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  • Olmert Faces Pressure to Resign

    The majority of Israelis are calling for the PM to step down in the wake of a report accusing him of failing in last year's war against Hezbollah:
    Olmert Faces Pressure to Resign

    By Robert Berger
    Jerusalem
    01 May 2007

    There is political turmoil in Israel after an official probe issued a damning report on the government's handling of last year's war in Lebanon. As Robert Berger reports from VOA's Jerusalem bureau, Israel's embattled leader is in the hot seat.

    Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is facing mounting pressure to resign, after an official inquiry harshly criticized his handling of the Lebanon war. The five-member commission accused Mr. Olmert of a "severe failure in judgment, responsibility and caution."

    The Prime Minister suffered a further blow when Cabinet Minister Eitan Cabel quit.

    "Ehud Olmert must resign," Cabel said. "I cannot sit in a government headed by Ehud Olmert."

    Cabel is a member of the Labor Party, the senior coalition partner in the government. Some members of Mr. Olmert's own Kadima party are also calling for his resignation, though most are standing behind the Prime Minister. Cabinet Minister Avi Dichter.

    Dichter praised Mr. Olmert for the way he led the country in the months after former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon suffered a sudden, massive stroke in January of 2006.

    Nevertheless, Mr. Olmert is taking the blame for Israel's failure to deal a knockout blow to some 5,000 Hezbollah guerrillas during a 34-day air and ground assault on Lebanon. The report said he acted hastily by going to war after Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers in a cross-border raid. It said he did not have a detailed military plan and did not ask for one.

    "There were mistakes and failures...and they will be fixed," Mr. Olmert said. "But to resign, he added, would be inappropriate."

    The Israeli public sees things differently. A poll shows that 69 percent believe Mr. Olmert should resign.
    Source: VoA
    "Every man has his weakness. Mine was always just cigarettes."

  • #2
    It looks like Olmert is in the running to be the least popular PM in the history of history. He is probably the olny political leader in the world who actually wishes he was Dubya.

    Apparently a snap poll by a TV station showed 0% of people wanted to vote for him. Even if this is a fair bit off (and I think it is), he is probably struggling to make single figures.

    My personal take on this is that it is precisely what he deserves. he launched an unnscessary & ill-concieved war whose major results were to cripple Lebanon's emerging democracy & economy & make a nasty piece of work like Nasrallah into a hero for people who normally wouldn't give him the time of day. And for what? The poor bloody IDF soldiers who were kidnapped are still in captivity; Israel looks weak & foolish; & a bunch of people, mostly civilians, died. 'Own goal' does not even begin to describe it.


    Kadima in ferment after Winograd report | Jerusalem Post

    Kadima in ferment after Winograd report
    By GIL HOFFMAN AND SHEERA CLAIRE FRENKEL

    Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was critically injured by the interim Winograd Report released Monday and has no chance of surviving the final report expected in July, a senior Kadima official said on Monday.

    The senior official, who had intended to defend Olmert in the press, instead eulogized him privately. But no one in Kadima was willing to say on the record on Monday that the prime minister had to resign.

    "Olmert cannot remain prime minister after such a report," the senior official said. "The responsibility on his shoulders is too broad. The final report will be much more severe. If Olmert does not leave on his own, Kadima will have to force him out."

    Minister-without-Portfolio Eitan Cabel, of Labor, suggested that Olmert should resign and hinted that he was considering quiting the government as well.
    "The report struck a fatal blow for Olmert but the burden of responsibility is on my shoulders as well," Cabel said. "We can't ignore what the report says about us ministers."

    Labor leadership candidate Ami Ayalon announced Tuesday that after finishing reading the 150 page Winograd interim report, he had decided Prime Minister Ehud Olmert must quit.

    Ayalon went on national TV Sunday evening to say that he did not believe Olmert should quit, but added that after reading the entire report, he decided that its conclusions were harsher than the leaks of the report that were broadcast Friday.

    "The report found that Olmert and the Israeli leadership had failed personally and therefore the prime minister should not be allowed to continue in that position," Ayalon said.

    Both Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz vowed to remain in office despite calls from across the political spectrum for them to resign for their "failures" in handling the Second Lebanon War according to the report.
    A Channel 2 poll taken after the report was released found that 65 percent of Israelis believe Olmert should quit and 75% that Peretz should resign. Only 14% said Olmert should remain in office and 10% that Peretz should stay. Fifty-three percent said Israel should go to elections.

    In a separate question on who they would vote for, the poll found that 26% of Israelis believe that Likud chairman Binyamin Netanyahu should be prime minister, followed by Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni (9%), former prime minister Ehud Barak (6%), Labor MK Ami Ayalon (5%), Vice Premier Shimon Peres (4%), Israel Beiteinu leader Avigdor Lieberman (3%), billionaire Arkadi Gaydamak (2%) and Peretz (1%). Olmert received zero percent in the poll, Channel 2 said.

    Olmert convened Kadima ministers following the report's release and none of them overtly criticized him. But Livni and Public Security Minister Avi Dichter raised eyebrows in the meeting when they said they needed to read the report before expressing their opinions.

    Livni used the meeting to deny that she was trying to topple Olmert. "In the last few days, people have tried to drag me into a personal political fight, but I don't intend to play that game," Livni said. "There is nothing personal between me and the prime minister."

    Livni's loyalists said she checked with Olmert and he denied reports in the Hebrew press that he intended to fire her to avenge her recent political activity.

    Most Kadima MKs adopted the prime minister's line of opposing early elections but some MKs, such as Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee chairman Tzahi Hanegbi, refused to conform.

    "The prime minister must ask himself, in light of the circumstances, if he has the authority and ability to lead the government now, and if he has the power to repair the failures that were revealed," Hanegbi said. "If the answer to both these questions is negative, he will have to reach his own conclusions."

    Kadima MK Yoel Hasson typified the government's response, calling on the Israeli public to have patience and let the Olmert government implement the recommendations of the report.

    Hizbullah's Sheikh Nasrallah "did not manage to win the war - don't let him win it now," Hasson said. "The report should be read with professionalism, and not be turned into a political battering ram. The prime minister must implement necessary changes in his government and begin by studying the report, reaching conclusions and implementing lessons to prepare for coming challenges."

    Olmert's coalition partners gave no indication that they intend to threaten the stability of his government. Israel Beiteinu released a statement reminding voters that the party joined the coalition only after the war in an effort to fix many of the problems identified in the report.

    Shas leader Eli Yishai said the report must not be used as a "starting point for an internal battle. The report must provide an opportunity for a common revival of all parts of Israel."

    Labor MKs were hesitant to express an opinion on the report, with only the candidates that are challenging Peretz for the party leadership calling on the defense minister to step down from his post.

    MK Ophir Paz-Pines said that "the prime minister and the defense minister must stand up and accept responsibility and resign, and not just hang on." He said that if Olmert and Peretz didn't quit, the public should protest in the streets.

    Labor faction chairman MK Yoram Marciano announced that the Labor faction would gather this week to discuss the commission's report.
    "Israel and its leaders must learn the operational lessons as soon as possible," said Marciano. "We must not use the committee's conclusions to chop heads, but to look forward and prepare for the next war."

    Likud MKs led the right-wing parties in calling for the government to step down immediately, but Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu declined to enter the fray and gave no interviews
    .
    "The report leads to just one conclusion: The failed government no longer has moral validity to rule. It must return the mandate to the people immediately," said Likud faction chairman Gideon Sa'ar.

    Likud MK Silvan Shalom said the report was a damning indictment against the Olmert government and called for new elections.

    "There's no more room for survival games and political manipulations. I will act by any means possible to bring down this government," Shalom said.
    Meretz Faction chairwoman MK Zehava Gal-On was the only opposition MK to criticize the report - for not issuing harsh enough recommendations.

    "What the commission should have said and didn't say was that 'Olmert and Peretz should go home,'" said Gal-On. "While its criticisms against the prime minister and defense minister are sharp, the minute there aren't operative conclusions and there's no eviction notice, the commission's conclusions have no moral force."

    Meretz chairman MK Yossi Beilin said the report's conclusions "leave no room for interpretation," and that Peretz and Olmert must resign and leave the political realm entirely.
    sigpic

    Win nervously lose tragically - Reds C C

    Comment


    • #3
      Peretz Waffles

      The First Post : France just seconds from downing Israeli jet

      Evidently, the Israelis and the French nearly had another incident. Personally, I'm convinced that POG is re-arming and re-fortifying in the south. There have been numerous mentions of this since, literally, the implementation of the latest cease-fire.

      To that end, I'm unopposed to the IsAF continuing such missions. It could well be provocative. Then again, it's not impossible that the French are a tad sensitive to IsAF over-flights while turning a blind-eye to POG operations. In either case, I don't presume that Israeli pilots are joy-riding. Instead, I'm certain that they're there (airspace of southern Lebanon) at the direction of their military commanders and civilian leaders- one of whom includes Defense Minister Amir Peretz.

      Which leads me to this.

      Peretz: We are fixing damage caused by depleted pre-war reserves <br><br> - Haaretz - Israel News

      "Peretz said that despite the findings of the Winograd Commission, which pointed to countless failures in the conduct of the government and the defense establishment during the war, 'today there are no Hezbollah strongholds in southern Lebanon and there is a United Nations presence in southern Lebanon.'

      'I am certain that even the greatest critics of the war wouldn't want to go back to where we were before the war,' he added."


      Did I read that correctly? Is the defense minister of Israel celebrating the presence of U.N. forces as a stabilizing agent in southern Lebanon at the same moment that his air force are flying missions in the south? What gives? Either the U.N. forces are failing to stop/massively hinder the POG rearmament/fortification/reconstitution, justifying an Israeli need to continue the over-flights or, believing the defense minister, Amir Peretz, there's no justification for these missions.

      "...And for what? The poor bloody IDF soldiers who were kidnapped are still in captivity;"

      That's your take, Bigfella, but the causes for war were a bit more complex than you allude. Therein lies much of the Israeli discontent, not an opposition to the war, but it's results. Your emphasis on the kidnappings ignores the willfully provocative nature of that action followed immediately by a far more telling cause for war- a strategic and sustained rocket campaign against northern Israel, it's people and COMMERCE from as far north as shia neighborhoods of Beirut.

      This was a challenge impossible to ignore for any Israeli gov't., much less Olmert, in office less than six months because of Sharon's failing health. It's all about the results at the P.M. level, and they just weren't there. The army will take it's lumps over reservist equipping and preparation, the defense ministry abjectly failed to provide Olmert with the operational and strategic leverage to compel POG to cease it's missile campaign other than bomb them where you find them. The Foreign Ministry, it seems, allowed POG's excellent propaganda campaign to shape the battlefield, surrendering much of the moral high ground which Israel held at the beginning of hostilities.

      Plenty of blame to go around, but not for the reasons you'd suggest. Hardly unnecessary, if ill-conceived.
      "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
      "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

      Comment


      • #4
        I agree with S-2, Bigfella,the Winograd Commission is judging negatively not Olmert's decision to go to war. A clear majority of Israelies were for it. It was the implementation part of it that people are pissed off at Olmert about. Unecessary? You're either uninformed or a wishful thinker.

        As for Peretz, he is inept for the Minister of Defense post, and I said this from day one.

        As for the French, those bastards are biased as hell. They ride around showing their "presence" but do nothing to interfere with Hizballah's operations. I hope, for their sake, that they do not shoot at IAF planes. Because Israel is not the UK, and will not deal with provocations in the way that the UK did with Iran.
        In Iran people belive pepsi stands for pay each penny save israel. -urmomma158
        The Russian Navy is still a threat, but only to those unlucky enough to be Russian sailors.-highsea

        Comment


        • #5
          Winograd Findings- Haaretz

          The main findings of the Winograd partial report on the Second Lebanon War

          By Haaretz Staff

          1. On September 17th 2006, the Government of Israel decided, under section 8A of The Government Act 2001, to appoint a governmental commission of examination "To look into the preparation and conduct of the political and the security levels concerning all the dimensions of the Northern Campaign which started on July 12th 2006". Today we have submitted to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense the classified interim report, and we are now presenting the declassified report to the public.

          2. The Commission was appointed due to a strong sense of a crisis and deep disappointment with the consequences of the campaign and the way it was conducted. We regarded this difficult task both as a duty and a privilege. It is our belief that the larger the event and the deeper the feeling of crisis - the greater the opportunity to change and improve matters which are essential for the security and the flourishing of state and society in Israel. We believe Israeli society has great strength and resilience, with a robust sense of the justice of its being and of its achievements. These, too, were expressed during the war in Lebanon and after it. At the same time, we must not underrate deep failures.

          3. This conception of our role affected the way we operated. No-one underestimates the need to study what happened in the past, including the imposition of personal responsibility. The past is the key for learning lessons for the future. Nonetheless, learning these lessons and actually implementing them are the most implications of the conclusions of the Commission.

          4. This emphasis on learning lessons not only follows from our conception of the role of a public commission. It also follows from our belief that one of Israeli society's greatest sources of strength is its being free, open and creative. Together with great achievements, the challenges facing it are existential. To cope with them, Israel must be a learning society - a society which examines its achievements and, in particular, its failures, in order to improve its ability to face the future.

          5. Initially we hoped that the appointment of the Commission would serve as an incentive to accelerate learning processes in the relevant systems, so that we could devote our time to study all of the materials in depth, and present the public with a comprehensive picture. However, learning processes have been limited. In some ways an opposite, and worrying, process emerged - a process of 'waiting' for the Commission's Report before energetic and determined action was taken to redress the failures that have been revealed.

          6. Therefore we decided to publish initially an Interim Report, focusing on the decisions related to the start of the war. We did this in the hope that the relevant bodies would take urgent action to change and correct all the implications. We would like to reiterate and emphasize that we hope that this Partial Report, which concentrates on the functioning of the highest political and military echelons in their decision to move to war will not divert attention from the troubling overall picture revealed by the war as a whole.

          7. The interim report includes a number of chapters dealing with the following subjects:

          a. The Commission's perception of its role, and its attitude to recommendations in general and to recommendations dealing with specific persons in particular (chapter 2). We see the main task of a public commission of inquiry (or investigation) as determining findings and conclusions, and presenting them - with its recommendations - before the public and decision makers so that they can take action. A public commission should not, in most cases, replace the usual political decision-making processes and determine who should serve as a minister or senior military commander. Accordingly, we include personal conclusions in the interim report, without personal recommendations. However, we will reconsider this matter with regards to our Final Report, in view of the depiction of the war as a whole.

          b. The way we balanced our desire to engage in a speedy and efficient investigation with the rights of those who may be negatively affected to 'natural justice' (chapter 3). The special stipulations of the Commissions of Inquiry Act in this regard do not apply to a governmental commission of Examination, but we regard ourselves, naturally, as working under the general principles of natural justice. The commission notified those who may be affected by its investigation, in detailed letters of invitation, of the ways in which they may be negatively affected, and enabled them to respond to allegations against them, without sending "notices of warning" and holding a quasi-judicial hearing before reaching out conclusions. We believe that in this way we provided all who may be negatively affected by our report with a full opportunity to answer all allegations against them.

          c. The processes and developments in the period between the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon until July 11, 2006 which contributed to the background of the Lebanon War (chapter 4). These processes created much of the factual background against which the decision-makers had to operate on July 12th, and they are thus essential to both the understanding and the evaluation of the events of the war. Understanding them is also essential for drawing lessons from the events, whose significance is often broader than that of the war itself.

          8. The core of the interim report is a detailed examination of the decisions of senior political and military decision-makers concerning the decision to go to war at the wake of the abduction of the two soldiers on the morning of July 12th. We start with the decision of the government on the fateful evening of the 12th to authorize a sharp military response, and end with the speech of the Prime Minister in the Knesset on July 17th, when he officially presented the campaign and its goals. These decisions were critical and constitutive, and therefore deserve separate investigation. We should note that these decisions enjoyed broad support within the government, the Knesset and the public throughout this period.

          9. Despite this broad support, we determine that there are very serious failings in these decisions and the way they were made. We place the primary responsibility for these failures on the Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. All three made a decisive personal contribution to these decisions and the way in which they were made. However, there are many others who share responsibility for the mistakes we found in these decisions and for their background conditions.

          10. The main failures in the decisions made and the decision-making processes can be summed up as follows:

          a. The decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike was not based on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan, based on careful study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena. A meticulous examination of these characteristics would have revealed the following: the ability to achieve military gains having significant political-international weight was limited; an Israeli military strike would inevitably lead to missiles fired at the Israeli civilian north; there was not another effective military response to such missile attacks than an extensive and prolonged ground operation to capture the areas from which the missiles were fired - which would have a high "cost" and which did not enjoy broad support. These difficulties were not explicitly raised with the political leaders before the decision to strike was taken.

          b. Consequently, in making the decision to go to war, the government did not consider the whole range of options, including that of continuing the policy of 'containment', or combining political and diplomatic moves with military strikes below the 'escalation level', or military preparations without immediate military action - so as to maintain for Israel the full range of responses to the abduction. This failure reflects weakness in strategic thinking, which derives the response to the event from a more comprehensive and encompassing picture.

          c. The support in the cabinet for this move was gained in part through ambiguity in the presentation of goals and modes of operation, so that ministers with different or even contradictory attitudes could support it. The ministers voted for a vague decision, without understanding and knowing its nature and implications. They authorized the commencement of a military campaign without considering how to exit it.

          d. Some of the declared goals of the war were not clear and could not be achieved, and in part were not achievable by the authorized modes of military action.

          e. The IDF did not exhibit creativity in proposing alternative action possibilities, did not alert the political decision-makers to the discrepancy between its own scenarios and the authorized modes of action, and did not demand - as was necessary under its own plans - early mobilization of the reserves so they could be equipped and trained in case a ground operation would be required.

          f. Even after these facts became known to the political leaders, they failed to adapt the military way of operation and its goals to the reality on the ground. On the contrary, declared goals were too ambitious, and it was publicly stated that fighting would continue until they were achieved. But the authorized military operations did not enable their achievement.

          11. The primary responsibility for these serious failings rests with the Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. We single out these three because it is likely that had any of them acted better - the decisions in the relevant period and the ways they were made, as well as the outcome of the war, would have been significantly better.

          12. Let us start with the Prime Minister.

          a. The Prime Minister bears supreme and comprehensive responsibility for the decisions of 'his' government and the operations of the army. His responsibility for the failures in the initial decisions concerning the war stem from both his position and from his behavior, as he initiated and led the decisions which were taken.

          b. The Prime Minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one. Also, his decision was made without close study of the complex features of the Lebanon front or of the military, political and diplomatic options available to Israel. He made his decision without systematic consultation with others, especially outside the IDF, despite not having experience in external-political and military affairs. In addition, he did not adequately consider political and professional reservations presented to him before the fateful decisions of July 12th.

          c. The Prime Minister is responsible for the fact that the goals of the campaign were not set out clearly and carefully, and that there was no serious discussion of the relationship between these goals and the authorized modes of military action. He made a personal contribution to the fact that the declared goals were over-ambitious and not feasible.

          d. The Prime Minister did not adapt his plans once it became clear that the assumptions and expectations of Israel's actions were not realistic and were not materializing.

          e. All of these add up to a serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence.

          13. The Minister of Defense is the minister responsible for overseeing the IDF, and he is a senior member of the group of leaders in charge of political-military affairs.

          a. The Minister of Defense did not have knowledge or experience in military, political or governmental matters. He also did not have good knowledge of the basic principles of using military force to achieve political goals.

          b. Despite these serious gaps, he made his decisions during this period without systemic consultations with experienced political and professional experts, including outside the security establishment. In addition, he did not give adequate weight to reservations expressed in the meetings he attended.

          c. The Minister of Defense did not act within a strategic conception of the systems he oversaw. He did not ask for the IDF's operational plans and did not examine them; he did not check the preparedness and fitness of IDF; and did not examine the fit between the goals set and the modes of action presented and authorized for achieving them. His influence on the decisions made was mainly pointillist and operational. He did not put on the table - and did not demand presentation - of serious strategic options for discussion with the Prime Minister and the IDF.

          d. The Minister of Defense did not develop an independent assessment of the implications of the complexity of the front for Israel's proper response, the goals of the campaign, and the relations between military and diplomatic moves within it. His lack of experience and knowledge prevented him from challenging in a competent way both the IDF, of which he was in charge, and the Prime Minister.

          e. In all these ways, the Minister of Defense failed in fulfilling his functions. Therefore, his serving as Minister of Defense during the war impaired Israel's ability to respond well to its challenges.

          14. The Chief of Staff (COS) is the supreme commander of the IDF, and the main source of information concerning the army, its plans, abilities and recommendations presented to the political echelon. Furthermore, the COS's personal involvement with decision making within the army and in coordination with the political echelon was dominant.

          a. The army and the COS were not prepared for the event of the abduction despite recurring alerts. When the abduction happened, he responded impulsively. He did not alert the political leaders to the complexity of the situation, and did not present information, assessments and plans that were available in the IDF at various levels of planning and approval and which would have enabled a better response to the challenges.

          b. Among other things, the COS did not alert the political echelon to the serious shortcomings in the preparedness and the fitness of the armed forces for an extensive ground operation, if that became necessary. In addition, he did not clarify that the military assessments and analyses of the arena was that there was a high probability that a military strike against Hezbollah would make such a move necessary.

          c. The COS' responsibility is aggravated by the fact that he knew well that both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense lacked adequate knowledge and experience in these matters, and by the fact that he had led them to believe that the IDF was ready and prepared and had operational plans fitting the situation.

          d. The COS did not provide adequate responses to serious reservations about his recommendations raised by ministers and others during the first days of the campaign, and he did not present to the political leaders the internal debates within the IDF concerning the fit between the stated goals and the authorized modes of actions.

          e. In all these the Chief of Staff failed in his duties as commander in chief of the army and as a critical part of the political-military leadership, and exhibited flaws in professionalism, responsibility and judgment.

          15. Concomitantly we determine that the failures listed here, and in the outcomes of the war, had many other partners.

          a. The complexity of the Lebanon scene is basically outside Israel's control.

          b. The ability of Hezbollah to sit 'on the border', its ability to dictate the moment of escalation, and the growth of its military abilities and missile arsenal increased significantly as a result of Israel's unilateral withdrawal in May 2000 (which was not followed, as had been hoped, by The Lebanese Army deploying on the border with Israel).

          c. The shortcomings in the preparedness and the training of the army, its operational doctrine, and various flaws in its organizational culture and structure, were all the responsibility of the military commanders and political leaders in charge years before the present Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff took office.

          d. On the political-security strategic level, the lack of preparedness was also caused by the failure to update and fully articulate Israel's security strategy doctrine, in the fullest sense of that term, so that it could not serve as a basis for coping comprehensively with all the challenges facing Israel. Responsibility for this lack of an updated national security strategy lies with Israel's governments over the years. This omission made it difficult to devise an immediate proper response to the abduction, because it led to stressing an immediate and sharp military strike. If the response had been derived from a more comprehensive security strategy, it would have been easier to take into account Israel's overall balance of strengths and vulnerabilities, including the preparedness of the civilian population.

          e. Another factor which largely contributed to the failures is the weakness of the high staff work available to the political leadership. This weakness existed under all previous Prime Ministers and this continuing failure is the responsibility of these PMs and their cabinets. The current political leadership did not act in a way that could compensate for this lack, and did not rely sufficiently on other bodies within and outside the security system that could have helped it.

          f. Israel's government in its plenum failed in its political
          function of taking full responsibility for its decisions. It did not explore and seek adequate response for various reservations that were raised, and authorized an immediate military strike that was not thought-through and suffered from over-reliance on the judgment of the primary decision-makers.

          g. Members of the IDF's general staff who were familiar with the assessments and intelligence concerning the Lebanon front, and the serious deficiencies in preparedness and training, did not insist that these should be considered within the army, and did not alert the political leaders concerning the flaws in the decisions and the way they were made.

          16. As a result of our investigation, we make a number of structural and institutional recommendations, which require urgent attention:

          a. The improvement of the quality of discussions and decision making within the government through strengthening and deepening staff work; strict enforcement of the prohibition of leaks; improving the knowledge base of all members of the government on core issues of Israel's challenges, and orderly procedures for presentation of issues for discussion and resolution.

          b. Full incorporation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in security decisions with political and diplomatic aspects.

          c. Substantial improvement in the functioning of the National Security Council, the establishment of a national assessment team, and the creation of a center for crisis management in the Prime Minister's Office.

          17. We regard it of great importance to make findings, reach conclusions and present recommendations on the other critical issues which emerged in this war. We will cover them in the final report, which we strive to conclude soon. These subjects include, among others, the direction of the war was led and its management by the political echelon; the conduct of the military campaign by the army; the civil-military relationship in the war; taking care of Israel's civilian population under missile attack; the diplomatic negotiations by the Prime Minister's office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; censorship, the media and secrecy; the effectiveness of Israel's media campaign; and the discussion of various social and political processes which are essential for a comprehensive analysis of the events of the war and their significance.

          18. Let us add a few final comments: It took the government until March 2007 to name the events of the summer of 2006 "The Second Lebanon War". After 25 years without a war, Israel experienced a war of a different kind. The war thus brought back to center stage some critical questions that parts of Israeli society preferred to avoid.

          19. The IDF was not ready for this war. Among the many reasons for this we can mention a few: Some of the political and military elites in Israel have reached the conclusion that Israel is beyond the era of wars. It had enough military might and superiority to deter others from declaring war against her; these would also be sufficient to send a painful reminder to anyone who seemed to be undeterred; since Israel did not intend to initiate a war, the conclusion was that the main challenge facing the land forces would be low intensity asymmetrical conflicts.

          20. Given these assumptions, the IDF did not need to be prepared for 'real' war. There was also no urgent need to update in a systematic and sophisticated way Israel's overall security strategy and to consider how to mobilize and combine all its resources and sources of strength - political, economic, social, military, spiritual, cultural and scientific - to address the totality of the challenges it faces.

          21. We believe that - beyond the important need to examine the failures in conducting the war and the preparation for it, beyond the need to identify the weaknesses (and strengths) in the decisions made in the war - these are the main questions raised by the Second Lebanon War. These are questions that go far beyond the mandate of any particular commission of inquiry; they are the questions that stand at the center of our existence here as a Jewish and democratic state. It would be a grave mistake to concentrate only on the flaws revealed in the war and not to address these basic issues.

          We hope that our findings and conclusions in the interim report and in the final report will not only impel taking care of the serious governmental flaws and failures we examine and expose, but will also lead towards a renewed process in which Israeli society, and its political and spiritual leaders will take up and explore Israel's long-term aspirations and the ways to advance them.

          (S-2 note-This also appears verbatim in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. Do you mean that nobody has leaked a full copy of the Interim report to the media yet? Heavens!)
          "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
          "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

          Comment


          • #6
            Interested Parties Weighing In

            Nasrallah praises Winograd report; Siniora: No mention of destruction in Lebanon - Haaretz - Israel News

            Nasrallah's comments are an interesting back-handed compliment to the Israeli people, given that it was intended as a snide claim to "victory". If POG wishes to declare victory, so be it. Israel certainly didn't "win". If not losing is victory (and it can be), then POG's survival and continued threat to the Lebanese government constitutes a victory of sorts.

            Siniora's comments reveal the desperation which he must feel from the mounting challenge to his government from POG. His appeal to a national resistance against Israel is fascinating as it's his government's complicit abdication of it's sovereign responsibilities that led to this war in the first place.
            "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
            "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

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            • #7
              The Prime Minister led in the worst way. He chose to do something and then when he started, he was indecisive. Some Units got orders to go across north over 20 different times only to get them canceled in the last second. Those orders come from the top.
              Relying on the air force is something that Israel has never before done. Israel launched its first American Shock and Awe campaign with this war and while they shocked and awed everyone, they didn't acheive their goals.

              Worst thing a President or Prime Minister can do is set unattainable goals.

              Olmert's two goals
              -get back the two soldiers
              -Destory Hezbollah

              Israel's military commanders probably told Olmert after he uttered out objective #2 that it isn't really possible to get rid of a native armed gorup that entrenched. It just isn't militarily possible without a full occupation and martial law. It was bravado talking and the military had to serve political goals made by political statements rather then a comprehensive tactical campaign.
              Israel managed to acheive its goal in 1982 which was kicking the PLO out of Lebanon but they weren't native to Lebanon and they weren't liked by any of Lebanon's sects.

              If Olmert had stated instead that the objective is to show nations that if they let 3rd party groups impede their soverignty to Israel's harm then they should not expect Israel to respect their soverignty either and there will be a large price to pay. That would have been a goal the military could guarantee and did.
              Also Olmert was too worried about another Lebanon occupation that he neglected the obvious truth that the rockets won't stop until the ground they are launched from is seized and secured.
              The worst mistake of Olmert was that his adminstration was more occupied in the first few days of the war by the missing soldiers and the consquences of war then by the tactical situation with the rockets landing on Israel. Those rockets could have relatively been easily stopped had they been focused on early on.

              If the US couldn't find massive Scud launchers that were firing at Israel in 91 it should have been realized that launchers the size of my coffee table weren't going to be destroyed by a mighty air force.

              The military has done its part since the war and so has the Israeli people. Israel's elite units are getting more volunteers then ever before and reservists are training very hard during their yearly's. I read yesterday that reservists are doing hard training for up to 44 days a year in many units.

              In regards to the Defense Minister I can't really go into detail on my opinion as I simply get too upset thinking about "Stalinsky" as he is called here for his ridiculous mustache. Here is a man whose military career ended when a jeep he was fixing fell on his foot.

              If you went to visit Ariel Sharon in his coma bed and whispered into his ear that Amir Peretz the former Teamsters like Union president is defense minister he would probably flatline in a heartbeat.
              Last edited by Druze; 03 May 07,, 00:54.

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              • #8
                Druze Reply

                Interesting comments. A few thoughts-

                "Olmert's two goals
                -get back the two soldiers
                -Destory Hezbollah"


                Stated? If so, both were largely unattainable. The initial kidnapping in Gaza had already proved vexing enough.

                "If Olmert had stated instead that the objective is to show nations that if they let 3rd party groups impede their soverignty to Israel's harm then they should not expect Israel to respect their soverignty either and there will be a large price to pay. That would have been a goal the military could guarantee and did."

                Now, THIS is worthy of war. I cannot concur that the Lebanese government and army were incapable of meeting their responsibilities. It is the essential raison d'etre of any nation. It calls to the legitimacy of his government then and now. Clearly, though, had they done so, Siniora would not be facing the challenge to his government from POG that he does today.

                "...he neglected the obvious truth that the rockets won't stop until the ground they are launched from is seized and secured. The worst mistake of Olmert was that his adminstration was more occupied in the first few days of the war by the missing soldiers and the consquences of war then by the tactical situation with the rockets landing on Israel."

                Olmert's government seems most culpable here. I can't imagine that, given the existing intelligence and obvious threat that such a capability in the hands of POG implied that war-plans weren't available to seize a buffer which would sanitize any rocket belt. The IsAF removed the threat of long-ranged systems fairly quickly, but the continuing barrage of short to medium range tactical rockets continued largely unabated. The eventual ground operations seemingly entailed little coherance or forethought. That's since been verified. Thus, no plan?

                What's interesting to me is that the IDF and Ministry of Defense, indeed the GOVERNMENT knew that POG had re-infiltrated the south, fortifying and pre-positioning supplies and weapons for seven years. These included mortars and tactical range rockets. Further, they knew that the Syrians and Iranians had supplied more sophisticated and longer-ranged rocket systems. This effectively deepened the battlefield, complicating the targeting process.

                Still, were the objectives as you've suggested, Druze, it would have placed the responsibility for war upon it's rightful shoulders, the Lebanese government. Its acquiescence of both sovereign rights and RESPONSIBILITIES made it culpable in POG's rocket campaign, both philosophically and practically. The Lebanese army's unwillingness to occupy and assert it's authority over southern Lebanon led directly to this condition.
                "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

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                • #9
                  Druze,

                  What rank were you?

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                  • #10
                    Originally posted by Officer of Engineers View Post
                    Druze,

                    What rank were you?
                    2nd. LT.

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                    • #11
                      So you commanded a platoon?
                      In Iran people belive pepsi stands for pay each penny save israel. -urmomma158
                      The Russian Navy is still a threat, but only to those unlucky enough to be Russian sailors.-highsea

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                      • #12
                        Originally posted by Stan187 View Post
                        So you commanded a platoon?

                        Yes 2nd. LT in infantry is a platoon commander. Its a junior officer training course that is about 6 months long. For Armoured Corp, and Mechanized infantry the course to get a junior officer grade is about 3 months+ depending on your division. A 3-4 month course precedes the junior officer training to achieve NCO status. If accepted to take the junior officer course you agree to an additional year to two years. Once at the grade of 2nd. LT you can opt to to continue on a couple of further specialized courses, and then if you are accepted and are seriously committed to a full career in the IDF you can enroll in a Command and Staff school. If you get that far and preove yourself you can go further and attend a National Defense course and or be accepted in military training courses in the US and Britiain. The higher command courses after 2nd grade LT are about a year each course.

                        But once you finish active duty as a 2nd LT. as I did you can't take command of a platoon in time of war if its an active duty unit. My platoon leading days were in Gaza and Lebanon.

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                        • #13
                          Gotcha, so if you served in the normal miluyim you'd still be commanding your platoon because all of them would be reservists too.
                          In Iran people belive pepsi stands for pay each penny save israel. -urmomma158
                          The Russian Navy is still a threat, but only to those unlucky enough to be Russian sailors.-highsea

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                          • #14
                            Under a banner reading "Failures, Go Home," tens of thousands of Israelis from across the political spectrum joined Thursday night in demanding the resignations of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and his defense minister for their performance during last summer's war in Lebanon.

                            Sign Up

                            He refuses to go.

                            Read on.


                            "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

                            I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

                            HAKUNA MATATA

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                            • #15
                              "That's your take, Bigfella, but the causes for war were a bit more complex than you allude. Therein lies much of the Israeli discontent, not an opposition to the war, but it's results. Your emphasis on the kidnappings ignores the willfully provocative nature of that action followed immediately by a far more telling cause for war- a strategic and sustained rocket campaign against northern Israel, it's people and COMMERCE from as far north as shia neighborhoods of Beirut.

                              This was a challenge impossible to ignore for any Israeli gov't., much less Olmert, in office less than six months because of Sharon's failing health. It's all about the results at the P.M. level, and they just weren't there. The army will take it's lumps over reservist equipping and preparation, the defense ministry abjectly failed to provide Olmert with the operational and strategic leverage to compel POG to cease it's missile campaign other than bomb them where you find them. The Foreign Ministry, it seems, allowed POG's excellent propaganda campaign to shape the battlefield, surrendering much of the moral high ground which Israel held at the beginning of hostilities.

                              Plenty of blame to go around, but not for the reasons you'd suggest. Hardly unnecessary, if ill-conceived." S-2

                              S-2,

                              I referred to the war as 'unecessary' because I believe that the issues that led to its outbreak could have been handled differently & better. I think you actually stumbled onto the major reasons behind the war with your comment about Olmert being a new PM etc.

                              My view of the war was that Olmert was presented with the sort of situation that Israeli PMs regularly face, but felt that he needed to 'make his bones' by looking tough. It reminded me of the tragic sight of Shimon Perez in a helmet shelling Sth Lebanon in the election after Rabin's murder. It is always possible to find a justification for using force, doesn't mean it was really necessary.

                              The sad truth is that Israeli soldiers have been kidnapped before & probably will be again. Israel has successfully done deals for their release & probably will again. Rockets have been launched before & probably will be again. Israel has taken action short of invasion to deal with them before & probably will again. The decision to invade Lebanon was a choice, not a necessity. Even if the IDF had been ready & proper plans in place, I think it would have been a poor choice. The fact they were not made it a criminally bad choice.

                              The deaths of 160 Israelis & over 1000 Lebanese seems a very high price to pay for whatever the invasion might have achieved. I'm sure there was an easier way to get the UN to beef up its presence. I'm damned sure that ways to undermine the POG could be reached that didn't boost its political power, cripple Lebanese democracy & severly damage relations betweem Israel & Lebanon - the two nations with the greatest interest in seeing Hizbullah undermined. Assad must be wetting himself with laughter.

                              While the situations are not entirely comparable, I think the Brits showed that 'looking tough' is not always the best way to deal with a difficult situation. Pride can be a curse, and a smart adversary can exploit it. I wonder what the parents of the Israeli soldiers thought when they saw the British marines return home without a shot fired?
                              sigpic

                              Win nervously lose tragically - Reds C C

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