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Moves afoot to undermine Pakistan’s new envoy to US
By Khalid Hasan
WASHINGTON: On the eve of the new Pakistani ambassador Jehangir Karamat’s arrival here, attempts could be underway to limit his effectiveness by linking him with the AQ Khan affair.
According to New Republic, “Now it turns out that Pakistan’s new envoy to Washington may have sanctioned his proliferation ... Last February, following exposure of his black-market network, Khan told Pakistani investigators that he traded in nuclear technology with the full knowledge of top military officials, including Karamat, Karamat’s predecessor as army chief, and Musharraf, who succeeded Karamat in that post. Khan made the allegations in an eleven-page signed statement in which he confessed to selling atomic secrets beginning in 1988. A senior Pakistani military official told reporters in early February that Khan had named Karamat and retired general Mirza Aslam Beg, who headed Pakistan’s army from 1988 to 1991, as authorising the sales. According to the official, Khan’s statement accused Karamat and Beg of “indirectly instructing” him to make the transfers. The official said Khan told investigators he had acted on instructions Karamat and Beg passed through two middlemen - one a military adviser to former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the other a friend of Bhutto’s. The New Republic, a reputable publication, points out that Dr Khan remains to be “brought to justice,” contrary to President Bush’s claim. No sanctions have been placed on Pakistan; on the contrary, praise has been heaped on the Musharraf government for its “serious efforts” to “end the activities of a dangerous network.”
The report claims that in debriefings by investigators, Dr Khan reportedly asserted that Gen Karamat was included in the details of an arrangement in which Pakistan received help with its ballistic missile program in exchange for providing North Korea with uranium enrichment technology. “During his tenure as army chief of staff, Karamat held overall responsibility for Pakistan’s Ghauri mid-range missile programme. In December 1997, he reportedly made a secret trip to North Korea. Four months later, in April 1998, he officiated at the first successful test of the Ghauri, widely believed to be a rechristened North Korean Nodong missile. ‘What Khan is implying is that there was a quid pro quo and that Karamat was aware of what was going on,” says Gaurav Kampani, a senior (Indian) research associate at the Centre for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California. ‘(Khan) is suggesting that (Karamat) presided over the nuclear-for-missile transfer or actually signed off on it.’ Karamat insisted to The New Republic he did not travel to North Korea and was not aware of or involved in an exchange of missiles for nuclear technology,” New Republic reports.
The magazine says those who know Karamat describe him as a level-headed, sober individual. Stephen Cohen, director of the South Asia Project at the Brookings Institution where Karamat was a visiting fellow in 2000, says Karamat is one of the most “sensible” and “reflective” officers the Pakistani military has produced. “I have great respect for him,” Cohen said.
“He’s a very thoughtful guy … I think he’s a very decent person.” However, adds the report, “Cohen and other close observers of Pakistani affairs agree there may be substance to AQ Khan’s assertions. ‘There is no way Khan could have done what he did without at least the acquiescence of the Pakistani military establishment’ says Ashley Tellis, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who studies South Asia.”
The report adds, “Karamat is a case in point. Washington’s response to his nomination as ambassador has been muted. The general is expected to present his credentials to President Bush and take up his new post shortly. Asked to comment on AQ Khan’s allegations concerning Karamat, the State Department declined.”
The article argues that if Dr Khan is telling the truth, then the Bush administration needs to take a “good hard look” at those he implicated. Until there is a full investigation of the Khan affair, argues the journal, it will be impossible to know which of the scientist’s nuclear deals were approved by Pakistani officials, or even whether the nuclear network has been shut down.
By Khalid Hasan
WASHINGTON: On the eve of the new Pakistani ambassador Jehangir Karamat’s arrival here, attempts could be underway to limit his effectiveness by linking him with the AQ Khan affair.
According to New Republic, “Now it turns out that Pakistan’s new envoy to Washington may have sanctioned his proliferation ... Last February, following exposure of his black-market network, Khan told Pakistani investigators that he traded in nuclear technology with the full knowledge of top military officials, including Karamat, Karamat’s predecessor as army chief, and Musharraf, who succeeded Karamat in that post. Khan made the allegations in an eleven-page signed statement in which he confessed to selling atomic secrets beginning in 1988. A senior Pakistani military official told reporters in early February that Khan had named Karamat and retired general Mirza Aslam Beg, who headed Pakistan’s army from 1988 to 1991, as authorising the sales. According to the official, Khan’s statement accused Karamat and Beg of “indirectly instructing” him to make the transfers. The official said Khan told investigators he had acted on instructions Karamat and Beg passed through two middlemen - one a military adviser to former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the other a friend of Bhutto’s. The New Republic, a reputable publication, points out that Dr Khan remains to be “brought to justice,” contrary to President Bush’s claim. No sanctions have been placed on Pakistan; on the contrary, praise has been heaped on the Musharraf government for its “serious efforts” to “end the activities of a dangerous network.”
The report claims that in debriefings by investigators, Dr Khan reportedly asserted that Gen Karamat was included in the details of an arrangement in which Pakistan received help with its ballistic missile program in exchange for providing North Korea with uranium enrichment technology. “During his tenure as army chief of staff, Karamat held overall responsibility for Pakistan’s Ghauri mid-range missile programme. In December 1997, he reportedly made a secret trip to North Korea. Four months later, in April 1998, he officiated at the first successful test of the Ghauri, widely believed to be a rechristened North Korean Nodong missile. ‘What Khan is implying is that there was a quid pro quo and that Karamat was aware of what was going on,” says Gaurav Kampani, a senior (Indian) research associate at the Centre for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California. ‘(Khan) is suggesting that (Karamat) presided over the nuclear-for-missile transfer or actually signed off on it.’ Karamat insisted to The New Republic he did not travel to North Korea and was not aware of or involved in an exchange of missiles for nuclear technology,” New Republic reports.
The magazine says those who know Karamat describe him as a level-headed, sober individual. Stephen Cohen, director of the South Asia Project at the Brookings Institution where Karamat was a visiting fellow in 2000, says Karamat is one of the most “sensible” and “reflective” officers the Pakistani military has produced. “I have great respect for him,” Cohen said.
“He’s a very thoughtful guy … I think he’s a very decent person.” However, adds the report, “Cohen and other close observers of Pakistani affairs agree there may be substance to AQ Khan’s assertions. ‘There is no way Khan could have done what he did without at least the acquiescence of the Pakistani military establishment’ says Ashley Tellis, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who studies South Asia.”
The report adds, “Karamat is a case in point. Washington’s response to his nomination as ambassador has been muted. The general is expected to present his credentials to President Bush and take up his new post shortly. Asked to comment on AQ Khan’s allegations concerning Karamat, the State Department declined.”
The article argues that if Dr Khan is telling the truth, then the Bush administration needs to take a “good hard look” at those he implicated. Until there is a full investigation of the Khan affair, argues the journal, it will be impossible to know which of the scientist’s nuclear deals were approved by Pakistani officials, or even whether the nuclear network has been shut down.
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