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View Full Version : Carrier killers (an article from JED online)



lurker
01 Mar 04,, 01:29
I think this one will be interesting to the public, since not everrybody have an access to JED.

Carrier Killers

The Cold War required the Soviet Union to compete with the US on the high seas. Never being a naval power, the Soviets had to find a way to bypass US dominance in blue waters. The answer was the submarine and the guided missile. As the aircraft-carrier battlegroup is a symbol of US naval power, the missile-armed submarine became a symbol of Soviet naval power. Russia continues in this line, hoping to restore some of its former glory.

After WWII, it was obvious that reaching naval parity with the US Navy was too difficult a task for the Soviet Navy. But new weapons and technology would provide adequate capabilities. Therefore, three parallel anti-ship missile programs started in 1947: Kometa (AS-1), air launched; Shchuka, sea launched; and Shtorm, shore launched. In February 1953, only the first of these missiles was accepted to service, while the other programs were terminated due to the lack of satisfactory results. Further analyses revealed that treating the missile as a pilotless airframe was the wrong approach to the problem. As a result, since early 1954, all missile programs in the Soviet Union and then Russia have been led by the guidance-system design facility, not by the missile-design facility.

In 1955 the Shchuka program was restored under the codename "KSShch" and led by the guidance-system designer. The missile was actually fielded in moderate numbers on Kildin- (56EM/M) and Krupny-class destroyers. It was a complete failure, though. Designed as a long-range attack system with a theoretical range of 185 km, the operational range was limited to only 30-35 km by its poor guidance system. The missile was radio-command guided to the target, which was observed by the destroyer's radar. The KSShch-B version with active-radar guidance and target designation by Ka-15RC helicopter was never fielded, since the radar and targeting equipment were too heavy to be carried by a light shipboard helicopter. The whole system was withdrawn in the mid-1960s. All the later anti-carrier missiles were developed by OKB-52 (NPO Mashinostroyenia since 1983) in Reutovo near Moscow. The organization was lead by the famous Valdimir N. Chelomey until his death in 1984 and then by Gerberd A. Efremov. The OKB-52/NPO Mashinostroyenia also developed some Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

Get the Carrier: P-6/P-35 Progress (SS-N-3 Shaddock, Sepal)

The first priority of the Soviet Navy was to defend coastal areas to provide security for land operations. The second task of the Red Fleet was to disrupt US/NATO shipping across the Atlantic and in European waters. In the early 1950s, it became clear that the aircraft-carrier battlegroup represented the most significant threat to the Soviet Navy. Carrier battlegroups could hamper any Soviet naval operations, defensive or offensive.

To fight the carrier battlegroup, it was decided in August 1956 that a long-range anti-ship cruise missile would be developed. The basis for it was to be the P-5 Progress (4K95; SS-N-3A Shaddock) supersonic land-attack cruise missile with a range of 500 km. The P-5 had inertial autonomous guidance, and the modernized P-5D version had Doppler radar mid-course correction. The missile, developed by OKB-52 (presently NPO Mashinostroyenia) in Moscow, had a solid-propellant booster and an air-breathing turbojet sustainer. The missile's wings unfolded after launch, which reduced the size of the launch container.

From the outset, two versions of the missile were developed: the surface-ship-based P-35 (SS-N-3B Sepal) and the submarine-based P-6 (SS-N-3C Shaddock). For both, a guidance system was developed with INS/Doppler for the mid-course phase and an active-radar seeker for the terminal phase. The first (land) tests began in October 1959 for the P-6 and the following December for the P-35. During the years 1963-68, eight surface ships were equipped with P-35 missiles: four Kynda-class cruisers with two four-tube SM-70 launchers and four Kresta I-class large frigates with two twin-tube KT-35 launchers. From 1963 to 1968, 16 Juliet-class diesel submarines were also fielded, with each submarine carrying four launch tubes and the same number of P-6 missiles. In 1966 it was also decided that the P-5 land-attack cruise missiles that armed five Echo I-class nuclear submarines would be withdrawn from service, with the subs being converted into torpedo-armed attack submarines. Between 1963 and 1966, 16 Echo II-class nuclear submarines were built for the Northern Fleet and 13 for the Pacific Fleet, all of which were armed with P-6 anti-ship missiles. Each Echo II sub carried six launch tubes and the same number of missiles.

The P-6 and P-35 missiles, which differ only in minor ways, were fitted with the same guidance system and warhead. The latter could be either a 800-kg high explosive (HE) or a 100-kT-yield (approximately) nuclear weapon. After launch, the missile climbed to a high altitude, accelerated to Mach 1.5, and started searching the front area with its radar seeker. The resulting picture was transmitted to the launching ship via a TV channel. When a target was acquired, the operator on the ship verified whether it was the desired target (e.g., the aircraft carrier in the group). If so, the operator designated it as such and turned the missile's seeker on automatic-track mode. Thereafter, the missile descended to low altitude, remaining at supersonic speed. The missile was intended to hit the water 10-20 m before the target and dive to detonate underwater to increase damage. The range of the missile was 300-350 km.

The P-6/P-35 Progress missiles gave the Soviet Navy long-range anti-ship capabilities for the first time. Prior to that, only Tu-16KS maritime bombers, armed with K-10 anti-ship cruise missiles, had such reach. Nevertheless, the whole system was cumbersome and full of shortcomings. A single salvo took 8-12 minutes to reach the target, depending on range. Then it took 4-6 minutes to prepare for the the next salvo, followed by another 8-12 minutes of flight. Thus, the whole missile-launch sequence for six missiles from a nuclear submarine, or eight from a cruiser, took 20-30 minutes. Meanwhile, the attack force, consisting of surface ships or submarines (which had to remain surfaced), was exposed to enemy counterattacks. Moreover, only three or four ships, launching no more than 12 missiles between them, could operate at the same time against a given carrier battlegroup due to the number of radar and datalink channels available. It was determined that two to four hits with nuclear-armed missiles would be enough to disable the entire carrier battlegroup. The situation was different in the case of conventional warheads, and Soviet commanders knew that, in this case, the task was unachievable.

However, even this thin threat led the US Navy to seek a fighter capable of engaging multiple aircraft and cruise missiles at long range. As there was no time to conduct traditional intercept (a F-4 Phantom armed with AIM-7 Sparrow missiles was inadequate for this task), the AN/AWG-9 fire-control system and AIM-54 Phoenix missile systems were developed, initially for the the F-111B and then for the F-14A Tomcat. Teams of E-2B Hawkeyes and F-14s working together could provide early warning of cruise-missile launches. A single F-14 could engage six targets simultaneously with AIM-54A missiles. The E-2 and F-14 tandem became a nightmare for Soviet long-range reconnaissance and missile-carrying aircraft for years to come, and the danger was also appreciated by submarine commanders, who understood that many of their cruise missiles had little chance of reaching the target.

In the early years, the biggest problem was targeting. To find and track an carrier group on the ocean was an extremely difficult task. The answer was found in the use of signals- intelligence (SIGINT) and radar- reconnaissance aircraft, typified by the Tu-16RM Badger D and Tu-95RC Bear D, respectively. The Badger D SIGINT aircraft would pick up radar and radio signals emitted by a carrier group and direct a Bear D, equipped with a long-range sea-search radar. Both aircraft cooperated but operated independently. There was no need for SIGINT aircraft to approach the deadly zone around the carrier, and when the radar track was established, the SIGINT aircraft would search other areas.

The MRSC-1 Uspekh system was developed specifically for target acquisition and designation for anti-ship missiles. It consisted of a Tu-95RC Bear D with its radar and a data-exchange system with aircraft and ship interfaces. Echo II submarines used the Argument fire-control system for presetting a missile's INS and for data exchange with the missile in flight. The whole system was fielded the in latter half of the 1960s. Two new systems were developed in the early 1970s. First was the more capable Uspekh-U, which was based on a modernized Tu-95RC aircraft. The other became the primary targeting means of the Soviet - and presently the Russian - Navy. This was the MKRC Legenda space-based system, operational in 1979, the main element of which is radar-equipped 17F16 satellites that use onboard miniature nuclear reactors for power. Again, the system consisted of both SIGINT- and radar-equipped components, but in this case they were satellites. The Legenda system did not replace the Uspekh-U, which also remains in service, but provides greater coverage and flexibility. The deployment of both systems solved the problem of targeting for cruise-missile-armed units, both surface warships and submarines. The latter, equipped with the Kasatka (and later-model) receiving equipment, are able to receive basic targeting information from the Legenda reconnaissance system, even when submerged. This feature greatly improved submarine survivability.

P-70 Ametist (SS-N-7) and P-120 Malakhit (SS-N-9)

The development of an anti-ship missile system for underwater launch was initiated in April 1959, and the OKB-52 Design Bureau, led by Vladimir Chelomey, was appointed to the task. At the same time, development of the first submarine to be armed with the new system, the Papa class, also started in 1959. The submarine was nuclear powered and armed with 10 launchers for P-70 missiles.

The P-70 Ametist (SS-N-7, 4K66) had a small delta wing and was powered by a solid-propellant sustainer. It was also provided with four small boosters that worked underwater. It had a programmable INS guidance system and an analog radar seeker with some anti-jamming capabilities. The missile itself had a very small frontal radar cross-section. The missile could be launched from depths of up to 30 m. It flew to the target at an altitude of 40-60 m using a radar altimeter at a high subsonic speed. Maximum range of the missile was 70-80 km when the target was designated from a third source, or about 50 km when the target was detected by the launching sub's powerful MGK-300 Rubin digital sonar. The missile had a 1,000-kg conventional warhead or a 200-kT-yield nuclear one. The first underwater launch of a 4K66 Ametist missile from a special stand occurred in June 1961. From July to December of 1964, the missile was tested on a modified Whisky-class experimental submarine. The missile was accepted to service in June 1968.

The construction of K-162, the first Papa-class boat, began in 1962 and continued through 1969. The long construction period was a result of the use of many revolutionary systems at the same time: a titanium hull, a modern nuclear reactor, and a lot of digital and analog- digital electronic equipment. Due to the enormous costs, the navy called the ship "Golden Fish." During trials, the submarine's performance was excellent. For example, the underwater speed was 42 knots, and in 1971 the ship established a still-unbeaten underwater speed record of 44.7 knots. The tactics of attack required a quiet approach to the target as long as possible and missile launch from maximum range. Escape maneuvers were then to be performed at maximum speed.

K-162, however, was to be a one-of-a-kind ship, since it was too expensive and complicated. Instead, from 1967 to 1973, eleven Charlie I-class submarines were built with more conventional equipment. The MGK-100 Kerch analog passive sonar had a range of 30-35 km. Each submarine was armed with eight launchers (small silos) for the P-70 system. The Brest analog fire-control system had interfaces to the Legenda and Uspekh systems. Most of the Charlie Is served with the 11th Division of the 1st Flotilla of the Northern Fleet, while some formed the 10th Division of the 2nd Flotilla of the Pacific Fleet. All of these submarines were withdrawn from service by 1993.

From very beginning, it was obvious that the P-70 Ametist system would have little chance of successfully engaging a target. The main limitation came from the relatively short range of the launching sub's sonar. Even when the target's position was known before approaching the group, sonar contact (in passive mode) was desired to update the location of moving targets. Therefore, in February 1963, the decision was made to develop a longer-range missile, while work on new, long range sonars was underway. In the mid-1970s, the Charlie I class was equipped with the digital, long-range (150-200 km) MGK-300 Rubin sonar and, in the late 1970s, with the even more capable MGK-400 Rubikon sonar with a range of over 200 km. The foundation for a longer-range, underwater-launched missile has been laid.

Soviet planners determined that approaching a US carrier group closer than 100 km was suicide for a submarine, so a minimum range requirement of 120 km was set. The new P-120 Malakhit (SS-N-9 Siren) missile was also developed by the Chelomey-led CKBM Design Bureau (presently NPO Mashinostroenia). It was based on the earlier P-70 Ametist missile, though larger to meet the range requirement. Contrary to its predecessor, which could be launched only from submarines, the P-120 had a universal booster that enabled launch from both surface ships and subs. It could be launched from a depth of 50 m. The P-120 was powered by a solid-fuel sustainer that gave the missile high subsonic speed as it flew at an altitude of 40 m. The range was dictated by the aforementioned requirement, though some sources say it could reach 150 km. A modernized terminal-phase guidance system had two sensors combined in one: a traditional but improved active-radar seeker supported by a passive infrared seeker mounted beneath. This measure improved resistance to countermeasures launched by defending ships. The missile had either a 500-kg HE or 200-kT-yield nuclear warhead.

The P-120 Malakhit system was accepted to service in March 1972. Tests of the underwater system took longer, and the P-120 missile was accepted into service onboard submarines in November 1977. The new missiles armed small, fast corvettes of the Nanuchka I class. In all, from 1969 to 1976, 18 of these ships were built, followed by 21 Nanuchka III-class ships. Today, though, only the latter remain in service. Between 1973 and 1980, six Charlie II-class submarines were built. Each sub had eight missile tubes and usually carried six conventional and two nuclear missiles. All of the submarines had the MGK-400 Rubikon sonar system. In the early 1980s, the Rubikon sonar was replaced by the MGK-500 Skat system, which used a much more capable digital computer and advanced signal processing. Launch of P-120 missiles (all eight could be launched in a quick salvo) was directed by the Raduga fire-control system. Submarines were provided with a Molnia digital interface to the Uspekh and Legenda targeting systems, along with a Paravan towed array for very-low-frequency communications. All of the Charlie II submarines were very recently withdrawn from service, but P-120 missiles continue to be used on Nanuchka III corvettes.

P-500 Bazalt (SS-N-12 Sandbox) and P-1000 Vulkan

Presently, the P-500 Bazalt (SS-N-12 Sandbox) remains only on surface ships, but it is still one of the most capable Russian naval weapons. For a long time it was underestimated in the West. Since the missile was similar in appearance to the P-6/P-35 series, it was not even recognized for a long time, especially as the main armament of Echo II submarines.

Development of the intended P-6/P-35 replacement was initiated on the very same day as the P-120 Malakhit program (February 28, 1963). It was to be a surface-launched missile for both submarines and surface ships. To avoid any counterattack from a carrier group, the missile's range was to be 500 km, outside the usual operational radius of carrier-protection forces. At the same time, the guidance system and missile survivability were to be greatly improved and in line with evolving tactics. For the first time, it was assumed that any attack on a carrier group would be of a massive character. The tactics of such an attack is described later, but it is worth describing some P-500 Bazalt features beforehand.

The P-500 missile is similar in appearance to the P-6/35 and was powered by a liquid-fuel sustainer and solid-rocket booster. It has a speed of Mach 2 at high altitude and Mach 1.5-1.6 at low altitude. The flight profile of the missile varies from 30 to 7,000 m (low-low or low-high). Guidance is based on a digital INS on a gyro- stabilized platform and an active-radar seeker, which periodically switches to passive mode. For the first time, the missile was equipped with a digital computer (Tsifrova Vichislenna Mashina, "digital computing device"). The guidance system was also equipped with a datalink to communicate between missiles in a salvo, with a salvo consisting of eight missiles launched at short intervals. Usually, one of the missiles flies high (5,000-7,000 m) to pick up the target, while the rest remain at medium to low altitude with their radar seekers switched to passive mode. The leading missile then transmits targeting data to the others and allocates individual targets, with half of the salvo directed at the aircraft carrier and half at other ships in the area, one apiece. The onboard radar seekers are turned on at the last moment, just before reaching the target. If the lead missile is shot down, another one (in a programmed sequence) takes over and climbs to a higher altitude to continue directing the salvo. All the missiles have active radar jamming to disrupt any defensive action from fighters and shipboard air-defense systems. In addition, vital parts of the P-500 missile are armored to increase survivability.

Early trials of the first version of the P-500 system were conducted from 1969 to 1970, and from 1971-75, tests of the final version, with a 550-km range, were completed. The missile has a 1,000-kg HE warhead or a 350-kT-yield nuclear warhead. In 1975 the P-500 system was introduced to service on 10 out of the 29 Echo II-class submarines then in service. Nine of them received the Kasatka-B system for receiving data from the Uspekh and Legenda targeting systems (radar picture only), while one received the Uspekh interface only, without access to the Legenda space targeting system. Communications with targeting systems could be conducted from periscope depth with the antenna above the surface. Usually, Soviet submarines carried six conventional and two nuclear P-500 missiles on combat patrols. All of the submarines armed with P-500 missiles were withdrawn from service in the mid-1990s.

The P-500 Bazalt system, however, was not only used on submarines. In 1977 the system was accepted into service onboard Kiev-class aircraft carriers, four of which were built. The first three had a battery of eight launchers in the forward deck. The last ship of the class, commissioned the Baku in 1987, was built to a modified design and had no less than 12 launchers. All of these ships were withdrawn from service in the 1990s, but the last ship, renamed Admiral Gorshkov , is to be sold to India - after stripping off the P-500 missiles.

The only ships still armed with the P-500 Bazalt system are Slava-class cruisers. The first ship of the class, commissioned in 1983, underwent a major overhaul in the 1990s and was renamed the Moskva . It serves with the Russian Navy's Black Sea Fleet. The Northern Fleet operates the Marshal Ustinov , commissioned in 1986, while the Pacific Fleet operates the Varyag , commissioned in 1989. According to unconfirmed sources, however, the last was re-armed with the P-1000 system (see below). The first two ships (and possibly all three) have a tremendous battery of 16 P-500 Bazalt missiles, which can be directed at targets with the assistance of embarked Ka-27 Helix helicopters. A fourth cruiser, the Ukrainian Ukraina , was armed with the P-500 system. The ship was completed in late 2001, but after lengthy deliberations, it never entered service with the Ukrainian Navy. Declared spare, it now is to be sold abroad.

The P-1000 Vulkan was one of the most mysterious missiles in Soviet service. It was also the last Russian missile that required a submarine to surface for launch. Its existence was never discovered by NATO, despite the fact it was operational on five submarines. It was generally similar to P-500 but had titanium armor, and many of its steel parts were replaced by titanium ones. This enabled a significant decrease in launch weight. At the same time, a more powerful booster and a more powerful and more fuel-efficient sustainer turbojet engine was employed. This increased the range to about 700 km. Its development was initiated in May 1979, and it underwent tests in the mid-1980s. The P-1000 was introduced into service in about 1987. In the late 1980s, five Echo II-class submarines were modernized to accommodate the new P-1000 Vulkan system, but all five were withdrawn from service in the mid-1990s. Thus, it was in front-line service for only about seven or eight years (unless it has, in fact, been installed on the Varyag ).

P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck)

The development of the P-700 missile system started in 1969, but it was prolonged due to its complexity. It was assumed that the main source of information would be the satellite-based reconnaissance network, and from the very beginning, it was believed that the missile would be able to communicate with it directly after launch. The initial targeting information was to be received by a submarine cruising at a depth of about 30 m via a long-wave communications system from ground bases. The attack was to be coordinated with a group of long-range Tu-22M anti-ship aircraft. The underwater attack group consists of three to five Oscar and Oscar II subs, each armed with 24 P-700 missiles. The subs were to launch 70-120 such missiles against a single carrier group in a single mass attack. Roughly 30-50% of them are aimed at the carrier, while the others go after accompanying ships. Another salvo of 12-24 missiles was to be launched by aircraft, mainly to saturate the carrier group's defenses. The 30-knot speed of the Oscar I/II submarines enables a rapid approach to the launch area, about 450-500 km from the carrier group, and equally quick evasion after the attack.

The missile employs all of the techniques from the Bazalt/Vulkan. One lead missile per every 24 in the salvo flies at high altitude to reconnoiter the target, using its radar in active and passive modes. The active mode is used in quick "looks," then turned off to increase the penetration probability. The lead missile assigns targets to all subordinate missiles and communicates with the other lead missiles in the massive salvo to coordinate the attack. To achieve this, the missile is equipped with a powerful digital computer with three processors. The missile has an onboard integrated electronic-countermeasures suit for avoiding enemy anti-missile attacks using a combination of maneuver and deception jamming. The computer could order the missile to one of various stored courses with multiple altitudes. At high altitude, the missile speed is Mach 2.5, while at low (sea-skimming) altitude, it is Mach 1.5. Vital parts of the missile are armored to increase penetration against fire from Phalanx-type close-in weapon systems and against fragments of closely exploding air-defense missiles. The missile has a conventional 750-kg HE warhead or a nuclear warhead with an unknown yield (reportedly 500 kT, but that seems too high).

The guidance system was developed by TsNII "Granit." The missile itself was developed in OKB-52 (later NPO Mashinostoyeniya) under the direction of Chelomey and, after his death in 1984, under Gerberd Efremov. First tests of the missile started in November 1975. Numerous difficulties prolonged the factory tests until 1979, and in autumn of that year, the missile began state trials. Technical difficulties further prolonged the trials through October 1983, and the missile was officially accepted into service in March 1983. At this time, the space-based Legenda reconnaissance system had been fully deployed. In addition to the satellite system, the submarine could also use its own MGK-540 Skat-3 sonar system for targeting.

Only two Oscar I ships have been built: the K-525 (Arkhangelsk ) and K-206 (Murmansk ), commissioned in 1981 and 1983, respectively. Both remain in service with the Northern Fleet, and each are armed with 24 missiles and have Kasatka-U receivers for communication with the Legenda system. The subs were followed by the "ultimate" Oscar II class, of which 11 have been commissioned since 1986. The Northern Fleet operates the K-119 (Voronezh ), K-148 (Krasnodar ), K-410 (Smolensk ), K-266 (Orel ), K-186 (Omsk ), and K-150 (Tomsk ). The K-141 (Kursk ) exploded and sank on August 13, 2000. The Pacific Fleet operates the K-132 (Irkutsk ), K-173 (Krasnoyarsk ), K-442 (Chelabinsk ), and K-456 (Vyluchinsk ). The Russian Navy plans to commission a replacement for the Kursk, the K-329 (Belgorod ).

The P-700 missile was also introduced to service as a weapon for surface ships. Four Kirov-class nuclear cruisers were commissioned between 1980 and 1998: the Kirov (renamed Admiral Ushakov ), Frunze (renamed Admiral Lazarev ), Kalinin (renamed Admiral Nakhimov ) and Yuriy Andropov (renamed Pyotr Velikiy ). They were armed with 20 semi-vertical (with some oblique, like in submarines) P-700 Granit launchers. The system was directly adapted from submarines - to the point where the launchers have to be filled with water before launch. Fire control is provided by the MR-212 Vaygach-U onboard radar and other ships' electronic systems (the Gurzuf or Kantata-M passive reconnaissance systems, for example). The first two cruisers were withdrawn from service in the late 1990s, but the Admiral Nakhimov and the Pyotr Velikiy continue to serve. The only other ship equipped with P-700 Granit system is the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznietsov , commissioned in 1990 and operational with Russian Northern Fleet since 1995. The ship is armed with 12 P-700 launchers.


P-6 Progress

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P-35 Progress
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The P-35 Progress system is a long-range anti-ship missile that originated as a strategic cruise missile (P-5 Pityorka). It can carry out over-the-horizon attacks on hostile ships. A P-5S coastal-defense variant is known by the NATO designation of SSC-1 Sepal. The missile's guidance is by command and an active-radar/passive-IR seeker. Because of the very long range of this missile (450 km), the P-6D Progress version was introduced with mid-course guidance provided by a Tu-95 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft using its Big Bulge I-band search radar to locate the target and pass information back to the main control. The Big Bulge has a range of 350-400 km at 4,000-m altitude and is used to transmit radar pictures of the target to the missile-launching vessel. After launch, the missile climbs to about 400 m to enable the radar seeker to lock on as early as possible and to relay information back to the fire-control system. Final attack is in the form of a shallow dive. The P-7D Progress version has a radar altimeter to enable a more controled flight profile.

Manufacturer : Chelomey Designation : P-6, P-35 Progress Guidance : Mid-course autopilot (some versions with command update by datalink), terminal active radar Warhead : 800-kg HE or 100 kT nuclear Propulsion : Turbojet Range 460 km Speed : Mach 1.4 Length : 1,000 cm Body Diameter: 90 cm Wingspan : 260 cm Launch Weight : 4,500 kg Date Operational : 1960s Platforms : Ships; land Users : Russia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Syria, Angola


P-70 Ametist
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The P-70 was the first Soviet ASM that could be launched by a submerged submarine. It is a medium-range missile with mid-course guidance by autopilot, with a J-band active-radar seeker for the terminal phase. Initial detection of the target is by either the submarine's ESM system or by the Snoop Head search radar operating in the ESM mode. Normally, the missile is launched from ranges up to 65 km, after which it climbs to about 100 m before the seeker locks on. Final approach for the attack is in the form of a shallow dive. Externally, the P-70 is cylindrical in shape, with a sharply pointed nose and a prominent reinforcing member or wiring duct along the underside of the body. There are short, folding, swept-back wings midway up the body in the rear half and three rear-facing cooling ducts around the wing leading edge.

Manufacturer : Chelomey Designation : P-70 (4K66) Guidance : Mid-course autopilot; terminal active-radar seeker Warhead : 500-1,000 kg HE or 200-kT nuclear Propulsion : solid-state rocket Range : 65 km Speed : Mach 0.9 Length : 670 cm Wingspan : 1,200 cm Launch Weight : 3,375 kg Date Operational : 1968 Platforms : Ships: Projects 670 (Charlie I)- and 661 (Papa)-class submarines Users : Russia


P-120 Malakhit
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The P-50 Malakhit was developed as a "universal" anti-ship missile for submarines and surface ships. It was intended to replace the high-altitude, relatively slow P-35 Progress (SS-N-3 Shaddock). Before the project was completed, it was replaced by a more advanced design - the P-120. The missile entered service in 1969. It was initially deployed on surface ships and subsequently on the Charlie II submarines. It also has longer range than the Ametiste (SS-N-7 Starbright) (70 km when submarine launched and 110 km surface-ship launched). The fire-control radar normally associated with the missile is either the Band Stand or the Plank Shave. The Band Stand operates over the D to F frequency bands and is used for target acquisition and tracking. The Plank Shave is a missile-control radar of which very few details are available. The missile's guidance is identical to that of the Ametiste with one important distinction: it can receive mid-course command updates from the launching platform or a third party.

Manufacturer : NPO Mashinostroenia Designation : P-120 (4K85) Guidance : Mid-course autopilot; terminal active-radar seeker Warhead : 1,000-kg HE or 200-kT nuclear Propulsion : solid-fuel booster and sustainer Range : 110 (surface launch) 70 (submarine) km Speed : Mach 0.9 Length : 884 cm Launch Weight : 3,000 kg Date Operational : 1972 Platforms : Ships: Project 670M (Charlie II) submarines, Project 1234 (Nanuchka), and Project 1240 (Sarancha) fast missile boats Users : Russia


P-500 Bazalt
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The P-500 is a long-range, supersonic cruise missile. The development of the missile started in 1963 as the P-350 (4K77) program, which was canceled but subsequently evolved into the P-500 (4K80) project. It was accepted to service in 1973 and became operational two years later. It has a cylindrical body, the front of which is slim with a sharply pointed nose. Two-thirds of the way along, it bulges before tapering toward the rear. The missile is powered by a turbojet, and there is a small air intake about halfway along the body. The missile features command or inertial guidance with the option of mid-course updates. Aircraft such as the Tu-95RC Bear D, the Ka-25 Hormone B, and the Ka-27 Helix B may be used for over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting. Terminal-phase guidance is either by an active-radar seeker or by passive radar homing. The payload consisted of either a 1,000-kg high-explosive warhead or a 350-kT nuclear device, but the latter has now been removed. It can be launched from surface ships or submarines, although the latter must surface to launch. Associated radars are the H/I-band Front Door or the Front Door C system, which both provide mid-flight updates to the missile if required. The former is a missile-guidance radar that has a multiple antenna system and is primarily for submarine use. The Front Door C is used by surface vessels and features a "hidden" antenna that hinges out when needed.

Manufacturer : Chelomey Designation : P-500 (4K80) Guidance : Mid-course autopilot; terminal active-radar seeker Warhead : 1,000-kg HE semi-armor piercing or 350- kT nuclear Propulsion : liquid-fuel rocket Range : 550 km Speed : Mach 2.5 Length : 1,700 cm Body Diameter: 90 cm Wingspan : 260 cm Launch Weight : 5,000 kg Date Operational : 1975 Platforms : Project 1143 (Kiev) aircraft carriers, Project 1164 (Slava) cruisers, Project 675 (Echo II) submarines Users : Russia


P-700 Granit
http://www.jedonline.com/getblob.asp?journalid=4&year=2003&month=10&section=articles&img=granit.jpg

The improved US ASW defenses around carrier battlegroups during the 1970s increasingly restricted the effectiveness of Soviet submarines carrying the Ametist/Malakhit (SS-N-7/9 Starbright/Siren) missiles. At the same time, the Soviet Navy wished to strengthen the defenses of its SSBN bastions, and this led to a requirement for a new missile. The P-700 Granit was developed as a more successful turbojet alternative to the Bazalt (SS-N-12 Sandbox) from which it was derived and whose liquid rocket proved troublesome. The long-range, sea-skimming anti-ship missile is launched from both surface ships and Oscar-class submarines. In the mid-course, it has an autopilot and can receive course updates by X-band datalink. It has a Ku-band active radar for terminal guidance and has a radar-homing capability.

Manufacturer : NPO Mashinostroenia Designation : P-700 (3M45) Guidance : Mid-course autopilot; terminal active-radar seeker and passive anti-radiation Warhead : 750-kg HE or 500-kT nuclear Propulsion : Two solid-fuel boosters one turbojet sustainer Range : 550 km Speed : Mach 1.6 Length : 10 m Body Diameter: 85 cm Launch Weight : 7,000 kg Date Operational : 1980 Platforms : Project 949 (Oscar) and 949A (Oscar II) submarines, Project 1143.5 (Kuznetsov) aircraft carriers, Project 1144 (Pyotr Velikiy) cruisers Users : Russia


http://www.jedonline.com/

Garry
23 Jun 04,, 12:27
Great reading.... it indeed confirms my belief that no large object on sea surface can be safe.... so sad that most of these weapons are not in service any more.

I know only Aegis and Tomcat as the means to protecting carrier groups against cruise missile...... However I am sure americans had invented (or tried to invent) something to counter this threat.... do you have anything to read about it?

bigross86
23 Jun 04,, 14:15
Aegis is a system that encorporates the Sea-Sparrow, the SM-1, the SM-2, the SM-2ER, and (soon) the SM-3. Tomcats do have the added range of the AIM-54C Phoenix missile in shooting down cruise missiles, but (as much as it pains me to say this) the F/A-18E/F can also do that with AIM-120C AMRAAM's, IIRC. AIM-9M, and by extension the AIM-9X can also shoot them down, but that's close range. There's also the CWIS weapons system to think of here. With all that defense, plus the extended view of the E-2C Hawkeye and the E-3B Sentry means the carrier is gonna have plenty warning.

lurker
23 Jun 04,, 17:52
AIM-54 and others "long range" AA missiles (SM is also here) will have very little hit probability against fast maneuvering targets at max distances.

Why?

Because they fly ballistic trajectories, and attack their targets from above, when missile engine is already burnt out (and her maneuverability is limited).

CIWS "Vulcan" have a very limited range of engagement, (and being removed from USN as we speak) and will have only couple of seconds to react.

There is very little means even now (except maybe RIM) to intercept a trget maneuvering on 20 G.

Praxus
23 Jun 04,, 18:12
Ever heard of Sm-2's and SeaSpearow?

Both can intercept incomg supersonic manouvering anti-ship missiles.

lurker
23 Jun 04,, 18:35
Yes I heard about them. I also heard that the polygon results are usually very different from the real thing.

For example AIM-54 achieved very little in real life than it was expected (like 0 hits from 4 launches and so on).

US had no supersonic manuevering target drones, and I think they don't have them even now to test things.
"Krypton" based drones may be supersonic, but anyone hardly can call them "maneuverable".

Praxus
23 Jun 04,, 21:32
We have the Vandal and we our developing a new super-sonic drone.

The ESSM has engaged a drone going Mach 5 pulling 10 G's.

http://www.natoseasparrow.org/art/ESSMvideo/ESSM-SDTS.wmv

lurker
23 Jun 04,, 21:44
About "Vandals" and so on:


The AQM-37 fills a valuable "niche" as a training target, since it can simulate high-speed threats, such as long-range missiles. However, there are some specialized threats that it does not simulate well, such as fast sea-skimming antiship missiles.

The US Navy has gone through a succession of programs in an attempt to obtain such a target. An initial investigation was conducted in the early 1970s for a target designated the "BQM-90", but lack of funds led to the cancellation of the program in 1973 even before a contractor was selected.

As an interim measure, the Navy then decided to convert some old "RIM-8 Talos" shipboard antiaircraft missiles to targets, giving them the designation "MQM-8G Vandal". The Talos targets were not entirely satisfactory for the job, and so in 1977 the Navy awarded a contract to Teledyne Ryan for a purpose-designed target, the "Model 258 / BQM-111A Firebrand".

The Firebrand was a neat dart with small delta wings, a conventional tail arrangement, and a Marquardt ramjet mounted at each end of the horizontal tailplane. It was to be launched from a DC-130, boosted up to Mach 1.2 by a solid-fuel booster, and cruise towards its objective at Mach 2.2, dropping to low level during the terminal "attack" phase. However, the Firebrand began to seem a bit too heavy for its role, and funding was tight again, so the Navy axed the program in 1982.

That meant keeping the Vandal targets in service, while the Navy went through another iteration to obtain an antiship missile simulator target, awarding a contract to Martin Marietta for the "AQM-127A Supersonic Low-Altitude Target (SLAT)" in 1984. The SLAT was a "flying stovepipe", little more than a cylinder powered a hybrid boost-rocket / ramjet engine with an intake under the nose, and no flight surfaces except for cruciform tailfins. The program was killed off in 1991 without flying a prototype.

As a result, the Vandal had to soldier on into the 1990s, but its numbers were dwindling. Later in the decade, as an interim solution, the Navy acquired a handful of Soviet-built "Kh-31A" ramjet-powered anti-ship missiles, modified to "MA-31" targets by Boeing, as an interim solution.

In the summer of 2000, in a fourth attempt to acquire an antiship missile simulator target, the US Navy signed a contract with Orbital Sciences Corporation (OSC) to build the "GQM-163 Supersonic Sea-Skimming Target (SSST)".

http://www.vectorsite.net/twuav1.html


That means SM-2 and SeaSpearow were developed NOT having a useful targets to test on.

p.s. ESSM does not exist yes as a production weapon, and we are talking about things that are at least 15-20 years in service already.

bigross86
23 Jun 04,, 22:13
For at least the last couple hundred miles the missile has to fly straight in to get to the ships. Not counting the pop-up manouver, that should make them very easy targets. Besides, All you need to do is drop a decent amount of cheff in their way about 100 miles off and they'll explode prematurely

TopHatter
23 Jun 04,, 22:17
CIWS "Vulcan" have a very limited range of engagement, (and being removed from USN as we speak) and will have only couple of seconds to react.


Lurker, do you have any documentation on the CIWS being removed from USN ships? I havent heard anything about that, and I would very interested to see the USN's reasoning on this.

lurker
23 Jun 04,, 22:42
Lurker, do you have any documentation on the CIWS being removed from USN ships? I havent heard anything about that, and I would very interested to see the USN's reasoning on this.
No I haven't read this anywhere.
All that is from studying the latest photos of the CVN's for example.
All latest CVNs have no CIWS at all, and "Nimitz" had them removed after last refit.

"Ronald Reagan" without CIWS photo study:
http://tbma.deeptown.org/images/RReaganNoCIWS.jpg

"Nimitz" last year in Indian Ocean (Do You see Vulcan's? Me don't):
http://tbma.deeptown.org/images/CVN-68-090603.jpg

lurker
23 Jun 04,, 23:05
For at least the last couple hundred miles the missile has to fly straight in to get to the ships. Not counting the pop-up manouver, that should make them very easy targets. Besides, All you need to do is drop a decent amount of cheff in their way about 100 miles off and they'll explode prematurely
There is no pop-ups anymore anywhere. For example look at the latest Harpoon's (first models were making it).
It was removed by simply modifying the flight-program.

About "chaff" and so on - modern missiles can identify Radar "profiles" of the targets and attack designated target in the group (At least "Granit" does that fro a long time already).
So simple chaff would not work.

Probably if there is IR seeker, it can provide IR "profile" too. But that is just my guess.

TopHatter
24 Jun 04,, 02:43
No I haven't read this anywhere.
All that is from studying the latest photos of the CVN's for example.
All latest CVNs have no CIWS at all, and "Nimitz" had them removed after last refit.

"Ronald Reagan" without CIWS photo study:
http://tbma.deeptown.org/images/RReaganNoCIWS.jpg

"Nimitz" last year in Indian Ocean (Do You see Vulcan's? Me don't):
http://tbma.deeptown.org/images/CVN-68-090603.jpg

You are correct, I don't see any Vulcan's with the exception of the very first picture, the number "2" position has what appears to be a CIWS mount but the very next picture shows a different angle but no CIWS, instead a RAM.
Obviously I had completely forgotten that they were phasing out the CIWS in favor of the RAM system and retaining the Sea Sparrow mounts.
Very nice pictures of the Ronald Reagan by the way, did you find them online?

lurker
24 Jun 04,, 03:05
Very nice pictures of the Ronald Reagan by the way, did you find them online?

Yup, there: http://www.news.navy.mil/view_gallery.asp?category_id=10
Click on "Download HiRes" to get HUGE versions.

Bill
24 Jun 04,, 18:05
Phalanx CIWS is being replaced by the RAM missile.

SM-2 Block IIIB and newer feature terminal IR homing and vectored thrust for dealing with incoming missiles.

ESSM is in serial production. ESSM was specificly designed as a medium range missile killer. It has vectored thrust and a 80G manuevering threshold.

lurker
24 Jun 04,, 18:15
ESSM is in serial production. ESSM was specificly designed as a medium range missile killer. It has vectored thrust and a 80G manuevering threshold.

Looks like I missed something. When did that happend?

Bill
04 Jul 04,, 07:25
As of 2002 the USN awarded a contract to have the Tico CGs VLS and combat systems modified for ESSM needs. As the cruisers come in for refit the systems are added(they are also getting 5"/62 guns and RAM point missile defenses as well during this process). In the last two years probably most of them have been done by now.

http://www.navlog.org/Tico_VLS.html

There is also a similar program for the Burkes.

ESSM has cleared all testing and is slated for IOC in 2004 and is currently in initial Block 0 production. RAM is already in the fleet on some vessels, and has entered improved Block1 production. RAM is housed in a 21rd Mk31 launcher, or in a proposed 11rd SEARAM Phalanx mount. RAM Block1 has several modes including RF homing(home on jam/radar), Home all the way, anti-surface mode, and features fire and forget terminal IIR homing. In live-fire tests RAM was something like 96% effective.

TopHatter
10 Jul 04,, 19:04
I wonder how those "carrier-killers" would fare against SEA RAM...

bodybag
10 Jul 04,, 19:25
You guys forgot about submarines which constitutes much bigger threat to AC
than anything else.It is harder to detect incoming modern high velocity torpedos,than to detect rockets fired in the air.
China ,Iran are investing in submarines for this reason mainly and that is the right thing to do."Dinosaurs of the seas"(Aircraft carrier) days are numbered.

Praxus
10 Jul 04,, 20:29
According to your logic, all ships except subs are numbered. This is clearly not the case.

Nothing is as versitile as a Carrier is and it won't be replaced for a long time.

bodybag
10 Jul 04,, 21:13
According to your logic, all ships except subs are numbered. This is clearly not the case.

Nothing is as versitile as a Carrier is and it won't be replaced for a long time.
I would not go that far but yes, almost all ships can be neutralized very quickly in
big regional conflict.Falkland war provides example how effective were rockets against "sitting ducks" ships .Instead of those US monsters I would go for British type carriers ,and anyway currently with in the air refueling one can fly from midwest air base for a mission to M.East and back in no time.And invest this huge surpluss of cash in remotely operated crafts.

TopHatter
11 Jul 04,, 08:06
I would not go that far but yes, almost all ships can be neutralized very quickly in
big regional conflict.Falkland war provides example how effective were rockets against "sitting ducks" ships .Instead of those US monsters I would go for British type carriers ,and anyway currently with in the air refueling one can fly from midwest air base for a mission to M.East and back in no time.And invest this huge surpluss of cash in remotely operated crafts.

Nope, if I was a country with the United States' resources I would not build smaller carriers. The big-deck CVNs have proven their worth time and time again. The answer to the submarine threat is the modern CVBG or Carrier Strike Force or whatever the hell they want to call it these days.
Nestled into the CVBG is the most potent ASW asset ever known to man: The modern SSN, be it USN or RN.
Besides these sharks of steel, you have Tico/Burke/Spru-can/Perry-class escorts to ward the bird farms against the SSK/SSN threat.
Yes, a sub penetrating the ASW screen can wreak a helluva lot of damage, no question about it.
But a carrier CAN withstand a torp hit or even two and remain on station and still conduct flight ops.
The same cannot be said of her escorts of course, but the carrier the whole reason for being when it comes to a CVBG.
Nothing afloat is a more weighted and flexible weapons system. Nothing.
Operations against Iraq (from 1991 to 2003) Bosnia and Afghanistan have proven this without a doubt.
You don't need a shaky ally's permission to use the ocean as an offensive basis for overwhelming airstrikes. You just sail off someone's coast and sit there...a potenial dagger poised at the throat of a foe.

The Chap
20 Aug 04,, 06:22
Yes I heard about them. I also heard that the polygon results are usually very different from the real thing.

For example AIM-54 achieved very little in real life than it was expected (like 0 hits from 4 launches and so on).

US had no supersonic manuevering target drones, and I think they don't have them even now to test things.
"Krypton" based drones may be supersonic, but anyone hardly can call them "maneuverable".

1982? Sea Wolf? Not perfect but not too shabby.

Hk40
27 Aug 04,, 15:29
I think this one will be interesting to the public, since not everrybody have an access to JED.

Carrier Killers

The Cold War required the Soviet Union to compete with the US on the high seas. Never being a naval power, the Soviets had to find a way to bypass US dominance in blue waters. The answer was the submarine and the guided missile. As the aircraft-carrier battlegroup is a symbol of US naval power, the missile-armed submarine became a symbol of Soviet naval power. Russia continues in this line, hoping to restore some of its former glory.

After WWII, it was obvious that reaching naval parity with the US Navy was too difficult a task for the Soviet Navy. But new weapons and technology would provide adequate capabilities. Therefore, three parallel anti-ship missile programs started in 1947: Kometa (AS-1), air launched; Shchuka, sea launched; and Shtorm, shore launched. In February 1953, only the first of these missiles was accepted to service, while the other programs were terminated due to the lack of satisfactory results. Further analyses revealed that treating the missile as a pilotless airframe was the wrong approach to the problem. As a result, since early 1954, all missile programs in the Soviet Union and then Russia have been led by the guidance-system design facility, not by the missile-design facility.

In 1955 the Shchuka program was restored under the codename "KSShch" and led by the guidance-system designer. The missile was actually fielded in moderate numbers on Kildin- (56EM/M) and Krupny-class destroyers. It was a complete failure, though. Designed as a long-range attack system with a theoretical range of 185 km, the operational range was limited to only 30-35 km by its poor guidance system. The missile was radio-command guided to the target, which was observed by the destroyer's radar. The KSShch-B version with active-radar guidance and target designation by Ka-15RC helicopter was never fielded, since the radar and targeting equipment were too heavy to be carried by a light shipboard helicopter. The whole system was withdrawn in the mid-1960s. All the later anti-carrier missiles were developed by OKB-52 (NPO Mashinostroyenia since 1983) in Reutovo near Moscow. The organization was lead by the famous Valdimir N. Chelomey until his death in 1984 and then by Gerberd A. Efremov. The OKB-52/NPO Mashinostroyenia also developed some Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

Get the Carrier: P-6/P-35 Progress (SS-N-3 Shaddock, Sepal)

The first priority of the Soviet Navy was to defend coastal areas to provide security for land operations. The second task of the Red Fleet was to disrupt US/NATO shipping across the Atlantic and in European waters. In the early 1950s, it became clear that the aircraft-carrier battlegroup represented the most significant threat to the Soviet Navy. Carrier battlegroups could hamper any Soviet naval operations, defensive or offensive.

To fight the carrier battlegroup, it was decided in August 1956 that a long-range anti-ship cruise missile would be developed. The basis for it was to be the P-5 Progress (4K95; SS-N-3A Shaddock) supersonic land-attack cruise missile with a range of 500 km. The P-5 had inertial autonomous guidance, and the modernized P-5D version had Doppler radar mid-course correction. The missile, developed by OKB-52 (presently NPO Mashinostroyenia) in Moscow, had a solid-propellant booster and an air-breathing turbojet sustainer. The missile's wings unfolded after launch, which reduced the size of the launch container.

From the outset, two versions of the missile were developed: the surface-ship-based P-35 (SS-N-3B Sepal) and the submarine-based P-6 (SS-N-3C Shaddock). For both, a guidance system was developed with INS/Doppler for the mid-course phase and an active-radar seeker for the terminal phase. The first (land) tests began in October 1959 for the P-6 and the following December for the P-35. During the years 1963-68, eight surface ships were equipped with P-35 missiles: four Kynda-class cruisers with two four-tube SM-70 launchers and four Kresta I-class large frigates with two twin-tube KT-35 launchers. From 1963 to 1968, 16 Juliet-class diesel submarines were also fielded, with each submarine carrying four launch tubes and the same number of P-6 missiles. In 1966 it was also decided that the P-5 land-attack cruise missiles that armed five Echo I-class nuclear submarines would be withdrawn from service, with the subs being converted into torpedo-armed attack submarines. Between 1963 and 1966, 16 Echo II-class nuclear submarines were built for the Northern Fleet and 13 for the Pacific Fleet, all of which were armed with P-6 anti-ship missiles. Each Echo II sub carried six launch tubes and the same number of missiles.

The P-6 and P-35 missiles, which differ only in minor ways, were fitted with the same guidance system and warhead. The latter could be either a 800-kg high explosive (HE) or a 100-kT-yield (approximately) nuclear weapon. After launch, the missile climbed to a high altitude, accelerated to Mach 1.5, and started searching the front area with its radar seeker. The resulting picture was transmitted to the launching ship via a TV channel. When a target was acquired, the operator on the ship verified whether it was the desired target (e.g., the aircraft carrier in the group). If so, the operator designated it as such and turned the missile's seeker on automatic-track mode. Thereafter, the missile descended to low altitude, remaining at supersonic speed. The missile was intended to hit the water 10-20 m before the target and dive to detonate underwater to increase damage. The range of the missile was 300-350 km.

The P-6/P-35 Progress missiles gave the Soviet Navy long-range anti-ship capabilities for the first time. Prior to that, only Tu-16KS maritime bombers, armed with K-10 anti-ship cruise missiles, had such reach. Nevertheless, the whole system was cumbersome and full of shortcomings. A single salvo took 8-12 minutes to reach the target, depending on range. Then it took 4-6 minutes to prepare for the the next salvo, followed by another 8-12 minutes of flight. Thus, the whole missile-launch sequence for six missiles from a nuclear submarine, or eight from a cruiser, took 20-30 minutes. Meanwhile, the attack force, consisting of surface ships or submarines (which had to remain surfaced), was exposed to enemy counterattacks. Moreover, only three or four ships, launching no more than 12 missiles between them, could operate at the same time against a given carrier battlegroup due to the number of radar and datalink channels available. It was determined that two to four hits with nuclear-armed missiles would be enough to disable the entire carrier battlegroup. The situation was different in the case of conventional warheads, and Soviet commanders knew that, in this case, the task was unachievable.

However, even this thin threat led the US Navy to seek a fighter capable of engaging multiple aircraft and cruise missiles at long range. As there was no time to conduct traditional intercept (a F-4 Phantom armed with AIM-7 Sparrow missiles was inadequate for this task), the AN/AWG-9 fire-control system and AIM-54 Phoenix missile systems were developed, initially for the the F-111B and then for the F-14A Tomcat. Teams of E-2B Hawkeyes and F-14s working together could provide early warning of cruise-missile launches. A single F-14 could engage six targets simultaneously with AIM-54A missiles. The E-2 and F-14 tandem became a nightmare for Soviet long-range reconnaissance and missile-carrying aircraft for years to come, and the danger was also appreciated by submarine commanders, who understood that many of their cruise missiles had little chance of reaching the target.

In the early years, the biggest problem was targeting. To find and track an carrier group on the ocean was an extremely difficult task. The answer was found in the use of signals- intelligence (SIGINT) and radar- reconnaissance aircraft, typified by the Tu-16RM Badger D and Tu-95RC Bear D, respectively. The Badger D SIGINT aircraft would pick up radar and radio signals emitted by a carrier group and direct a Bear D, equipped with a long-range sea-search radar. Both aircraft cooperated but operated independently. There was no need for SIGINT aircraft to approach the deadly zone around the carrier, and when the radar track was established, the SIGINT aircraft would search other areas.

The MRSC-1 Uspekh system was developed specifically for target acquisition and designation for anti-ship missiles. It consisted of a Tu-95RC Bear D with its radar and a data-exchange system with aircraft and ship interfaces. Echo II submarines used the Argument fire-control system for presetting a missile's INS and for data exchange with the missile in flight. The whole system was fielded the in latter half of the 1960s. Two new systems were developed in the early 1970s. First was the more capable Uspekh-U, which was based on a modernized Tu-95RC aircraft. The other became the primary targeting means of the Soviet - and presently the Russian - Navy. This was the MKRC Legenda space-based system, operational in 1979, the main element of which is radar-equipped 17F16 satellites that use onboard miniature nuclear reactors for power. Again, the system consisted of both SIGINT- and radar-equipped components, but in this case they were satellites. The Legenda system did not replace the Uspekh-U, which also remains in service, but provides greater coverage and flexibility. The deployment of both systems solved the problem of targeting for cruise-missile-armed units, both surface warships and submarines. The latter, equipped with the Kasatka (and later-model) receiving equipment, are able to receive basic targeting information from the Legenda reconnaissance system, even when submerged. This feature greatly improved submarine survivability.

P-70 Ametist (SS-N-7) and P-120 Malakhit (SS-N-9)

The development of an anti-ship missile system for underwater launch was initiated in April 1959, and the OKB-52 Design Bureau, led by Vladimir Chelomey, was appointed to the task. At the same time, development of the first submarine to be armed with the new system, the Papa class, also started in 1959. The submarine was nuclear powered and armed with 10 launchers for P-70 missiles.

The P-70 Ametist (SS-N-7, 4K66) had a small delta wing and was powered by a solid-propellant sustainer. It was also provided with four small boosters that worked underwater. It had a programmable INS guidance system and an analog radar seeker with some anti-jamming capabilities. The missile itself had a very small frontal radar cross-section. The missile could be launched from depths of up to 30 m. It flew to the target at an altitude of 40-60 m using a radar altimeter at a high subsonic speed. Maximum range of the missile was 70-80 km when the target was designated from a third source, or about 50 km when the target was detected by the launching sub's powerful MGK-300 Rubin digital sonar. The missile had a 1,000-kg conventional warhead or a 200-kT-yield nuclear one. The first underwater launch of a 4K66 Ametist missile from a special stand occurred in June 1961. From July to December of 1964, the missile was tested on a modified Whisky-class experimental submarine. The missile was accepted to service in June 1968.

The construction of K-162, the first Papa-class boat, began in 1962 and continued through 1969. The long construction period was a result of the use of many revolutionary systems at the same time: a titanium hull, a modern nuclear reactor, and a lot of digital and analog- digital electronic equipment. Due to the enormous costs, the navy called the ship "Golden Fish." During trials, the submarine's performance was excellent. For example, the underwater speed was 42 knots, and in 1971 the ship established a still-unbeaten underwater speed record of 44.7 knots. The tactics of attack required a quiet approach to the target as long as possible and missile launch from maximum range. Escape maneuvers were then to be performed at maximum speed.

K-162, however, was to be a one-of-a-kind ship, since it was too expensive and complicated. Instead, from 1967 to 1973, eleven Charlie I-class submarines were built with more conventional equipment. The MGK-100 Kerch analog passive sonar had a range of 30-35 km. Each submarine was armed with eight launchers (small silos) for the P-70 system. The Brest analog fire-control system had interfaces to the Legenda and Uspekh systems. Most of the Charlie Is served with the 11th Division of the 1st Flotilla of the Northern Fleet, while some formed the 10th Division of the 2nd Flotilla of the Pacific Fleet. All of these submarines were withdrawn from service by 1993.

From very beginning, it was obvious that the P-70 Ametist system would have little chance of successfully engaging a target. The main limitation came from the relatively short range of the launching sub's sonar. Even when the target's position was known before approaching the group, sonar contact (in passive mode) was desired to update the location of moving targets. Therefore, in February 1963, the decision was made to develop a longer-range missile, while work on new, long range sonars was underway. In the mid-1970s, the Charlie I class was equipped with the digital, long-range (150-200 km) MGK-300 Rubin sonar and, in the late 1970s, with the even more capable MGK-400 Rubikon sonar with a range of over 200 km. The foundation for a longer-range, underwater-launched missile has been laid.

Soviet planners determined that approaching a US carrier group closer than 100 km was suicide for a submarine, so a minimum range requirement of 120 km was set. The new P-120 Malakhit (SS-N-9 Siren) missile was also developed by the Chelomey-led CKBM Design Bureau (presently NPO Mashinostroenia). It was based on the earlier P-70 Ametist missile, though larger to meet the range requirement. Contrary to its predecessor, which could be launched only from submarines, the P-120 had a universal booster that enabled launch from both surface ships and subs. It could be launched from a depth of 50 m. The P-120 was powered by a solid-fuel sustainer that gave the missile high subsonic speed as it flew at an altitude of 40 m. The range was dictated by the aforementioned requirement, though some sources say it could reach 150 km. A modernized terminal-phase guidance system had two sensors combined in one: a traditional but improved active-radar seeker supported by a passive infrared seeker mounted beneath. This measure improved resistance to countermeasures launched by defending ships. The missile had either a 500-kg HE or 200-kT-yield nuclear warhead.

The P-120 Malakhit system was accepted to service in March 1972. Tests of the underwater system took longer, and the P-120 missile was accepted into service onboard submarines in November 1977. The new missiles armed small, fast corvettes of the Nanuchka I class. In all, from 1969 to 1976, 18 of these ships were built, followed by 21 Nanuchka III-class ships. Today, though, only the latter remain in service. Between 1973 and 1980, six Charlie II-class submarines were built. Each sub had eight missile tubes and usually carried six conventional and two nuclear missiles. All of the submarines had the MGK-400 Rubikon sonar system. In the early 1980s, the Rubikon sonar was replaced by the MGK-500 Skat system, which used a much more capable digital computer and advanced signal processing. Launch of P-120 missiles (all eight could be launched in a quick salvo) was directed by the Raduga fire-control system. Submarines were provided with a Molnia digital interface to the Uspekh and Legenda targeting systems, along with a Paravan towed array for very-low-frequency communications. All of the Charlie II submarines were very recently withdrawn from service, but P-120 missiles continue to be used on Nanuchka III corvettes.

P-500 Bazalt (SS-N-12 Sandbox) and P-1000 Vulkan

Presently, the P-500 Bazalt (SS-N-12 Sandbox) remains only on surface ships, but it is still one of the most capable Russian naval weapons. For a long time it was underestimated in the West. Since the missile was similar in appearance to the P-6/P-35 series, it was not even recognized for a long time, especially as the main armament of Echo II submarines.

Development of the intended P-6/P-35 replacement was initiated on the very same day as the P-120 Malakhit program (February 28, 1963). It was to be a surface-launched missile for both submarines and surface ships. To avoid any counterattack from a carrier group, the missile's range was to be 500 km, outside the usual operational radius of carrier-protection forces. At the same time, the guidance system and missile survivability were to be greatly improved and in line with evolving tactics. For the first time, it was assumed that any attack on a carrier group would be of a massive character. The tactics of such an attack is described later, but it is worth describing some P-500 Bazalt features beforehand.

The P-500 missile is similar in appearance to the P-6/35 and was powered by a liquid-fuel sustainer and solid-rocket booster. It has a speed of Mach 2 at high altitude and Mach 1.5-1.6 at low altitude. The flight profile of the missile varies from 30 to 7,000 m (low-low or low-high). Guidance is based on a digital INS on a gyro- stabilized platform and an active-radar seeker, which periodically switches to passive mode. For the first time, the missile was equipped with a digital computer (Tsifrova Vichislenna Mashina, "digital computing device"). The guidance system was also equipped with a datalink to communicate between missiles in a salvo, with a salvo consisting of eight missiles launched at short intervals. Usually, one of the missiles flies high (5,000-7,000 m) to pick up the target, while the rest remain at medium to low altitude with their radar seekers switched to passive mode. The leading missile then transmits targeting data to the others and allocates individual targets, with half of the salvo directed at the aircraft carrier and half at other ships in the area, one apiece. The onboard radar seekers are turned on at the last moment, just before reaching the target. If the lead missile is shot down, another one (in a programmed sequence) takes over and climbs to a higher altitude to continue directing the salvo. All the missiles have active radar jamming to disrupt any defensive action from fighters and shipboard air-defense systems. In addition, vital parts of the P-500 missile are armored to increase survivability.

Early trials of the first version of the P-500 system were conducted from 1969 to 1970, and from 1971-75, tests of the final version, with a 550-km range, were completed. The missile has a 1,000-kg HE warhead or a 350-kT-yield nuclear warhead. In 1975 the P-500 system was introduced to service on 10 out of the 29 Echo II-class submarines then in service. Nine of them received the Kasatka-B system for receiving data from the Uspekh and Legenda targeting systems (radar picture only), while one received the Uspekh interface only, without access to the Legenda space targeting system. Communications with targeting systems could be conducted from periscope depth with the antenna above the surface. Usually, Soviet submarines carried six conventional and two nuclear P-500 missiles on combat patrols. All of the submarines armed with P-500 missiles were withdrawn from service in the mid-1990s.

The P-500 Bazalt system, however, was not only used on submarines. In 1977 the system was accepted into service onboard Kiev-class aircraft carriers, four of which were built. The first three had a battery of eight launchers in the forward deck. The last ship of the class, commissioned the Baku in 1987, was built to a modified design and had no less than 12 launchers. All of these ships were withdrawn from service in the 1990s, but the last ship, renamed Admiral Gorshkov , is to be sold to India - after stripping off the P-500 missiles.

The only ships still armed with the P-500 Bazalt system are Slava-class cruisers. The first ship of the class, commissioned in 1983, underwent a major overhaul in the 1990s and was renamed the Moskva . It serves with the Russian Navy's Black Sea Fleet. The Northern Fleet operates the Marshal Ustinov , commissioned in 1986, while the Pacific Fleet operates the Varyag , commissioned in 1989. According to unconfirmed sources, however, the last was re-armed with the P-1000 system (see below). The first two ships (and possibly all three) have a tremendous battery of 16 P-500 Bazalt missiles, which can be directed at targets with the assistance of embarked Ka-27 Helix helicopters. A fourth cruiser, the Ukrainian Ukraina , was armed with the P-500 system. The ship was completed in late 2001, but after lengthy deliberations, it never entered service with the Ukrainian Navy. Declared spare, it now is to be sold abroad.

The P-1000 Vulkan was one of the most mysterious missiles in Soviet service. It was also the last Russian missile that required a submarine to surface for launch. Its existence was never discovered by NATO, despite the fact it was operational on five submarines. It was generally similar to P-500 but had titanium armor, and many of its steel parts were replaced by titanium ones. This enabled a significant decrease in launch weight. At the same time, a more powerful booster and a more powerful and more fuel-efficient sustainer turbojet engine was employed. This increased the range to about 700 km. Its development was initiated in May 1979, and it underwent tests in the mid-1980s. The P-1000 was introduced into service in about 1987. In the late 1980s, five Echo II-class submarines were modernized to accommodate the new P-1000 Vulkan system, but all five were withdrawn from service in the mid-1990s. Thus, it was in front-line service for only about seven or eight years (unless it has, in fact, been installed on the Varyag ).

P-700 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck)

The development of the P-700 missile system started in 1969, but it was prolonged due to its complexity. It was assumed that the main source of information would be the satellite-based reconnaissance network, and from the very beginning, it was believed that the missile would be able to communicate with it directly after launch. The initial targeting information was to be received by a submarine cruising at a depth of about 30 m via a long-wave communications system from ground bases. The attack was to be coordinated with a group of long-range Tu-22M anti-ship aircraft. The underwater attack group consists of three to five Oscar and Oscar II subs, each armed with 24 P-700 missiles. The subs were to launch 70-120 such missiles against a single carrier group in a single mass attack. Roughly 30-50% of them are aimed at the carrier, while the others go after accompanying ships. Another salvo of 12-24 missiles was to be launched by aircraft, mainly to saturate the carrier group's defenses. The 30-knot speed of the Oscar I/II submarines enables a rapid approach to the launch area, about 450-500 km from the carrier group, and equally quick evasion after the attack.

The missile employs all of the techniques from the Bazalt/Vulkan. One lead missile per every 24 in the salvo flies at high altitude to reconnoiter the target, using its radar in active and passive modes. The active mode is used in quick "looks," then turned off to increase the penetration probability. The lead missile assigns targets to all subordinate missiles and communicates with the other lead missiles in the massive salvo to coordinate the attack. To achieve this, the missile is equipped with a powerful digital computer with three processors. The missile has an onboard integrated electronic-countermeasures suit for avoiding enemy anti-missile attacks using a combination of maneuver and deception jamming. The computer could order the missile to one of various stored courses with multiple altitudes. At high altitude, the missile speed is Mach 2.5, while at low (sea-skimming) altitude, it is Mach 1.5. Vital parts of the missile are armored to increase penetration against fire from Phalanx-type close-in weapon systems and against fragments of closely exploding air-defense missiles. The missile has a conventional 750-kg HE warhead or a nuclear warhead with an unknown yield (reportedly 500 kT, but that seems too high).

The guidance system was developed by TsNII "Granit." The missile itself was developed in OKB-52 (later NPO Mashinostoyeniya) under the direction of Chelomey and, after his death in 1984, under Gerberd Efremov. First tests of the missile started in November 1975. Numerous difficulties prolonged the factory tests until 1979, and in autumn of that year, the missile began state trials. Technical difficulties further prolonged the trials through October 1983, and the missile was officially accepted into service in March 1983. At this time, the space-based Legenda reconnaissance system had been fully deployed. In addition to the satellite system, the submarine could also use its own MGK-540 Skat-3 sonar system for targeting.

Only two Oscar I ships have been built: the K-525 (Arkhangelsk ) and K-206 (Murmansk ), commissioned in 1981 and 1983, respectively. Both remain in service with the Northern Fleet, and each are armed with 24 missiles and have Kasatka-U receivers for communication with the Legenda system. The subs were followed by the "ultimate" Oscar II class, of which 11 have been commissioned since 1986. The Northern Fleet operates the K-119 (Voronezh ), K-148 (Krasnodar ), K-410 (Smolensk ), K-266 (Orel ), K-186 (Omsk ), and K-150 (Tomsk ). The K-141 (Kursk ) exploded and sank on August 13, 2000. The Pacific Fleet operates the K-132 (Irkutsk ), K-173 (Krasnoyarsk ), K-442 (Chelabinsk ), and K-456 (Vyluchinsk ). The Russian Navy plans to commission a replacement for the Kursk, the K-329 (Belgorod ).

The P-700 missile was also introduced to service as a weapon for surface ships. Four Kirov-class nuclear cruisers were commissioned between 1980 and 1998: the Kirov (renamed Admiral Ushakov ), Frunze (renamed Admiral Lazarev ), Kalinin (renamed Admiral Nakhimov ) and Yuriy Andropov (renamed Pyotr Velikiy ). They were armed with 20 semi-vertical (with some oblique, like in submarines) P-700 Granit launchers. The system was directly adapted from submarines - to the point where the launchers have to be filled with water before launch. Fire control is provided by the MR-212 Vaygach-U onboard radar and other ships' electronic systems (the Gurzuf or Kantata-M passive reconnaissance systems, for example). The first two cruisers were withdrawn from service in the late 1990s, but the Admiral Nakhimov and the Pyotr Velikiy continue to serve. The only other ship equipped with P-700 Granit system is the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznietsov , commissioned in 1990 and operational with Russian Northern Fleet since 1995. The ship is armed with 12 P-700 launchers.


P-6 Progress

http://www.jedonline.com/getblob.asp?journalid=4&year=2003&month=10&section=articles&img=p6.jpg


P-35 Progress
http://www.jedonline.com/getblob.asp?journalid=4&year=2003&month=10&section=articles&img=p35.jpg

The P-35 Progress system is a long-range anti-ship missile that originated as a strategic cruise missile (P-5 Pityorka). It can carry out over-the-horizon attacks on hostile ships. A P-5S coastal-defense variant is known by the NATO designation of SSC-1 Sepal. The missile's guidance is by command and an active-radar/passive-IR seeker. Because of the very long range of this missile (450 km), the P-6D Progress version was introduced with mid-course guidance provided by a Tu-95 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft using its Big Bulge I-band search radar to locate the target and pass information back to the main control. The Big Bulge has a range of 350-400 km at 4,000-m altitude and is used to transmit radar pictures of the target to the missile-launching vessel. After launch, the missile climbs to about 400 m to enable the radar seeker to lock on as early as possible and to relay information back to the fire-control system. Final attack is in the form of a shallow dive. The P-7D Progress version has a radar altimeter to enable a more controled flight profile.

Manufacturer : Chelomey Designation : P-6, P-35 Progress Guidance : Mid-course autopilot (some versions with command update by datalink), terminal active radar Warhead : 800-kg HE or 100 kT nuclear Propulsion : Turbojet Range 460 km Speed : Mach 1.4 Length : 1,000 cm Body Diameter: 90 cm Wingspan : 260 cm Launch Weight : 4,500 kg Date Operational : 1960s Platforms : Ships; land Users : Russia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Syria, Angola


P-70 Ametist
http://www.jedonline.com/getblob.asp?journalid=4&year=2003&month=10&section=articles&img=ametist.jpg

The P-70 was the first Soviet ASM that could be launched by a submerged submarine. It is a medium-range missile with mid-course guidance by autopilot, with a J-band active-radar seeker for the terminal phase. Initial detection of the target is by either the submarine's ESM system or by the Snoop Head search radar operating in the ESM mode. Normally, the missile is launched from ranges up to 65 km, after which it climbs to about 100 m before the seeker locks on. Final approach for the attack is in the form of a shallow dive. Externally, the P-70 is cylindrical in shape, with a sharply pointed nose and a prominent reinforcing member or wiring duct along the underside of the body. There are short, folding, swept-back wings midway up the body in the rear half and three rear-facing cooling ducts around the wing leading edge.

Manufacturer : Chelomey Designation : P-70 (4K66) Guidance : Mid-course autopilot; terminal active-radar seeker Warhead : 500-1,000 kg HE or 200-kT nuclear Propulsion : solid-state rocket Range : 65 km Speed : Mach 0.9 Length : 670 cm Wingspan : 1,200 cm Launch Weight : 3,375 kg Date Operational : 1968 Platforms : Ships: Projects 670 (Charlie I)- and 661 (Papa)-class submarines Users : Russia


P-120 Malakhit
http://www.jedonline.com/getblob.asp?journalid=4&year=2003&month=10&section=articles&img=malakhit.jpg

The P-50 Malakhit was developed as a "universal" anti-ship missile for submarines and surface ships. It was intended to replace the high-altitude, relatively slow P-35 Progress (SS-N-3 Shaddock). Before the project was completed, it was replaced by a more advanced design - the P-120. The missile entered service in 1969. It was initially deployed on surface ships and subsequently on the Charlie II submarines. It also has longer range than the Ametiste (SS-N-7 Starbright) (70 km when submarine launched and 110 km surface-ship launched). The fire-control radar normally associated with the missile is either the Band Stand or the Plank Shave. The Band Stand operates over the D to F frequency bands and is used for target acquisition and tracking. The Plank Shave is a missile-control radar of which very few details are available. The missile's guidance is identical to that of the Ametiste with one important distinction: it can receive mid-course command updates from the launching platform or a third party.

Manufacturer : NPO Mashinostroenia Designation : P-120 (4K85) Guidance : Mid-course autopilot; terminal active-radar seeker Warhead : 1,000-kg HE or 200-kT nuclear Propulsion : solid-fuel booster and sustainer Range : 110 (surface launch) 70 (submarine) km Speed : Mach 0.9 Length : 884 cm Launch Weight : 3,000 kg Date Operational : 1972 Platforms : Ships: Project 670M (Charlie II) submarines, Project 1234 (Nanuchka), and Project 1240 (Sarancha) fast missile boats Users : Russia


P-500 Bazalt
http://www.jedonline.com/getblob.asp?journalid=4&year=2003&month=10&section=articles&img=bazalt.jpg

The P-500 is a long-range, supersonic cruise missile. The development of the missile started in 1963 as the P-350 (4K77) program, which was canceled but subsequently evolved into the P-500 (4K80) project. It was accepted to service in 1973 and became operational two years later. It has a cylindrical body, the front of which is slim with a sharply pointed nose. Two-thirds of the way along, it bulges before tapering toward the rear. The missile is powered by a turbojet, and there is a small air intake about halfway along the body. The missile features command or inertial guidance with the option of mid-course updates. Aircraft such as the Tu-95RC Bear D, the Ka-25 Hormone B, and the Ka-27 Helix B may be used for over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting. Terminal-phase guidance is either by an active-radar seeker or by passive radar homing. The payload consisted of either a 1,000-kg high-explosive warhead or a 350-kT nuclear device, but the latter has now been removed. It can be launched from surface ships or submarines, although the latter must surface to launch. Associated radars are the H/I-band Front Door or the Front Door C system, which both provide mid-flight updates to the missile if required. The former is a missile-guidance radar that has a multiple antenna system and is primarily for submarine use. The Front Door C is used by surface vessels and features a "hidden" antenna that hinges out when needed.

Manufacturer : Chelomey Designation : P-500 (4K80) Guidance : Mid-course autopilot; terminal active-radar seeker Warhead : 1,000-kg HE semi-armor piercing or 350- kT nuclear Propulsion : liquid-fuel rocket Range : 550 km Speed : Mach 2.5 Length : 1,700 cm Body Diameter: 90 cm Wingspan : 260 cm Launch Weight : 5,000 kg Date Operational : 1975 Platforms : Project 1143 (Kiev) aircraft carriers, Project 1164 (Slava) cruisers, Project 675 (Echo II) submarines Users : Russia


P-700 Granit
http://www.jedonline.com/getblob.asp?journalid=4&year=2003&month=10&section=articles&img=granit.jpg

The improved US ASW defenses around carrier battlegroups during the 1970s increasingly restricted the effectiveness of Soviet submarines carrying the Ametist/Malakhit (SS-N-7/9 Starbright/Siren) missiles. At the same time, the Soviet Navy wished to strengthen the defenses of its SSBN bastions, and this led to a requirement for a new missile. The P-700 Granit was developed as a more successful turbojet alternative to the Bazalt (SS-N-12 Sandbox) from which it was derived and whose liquid rocket proved troublesome. The long-range, sea-skimming anti-ship missile is launched from both surface ships and Oscar-class submarines. In the mid-course, it has an autopilot and can receive course updates by X-band datalink. It has a Ku-band active radar for terminal guidance and has a radar-homing capability.

Manufacturer : NPO Mashinostroenia Designation : P-700 (3M45) Guidance : Mid-course autopilot; terminal active-radar seeker and passive anti-radiation Warhead : 750-kg HE or 500-kT nuclear Propulsion : Two solid-fuel boosters one turbojet sustainer Range : 550 km Speed : Mach 1.6 Length : 10 m Body Diameter: 85 cm Launch Weight : 7,000 kg Date Operational : 1980 Platforms : Project 949 (Oscar) and 949A (Oscar II) submarines, Project 1143.5 (Kuznetsov) aircraft carriers, Project 1144 (Pyotr Velikiy) cruisers Users : Russia


http://www.jedonline.com/

Gee......Nice history, but I really need to ask. Has the "Mighty" Soviet Navy ever sunk a carrier? In All Of It's Glory and Grandeur - Have the Soviet's even obtained a bead on a US Super (Nimitz Class) Carrier?
Be........Real.

The Chap
28 Aug 04,, 00:10
Thank you Lurker! :) Now I have to find extra bloody paper :biggrin:
Please sir, can I have some more? :biggrin:
Superb!

sw55
05 Jan 05,, 23:51
I think the US has had lots of practice shooting down supersonic, and even maneuvering missiles for a long time with the Vandal, and now the Coyote.
http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-163.html

The CIWS have been removed when replacing them with RAM, which is specifically designed to combat supersonic maneuvering sea skimming missiles.

Don't assume that just because the US does not have a 'Moskit" that it wants one or that it has been asleep while the Russians have deployed theirs...
This technology has been dealt with for thirty years now.

Bill
06 Jan 05,, 01:09
The SM-2 is the US' Moskit.

Have fun shooting down a salvo-fired six pack of Mach 3.5 SM-2s bearing in on a Udaloy or Sovremny... ;)

Franco Lolan
06 Jan 05,, 03:33
Lurker, I sincerely appreciate your insight. Please feel free to express it.

sw55
09 Jan 05,, 17:59
The SM-2 is the US' Moskit.

Have fun shooting down a salvo-fired six pack of Mach 3.5 SM-2s bearing in on a Udaloy or Sovremny... ;)

Especially when you consider a MK-41 VLS Tico has potentially 68 of them, to ripple off. That makes them much more heavily armed than they look, and makes even Russian heavy Kirov's look underarmed under certain circumstances.

That ESSM video was awesome, where do you find them?

Bill
10 Jan 05,, 06:30
I'm sure ripple fired Mach 4+ ESSMs in surface mode wouldn't be much fun to try to intercept either... ;)

lurker
29 Jan 06,, 06:40
TV showed a test hit by P-700 Granit/Shipwreck.

sparten
29 Jan 06,, 07:26
Cool. A Tico, Burke, Perry and possibly even a Wasp would be doomed if hit by such a missle. But a CVN? Well probably a gaping hole in her flight deck and about 500 dead, but I doubt it will sink, unless, you have a case where there are armed aircraft on deck, or where the missle reaches the magazine.

lurker
29 Jan 06,, 07:32
Cool. A Tico, Burke, Perry and possibly even a Wasp would be doomed if hit by such a missle. But a CVN? Well probably a gaping hole in her flight deck and about 500 dead, but I doubt it will sink, unless, you have a case where there are armed aircraft on deck, or where the missle reaches the magazine.
Nobody planned to lauch just one missile against CVN. Since full salvo is 24 (or 48) missiles against CVBG, I think that about half would be targeting CVN itself.

sparten
29 Jan 06,, 08:24
Of that, only a couple could be expected to actually hit the carrier.

lurker
29 Jan 06,, 09:30
Of that, only a couple could be expected to actually hit the carrier.
Sure. I would say fair number would be around five.

sparten
29 Jan 06,, 09:43
5 hits, that would probably cause the carrier to sink.

lurker
29 Jan 06,, 09:48
5 hits, that would probably cause the carrier to sink.
Mission kill for sure. Sometimes it does not require too many hits to do a big ship in, in case of Hood - just one.
If it causes a big fire - it probably will sink.

Bill
29 Jan 06,, 10:30
Mission kill for sure. Sometimes it does not require too many hits to do a big ship in, in case of Hood - just one.
If it causes a big fire - it probably will sink.

I highy doubt 5 out of 48 missiles would get through and specifically target the carrier in the center of the screen.

5 or 10 or any amount of missiles probably won't sink a carrier, but they could completely gut it with fire. To sink a carrier you need holes at or below the waterline, and missiles don't make those.

gunnut
29 Jan 06,, 10:55
How about the "Sunburn?" I heard a lot about this new carrier killer that the Chinese have been very high on.

Also, how resistant are these missiles in a heavy ECM environment? So far all the discussions are on intercepting them with hardware. What about soft kills?

rickusn
29 Jan 06,, 12:41
There are varying views on the Sunburn. Heres one.:

Monday, April 25, 2005
The Sunburn is generally overrated
The Chinese acquisition of Russian Mosquito (Moskit) antiship missiles has stimulated a lot angst among conservative scribblers on defense issues. A commentator writing under the pseudonym of Stokes Pennwalt begs to differ:

The Moskit/Sunburn was originally designed to be launched en masse at a CVBG to deluge and overwhelm the weapons of fleet defense combatants, and make its way through to the carrier said ships would be protecting. Originally designed to be carried by supersonic Tu-22M/26 Backfires (knock-off Soviet clones of the defunct American B-1A), they ended up being deployed in air launchable versions with carrier-based Su-27M Flankers and sea-launchable from Sovremenny-class destroyers. Soviet naval air power was fairly laughable at the time, but a good deal of their surface combatants were also Sunburn-equipped, which made the missile a nonetheless ubiquitous threat to be considered.

It's fast. And that's about it. Its flight speed reduces the engagement time-envelope of hard point defense systems like CIWS and RAM from ~2 minutes to around 30 seconds at best. With a shortened envelope, this increases the chances of a missile (component of a large salvo) saturating a defense system, and getting inside its decision cycle. The surface combat systems of 1980 had a hard time identifying and prioritizing targets that quickly, and given that a Sunburn attack would have ostensibly involved hundreds of them, it was nearly assured that enough would make it through to harm the carrier. That was pre-AEGIS though, and the US Navy's Ticonderoga-class cruisers changed all that. AEGIS was designed, at inception, to specifically mitigage the threat of a Soviet missile attack on an American carrier battle group. Block 0 AEGIS showed up, tactics were developed, and a mode of protection became available.

The missiles became even less of a concern around 1987-88, when the entire AEGIS system received a baseline upgrade. Chief amongst these changes was the refinement of the AN/SPY-1D phased array radar and Block 1 CIWS upgrade. The new SPY-1D could better track sea skimming missiles than the 1A because its digital signal processors had been upgraded with faster CPUs that could filter out RF backscatter from wavetops. The Block 1 CIWS upgrade increased CIWS's rate of fire by 25% (4500r/min, pneumatic gun drive) and extended its engagement envelope past 2 nautical miles with subcaliber Tungsten teflon-saboted ammunition (14mm penetrator) - thus increasing potency markedly. Also upgraded was the internal search radar, although this was not as significant, given that AEGIS CIWS is slaved to the SPY, and usually doesn't even spin up its own internal search radar.

The largest reason why the Sunburns never became more of a threat, however, had little to do with technology and everything to do with modern American naval tactics. A carrier battle group operates at sea with impunity. That's the only way to put it. Both under the waves and over, hundreds of nautical miles out, the maritime battlespace is under control of the CVBG. If the sea can't be secured, the carrier won't be there. It's too much of a strategic risk, given the aircraft carrier's role in American defensive posture. Anyway, to launch an attack with Sunburns, bombers would have to close to within the missile's 50 nautical mile standoff range. The problem for them is, carriers in wartime steaming run a two tiered net of CAP aircraft, beginning 300 nautical miles out. The 300nm CAP flight usually consists of 2-4 fighters at 10-12,000 feet with an E-2C Hawkeye flying charlie around 30,000 feet. At that altitude, the Hawkeye's SAR has a range of another ~250nm. So, starting at 600nm away, the bomber formations are detected. Outer tier CAP aircraft are vectored, inner-tier CAP aircraft, 2-4 fighters patrolling at 150-200nm, move out to the outer track, and the carrier launches its alert-5 fighters to relieve the inner tier. Supposing the outer tier fighters can't do the job, the inner tier moves out, and the carrier launches the alert-15 fighers - and so on. In the event that the bombers can negotiate the fighter gauntlet, there remains the surface combatants - AEGIS ships that can track and engage up to 256 targets at a time. Remember, AEGIS was designed to be able to stop a missile barrage. Aircraft are fish in a barrel to a Ticonderoga with a magazine full of SM-2s. And that's the primary reason why the USN didn't get skittish around the Sunburn like we would think they would. The attacking aircraft would be attacked and likely destroyed before they closed to within 200 nautical miles of the battle group, much less the 50nm outer engagement limit of the missiles. The missiles would never leave the pylons.

The Sunburn is a novelty; nothing more. Some things about it are pretty cool though. Ramjet-sustained cruise missiles have a certain simplistic finesse to their design that's appealing. The Sunburn is so fast, that at 1,300mph at sea level, its skin gets so hot that it's a veritable beacon on a FLIR. The speed is astounding, but the missile is fairly mediocre as a weapon. Like most Russian technology, it excels in one specific attribute, forsaking all others. (See also: MiG-25 Foxbat, Oscar II SSGN) More of a curious sideshow than something to be feared, the Sunburn really isn't the threat that Tom Clancy cracked it up to be. The Soviet engineers came up with some crazy stuff in their day. Although once in a while they had some real winners. That whole gas turbine thing turned out pretty well, and I've always had a soft spot for the Kirovs.
Congressman Dana Rohrabacher of California has highlighted this threat on various occasions. The question here is whether the honorable Congressman has been engaged in disinformation against the Chinese, on behalf on the Pentagon, in hopes that they will waste billions of dollars amassing what the US Navy considers piles of useless junk.

posted by Zhang Fei @ 9:00 AM

lurker
29 Jan 06,, 13:58
The whole article is based on god knows what, Sunburn is designed to attack ships size of cruiser and less.
Middle caliber, if you want :)

sparten
29 Jan 06,, 13:58
I highy doubt 5 out of 48 missiles would get through and specifically target the carrier in the center of the screen.

5 or 10 or any amount of missiles probably won't sink a carrier, but they could completely gut it with fire. To sink a carrier you need holes at or below the waterline, and missiles don't make those.
Sniper, last year at another board we were discussing Jutland, and and specifically the blowing up of the Battlecruisers. The thing one guy pointed out was that all three took multiple hits from, Derfflinger and the rest. The damage to Invicible and Indetafigable was already bad enough to force them to retire from the line, even before the fatal hits. Queen Mary was the only one whhere the explosion was sudden, but even then its been pointed out that she had already recieved on order of half a dozen hits from Derfflinger. before the one that penetrated "Q" Turret.

So if a carrier is hit by 5 or six Shipwrecks, you alraedy have heavy damage, large fires and quite a bit of flooding that the ship would be doomed anyway, due to the sheer number of hits.

rickusn
29 Jan 06,, 15:11
"The whole article is based on god knows what, Sunburn is designed to attack ships size of cruiser and less.
Middle caliber, if you want "


I posted the article as an example of the many dubious and conflicting views out there.

While Im sure theoretically Sunburn could be used against a carrier I would tend to agree with Lurker .

Although this missle is much larger and faster than the Harpoon/Exocet/Switchblade anti-ship missles usually considered "middle caliber" it is similarly ranged approx 50-70nm depending on the version.

Now the P-700 Shipwreck missles produced for use on the Kirov class cruisers and the Oscar class SSGN's is another story along with the Sandbox missles fitted to the Slava class cruisers.

Bill
29 Jan 06,, 18:02
So if a carrier is hit by 5 or six Shipwrecks, you alraedy have heavy damage, large fires and quite a bit of flooding that the ship would be doomed anyway, due to the sheer number of hits.

I don't disagree with any of that...but it would still not sink unless it was finished off with torpedos or scuttled. In order to sink a ship you need to hole the hull. AShMs are not the right weapon for that endeavor. That's why god invented Torpedos.

LOL.

Bill
29 Jan 06,, 18:03
How about the "Sunburn?" I heard a lot about this new carrier killer that the Chinese have been very high on.

Also, how resistant are these missiles in a heavy ECM environment? So far all the discussions are on intercepting them with hardware. What about soft kills?

According to Rick USN and some other sailors i'm friendly with US soft kill(ie ECM) systems are very effective.

rickusn
29 Jan 06,, 21:28
According to Rick USN and some other sailors i'm friendly with US soft kill(ie ECM) systems are very effective.


I dunno if I ever said that if I did I dont now have any documentation to back it up.

OTOH I have related that effectively targeting ant-ship missles is problematic especially as you increase the range.

The USN is not even putting harpoon on the new Burkes.

It appears that the wepon of choice for surface combatants is the Standard SAM missle.

Not really a ship killer. But apparently an effective mission killer.

Longer ranged attacks would be carried out by aircraft.

Submarines too are in the mix of attacking enemy surface combatants far from the battlegroup.

USN Surface Combatants simply are not seen by the USN to be used for long-range attacks vs enemy surface combatants. Or at least so it appears.

Strike/AAW/ASW are their primary missions with the exception of the OHP's and weve already discussed them in another thread.

ASW took a back seat for awhile after the end of the cold-war. Renewed interest of late is revitalizing the USN's capabilities.

lurker
29 Jan 06,, 21:41
While Im sure theoretically Sunburn could be used against a carrier
Yes, theoretically it could.

... But assured required expedenture (or how it is in engl.) to sink it is around 70 missiles ;)

rickusn
29 Jan 06,, 22:17
"But assured required expedenture (or how it is in engl.) to sink it is around 70 missiles "
__________________


Thats reassuring!!!!!!!!!!!!! LOL

Bill
30 Jan 06,, 00:58
I dunno if I ever said that if I did I dont now have any documentation to back it up.


You did, here on WAB.

If you REALLY want me too i can hunt it down, would take a while...but it's out there.

Bill
30 Jan 06,, 00:59
Yes, theoretically it could.

... But assured required expedenture (or how it is in engl.) to sink it is around 70 missiles ;)

Expenditure.

rickusn
30 Jan 06,, 01:36
You did, here on WAB.

If you REALLY want me too i can hunt it down, would take a while...but it's out there.

Dont go to too much effort. Its not a real big deal. But if you come across it I would like to re-read it to refresh memory. I d like to know what I used for sources and documentation. Or in what context I included the assumption.

You know I dont like to make statements unless I have some material to back them up.

Im sure Ive stated that the USN has countermeasures available but "very effective" I can only hope I think.

Although it is possible I do have info around here to make that claim. I just for the life of me cant remember where I have it and/or found it.

Like I said if its not too much trouble refresh my memory. Im going to try on this end although not particularly hard. Unless of course it keeps me from sleeping.

Bill
30 Jan 06,, 04:38
Here ya go, it was in response to some of the wabsters babbling on about some of the new supersonic sea skimmers and how vulnerable the USN is:

http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/showthread.php?t=5188&highlight=brahmos

My post:


ESSM and RAM both exist specifically because of missiles like Brahmos.

The threat hasn't even finished fielding Brahmos, and the USN has already identified the weakness, designed and tested the neccesary defensive systems, and integegrated and fielded them in the fleet.

The RIM-162 ESSM and RIM-116 RAM are the USNs answer to Brahmos, Sunburn, and all the other worldbeater missiles around the world.

A single Arliegh Burke DDG Aegis guided missile destroyer can embark as many as 360 Mach 4+ 60g ESSM missiles in it's VLS cells, and perform as many as 16 simultaneous intercepts with the state of the art medium range ESSM and Mk7 Aegis system. ESSM was designed from the ground up as a missile killer, as was RAM.

Brahmos and Sunburn are still a threat, but the USN has made sure it's a threat they're fully prepared to deal with.

PS: Both ESSM and Block1 RAM have an anti-ship/anti-surface capability as well.

Your response:


Sniper is correct. But thats just the "hard kill" part. The USN has a plethora of "soft kill" systems.

Plus the fact that the USNs doctrine is to "kill the shooter" before he fires. And they have the capability to do that. And/or screw up their targeting, which isnt to do easy in the first place(M21: I assumed you meant OTH targetting wrt that sentence).


But what do I know Im just a fork-lift driver. LOL

Yup. And Christ was only a carpenter. LOL

Bring it on I say. The world apparently needs yet another lesson.

And we may be soft but we arent yet melting. LOL

Notice the small scratches the USN has received via AshM, mines or small boat attacks have been acknowledged and rectified accordlingly. Notice again that the USN pays attention and changes to situations and threats.

Steeped in tradition yes but ever-changing with no fear as an institution irregardless of any individual or individuals who from time to time hold power.

Its amazing to me how critical of the USN I have been in my life(even after serving for four years) and somehow you people force me to defend the institution.

Boggles my mind. LOL

GOD bless Snow.

leolover
30 Jan 06,, 06:37
how would aegis-equipped escorts with sm-2, ram and essm compete with threats like mach 5 misslies?

could missiles like HARM (i knwo its an arm, not an asm) or AS-16 break through the aegis-defense of a CVBG?

gunnut
30 Jan 06,, 07:09
how would aegis-equipped escorts with sm-2, ram and essm compete with threats like mach 5 misslies?

could missiles like HARM (i knwo its an arm, not an asm) or AS-16 break through the aegis-defense of a CVBG?


If I understand correctly, Aegis escorts are only a layer of the multi-layered defenses deployed by the USN to protect the CBG.

All missiles have limited ranges. The launch vehicle must get within the range of the outer CAP to get targeting data and fire their missiles. Should they succeed in that, they have to get by the 2nd layer of CAP. Of course there will be more fighters within that along with Aegis escorts laying down SAM traps.

USN's strategy to deal with these missiles is to destroy the source before the threat materializes.

"The enemy cannot push the button, if you disable his hand." - Sgt. Zim, Starship Troopers.

gunnut
30 Jan 06,, 07:13
Here's my next question. I read somewhere that China has developed anti-ship ballistic missile. How credible a threat is that?

sparten
30 Jan 06,, 08:00
I don't disagree with any of that...but it would still not sink unless it was finished off with torpedos or scuttled. In order to sink a ship you need to hole the hull. AShMs are not the right weapon for that endeavor. That's why god invented Torpedos.

LOL.
Thats what the Perrys are for, a couple of torpedos from them would finish the job. But you do agree with me that 6 Shipwrecks would doom a carrier?

Bill
30 Jan 06,, 10:00
Thats what the Perrys are for, a couple of torpedos from them would finish the job. But you do agree with me that 6 Shipwrecks would doom a carrier?

Gut it, sure. Whether or not it could be towed/recovered or had to be scuttled would be a matter of damage control responsiveness and effectiveness.

No realistic amount of Shipwrecks would actually *sink* the Carrier though.

rickusn
30 Jan 06,, 11:31
Ah yes Ill stand by that. Thanks.

leolover
30 Jan 06,, 12:14
If I understand correctly, Aegis escorts are only a layer of the multi-layered defenses deployed by the USN to protect the CBG.

All missiles have limited ranges. The launch vehicle must get within the range of the outer CAP to get targeting data and fire their missiles. Should they succeed in that, they have to get by the 2nd layer of CAP. Of course there will be more fighters within that along with Aegis escorts laying down SAM traps.

USN's strategy to deal with these missiles is to destroy the source before the threat materializes.

"The enemy cannot push the button, if you disable his hand." - Sgt. Zim, Starship Troopers.

of course, i know that, but what will happen if the attacker overrun or fool the fighters (something like described in "red storm rising") and launches his missiles???

is aegis combined with SM-2, RAM and ESSM capable of defeating AS-16 and HARM-style missiles???

Bill
30 Jan 06,, 16:38
"
is aegis combined with SM-2, RAM and ESSM capable of defeating AS-16 and HARM-style missiles???"

Yeah. The $1,000,000 question is, how many in what time frame?

Short of war, no way of really knowing.

lurker
30 Jan 06,, 18:48
No realistic amount of Shipwrecks would actually *sink* the Carrier though.
RN was probably thinking the same, until "Sheffiled" got hit by an unexploded "Exoset". :)

gunnut
30 Jan 06,, 18:53
of course, i know that, but what will happen if the attacker overrun or fool the fighters (something like described in "red storm rising") and launches his missiles???

is aegis combined with SM-2, RAM and ESSM capable of defeating AS-16 and HARM-style missiles???

You mean should the outer defensive perimeter allow a few of them through, what would happen...I appologize, I misunderstood.

Well, like what sniper said, everything is in theory until proven in war, especially when it comes to missile defense against supersonic seaskimmers.

SM-2, ESSM, and RAM combined with a strong ECM suite and decoys should be fairly challenging for the offending missile. All we have to do is to make the missile lose target tracking for a few seconds. At that speed, it could be way off and never even have a chance to reacquire the target.

Then in Burke's case, I'm not sure how a stealthy hull form affects a missile's ability to track. But they incoming missile might have even less time to home in on the escort.

As you can see, I really have said nothing, since I don't know anything. :biggrin:

Bill
31 Jan 06,, 01:26
RN was probably thinking the same, until "Sheffiled" got hit by an unexploded "Exoset". :)

Sheffield is built to nowhere near the same level of protection as a Nimitz is, lol. Most people don't know it, but the Nimitz's have quite a lot of armored protection.

Sandman
08 Feb 06,, 12:24
The USN was worried about the large diameter (650mm) wake following torpedos the Soviets fielded in the Cold War. One admiral said that the only way to deal with them was to put a Frigate in the wake of the carrier. I would think an ensign with a box of hand grenades on the stern might cause problems for such a weapon, much less dropping full sized WW2 depth charges over the stern as the torpedo closes, and I am sure some sort of aimed "hedge hog", or short range rocket you see in clusters on Russian warships which have an anti-torpedo function, all would be better than sacrificing a Frigate. Then again, if the carrier just ran flat out it probably could out run/range it. (50 knots?)
And don't worry GUnnut, I know even less.

canoe
08 Feb 06,, 13:15
You guys forgot about submarines which constitutes much bigger threat to AC
than anything else.It is harder to detect incoming modern high velocity torpedos,than to detect rockets fired in the air.
China ,Iran are investing in submarines for this reason mainly and that is the right thing to do."Dinosaurs of the seas"(Aircraft carrier) days are numbered.

If sea based armed UAV's progress as rapidly as their airborne companions I wouldn't be too sure. Basiclly in this day in age your not safe in anything unless you have lots and lots of defensive weapons and a good early warning system.

canoe
08 Feb 06,, 13:41
RN was probably thinking the same, until "Sheffiled" got hit by an unexploded "Exoset". :)

Few points on that.

1. Sheffield was 3,660 tons, Nimitz is about 70,000 tons.
2. The Sheffield was not simply sunk by the missile hit, apparently the missile hit the control room and knocked out the ships computer. The ignition of the unexploded missiles fuel caused a major fire to break out gutting the ship which a few days later caused it to sink.
3. At the time I beleive the only defence the British had against a low flying sea skimming missile was the seawolf anti-missile missile.

I'd imagine if the Sheffield had a much better fire surpression system they might have been able to save the ship but nothing is for certain.

sparten
08 Feb 06,, 14:43
Most people don't know it, but the Nimitz's have quite a lot of armored protection.
Only around the mags, 4 inches I believe.

canoe
08 Feb 06,, 20:50
Only around the mags, 4 inches I believe.

I think on since CVN-73 and onward they've improved the topside armor and are using a new type of high grade steel.

I can't find any armor specs for the newer Nimitz carriers but I did find the armor specs for the older Enterprise.

Armor as built:
2.5-4 inch belt
60 lb protective decks
4 inch bulkheads
4 inch side and 2 inch top round conning tower
4 inch side over steering gear

sparten
09 Feb 06,, 05:26
Still no Yamato. Armour on a carrier is supposed to be an insurance nothing else.

lurker
09 Feb 06,, 08:16
Few points on that.

1. Sheffield was 3,660 tons, Nimitz is about 70,000 tons.
2. The Sheffield was not simply sunk by the missile hit, apparently the missile hit the control room and knocked out the ships computer. The ignition of the unexploded missiles fuel caused a major fire to break out gutting the ship which a few days later caused it to sink.
3. At the time I beleive the only defence the British had against a low flying sea skimming missile was the seawolf anti-missile missile.

I'd imagine if the Sheffield had a much better fire surpression system they might have been able to save the ship but nothing is for certain.
1. It was one tiny Exocet, 170kg warhead. Each Shipwreck carries ~700kg of HE.
2. The key word is "unexploded". Add "exploded" fuel from a missle that size of a small jet.
3. Effectiveness of everything else is there to be proven.

Bill
09 Feb 06,, 09:32
1. It was one tiny Exocet, 170kg warhead. Each Shipwreck carries ~700kg of HE.
2. The key word is "unexploded". Add "exploded" fuel from a missle that size of a small jet.
3. Effectiveness of everything else is there to be proven.

Yes, a tiny exocet. Shipwreck is about 5-6x larger.

Except that a Nimitz is easily 10x larger than the Sheffield. And unlike the sheffield, armored.

sparten
09 Feb 06,, 10:26
Sniper, I repeat armour on a carrier is just an insurance, it is not designed to stand up to a pounding like the ships of the line of old.
Add to that the chance of being caught with a packed flight deck. Carriers best defences are its own air group and escorting Ships.

canoe
09 Feb 06,, 10:51
1. It was one tiny Exocet, 170kg warhead. Each Shipwreck carries ~700kg of HE.
2. The key word is "unexploded". Add "exploded" fuel from a missle that size of a small jet.
3. Effectiveness of everything else is there to be proven.

I think my point is if the missile had exploded it probably would have been less of a problem for the ship. The situation was unique in that the first batch of type 42's didn't appear to have a good fire surpression system. Which is why the internal layout of the second batch of type 42's was changed.

In theory if they'd been able to control the fire the ship would have been fine minus the damage to the control area.

In terms of the carriers the U.S intentionally sank one of them recently when they retired it and while they didn't release the specifics of how much damage the carrier took they did state it survived a fairly massive amount of damage. This was with hits from missiles, torpedos, mines, IED's, etc. And the ship had no crew or any form of damage control and still took a beating and didn't sink.

sparten
09 Feb 06,, 11:54
And it also did not have bomns, fuel and aircraft on board.

canoe
09 Feb 06,, 12:09
And it also did not have bomns, fuel and aircraft on board.

I beleive it did have a fair bit of fuel, someone would have to verify that for me though. In terms of aircraft and bombs fair enough but from what I understand the bombs are kept in a pretty well protected area.

Dreadnought
09 Feb 06,, 14:13
Still no Yamato. Armour on a carrier is supposed to be an insurance nothing else.

IMO I agree. Damage control is what will save their tails and fast damage control at that. The newer class carriers compartments are subdivided 10 fold over the earlier carriers. Yes they can absorb more damage then the older carriers but what keeps them afloat are the damage control teams and them having their ops (flooding/firefighting) and defensive team skills down to the "t".

A carriers protection are its missles, phaylynx, of coarse its air wings and its escorts as well as knowing what is coming at it (radars)(forward bow radar/eletronic warfare suite) and the carriers speed . But if all else fails damage control will be the only thing to keep her afloat and this is only "if possible". As we have seen in numerous pics here on WAB carriers can take on a serious list (20^ and sometimes even more) with major damage and still manage to limp away atleast for enough time to get its crew off if not back to port or repair facility.

However you must get to the Carrier first and the chances of that on a war footing with her air wing and escorts arent very good chances at all if any in modern day warfare.

Bill
09 Feb 06,, 18:32
Sniper, I repeat armour on a carrier is just an insurance, it is not designed to stand up to a pounding like the ships of the line of old.


That's good, because nothing around can pound a ship like the old ships of the line could.

The Nimitz have armored hulls, heavily armored magazines/weapon stores/propulsion, massive compartmentalization, and truly mindnumbing firefighting capability.

Comparing a Nimitz to a Sheffield is just stupid.

Bill
09 Feb 06,, 18:34
I beleive it did have a fair bit of fuel, someone would have to verify that for me though. In terms of aircraft and bombs fair enough but from what I understand the bombs are kept in a pretty well protected area.

USN bombs are also insensitive munitions.

Defcon 6
11 Feb 06,, 03:08
Few points on that.

1. Sheffield was 3,660 tons, Nimitz is about 70,000 tons.
2. The Sheffield was not simply sunk by the missile hit, apparently the missile hit the control room and knocked out the ships computer. The ignition of the unexploded missiles fuel caused a major fire to break out gutting the ship which a few days later caused it to sink.
3. At the time I beleive the only defence the British had against a low flying sea skimming missile was the seawolf anti-missile missile.

I'd imagine if the Sheffield had a much better fire surpression system they might have been able to save the ship but nothing is for certain.

Actually the Nimitz is 102,000 tons.

Defcon 6
11 Feb 06,, 03:09
That's good, because nothing around can pound a ship like the old ships of the line could.

The Nimitz have armored hulls, heavily armored magazines/weapon stores/propulsion, massive compartmentalization, and truly mindnumbing firefighting capability.

Comparing a Nimitz to a Sheffield is just stupid.

Nimitz's don't have any armor last time I checked.

Bill
11 Feb 06,, 04:04
Nimitz's don't have any armor last time I checked.

Check again.

Horrido
11 Feb 06,, 08:53
Haven't throroughly read through the thread, but has anyone touched upon guiding an over-the-horizon missile to target, much less finding the target in the first place? In the past, the Soviets had to rely upon aerial or submersible assets to provide targetting adjustments and guidance to their missiles. This is why Harpoon missiles became so important, to whack those submarines providing guidance while they were at or near the surface. I see no reason for this problematic situation to have changed.

lurker
11 Feb 06,, 22:06
Haven't throroughly read through the thread, but has anyone touched upon guiding an over-the-horizon missile to target, much less finding the target in the first place? In the past, the Soviets had to rely upon aerial or submersible assets to provide targetting adjustments and guidance to their missiles. This is why Harpoon missiles became so important, to whack those submarines providing guidance while they were at or near the surface. I see no reason for this problematic situation to have changed.
Depends on a missile.

p.s. Harpoon?? Whacking a submarine? Providing guidance??? ... nice.

TopHatter
11 Feb 06,, 22:17
Depends on a missile.

p.s. Harpoon?? Whacking a submarine? Providing guidance??? ... nice.
Yes, that was the original - somewhat quaint in hindsight, given what a huge success it turned out to be - intent of the Harpoon program:
To destroy surfaced Soviet submarines, such as those providing midterminal guidance to Soviet antiship missiles...not unlike a whaler blasting a harpoon into the side of a whale.

That's where the name came from ;)

canoe
11 Feb 06,, 22:35
Actually the Nimitz is 102,000 tons.

I was just generally going by the posted stats on it. Global security showed it at around 97,000 tons full load and I thought I read somewhere it was ~70k tons empty.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/cvn-68-specs.htm

lurker
11 Feb 06,, 22:38
Yes, that was the original - somewhat quaint in hindsight, given what a huge success it turned out to be - intent of the Harpoon program:
To destroy surfaced Soviet submarines, such as those providing midterminal guidance to Soviet antiship missiles...not unlike a whaler blasting a harpoon into the side of a whale.

That's where the name came from ;)
For some 30 years Soviet/Russian sub's SSMs does not use midcourse guidance.

canoe
11 Feb 06,, 22:39
Yes, that was the original - somewhat quaint in hindsight, given what a huge success it turned out to be - intent of the Harpoon program:
To destroy surfaced Soviet submarines, such as those providing midterminal guidance to Soviet antiship missiles...not unlike a whaler blasting a harpoon into the side of a whale.

That's where the name came from ;)

In other weird news I recall just reading a few days ago the U.S is testing some type of underwater canister launched version of the AIM-9X which would allow U.S subs to engage aircraft while submerged. Apparently U.S subs already have sensor systems that allow them to detect aircraft from underwater. If anyone interested in that sorta thing I can try and find the article.

**Update***
The previously mentioned link.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsub/articles/20060210.aspx

TopHatter
11 Feb 06,, 23:03
For some 30 years Soviet/Russian sub's SSMs does not use midcourse guidance.
My apologies, I should have been more specific. I was referring to air-launched ASMs

lurker
11 Feb 06,, 23:35
My apologies, I should have been more specific. I was referring to air-launched ASMs
Last missiles that had semi-active guidance were AS-3's which were decomissioned like in 70's.

Everything else after that is mostly uses innertial guidance with terminal active radar guidance (Sometimes it's active/passive, sometimes + IR; - but all of them are authonomous).

TopHatter
12 Feb 06,, 00:20
Last missiles that had semi-active guidance were AS-3's which were decomissioned like in 70's. Correct!
And when was the Harpoon project first initiated? 1965! ;)

Bill
12 Feb 06,, 02:49
For some 30 years Soviet/Russian sub's SSMs does not use midcourse guidance.

Midcourse guidance updates massively increase the chances of a hit for any OTH AShM.

TASM didn't 'need' midcourse updates either....unless you actually wanted to hit what you were shooting at.

lurker
12 Feb 06,, 10:52
Midcourse guidance updates massively increase the chances of a hit for any OTH AShM.

TASM didn't 'need' midcourse updates either....unless you actually wanted to hit what you were shooting at.
Well, it's all accounted for.

In a place of Janes guys I would also post range of P-700 as 400+ miles ;)

Bill
12 Feb 06,, 13:59
Hitting any target at 400 miles in actual combat conditions against an ENCOM'd fleet is a hell of a lot harder to accomplish in real life than it is to babble about on the internet.

Every sailor i've ever talked too has echoed that sentiment.

TopHatter
12 Feb 06,, 15:22
Last missiles that had semi-active guidance were AS-3's which were decomissioned like in 70's.

Everything else after that is mostly uses innertial guidance with terminal active radar guidance (Sometimes it's active/passive, sometimes + IR; - but all of them are authonomous).
Don't forget, even a missile that came after the AS-3 - the AS-4 - was upgraded to enable mid-course updates. ;)


In a place of Janes guys I would also post range of P-700 as 400+ miles And it's likely that the Granit also has the capability for mid-course updates. ;)

I guess it's considered a "nice to have". :redface:

lurker
12 Feb 06,, 18:28
And it's likely that the Granit also has the capability for mid-course updates. ;)
I guess it's considered a "nice to have". :redface:
As opposing to that they always say that "Granit" is completly fire-and-forget system.

TopHatter
12 Feb 06,, 18:58
As opposing to that they always say that "Granit" is completly fire-and-forget system.
"They" can say whatever they want....at least until it's specs are revealed by the Russians, or one is delivered by UPS to various "interested parties" :redface:

lurker
12 Feb 06,, 19:43
"They" can say whatever they want....at least until it's specs are revealed by the Russians, or one is delivered by UPS to various "interested parties" :redface:
They means "in the books". Specs are partially open.

rickusn
12 Feb 06,, 19:44
Tophatter do you not yet know that all things Russian are the best and better yet undefeatable.

Their miitary does not have to train, fly or go to sea to achieve their superiority. They dont even need funding. All they have to do is talk and victory is instantly assured.

I quake in my boots at the thought of my nation, the U.S.A., confronting the omnipotent, all-powerful Russian military machine.

Any failures are the result of U.S. conspiracies, sabotage and outright attacks(think Kursk) on the Motherland. And therefore the Russians have no weaknesses.

The demise of the USSR actually never happened its only a cute fairytale. A bedtime story for American children so as to be able to sooth their tortured souls and allow them a measure of peaceful sleep..

Here is the arrogance and ignorance always displayed by Russians. :

"The Secret of the Kursk’s Weapons
Dmitry Safronov


The Kursk submarine still has 22 “Granit” – SSN19 (NATO classification – “Shipwreck”) secret, supersonic long-range cruise missiles for strikes against surface forces on board.

It is precisely for this reason that Russian naval ships are on round-the-clock patrol duty in the area of the stricken Kursk. The coordinates for the center of patrol area are 37 degrees 35 minutes E. longitude, 69 degrees 40 minutes N. latitude. The Kursk lies at this spot at a depth of about 100 meters.

Strana.Ru has learned from Navy Central Command that there was a change of patrol ships at the site of the accident a few days ago. The heavy cruiser Pyotr Velikiy (Peter the Great) has replaced the large anti-submarine ship Admiral Kharlamov.



The Mashinostroyeniye Company built the submarine’s main weapon – the “Shipwreck” long-range, supersonic missile. The missile is considered a top-secret weapon.

Naval ships of the “Antei” class (project 949A) appeared back in the times of the Soviet Navy, Mashinostroyeniye General Director Gerbert Yefremov explained to our correspondent. Such ships were designed to counterbalance American aircraft carrier forces and all groups of striking ships at sea.

The idea of a so-called “asymmetrical” response materialized at the beginning of the 1980s. Essentially, the idea was based on creating a powerful group of nuclear-powered strike submarines armed with long-range supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. The Granit missile was built at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s. The project was carried out by the Reutovo branch of Mashinostroyeniye under Academician Vladimir Chelomeyev.

The “Shipwreck” can be fired both from surface vessels and submarines. It has a range of over 500 kilometers. Its firing weight is 7 tons and it has a length of 10 meters. Its velocity is 2.5 mach (2,800 km/hr). The Granit is capable of carrying different types of warheads.

However, it is not only the excellent flight characteristics of the missile and the homing device's countermeasures that enable the “Shipwreck” to preserve its unique combat capabilities, Yefremov points out.

The missile’s chief merit is its unique guidance system. It is based on “artificially intelligent” electronic systems that enable the missile to strike a single vessel, according to the “one ship – one missile” principle. The missile itself selects and classifies the targets by their “importance.” It chooses the tactic of attack and plans how it is to be carried out. The missile’s onboard computer is loaded with data on modern classes of ships to exclude errors in choosing its maneuvers to hit the selected target.

The missile’s computer also holds purely tactical data, for instance, on the type of ship formation. This data enables it to identify what lies ahead – a convoy, an aircraft group or a landing assault force – and to attack the main targets. The onboard computer also holds data for countering the enemy’s radio jamming signals, as well as tactical means for escaping air fire.

After the missiles are launched in a volley, the designers explain, they decide by themselves which one will attack which target, and what kind of maneuvers must be carried out in accordance with mathematical algorithms in the behavior program.

The missile also has capabilities for outwitting attacking missile-interceptors. After the main target in the group of ships is knocked out, the remaining missiles attack other ships in the formation, excluding the possibility of one and the same target being hit by two missiles.

Last year (1999), the Kursk was on a patrol mission in the Mediterranean. And as the story was told at Russia's chief naval headquarters, the US 6th Fleet Command was compelled to dispatch everything it could to track down the Kursk, but they came up with nothing.

Finally, a huge circle 500 km. in diameter was drawn on the maps and US naval ships were strictly forbidden to enter this circle. By its presence alone, the Kursk paralyzed the whole US fleet, and compelled it to think about its security.

"There is every reason to suppose that the US Navy will not pass up a chance to get its hands on any information about our missile for creating a defense system against it,” Yefremov points out. “And here, there is no need to nurse any illusions about various international treaties, or laws of ethics.”

But even if such a system appears, Granit will still remain a most powerful weapon against any well-defended adversary. Even if a missile interceptor hits, Granit will be able to retain its initial velocity because of its huge mass and speed. As a result, it can reach its target. The impact of such a strike will be such that even without its warhead, the missile will be able to snap a destroyer-class vessel in half.

Today, Mashinostroyeniye is working on a program to support Granit’s high combat efficiency throughout its entire service life. This concerns both its flight characteristics and its “intellectual” capabilities. All this work does not require large investments, and this means that the Russian Navy will still have decisive “arguments” in any sea battle.

The technical capabilities that have already been put into Granit form the basis for the concept of building a new type of anti-ship missile, the “Yakhont.”"


Yes it is now time for the US not only to disband their navy but as a nation to concede total,unmitigated defeat and submit to the unconditional surrender demands of the Worlds(My mistake: The Universes) Greatest Power the almighty Russian Empire.


LOL Will you people never give up with your nonsensical, unreal outlooks?

lurker
12 Feb 06,, 19:48
LOL, when will you grow up?

Where did I said that "that all things Russian are the best and better yet undefeatable."?

There is a plenty of stupid people from any country. Does not take much to find people who thinks "that all things American is best and better and undefeatable and shoots laser beams from their a**es" right on this board. :)

rickusn
12 Feb 06,, 20:08
Lurker when your screwed up country can dispose of its own nuclear submarines without the help of the entire free world you can insult me with phrases such as:

"LOL, when will you grow up?"

Until then you should keep your big,fat mouth shut.

But I doubt if you have the either the humility or the guts for such a course of action.

If you have a problem with "stupid" people take it up with them.

My problem is you a and your repeated statements and implications that all things Russian work as advertised and no U.S. products do..

To say you havent done this(and repeatedly I might add) is a total lie.

Your total inability to fess up to your nonsensical assertions shows a total lack of character.

But then what else would I expect from someone who has none..

lurker
12 Feb 06,, 20:17
Yawn, you boring the hell out of me.

TopHatter
12 Feb 06,, 20:38
They means "in the books". Specs are partially open.
Great. Let me know when they're opened up all the way.



There is a plenty of stupid people from any country. Does not take much to find people who thinks "that all things American is best and better and undefeatable and shoots laser beams from their a**es" right on this board. :)
Actually, my whole jumping into this thread was based on this little uninformed statement made by yourself:


p.s. Harpoon?? Whacking a submarine? Providing guidance??? ... nice.
OK, here's the deal: I don't expect you to know the origins of the Harpoon program. But when expressing disbelief, it helps if you avoid the sarcasm and derisively dismissive attitude, at least until you've got all the facts.

Try this out instead:


I hadn't read anything about Harpoon being intended for an anti-submarine mission. I'm also a bit confused about the whole "providing guidance" part.

Heck, for that matter, you COULD have done a BARE minimum of research on the subject before shooting your mouth off.

I'll be the first to admit that when I shoot my mouth off, there is usually someone who'll be there to shut it for me with facts that I hadn't been aware of. Awfully embarrassing for me, I can assure you. ;)

Furthermore, you're very quick to point out when Americans are bashing Soviet/Russian gear. But you seem to have no problem doing it yourself.

Ever think of responding with a quiet, reasoned tone in your post, sticking to the facts and leaving the nationalism at home?

For that matter, I thought you lived in the United States yourself...?

rickusn
12 Feb 06,, 21:29
"Yawn, you boring the hell out of me."

Yes Im well aware that facts and reality bore you.

Bores alot of other American enemies too.

In fact our whole plan is to bore you and your kind to death. LOL

Been doing it for a couple of centuries now and dont plan to stop.

Its well known that only arrogant, ignorant, no account people of low character succumb to boredom.

I guess you just wrote your epitaph.


My new motto:


"America: Winning the war by boring to death one enemy at a time"

LOL

And here all this time I thought that this new century would bring a new serious challenge by our enemies to the American Way of Life.

But I see "boredom" is still the weapon that works the best. What could be easier? Some things never change. LOL

Bill
13 Feb 06,, 00:05
Tophatter do you not yet know that all things Russian are the best and better yet undefeatable.

Their miitary does not have to train, fly or go to sea to achieve their superiority. They dont even need funding. All they have to do is talk and victory is instantly assured.

LOL, that's friggin' funny. :biggrin:

lurker
14 Feb 06,, 05:27
Heck, for that matter, you COULD have done a BARE minimum of research on the subject before shooting your mouth off.

I'll be the first to admit that when I shoot my mouth off, there is usually someone who'll be there to shut it for me with facts that I hadn't been aware of. Awfully embarrassing for me, I can assure you. ;)

I was just stumbled a little bit, because there were very little amount of subs in the USSR navy that were required to be surfaced for their function. Like early radar screen subs, ot later long range retranslators. But all of those were custom designs, not a big series.

I didn't know that we were talking about 60's. And in that time there was a big line of subs exacly fitting that profile - "folding beds" - Echo's. They needed a fairly long time for a surface launch.



Furthermore, you're very quick to point out when Americans are bashing Soviet/Russian gear. But you seem to have no problem doing it yourself.

Have you seen me bashing US aircraft? I have enormous respect for US Airforce, and just see a difference in concept going down to every piece of equipment. I know about real deficiencies in Russian equipment, just not want to talk about them (But I have fun when you guy are trying to add some fictional stuff to it).
For example take Harpoon. What makes it great? Flexibility. The thing that it's very mobile. You can launch almost from any platform ranging from a helicopter to a big ship.
You can't do the same with Shipwreck. You cannot reload it at sea. You cannot put it on a plane. ... And the biggest problem with it, thats the initial tagreting infrastructure is broken. The only thing that left there is passive sats, and airplanes. ... That, and not a fictional midcourse correction is a biggest problem.



Ever think of responding with a quiet, reasoned tone in your post, sticking to the facts and leaving the nationalism at home?

I left it at home long time ago. The one and only oath that I made was given to the country that not exists anymore.



For that matter, I thought you lived in the United States yourself...?
Yes, there too.

lurker
14 Feb 06,, 05:31
"Yawn, you boring the hell out of me."
Yes Im well aware that facts and reality bore you.

LOL. Don't spend all your money on gilrs and drinks just yet.

Russia plains to pay off all the remains of the USSR debt this year. ALL. OF. IT.

All 26 billions $ that remains. That is 13 times bigger than 2 billions that is needed yearly for the sub utilization program.

:)

rickusn
14 Feb 06,, 06:00
And you continue to prove my point:

"Its well known that only arrogant, ignorant, no account people of low character succumb to boredom.

I guess you just wrote your epitaph."


Maybe you should ask Norway, Japan and the UK among others how much they like footing the bill to clean up the Russian mess.

But then of course to you its only a U.S. conspiracy. But thats right weve also spent money helping to clean up the mess. But thats right we stopped because the Russians spent the money elsewhere in particular on revitalising their nuclear deterrent.

Never heard anyone complain about the interest the U.S. pays on its debt. ALL nations clamor(including China) to sell their products in the U.S.. Never heard that about Russia. I wonder why?

What are the aforementioned countries receiving in return for their expenditures?
Nothing. Basically they are held hostage. Its extortion. Its either pay the clean-up cost now or later when the problem is much worse and much harder to clean up..

Maybe you should take your own advice about "growing up".

But that would take "character" which weve already ascertained you sorely lack..

LOL Swearing at me. Yep thatll get my goat.

I know every vile epithet ever devised by mankind in dozens of languages.

Your pitiful attempt is quite humorous.

Post your email and Ill show you what swearing is all about.

But again Ill bet your gutless. Arent you?

lurker
14 Feb 06,, 06:11
Maybe you should ask Norway, Japan and the UK among others how much they like footing the bill to clean up the Russian mess.
They pay 1 billion out of 2.

rickusn
15 Feb 06,, 01:08
Your full of crap as usual.

This site has tons of info:

http://www.bellona.no/en/index.html

But even if you were correct. Which you arent.

Why should anyone else pay anything?

Its pure extortion.

Or on the part of those nations participating pure appeasement.

lurker
15 Feb 06,, 10:17
Don't know what you are talking about. :)

If US would like to dismantle all of it's nuclear carriers, a lot of countires would like to help and donate.

Just because they are such a good friends. :)

TopHatter
15 Feb 06,, 17:51
Don't know what you are talking about. :)

If US would like to dismantle all of it's nuclear carriers, a lot of countires would like to help and donate.

Just because they are such a good friends. :)
I'm guessing that those countries that have been saved by U.S. carriers - either through humanitarian aid or military action - would probably prefer them NOT to be dismantled. ;)

Dreadnought
15 Feb 06,, 18:16
Don't know what you are talking about. :)

If US would like to dismantle all of it's nuclear carriers, a lot of countires would like to help and donate.

Just because they are such a good friends. :)


Uh huh and what would deter such "good friends" from running amok in the world oceans and skies mind you? :rolleyes:

rickusn
16 Feb 06,, 01:49
Once again Lurker shows his ignorance.

Surprise. Surprise.

LOL

Dreadnought
16 Feb 06,, 14:54
Don't know what you are talking about. :)

If US would like to dismantle all of it's nuclear carriers, a lot of countires would like to help and donate.

Just because they are such a good friends. :)


Lurker a question... I am taking for granite you are Russia yes? Can you tell me approximately where in Russia or some kind of landmark? The reason...just wanted to see if there are any Naval port pics you could post. I have a pic I was going to ask you about but apparently I cant find it now. It looked like two cruisers in the background and I was wondering if they were of the Kirov class or Slava class moored together. Ill keep looking for it.

HistoricalDavid
19 Feb 06,, 16:21
So on the final count, what does the typical carrier battle group have to counter these 'carrier-killers'?

1. Not being found
2. Mission-killing the shooter, in a variety of ways
3. Killing the missile using carrier-borne aircraft... unlikely
4. ECM soft-kill systems
5. SM-2 Block IIIB and ESSM
6. SeaRAM or just RAM
7. Structural design of carriers, though I'd rather not rely on that.

And that's not mentioning other NATO countries' ships carrying things like Aster 15/30 missiles.

Should I be worried?

Bill
19 Feb 06,, 18:09
So on the final count, what does the typical carrier battle group have to counter these 'carrier-killers'?

1. Not being found
2. Mission-killing the shooter, in a variety of ways
3. Killing the missile using carrier-borne aircraft... unlikely
4. ECM soft-kill systems
5. SM-2 Block IIIB and ESSM
6. SeaRAM or just RAM
7. Structural design of carriers, though I'd rather not rely on that.

And that's not mentioning other NATO countries' ships carrying things like Aster 15/30 missiles.

Should I be worried?

You forgot to add the Mk15/1B Phalanx CIWS to the list.

HistoricalDavid
19 Feb 06,, 20:15
Its numbers are being trimmed somewhat and I doubt it can offer serious protection against a 7-tonne missile(s) going Mach 2+. Even if it does react quickly enough, I doubt it can pump enough DU into the things to really stop them, not necessarily from damaging the ships, but damaging sensitive stuff such as radar antennae.

I suppose it can go at No.7 but the conclusion is - another Russian 'superweapon' which turns out to be of uncertain utility. The best solution will always be No.1. :)

EDIT: Actually the best defence will be the Russians themselves. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3304377.stm :p

Bill
20 Feb 06,, 02:09
Its numbers are being trimmed somewhat and I doubt it can offer serious protection against a 7-tonne missile(s) going Mach 2+. Even if it does react quickly enough, I doubt it can pump enough DU into the things to really stop them, not necessarily from damaging the ships, but damaging sensitive stuff such as radar antennae.

I suppose it can go at No.7 but the conclusion is - another Russian 'superweapon' which turns out to be of uncertain utility. The best solution will always be No.1. :)

EDIT: Actually the best defence will be the Russians themselves. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3304377.stm :p

20mm APDS works just fine on 20 ton Mach 2+ fighters. No idea why it wouldn't work on 7 ton missiles.

HistoricalDavid
20 Feb 06,, 16:37
20mm APDS works just fine on 20 ton Mach 2+ fighters. No idea why it wouldn't work on 7 ton missiles.

Never heard of that happening, or even being designed for it, but I'll take your word on it. It did have difficulty intercepting that slow Silkworm during the Gulf War.

What I'm thinking of is pieces of a chewed-up Granit still having enough momentum to do damage to the ship.

Bill
20 Feb 06,, 17:04
The standard US fighter gun since the mid 1950's has been the 20mm Vulcan cannon.

The same exact gun employed by the Phalanx CIWS.

Since the 1950s US fighters have scored god only knows how many gun kills with their Vulcans.

I don't know about you, but i would not want to be in an SU-27(over 20 tons full combat load) that got hit with a 1 second burst of 20mm APDSDU cannon fire!(about 80rounds).

A 20mm APDSDU round will penetrate around 2" of steel plate armor, i therefore don't see a problem getting into the guts of a missile.

To me, the main drawback of the Phalanx system was the short range of the 20mm round, not any problem with firepower or destructiveness. The Goalkeeper 30mm CIWS goes a long way toward correcting that problem, and also has the benefit of firing the FAR more powerful 30x173mm cartridge of the A-10 warthog. :)

Dreadnought
22 Feb 06,, 16:48
The standard US fighter gun since the mid 1950's has been the 20mm Vulcan cannon.

The same exact gun employed by the Phalanx CIWS.

Since the 1950s US fighters have scored god only knows how many gun kills with their Vulcans.

I don't know about you, but i would not want to be in an SU-27(over 20 tons full combat load) that got hit with a 1 second burst of 20mm APDSDU cannon fire!(about 80rounds).

A 20mm APDSDU round will penetrate around 2" of steel plate armor, i therefore don't see a problem getting into the guts of a missile.

To me, the main drawback of the Phalanx system was the short range of the 20mm round, not any problem with firepower or destructiveness. The Goalkeeper 30mm CIWS goes a long way toward correcting that problem, and also has the benefit of firing the FAR more powerful 30x173mm cartridge of the A-10 warthog. :)

Got a goalkeeper for the flatbed? :biggrin:

HistoricalDavid
22 Feb 06,, 19:38
Unless he has to strafe the ship with gunfire, how will an aircraft get within the range of a CIWS anyway? Gun kills are perfectly possible in air war because you are mobile; I cannot similarly envision a battle group sailing at impressive 31 knots to catch a 200+ knot Sukhoi. He will be shot down by the carrier's aircraft or the battle group's AA missiles anyway. Not to denigrate the Phalanx... but it is still a largely immobile gun system against an aircraft, even with a huge RoF and a sizeable round. I can't imagine a 30mm round solving that problem of range versus aircraft, but that's irrelevant because sadly, the Goalkeeper is not aboard your ships.

That's how I can't envision it being used against aircraft, not because it hasn't got the firepower.

Now against missiles, my original question still stands; can it destroy such a large missile totally as to prevent what I said?

Dreadnought
22 Feb 06,, 19:50
Unless he has to strafe the ship with gunfire, how will an aircraft get within the range of a CIWS anyway? Gun kills are perfectly possible in air war because you are mobile; I cannot similarly envision a battle group sailing at impressive 31 knots to catch a 200+ knot Sukhoi. He will be shot down by the carrier's aircraft or the battle group's AA missiles anyway. Not to denigrate the Phalanx... but it is still a largely immobile gun system against an aircraft, even with a huge RoF and a sizeable round. I can't imagine a 30mm round solving that problem of range versus aircraft, but that's irrelevant because sadly, the Goalkeeper is not aboard your ships.

That's how I can't envision it being used against aircraft, not because it hasn't got the firepower.

Now against missiles, my original question still stands; can it destroy such a large missile totally as to prevent what I said?

My guess is no. Somewhere if I can recall I read a story about a sailor onboard a USN destroyer that destroyed an incoming torpedo with a 20mm AA gun the sailor was killed and the ship slightly damaged but saved his crew and ship for even more damage and they were not mission killed.

Further when Operation Dessert Storm had come into play two silkworm missles were shot at a USN Battleship Missouri. One missed altogether but 1 made a beeline for Missouri and was intercepted by two Sea Dart missles from the destroyer HMS Gloucester (D96). Missouri could have easily defended herself by having the CIWS go active but it was not necessary as her escorts quickly demonstrated also had it (CIWS) gone active there may have been alot more casualities on the decks of her escorts that day that were well within her range.

HistoricalDavid
22 Feb 06,, 21:05
The 20mm guy destroyed the torpedo? I think it was a missile. :p

Anyway, although the CIWS has a far higher RoF, the Granit is far larger and faster.

Dago
23 Feb 06,, 07:00
Carrier Killer? Well, first you need to provide accurate OTH-T date before it can even be considered a "Carrier Killer" not to mention you can factor in the Quad Packed ESSM cells (40km?) and the large amount of SM-2 ER's in a CVBG.

Dreadnought
23 Feb 06,, 13:08
The 20mm guy destroyed the torpedo? I think it was a missile. :p

Anyway, although the CIWS has a far higher RoF, the Granit is far larger and faster.

No it wasnt a missle shot I believe it was AA gun fire. :tongue:

I would rather have the higher rate of fire in CIWS or larger caliber Goalkeeper.
Why have something larger and faster if it cant produce the firepower that CIWS can being smaller and more compact with a higher rate of fire. More bullets in the air gives it a better chance and destroying or deflecting the incoming missle.
Granit is also fairly newer then CIWS no?

HistoricalDavid
23 Feb 06,, 16:59
I would rather have the higher rate of fire in CIWS or larger caliber Goalkeeper.

Okay, this has gone far enough. CIWS is at best a last-resort system because of the missiles I originally listed.

Dreadnought
23 Feb 06,, 18:00
Okay, this has gone far enough. CIWS is at best a last-resort system because of the missiles I originally listed.

Soo in other words CIWS would not take out those missles that you have listed above? Is this what you are stating? :confused:

Dreadnought
23 Feb 06,, 18:53
Never heard of that happening, or even being designed for it, but I'll take your word on it. It did have difficulty intercepting that slow Silkworm during the Gulf War.

What I'm thinking of is pieces of a chewed-up Granit still having enough momentum to do damage to the ship.

David,
Just so you know CIWS aboard USS Missouri did go active when Missouri was fired upon by the Iraqi's using silkworms from a stern position. However SeaDart missles from the frigate HMS Gloucester intercepted the missle long before it came into CIWS range. Hence the escorts did their jobs so Missouri stays on station on mission doing what she does best throwing 16" shells where they are needed. Missouri fired not one shot at the incoming Iraqi silkworm although she was more then ready too.

*So in any case the CIWS system was not slow at all. Merely, it didnt fire at all because it didnt have to. According to the ships report CIWS was ready and standing by after chafes were already launched and they watched the missle incoming get destroyed by the SeaDarts fired by Gloucester.


Would pieces of an exploded missle still hit the ship?

Yes, physics prove that pieces would still hit any ship if the range was in close irregardless of the defensive weapon used to counter it. The very same would happen to the Granit system as well pending the interception range of the incoming missle. If any missle is allowed to close the range on the ship and it is intercepted chances are its raining little peices of missle casement all over the area, ship,water etc. No missle interceptor is going to vaporize the incoming missle totally. Not CIWS, Not Goalkeeper, and not Granit or any other missle system either.

HistoricalDavid
23 Feb 06,, 19:08
Soo in other words CIWS would not take out those missles that you have listed above? Is this what you are stating? :confused:

...No, I listed the anti-missile missiles such as the SM-2, RAM and ESSM which have far longer engagement ranges than any gun system and hence answers your other post; with missiles there is now a far larger distance between the point when the missile is being hit and the ship itself.

I'm assuming those systems which I mentioned would be able to intercept the missile first. That's why the CIWS is a last resort.

Dreadnought
23 Feb 06,, 19:19
...No, I listed the anti-missile missiles such as the SM-2, RAM and ESSM which have far longer engagement ranges than any gun system and hence answers your other post; with missiles there is now a far larger distance between the point when the missile is being hit and the ship itself.

I'm assuming those systems which I mentioned would be able to intercept the missile first. That's why the CIWS is a last resort.

Considering CIWS in close in yes. Missles definately have longer range then guns.

Bill
23 Feb 06,, 22:10
Unless he has to strafe the ship with gunfire, how will an aircraft get within the range of a CIWS anyway? Gun kills are perfectly possible in air war because you are mobile; I cannot similarly envision a battle group sailing at impressive 31 knots to catch a 200+ knot Sukhoi. He will be shot down by the carrier's aircraft or the battle group's AA missiles anyway. Not to denigrate the Phalanx... but it is still a largely immobile gun system against an aircraft, even with a huge RoF and a sizeable round. I can't imagine a 30mm round solving that problem of range versus aircraft, but that's irrelevant because sadly, the Goalkeeper is not aboard your ships.

That's how I can't envision it being used against aircraft, not because it hasn't got the firepower.

Now against missiles, my original question still stands; can it destroy such a large missile totally as to prevent what I said?

You miss my point.

My point was that if a 20mm vulcan will tear a 20 plus ton fighter to shreds in a second, a missile with 1/3 the mass has no chance at all.

That was my point.

Enzo Ferrari
04 Mar 06,, 02:37
In theory the best "Carrier Killer" is the Carriers and their aircrafts themselves, this is concluded by the Soviets themselves as they tried to made some before their collapse, get over it.

Dreadnought
06 Mar 06,, 14:18
In theory the best "Carrier Killer" is the Carriers and their aircrafts themselves, this is concluded by the Soviets themselves as they tried to made some before their collapse, get over it.

Sorry, IMO but I would have to side with a submarine having a better chance then anybody and downing a carrier quickly and surgically. That is if you can reach through her escorts :rolleyes:

Sandman
07 Mar 06,, 01:24
http://www.natoseasparrow.org/art/ESSMvideo/ESSM-SDTS.wmv

Missiles seem to be well covered by the latest in antimissile tech. Torpedos seem to be another issue.

Russians have these things;

http://www.airshow.ru/expo/587/prod_570.htm

Sandman
07 Mar 06,, 01:51
Good commentary on how Fast ASMs work relative to slower subsonic one's.

[on www.warships1.com, in response to a statement about
Russian supersonic anti-ship missiles]

Don't hold your breath. Statements like that are an absurd
over-simplification. The Russian anti-ship missiles represent one set of
technical solutions to penetrating anti-missile defenses. They are not
the only set of solutions to those requirements nor are they necessarily
the best.

The Russian attention to hypersonics had its costs. The missiles are big
and heavy. limiting the number that can be carried. Their high speed
causes severe airframe heating that prevents them using infra-red
guidance. It also commits them to a straight run-in course (or, at best,
gentle curves). They have a heat plume that a thermal sight can detect
while the missile is still kilometers over the horizon.

There are such things as adaptive and iterative guidance systems that can
be applied to subsonic missiles that simply cannot be used on the
hypersonics. Subsonics have much lower signatures so can be more
difficult to spot. They don't guzzle fuel like hypersonics so can deliver
equal punch in a much smaller airframe. And so it goes.

For your information; Russian-style hypersonics are known as "streakers",
Western style highly agile subsonics as "dancers". Both have their place
but their relative merits are still being evaluated with great passion.

What is startling is how few of their naval weapons the Russians have
actually sold. P-270 Moskit has gone to China and they have sold 96 Kh-35
Harpoonski to Algeria. Contrary to your repeated assertions, they have
not sold any of their naval weapons to the US. They have sold a small
number of M-31 target drones to the US via Boeing on the simple logic
that it was cheaper to buy the actual missile in question than to spend
money developing a simulator. M-31 is a version of Kh-31, a short-range
air-to-surface missile, roughly equivalent to Maverick.

As a point of factual accuracy, neither the US nor the UK nor any other
major western sea power has adopted or has any plans to adopt any Russian
designed weapons system.

As a point of factual accuracy, according to SIPRI, Russia is now the 5th
largest arms supplier in the world in terms of value of signed contracts
and its relative position is declining.

I would like to revise my first sentence. please do hold your breath
while waiting, you'll find the experience instructive

Stuart [Slade]


Streakers and dancers complicate intercept in two ways. If we take the
intercept window of a crude, basic anti-ship missile (subsonic,
straight-in) as a baseline there are two options. The first is to use the
Russian approach and get the missile to cross that intercept zone as
quickly as posisble. This means adopting the shortest path across it and
flying that path as fast as possible. Hence P-270. This is a perfectly
viable approach.

The second is to stretch the time the CIWS needs to destroy the missile
to the longest possible point. In effect, this (a) reduces the percentage
chance of the system killing the missile and (b)reduces the number of
inbound systems a single CIWS can engage. One way of doing this is to use
an iterative guidance system in the missile. This works by giving the
missile a fine-cut radar receiver which picks up and localizes the
emissions from the CIWS fire control system. The missile knows its own
coure and speed, it now knows the position of the CIWS (and can work out
the course and speed of the target). The computer in the missile knows
the algorithms used by the closed loop tracking system in the CIWS to
correct the aim of the CIWS. it can therefore work out what the firing
correction applied by the CIWS will be and alter the missile's flight
path to be somewhere else. This system is a service reality.

A third method is to physically shrink the envelope. The outer edge of
the intercept window is set by the maximum range at which the inbound
missile can be spotted, the inner edge is the range at which wreckage
from the shot-down missile will still strike the target ship. We can push
the outer edge in by flying the missile lower, by making it more
difficult to spot and by reducing its emissions. We can pull the inner
edge outwards by making sure the shot-down wreckage travels faster.

Putting all this together means that existing streakers fulfill
rerquirement (a) very well at expense of (b). In terms of (c), the
significantly pull the inner edge back (from 1 km to around 2.5) but have
major sacrifices in the outer edge. Their level of airframe heating,
their heat plume, the altitude at which they fly, their active radar
emissions, all mean they can be detected well over the horizon.

On the other hand, dancers make major gains in (b) at cost of performance
in (a). They sacrifice the inner edge of the engagement zone but achieve
major gains in reducing the outer edge by being inconspicuous. Typically,
they come in with their radars off (homing on command or IR), they are
coated with RAM (which streakers can't use since it burns off), they have
little airfrme heating and only a limited plume.

In summary, streakers move fast but have a larger, more distant intercept
zone. dancers move more slowly and evasively and have a much smaller
intercept zone, closer to the target ship. Close your eyes and visualize
it, you'll see what I mean.

This leads to a curious point which comes back to the Soviet's lack of
systems analysis. They designed P-270 to exploit certain weaknesses in
the SPY-1 radar performance. This it does, but by looking at a single bit
of equipment in isolation, they neglected to evaluate the target system
as a whole. Had they done so, they'd have found they'd managed to push
the intercept envelope back into an area where AEGIS works very, very
well. Once Standard SM-2 had been given an IR auxiliary homing system,
it was more than capable of shooting the P-270s out of the sky. Its
essential to think system-to-system NOT weapon-to-weapon.

On average a P-270 weighs about 4.5 times as much as a Harpoon. This
loads the odds in favor of Dancers - remember effectiveness is related to
squares of numbers.

Your comments about Yakhonts containers do not represent new technology
or anything particularly unusual - most western missiles have been
delivered that way since the late 1960s. We treat them as "wooden rounds"
- get them, slip them into the rails, hook them up, run a self-diagnostic
then adjust people's attitude with them.

Sadly, I can deny the Russians are achieving a lot of success; I say
sadly because I thought they were going to do a lot better than they
have. Their equipment has stirred up a lot of interest but relatively
little of that has translated into sales. Where it has, it is usually
because of a lack of any opposition. Malaya represents the only case
where Russian equipment has secured an order in the face of Western
competition.

Stuart


http://yarchive.net/mil/russian_missiles.html

Bill
07 Mar 06,, 04:13
Heh, Stuart Slade strikes again. :)

Sandman
07 Mar 06,, 10:52
Heh, Stuart Slade strikes again. :)

I never heard of the name before this article. Is that good or bad? Is he credible?

Officer of Engineers
07 Mar 06,, 12:19
He was/is a nuclear weapons targeteer for the US DoD/DoE. Yeah, he's credible.

Sandman
07 Mar 06,, 22:35
He was/is a nuclear weapons targeteer for the US DoD/DoE. Yeah, he's credible.

I thought so. Anyone have any of his other writings?

Bill
07 Mar 06,, 23:06
I thought so. Anyone have any of his other writings?

I posted his essay on 'nuclear winter' and his opinion on suitcase nukes in the science forum. I also included a link to "TBOVerse", an alternate WWII history he wrote somewhere on this forum(i think it was the history forum?)

He is also a board administrator at David Newton's EZBoard site. TONS of his work is published there. In fact there is an entire section of the forum dedicated to his alternate history fiction works.

Stuart is very good people.

Dreadnought
08 Mar 06,, 18:49
Heh, Stuart Slade strikes again. :)

Secret Agent Man ;)

Shadowsided
17 Oct 06,, 22:16
Hey snipe can I please have a link on the SM 1 hitting an Iranian boat thanx bro.

Bill
24 Oct 06,, 19:59
Hey snipe can I please have a link on the SM 1 hitting an Iranian boat thanx bro.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Praying_Mantis

Galrahn
25 Oct 06,, 01:26
Hey snipe can I please have a link on the SM 1 hitting an Iranian boat thanx bro.

This is what your looking for.


FAIR USE NOTICE
This post contains copyrighted material, which is reproduced under the Fair Use Provision of Title 17, U.S.C. Section 107, and is posted for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. This material is posted without profit for the benefit of those who, by accessing this post, are expressing a prior interest in this information for research and educational purposes.



Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute 66 (May 1989)
© 1989 United States Naval Institute
The Surface View: Operation Praying Mantis

By
Captain J. B. Perkins III, U.S. Navy

For the escorts of Battle Group Foxtrot, preparations for the 18 April 1988 Operation Praying Mantis began in the southern California operating area ten months earlier. From this first underway period as a unit, the Battle Group Commander, Rear Admiral Guy Zeller (Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group Three) had insisted on a rigorous set of exercises to prepare for the upcoming tour on station in the North Arabian Sea (NAS). Initially, the ships drilled hard at interpreting rules of engagement (ROE) and at devising means to counter small high-speed surface craft (e.g., Boghammers) and low, slow-flying aircraft-both of which abound in and around the Persian Gulf. We later added exercises stressing anti-Silkworm (an Iranian surface-to-surface missile) tactics, boarding and search, Sledgehammer (a procedure to vector attack aircraft to a surface threat), convoy escort procedures, naval gunfire support (NGFS), and mine detection and destruction exercises.

We practiced in every environment-in the Bering Sea during November, throughout our transit to the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and on station in the NAS. During the battle group evolution off Hawaii in January, we executed a 96-hour Persian Gulf scenario, with a three submarine threat overlaid. We conducted live, coordinated Harpoon missile firings in southern California and off Hawaii, dropped Rockeye, Skipper, and laser-guided bombs (LGBs) on high-speed targets off Point Mugu and Hawaii and drilled, drilled, drilled. By late March, each ship had completed dozens of these exercises, and we were considering easing the pace and working on ways to make the exercises more interesting, as the day approached when the Forrestal (CV-59) battle group would relieve us. Such philosophic discussions ended abruptly when the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) hit a mine on 14 April.

Four battle group ships en route to a port call in Mombasa were turned around, and the USS Joseph Strauss (DDG-16) and USS Bagley (FF-1069) raced north, refueled from the USS Wabash (AOR-5) and steamed through the Strait of Hormuz at more than 25 knots to join teammates, the USS Merrill (DD-976) and USS Lynde McCormick (DDG-8) . They, and their Middle East Force (MEF) counterparts, the USS Simpson (FFG-56), USS O'Brien (DD-975), USS Jack Williams (FFG-24), USS Wainwright (CG-28) , USS Gary (FFG-51), and USS Trenton (LPD-14) repositioned at high speed as the plan was developed. In the NAS, the USS Enterprise (CVN65) closed to within 120 nautical miles of the Strait of Hormuz. Her escorts, the USS Reasoner (FF-1063) and Trurtun (CGN-35), were stationed to counter the potential small combatant threat in the Strait, and the air threat from Chah Bahar.

Table 1 U.S. Naval Order of Battle

OTC: Commander Joint Task Force Middle East

(Embarked on the Coronado) Battle Group Commander:

ComCruDesGru Three (Embarked on the Enterprise)

SAG Bravo:

OSC: ComDesRon Nine (Embarked on the Merrill)

USS Merrill (1 SH-2F)

USS Lynde McCormick

USS Trenton (1 SH-60B)

MAGTF 2-88 (4 AH-IT, 2 UH-1, 2 CH-46)


SAG Charlie:

OSC: CO, USS Wainwright

USS Wainwright

USS Bagley (1 SH-2F)

USS Simpson (1 SH-60B, I UH-60)

SEAL Platoon


SAG Delta:

OSC: ComDesRon Twenty Two (Embarked on the Jack Williams)

USS Jack Williams (2 SH-2F)

USS O'Brien (2 SH-2F, I UH-60)

USS Joseph Strauss

CVW-11 CAP/SUCAP Support

On 16 April, I flew with Lieutenant Commander Mark "Micro" Cessnock -- my one-officer "battle micro staff"- from the Enterprise to Bahrain at the direction of Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East (CJTFME). Rear Admiral Anthony Less, to assist in planning and executing the response. We were joined on the flagship, the USS Coronado (AGF-Il), by the MEF Destroyer Squadron Commander and began working on the plan with the CJTFME staff and other players. The objectives were clear:


Sink the Iranian Saam-class frigate Sabulan or a suitable substitute.

Neutralize the surveillance posts on the Sassan and Sirri gas/oil separation platforms (GOSPs) and the Rahkish GOSP, if sinking a ship was not practicable.

There were also a number of caveats (avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage, limit adverse environmental effects) to ensure that this was in fact a "proportional response."


It was a long night, but by 0330 on 17 April we had developed a plan. We formed three surface action groups, each containing both battle group and MEF ships, that were to operate independently but still be mutually supportive. Surface Action Group (SAG) Bravo was assigned Sassan (and Rahkish), SAG Charlie, Siril, and SAG Delta, the Sabalan. The Gary was our free safety, a lone sentinel on the northern flank protecting the barges. Each SAG commander had an objective and a simple communications plan to direct our forces, to coordinate if required, and to report to CJFTME.


Both GOSPs were to be attacked in the same fashion: we would warn the occupants and give them five minutes to leave the platform, take out any remaining Iranians with naval gunfire, insert a raid force (Marine reconnaissance unit at Sassan/SEALs at Sirri) on the platform, plant demolition charges, and destroy the surveillance post. Colonel Bill Rakow, Commander of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 2-88, and I developed a plan to coordinate NGFS and Cobra landing zone preparatory fire and discussed criteria for committing the raid force, which included the possibilities of die-hard defenders, secondary explosions, and booby traps.


At first light, as SAG Bravo approached the Sassan GOSP, the Trenton began launching helos, including the LAMPS-Ill from the Samuel B. Roberts, which we used for surface surveillance. The GOSP appeared unalerted as we came into view from the southwest and turned to a northerly firing course -- our gun target line was limited by a United Arab Emirates oil field three nautical miles south of Sassan and a large hydrogen sulfide tank on the northern end of the GOSP. H-Hour was set at 0800; at 0755, we warned the Sassan GOSP inhabitants in Farsi and English.

"You have five minutes to abandon the platform; I intend to destroy it at 0800."

This transmission stimulated a good deal of interest and activity among a growing group of Iranians, milling about on the roof of the living quarters. Several men manned their 23-mm. gun and trained it on the Merrill about 5,000 yards away, but many more headed for the two tugs tied up alongside the platform. One tug left almost immediately, and the other departed with about 30 men on board soon afterward. The VHF radio blared a cacophony of English and Farsi as the GOSP occupants simultaneously reported to (screamed at) naval headquarters and pleaded with us for more time. At 0804, we told the inhabitants that their time was up and commenced firing at the gun emplacement. This was not a classic NGFS mission; I had decided on airbursts over the GOSP to pin down personnel and destroy command-and-control antennae, but to avoid holing potential helo landing surfaces.


At the first muzzle flash from the Merrill's 5-inch mount 51, the Iranian 23-mm. gun mount opened up, getting the attention of the ship's bridge and topside watchstanders. The Merrill immediately silenced the Iranian gun with a direct hit, and encountered no further opposition. After about 50 rounds had exploded over the southern half of the GOSP, a large crowd of converted martyrs gathered at the northern end. At this point, we checked fire and permitted a tug to return and pick up what appeared to be the rest of the Sassan GOSP occupants. Following this exodus, the Merrill and the Lynde McCormick alternated firing airbursts over the entire GOSP (less the hydrogen sulfide tank), and we watched the platform closely for any sign of activity but saw none. As this preparatory NGFS progressed, Colonel Rakow and I selected 0925 as the time to land his raid force. In a closely coordinated sequence, the ships checked fire, Cobra gunships delivered covering fire, and the UR-1 and CH-46 helos inserted the Marines via fast rope. It was a textbook assault, and I caught myself stopping to admire it. Despite some tense moments when Iranian ammunition stores cooked off, the platform was fully secured in about 30 minutes, and the demolition and intelligence-gathering teams flew to the GOSP. About two hours later, 1,500 pounds of plastic explosives were detonated by remote control, turning the GOSP into an inferno.


Meanwhile, the fog of war had closed in periodically. First, a United Arab Emirates patrol boat approached at high speed from the northwest. We evaluated it as a possible Boghammer-a popular classification that day. It could be engaged under the ROE, but we just identified it and asked it to remain clear. Later, we reconstituted SAG Bravo and headed north to attack Rahkish GOSP, for no ship had yet been located and sunk. A Cobra helo crew, our closest air asset, evaluated a 25-knot contact closing from the northeast as a warship. This quickly took shape as a "possible Iranian Saam FFG," and the Merrill made preparations to launch a Harpoon attack. We then asked for further descriptive information and ultimately for a bull number. The contact turned out to be a Soviet Sovremennyy-cIass DDG. The skipper, when asked his intention, replied with a heavy accent, "I vant to take peectures for heestory." We breathed easier. Shortly after that, SAG Bravo was instructed to proceed at full speed to the eastern Gulf, in response to Boghammer attacks in the Mubarek oil field. That ended our participation in the day's fireworks.


At the Sirri GOSP, the sequence of events began essentially the same way they did at Sassan. SAG Charlie gave warnings on time, most of the occupants departed on a tug, and the Wainwright, Bagley, and Simpson commenced fire about 0815. Sirri was an active oil-producing platform, however, and one of the initial rounds hit a compressed gas tank, setting the GOSP ablaze and incinerating the gun crew. Thus, it became unnecessary to insert the SEAL platoon.


With the primary mission accomplished, SAG Charlie patrolled the area. About three hours later, they detected the approach of an Iranian Kaman patrol boat, which the Bagley's LAMPS-I identified as the Joshan. As the patrol boat closed, the SAG commander repeatedly warned the Iranian that he was standing into danger and advised him to alter course and depart the area. When his direction was ignored, the U.S. commander requested and was granted "weapons free" by CJTFME. He then advised the

Joshan:

"Stop your engines and abandon ship; I intend to sink you."

After thinking this communication over, the Joshan 's CO apparently decided to go out firing and launched his only remaining Harpoon. The three SAG Charlie ships, now in a line abreast at 26,000 yards, and the Bagley's LAMPS simultaneously detected the launch and maneuvered and launched chaff. The Harpoon passed down the Wainwright's starboard side close aboard (the seeker may not have activated) and was answered by a volley of SM-1 missiles from the Simpson and the Wainwright. Four missiles fired; four hits. An additional SM-1 (a hit) and a Harpoon (a miss, probably resulting from the sinking Joshan's sudden lack of freeboard) were fired, and the patrol boat was eventually sunk with gunfire.

SAG Charlie had still more opportunities to modify the Iranian naval order of battle when an F-4 made a high-speed approach just prior to the sinking of the Joshan hulk (SAG Bravo also detected approaching F-4s, but those dove to the deck and departed as they reached SM-1 range). The Wainwright is SM-2 equipped. As the F-4 continued to close, ignoring warnings on both military and internal air defense circuits, the SAG Commander fired two missiles and hit the Iranian aircraft. Only the pilot's heroic efforts enabled the Iranians to recover the badly damaged aircraft at Bandar Abbas. At this point, SAG Charlie was through for the day, as well.

For SAG Delta, it had been a frustrating night and day of following up intelligence leads and electronic sniffs as they tried to locate the Sabalan. Various reports had held her in port or close to Bandar Abbas with engineering problems. The tempo picked up when the U.S. civilian tug Willy Tide and a U.S. oil platform were attacked by Iranian Boghammers near the Saleh and Mubarek oil fields. The Joseph Strauss provided initial vectors that assisted the A-6s in locating and destroying one of these high-speed craft and chasing the others onto the beach at Abu Musa Island. Following this successful tactical air engagement, an Iranian Saam-class frigate, the Sahand, was discovered proceeding southwest at high speed toward the Mubarek and Suleb fields, perhaps as part of a preplanned Iranian response to the GOSP attacks. Another CVW-11 A-6 detected her when it flew low for a visual identification. Pursued by antiaircraft fire, the A-6 evaded and reattacked with Harpoon, Skipper, and a laser-guided bomb. This brought the Sahand dead in the water as SAG Delta closed on the position at high speed. The Joseph Strauss conducted a coordinated Harpoon attack with the A-6's wingman, achieving near-simultaneous times on target in the first-ever coordinated Harpoon attack in combat.

Although this was the SAG's final participation in the day's attack on Iranian forces, their location in the crowded waters of the Strait of Hormuz-closest to the Bandar Abbas naval base and airfield-led to several tense moments. Reports of Iranian Silkworm antiship missile firings and the apparent presence of targeting aircraft caused the SAG to fire SM-1 missiles at suspected air contacts and in several other near engagements. Because of the concentrated effort of both Battle Group Foxtrot and SAG Delta assets--with special credit going to the E-2C and F-14 aircrews-however, there were no blue-on-blue or blue-on-white engagements. These results reflect an extraordinary degree of discipline on the part of ship and air crews, as well as a bit of good luck, in this area jammed with so many oil platforms, neutral naval and merchant ships, small craft, and civilian aircraft.

As the sun set on 18 April, all objectives of Operation Praying Mantis had been achieved. There were no civilian or U.S. casualties, and collateral damage was nil. The Iranian war effort had been struck a decisive and devastating blow. Tactics and procedures that had been honed over the previous nine months had been dramatically validated, but a number of lessons were (re)learned which should be reviewed by commanders in future "proportional responses" of this sort. They include:

KISS: Keep It Simple, Stupid. Simple plans, with clear objectives and a minimum of interdependence and rudder orders from higher authority are most effective.

Force Integration: Pairing up disparate forces (e.g., at least one MEF and one battle group ship in each SAG; co-locating SAG and MAGTF commanders) is essential in a joint-or multiple task group-operation.

Surface Surveillance: Air assets, fixed wing and helos, are essential to force protection, targeting, and battle damage assessment. Visual identification is almost always required; especially in areas with high white and blue shipping densities.

"Proportional" responses: Classic contingency plans do not contain such options and should. The order to respond will leave little time to plan and collect intelligence.

Linguistic support: The Farsi linguist was indispensable; both in communicating with the Iranians and in gleaning intelligence from clear radio circuits.

GOSP destruction: This was not classic NGFS since the goal was to clear the platform, not destroy it. Their distinctive construction makes shooting off platform legs a non-starter and a waste of ammunition (we fired 208 rounds total at both Sassan and Sirti). Airbursts were effective for this mission but mechanical time fuse ammunition was in short supply.

Warnings: Warning an armed GOSP-or worse, a warship-prior to opening fire may register high on the humane scale, but it clearly ranks low in terms of relative tactical advantage. We should rethink this requirement.

Missile performance: SM-1 in the surface mode worked very well (five fired; five hits), which is better than my earlier experiences. With its high speed, it should be the weapon of choice in a line-of-sight engagement. Harpoon performance was good, and its use as a "stopper' '-even at relatively short range and in proximity of other shipping-was validated.

Fog of war: Karl von Clausewitz was right; it is always there. Commanding officers need to think through, talk through, and exercise in as many scenarios as possible with their watch teams. There is no cookbook solution to the problem of deciding when to shoot and when to take one more look first.

Most of us believe in the deterrent value of sea power and hope that by such strength we will successfully avoid conflict. Should deterrence fail, however, and hostilities occur, each of us wants to be there to act swiftly and decisively. Such was the opportunity presented to the ships and aircraft of Battle Group Foxtrot and the Middle East Force on 18 April 1988, and their crews did themselves, and all Americans, proud.

lurker
25 Oct 06,, 16:20
...
They have sold a small
number of M-31 target drones to the US via Boeing on the simple logic
that it was cheaper to buy the actual missile in question than to spend
money developing a simulator. M-31 is a version of Kh-31, a short-range
air-to-surface missile, roughly equivalent to Maverick.
...
Stuart
http://yarchive.net/mil/russian_missiles.html
oh, Stuart strikes again to show his lameness on a subject.
Just this quoted sentence is enough understand how deep this lameness goes.

REAL equivalent of Maverick was produced until recently under Kh-25M index.

Bill
25 Oct 06,, 18:14
oh, Stuart strikes again to show his lameness on a subject.
Just this quoted sentence is enough understand how deep this lameness goes.

REAL equivalent of Maverick was produced until recently under Kh-25M index.
There are a lot of ways a missile can be 'roughly equivelant' to another. Guidance, ROLE(which i suspect he meant), size, range, etc.

And if you're implying you're "more expert" than Stuart Slade on naval issues, well...we'll just let each poster at WAB make up his own mind in that regard. :rolleyes:

I know what Patton would say...

"The difficulty in understanding the Russian is that we do not take cognizance of the fact that he is not a European, but an Asiatic, and therefore thinks deviously. We can no more understand a Russian than a Chinese or a Japanese, and from what I have seen of them, I have no particular desire to understand them except to ascertain how much lead or iron it takes to kill them. In addition to his other amiable characteristics, the Russian has no regard for human life and they are all out sons-of-biitches, barbarians, and chronic drunks."
~General George S. Patton

lurker
25 Oct 06,, 18:59
There are a lot of ways a missile can be 'roughly equivelant' to another. Guidance, ROLE(which i suspect he meant), size, range, etc.

And if you're implying you're "more expert" than Stuart Slade on naval issues, well...we'll just let each poster at WAB make up his own mind in that regard. :rolleyes:

Kh-31 and Maverick have only one thing in common. They are Missiles. Other than that... supersonic ramjet vs solid propellant rocket, about twice bigger than Maverick, anti-radar supersonic missile vs subsonic air-surface... WHAT is HERE to think about. They are damn identical... :)



I know what Patton would say...

"The difficulty in understanding the Russian is that we do not take cognizance of the fact that he is not a European, but an Asiatic, and therefore thinks deviously. We can no more understand a Russian than a Chinese or a Japanese, and from what I have seen of them, I have no particular desire to understand them except to ascertain how much lead or iron it takes to kill them. In addition to his other amiable characteristics, the Russian has no regard for human life and they are all out sons-of-biitches, barbarians, and chronic drunks."
~General George S. Patton
Not really interested in flaming. Got tired of propaganda **** back in Soviet times.

Bill
26 Oct 06,, 07:31
Kh-31 and Maverick have only one thing in common. They are Missiles. Other than that... supersonic ramjet vs solid propellant rocket, about twice bigger than Maverick, anti-radar supersonic missile vs subsonic air-surface... WHAT is HERE to think about. They are damn identical... :)
Oh, ok...so the fact that they are both air to surface missiles with an anti-ship role that can be lofted by strike fighters is not a commonality then?

Guess what, given the same mission, a russian fighter may very well take off armed with Kh-31s to do the same job a USAF F-16C armed with 300lb anti-shipping Mavs would.

As far as flaming, i'm just quoting the greatest manuever warfare general of WWII. Not my fault he was not a fan of Russians.

lurker
26 Oct 06,, 07:54
Oh, ok...so the fact that they are both air to surface missiles with an anti-ship role that can be lofted by strike fighters is not a commonality then?

Of course, first thing that comes in mind when anyone thinks about Kh-31 is Maverick, why not. Give or take 3 times more op. radius, their tactical use would be the same. Why not? ;)

I've forwarded those posts above to russian community, and besides a lot of laugh there has been some informative ones. One would probably summarize them all:


Stuart Slade is considered on the west as one of the big specialists in Russian/Soviet weapon systems, almost as Exeter in Russia.
Is he still around on warhips1, or all of this came from the archive?
I was flaming with him five years ago about that utter crap that he writes about soviet/russian ASM's and SLBM's, but finally got tired of his ignorance (curiously he is british, not american) and "we-are-here-know-you-better" attitude and left.
Looks like he got loose again and need a pair of kicks in the ass to get back to his senses. ;)

I think that finishes discussion about that Stuart character.

p.s. Nor I am interested in stuff said by some insane WWII general.

Bill
26 Oct 06,, 07:59
Alas, you are right, two 'air to surface missiles' clearly have nothing in common.

LOL....just STFU and pass me the vodka you G-damned whining Russian troll...i need a drink. :biggrin:

lurker
26 Oct 06,, 08:05
Alas, you are right, two 'air to surface missiles' clearly have nothing in common.

LOL....just STFU and pass me the vodka you G-damned whining Russian troll...i need a drink. :biggrin:

I am trying to slow down on vodka :( My girl have something against it, so only beer for me now ;/

Garry
14 Dec 06,, 08:55
Just came back from the meeting with a friend who was working in RKK Energia. He said to me that Reshetneva has finished land testing fo the new satelite for the Legenda system. It has 2 times less weight!!! It can be used on the low altitude up to 6 years!!! Its reactor is updated - in the past the whole satelite was parked on a higher altitude.... now reactor module can be separated at the end of the service and only this module is to be parked on higher altitude while main body of the satellite destroys on its way down.

This let them save a lot of weight for fuel for sustaining low orbit for a period not less than 4 years and up to 6 years in good case scenario. The cost of each sattelite grew significantly but the launch cost and total program cost reduces DRAMATICALLY as much less satelites would need to be replaced annually.

One more thing - Legenda would not be only targetting any more.... it would have lot more functions to share its budget.

Seems like NAVY wants to relaunch the program observing oceans

Francois
15 Dec 06,, 07:32
I am trying to slow down on vodka :( My girl have something against it, so only beer for me now ;/
Damned, I sweared you were gay!

Master Chief
16 Dec 06,, 21:58
The US navy needs to get its head out of its own ass! As for the A Chinese submarine stalked a U.S. aircraft carrier battle group in the Pacific last month and surfaced within firing range of its torpedoes and missiles before being detected, Now back when I was in the navy, during the cold war years and for some time after this would have never happened! Why? The russians kept us sharp! We drilled and drilled time after time. There is a thirty mile kill zone around each and every carrier. Where no sub, ship or sub should not get into, with out escort. And the navy cutting back on surface ships is ********. Also back then there was more then one class of cruiser, and more then two class of destroyers. Yea what do we have now the A. Burks and the Zumwalts. and now just one class of frigate the O.H. Perry.

Garry
18 Dec 06,, 08:44
Damned, I sweared you were gay!

Lets hope your other beliefs are closer to reality ;)

Garry
18 Dec 06,, 09:01
The US navy needs to get its head out of its own ass! As for the A Chinese submarine stalked a U.S. aircraft carrier battle group in the Pacific last month and surfaced within firing range of its torpedoes and missiles before being detected, Now back when I was in the navy, during the cold war years and for some time after this would have never happened! Why? The russians kept us sharp! We drilled and drilled time after time. There is a thirty mile kill zone around each and every carrier. Where no sub, ship or sub should not get into, with out escort. And the navy cutting back on surface ships is ********. Also back then there was more then one class of cruiser, and more then two class of destroyers. Yea what do we have now the A. Burks and the Zumwalts. and now just one class of frigate the O.H. Perry.

The GLONAS is covering Eurasia... and it is going to be fully operational by 2010.... open for commercial use since 2009....

Assuming that new LEGENDA requires around 24 satelites.... if the prototype which is tested now proves operational... I guess Reshetneva can not manufacture more than 6 new Legenda satelites per year... so 4 years or more needed to restore system to cover the globe... I guess they would start with areas close to Russian shores.

Again... the secret of the long survavability of the new satelites is separation of reactor module. Legenda satelites could not be abandonned to fall down because of nuclear reactor. Hence they were quite heavy due to requirement to park them on higher orbit at the end of operation... This required A LOT OF FUEL to boost it up at the end. One the low orbit one needs spendng a lot of fuel to keep the orbit... and even more if you are heavy...

Now the circle is broken. Only reactor is going to be parked.... => less fuel for parking lighter weight... => less weight less fuel for keeping orbit => longer time you may stay on the low orbit with the same fuel => less frequent replacement launches => system gets MUCH cheaper.

gf0012-aust
18 Dec 06,, 09:14
The GLONAS is covering Eurasia... and it is going to be fully operational by 2010.... open for commercial use since 2009....



Glonas is not a full constellation - and it won't be a completely global system by 2010. There aren't enough sats in the constellation to provide full global race track redundancy.

Going on current russian track records for launching, they won't get the requisite number of sats up for quite a while.

Their marketing people certainly deserve a bonus though....

Dreadnought
19 Dec 06,, 17:55
Alas, you are right, two 'air to surface missiles' clearly have nothing in common.

LOL....just STFU and pass me the vodka you G-damned whining Russian troll...i need a drink. :biggrin:

:biggrin: LMAO

Garry
27 Dec 06,, 17:04
Glonas is not a full constellation - and it won't be a completely global system by 2010. There aren't enough sats in the constellation to provide full global race track redundancy.

Going on current russian track records for launching, they won't get the requisite number of sats up for quite a while.

Their marketing people certainly deserve a bonus though....

They have 18 now - hence they lack 6 sats. I don't know what is replacement need for the near future..... those low orbit sats are not living long.... Next year they budgeted 50% growth in millitary launches, but we don't know what they would launch.

highsea
27 Dec 06,, 18:08
They have 18 now - hence they lack 6 sats. I don't know what is replacement need for the near future..... those low orbit sats are not living long.... Next year they budgeted 50% growth in millitary launches, but we don't know what they would launch.Hi Garry. 16 in their slots, not 18. Only 11 of which are operating. 6 in Plane 1 and 5 in Plane 3. Plane 2 is empty. This is a decrease of 4 active sats since April 2006, There have been a total of 5 dropouts since July, and one (783) was brought back online but is living on borrowed time- it is over 5 years old, and the grandaddy of the bunch.

There were 3 sats launched in 2005, 2 of which are working (one dropped out about 3 weeks ago). No new Glonass sats were launched in 2006.

Of the 16 sats, 9 are at or beyond their service life, 2 will reach that mark in 2007, and 1 more in 2008. At least 6, and most likely 8 of the active sats will dropout by 2010. Of the 5 inactive ones, only 1 (714) has any real chance of getting back to active status and surviving until 2010.

So to have a full Constellation by 2010, you will need to launch minimum 20 new sats, as there are only 4 Glonass-M variant in place today. And that's assuming 714 comes back online, and hasn't suffered a major failure.

I have to question if the launch schedule can even keep pace with the dropouts, let alone build up to full operational status. They are certainly going down faster than they are going up...

edit to add: I just found out that another Glonass sat has been malfunctioning since December 17. R04 (795) is observed on the wrong frequency and broadcast messages are not available. The Glonass website is still listing it as active, but JPL has classified it as unusable.

gunnut
27 Dec 06,, 20:01
Do we replace our satellites every year, or when they stop working? How many are up there? What do you think of the new European system, the Galileo (I think)?

highsea
27 Dec 06,, 20:09
Do we replace our satellites every year, or when they stop working? How many are up there?Are you referring to GPS sats or just in general?

What do you think of the new European system, the Galileo (I think)?It does basically the same thing as GPS, but by a bigger committee, lol.

Garry- how did the Christmas Day launch go? This will add 3 Glonass-M sats if everything works as planned. They should come online sometime mid-2007.

If the schedule is followed, there will be 6 launched in 2007, and 5 more in 2008. This would give 18 total sats by mid-2009 assuming 714 comes back up and there are no failures.

gunnut
27 Dec 06,, 20:12
Are you referring to GPS sats or just in general?
It does basically the same thing as GPS, but by a bigger committee, lol.

GPS satellites. How many do we have up there and how many is the minimum needed for a system like that?

highsea
27 Dec 06,, 20:34
GPS satellites. How many do we have up there and how many is the minimum needed for a system like that?There are 31 GPS sats in orbit, 29 are operational. The constellation calls for 24 sats in 6 orbital planes, with one spare in each plane.

The design life is about 7.5 years, but we have one that is over twice that and still going, and about 8-9 that were launched in 1992-1993.

You can check status here:

ftp://tycho.usno.navy.mil/pub/gps/gpstd.txt

Tha Gallileo system is also a 30 sat constellation, but with 9 sats ea. in 3 orbital planes and one spare per plane. Design life is 10-12 years. It is projected to become operational in 2010, a couple years behind schedule.

gf0012-aust
28 Dec 06,, 02:32
They have 18 now - hence they lack 6 sats. I don't know what is replacement need for the near future..... those low orbit sats are not living long.... Next year they budgeted 50% growth in millitary launches, but we don't know what they would launch.


24 sats won't give them global racetrack redundancy at a meaningful level.

numerically, 24 will give them a global constellation - but thats about it.

and I seriously doubt that they will have 24 usable platforms in place - let alone a fully redundant constellation.

edit: and noticed highseas qualification after posting. ;)

highsea
28 Dec 06,, 03:01
...and I seriously doubt that they will have 24 usable platforms in place - let alone a fully redundant constellation.That's my take too, Gf.

Another big if is the planned GSLV launches. With a 50% success rate and only 4 launches under it's belt, and the next rocket planned to use the Indian cryo stage for the first time, I would not be counting chickens. Also due to the recent failure, the GSLV schedule is bound to be kicked back at least 8-12 months.

The next Proton launch should go off on schedule.

And whether or not the Glonass-K will be ready in time is not at all certain, and that would affect the planned Soyuz launches.

Based on what we have seen in the past, it seems prudent to be a bit "cautious" wrt the schedule, if you know what I mean...

gf0012-aust
28 Dec 06,, 03:16
Based on what we have seen in the past, it seems prudent to be a bit "cautious" wrt the schedule, if you know what I mean...

without wanting to upset the pro-russian platform club, the russians demonstrate stellar persistence in blowing out their schedules.

they are regularly 2-3-4 years in lag on major capital asset delivery at the CTD level, - let alone going "gold".

Bear in mind that the way that they wanted to short circuit the Glonas schedule was to invite India in as a participant. They are in no position to fast track anything.

highsea
28 Dec 06,, 03:24
...Bear in mind that the way that they wanted to short circuit the Glonas schedule was to invite India in as a participant. They are in no position to fast track anything.That's why I mentioned the GSLV launches and Glonass-K. The current (pretty optimistic) schedule to get 18 sats by mid-2009 assumes no hitches on either side (and there is aready a serious hitch with GSLV)...

That's not something I would want to lay money on, lol.

gf0012-aust
28 Dec 06,, 03:36
That's why I mentioned the GSLV launches and Glonass-K. The current (pretty optimistic) schedule to get 18 sats by mid-2009 assumes no hitches on either side (and there is aready a serious hitch with GSLV)...

That's not something I would want to lay money on, lol.

I was tempted to make some reference to Yakhont/Glonas/Brahmos but thought better of it. :biggrin:

The russians really have sucker punched the indian military on a number of levels. If I was the Indian Ex-Chequer I'd have a few senior mil-personel's "nutz in a noose" and some "please explains" coming thick and fast.

All good for the russians though... as I said before, their marketing people (and their contract managers) deserve hefty bonuses....

highsea
28 Dec 06,, 03:52
Lol. Don't go there, Gary... :tongue:

gf0012-aust
28 Dec 06,, 04:31
Lol. Don't go there, Gary... :tongue:

I have no intention I've getting caught up in return fire.... :eek:

kams
28 Dec 06,, 04:39
Some time back India decided not to totally depend on either GPS or GLONASS and develop IRNSS (http://www.space.com/spacenews/archive06/India_052206.html) with foot print over Indian Subcontinent. :rolleyes: