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Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime

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  • Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime

    The first (and hopefully not last) book for the "book of the month" club will be Amazon.com: Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime: Books: Eliot A. Cohen.

    I'll reopen this thread once we begin the discussion in August. Below is a review of the book by noted conservative columnist Michael Barone, as well as an interview of the author on PBS News Hour.

    Michael Barone reviewed the book back in 2002. Here's his closing remarks, which send a chill down my spine.

    To find a workable plan for action against Iraq, Bush is going to have to act more like Cohen's supreme commanders than he has so far, and he is going to have to give full backing to Rumsfeld's efforts as well. War is too important to be left entirely to the generals. It is time for the supreme commander to command.
    Five years later, we'll be able to judge whether Barone's interpretation of the book's prescriptions was correct or not.

    Here's a PBS News Hour interview with Professor Cohen on the book. Here's the intro to the interview:

    MARGARET WARNER: In wartime, who should run the show: The politicians or the generals? That's the subject of a provocative new book by military affairs expert Elliott Cohen. The book is "Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime." It looks at four great war time leaders-- Abraham Lincoln; World War I French Premiere George Clemenceau; Winston Churchill; and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurian-- to answer the question. Among its readers, President Bush, who read it during his Texas vacation. Cohen is a professor at the school at the Nitze School at Johns Hopkins University. A former Pentagon official, he now serves on the defense policy board, a group that advises the secretary of defense. And welcome, Professor Cohen.
    "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

  • #2
    The following members have "signed up" to read the book and participate in the discussion.

    Albany Rifles
    S-2
    JAD_333
    Bigfella
    Last edited by Shek; 08 Jul 07,, 15:07.
    "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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    • #3
      We'll officially kick off the discussion sometime next week, and since this book revolves around a series of case studies, I'll create separate threads for each of the different cases, with links through this "master" thread, which I will keep as a "sticky" thread.

      Since I just started reading the book yesterday, don't wait for me to start posting on the different threads if you've got something that you found interesting/revealing/insightful/dreadful.

      Lastly, if you've decided to read the book and join in the discussion, please let me know so I can add your name to the top of the list of those contributing who have actually read the book. Thanks.
      "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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      • #4
        Hey Shek

        Great call. I am about 2/3s of the way through it (had a 2 finish 2 book son Shiloh first). Really opened my eyes about Clemenceau & Foch.

        I should be finished up by early next week.
        “Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
        Mark Twain

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        • #5
          looking forward to reading the book and learning more from comments here
          "If we will not be governed by God then we will be ruled by tyrants" -William Penn

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          • #6
            Ryan Bailey Reply

            Read it. A superb study of wartime leadership, as I mentioned in my welcome to you. We're on hold temporarily so take notes if a library copy. I suspect that around the holidays there may be a chance to get into it in detail.

            SUPREME COMMAND promises to be a good discussion.
            "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
            "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

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            • #7
              Hey Ya'll, I have read Supreme Command...where is the discussion? Did I miss it?

              I was intrigued by Ben-Gurion's history in the 40's as a terrorist (as defined by the British). The early Israelis had their own guerrilla warfare going. Is the early Israeli-Arab conflict a subject of study for the COIN academics like the Algerian conflict?

              The book was excellent!

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              • #8
                Originally posted by toby11 View Post
                Hey Ya'll, I have read Supreme Command...where is the discussion? Did I miss it?

                I was intrigued by Ben-Gurion's history in the 40's as a terrorist (as defined by the British). The early Israelis had their own guerrilla warfare going. Is the early Israeli-Arab conflict a subject of study for the COIN academics like the Algerian conflict?

                The book was excellent!
                Toby,
                I fell off a cliff when it came time to discuss the book. Sorry!
                "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

                Comment


                • #9
                  Here's an oped on the same topic of civil-military relations:

                  Our Generals Almost Cost Us Iraq - WSJ.com

                  The dominant media storyline about the Iraq war holds that the decisions about how to conduct it pitted ignorant civilians -- especially the president and secretary of defense -- against the uniformed military, whose wise and sober advice was cavalierly ignored. The Bush administration's cardinal sin was interference in predominantly military affairs, starting with overruling the military on the size of the force that invaded Iraq in March 2003.

                  But it's not just the media that peddles this story. As Bob Woodward illustrates in his new book, "The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008," it also resonates among many senior uniformed military officers.

                  The plausibility of the narrative rests on two questionable principles. The first is that soldiers have the right to a voice in making policy regarding the use of the military instrument -- that indeed they have the right to insist that their views be adopted. The second is that the judgment of soldiers is inherently superior to that of civilians when it comes to military affairs. Both of these principles are at odds with the American practice of civil-military relations, and with the historical record.

                  In our republic the uniformed military advises the civilian authorities, but has no right to insist that its views be adopted. Of course, uniformed officers have an obligation to stand up to civilian leaders if they think a policy is flawed. They must convey their concerns to civilian policy-makers forcefully and truthfully. But once a policy decision is made, soldiers are obligated to carry it out to the best of their ability, whether their advice is heeded or not.

                  Moreover, even when it comes to strictly military affairs, soldiers are not necessarily more prescient than civilian policy makers. This is confirmed by the historical record.

                  Historians have long recognized that Abraham Lincoln's judgment concerning the conduct of the Civil War was vastly superior to that of Gen. George McClellan. They have recognized that Gen. George C. Marshall, the greatest soldier-statesman since George Washington, was wrong to oppose arms shipments to Great Britain in 1940, and wrong to argue for a cross-channel invasion during the early years of World War II, before the U.S. was ready.

                  Historians have pointed out that the U.S. operational approach that contributed to our defeat in Vietnam was the creature of the uniformed military. And they have observed that the original -- unimaginative -- military plan for Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf War was rejected by the civilian leadership, which ordered a return to the drawing board. The revised plan was far more imaginative, and effective.

                  So it was with Iraq. The fact is that the approach favored by the uniformed leadership was failing. As the insurgency metastasized in 2005, the military had three viable alternatives: continue offensive operations along the lines of those in Anbar province after Fallujah; adopt a counterinsurgency approach; or emphasize the training of Iraqi troops in order to transition to Iraqi control of military operations. Gen. John Abizaid, commander of the U.S. Central Command, and Gen. George W. Casey, commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq -- supported by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Richard Myers -- chose the third option.

                  Transitioning to Iraqi control was a logical option for the long run. But it did little to solve the problem of the insurgency, which was generating sectarian violence. Based on the belief by many senior commanders, especially Gen. Abizaid, that U.S. troops were an "antibody" to Iraqi culture, the Americans consolidated their forces on large "forward operating bases," maintaining a presence only by means of motorized patrols that were particularly vulnerable to attacks by improvised explosive devices. They also conceded large swaths of territory and population alike to the insurgents. Violence spiked.

                  In late 2006, President Bush, like President Lincoln in 1862, adopted a new approach to the war. He replaced the uniformed and civilian leaders who were adherents of the failed operational approach with others who shared his commitment to victory rather than "playing for a tie." In Gen. David Petraeus, Mr. Bush found his Ulysses Grant, to execute an operational approach based on sound counterinsurgency doctrine. This new approach has brought the U.S. to the brink of victory.

                  Although the conventional narrative about the Iraq war is wrong, its persistence has contributed to the most serious crisis in civil-military relations since the Civil War. According to Mr. Woodward's account, the uniformed military not only opposed the surge, insisting that their advice be followed; it then subsequently worked to undermine the president once he decided on another strategy.

                  In one respect, the actions taken by military opponents of the surge, e.g. "foot-dragging," "slow-rolling" and selective leaking are, unfortunately, all-too-characteristic of U.S. civil-military relations during the last decade and a half. But the picture Mr. Woodward draws is far more troubling. Even after the policy had been laid down, the bulk of the senior U.S. military leadership -- the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, the rest of the Joint Chiefs, and Gen. Abizaid's successor, Adm. William Fallon, actively worked against the implementation of the president's policy.

                  If Mr. Woodward's account is true, it means that not since Gen. McClellan attempted to sabotage Lincoln's war policy in 1862 has the leadership of the U.S. military so blatantly attempted to undermine a president in the pursuit of his constitutional authority. It should be obvious that such active opposition to a president's policy poses a threat to the health of the civil-military balance in a republic.

                  Mr. Owens is a professor at the Naval War College and editor of Orbis, the journal of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
                  "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

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                  • #10
                    Toby,
                    I fell off a cliff when it came time to discuss the book. Sorry!
                    Shek, I forgive you. ;) Thanks for the WSJ op-ed ink.

                    I read W.T Owen's piece this morning and it has been bothering me ever since. I am not a historian like my favorite people :)), but this comparing Bush to Lincoln...gee...it just seems a little revisionist to me. The war Lincoln dealt with was in his back yard and he sat down and listened to his Cabinet. I think Bush's civil-military relations might be more aptly compared to LBJ's.

                    Now I am going to have to go check out Eliott Cohen's book from the library again, reread it and then reread a few chapters in "Dereliction of Duty"...one more miserable time...in case all you guys disagree with me and I have to defend my honor.

                    P.S. I might have to read Linda Robinson's book, Tell Me How This Ends, as well, as a counterpoint to Mr. Best Seller, Bob Woodward.
                    Last edited by toby11; 25 Sep 08,, 02:37.

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                    • #11
                      Dear Friends, Finally read a library copy of this book, whilst here at Ft. Knox for MC3.
                      It really did put things in perspective on statemanship which I examine through the Greek paradigm.

                      Very busy with my studies but I'm slowly advancing through Mcgregor's Warrior's Rage now.

                      wishing you all the best.

                      cheers

                      -B.
                      "If we will not be governed by God then we will be ruled by tyrants" -William Penn

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                      • #12
                        Ryan Bailey Reply

                        What's MC3 Ryan?
                        "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                        "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

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                        • #13
                          The Maneuver Captains Career Course I believe.

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                          • #14
                            Tarek Morgen Reply

                            Thanks.

                            At one time it was simply the Armor Officer Advance Course. My how times change.
                            "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                            "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

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                            • #15
                              S2

                              Armor/Infantry/Field Artillery Officers Advanced Course aka 7 months of legalized beer drinking and golfing
                              “Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
                              Mark Twain

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