several, the United States needs an effective national strategy which explains when, why, and
how the nation should undertake it.
• The basic assumptions of the current approach need revisited, especially those dealing with the role of the state,
the strategic framework for American involvement, and the whole-of-government approach.
• Given the demands placed upon the armed forces by the current campaigns, most of the effort has been on tactics,
training, and doctrine. Ultimately strategic transformation is at least as important if not more so.
• Rather than thinking of counterinsurgency and warfighting as competing tasks, the military and other government
agencies must pursue ways to integrate them, thus assuring that the United States can address the multidimensional
threats which characterize the contemporary security environment.
The document is located here:
COIN OF THE REALM: U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY
I thought this would be a good discussion generator on the merits of COIN and how the US is implementing the COIN strategy and its effect on our operational capabilities for modern conventional warfare.
The impact COIN operations have on the OPTEMPO of our forces is high. If you add another element to the mix, say Iran, what impact would transitioning back to a conventional war would our forces have to endure, if necessary?
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