PDA

View Full Version : Fire the Generals from dni



WECIV
01 May 07,, 05:49
http://d-n-i.net/fcs/macgregor_generalship.htm

Good read. Lot of good points.

W

Shek
01 May 07,, 09:16
Fire the Generals! by COL Douglas Macgregor (http://d-n-i.net/fcs/macgregor_generalship.htm)

Good read. Lot of good points.

W

MacGregor doesn't do it for me. He's a bitter pill, and his last book, Transformation Under Fire, was mostly a waste of ink. IIRC, he was for an even smaller invasion force for OIF, and so I find his remarks about no occupation troops being ready disingenuous. Heck, he complains about the desire to consolidate positions before moving on, and yet, if you look at his combat record in ODS, he told then CPT McMaster to wait and not attack the Iraqis dug in at 73 Easting. CPT McMaster was already in contact and so developed the situation and Eagle Troop crushed an Iraqi RG Brigade. COL McMaster is on his way to many stars, and COL(R) MacGregor is a talking head. LOL!

Anyways, his oped, while full of contextual misquotes due to what information he leaves out, does have some truth to it. However, it is fundamentally different than LTC Yingling's piece, and much less scholarly. It's a bitter piece from a bitter pill.

WECIV
01 May 07,, 17:43
We could have invaded with a much smaller force. The points about Fallujah were spot on as well as the Tikrit issue.

W

Shek
01 May 07,, 18:23
We could have invaded with a much smaller force. The points about Fallujah were spot on as well as the Tikrit issue.

W

1. With a smaller invasion force, we'd have had even more instability in Iraq. This is the same conventional mindset that got us into trouble. As it was, the generated start concept was a strategic disaster.

2. The Fallujah quotes are taken out of context, and thereby present a strawman argument which MacGregor beats up while avoiding reality. There was consternation over the decision to lay seige without the necessary resources to do a siege type assault on Fallujah, and even more important, this ran directly counter to what the commander on the ground, then MG Mattis, wanted to do. Mattis quotes that support MacGregor's argument are included, but those that don't, aren't. Nice cherry picking :rolleyes:

3. The Tikrit argument is a strawman as well. Name the strategic difference that was made? None. Next, what Army unit is going to go to Tikrit? Name it, and what gap do you leave by their absence? Furthemore, I'd say that this was a blessing in disguise. Look what happened when the Marines were relieved by 4ID. I'm sure that it wouldn't have been much better if it had been 3ID, instead.

Sorry, MacGregor is simply either spewing a bunch of junk or else talking about things that had already been published before. It's not a surprise that no one picked up his oped.

Shek
01 May 07,, 20:08
From Cobra II, page 33, COL MacGregor said that 50K troops could attack Baghdad and win within two weeks. To what strategic advantage? I'm not seeing any. However, it does appear that he probably was very influential in shaping Rumsfeld's pestering of Franks to the point that we made the TPDFL much too small for the task, essentially throwing out the plan for 375K that was developed under General Zinni and would have ensured that we had the forces in place to have prevented the security vacuum that we created.

http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/iraq/lessons-learned/03-10-21-biddle.htm

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2003_hr/03-10-21warcollege.pdf

If your not convinced that faster was better, then here's the analysis that demonstrates that speed didn't gain any strategic advantage.

Just think, over a year's worth of planning and haggling over the invasion force was dedicated to shaving a handful of weeks off of the fall of Baghdad, at the expense of planning for the aftermath. A very poor trade off if you ask me.

Blademaster
01 May 07,, 20:53
The problem with Gen. Zinni's plan is that it would overstretch the army to the point where we could not honor our commitments to Bosnia and other places. Zinni's plan would leave the US with little troops in reserve to combat hotspots since we would essentially be tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I think MacGregor was counting on the Iraqi Army to take up the slack.

Shek
01 May 07,, 21:14
The problem with Gen. Zinni's plan is that it would overstretch the army to the point where we could not honor our commitments to Bosnia and other places. Zinni's plan would leave the US with little troops in reserve to combat hotspots since we would essentially be tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I think MacGregor was counting on the Iraqi Army to take up the slack.

Blademaster,

The commitent to Bosnia was chump change in 2003, around 3K, and those had been ARNG for quite a while. I'm not sure of the levels in Kosovo, but I believe that was around a brigade.

The bottomline is that we tried victory on the cheap, and because we've never established security in Iraq, we've actually spent much more than had we just done it right with overwhelming troops available. At 375K, you could have mobilized the Guard and Reserves just like in ODS, established security during OIF I, spent money on reconstruction in much larger amounts, trained ISF by rehabilitating the existing services, and probably be a much lower levels of troops than we are now. The 375K would have been supplemented by the IA as well (and this # was only 100K larger than the actual Cobra II plan). If OIF was such an absolute need, then mobilizing the nation for war just in case shouldn't have been off the table.

Putting all of the above into perspective, Congress balked at paying $18 billion in reconstruction when the bill was put before them back in 2003. Our current bill per month is close to $10 billion for operations in Iraq. So, we may not have paid up front, be we sure as hell are paying for our "victory on the cheap" in spades on the back end.

Blademaster
01 May 07,, 22:20
I am not saying that I disagreed with Gen. Zinni's plans. It is just that his plan presented several geopolitical consequences that the White House did not want to take on. I mean take a look at Bush's "Continue shopping" when asked what the American citizens could do after 9/11. He totally missed the boat on that one. He could have easily increased the Army size to 750,000 if he had called on them right after 9/11.

I totally agreed with your assessment and in fact, wanted more troops to do the job right right in the early stages of war.

Shek
02 May 07,, 13:33
I am not saying that I disagreed with Gen. Zinni's plans. It is just that his plan presented several geopolitical consequences that the White House did not want to take on. I mean take a look at Bush's "Continue shopping" when asked what the American citizens could do after 9/11. He totally missed the boat on that one. He could have easily increased the Army size to 750,000 if he had called on them right after 9/11.

I totally agreed with your assessment and in fact, wanted more troops to do the job right right in the early stages of war.

:)