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bolo121
08 Jan 08,, 18:47
Hi

came across this a few months ago and wondered what you guys on WAB thought of it..

full article is here
Military History Online (http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/armies/introduction.aspx)

Introduction

This work endeavors to explore the historiography surrounding a controversial and emotionally charged subject, namely the comparative combat performance of the United States and German armies in the European Theatre in World War II. While the subject has been of interest to soldiers and military historians for over fifty years, and hence would seem to be a likely candidate for reasoned debate, nevertheless it continues to incite strong interest among partisans on both sides. Indeed, in recent years the topic has generated some rather heated work, particularly from those who advocate the view that the United States Army was more than a match for the Wehrmacht in that elusive quality known as "fighting power". One reading the literature on the subject published within the last ten years or so is in fact struck by the aggressively adversarial tone adopted by the authors. One might reasonably inquire why such a stridently partisan tenor has asserted itself in this area of military history.

The answer to this question lies, it may be reasonably argued, not with the performance of the U.S. Army in World War II, but with its experience in the Vietnam War. Anyone who experienced firsthand the passage of the United States through the long period during which that conflict progressed cannot fail to be aware of its profound effect upon nearly every aspect of American life and culture. Although it obviously was not the only historical force at work in the period, nonetheless it can be said to have contributed mightily to a number of significant negative phenomena with which Americans continue to struggle. These include such things as the diminution in value of higher education through grade inflation; the more or less permanent distortion of the American economy resulting from the consistent policies of succeeding presidential administrations in following a "guns and butter" economic policy throughout the course of the conflict; the degradation of moral authority in sexual and social relationships; and, not least of all, disrespect for and suspicion of all things governmental.

Perhaps nowhere were the pernicious effects of the Vietnam War felt more profoundly than in the U.S. military establishment. This can be observed not only in personal memory and the literature devoted to the subject, but also in the experiences of those who served. Delve into the subject with any officer or enlisted man who went through this crucible. You will find not only the horrific recollections common to those who have experienced combat, but also a litany of other horrors not previously associated with military service in the American experience. The examples are many and diverse. In perhaps the ultimate form of military disrespect, American soldiers "fragged" their officers in the combat zone. American soldiers perceived themselves as being pilloried by the American news media. Returning soldiers in uniform were humiliated by their fellow citizens. In the aftermath of the war, indeed even to the time of this writing, so-called "veterans" have debased the experiences of those who actually served by bogus claims not only to veteran status itself, but also to battle honors.

For the American military, however, the most significant fact about the Vietnam War was and is that, by any objective standard, from the American perspective it was not successfully concluded. It is true, of course, that the United States did not emerge from the war a defeated nation, in the manner of those countries on the losing side in the First and Second World Wars. In relative terms, the number of Americans who perished in the cause was small. American territory and industry were not ravaged. With few exceptions, American soldiers and politicians have never been charged with war crimes. The United States has not been compelled to pay reparations. On the other hand, unlike even in the case of the Korean War, there has been not even a pretext that the United States was the victor in Vietnam. The last Americans fled ignominiously from Saigon. And South Vietnam, the nation on whose behalf so much American blood and treasure were expended, has ceased to exist, having been absorbed into the body politic of its former foe.

The irony of this situation can only have been exacerbated for the American military by subsequent events. By 1990, the Cold War, the historical backdrop against which the Vietnam War had taken place, had ended, rendering the United States the sole great power in the world. Far from curing the ills engendered for the U.S. military by the Vietnam conflict, this event seemed only to magnify them. Not only did the successful conclusion of the Cold War fail to eradicate the negative public image of the Vietnam War and the military which had fought it, it also brought about a drastic reduction in military force. With the exception of those whose lives would be directly affected by base closings and the like, the American public greeted this reduction in force with indifference. Not even the hugely popular Gulf War could rectify this situation.

The increasingly fractious debate over the relative quality of the U.S. and German armies during the Second World War has its roots in this decline in the fortunes of the U.S. military establishment. It is a truism that human frustration in one area often expresses itself in another. As will be seen, this work focuses on four works published within the last fifteen years, each of which seeks, in strident tones, to lay to rest once and for all what they characterize as "the myth of German superiority". All four were written by (at the time of their writing) serving officers in the United States Army. Each officer was at least a Lieutenant Colonel in rank, and thus likely to have served at the time of the Vietnam War. What is certain is that each of them served in the U.S. Army in the aftermath of that war. Each of them thus matriculated through the Army's staff college and advanced schools at a time when those institutions attempted to come to terms with the "lessons learned" from that conflict. In that time and place rising officers were educated, at least in part, with a body of work written during the 1950's and 1960's by historians whom one prominent military historian of more recent vintage is pleased to call "German lovers".

A defeated army cannot hope to gain much capital by dwelling on the military deficiencies of its former foe, particularly when, in spite of its "lost victories", that army has subsequently emerged as THE dominant military force in the world. Unseemly though it might be to criticize the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, however, there is no likelihood of opprobrium attaching to one who criticizes the Wehrmacht, particularly when the fall of the Evil Empire has reduced to nil the likelihood that the U.S. Army might have to fight side by side with Germans to defend western Europe against the Red hordes. The Wehrmacht, indeed, is an easy target. The Nazi regime for which it fought ranks among the most vicious in the twentieth century. Some of the Wehrmacht's soldiers committed, or had complicity in, heinous war crimes and crimes against humanity. Finally, two generations of publicity, including written works, television shows and films, has succeeded in creating an image of the German soldier as a Nazi automaton, an image fostered and encouraged by such eminent historians as Gerhard Weinberg and Omer Bartov, as well as successful non-historians such as Daniel Goldhagen. [1]

There is more to the partisanship of the American officer corps and its adherents in this debate than mere opportunistic frustration. While the outcome of the Vietnam War deeply wounded the self-image of the American military, more recent events have had the opposite effect. The disappearance of the Soviet Union as a credible military threat, and the overwhelming victory of the United States-led coalition in the Gulf War have engendered in the U.S. military a tremendous sense of hubris. As against their contemporaries, whether friend or potential foe, this arrogance on the part of the American officer corps is somewhat understandable. The armed forces of many other countries contain elite elements, some of which may even be the equal in skill and bravery to members of the U.S. Marines, Navy Seals and Army Rangers. No other armed force in the world, however, has the resources to utterly crush an enemy. More difficult to understand is the intellectual process by which this pride of place has found its way into the historical literature dealing with America's enemies of the past. The motivating logic seems to be, however, that since no existing armed force can be considered a match for the American military, it must have always been so. A corollary to this principle is that the historical record needs must be "corrected" to reflect this elemental truth.

It is the purpose of this work to examine the literature of the apologists for the U.S. Army in World War II, and determine whether the authors of that literature have met their burden of proof.

S2
08 Jan 08,, 21:29
An interesting article. I'm aware of the schools of thought yet haven't read any except the older guys. I wondered when Depuy would pop into the article and, sure enough, there he was.

I think I could make a case that both schools (if they even actually exist as the author implies) have validity and therefore hold no monopoly on the truth. Much lies in the use of German army sources (i.e. Von Manstein, Von Mellenthin, Guderian, Raus, etc.) coupled w/ incomplete clarity of German operations, organization for combat, and circumstances tempered by a skewed teutonically enhanced perspective-often unnecessary and even detrimental to their performance.

The same may apply to U.S. operational and tactical performance. I see a case to be made, for instance, in the rapid maturing of U.S. commanders and troops unexposed to battle previous to entering Europe. The maturation of these forces, in general, is dramatic between 6 June, 1944 and 20 May, 1945. So too the decline in overall German performance.

Yet the lessons reputedly attributed to the "old school", skewed by German sources with agendas, bears study as it explores the resilience of an army in decline-unlike the U.S. Army. There were, and remain lessons to be extracted from the excellent performance of numerous German units under onerous conditions. There remains equal reasons to study German operations at the height of German power as well.

I'll read it again, I'm certain. I'll certainly now look for the books that these "young turks" have written as I haven't read them and fear dissembulation by the article's author to make HIS case. As surely as his suggestion that these army officers willfully mis-interpreted earlier works to sustain their claims, so too, perhaps, he.

Always interesting stuff. I had a primer of Depuy's Quanitative Judgement Method of Analysis open, written by Depuy, as I was reading the article. Go figure!:)

Hope others might pile in who've read these newer books.

dalem
08 Jan 08,, 22:27
The whole "Germans are uber, Americans sucked" line never sat well with me. After all, we kicked German butt from one end of Europe to the other, and did it even when we didn't have planes in the air or shells for our artillery.

Did that make the U.S. Army/Corps/Division/Regiment/Battalion/Company/Platoon/Squad better or worse than their German counterparts?

I say better.

-dale

S2
08 Jan 08,, 23:12
"After all, we kicked German butt from one end of Europe to the other, and did it even when we didn't have planes in the air or shells for our artillery."

Yet with air superiority, naval gunfire, unlimited artillery and CAS, supplies, and the use of fresh and well-trained troops it took us six weeks plus to capture St. Lo, for instance?

What enormous advantages other than fighting acumen did the Germans possess to hold us back so? Curious.

GAU-8
08 Jan 08,, 23:49
What enormous advantages other than fighting acumen did the Germans possess to hold us back so? Curious.

The Germans fielded superb soldiers who were brilliantly led. You've got to give them credit where credit is due. That being said, they were well-armed tactical geniuses. In WW II, they were also strategically foolish. The U.S. has a special genius for logistics just as the British and Russians have a genius for espionage and intelligence. In the area of production and logistics, the Germans failed--or rather risked all and lost. IMHO.

S2
09 Jan 08,, 00:27
None of this is so clear to me, I guess, when discussing a war as large as W.W.II. I do see shades of grey and think that it's articles like bolo121's discovery which provoke more nuanced appreciations.

I'm less interested in this article's distilled conclusions than the ingredients. Both Dalem and you may be correct but should be affirmed through points which illuminate your positions relative to the article.

The article alleges a dispute between two suggested "schools of thought" regarding U.S. Army combat performance benchmarked against the Germans. If read, there's plenty inside four article pages and referred sources to discuss without broadening the topic outside it's suggested parameters.

Albany Rifles
09 Jan 08,, 03:32
"After all, we kicked German butt from one end of Europe to the other, and did it even when we didn't have planes in the air or shells for our artillery."

Yet with air superiority, naval gunfire, 1. unlimited artillery and CAS, supplies, and the use of 2. fresh and well-trained troops it took us six weeks plus to capture St. Lo, for instance?

What enormous advantages other than fighting acumen did the Germans possess to hold us back so? Curious.

1. There was actually a shortage of 105mm artillery since the US Mulberry got wrecked and ammo came across the beaches slowly.

2. The 29th ID was a new unit in its first combat against experienced German troops in exceptional defensive terrain. Want a good read on this, read The Clay Pigeons of St Lo.

And why? Because the US had to develop the doctrine for hedgerow fighting...demonstrating another characteristic of US forces, flexibility.

S2
09 Jan 08,, 08:46
"1. There was actually a shortage of 105mm artillery since the US Mulberry got wrecked and ammo came across the beaches slowly.

2. The 29th ID was a new unit in its first combat against experienced German troops in exceptional defensive terrain."

So the direct-support batteries of some of the engaged allied divisions saw a temporary reduction of ammo from something short of "unlimited" to...?

Under Dalem's expressed criteria it was a non-issue.

The 29th wasn't the only unit under XIX Corps in this zone of attack and had been in battle for a week when the attack was initiated (June 13). Further, these "experienced German troops" is a misnomer.

The 352 Inf. Div. was a shell of it's "eastern" self BEFORE June 6, much less after. That it retained cohesion in the form of a reduced battle-group by this point is, in itself, remarkable. It was augmented by elements from numerous other divisions- 17 S.S. PGD, 3 Fallshirm Div, 275 Grenadier Div, and 130 Panzer (Lehr) to name a few. German LXXXIV Corps was under enormous pressure from June 6 forward. See David Isby's FIGHTING IN NORMANDY- The German Army From D-Day to Villers-Bocage for a superb series of interviewed vignettes drawn from the "other side of the hill".

The St. Lo attack was actually initiated well before the late June storms w/initial forays conducted beginning 13 June. The terrain was unprepared and as new to German fighting formations as American. German formations were not measurably endowed with vast numbers of experienced N.C.O.s and junior officers.

The terrain was defensively superb. The Germans recognized it's advantages and clung tenaciously. That was the one advantage that a mixed-bag of formations operating in ad-hoc commands seized upon to anchor their efforts.

Still, the Caumont gap lay open and unexploited for a week after invasion...

Shades of grey, A.R. It's just not as simple as suggested.

A couple of nice reads from the CMH-

Cross-Channel Attack (http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/7-4/7-4_Contents.htm)

St. Lo (http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/100-13/st-lo_0.htm)

When you're kickin' German butt from one end to the other, even w/o CAS and artillery, all the aforementioned should have been water off a duck. No big deal. It just wasn't the case.

Both schools offer something valuable but it's not in their distilled positions. The value lies in the specific examples offered. Further, the article's author has his own agenda, it seems, of creating two schools and pitting them against one another. He borrows the most institutional viewpoints grounded upon unfairly generalized descriptions of one another to do so.

I am no fan of SLA Marshall, for instance, because of the grossly generalized conclusions that he reached about infantry performance. Yet I won't deny the specific value of his findings. No doubt that it's true that allied infantry would often be paralyzed into dis-use of their individual weapons. If so, though, I expect that those pcts. increased as we gained battle acumen across Europe.

bolo121
09 Jan 08,, 14:22
The Germans fielded superb soldiers who were brilliantly led. You've got to give them credit where credit is due. That being said, they were well-armed tactical geniuses. In WW II, they were also strategically foolish. The U.S. has a special genius for logistics just as the British and Russians have a genius for espionage and intelligence. In the area of production and logistics, the Germans failed--or rather risked all and lost. IMHO.

Yup I was always impressed with the way they could just grab leftovers from a dozen different units, put them into a kampgruffe and counter attack.

Comparisons are tough to make because the Germans were an army on the decline while the US was building itself up into a mighty force. The best of Germany's soldiers were already dead or wounded on the Ostfront by the time of Normandy.

Albany Rifles
09 Jan 08,, 15:05
So the direct-support batteries of some of the engaged allied divisions saw a temporary reduction of ammo from something short of "unlimited" to...?


It was not just DS batteries and it was artillery ammo across the board, but it hit 105mm the hardest. There were days the CSRs were in the single digits.


My point about experienced was the German troops, for the most part, had a greater amount of combat experience than the US troops. Panzer Lehr, 352d Infantry and II Parachute Corps all had had at least some experience.

The 29th ID, 2d ID and 35th ID all started their comabt experience in Normandy.

That experience showed in the early part of the battle with the Germans' success coupled with th ehedgerow defense. In the later stages of the battle the weight of US arms started to show.

Dreadnought
09 Jan 08,, 15:34
One reason among many: The Germans didnt have to cross Oceans, fight of sub attacks among others and bring their logistics with them the entire way i.e.(Planes,Tanks,Troops,supplies,Fuel etc etc etc.) The Germans just ravaged what they wanted and moved on but its a completely different story when you must bring your own and help protect those that have been scattered to the wind even when crossing a battlezone such as the Atlantic and Pacific. All the while finding and hunting the Japanese from Island to Island the entire way. Had we been able to concentrate all forces on Germany the outcome would have come much much sooner then it did IMO.

zraver
09 Jan 08,, 17:19
by the time of Normandy in 44 the US had man for man better infantry. Who were better fed,better supplied, better trained, had a better rifle and SMG, and better medical services.

Germany via the long years of combat on the eastern front was running out of men in the prime age groups for military service, was cutting down training, using outdated battle rifles and replacing manpower with more MG-42's. But by the dint of that same experience had more experienced small unit tactical leaders.

By late 44 and early 45 the playing field had leveled a bit as American replacements lacked as much training as the invasion troops, but whose small unit leaders were now seasoned veterans. However the Americans remained ahead in support and platoon fire-power unless vs certain SS and elite Heer units with the MP-43/44.

Man for man the German soldier never out performed the US soldier. Verses the US the greatest examples of German feats of arms involve ideal defensive positions (Monte Cassino, Hedgrows, Hurtegen). On the offensive the Germans never managed to achieve and or then keep thier objectives. Patton's response to Kasserine, the 101AB/10AD at Bastonge showed the Americans could defend while the battle for Messina, the race across Brittany, St. Lo, relief of Bastonge and other battles showed the Americans could attack and keep what they won.

If we look at the Normandy campaign the German army suffered 23,000 killed fighting from ideal terrain vs roughly 37,000 allied dead. However the Germans ended up with 200,000 missing or taken prisoner and 67,000 wounded vs 150,000 allied wounded and 19,000 missing or POW.

Total German battle losses were 90,000 with roughly 1-3 being fatal vs 180,000 allied battle losses but only 1-4.5 being fatal (better medical services)

So while the Germans inflicted battle losses at the rate of 2-1 they suffered a far higher proportion of dead and consummate loss of experiance.

BD1
09 Jan 08,, 17:33
One reason among many: The Germans didnt have to cross Oceans, fight of sub attacks among others and bring their logistics with them the entire way i.e.(Planes,Tanks,Troops,supplies,Fuel etc etc etc.) The Germans just ravaged what they wanted and moved on but its a completely different story when you must bring your own and help protect those that have been scattered to the wind even when crossing a battlezone such as the Atlantic and Pacific. All the while finding and hunting the Japanese from Island to Island the entire way. Had we been able to concentrate all forces on Germany the outcome would have come much much sooner then it did IMO.

The Germans on the other hand had in Normandy very little railroads left , no supplies , fuel , under constant bombing campaigns , and pretty big part of force on East and Italy . That maybe levels the field a little .

zraver
09 Jan 08,, 17:59
The Germans on the other hand had in Normandy very little railroads left , no supplies , fuel , under constant bombing campaigns , and pretty big part of force on East and Italy . That maybe levels the field a little .

the Germans were able to feed in and supply several panzer and panzer-grenadier divisions during the battle so supplies existed, if not in ideal amounts. Plus some of these divisions were elite formations who could be expected to fight above thier weight. Some like the 12th SS did, others like Panzer Lehr did not.

S2
09 Jan 08,, 18:56
A.R.-

3 Fallshirm Div was, in fact, a superbly trained and conditioned division. It's TO&E was complete. It was not an EXPERIENCED division that had seen battle as a unit. Many of it's officers and N.C.O.s had, of course, but w/ an average age 17 1/2 for it's riflemen, it wasn't far removed from the 101st who'd dropped into battle for the first time days earlier.

I'm quibbling, though. I don't deny advantages existed for the Germans. Primarily, though, they owed to the advantages of terrain in the American sector and the German ability to fully exploit such to their overall success. My comment remains primarily directed at Dalem. You should know that, I hope.

Zraver-

"the Germans were able to feed in and supply several panzer and panzer-grenadier divisions during the battle so supplies existed, if not in ideal amounts."

Divisions (elite or otherwise)arrived incrementally by kampfgruppe off the march w/ men and equipment exhausted by the experience. Most fed immediately into battle though almost none as integrated divisional formations.

"Weakness on the German side resulted mainly from the nearly incredible difficulties of moving troops into the line-difficulties that had constantly disrupted Seventh Army offensive plans and jeopardized its defensive positions everywhere in Normandy. The story of how Kampfgruppe Heintz struggled up to Montmartin-en-Graignes where it fought against the 120th Infantry is worth the telling for it shows how completely the battlefield was sealed off by Allied air forces. (Map XVIII)

Kampfgruppe Heintz consisted of the 984th Regiment of the 275th Division, reinforced by the division Fuesilier battalion, a three-battery artillery battalion, the engineer battalion, and a Flak battery.76 It had been ordered on the morning of 6 June to begin immediate priority movement to the battle area. The division headquarters then at Redon in Brittany was less than 120 miles by rail from St. Lô. A day or two should have been ample for the movement. But Allied aircraft, sovereign in the skies, ruled otherwise.

The Kampfgruppe took only about ten hours to assemble but was delayed in entraining by air attacks which blocked tracks, damaged locomotives, and generally interfered with the assembling of cars. These delays continued through the night, and by 0800 the following morning only three sections of the Kampfgruppe had been loaded. In the afternoon five trains were under way; three were still being loaded. The lead train made good progress to Avranches, where at 1400 it was held up by undetermined trouble ahead. While this was being cleared up, the rails behind it were cut. Late in the afternoon the train passed through Avranches and reached Foligny a few miles to the north. At Foligny, however, air attack destroyed it with total loss of vehicles and equipment and very heavy casualties. The second train in the meantime reached Pontorson but was there halted by rail cuts to the east. Under heavy air attack which took severe toll of the men and equipment of the engineer unit aboard, the train was unloaded and the troops ordered to continue on foot.77

[378]


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All other trains en route on 7 June had been attacked and so delayed that at 1800 hey were still all south of Rennes. At that time it was reported that bombs had cut the rails in three places between Rennes and Dol and the whole movement was ordered rerouted via la Brohiniere-Dinan-Dol. Scarcely had this decision been made when it was discovered that between Dinan and Dol the tracks were broken in no fewer than nineteen places. All during 8 June seven trains languished on the rails south of Rennes. Two other t rains meanwhile were struggling to load artillery units of the Kampfgruppe and were being continually interrupted by air attacks. It was 1915 on 8 June before the last train got under way. Since no progress had been made to clear the route beyond Rennes on 7 June, it had been decided to reroute the trains through Fougères. On 9 June the Fougères line was cut. The transportation officers then gave up. The troops of Kampfgruppe Heintz were all unloaded and ordered to proceed by truck or foot. The bulk of the unit had thus in two days and three nights traveled less than thirty miles. Three to five more days were consumed in the road march to the final assembly areas where the Kampfgruppe was attached to the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division and put at once into the line southeast of Carentan.78

The experience of Kampfgruppe Heintz in trying to move under unrestricted Allied air attacks was by no means exceptional. On the contrary the difficulties of a unit of the 265th Division ordered out of Brittany at the same time were even worse..."

Supply, replacements, and unit reinforcement was of the most tenuous nature. The above vignette clearly illustrates the utter isolation of the Normandy battlefield by allied tactical and strategic air forces. When one looks at the quality of the German formations eventually in the battle, it seems that only their severe impedence by allied air-power kept the beaches as secure as they proved.

Had 21 Pz Div, Pz Lehr, 12 S.S., 1 S.S., 2 S.S., 9 S.S., 10 S.S. 17 S.S., 2 Pz, 116 Pz, and 3 Fallshirm Div showed intact within hours or even days of the invasion, allied ground forces would have been in a heap o' trouble. The eventual concentration/density was as high on a fifty mile frontage as any I recall in the war, to include Kursk.

"Plus some of these divisions were elite formations who could be expected to fight above thier weight. Some like the 12th SS did, others like Panzer Lehr did not."

I take exception here. I have very high regard for the fighting qualities of 12 SS Pz Div (an inexperienced division at the battle's outset). However, I hold that same regard for 130 (Lehr) Pz Div. Nothing I've read indicates that Bayerlein's men didn't give the full measure of skill and effort up to the day of their virtual annihilation.

zraver
09 Jan 08,, 20:45
[B]

I take exception here. I have very high regard for the fighting qualities of 12 SS Pz Div (an inexperienced division at the battle's outset). However, I hold that same regard for 130 (Lehr) Pz Div. Nothing I've read indicates that Bayerlein's men didn't give the full measure of skill and effort up to the day of their virtual annihilation.

Not a dig on the division itself who did well against the British, but in its failure overall. That this was do in part to carpet bombing, numerical inferority and tac-air interdiction does not detract from the fact that the OKW expected the division to last longer than it did- while fighting above its weight. Nor was the division virtually annihilated by the Cobra bombardments if you look at its strength on 27 July: 33 tanks operational, 74 in workshops, 391 other various operational and 54 in short term repair, and about 11,000 men, but was light on artillery and infantry after I./Pz.Art.Rgt. got mangled by the American 3AD and infantry bore the brunt of the Cobra bombardment.

S2
09 Jan 08,, 21:16
Remarkable resiliance but on June 26 Lawton Collins' VII Corps had been attacking in zone for a day and he was commiting his armor to initiate the breakout. Lehr's C3I was shot. No links up or down from division and minimal infantry further gutted in the bombardment. Discombobulated totally seems the consensus.

Zraver, what's your source on those daily returns? I'd love a peek.:)

zraver
09 Jan 08,, 21:26
S-2 check this site out

Panzer-Lehr (http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/gerob/pzdiv/lehr.html)

S2
09 Jan 08,, 21:39
I've seen that before. It looks like something by George Zetterling. Have you read any of Thomas Jentzs' stuff. His armor data seems really soundly based.

I traced that link back and found this-Comments On Deutsche Militarische Verlust By Rudinger Overmans (http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/overmans.pdf)

It looks interesting. Then there appears a strength return for August 10, 1944 at a separate link. I didn't look closely at it but shall out of curiousity.

zraver
09 Jan 08,, 21:49
I am sure I have in the past and will again as my library rebuilds.