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  • Stalingrad

    If you look at the location of Stalingrad on an atlas, you have to wonder what were Hitler and the German General Staff thinking about trying to take Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

    I realize the intention was to seize the Caucasus oil fields, but if you look at the supply lines involved; especially in light of the fact the German army was primarily supplied by horse and cart, the thought of being able to take and hold this vast area is just ridiculous. Especially in the dead of winter.

    With their only flank protection being lightly armed Hungarians, Romanians, and Italians, you can see how the Soviet Generals must have been salivating to begin their attack and surround Paulus and the 6th Army.

    Manstein should have done the honorable thing and ignored Hitler's order and launched an immediate breakout of the 6th Army after the initial Soviet offensive. Manstein owed it to his troops.

  • #2
    Mainstein wasn't in control. Von Paulus was Hitler's golden boy. The goal of the summer 42 campaign wasn't just about oil and gas. Had the Germans seized baku Russia probalby would ahve bowed out of the war. The Archangle route wa sonly open during the winter and with out the Persian supply road the USSR would ahve starved in several critical logistics areas.

    There is also the chance that once she was fully insulated from Russia, Turkey would have jumped on Germany's side dramatically shortening the supply lines with direct rail transport to Islamabad a short ferry ride and nearly direct rail to the front with little danger of partisans except through Yugoslavia and Greece.

    All very good reasons to try, the german failure actually occured much earleir than the investment of the city with 4 critical blunders. 1- Placing a staff office rin charge of an Army. Von paulus had neve rcommande din combat beofre and during the spring Russian offensive lsot cotnrol of the 6th and was nearly routed and a great deal of time was lsot as the 6th re-organised. 2-By allowing the bulk of several Russian armies to escape after the failed Soviet counter attacks. 3- A few time consuming delay's as Hoth and the 4th crossed in front of the 6th the Soviets were able to fortify the city. The next big mistake 4 was trying to take the city by storm rather than simply encircling it and taking it by seige. Direct storming of Soviet cities had already proven to be suicidal at Stevastopol in the Crimea and the Wermacht knew not to try it again.

    granted this is all 20/20 hindsight but some of the information was known and simply not acted upon. Using allied troops to hold the flanks was not a bad move, it was the only move. They didn't have the fire to take part in the assault on the city, and didn't have the mobility to support the drive towards the oil. base don Abwher reports the flans were safe. Soviet force dhad been in constant retreat since the earlier failed offensives and cunter attacks.

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    • #3
      The key thing to keep in mind was Hitler's view that Russia was on the verge of collapse. He had insisted on that same view in late '41, when he insisted that the German forces keep 'pushing', rather than falling back to defensible positions that could be properly supplied. Instead, in '41, the Germans were left in exposed forward positions that often had to be supplied by air. One way or the other the Germans managed (barely) to hold on through the winter. This was as much due to Russian difficulties with supply and weather and lack of experience in managing an offensive as it was the determined German defense. In spring '42, the Russians launched a number of counterattacks which were defeated by the Germans - especially around Kharkov where the Russian attack ran right into the 'teeth' of the planned German southern attack. After inflicting those defeats on the Russians, Hitler again became confident that the Russians were on the verge of collapsing. Thus, once the initial breakthrough was achieved, the German offensive was conducted more like a pursuit of a routed enemy. The Russians managed to establish a defense line along the Don (which the Germans didn't really challenge) and in the rubble of Stalingrad itself. This is where the Germans started to make their big mistakes, based on Hitler's underestimation of remaining Russian strength, which really set them up for a big fall. The offensive was split into 2 directions (towards Stalingrad and into the Caucasus). Neither had the logistical backing to maintain a rapid rate of advance. They next insisted in fighting for Stalingrad street by street without completely cutting it off (the Russian held the opposite bank of the Volga and could get supplies across the river - albeit with some difficulty). This was a type of fighting that gave the Russians a chance - it was mobile warfare in the open steppes where the Germans held the big advantage. As German losses in the fighting for Stalingrad mounted, the Germans were forced to draw in more and more of their available forces, leaving only the Axis allies to hold the flanks (the Germans never managed to completely replace their losses from the previous winter either, which worsen the situation). At the same time, the Germans were advancing deeper into the Caucasus, on a logisitcal shoestring that denied them the ability to force and win a decisive battle. There were certainly German commanders who recognized the vunerable position they were in before the Russians attacked. However, Hitler insisted that the Russians would collapse if Germany just 'stayed the course' a little bit longer - and many of the commanders who had contradicted Hitler had been sacked the previous winter, so there weren't any volunteers to do the 'emperor's new clothes' routine this time.

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      • #4
        Originally posted by Irishman7 View Post
        ...
        Manstein should have done the honorable thing and ignored Hitler's order and launched an immediate breakout of the 6th Army after the initial Soviet offensive. Manstein owed it to his troops.
        As mentioned, von Manstein wasn't in command of the 6th Army - Paulus was. Von Manstein was only in command of the relief force being 'scraped' together. Thus, he was forced to coordinate with Paulus. The problem was, again, Hitler - this time his insistence that Stalingrad be held. The 6th Army couldn't both breakout AND hold Stalingrad at the same time - so although plans were made the breakout wasn't launched in time. Since the German forces were not powerful enough to 'defeat' the Russians in the area, the only reason to break-in/out would have been to evacuate Stalingrad anyway. That, plus Goring (of course) assured everyone that the Luftwaffe could adequately supply the forces inside the pocket through the winter (they never came close). So, the opportunity was lost and the German forces outside of the pocket had to fall back to try to hold some sort of defensive line, lest they too be surrounded.

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        • #5
          Stalingrad/Volgograd is not absolutely ordinary city. It lasts by a strip along the Volga's bending bank for about 80 km. And Volga in this place is pretty wide. To set a siege of this city looks like completely unreal.

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          • #6
            Originally posted by MrFirst View Post
            Stalingrad/Volgograd is not absolutely ordinary city. It lasts by a strip along the Volga's bending bank for about 80 km. And Volga in this place is pretty wide. To set a siege of this city looks like completely unreal.
            As with other urban areas that the Germans captured without so much difficulty (e.g. Kiev) the way to do it was to continue the offensive 'past' the city on either side so that it was completely isolated. Once reinforcements / supplies are effectively cut off, then the city can be captured without so much difficulty. This worked with a number of urban centres in the Soviet Union and there's no reason to believe it would not have worked in the case of Stalingrad as well, in spite of the 'uniqueness' of the city. However, the German plan did not involve crossing the Volga - that was the problem. In that case it was not really necessary to take the city. Once the local industry could be brought under artillery bombardment and rendered useless, the Russians could have been left in control of the 'rubble'. To try to capture it, street by street, in a 'frontal' assault while it could still be reinforced and resupplied was a huge mistake. Doubly so since it played into Russian strengths and German weaknesses, and set the Germans up for the decisive Russian counterattack.

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            • #7
              If it hadn't been for the attack on Pearl Harbor and Operation Barbarossa then the Axis forces could have met in India and have completely encircled the Soviet Union and cut off the Persian trade routes. The only thing that really would of stood in Germany's, Japan's, and Italy's way as well as the various other smaller allies like vichy france and Iran would of been Britian.

              Britian was doing a good job of duking it out with Germany, but seemed to be having trouble holding onto it's colonies to the east of India.

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              • #8
                Paulus had limited ability to break out. For weeks before the encirclement, his army was using up its fuel and ammunition as quickly as it could be delivered, and once cut off, he just didn't have the mobility or firepower to extricate much of his force. At best, he could have abandoned all his artillery, vehicles, and other heavy equipment, and escaped with half of his personnel.

                Paulus was arguably more effective for a longer period of time by digging in and standing a siege, than he could have been by attempting to withdraw. Paulus' army held out well and bought the Axis weeks in which to reassemble their broken front. Would it have been worth it for Paulus to escape, only perhaps to have Kleist cut off instead?

                Even Manstein initially wanted Paulus to stay put until Manstein could get through. At the time, Manstein was about as sanguine as Hitler when it came to the prospect of relieving Stalingrad.


                It's interesting how many times in WWII when one side or another thought their opponent closer to collapse than they really were:

                1. The Germans thought the Russians would collapse after their summer defeats in 1941, but instead the Russians rallied during the fall and winter.

                2. The Russians thought the Germans would collapse after Stalingrad, and so they kept pushing until they ran their neck into a noose at Kharkov. They also launched offensives elsewhere along the front, which mostly failed with heavy losses.

                3. The Western allies thought the Germans would collapse after Falaise, but instead the Germans rallied for another stand in the fall of 1944.

                In all cases, I read the same complaints:

                a) "It was the mud that stopped us, not the enemy!"

                b) "If the available supplies and reinforcements had been sent to" (insert commander's name and formation here) "then we would have made the final breakthrough and ended the war before" (insert name of soonest major holiday).

                c) "Our high command failed to properly exploit the opportunity because of" (select one: broad-front strategy/pursuit of economic objectives/political distrust of certain commanders).

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                • #9
                  Manstein had a beautiful offensive against the Russians at Kharkov...........Mainstein was totally against the Kursk battle plan drawn up by the General Staff in Berlin as he rightfully felt it was too obvious to the Soviets that Germany would attack the Kursk salient. After Kursk, the Germans lost all offensive capability. Mainstein should have been placed in charge of the Eastern Front in 1942 - 43 as he did a masterful job after Stalingrad keeping the Soviets off balance and losing battles.

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