Jihadi take-over of Pakistan?

[Guest]

Is there a danger of a jihadi take-over of Pakistan? Iran style revolution?

[Ray]

After the storming of the Red Mosque and the Chief Justice issue, the political parties have found an opening to sort out Musharraf.

One should have heard what Imran Khan has to say.

However, Musharraf will prevail so long as he has the support of the Army.

What one has to observe is to how the fundamentalist ridden ISI (Pakistan's spy agency and SS) jumps.

[Amarnath]

In pakistan, the army is supreme no ruler can survive without the support of the army. So the question should be will the pakistan army replace Musshy with a Jehadi

[Guest]

"Musharraf is living on borrowed life. He escaped two attempts to kill him in December, 2003, in which some junior officers of the Air Force were also involved, arrested convicted and executed. The reported firing on his plane by some unidentified elements from the roof of a house in Rawalpindi after it had taken off from the Chaklala air base on July 6, 2007, indicates that his intelligence agencies have not been able to identify all jihadi sleeper cells in the lower ranks of the Armed Forces---particularly in the Air Force--- and neutralise them."

[Ray]

For the sake of the world peace, let Musharraf live.

And I am not saying so just because he is a Mohajir.

[Ray]

The rules change when dictators serve US interests


The mosque siege reveals Musharraf's desperation to appear tough in the war on terror. But in truth he is a friend to terrorists

Imran Khan
Wednesday July 11, 2007
The Guardian

Over recent days, news from Pakistan has been dominated by the siege at the Red Mosque, which ended late yesterday. Scarcely a mile from the seat of power in Islamabad, the madrasa students and their two leading clerics inside the mosque first claimed attention with kidnappings, threats of suicide bombings and demands for the imposition of sharia law. The Musharraf regime mounted a military operation against the militants which led to the loss of numerous lives, among them one of the clerics, Abdul Rashid Ghaz.

A number of questions arise. Why was action not taken immediately? How were militants and arms able to get in under the gaze of the police and intelligence services? And why were other measures, including shutting off electricity at the mosque, not exhausted earlier?

The episode appears to have been drawn out deliberately by President Musharraf. Since he sacked the chief justice in March, a movement led by lawyers, journalists and opposition parties has been clamouring for democracy on Pakistan's streets. As Musharraf faces his biggest crisis, he is desperate to prove his indispensability to the west in the war on terror.

But this use of force is likely to produce unintended and dangerous consequences, as it has in Baluchistan, Waziristan and Bajaur. It may be salutary to recall how Indira Gandhi's order for troops to attack the Golden Temple, where Sikh militants were holed up, not only failed to subdue the militants but triggered a wave of violence, including her assassination. While few Sikhs may have sympathised with the militants, many came to deeply resent the government's high-handedness.

Suicide bombing and other noxious forms of terrorism were once alien to Pakistan. After eight years of military dictatorship, radicalism and fundamentalism are in the ascendant everywhere. Musharraf is perceived among radical elements as the west's instrument in a "war on Islam" - there could be no greater failure in the battle for hearts and minds.

Terrorism requires a political solution. Extremists can be marginalised through debate and political dialogue in a democracy. Military dictatorship, as we are now seeing, only exacerbates the problem. It has become obvious to every Pakistani that, far from presiding over a transition to genuine democracy in the country, Musharraf is intent on dismantling every democratic institution in his way. Over recent months he has assaulted the judiciary, restricted freedom of the press, and put hundreds of members of the opposition behind bars.

The roots of the most shocking incident so far, however, can be found in north London, where the chairman of the Musharraf-allied Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), Altaf Hussain, resides. When Pakistan's chief justice decided to address the bar in Karachi, a vast welcome was expected in the city. This worried Musharraf and his MQM allies, who control the Sindh government - and especially Karachi, the provincial capital. They decided to organise a rival rally the same day, despite protests by the opposition. What followed on the blood-soaked May 12 could be described in two words: state terrorism.

While the police stood aside, the terrorist arm of the MQM sprayed bullets into a peaceful procession of the opposition parties. Some 48 people lost their lives and 200 sustained bullet wounds. Among them were 10 members of my party. Most callously, Musharraf later that evening triumphantly claimed that the people had shown their "force". None of the opposition parties believe MQM's denials that they were involved in turning this peaceful protest violent. It was then I decided to launch legal proceedings against Altaf Hussain, who has been living in exile in London since 1992 and became a British citizen in 1999.

The MQM came into existence in the mid-1980s as a genuine people's movement in Karachi, representing the immigrant community that had arrived from India shortly after the creation of Pakistan. This community had serious grievances, the most significant being that educated young muhajirs could not get jobs because of imposed quotas. But within a few years it had degenerated into a thuggish mafia outfit, controlled by one man, Altaf Hussain.

Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and even the US state department and the European Union have issued reports about the MQM's terrorist activities. The only independent provincial assembly in Pakistan recently denounced the party as a "terrorist organisation", and last weekend the conference of opposition parties jointly resolved to support the legal proceedings against Hussain.

While Musharraf maintains that he is at the frontline of the war on terror - in which thousands of Pakistani soldiers and citizens have lost their lives - he has allied himself with the country's number one terrorist. And Tony Blair's government, which was at the fore of this war, gave Pakistan's number one terrorist citizenship.

It is impossible to embark on any quest for the hearts and minds of Pakistanis when these blatant double standards exist. Are dictators somehow fine when they exist to serve US interests, even if they destroy hopes of democracy in the process? And are terrorists only a problem when it is western blood that is shed?

· Imran Khan is the leader of the Pakistan Movement for Justice and a member of parliament
[email protected]
Imran Khan To the Fore as the Real Mussalman!

Aristotle,

What is your take now?

[Ray]

Another view

South Asia
Jul 12, 2007


Pakistan's post-mortem
By Syed Saleem Shahzad

KARACHI - Following the military storming of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad, considered a hotbed for support of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, US President George W Bush has praised Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf's role in checking extremism.

"Musharraf is a strong ally in the war against these extremists. I like him and I appreciate him," Bush said.

But while such praise from Musharraf's international allies is to be expected (see Pakistan's iron fist is to the US's liking, Asia



Times Online, July 11), within the country not everyone is convinced the government did the right thing.

"Whether they were security forces personnel or Lal Masjid militants, both were Muslims and both were martyrs," said Maulana Hanif Jalandari, the secretary general of the Federal Board of Islamic Seminaries, during a television debate. Jalandari was part of the negotiating team that failed to prevent the troops from being sent into the mosque after their bid to grant the occupants a safe passage out was rejected.

At least 60 people died in fighting after the troops went in on Tuesday, according to military reports, while about the same number of women and children who had been held hostage were rescued. On Wednesday morning there was still sporadic fighting in a seminary adjacent to the mosque.

The deputy chief cleric of Lal Masjid, Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, was among the dead, apparently caught in crossfire. The chief cleric, Ghazi's brother, Maulana Abdul Aziz, was earlier apprehended outside the mosque. He was dressed in a woman's burqa and is widely believed to have been tricked by intelligence agencies into leaving the mosque, ostensibly for negotiations.

During the debate on television, which also included Shah Abdul Aziz, a member of the National Assembly from the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, a six-party religious alliance, and Minister of Religious Affairs Ejaz ul-Haq, passions ran high and tears flowed. Both men were a part of the unsuccessful negotiating team.

"We did not want this operation to happen. Till our last we aimed to save lives. It is you who prompted Ghazi on the phone to be steadfast and not to lay down his weapons," ul-Haq accused Aziz. Aziz responded by calling ul-Haq and Musharraf the "biggest hypocrites", but he did admit that he had told Ghazi not to accept any humiliating terms of surrender.

Soon after the military operation began on Tuesday, Ghazi spoke to the media for the last time. "The room is full of smoke and I am having difficulty in talking. I appeal to the nation to stand up against this system of exploitation and work for an Islamic system of life ... the government blames us for using heavy weapons. I ask the media to come and question where those weapons are, and if we are using such weapons, where is the damage caused by such arms? We have only 14 AK-47 guns, most of them are licensed.

"I know my martyrdom is certain and I tell you that the government was never sincere in talking to us. After every sentence [while negotiating] they threatened us. They don't want talks. They just want to break us and humiliate us, so we prefer death.

"There were religious and political leaders who did not play any [positive] role and instead rang me only to try to terrify us with the wrath of the government and ask us to surrender. God will make them accountable on the day of judgment. I thank my friends in the media with whom I have spent a lot of good times and who have passed on my message," Ghazi's message concluded.

The 43-year-old Ghazi enjoyed widespread popularity in Pakistan, although he was not a mullah - he had a master's degree in international affairs from Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, as well as a master's in political science. He worked as an assistant director in the United Nations Children's Fund but after the murder of his father in 1998 he chose to become deputy prayer leader at the mosque. His father, Abdullah Aziz, founded the Red Mosque and his death had a profound effect on both brothers. Ghazi had fought briefly against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

In conversations with Pakistani militants over the years this correspondent frequently heard words to the effect that they never had the chance to see Osama bin Laden, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri or Taliban leader Mullah Omar, but they did have the chance to meet Ghazi.

The Pakistani media interviewed a number of the girls who were released from the mosque and the neighboring seminary, and many of them said that they regretted not having been able to become martyrs alongside their teacher, Ghazi.

Ghazi was certainly more restrained than his brother Aziz - even ul-Haq termed him a moderate - and Aziz is blamed for most of the mosque's hardline image.

Charges and counter-charges
Musharraf prepared the background for the raid by getting ul-Haq to inform the media that the government had information that several internationally wanted terrorists were holed up inside the Lal Masjid complex, which includes seminaries for male and female Islamic scholars, writes Zofeen Ebrahim of Inter Press Service.

"Nine suspected terrorists, said to be far more dangerous and harmful than al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives, were hiding inside the mosque compound," ul-Haq said at a Sunday press conference, though he refused to reveal their identities.

According to ul-Haq, the "high value terrorists" were in control of the mosque and not the chief cleric, who, he claimed, was being held hostage along with women and children.

Trouble began brewing at Lal Masjid early this year when its affiliated seminary for women, Jamia Hafsa, occupied a children's library demanding reconstruction of six mosques that had been demolished because they stood on encroached land. They further demanded strict enforcement of sharia law, and kidnapped an alleged brothel owner in a bid to chastise her.

By early April, the mosque had set up a sharia court and Aziz announced that any attempt to close it down would be avenged by thousands of suicide attacks.

"Moral squads" of girls and boys from the seminary were then allowed to rampage through the streets to "prevent vices and promote virtue", following the example of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Things came to a head when nine Chinese citizens, six of them women working in a massage parlour, were abducted last month. They were released a day later after diplomatic intervention.

As the Lal Masjid standoff began to take new twists and turns with each passing day, many critics viewed it as a stage-managed affair.

"There is a pervasive feeling in Islamabad that the chief cleric and his brother played into the hands of intelligence agencies. The tragedy is that whoever planned it failed to see that so many lives would be lost, and the people living in the G-6 area in Islamabad would become prisoners in their own homes," an Islamabad-based journalist said, requesting anonymity.

The timing of the military operation itself also raises doubts about the real motives of Pakistan's military government.

According to Ishtiaq Ali Mehkri, news editor at Geo TV, the Lal Masjid standoff was a "masterpiece of intelligence agencies" and an "eyewash" to deflect attention from issues of national importance, especially the Supreme Court hearing of the petition of Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, whom Musharraf summarily suspended as chief justice.

Mekhri's views were endorsed by Hamid Mir, senior political analyst at the same TV channel. "Musharraf wanted to diffuse the multi-parties conference in London [a meeting of dozens of Pakistani politicians]. Before that he was using Lal Mosque to distract [from] the judicial crisis."

According to Mir, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, head of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League, who was sent to negotiate with the mosque administration, and who was about to resolve the issue in April, was "asked by someone very important to delay it".

However, Mehkri believes there could be a longer-term scheme on the part of the Musharraf government in all this. "This could be a motive to seek US blessings for President Musharraf to remain in uniform."

In a statement the chairman of the Communist Party of Pakistan, Jameel Ahmad Malik, said: "The religious fundamentalist forces in Pakistan are the brainchild of the ISI [Inter Services Intelligence], the military intelligences and American imperialism."

The reference was to Pakistan-based mujahideen or Islamist militants who successfully fought the Soviets in Afghanistan through the 1980s with support from Washington.

After the Soviet army withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan is also known to have diverted the mujahideen to Kashmir to help with its protracted dispute with India over possession of the Muslim-majority territory of Kashmir.

Opposition parties in Pakistan have been accusing Musharraf of secretly encouraging Islamist radicalism to counter to growing demands by secular political groups for restoration of the democratic process and the calling of elections.

Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be reached at [email protected] .
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Pakistan's post-mortem

[Guest]

dear ray,
Imran Khan is the newfangled voice of conscience in Pak, he is a nice face to project, even when he's opposing you, the jehadis don't hate him (he's alive!).
Public opinion in pak is fully radicalised now,
to quote from an article,
"Pakistan's jehadi education: Pakistan's nuclear physicist and educationist Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy has pointed to the mainspring of Pakistan's conversion into a violent society, he is a government-appointed member of the Education Advisory Board. Dr Hoodbhoy brought to the notice of the head of Curriculum Wing of the Education Ministry a document that goes to the root of the matter we are discussing. It was a directive of the Federal Ministry of Education asking primary schools in Pakistan to produce a certain kind of pupils. So shocking were the contents of this directive that the head of the Curriculum Wing denied its existence in the face of a 300-strong audience during a conference. But Mr Abid Hassan Minto should have a look at the directive. Its heading is: At the completion of Class Five the child should be able to:

* Acknowledge and identify forces that may be working against Pakistan.

* Demonstrate by actions a belief in the fear of Allah.

* Make speeches on Jehad and Shahadat.

* Understand Hindu-Muslim differences and the resultant need for Pakistan.

* India's evil designs against Pakistan.

* Be safe from rumour-mongers who spread false news.

* Visit police stations.

* Collect pictures of policemen, soldiers, and National Guards.

* Demonstrate respect for the leaders of Pakistan.

From indophobia to xenophobia: The year 1995, when this directive was framed, was the high-water mark of jehad, and the PPP was in power in Islamabad. Ms Bhutto of course was busy doing other things. She has admitted after 1997 that she was hardly in control of the state apparatus as prime minister. But the indoctrination of the citizen began much earlier in Pakistan's history with an insertion in the Pakistan Penal Code of Section 123-A, which penalises citizens violating the ideology of Pakistan (ideology being added in 1992 by Nawaz Sharif). "

[Ray]

Hoodboy is a Shia I bet.

[Ray]

Can Pakistan Work? A Country in Search of Itself

Pervez Hoodbhoy
From Foreign Affairs, November/December 2004

Summary: Is Pakistan-nuclear proliferator, terrorist incubator, key U.S. ally-on the verge of collapse? In a new book, Stephen Philip Cohen rejects the most alarmist scenarios but warns that, without major reforms, Pakistan's prospects are indeed grim.

Pervez Hoodbhoy is a nuclear physicist at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad.

When he founded Pakistan in 1947, Muhammad Ali Jinnah-an impeccably dressed Westernized Muslim with Victorian manners and a secular outlook-promised the subcontinent's Muslims that they would finally be able to fulfill their cultural and civilizational destiny. Although the new nation arose from a bloodbath of ethnic cleansing and sectarian violence, and its fundamental premise was that Hindus and Muslims could never live together, its early years nevertheless held some promise of a liberal, relatively secular polity. But with time, Jinnah's Pakistan has grown weaker, more authoritarian, and increasingly theocratic. Now set to become the world's fourth most populous nation, it is all of several things: a client state of the United States yet deeply resentful of it; a breeding ground for jihad and al Qaeda as well as a key U.S. ally in the fight against international terrorism; an economy and society run for the benefit of Pakistan's warrior class, yet with a relatively free and feisty press; a country where education and science refuse to flourish but which is nevertheless a declared nuclear power; and an inward-looking society that is manifestly intolerant of minorities but that has never seen anything like the state-organized pogroms of India, Afghanistan, Iran, or China.

In The Idea of Pakistan, Stephen Philip Cohen sets out to understand this enigma of modern history. Cohen is the United States' leading analyst of South Asia, and this authoritative work of broad scope and meticulous research will surely become required reading on Pakistan. It also provides a view from the heart of the American empire, an analysis of how Washington can best advance its interests in South Asia. Cohen's facts are indisputable, his logic cold and clear, and his omissions deliberate and meaningful.

Ominous declarations of imminent chaos in Pakistan abound in the United States. Cohen aims both to raise warnings and to soothe fears. Although he acknowledges that profound problems plague both the idea and the reality of Pakistan, he distances himself from apocalyptic "failed state" scenarios. Catastrophic failure of this nuclear-armed state is surely a possibility. But Pakistan's fate will ultimately depend on whether its leaders can find an answer to the fundamental question that has plagued their fellow citizens for more than half a century: "How can we make the idea of Pakistan actually work?"

AN ARMY WITH A COUNTRY

According to a popular but rather humorless Pakistani joke, "all countries have armies, but here, an army has a country." Indeed, even when civilian governments have nominally been in charge in Pakistan, there has never been much doubt about who actually makes decisions there. In addition to holding political power, the Pakistani army controls vast commercial and industrial interests and owns massive rural and urban properties. As Cohen remarks, "regardless of what may be desirable, the army will continue to set the limits on what is possible in Pakistan."

General Pervez Musharraf, the country's current chief executive, seized power in a bloodless coup in 1999, and there have since been several attempts on his life. After each, the media has warned of a nuclear state careening out of control, with radical Islamists fighting to get into the driver's seat. Cohen rightly dismisses this view as alarmist. If the general were killed, the army establishment would quickly replace Musharraf with another senior officer, and various measures-the installation of former Citibank executive Shaukat Aziz as prime minister, most notably-have recently been undertaken to protect against a leadership crisis. Cohen also breaks with Musharraf's staunchest international backers, who "see him as a wise and modern leader, a secular man who is not afraid to support the West or to offer peace to India, and a man who can hold back the onrush of demagogues and Islamic extremists." Cohen notes that "no serious Pakistani analyst sees Musharraf in these terms. ... If he resembles any past Pakistani leader, it is General Yahya Khan-also a well-intentioned general who did the United States a great favor."

The question of why the warrior class was never tamed by civilian rule points back to the founding of the Pakistani state. As the respected Pakistani scholar Eqbal Ahmad has emphasized, the civilian system of power was never regarded by Pakistan's citizens as just, appropriate, or authoritative. And despite Jinnah's declarations, the idea of Pakistan was unclear from the start. Lacking any clear basis for legitimacy or direction, the state quickly aligned with the powerful landed class: the army leadership and the economic elite joined forces to claim authority in a nation without definition or cohesion. In subsequent years, the government maintained the feudal structure of society and entered into a manifestly exploitative relationship with Pakistan's poor eastern wing (which became Bangladesh in 1971 after a short but bloody war). Even now, bonded labor is common, and many peasants live in conditions close to slavery. Politicians, with the exception of the mercurial demagogue Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, have made no attempt at reform, ignoring the hearts and minds of the masses in favor of cultivating elite favor and pursuing quick financial gain.

The result has been ideological confusion, civilian helplessness, and an environment eminently hospitable to putsches. Indeed, no elected government has completed its term in Pakistan's 57-year history. Pakistani generals express contempt for the civilian order and steadfastly hold that "what is good for the army is good for Pakistan," and Pakistani society is thoroughly militarized. Bumper stickers read, "The Finest Men Join the Pakistan Army"; tanks parade on the streets of Islamabad while jet aircraft screech overhead; discarded naval guns, artillery pieces, and fighter aircraft adorn public plazas. It is even a criminal offense to "criticize the armed forces of Pakistan or to bring them into disaffection."

The military is only one (albeit the most important) component of the wider "establishment" that runs Pakistan. Cohen calls this establishment a "moderate oligarchy" and defines it as "an informal political system that [ties] together the senior ranks of the military, the civil service, key members of the judiciary, and other elites." Membership in this oligarchy, Cohen contends, requires adherence to a common set of beliefs: that India must be countered at every turn; that nuclear weapons have endowed Pakistan with security and status; that the fight for Kashmir is unfinished business from the time of partition; that large-scale social reforms such as land redistribution are unacceptable; that the uneducated and illiterate masses deserve only contempt; that vociferous Muslim nationalism is desirable but true Islamism is not; and that Washington is to be despised but fully taken advantage of. Underlying these "core principles," one might add, is a willingness to serve power at any cost.

BLOWBACK

Pakistan was put under U.S. sanctions after its nuclear tests in May 1998 and is now frequently referred to as a nuclear proliferator motivated by radical Islamist visions. But, as Cohen points out, Pakistan's nuclear dreams probably began 40 years ago when-under the aegis of the Central Treaty Organization-the U.S. Army initiated large-scale training of Iranian, Turkish, and Pakistani officers in armor, artillery, and other technical services. Hundreds of Pakistani officers attended U.S. schools between 1955 and 1958. "There was an important American contribution in the form of periodic visits by American nuclear experts to the Staff College in Quetta," says Cohen. During a visit to the Staff College, he noted that the school's official history refers to "a 1957 visit by a U.S. nuclear-warfare team that 'proved most useful and resulted in modification and revision of the old syllabus' to bring it into line with the 'fresh data' given by the team." In Cohen's opinion, "present-day Pakistani nuclear planning and doctrine is descended directly from this early exposure to Western nuclear strategizing; it very much resembles American thinking of the mid-1950s with its acceptance of first-use and the tactical use of nuclear weapons against onrushing conventional forces."

Cohen brings this new, and quite surprising, insight to U.S.-Pakistan nuclear history, but one might have expected a more detailed examination of this critical area, rather than a few quick comments. It is, in fact, a subject worthy of another book from him.

Pakistan's nuclear program began in earnest after India tested a "peaceful nuclear device" in 1974. Washington initially succeeded in thwarting Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, persuading France not to sell Pakistan a reprocessing plant. But Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgist employed by a European consortium that enriched uranium for nuclear power, forged ahead, surreptitiously acquiring classified information and materials and passing them to Bhutto's government. Using reverse engineering, Pakistan successfully built and began operating a uranium enrichment facility. By the time Bhutto was overthrown and hanged by his successor, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the nuclear program was in full swing.

The U.S. response has been a series of flips and flops, largely determined by immediate political needs rather than long-term strategic thinking. President Jimmy Carter imposed sanctions on Islamabad but waived them following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. A series of presidential waivers allowed U.S. economic and military assistance to continue flowing through 1990, as a reward for Pakistan's anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan. This was despite the fact that Pakistan disclosed in 1984 that it could enrich uranium for nuclear weapons and in 1987 that it could assemble a nuclear device. Even as the president of the United States solemnly informed Congress that Pakistan was not seeking to make nuclear weapons, anyone in Islamabad or Rawalpindi could hail a taxicab and ask to be taken to what was (and is) known as the "bomb factory." Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington toughened its stance on Pakistan's nuclear program and, after the 1998 nuclear tests (which were in response to similar moves by India), imposed harsh new sanctions. But soon after September 11, 2001-when Islamabad regained the strategic significance it had lost at the end of the Cold War-Washington dropped all nuclear-related sanctions, in part as a reward for Musharraf's decision to join the U.S.-led coalition against the Taliban.

Throughout this period, it was never a secret that Pakistan was and continues to be host to an array of radical Islamist groups. These pathological social and religious formations have a variety of aims-some target the American empire, whereas others focus on the more limited goal of "liberating" Kashmir or eliminating religious rivals-but all trace their origins to the U.S.-backed Afghan jihad, which over the course of a decade profoundly affected Pakistani society, culture, and politics and unleashed developments that would have dire consequences down the road. "During the first Afghan war, the [Inter-Services Intelligence agency's] strategy was to support hard-line Islamic groups, and with American concurrence, the ISI characterized the war against the Soviet intruders as a religious struggle against atheistic communism," Cohen writes. "Again with American encouragement, young Muslims were recruited to the 'cause' from the Arab and Islamic world, inadvertently creating a cohort that was to eventually form al Qaeda."

Cohen uses the words "concurrence" and "encouragement," but these are unsatisfactory descriptions: it is clear who the senior partner in this arrangement was. As the junior partner, Pakistan received a support package from Washington that included help with organization and logistics, military technology, and ideological support for sustaining and encouraging the Afghan resistance. Of these, the last was by far the most important, serving as it did to attract men and materiel from the Arab world and beyond to the jihad in Afghanistan.

CIA funds went to buy advertisements inviting hardened and ideologically dedicated men to fight in Afghanistan, and a $50 million U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) grant, administered by the University of Nebraska, Omaha, paid for textbooks that exhorted Afghan children "to pluck out the eyes of their enemies and cut off their legs." These were approved by the Taliban for use in madrassas (Islamic schools) and are still widely available in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Radical Islam went into overdrive as its superpower ally, the United States, funneled support to the mujahideen. Ronald Reagan feted jihadist leaders on the White House lawn, and the U.S. press lionized them. When Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in the face of the U.S.-Pakistani-Saudi-Egyptian alliance in 1988, a chapter of history seemed complete. But the costs of this victory revealed themselves over the course of the next decade. By the mid-1990s, it was clear that the victorious alliance had unleashed a dynamic beyond its control.

WHITHER PAKISTAN?

"Pakistan has adapted to changing strategic circumstances," Cohen observes, "by 'renting' itself out to powerful states, notably the United States, but also Saudi Arabia and China." He warns that the September 11 windfall and the al Qaeda card will, beyond a certain point, cease to guarantee cash and support. And although economic growth is currently strong, Pakistan has a fundamentally weak economy that is deeply dependent on remittances from overseas workers. Low-tech textile exports are the mainstay of its industrial production, and its work force does not meet the requirements of a modern economy. The army, meanwhile, is strong enough to prevent state failure but not imaginative enough to push through major changes. In the long run, minimal economic opportunity, a booming birth rate, intensive urbanization, a failed educational system, and a hostile regional environment will result in a large, young, and ill-educated population that has few prospects for economic advancement and is susceptible to political mobilization by radicals.

Cohen ventures several reasoned-and reasonable-guesses as to Pakistan's trajectory, focusing his attention on the forces driving it in different directions. He thinks that the present system is likely to continue, but that certain trends (the rise of radical Islamist groups, revived ethnic and regional separatism) and possible disruptions (the loss of U.S. or Chinese support, a major war with India, a series of assassinations) could yet transform it.

An Islamist revolution is unlikely, but the gradual strengthening of Islamist parties will certainly start to affect the government's makeup. One possible scenario is the return of a military-civilian coalition government similar to that of Zia-ul-Haq, united by nominal adherence to Islamic doctrine. Of course, Pakistan's history does offer plenty of examples of leaders inviting disaster by making fundamentally wrong choices, so more extreme scenarios-civil war, the triumph of Islamist radicalism, the return of outright authoritarianism-can never be ruled out.

In the worst case, Pakistan would simply come apart, spewing nuclear technology and terrorists in all directions. What can be done to prevent such a disastrous outcome? How can the idea of Pakistan be made to work? A number of key reforms-some touched on, though not explored, by Cohen-are necessary.

First, Musharraf must be forced to take seriously his call for "enlightened moderation." He has, to the relief of liberal Pakistanis, sought accommodation with India, softened his stance on Kashmir, cracked down on Islamist terrorism at home, and begun to negotiate the revision of blasphemy and anti-woman laws. But as Najam Sethi, the editor of an influential Lahore weekly, remarks, "the momentum of change is too slow and awkward and unsure to constitute a critical and irreversible mass." Sethi emphasizes two especially critical areas in which Musharraf must do more: packing up the jihadists, which means accepting that they are not the solution to the Kashmir issue, and reducing the influence of Islamist parties by facilitating the rise of moderate mainstream parties in free elections.

This latter goal points to the need for broad political reform in Pakistan to build responsible civilian leadership while keeping the military at bay. Cohen worries especially about declining U.S. influence over the Pakistani army, which he cites as a reason for growing radicalism in its ranks. But it is a mistake to think that anti-U.S. sentiment in the military stems from insufficient contact with its U.S. counterpart. Anti-Americanism reflects the general tension between the United States and the Islamic world, and more contact will not do much good, as is evidenced by the fact that, among the senior officers forcibly retired by Musharraf after his U-turn in Afghanistan, were those who had spent extended periods of time training in the United States. It is also a mistake to think that contacts with the U.S. military have historically fostered liberal and democratic beliefs in the Pakistan army.

Political reform must begin with the reversal of the legacy of Zia-ul-Haq, who set out to purge Pakistan of "the scourge of politics." He and his successors succeeded in depriving the Pakistani people of their means of self-expression and collective action, and popular politics at the national level has disappeared along with Pakistan's once-thriving trade unions, student groups, and peasant collectives. Thirty years ago, university students noisily argued over ideological positions and competed for votes in student elections. Today, there is no voting and no legitimate student government-just Islamic sectarian movements and groups defined by ethnicity pitted against one another. With Islamism as the only outlet for political involvement, these students are prime candidates for membership in extremist organizations. Unless political organizations are once again allowed to organize locally and nationally and intelligence agencies stop harassing critics of state policies, this "depoliticization" will push Pakistan further down the path toward instability.

The greatest threat to Pakistan's future may be its abysmal education system. Pakistani schools-and not just madrassas-are churning out fiery zealots, fueled with a passion for jihad and martyrdom. The obstacles to reform are great. For example, recent street rampages by Islamists forced Musharraf's former minister of education, Zubaida Jalal, to declare herself a fundamentalist and denounce as unacceptable school textbooks that do not include Quranic verses on jihad.

The United States, along with the United Kingdom and the European Union, has recently poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the Pakistani educational system-but with minimal effect. Usaid officials in Pakistan have shown little inclination or desire to engage with the government on the issue of eliminating jihad and militarism from school books. Indeed, rather than calling Musharraf's government on the continuing espousal of jihadist doctrine, the White House, out of either ignorance or compromise, even praised former Education Minister Jalal for her "reforms." Jalal's successor, General Javed Ashraf Qazi, is a former intelligence chief known for his ruthless tactics. It therefore appears that Musharraf's educational curriculum will go unchanged.

This difficulty, of course, reflects the underlying problems of Pakistan's government. Aware of its thin legitimacy and fearful of taking on powerful religious forces, no reigning government has made a serious attempt at curricular or educational reform, quietly allowing future minds to be molded by fanatics. But without such critical reforms, the long-term prospects for Pakistan are anything but comforting.

Hoodbhoy Up in Arms

This is what Hoodbohoy thinks of Pakistan.

But what Pakistan is, is what your links indicate.

What is wrong if Pakistan believes in such thoughts which are insular and with an aim to galvanise its citizens through indoctrination of an idea they feel is essential, even if flawed, for Pakistan's survival?

Goebbels also did what he did and Germany nearly brought the world to its knees!

Pakistan maybe bumbling along, but it is for her to select its path and its destiny!

[Archer]

Is there a danger of a jihadi take-over of Pakistan? Iran style revolution?

Not. a. chance.

Not. when. the. true. jihadis. are. ruling.

"Jihad fi Sabilillah"- the motto of the "moderate" Pakistani Army. Jihad in the way of Allah.

Nice, wot?

[Ray]

Princealisaheb,

I have some questions.

I saw the news. AQ #2 is baying for Musharraf's blood.

Are the Pakistanis women?

Who is ObL, a camel driver or a failed doctor, Zarqawi to dictate terms to Pakistan?

Pakistan is the dream child of Jinnah. Much blood flowed to achieve this dream. Did Jinnah do it so that foreigners dictated the fate of Pakistan?

I agree there is this ummah. But then, who is this camel driver or the failed doctor to decide what is good for Pakistan? They have not been able to to it in their country, so why should they screw Pakistan?

Pakistanis are not wearing bangles (churiyan nahin pahena).

First of all, Pakistani should make it clear that foreigners are not those who decide Pakistan's destiny and then they should talk of the ummah.

I am disappointed that Pakistanis allow such dimwits to decide their fate. If they are so incompetent, then they might as well allow the so called King of Saudi Arabia to rule them.

I am an Indian, but I feel very angry that what Jinnah, rightly or wrongly, organised for the Moslems of India, should be up for sale to idiotic Bedouins and their pimps!

[uss]

For the sake of the world peace, let Musharraf live.

And I am not saying so just because he is a Mohajir.

Sir,
You almost make Mushy indispensible to world peace. How long will people look the other way... the man's the most calculating politician-diplomat there ever was - and first opportunity he gets he will show his true colors - i'm betting another Kargil is in the offing, only this time it'll probly be a lot worse. Time for the Indian leadership to wake up and smell the coffee.

Regards,
USS.

[texasjohn]

Sir,
You almost make Mushy indispensible to world peace. How long will people look the other way... the man's the most calculating politician-diplomat there ever was - and first opportunity he gets he will show his true colors - i'm betting another Kargil is in the offing, only this time it'll probly be a lot worse. Time for the Indian leadership to wake up and smell the coffee.

Regards,
USS.

I could not agree more, but would you rather have an unknown "angel" or a known demon? At least here we know what to expect..

The leadership DOES need to be a lot less "chaltha hai". That will be India's undoing.

But then again, Indians elect their leaders...

[Ray]

Sir,
You almost make Mushy indispensible to world peace. How long will people look the other way... the man's the most calculating politician-diplomat there ever was - and first opportunity he gets he will show his true colors - i'm betting another Kargil is in the offing, only this time it'll probly be a lot worse. Time for the Indian leadership to wake up and smell the coffee.

Regards,
USS.

I don't deny that India should never drop its guard against Pakistan and its shenanigans towards India.

But what I has written in the last post above was that destiny of Pakistan is the sole realm of the Pakistanis and not the prerogative of smelly, unwashed Bedouins, who have nothing better to do or the resurrected mummies of Egypt.

These Bedouins have spread the poison amongst the Moslem in the name of Islam and the ummah. It has infected Indian Moslems too like the Glasgow bomber, who otherwise, as per the Indian news, was a docile chap. Today's news states that he wept when ragged in the college. Imaging that - a man who cannot take ragging, could become such a horrid person and charged with Islamic fervour as to become a suicide bomber!

And he was living in Saudi Arabia full of the dirty Bedouins who indoctrinated him!

Why should the Bedouins ruin the world?

Osama can't control his 27 year old son who has gone and married a 51 year old British grandmother and so he lets his frustration warp the world and we sit pretty?!

If it is not Musharraf, then who is the one you put your money on? The chocolate cream fundamentalist called Imran Khan or that pretty doll Benazir?

Benazir is still OK by Pakistani standards as viewed by Indians, but one has to listen to Imran Khan and read between the lines. Another Osama in the making!