US troop movement

[berkut]

I read an article today about 5 US soldiers dying in Iraq when their M113 hit a mine. This suggested a topic for my first post here.
I have followed the war in Chechnya very closely as described by actual participants. One thing that I noticed when watching some video clips from Iraq is the striking difference about tactics employed for troop movement.
Russia has learned a gread deal about fighting guerilla warfare from Afghanistan and Chechnya. One of the first lessons was that the vehicles designed for the battlefields of Europe were sometimes useless for these types of campaigns. To make it short, it was soon realized that a soldier had a far better chance of survival when riding atop their vehicles as opposed to being inside as they were originaly trained. Even after taking into consideration the possibility of sniper attacks it was much safer not to be inside a tin death trap. If a vehicle hits a good landmine there's almost 100% certainty that all that will be left of its occupants inside is unrecognizable fragments smithered over the walls. On the contrary, soldiers that were on top usualy end up thrown off with a concussion and a few broken bones. Also in the event of a convoy being ambushed the thin armor of an APC (much less a HMV) will not be able to stop an RPG round. THe result will still be fatal for the occupants inside the conpartment.
I have seen several report that were made by US tacticians where they analyzed Russian experience in Chechnya and their tactics. The question then arises why does US is not willing to change the tactics that were designed for a complitely different warfare?

[Officer of Engineers]

I read an article today about 5 US soldiers dying in Iraq when their M113 hit a mine. This suggested a topic for my first post here.
I have followed the war in Chechnya very closely as described by actual participants. One thing that I noticed when watching some video clips from Iraq is the striking difference about tactics employed for troop movement.
Russia has learned a gread deal about fighting guerilla warfare from Afghanistan and Chechnya. One of the first lessons was that the vehicles designed for the battlefields of Europe were sometimes useless for these types of campaigns. To make it short, it was soon realized that a soldier had a far better chance of survival when riding atop their vehicles as opposed to being inside as they were originaly trained. Even after taking into consideration the possibility of sniper attacks it was much safer not to be inside a tin death trap. If a vehicle hits a good landmine there's almost 100% certainty that all that will be left of its occupants inside is unrecognizable fragments smithered over the walls. On the contrary, soldiers that were on top usualy end up thrown off with a concussion and a few broken bones. Also in the event of a convoy being ambushed the thin armor of an APC (much less a HMV) will not be able to stop an RPG round. THe result will still be fatal for the occupants inside the conpartment.
I have seen several report that were made by US tacticians where they analyzed Russian experience in Chechnya and their tactics. The question then arises why does US is not willing to change the tactics that were designed for a complitely different warfare?

The US does dismount but at point of contact.

[berkut]

The US does dismount but at point of contact.

As you might have noticed partisan war in Iraq is gaining momentum. Guerilla warfare favors mines and other improvised explosive devices over direct confrontation. As such the real danger is present while the convoy is in motion. Thats why soldiers riding inside the APCs are doomed when a powerful charge is detonated under their vehicle. Muslim guerillas are actually briliant at mining roads and booby traps. They often manage to outwit even the most well equipped combat ingineers. I dont know how much the rest of the muslim world cares about Iraq but if they will deside to concentrate their experts there, the losses will increase dramatically.

[Officer of Engineers]

As you might have noticed partisan war in Iraq is gaining momentum. Guerilla warfare favors mines and other improvised explosive devices over direct confrontation. As such the real danger is present while the convoy is in motion. Thats why soldiers riding inside the APCs are doomed when a powerful charge is detonated under their vehicle. Muslim guerillas are actually briliant at mining roads and booby traps. They often manage to outwit even the most well equipped combat ingineers. I dont know how much the rest of the muslim world cares about Iraq but if they will deside to concentrate their experts there, the losses will increase dramatically.

VERY DIFFERENT OPPENANTS AND TERRAIN.

Chechnya is muddy roads and many Chechens were formed Army or were trained by the very same Army vets who were in Afghanistan. They have extensive expereince in both IED and UEO.

Fallujah is concrete. Cannot dig into concrete and cannot bury a mine at least not without visibility issues. There are also too many ways (at least 4 in any standard city block) to approach for any defender to effectively position IEDs.

Sorry, you're actually talking to a combat engineer who faced Muslims in Yugoslavia. I was not impressed.

[berkut]

VERY DIFFERENT OPPENANTS AND TERRAIN.

Chechnya is muddy roads and many Chechens were formed Army or were trained by the very same Army vets who were in Afghanistan. They have extensive expereince in both IED and UEO.

Fallujah is concrete. Cannot dig into concrete and cannot bury a mine at least not without visibility issues. There are also too many ways (at least 4 in any standard city block) to approach for any defender to effectively position IEDs.

Sorry, you're actually talking to a combat engineer who faced Muslims in Yugoslavia. I was not impressed.

First I want to say that I'm not challenging your experience in Yugoslavia, but as you said yourself a lot depends on the profficiency and training level of those involved. Thats is why I mentioned that if Muslim world does send in its proffesionals it would get ugly.
Regarding the 4 ways into a city block... Their intentions are not to prevent an attack or destroy some particular unit, but simply inflict human casualties and an attack on morale. It doesn't matter what, who, or when it goes off as long as it sends coffins home and makes statistics, and crying mothers.
I'm sure that streets of a typical Iraqui town are a far cry from the "main" street in your local town in terms of pavement. And the fact that these 5 soldiers died along with many others as a result of landmine is an undesputable argument of certain skill of guerillas and road conditions in Iraq.

[Officer of Engineers]

First I want to say that I'm not challenging your experience in Yugoslavia, but as you said yourself a lot depends on the profficiency and training level of those involved. Thats is why I mentioned that if Muslim world does send in its proffesionals it would get ugly.
Regarding the 4 ways into a city block... Their intentions are not to prevent an attack or destroy some particular unit, but simply inflict human casualties and an attack on morale. It doesn't matter what, who, or when it goes off as long as it sends coffins home and makes statistics, and crying mothers.
I'm sure that streets of a typical Iraqui town are a far cry from the "main" street in your local town in terms of pavement. And the fact that these 5 soldiers died along with many others as a result of landmine is an undesputable argument of certain skill of guerillas and road conditions in Iraq.

As I stated, not impressed. There are several factors here.

1) The lazy nature of some Russian units doing their patrols and transport - ie predictable schedules on the same route without any recee action.

2) The time and space needed to set up minestrike ambushes which includes remote detonation

3) The possibility of collateral or even friendly casualties

The point is that Chechnya is a complete warzone without regard to friendly or hostile casualties. The Chechen rebels have no disregard about inflicting friendly casualties and thus can take their time and effort to plan and execute properly.

These conditions rarely exists in Iraq. The insurgents are fighting within city neighbourhoods, often their very own. They have to take extreme care not to hurt their own, especially their own women and children.

In order for an IED and/or minestrikes to work, you HAVE to know where and when the enemy is coming. Unless you have the resources to cover and man all approaches (to prevent children from pre-mature detonation and unanticipated and very unwanted green-on-green casualties), you have to make a guess and plant your resources in limited fashion which means you're counting on luck.

Combat engineering is a dedicated branch. You can do a hell of alot of work and alot of time just to kill one or two people. The suicide bombings in Israel will give you an idea how much work is involved and they're killing civilians. This being said, we are a warfare branch, meaning that we act in a combined arms scenario to fight wars and to kill armies. If professionals do come in, they'll kill people in 1s and 2s but they would be dead within minutes when the full might of a very angry arm'd coy is on them.

[berkut]

Let me give you one example of a tactic that dates back to the Afghanistan war.

Anti tank improvised mine. A few kilos of explosives are burried under a country road in a rural area. The detonation mechanism consists of a simple AA batery and an electric igniter. Two thin wires go to the surface and are connected to two small metal random objects (coins, nails, shrapnel, whatever). This mechanism will not be detected by any metal detector and will not be activated by any regular vehicle. However when a tracked APC or a tank pass over it, the tracks will short the contacts and detonate the device.

In the first Chechen campaign the rebels also favored remote detonation. Transmitters with ranges of several kilometers allowed the ambusher to observe the location from a safe place and detonate the device exactly when they want. During the second campaign jammers were introduced for Russian troops that either blocked those signals or prematurely detonated the devices. So far I have not heard of a similar device being a standard issue in the US army in Iraq.
Both of the above methods do not endanger the attacker in any way, with the exception of a short time it takes to plant the device.

I dont understand why you assume that all of the mining in Iraq takes place in cities, unless theres absolutely no military traffic between the populated areas (which is impossible). Also I hardly believe that every town and village in Iraq has paved streets.
As far as "laziness of Russian troops" that is a unproffessional statement at best. Even the greenest grunt understands the relationship between carelessness and coming home as a bunch of meet dumplings in a box. Hm, may be thats why it took Russian convoys in Afghanistan several days to cover a distance of just a couple of dozen miles when all armor snail paced behind recon and engineers on foot that probed every inch of ground with rods, mine detectors, and dogs. One particular engineer's head was prized at over $30,000 by the rebels because he knew his job well.

[Officer of Engineers]

Let me give you one example of a tactic that dates back to the Afghanistan war.

Anti tank improvised mine. A few kilos of explosives are burried under a country road in a rural area. The detonation mechanism consists of a simple AA batery and an electric igniter. Two thin wires go to the surface and are connected to two small metal random objects (coins, nails, shrapnel, whatever). This mechanism will not be detected by any metal detector and will not be activated by any regular vehicle. However when a tracked APC or a tank pass over it, the tracks will short the contacts and detonate the device.

In the first Chechen campaign the rebels also favored remote detonation. Transmitters with ranges of several kilometers allowed the ambusher to observe the location from a safe place and detonate the device exactly when they want. During the second campaign jammers were introduced for Russian troops that either blocked those signals or prematurely detonated the devices. So far I have not heard of a similar device being a standard issue in the US army in Iraq.
Both of the above methods do not endanger the attacker in any way, with the exception of a short time it takes to plant the device.

I dont understand why you assume that all of the mining in Iraq takes place in cities, unless theres absolutely no military traffic between the populated areas (which is impossible). Also I hardly believe that every town and village in Iraq has paved streets.
As far as "laziness of Russian troops" that is a unproffessional statement at best. Even the greenest grunt understands the relationship between carelessness and coming home as a bunch of meet dumplings in a box. Hm, may be thats why it took Russian convoys in Afghanistan several days to cover a distance of just a couple of dozen miles when all armor snail paced behind recon and engineers on foot that probed every inch of ground with rods, mine detectors, and dogs. One particular engineer's head was prized at over $30,000 by the rebels because he knew his job well.

Well, first off, I stated SOME Russian units, not all. The Russian Army's performance is uneven at best with some well trained, well disciplined troops doing their damdest and some who can't wait to get the hell out of there. Proper recee was not done in alot of cases. Also, combat is 99% sheer boredom and 1% sheer terror. It's the boredom that gets to you. If you done this patrol at the same time on the same road every day of the week for over 8 months, you tend to let the little things slide just so that you get home to that beer that much quicker. That's when things get messy. Well trained, well disciplined troops know enough to get out of theatre after 6 months in order to stay fresh (one of the problems in Iraq right now).

Also, engr recee is not breaching nor clearance. It's to detect possible sites and minestrike points. Recee are scouts who are supposed to find these things and if necessary, engage them. Conovy routes and departure times are classified info or on roads with constant traffic that would be impossible for any clandestine operation. Thus, unless you're very lucky in guessing the right route and the right time (or have extremely good intel), the chances of a successful minestrike are very slim.

Lastly, the Americans are beginning to get lazy. The stress is getting to them as shown by what happenned to 800th MP Bde. They're still using military convoys but the stress involved would soon force them to switch over to civilian suppliers as the troops must be rotated home. I expect that's the time when the heavy strikes would begin.

Again, the main point about using the Iraq cities is that is where the insurgents' resources are. They have not established outposts nor depots from which to strike forth. There is one major advantage the Chechens enjoy that any desert based Iraqi insurgent would not is water. Fighting in the desert means the control of water.

[Bill]

"So far I have not heard of a similar device being a standard issue in the US army in Iraq."

We have those.

A simple mineplow on the lead tank in a column will also take out any IEDs or mines the column will be threatened by anyway.

[berkut]

"So far I have not heard of a similar device being a standard issue in the US army in Iraq."

We have those.

A simple mineplow on the lead tank in a column will also take out any IEDs or mines the column will be threatened by anyway.

I suggest you read about experiences of Russian convoys in Afghanistan. Things have become a lot more complicated since WW2.

FOr one example: they put the detonator about 10 feet down the road from the actual charge. Your minetrail mounted on a tank goes over the burried charge (does nothing) then strikes the detonator/triggger and the charge goes off right undet the tank.

Other things include tiny thin wires, which a basically invisible, stretched at such a hight that they touch tank/APC/jeep long communications antenna which shorts them and detonates the charge under a vehicle. THese work best at night.

Even simpler is to use an Italian anti-tank mines that were in great abundance in Afghan. It has air pressure activated detonator and it is unpredictable when it will go off. i.e 1, 2, 3,4, vehicles roll over it and then it blows up under the 5th, or may be 2nd.

Also how many minetrails are you gonna bring with you? After one anti-tank mine it will be destroyed.


I'm not even gonna go into other creative things like directed charges mounted into a wall or even a tree.

These are actual experiences...........not taught in a field manual

Best thing there is: an experienced engineer with a pike and a dog.

[Bill]

I didn't serve in WWII, i'm nowhere near that old.

If the IED is buried close to the surface it will be disrupted by the blade of the tank and will explode in a harmless direction when it detonates. Even if it's under the tank it will probably not have the desired effect.

A attended US Army JOTC, i know a thing or two about IEDs my friend, believe me.

[berkut]

I didn't serve in WWII, i'm nowhere near that old.

If the IED is buried close to the surface it will be disrupted by the blade of the tank and will explode in a harmless direction when it detonates. Even if it's under the tank it will probably not have the desired effect.

A attended US Army JOTC, i know a thing or two about IEDs my friend, believe me.

In that case I can hardly picture a tank trying to plow a road....
I'm not an outsider to farming equipment and I can definately say that trying to plow a road that has been used for centuries and is harder than concrete in some places becasue of that is impossible.
If you are talking about plowing the so called "virgin soil" it might be a luxury reserved mainly to the desert. ALso only for large and important columns, since it would take forever to complete one leg of the way. Military traffic is usually non-stop.

I have not heard this method to be implemented anywhere besides mine-fields. I know that it was impossible in Afghan and Chechnya.

[Officer of Engineers]

In that case I can hardly picture a tank trying to plow a road....
I'm not an outsider to farming equipment and I can definately say that trying to plow a road that has been used for centuries and is harder than concrete in some places becasue of that is impossible.
If you are talking about plowing the so called "virgin soil" it might be a luxury reserved mainly to the desert. ALso only for large and important columns, since it would take forever to complete one leg of the way. Military traffic is usually non-stop.

I have not heard this method to be implemented anywhere besides mine-fields. I know that it was impossible in Afghan and Chechnya.

WE HAVE READ ABOUT IT!

Conflict in Afghanistan and Central Asia

And you are all wrong.

[berkut]

WE HAVE READ ABOUT IT!

Conflict in Afghanistan and Central Asia

And you are all wrong.

The conclusions drawn are rediculous. The author shows complete lack of understanding of certain aspects of Russian army.

Example: " In this report, the commander is taken to task for not carefully supervising the preparation of his troops for the march. Part of this criticism is based on lack of trust of subordinates and the lack of a Soviet professional NCO corps. The commander is expected to personally conduct all training. In armies with a professional NCO corps, such training and preparation is done by trained, seasoned sergeants who understand the unit missions and train their forces to meet them. The commander checks his sergeants, but does not have to get involved in training to the extent that his Soviet counterpart had to. This leaves more time for carefully planning the action. The Soviet system overburdened the company grade officers and limited individual training opportunities."

First off: there ARE separate training military institutions that specificaly train NCO.
Second and most important: The author as most westerners fails to realize the huge difference in higherarchy and training between Russia and US.
Military service in Russia is mandatory and each soldier serves two years in the army. THe inroduction of new recruits is specifically adjusted such that they do not exceed 1/4 of experienced soldiers in a regiment. When they come in they have only been serving for 6 months and have passed basic training and special adjustment camps that physicaly prepared them for Afghan in terms of climate, decease immunity, food, physical endurance, etc. When they were "delivered" to their new regiments, each soldier was attached to a "veteran" who had absolute authority over them and was responisble for their further specific training. After several more month they were finaly allowed to participate in raids and other combat realted operations. At that point they always followed their "superwiser" like a shadow that further taught them every little useful trick from why you should NOT dring water to when it is better to chock an enemy as opposed to slicing his trhoat.
So in fact they had a "personal trainer" who was oftentimes brutal but a lot more effective. THe knowledge was passed down by generations of soldiers and constantly enriched by personal experience.
The first years the 40th army was clueless but after a few years in gained a great deal of experience and became a lot more effective in many parts thanks to the unofficial higherarchy in the army.

[Officer of Engineers]

First of all, which report are you referring to. There's over 50 there.

Second, you've said the exact same thing your quote said.