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Nordic D-Day April 1944

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  • Nordic D-Day April 1944

    I've seen alot of alternate invasion strategies here, and the military members have weighed given their analysis given each sides capabilities at the time, their viability, logistical issues, etc.

    In this scenario, in April 1944, the British, Americans, and Canadians make landing and capture a port city on Norway's cost, perhaps Egensund or Stavanger, cutting German forces in Norway in two along a north-south line.

    The Soviets cut across Finland and make a long push south through Sweden, linking up with the Western Allies Allies at Helsingsborg or Malmo (sites of bridges connecting Sweden to Denmark today), and island hop to reach Jutland, pushing south while making additional landings near Lubeck and/or Kiel.

    How viable would have this strategy been given the Soviet and Western Allies capabilities in April 1944?

    A few factors I can think of early would would the length of transversing Sweden, German fortification of Norwegian ports, maintaining an element of surprise for ships traveling across the North Sea, and rough terrain for the Western Allies in Norway.
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  • #2
    Fuel would be an issue, I doubt they could have run a pipeline across the North Sea in those days, unlike the English Channel which is a whole lot shorter.
    Another would be the generally longer logistical tails, as well as the fact that Norway is really, intensely cold (there's a reason my great grandfather migrated to Australia).
    I think this could have worked alongside an invasion of Normandy, it would have tied up more of the Wermacht, eliminated the issues with Kreigsmarine raiders attacking convoys to Murmansk, and it would have allowed the Red Army and Western Allies to link up and potenitally cut off even more German troops in Scandanavia, as well as eliminating those pesky shipments of Swedish iron ore, although I think Sweden may have stopped helping the Nazis by this point. The Reds would also have then been able to deploy more troops to the Central and Southern Fronts, but this may not have come any sooner than it did in real life, after the Fins won the Lapland War and the Germans fell back to Norway.
    However there were absolutely no guarantees Overlord was going to succeed, so I guess SHAFE couldn't afford to risk anything on another amphibious invasion somewhere else, especially after Anzio went south. Even though the Wermacht in Norway was nothing spectacular, they still would have inflicted casualties, and in particular landing craft and amphibious warfare equipment would have been lost, and by this stage of the game, Overlord needed everything it could get.
    Maybe the more relevant 'what if' would be, "what if the UK and France had made even a vaguely co-ordinated effort to defend Norway in 1940, or even what if they had gone ahead with their plans and invaded the country first?"

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    • #3
      No USSR support. The Finns held thier own and Stalin wanted Gemrans off soviet soil fa rmore than he wanted Russian troops on Finnish soil. The Russian preparations for bagration are already under way in April of 44.

      Better than an allied attack into Norway in 44. Turn operation Torch into Operation Icicle. It offer the promise of allowing year round convoys to Russia. denial of weather data to Germany. Allied airbases in liberated Norway could strike across the Baltic sea (If Sweden could be brought in as a co-belligerent) at the German U-boat schools , the German Army Group North, and Finland. It also isolates Finland from German production, allows more air avenues into Gemrany for the bombing campaign (forcing the Luftwaffe even thinner) and cuts off the Norwegian iron supplies.

      It alos increases the drain created by the atlantic wall by turnign Denmark into a possible site of an Allied invasion.

      Becuase the US was never at war with Finland she might be able to get broker a peace and get Finland to switch sides.

      Combined these tantalizing prospects would totally unhinge Germanie swar effort in the east. becuase they would require Germany to shift even mor eassets east, The British 8th Army still has achance to liberate North Africa and take a limited offensive to Italy.

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      • #4
        Originally posted by zraver View Post
        No USSR support. The Finns held thier own and Stalin wanted Gemrans off soviet soil fa rmore than he wanted Russian troops on Finnish soil. The Russian preparations for bagration are already under way in April of 44.

        Better than an allied attack into Norway in 44. Turn operation Torch into Operation Icicle. It offer the promise of allowing year round convoys to Russia. denial of weather data to Germany. Allied airbases in liberated Norway could strike across the Baltic sea (If Sweden could be brought in as a co-belligerent) at the German U-boat schools , the German Army Group North, and Finland. It also isolates Finland from German production, allows more air avenues into Gemrany for the bombing campaign (forcing the Luftwaffe even thinner) and cuts off the Norwegian iron supplies.

        It alos increases the drain created by the atlantic wall by turnign Denmark into a possible site of an Allied invasion.

        Becuase the US was never at war with Finland she might be able to get broker a peace and get Finland to switch sides.

        Combined these tantalizing prospects would totally unhinge Germanie swar effort in the east. becuase they would require Germany to shift even mor eassets east, The British 8th Army still has achance to liberate North Africa and take a limited offensive to Italy.
        Interesting point, it's likely the Italian front would have been open to an attack with fewer troops than were used in Husky, as there would have been less German troops to help them, as well as the obvious point that many Italian soldiers preferred the Allies to the Axis.
        I guess I would have liked to see this if I were alive at the time, being part Norwegian and all, but hey, its all imaginary lines on a piece of paper at the end of the day.

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        • #5
          Not only less German troops, but the loss of Norwegian iron means lkess tanks, anti tank and anti aircraft guns, SS Nordland volunteers, plus hundreds of thousands more Red Army troops vs the Germans supplied by hundreds or thousands more freihgter loads of war material and allowing the USSR to sustain offnesive operations for longer periods of time.

          With fewer resources, more commitments and more pressure in the East there is less to put in France vs Overlord.

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          • #6
            I guess it just depends whether or not the Norwegian campaign could have been wrapped up quickly enough to get the war over as quick, or quicker than Overlord really did. Granted France probably would have fallen faster (depending on how the German commanders used their remaining resources, they did have a lot of C3 issues thanks to Hitler's interference) it still might have dragged the war out until 1946. I guess in the end its a matter of cost to benefit, the Allies might have taken fewer casualties if they'd followed this course of action, maybe Germany would have fallen apart faster upon invasion which would have saved a lot of the Marshall Plan's efforts, but the danger would be that such an action would simply slow down the timetable too much. I guess it might have been worth the gamble though, I would have strongly considered it.

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            • #7
              I think Churchill favoured a "Jupiter" operation against Norway.

              But the Germans maintained a substantial garrison in Norway all the way to the end of the war--indeed trapped there at the end of the war.

              I don't know the state of the fixed defenses, but the Germans had a lot of available men with several years in which to work. Does anyone know the extent of German fortification efforts in Norway?

              As for the April '44 plan, I think it would run into trouble in the spring thaw, there being very few all-weather roads in the region. It would also be hard to get and keep the sort of air superiority the Allies normally liked with their amphibious operations.

              At any rate the Germans in 1944 would have been much more numerous, better-equipped, and dug-in than the Norwegian and Allied troups they overcame so quickly in Norway in 1940. However, it is possible that the better troops (including a lot of Mountain units) would have long been rotated out of Norway, and replaced by low-quality static formations.


              One problem with "Torch into Icicle" is how do you launch that operation in November 1942? North Atlantic weather in winter is not conducive to air and amphibious operations. It would have to wait until early '43.

              A second problem is with general shipping tonnage, in a double sense.

              a) On the one hand, a whole bunch of Allied tonnage is tied up supplying the Commonwealth forces in Egypt. One major gain from clearing North Africa with "Torch" is to free a lot of that tonnage by re-opening the Mediterranean.

              b) On the other hand, a Scandinavian front would send a lot of Allied shipping in the opposite direction, increasing the burden on Allied merchant tonnage and convoy escorts at a time when they were already under a lot of strain.

              So I think that, like so many Allied alternatives, "Icicle" couldn't meet the all-important shipping question.
              Last edited by cape_royds; 23 Dec 06,, 04:25.

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              • #8
                The neat thing about Norway is you dont have to liberate it. Just cut it into thirds. The allies only the need north (For the convoys to Russia) and the south (To pressure Sweden, threaten Denmark, and the baltic. The trapped German garrison can be reduced at leisure.

                The requirements of allied shipping in the med are in aprt nessicitated by the war there. Knocking out Norway reduces Germany's warfighting options.

                The loss of Norwegian iron, finnish help, and reduce tonnag elosse sot the Luftwaffe marauder sin the north would offset this to a great degree.

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                • #9
                  zraver:

                  You're right about only needing a few key points in Norway.

                  Another thing I didn't think about was the economization of shipping caused by the loss of German air and submarine bases in Norway. That would offset the tonnage cost of the operation itself, and perhaps more than that.

                  However, I still don't see how the Allies could use much air power in Norway in the winter 1942/43. And that coast is favourable to submarine operations (esp. with mines) with bad weather keeping Allied air units grounded.

                  In other words, you wouldn't see the sort of unfettered air and naval control we enjoyed with the Mediterranean operations like Husky or Shingle. Landings in Norway would be a dicier affair, more reliant on the initiative and experience of the troops--things which weren't highly favourable to the Allies at that point. Finally, I would be reluctant to place any reliance on our ability to coordinate operationally with Soviet forces; that would make dealing with de Gaulle seem like a lighthearted romance.

                  Perhaps it was better to have the first major Anglo-American landings come against the Vichy French, and let our whole inter-Allied command and logistical system shake itself down under relatively easy circumstances.


                  There were significant gains from recovering control of French North and West Africa, e.g. the liquidation of at least one secondary front (rather than the creation of another), plus getting about seven or eight divisions of French, Moroccan, and Algerian troops available for frontline service.

                  And there was no easier time to grab Northwest Africa than in late '42. If the Germans had an opportunity to supplant the Vichy regime in a similar fashion to how they displaced the Italian government, the war in Africa may have dragged on a fair while, tying up a lot of Commonwealth resources. But in the event, their too-little, too-late effort to shore up Tunisia gave the Allies an unexpected bag of prisoners.

                  One last note: the iron mines were in Sweden, and except for the few months of the year when the Baltic was iced up, the Germans didn't need the port of Narvik to get that ore. The only way to cut the iron supply entirely would be to invade Sweden overland. Logistically, that would not be a tough and risky operation unless Sweden became an active co-belligerent. But they had no enthusiasm whatsoever for doing so, and even less given that the "Icicle" proposal would inevitably see a strong Soviet presence in Scandinavia.
                  Last edited by cape_royds; 23 Dec 06,, 20:31.

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                  • #10
                    Is Norway doable in November 42 despite the risks?

                    Germany is driving on the caucus oil feilds threatening the Persian supply route. Japan is maruading in the Indian Ocean and Axis airpower is still dominant in the med.

                    if Norway can be librated the Archangle convoys are safe and Russia can be supplied year round even if the caucaus region falls. Findland can be forced out ending the seige of Lenningrad and if Sweden can be talked into at least stoping trade with Germany the German war effort will be crippled. The Tirpitz threat can be removed, a large bag of German prisoners can be had (or atleast isolate a big German army)

                    The tonnage saved by not having to use the long route to Persia and ships not sunk by the luftwaffe allows more to be devouted for other purposes.

                    And strechting out the atlantic wall and area that needs to be defended from air attack weakens Germany for the upcoming invasion (44) and strategic bombing campaign.

                    if it suceeds Torch can still go off by the late spring early summer of 43 to distract Hitler from any Zitedel type operation.

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                    • #11
                      Good stuff, zraver. I see more of the upside now.

                      The loss of German air and submarine bases in Norway would have saved a good deal of shipping, and freed escorts to reinforce the main Atlantic runs.

                      But I wonder how much more tonnage the Russians could have funneled down from Archangel and Murmansk. Of course, being able to make midsummer runs would be a pure gain. But there might have been a bottleneck with their railroads, limiting the overall annual gains from that supply route even if it were made safe.

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                      • #12
                        The Archangle-Moscow line had more excess capacity than the Ural lines wich besides the lend lease also had Russia's own production to carry. During the winter darkness the Archangle run was preffered beucase you could ship more: vessel turn around times, less travel distance via rail better ports ect, less risk from marauding subs in the south atlantic and Indian ocean etc.

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