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  • Lessons from JFK on power, diplomacy

    Lessons from JFK on power, diplomacy

    By Graham Allison | March 2, 2007

    THE USS JOHN F. KENNEDY docked in Boston yesterday for a final farewell before decommissioning. While in service, the aircraft carrier was frequently stationed in the Mediterranean, projecting American power in the tumultuous Middle East. The retirement of the warship calls forth memories of the man for whom the vessel was aptly named and his conception of the role of military might in US strategy abroad.

    Bogged down in Iraq, many Americans argue that our military hammer should be put back in the closet in favor of diplomacy. Bellicose rhetoric about Iran and the dispatch of a second aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf raise fears about repetition of the run-up to the Iraq war. Had President Kennedy lived to be an elderly statesman, what advice might he give his successor about our current showdown with Iran?

    Lesson One: In addressing nuclear dilemmas, military might and diplomacy are not distinct alternatives, but necessary complements. Kennedy believed that the use of military muscle should be a last resort. But he knew that projection of US power in ways that threatened potential use of force was an essential instrument of statesmanship. For JFK, force was the hand inside the glove of diplomacy. In the world's most dangerous show down, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy confronted a Soviet leader sneaking nuclear-tipped missiles into Cuba and demanded that they be withdrawn. The first instinct of American policymakers at the time was a preventive first strike to eliminate the missiles. Although the president assembled overwhelming military force to demonstrate vividly US determination, he also orchestrated a decision-making process that invented additional options short of war. In the end, presented with the right mix of carrots and sticks, Khrushchev withdrew the missiles without a shot being fired.

    In the deployment of the USS Stennis to the Persian Gulf, one can hear echoes of Kennedy's naval quarantine of Cuba. What has been missing so far, however, is the equivalent of the second half of JFK's successful strategy: imaginative diplomacy.


    Lesson Two: President Kennedy famously said, "Let us never negotiate outof fear. But let us never fear to negotiate." Vice President Dick Cheney articulated the Bush administration's neocon alternative: "We don't negotiate with evil, we defeat it." Following that principle, the Bush administration watched as North Korea added eight bombs of plutonium to its arsenal and conducted a nuclear test. Only then did the United States resort to diplomacy, enter serious negotiations, and reach last month's agreement. Let us hope that, on the Iranian front, the administration will soon make a similar about-face.

    Even when negotiation proves successful, as it did this month when North Korea agreed to freeze its plutonium production, true neoconservatives object. The architect of the Bush administration's nonproliferation strategy, former undersecretary of state John Bolton, condemned the recent agreement on the grounds that it "contradicts the fundamental premises of the president's policy he's been following for the past six years." The secretary of state should be applauded for that contradiction.

    Lesson Three: The perfect should not be the enemy of the good. Although his ultimate goal was to bury Communism, Kennedy knew that this was a long-term project. Success would require careful small steps that avoided confrontations that could lead to a nuclear war neither country would survive. President Kennedy thus initiated arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union that led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, an emergency hotline between Washington and Moscow, and, ultimately, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

    If there is to be a negotiated solution that stops Iran short of a nuclear bomb, the United States will be required to take uncomfortable steps. These will include offering Iran a security assurance if and when it gives up its nuclear weapons program. Despite valid concerns about the nature of the Islamic Republic, as Defense Secretary Robert Gates wrotein a 2004 publication entitled "Iran: Time for a New Approach," "Iran is not on the verge of another revolution . . . The durability of the Islamic Republic and the urgency of the concerns surrounding its policies mandate that the United States deal with the current regime rather than wait for it to fall."

    Kennedy would have approved.

    Lessons from JFK on power, diplomacy - The Boston Globe

    Graham Allison is director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and author of "Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe."
    Some interesting perspectives.

    Currently, it appears that having started on a bellicose note towards 'rogue' states, the present US Adminstration appears to be changing tack and in the bargain is undertaking a backflip.

    It appears befuddling as if the US Administration is second guessing if its original policy was right having faced a sea of failures and road blocks to what was originally felt to be a smooth ride without hiccups. It does appear to be a confused state of affairs, but who knows? There could be some incisive strategy that has not been spelt out.

    One is only left wondering if the world is to get into a greater mess or will it surface and breathe easy!


    "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

    I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

    HAKUNA MATATA

  • #2
    A more detailed comment on Iran.

    Iran anyone?

    By Diana West
    March 2, 2007

    Maybe it's impossible to feel nostalgia for what has never been, but that doesn't mean I don't find myself wishfully thinking about the Kerry administration that never was. That's because if we were just now into the third year of John Kerry's first presidential term, all of the horrible things going wrong in the world would make a lot more sense.

    For example, if, under President Kerry, the Director of National Intelligence announced that Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al Zawahri, were re-establishing al Qaeda training camps in Northwest Pakistan, the apparent lack of American action on such stunning news would seem okay -- well, not okay, but the inaction itself would be something we had long grown used to. It would come quite naturally, then, to rail at President Kerry for trying to take Osama bin Laden's picture via satellite, but not trying to take him out. It would come quite naturally to think: If only George W. Bush had won that second term.

    Instead, the former president would probably be living large on his Texas ranch. While Americans despaired over, say, President Kerry's latest immigration nightmare -- still-unsecured borders, pending amnesty for millions of illegal aliens, zealously prosecuted border agents -- W. would be playing host, down-home but dignified, to the occasional reunion with Bush-II-1 alumni. Maybe he would have learned to ride a horse by now, just to release a nice photo now and then of the rider on the range (very Reaganesque), something for conservatives to regard with political longing while suffering through Monsieur Kerry's latest presidential notion.

    And that notion surely would have included something as cockamamie as the "neighbors' meeting" on Iraq that was recently announced. This diplomatic potluck, calculated to seat jihad network "neighbors" Iran and Syria at the table alongside the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, the Arab League and, of course, Iraq, might easily have had "Kerry administration" written all over it. But it is, unhappily, a Bush administration initiative, a new riff on the defunct Bush Doctrine: "You're either for us, or you're against us -- we don't care which." What happened to the policy of not negotiating with terror-states like Iran? It's gone, apparently, replaced by a deadly confusion of cross-purposes. We want peace and stability in Iraq; Iran is already at war with us to destabilize Iraq and drive us from the region. We want Israel to live long and prosper; Iran supports Hezbollah and openly promises "to wipe Israel off the face of the map." As Andrew C. McCarthy, writing at National Review Online, put it, "There is no mutuality of interest." And when there is no mutuality of interest, there is nothing to talk about. With respect to Winston Churchill, "jaw jaw" is not always better than "war war." And I strongly doubt he would have approved of "jaw jaw" during "war war."

    There is an even greater problem with the premise of these negotiations. Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is someone whose concerns have far less to do with this world than the "next," whose rationale is shaped not by the consequences of economic sanctions or air raids, but rather by a Islamic vision of the apocalypse. Indeed, as the Hudson Institute's Laurent Murawiec has pointed out, Mr. Ahmadinejad, while mayor of Tehran, "insistently proposed that the main thoroughfares of Tehran should be widened so that, he explained, on the day of his reappearance, the Hidden Imam, Mohamed ibn Hassan, who went into the great occultation in 941 A.D., could tread spacious avenues." This not-so-trivial Ahmadinejad trivia came from a trenchant speech entitled "Deterring Those Who Are Already Dead?" in which Mr. Murawiec analyzed the jihadist mindset in thrall to violence, death and the afterlife. One conclusion: "Contemporary jihad is not a matter of politics at all (of 'occupation,' of 'grievances,' of colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism and Zionism), but a matter of Gnostic faith. Consequently, attempts at dealing with the problem politically will not even touch it."

    This, in Mr. Murawiec's analysis, neutralizes strategies of deterrence. It would also seem to upend any dangerously naive hopes for a level negotiating table in Baghdad. "Deterrence only works if the enemy is able and willing to enter the same calculus," Mr. Murawiec wrote. "If the enemy plays by other rules and calculates by other means" -- the triumph of Allah on earth, for instance -- "he will not be deterred."

    But he will come, it seems, to Baghdad to meet with... the Bush administration.
    Iran anyone? - Editorials/Op-Ed - The Washington Times, America's Newspaper
    Last edited by Ray; 03 Mar 07,, 19:02.


    "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

    I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

    HAKUNA MATATA

    Comment


    • #3
      And this is what Joschka Fischer has to say.

      Europe has a vital role to play in bringing Iran around

      By Joschka Fischer

      Commentary by
      Friday, March 02, 2007

      Washington is once again abuzz with talk of war, not only of the latest "strategy for victory" in Iraq, but now also of military action against Iran. The harder it becomes to discern any rationality in the Bush administration's actions, the louder the rumor mill grinds. Will President George W. Bush order an air and special forces attack on Iran?

      Ever since Bush's State of the Union address at the end of January, hardly a day has passed without something happening in connection with Iran or without the Bush administration ratcheting up its rhetoric. Clearly, the United States is also pressing ahead with preparations for an air strike. (A more extensive military commitment is scarcely possible, given how overstretched American ground forces already are.)

      Indeed, the confrontation with the Iranians in Iraq is visibly intensifying, and it may be gathering strength elsewhere as well. A bomb directed at the Iranian Revolutionary Guards recently exploded on Iran's border with Afghanistan. And there are, of course, new attempts by the US to drum up "evidence" of an Iranian threat that may justify an attack.

      Is this all a bluff? The world could perhaps calmly wait for an answer, but for the fact that the progress of Iran's nuclear program and the approaching end of Bush's term might create an incalculable dynamic of its own. As with Iraq, America's strength may be enough to start a war, but not to win it. But the consequences of a military adventure in Iran would far surpass those of the war in Iraq. Doing things by halves yet again in the Middle East would be the worst of all possible options - bad for the region and bad for its neighbors. The first among the neighbors affected would be Europe.

      So how has Europe, with its vital security interests at stake, responded to these developments? British Prime Minister Tony Blair has already adapted to the Bush administration's new confrontational rhetoric. French President Jacques Chirac unguardedly speculated that an Iran with one or two nuclear bombs might not pose a serious threat, given the possibility of nuclear retaliation. His musings so startled French officials that they quickly jumped in to correct the president's comments. German Chancellor Angela Merkel gives speeches at security conferences that find favor in America, but otherwise Germany prefers to stay in the background.

      Across Europe, risk avoidance seems to be the order of the day, even at the expense of the common interest and NATO solidarity. The German Navy is defending the Lebanese coast against Hizbullah, while other European nations bear the brunt of policing Lebanon on the ground. In Afghanistan, Germany, with its strong military presence in the north, has been turning a deaf ear to calls for help from the Canadian allies fighting a revived Taliban in the south. Germany now wants to send some Tornado jets for reconnaissance purposes - better than nothing, but not by much.

      In terms of security policy, Europe is stagnating, if not regressing, at the very moment when unity is needed more then ever. The "big three" of Europe - and Germany, as the current European Union president in particular - must find a way to act together in strategic security matters. If they don't, Europe will largely cease to matter when the going gets rough. And the going is now getting quite rough in Iran and the Gulf.
      The Daily Star - Lebanon - The Middle East's Leading English Language Newspaper

      Should Iran be attacked this year, the consequences will be borne first and foremost by the region, but also by Europe as the Middle East's immediate western neighbor; and they will be felt for a long time to come. Indeed, Europe will have to share the costs if Iran prevails and becomes a nuclear power. So there is much at stake for the old continent.

      To be precise, two overriding EU security interests are at stake: avoiding a war with Iran and preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power. These two apparently contradictory interests can be reconciled and translated into a common strategy by adopting a three-pronged approach based on efficient isolation, effective containment, and direct negotiations.

      The Europeans - led by Merkel, Blair, and Chirac - should agree to assure the US that Europe is ready to pay a high, perhaps very high, economic price by taking decisive action to intensify the sanctions against Iran. But they should offer this only on two strict preconditions: that the military option be taken off the table, and that all parties involved - including the US - enter into direct negotiations with Iran.

      The policy of isolation coupled with direct negotiations would be strengthened further by a common strategy toward Syria, aimed not at "regime change," but at "coalition change" - that is, drawing Syria away from its close alliance with Iran.

      It was both right and important that the EU Council of Foreign Ministers agreed on sanctions against Iran. Faced with the threat of financial sanctions, Iran's political elite is increasingly realizing the price of its confrontational course. It is imperative to further this process in a resolute manner, while at the same time rejecting military adventurism.

      It is up to Europe to prevent the two worst developments in Iran - war and nuclear armament - by acting jointly and with determination. Vital European and trans-Atlantic interests are at stake. It is thus Europe's responsibility - and especially Germany's, as the current EU president - to act now.

      Joschka Fischer was Germany's foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005. A leader in the Green Party for nearly 20 years, he is now a visiting professor at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School. THE DAILY STAR publishes this commentary in collaboration with

      Project Syndicate (www.project-syndicate.org).


      "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

      I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

      HAKUNA MATATA

      Comment


      • #4
        So, what is the way out?


        "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

        I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

        HAKUNA MATATA

        Comment

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