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Military Review
Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
July - August 2001
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US and British Approaches to Force Protection
by Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. Caniglia, US Army
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Two allied military forces operating in the Balkans in adjacent zones are similarly equipped, trained and led. The communities, factions and problems they face are the same. They speak the same language and come from a common military cultural heritage. They have been allies in war and peace and are members of NATO where they champion the same military positions; they support the same NATO doctrine for peace support operations. Their national written force-protection doctrines are nearly the same, and despite disagreements, they are staunch political allies.1 Yet, when patrolling Balkan streets, US and British soldiers present radically different public images.
US troops wear helmets and body armor—hence their nickname, "ninja turtles." They travel in convoys with guns manned and ready. When they stop, they disperse to overwatch positions, ready to apply defensive force. At night most retire to fortified camps or outposts as Romans did on campaigns, cut off from the people they came to protect.
British troops wear berets and walk and talk with the locals. They travel in small groups, armed but with weapons slung. Some wear ammunition pouches; some do not; none wears body armor unless there is an imminent threat. Off duty they eat and relax in town; many live there. Single vehicles often travel the roads, identifiable only by their painted military patterns.
Each nation participating in the implementation force (IFOR), stabilization force (SFOR) and Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR) has adopted force-protection policies based on national doctrine. The British posture represents most nations' approach; the US posture is the exception.2 Although popular attitudes and political direction influence policy makers, force-protection policy for an operation is based on rational calculations of interest, efficacy and acceptable cost.
A soldier of the British Coldstream Guards plays with Balkan children
in stereotypical contrast to soldiers of the US 1st Armored Division.
Neither British nor US doctrine implies zero-casualty tolerance or places force protection above mission accomplishment. Both restate the traditional military responsibility to win with minimal casualties. Commanders have historically planned, adjusted, retreated, regrouped and advanced with new strategies to win at the lowest cost. Both US and British generals are concerned about casualties, and they adjust strategy to minimize them but not at the expense of the mission. Why do these generals with very similar doctrine differ in their policies?
Numerous references in official reports support a popular military view that policy differences among coalition members will be exploited in peace operations to manipulate public sentiment against a specific force.3 Further, a 1996 Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) study indicates that those dealing directly with the disputants and civil population in Bosnia saw policy variations among sectors as counterproductive.4
But, the implications go deeper. Force-protection policy can affect unity of effort, an imperative in military coalitions. Differences may also affect other aspects of a coalition, such as orders to open fire or induce confusion among the civil population, which could lead to serious incidents. In a highly charged political environment, policy differences can undermine a coalition's mission.
Senior military leaders are directly influenced by orders from above and results from below. They are indirectly influenced by other factors such as doctrine, experience, history and resources. Although they receive their orders from civilian leaders who represent society, society's mood may also influence them. Presumably, the British, with their routinely less-protective uniform, posture and procedures, and claims of mission command, would show greater tolerance for risk. US policy, because it is dictated or influenced from above, should show the opposite.
British Civilian Leaders and Parliament
The Prime Minister's Questions in the House of Commons and parliamentary debates over Bosnia and Kosovo do not indicate a philosophy of casualty aversion. The prime minister was an early and vocal supporter of maintaining a credible ground war option for Kosovo. There was a sober recognition of the personal and political effects of casualties but nothing indicating hesitation on these grounds. The debates seemed to concern the level of British interests, the ability to field the required force and civilian casualties in the war zone more than potential British military casualties. In fact, the subject of British military casualties occurs infrequently and then only as a derivative rather than a primary topic.5
The same is true of the public. Two major newspapers, The London Times and The Daily Telegraph, reported concern over legalities, national interests and military casualties. However, as in Parliament, public support or criticism hinged on issues other than the likelihood of military casualties.6 British casualties in the Balkans, and more recently in Sierra Leone, received scant coverage. The tone was not critical, and the largest public and media reaction was to favor a pension for the pregnant girlfriend of a soldier killed in Sierra Leone. This evidence complements the thoughts of Professor Christopher Dandeker, head of the Military Studies Department at King's College, London, who stated, "British imperial history is a key dimension of our armed forces and UK civil-military relations. Small wars and operations at the interface between war and peacekeeping (as in Sierra Leone recently) are part of British military culture. The public are used to this and used to expecting casualties."7
The parliamentary record shows some evidence of casualty intolerance in British society, but it is oblique, rare and unconvincing.8 British opinions differ, but clearly senior military leaders are expected to do no more than their best to accomplish the mission with the prudent care and diligence that has always been required of democratic militaries. Leaders have not been subject to orders or overt pressure to have no casualties.
US Civilian Leaders and Congress
As with the British, there is no overt evidence that the US force-protection policy was a reaction to political or social pressure. General George A. Joulwan was supreme allied commander of NATO forces and the senior US officer in Europe when US forces crossed the Sava River into Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of IFOR.9 He framed the force-protection policy that has served, with modification, in Kosovo ever since. During planning for the operation, he personally advised the president and secretary of defense that casualties were a risk that could not be eliminated. Joulwan stated in an interview that politicians never directed or implied that he and his chain of command avoid casualties at the expense of the mission. Nor was he given to believe that the success of the mission depended on a few or no casualties.10 Joulwan's successors had similar experiences. One of them, speaking off the record to a military audience, stated that he felt no pressure from political leaders to pursue a zero-casualty policy.
In a 1998 speech President William J. Clinton stated, "We must, and we will, always do everything we can to protect our forces. We must and will always make their safety a top priority. . . . But we must be strong and tough and mature enough to recognize that even the best-prepared, best-equipped force will suffer losses in action."11 The practical expression of this view that Joulwan alluded to can be seen in the comments of deputy Pentagon press spokesman Admiral Craig Quigley when he told reporters, "Commanders have authority to raise and lower threat conditions based on the local situation."12 If civilian leaders intended an unrealistic casualty-tolerance policy, commanders would not have any latitude.
How should we interpret official statements that call for minimizing casualties? The US National Security Strategy states that humanitarian use of military forces "will entail minimal risk to American lives."13 Former US Secretary of Defense Wil-liam Cohen publicly stated that force protection was his number one priority when he sent troops overseas.14 General Wesley Clark, commander of US forces in Europe during the Kosovo operation, said, "My highest priority for the US European Command theater is antiterrorism and force protection."15 These expressions are consistent with long-standing US military tradition, practice and doctrine to minimize casualties while accomplishing a mission. It is a leader's inherent responsibility and has been the goal for equipping, training and preparing professional militaries. Along with the president's public acceptance of risk and Joulwan's statements, these expressions cannot be taken as pressure for zero or unrealistically low casualties.
The Congressional Record from December 1995 through November 2000 indicates significant discussion of casualties but always in the context of national interest. Most contention concerned the president's authority to commit military forces to hazardous situations without consulting Congress—a reason many gave for not supporting the Kosovo bombing. Risk to soldiers or aircraft did not play prominently in debates outside the context of national interest. The Congressional Record signals no intolerance of casualties, only that risk should relate to unimportance and that Congress has a decisionmaking role.
Sociologists have likewise concluded that the American public will tolerate casualties but require that US interests warrant the cost.16 A study shows that the public did not reduce support for the Somalia operation because 18 US soldiers were killed. Public support collapsed once politicians said the mission could not succeed. It went on to point out that the public supported the Bosnia mission, despite the mistaken belief that US soldiers had died there.17 We know that casualty tolerance is a product of a rational calculation of three variables: interests, results and costs.18 Public reaction indicated casualty intolerance without qualification.
Distinguishing Improper Pressure
From Planning Guidance
Many commentators seem to presume that political guidance to limit casualties is improper. There is also a popular suspicion that senior military leaders have allowed an inference of zero-casualty tolerance to affect mission accomplishment. This leads to two questions: What is improper pressure? What would an action based on improper pressure look like?
Appropriate pressure seeks mission accomplishment at least cost and considers whether decisions accept the estimated risks and costs. Before selecting a course of action, parameters such as acceptable risk or casualty tolerance are simply planning guidance. Since military operations in US and British doctrine support political objectives, such
political guidance would be proper. Using this guidance, military leaders would prepare the most acceptable courses of action and advise how to balance political and military costs and benefits. Considering casualties, a central factor in the public's calculus of operational merit, is not in and of itself improper. Directing an operation without being willing to risk casualties, however, inverts the mission-first-at-least-cost principle and constitutes improper pressure.
Overt pressure has not been a factor in senior military policy formulation but might have been inferred. The evidence commonly cited appears to show this at first but is arguable, fragmentary, of unknown context or not directly to this point.19 This raises the question of what improper pressure might look like. Unless there are detailed inside accounts, improper pressure, inferred or otherwise, would be manifest as a militarily unjustified decision. If it were a rational course of action, no one would presume it to be improper, implied or even overt pressure.
Consequences of lax uniform standards go beyond appearance to functionality—here dirty weapons and ammunition.
If a leader adjusted strategy to eliminate casualties and still accomplished the mission, he would be considered a hero. If he refused to commit forces until complementary action had eliminated the risk of casualties and were still to succeed in the mission, it would be hailed as a triumph of synchronization and politico-military campaign planning. If he enforced inconvenient security measures but got the job done without casualties, he would be called prudent and responsible. Success is success and the cheaper the better. The only indicator that inferred political pressure has improperly influenced an operation would be an inversion of the mission-first-at-least-cost formula. As long as the mission is accomplished acceptably with minimal casualties, it is impossible to conclude that political influence has been improper or that military leaders have failed to do their duty because of what they infer.
To judge negatively the conservative approach of military leaders who successfully accomplish the mission is to express personal preference, not an objective conclusion. Joulwan, speaking of his Bosnia experience, states without reservation that his plans and policy were based on military necessity, not political or social pressure.20 Senior US and British military leaders selected force-protection approaches based on military factors, doctrine and mission accomplishment. The political mission remained paramount, and military leaders adhered to planning guidance.
Origin of US Force-Protection
Policy in the Balkans
Joulwan states that initial US force-protection policy was based on military necessity and that he was influenced by two factors. First, many believed that a lack of professionalism contributed significantly to the US failure in Vietnam and that lax uniform standards were part of the lost professionalism. Enforcing mission-appropriate uniform policies became an underlying tenet of professionalism. Since the mission in Bosnia was peace enforcement, not peacekeeping, the force had to be prepared for combat. Joulwan's uniform policy conformed to that need.
Second, senior US military leaders cited a terrorist threat to US forces, perhaps greater than that to our allies. Joulwan held the conviction that strength deters attacks and encourages cooperation. He felt that the IFOR peace-enforcement mission must not be confused with the UN Protection Force's peacekeeping mission. An image of combat readiness was, in itself, good protection.21
Joulwan's philosophies have been preserved in the US force-protection policy for the Balkans. Reported results support its soundness. US commanders point to casualty statistics, which include accident victims, that are lower than those for forces with other postures.22 The mission was accomplished, and the combat uniform did not hinder creating working relationships with the local population.23 The force did not exhibit symptoms of unprofessionalism reminiscent of Vietnam; and British General Roderick Cordy-Simpson, UN Protection Forces commander in Sarajevo, suggested before Parliament that the US approach had merit.24 In a subsequent report, Parliament stated that "pursuit of a military doctrine based upon the use of minimum force may not be the most appropriate in coercive scenarios such as Kosovo."25 US generals made policy based on military necessity as they knew it, and they saw results that confirmed their work. In their busy world, there would have been no reason to revisit something that was not broken—except that the law of unintended consequences always applies.
Rumors of US Casualty Intolerance
Ambassador for International Religious Freedom Robert A. Seiple, commenting on the emphasis that US military leaders place on avoiding casualties, said, "The safest place on the modern battlefield is in uniform."26 Although senior military leaders followed doctrine and not improper pressure, rumors persist. US and international military communities believe that US senior military leaders do fear casualties. Conventional wisdom holds that senior military officers, influenced by politicians and the public, have adopted a zero-casualty standard.27 The US European Command's joint review of the Bosnia operation concluded that "It was generally understood that fatalities would not be politically acceptable in this, a peace implementation operation."28 An IDA report on Bosnia found that "US national commanders were operating under the implied guidance to incur no casualties although no written guidance was ever issued to this effect."29 This conclusion is ubiquitous in literature and opinion among the British, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies. A report from an international conference of these nations stated, "It was understood that domestic political imperatives influence US force-protection thinking, while the UK and others will look for opportunities to `reach out' to local communities at the lowest levels and as early in an operation as possible."30
Commonly cited as evidence are anecdotal reports. A platoon leader recently returned from Bosnia told the United States Military Academy graduating class that had he told his platoon that there was nothing worth any of them being hurt over.31 A newly arrived major was told that if the mission interfered with force protection, the mission came second. A battalion commander reported, "It's simple. When I received my written mission from division, absolutely minimizing casualties was the mission prioritized as first, so I in turn passed it on in my written operation order to my company commanders."32 US Army Europe's 1997 operation order on force protection states in the first line of its concept of operation, "Force protection is the first priority of all forces."33 These examples could be interpreted as being consistent with zero-casualty guidance. Raising force protection to the status of a mission suggests as much. Clearly those below the senior military level are convinced that the United States is casualty-averse. What is not immediately clear is the origin of the idea.
US force-protection policy is not stated in zero-casualty terms. Written policy uses traditional ways to describe commanders' responsibility for troops, ways analogous to those seen in long-standing leadership doctrine and more recent joint doctrine—neither of which has a zero-casualty message.34 It follows that the zero-casualty idea must have originated as a popular interpretation of events—a grass-roots phenomenon not based on traditional reading of the policy's words. Fueled by observation and constant exposure to whispered certainty, the tactical military has embraced the belief along with the rest of the world.35 It now stands as an article of faith. It appears to be as Thucydides said two millennia ago, "Most people will not take trouble in finding out the truth, but are much more inclined to accept the first story they hear."36
Grass-Roots Mythology
The belief that US force-protection policy is based on casualty intolerance is a myth that does not accurately describe the policy's origins or intent. The artifact of the force-protection policy is interpreted through this myth and misunderstood. What the authors of the policy see simply as a more formal articulation of a commander's traditional responsibility for minimizing casualties, agents of the myth see as an exhortation to zero casualties.37
This unintended interpretation has gained the weight of collective belief, which has colored the interpretation of orders, events and affected decisions. The myth is so widely accepted that it has become folklore and changed US military bureaucracy.38 As an example, force protection is being institutionalized in formal structures, which underscores its importance, provides additional legitimacy to the myth and enhances its usefulness in explaining the world.39 It becomes a self-sustaining cycle.
The myth then becomes routine. As guidance spreads downward, it becomes more elaborate and restrictive. The inevitable rise of institutional structures produces staff officers with checklists, risk-assessment methodologies and force-protection paragraphs in orders. Force protection rises to the status of a mission from its traditional role as a responsibility. Institutionalizing force protection has become a cottage industry in the US military; it now consumes resources and affects events. Even an intentional impression of zero-casualty tolerance could not have been better reinforced.
It is reinforced more directly when observations fit expectations. Interviews with junior military leaders in Bosnia in 1996 indicated widespread dissatisfaction with what was seen as out-of-touch policy. The troops did not see a high threat, despite the official mission of peace enforcement.40 What uniform and operational procedures are most appropriate for zero-casualty tolerance? Those indicated in the policy—those used for combat. If there were no tacit zero-tolerance policy in effect, junior commanders would expect flexibility in dress and procedures, much as the British enjoy. Yet, authority to be flexible was reserved for more senior military leaders. Local generals commanding the Bosnia division or Kosovo brigade sector were not seen as having the authority to change the posture. It was thought they had to clear exceptions with generals outside the zone of operations.41
Force protection became prioritized above the tactical mission as confusion over the nature of the operation conflated combat procedures and noncombat policy.42 Using the term "force protection" to describe this uneasy mix only exacerbated the confusion. Cohen reinforced the myth with statements about force-protection priority. Conservative tests for committing US forces, such as the so-called Caspar Weinberger-Colin Powell doctrine, complemented the picture by fitting the casualty-intolerance myth.43 Mandated force-protection briefings and frequent inspections have lent additional emphasis. The Army listened to the media and saw its allies next door choose less protection, lending credence to the interpretation. Factor in Mogadishu, initial US political rejection of a Kosovo ground option and an air war prosecuted from more than 10,000 feet.44 The explanation fit the phenomena and created its own weather. The fact that the United States has suffered casualties without any report of adverse action against its tactical leaders has not had any discernible effect on the myth.45 Like paradigms, myths are not replaced, even if they are incorrect, until something better comes along. Both the grass-roots army and its senior leaders have looked at the same phenomenon, seen a different picture and found no reason to change their interpretations.
The zero-casualty myth is built on an assumption that outside beliefs are influential within the military.46 The theory is supported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies that observes, "[T]oday's armed forces will also be pushed by the winds of society's pressures and pulled by the currents created by government polices and technological change. Society's pressures and the ramifications of government policies have a major impact on the current climate within military units."47
The US Army has redefined a commander's traditional responsibility for soldiers and skewed the relationship between it and the mission. But, this new understanding refutes the contention that US and British approaches to similar force-protection doctrine differ because of political pressure on US military leaders.
The Calculus of Casualty Tolerance
Ultimately societies determine what is worth dying for and, therefore, what is tolerable risk. Assessing their militaries requires understanding the underlying social calculus. The United States and Britain use the same formula but weigh the factors differently. When side by side, the nations may respond to the same threat differently. It appears that both US and British citizens tolerate casualties when their interests are at stake. However, Britons find their interests at stake more often, and their interests are of higher relative value. Thus, their tolerance for casualties is naturally higher, and as members of that society, their military leaders are commensurately shaped. US interests are not directly involved as often as British ones and are less often seen as vital.
The United Kingdom historically views itself in terms of its military interventions.48 It has pursued empire for the sake of survival. Because its home islands have few resources, Britain has been tied to the sea. Mercantilism became essential to its prosperity, a trend fueled by demands of the industrial revolution. The growing need for foreign raw materials, labor and markets required subduing competitors and protecting freedom of the seas. Britain's history is replete with wars to sustain itself on sea and shore far from home. Dandeker has also pointed out that the British public is accustomed to casualties.49 Perhaps they will flinch less quickly than Americans simply because, historically, they have not had the luxury.
On the other hand, principal US experiences have been directly linked to home defense or protecting American ideals, not economic survival. The Revolution, Civil War, War of 1812, World Wars I and II, Korea and Vietnam have all been popularly characterized as defending home and the American way of life.50 The fact that several were fought abroad is simply taken as smart strategy designed to avoid war on US soil. Small US expeditions, even those of the early 20th century arguably pursued for economic reasons, are largely unknown to Americans, and where recorded, are characterized as either neutrally or idealistically warranted interventions.51
Traditionally, US wars and military expeditions have been justified as responses to threats against the United States or its citizens abroad.52 In fact, commentators and politicians hailed the end of the Cold War as containment policy succeeding against an "evil empire."53 The Cold War and minor forays were not about acute threats of world war or oil cutoffs. Unlike Britain, the United States has seldom been geographically or economically threatened. The term "casualty tolerance" has different meanings for each country, depending on its culture and politics.
British leaders may consider their interest in the Balkans as more vital than the United States does and not just because of geographic proximity. Moreover, senior British military leaders have been socialized to a tendency to follow British tradition and have no immediate reason to jeopardize their traditional "hearts and minds" campaign by taking a more US-like approach, even though it could immediately reduce casualty risks. The United States would not have the same option of choosing a less-protective posture, not because of casualty intolerance within US society, but because of the heightened standard set by its culture's focus on indi- viduals and by the expectations set by US history.
An Imperial Army
Britain has unapologetically fought wars for economic purposes. The British military serves the monarch and suffers wounds in service of queen and country. British military culture is expeditionary; troops often have deployed in relatively small strength on distant shores.54 As a result, the British have long practiced persuasion based on an iron fist in a velvet glove, a policy or perhaps doctrine refined during their extensive experience with small-scale politico-military operations.55 Resources left them no choice. They had to engage hearts and minds immediately, fighting only when no other choice existed because they have seldom been able to overwhelm an opponent by combat power alone.
In doing so, the British have developed a charisma some call arrogance. It is not. This demeanor enables them to dominate without constant recourse to force of arms and to develop a professional reputation that is a form of symbolic capital.56 Predicated on symbolic capital, the British posture requires calculated, cavalier demonstration for effectiveness. Despite the benefits cited by senior US military leaders, the British have not taken up the US posture because it runs counter to the tradition and culture of British civil and military society. The culture survives because it has proven effective. The British do value soldiers but choose not to risk fixing what works. If they suffer somewhat more, the calculus of their society's tolerance will allow it.
The People's Army
US culture has aided the US Army's willingness to accept an unintended implication of zero-casualty tolerance. The US Army has a reputation as a firepower force—to avoid casualties, the United States invented "reconnaissance by fire," the "daisy cutter" and the atomic bomb. US military doctrine has always been able to overwhelm its opponent with an overmatching force. It deploys and fights in strength with adequate resources to assure victory. The basis for this approach has been an idealistic valuation of the individual, along the lines of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The materiel luxury of bombs and bullets substituted for soldiers' lives reinforces the viewpoint that all men are created equal. Philosophy and wealth do not instill a zero-casualty cultural attitude but, rather, reinforce commanders' traditional responsibility to avoid casualties at all cost. However, it is a short step along the spectrum from minimal to zero casualties, one the US Army is now taking.
US general officers, like their British counterparts, respond to their own culture. The US military's symbolic capital lies in its readiness to use overwhelming force. Senior US military leaders understand this without thought and use it just as the British use their approach. Force-protection policy developers who examine the major influences on US and British militaries rule out direct and indirect political and public influences as causal. Nearly identical doctrines have allowed such different policies because leaders applying the doctrines are products of different cultures, experiences and historical pressures. Because underlying ways of thinking and operating have been effective and codified in traditions that promise further success, it would be surprising if US and British generals had arrived at the same policy.
Successful multinational operations must bridge such gaps simply by coordinating policy during coalition formation and routine military-to-military contacts. Better yet, peacetime engagement with other militaries, including participation in international forums, develops practical interoperability tools and allows people to meet people. There is room for additional research, for instance, to validate or debunk the popular notion that policy dissimilarities are counterproductive. Also, the US Army should examine the balance between mission and casualties, and its potential impact on its warfighting ethic. Armies around the world are transforming. The better they understand these issues, the more promise there is for compatibility when and where it counts.
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1.UK Force Protection Doctrine, January 1999; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], 12 February 1999); US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 30 December 1994); interview with LTC Gary Harrity, Chief, Force Protection Division, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 6 December 2000.
2.US and British force-protection doctrine is similar. The major difference is that British doctrine explicitly includes combat while US doctrine covers noncombat operations in a combat zone.
3.American, British, Canadian, Australian (ABCA) RAINBOW SERPENT Post Exercise Report, (Rosslyn, VA: ABCA Program, 1998), passim, <www.abca.hqda. pentagon.mil> ABCA FOCUS 2000 Post Exercise Report, (Rosslyn, VA: ABCA Program, 1998) F-3, para 13.
4.Buchanan, et al., Operation Joint Endeavor—Descriptions and Lessons Learned (Planning and Deployment Phases) (Arlington, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses [IDA], 1996).
5.Records of the Parliament Stationary Office: Commons Hansard, Written Answers and Official Reports; Lords Hansard, Written Answers, Official Reports; and Select Committee on Defence reports for December 1995 through November 2000, <www.parliament.the-stationary-office.co.uk>.
6.London Timesarchives, <www.thetimes.co.uk >; Daily Telegrapharchives, <www.telegraph.co.uk>, website archives for December 1995 through November 2000.
7.Christopher Dandeker, Head of Department of War Studies, King's College, London, e-mail to Richard R. Caniglia, 18 Sepember 2000, Subject: RE: your project.
8.British House of Commons Committee on Defence, Minutes of Evidence (Question 11), 5 July 2000, <www.parliament.the-stationary-office.co.uk>, accessed 17 November 2000. The only indication of casualty aversion found was Dr. Christopher Coker's testimony before the Select Committee on Defence in hearings on the relationship of the military to the public. In Coker's words, "We live in risk-averse societies. . . . the calculus of risk is the basis on which we elect our politicians."
9.Implementation force for the Dayton accords, followed by the stabilization force (SFOR).
10.Interview with General George A. Joulwan on 24 November 2000, Washington, DC.
11.Remarks by President William J. Clinton at the National Defense University, 29 January 1998.
12.WAMU FM Radio Station, comments by Admiral C. Quigley, Pentagon press briefing on USS Cole, Washington, DC, 2 November 2000.
13.US National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, December 1999, 20.
14.WAMU FM Radio Station, Statement of William Cohen, Pentagon press conference on the USS Cole, Washington, DC, 12 October 2000.
15.Statement of General Wesley K. Clark, commander in chief, US European Command (USEUCOM), before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 29 February 2000, 49.
16.Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, "The Civil-Military Gap and Casualty Aversion" (Draft), a paper prepared for the Triangle Institute for Security Studies Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society, provided September 2000, 30; Eric V. Larsen, Casualties and Consensus (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996); Michael Alvis, Understanding the Role of Casualties in US Peace Operations: Landpower Essay Series (Arlington, VA: Association of the US Army, 1999); Mark J. Conversino, "Sawdust Superpower: Perceptions of US Casualty Tolerance in the Post-Gulf War Era," Strategic Review, Winter 1997.
17.Feaver and Gelpi, 12.
18.Erik V. Larson, "Ends and Means in the Democratic Conversation: Understanding the Role of Casualties in Support of US Military Operations," Ph.D. dissertation, RAND Graduate School, 1996, 320; Feaver and Gelpi, 9 and 28.
19.British House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Minutes of Evidence (Question 11), 5 July 2000. In the UK, General Sir Charles Guthrie, Chief of British Defence Staff, said, "We only do what the market will allow. What the market wants is zero-tolerance of casualties; it wants fewer wounded soldiers coming back; it wants, essentially, no casualties at all if you can get away with it." In context, this referred to preference, not intolerance. See also Lessons Learned Presentation—UK Experiences in Kosovo, Memorandum for Record—TEAL XXXIV Meeting, ABCA Armies' Standardization Program, Agenda Item 10, 5 May 2000, 23, <www.abca.hqda.pentagon.mil>; Wesley K. Clark, "The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead," Parameters, Winter 1999-2000.
20.Joulwan interview.
21.Ibid.
22.Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE) after-action review briefing (unclassified slide), USEUCOM, Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany, 18 March 1997, accessed through IDA, Arlington, Virginia; Brigadier General S. Kindred, commanding general, US National Support Element, notes from interviews conducted by Buchanan, et al., in preparation of Operation Joint Endeavor—Descriptions and Lessons Learned (Planning and Deployment Phases), Volumes I to VI. Access to these notes is restricted and must be granted by the authors.
23.Tony Cucolo, "Grunt Diplomacy: In the Beginning There Were Only Soldiers," Parameters, Spring 1999, 110-26.
24.Remarks before the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Minutes of Evidence (Questions 233 and 234), 3 February 1999.
25.House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Fourteenth Report, Section III, The Conduct of the Campaign, 24 October 2000, para 326.
26.Feaver and Gelpi, 1.
27.Conversino.
28.OJE Joint After-Action Review, USEUCOM, Stuttgart, Germany, December 1995-December 1996, OJE Implementation Phase, Force Protection, 29, accessed via IDA.
29.Buchanan, et al., III-19.
30.FOCUS 2000 Post-Seminar Report, F-3.
31.US Army lieutenant from the 1st Armored Division recently returned from Bosnia speaking to cadets at the United States Military Academy in January 1999; quotation provided by Dr. Shubert, US Joint Center for History, Pentagon ([email protected]).
32.Don M. Snider, John A. Nagl and Tony Pfaff, Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century (Carlisle, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 1-2.
33.US Army Europe Operation Order 1-97, Force Protection (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, US Army Europe, March 1997), para 3a(1).
34.JP 3-07.3; FM 100-23.
35.Interview with LTC Hodgkins, 10 October 2000, Washington, DC. Hodgkins was the defense attache in Bosnia from April 1999 to July 2000. He had daily contact with policymaking commanders involved with both SFOR and KFOR. He stated that force protection was the primary effort, with the mission coming second.
36.Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (New York: Viking Press, 1986), 1 and 20.
37.Joulwan interview.
38.Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, introduction in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio eds. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), chapter 2.
39.The US military has institutionalized force protection by creating bureaucratic organizations to service it. These include staff sections at various levels and doctrine.
40.Notes of interviews conducted by Buchanan, et al., Volumes I to VI, passim.
41.Hodgkins interview.
42.The Joulwan policy was crafted for combat, but the US Army Europe Force Protection Operation Order 1-97 applied to operations short of combat. For operations short of combat, safety is the first priority. For combat the mission is first, and force preservation is handled by combat doctrine on security, not force-protection policy.
43.Secretary of Defense William Cohen said it is "the top" priority; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff described it as "a top" priority.
44.The loss of US soldiers in a failed operation that is credited with causing US withdrawal from Somalia.
45.Multi-National Brigade (East) Operational Overview, 1st Infantry Division, 3 May 2000, lists one US soldier dead and 22 wounded during Kosovo operations.
46.Feaver and Gelpi, 4.
47."American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century," Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2000, <www.csis.org/pubs/am21exec.html>, 19 January 2000.
48.Edgar Schein as quoted by Don M. Snider in "An Uninformed Debate On Military Culture," Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, Winter 1999, 11-26.
49.Dandeker; Ben Shephard interview with British Broadcasting Company (BBC) World Update, BBC World Service, rebroadcast by WETA FM, 9 November 2000. Shephard, author of A War of Nerves, a study of 20th-century military psychology, observed during a discussion of the casualty tolerance of societies that the British are relatively tolerant, given their experience in World War I that has set a baseline for measuring all casualty rates.
50.Vietnam, despite its rising unpopularity after 1968, was initially a popular cause based on defending freedom. The later opposition has challenged only the characterization of the threat as dire and the unproductiveness of the strategy employed, not the basic motivation.
51.A review of the Standards of Learning Test results for Virginia high schools indicates that only 39 percent of students achieved a passing score in US history (Virginia Department of Education), <http://www.pen.k12.va.us/VDOE/Assess...s_history.html>; Ellen C. Collier, Congressional Research Service—Library of Congress, 7 October 1993, <www.history.navy.mil/wars/foabroad.htm>. The United States has deployed forces on named operations abroad 234 times from 1798 to 1993. A Congressional Research Service report overwhelmingly characterizes these in altruistic phrases such as "to protect American interests" and "to protect lives and property."
52.The criteria commonly used for just war theories consider the morality of the object, the risk of collateral damage or casualties and the probability of success.
53."But my nomination for the most important, lasting, and successful American initiative in diplomacy during the 1900's has to be the strategic concept of `containment,' containment of the Soviet Union and world communism." Henry Mattox, editor of American Diplomacy, <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/am...4/edit_14.html>, 8 Sep 2000.
54.Dandeker.
55.Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press, 1960), 322-25.
56.P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977), chapter 4.
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Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. Caniglia is assigned to the Strategic and Operational Doctrine and Maneuver Desk; American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies' Standardization Program; Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA), Washington, DC. He received a B.S. from the University of Nebraska—Lincoln and is completing his M.A. at George Mason University. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, including Equipping and Sustainment Policy and Prioritization Desk, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans—Force Development, Washington, DC; Requirements, Programs and Priorities Division, Headquarters, DA, Washington; director, Aviation Trades Training; Aviation Logistics School, Fort Eustis, Virginia; research and development coordinator, US Army Aviation Applied Technology Directorate, Fort Eustis; S4, 207th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade, VII Corps, Stuttgart, Germany; and S3, 3d MI Battalion, 501st MI Brigade, Korea.
Photos:
US Army
Soldier, UK Ministry of Defence
Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
July - August 2001
Return to the Table of Contents
US and British Approaches to Force Protection
by Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. Caniglia, US Army
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Two allied military forces operating in the Balkans in adjacent zones are similarly equipped, trained and led. The communities, factions and problems they face are the same. They speak the same language and come from a common military cultural heritage. They have been allies in war and peace and are members of NATO where they champion the same military positions; they support the same NATO doctrine for peace support operations. Their national written force-protection doctrines are nearly the same, and despite disagreements, they are staunch political allies.1 Yet, when patrolling Balkan streets, US and British soldiers present radically different public images.
US troops wear helmets and body armor—hence their nickname, "ninja turtles." They travel in convoys with guns manned and ready. When they stop, they disperse to overwatch positions, ready to apply defensive force. At night most retire to fortified camps or outposts as Romans did on campaigns, cut off from the people they came to protect.
British troops wear berets and walk and talk with the locals. They travel in small groups, armed but with weapons slung. Some wear ammunition pouches; some do not; none wears body armor unless there is an imminent threat. Off duty they eat and relax in town; many live there. Single vehicles often travel the roads, identifiable only by their painted military patterns.
Each nation participating in the implementation force (IFOR), stabilization force (SFOR) and Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR) has adopted force-protection policies based on national doctrine. The British posture represents most nations' approach; the US posture is the exception.2 Although popular attitudes and political direction influence policy makers, force-protection policy for an operation is based on rational calculations of interest, efficacy and acceptable cost.
A soldier of the British Coldstream Guards plays with Balkan children
in stereotypical contrast to soldiers of the US 1st Armored Division.
Neither British nor US doctrine implies zero-casualty tolerance or places force protection above mission accomplishment. Both restate the traditional military responsibility to win with minimal casualties. Commanders have historically planned, adjusted, retreated, regrouped and advanced with new strategies to win at the lowest cost. Both US and British generals are concerned about casualties, and they adjust strategy to minimize them but not at the expense of the mission. Why do these generals with very similar doctrine differ in their policies?
Numerous references in official reports support a popular military view that policy differences among coalition members will be exploited in peace operations to manipulate public sentiment against a specific force.3 Further, a 1996 Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) study indicates that those dealing directly with the disputants and civil population in Bosnia saw policy variations among sectors as counterproductive.4
But, the implications go deeper. Force-protection policy can affect unity of effort, an imperative in military coalitions. Differences may also affect other aspects of a coalition, such as orders to open fire or induce confusion among the civil population, which could lead to serious incidents. In a highly charged political environment, policy differences can undermine a coalition's mission.
Senior military leaders are directly influenced by orders from above and results from below. They are indirectly influenced by other factors such as doctrine, experience, history and resources. Although they receive their orders from civilian leaders who represent society, society's mood may also influence them. Presumably, the British, with their routinely less-protective uniform, posture and procedures, and claims of mission command, would show greater tolerance for risk. US policy, because it is dictated or influenced from above, should show the opposite.
British Civilian Leaders and Parliament
The Prime Minister's Questions in the House of Commons and parliamentary debates over Bosnia and Kosovo do not indicate a philosophy of casualty aversion. The prime minister was an early and vocal supporter of maintaining a credible ground war option for Kosovo. There was a sober recognition of the personal and political effects of casualties but nothing indicating hesitation on these grounds. The debates seemed to concern the level of British interests, the ability to field the required force and civilian casualties in the war zone more than potential British military casualties. In fact, the subject of British military casualties occurs infrequently and then only as a derivative rather than a primary topic.5
The same is true of the public. Two major newspapers, The London Times and The Daily Telegraph, reported concern over legalities, national interests and military casualties. However, as in Parliament, public support or criticism hinged on issues other than the likelihood of military casualties.6 British casualties in the Balkans, and more recently in Sierra Leone, received scant coverage. The tone was not critical, and the largest public and media reaction was to favor a pension for the pregnant girlfriend of a soldier killed in Sierra Leone. This evidence complements the thoughts of Professor Christopher Dandeker, head of the Military Studies Department at King's College, London, who stated, "British imperial history is a key dimension of our armed forces and UK civil-military relations. Small wars and operations at the interface between war and peacekeeping (as in Sierra Leone recently) are part of British military culture. The public are used to this and used to expecting casualties."7
The parliamentary record shows some evidence of casualty intolerance in British society, but it is oblique, rare and unconvincing.8 British opinions differ, but clearly senior military leaders are expected to do no more than their best to accomplish the mission with the prudent care and diligence that has always been required of democratic militaries. Leaders have not been subject to orders or overt pressure to have no casualties.
US Civilian Leaders and Congress
As with the British, there is no overt evidence that the US force-protection policy was a reaction to political or social pressure. General George A. Joulwan was supreme allied commander of NATO forces and the senior US officer in Europe when US forces crossed the Sava River into Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of IFOR.9 He framed the force-protection policy that has served, with modification, in Kosovo ever since. During planning for the operation, he personally advised the president and secretary of defense that casualties were a risk that could not be eliminated. Joulwan stated in an interview that politicians never directed or implied that he and his chain of command avoid casualties at the expense of the mission. Nor was he given to believe that the success of the mission depended on a few or no casualties.10 Joulwan's successors had similar experiences. One of them, speaking off the record to a military audience, stated that he felt no pressure from political leaders to pursue a zero-casualty policy.
In a 1998 speech President William J. Clinton stated, "We must, and we will, always do everything we can to protect our forces. We must and will always make their safety a top priority. . . . But we must be strong and tough and mature enough to recognize that even the best-prepared, best-equipped force will suffer losses in action."11 The practical expression of this view that Joulwan alluded to can be seen in the comments of deputy Pentagon press spokesman Admiral Craig Quigley when he told reporters, "Commanders have authority to raise and lower threat conditions based on the local situation."12 If civilian leaders intended an unrealistic casualty-tolerance policy, commanders would not have any latitude.
How should we interpret official statements that call for minimizing casualties? The US National Security Strategy states that humanitarian use of military forces "will entail minimal risk to American lives."13 Former US Secretary of Defense Wil-liam Cohen publicly stated that force protection was his number one priority when he sent troops overseas.14 General Wesley Clark, commander of US forces in Europe during the Kosovo operation, said, "My highest priority for the US European Command theater is antiterrorism and force protection."15 These expressions are consistent with long-standing US military tradition, practice and doctrine to minimize casualties while accomplishing a mission. It is a leader's inherent responsibility and has been the goal for equipping, training and preparing professional militaries. Along with the president's public acceptance of risk and Joulwan's statements, these expressions cannot be taken as pressure for zero or unrealistically low casualties.
The Congressional Record from December 1995 through November 2000 indicates significant discussion of casualties but always in the context of national interest. Most contention concerned the president's authority to commit military forces to hazardous situations without consulting Congress—a reason many gave for not supporting the Kosovo bombing. Risk to soldiers or aircraft did not play prominently in debates outside the context of national interest. The Congressional Record signals no intolerance of casualties, only that risk should relate to unimportance and that Congress has a decisionmaking role.
Sociologists have likewise concluded that the American public will tolerate casualties but require that US interests warrant the cost.16 A study shows that the public did not reduce support for the Somalia operation because 18 US soldiers were killed. Public support collapsed once politicians said the mission could not succeed. It went on to point out that the public supported the Bosnia mission, despite the mistaken belief that US soldiers had died there.17 We know that casualty tolerance is a product of a rational calculation of three variables: interests, results and costs.18 Public reaction indicated casualty intolerance without qualification.
Distinguishing Improper Pressure
From Planning Guidance
Many commentators seem to presume that political guidance to limit casualties is improper. There is also a popular suspicion that senior military leaders have allowed an inference of zero-casualty tolerance to affect mission accomplishment. This leads to two questions: What is improper pressure? What would an action based on improper pressure look like?
Appropriate pressure seeks mission accomplishment at least cost and considers whether decisions accept the estimated risks and costs. Before selecting a course of action, parameters such as acceptable risk or casualty tolerance are simply planning guidance. Since military operations in US and British doctrine support political objectives, such
political guidance would be proper. Using this guidance, military leaders would prepare the most acceptable courses of action and advise how to balance political and military costs and benefits. Considering casualties, a central factor in the public's calculus of operational merit, is not in and of itself improper. Directing an operation without being willing to risk casualties, however, inverts the mission-first-at-least-cost principle and constitutes improper pressure.
Overt pressure has not been a factor in senior military policy formulation but might have been inferred. The evidence commonly cited appears to show this at first but is arguable, fragmentary, of unknown context or not directly to this point.19 This raises the question of what improper pressure might look like. Unless there are detailed inside accounts, improper pressure, inferred or otherwise, would be manifest as a militarily unjustified decision. If it were a rational course of action, no one would presume it to be improper, implied or even overt pressure.
Consequences of lax uniform standards go beyond appearance to functionality—here dirty weapons and ammunition.
If a leader adjusted strategy to eliminate casualties and still accomplished the mission, he would be considered a hero. If he refused to commit forces until complementary action had eliminated the risk of casualties and were still to succeed in the mission, it would be hailed as a triumph of synchronization and politico-military campaign planning. If he enforced inconvenient security measures but got the job done without casualties, he would be called prudent and responsible. Success is success and the cheaper the better. The only indicator that inferred political pressure has improperly influenced an operation would be an inversion of the mission-first-at-least-cost formula. As long as the mission is accomplished acceptably with minimal casualties, it is impossible to conclude that political influence has been improper or that military leaders have failed to do their duty because of what they infer.
To judge negatively the conservative approach of military leaders who successfully accomplish the mission is to express personal preference, not an objective conclusion. Joulwan, speaking of his Bosnia experience, states without reservation that his plans and policy were based on military necessity, not political or social pressure.20 Senior US and British military leaders selected force-protection approaches based on military factors, doctrine and mission accomplishment. The political mission remained paramount, and military leaders adhered to planning guidance.
Origin of US Force-Protection
Policy in the Balkans
Joulwan states that initial US force-protection policy was based on military necessity and that he was influenced by two factors. First, many believed that a lack of professionalism contributed significantly to the US failure in Vietnam and that lax uniform standards were part of the lost professionalism. Enforcing mission-appropriate uniform policies became an underlying tenet of professionalism. Since the mission in Bosnia was peace enforcement, not peacekeeping, the force had to be prepared for combat. Joulwan's uniform policy conformed to that need.
Second, senior US military leaders cited a terrorist threat to US forces, perhaps greater than that to our allies. Joulwan held the conviction that strength deters attacks and encourages cooperation. He felt that the IFOR peace-enforcement mission must not be confused with the UN Protection Force's peacekeeping mission. An image of combat readiness was, in itself, good protection.21
Joulwan's philosophies have been preserved in the US force-protection policy for the Balkans. Reported results support its soundness. US commanders point to casualty statistics, which include accident victims, that are lower than those for forces with other postures.22 The mission was accomplished, and the combat uniform did not hinder creating working relationships with the local population.23 The force did not exhibit symptoms of unprofessionalism reminiscent of Vietnam; and British General Roderick Cordy-Simpson, UN Protection Forces commander in Sarajevo, suggested before Parliament that the US approach had merit.24 In a subsequent report, Parliament stated that "pursuit of a military doctrine based upon the use of minimum force may not be the most appropriate in coercive scenarios such as Kosovo."25 US generals made policy based on military necessity as they knew it, and they saw results that confirmed their work. In their busy world, there would have been no reason to revisit something that was not broken—except that the law of unintended consequences always applies.
Rumors of US Casualty Intolerance
Ambassador for International Religious Freedom Robert A. Seiple, commenting on the emphasis that US military leaders place on avoiding casualties, said, "The safest place on the modern battlefield is in uniform."26 Although senior military leaders followed doctrine and not improper pressure, rumors persist. US and international military communities believe that US senior military leaders do fear casualties. Conventional wisdom holds that senior military officers, influenced by politicians and the public, have adopted a zero-casualty standard.27 The US European Command's joint review of the Bosnia operation concluded that "It was generally understood that fatalities would not be politically acceptable in this, a peace implementation operation."28 An IDA report on Bosnia found that "US national commanders were operating under the implied guidance to incur no casualties although no written guidance was ever issued to this effect."29 This conclusion is ubiquitous in literature and opinion among the British, Australian, Canadian and New Zealand armies. A report from an international conference of these nations stated, "It was understood that domestic political imperatives influence US force-protection thinking, while the UK and others will look for opportunities to `reach out' to local communities at the lowest levels and as early in an operation as possible."30
Commonly cited as evidence are anecdotal reports. A platoon leader recently returned from Bosnia told the United States Military Academy graduating class that had he told his platoon that there was nothing worth any of them being hurt over.31 A newly arrived major was told that if the mission interfered with force protection, the mission came second. A battalion commander reported, "It's simple. When I received my written mission from division, absolutely minimizing casualties was the mission prioritized as first, so I in turn passed it on in my written operation order to my company commanders."32 US Army Europe's 1997 operation order on force protection states in the first line of its concept of operation, "Force protection is the first priority of all forces."33 These examples could be interpreted as being consistent with zero-casualty guidance. Raising force protection to the status of a mission suggests as much. Clearly those below the senior military level are convinced that the United States is casualty-averse. What is not immediately clear is the origin of the idea.
US force-protection policy is not stated in zero-casualty terms. Written policy uses traditional ways to describe commanders' responsibility for troops, ways analogous to those seen in long-standing leadership doctrine and more recent joint doctrine—neither of which has a zero-casualty message.34 It follows that the zero-casualty idea must have originated as a popular interpretation of events—a grass-roots phenomenon not based on traditional reading of the policy's words. Fueled by observation and constant exposure to whispered certainty, the tactical military has embraced the belief along with the rest of the world.35 It now stands as an article of faith. It appears to be as Thucydides said two millennia ago, "Most people will not take trouble in finding out the truth, but are much more inclined to accept the first story they hear."36
Grass-Roots Mythology
The belief that US force-protection policy is based on casualty intolerance is a myth that does not accurately describe the policy's origins or intent. The artifact of the force-protection policy is interpreted through this myth and misunderstood. What the authors of the policy see simply as a more formal articulation of a commander's traditional responsibility for minimizing casualties, agents of the myth see as an exhortation to zero casualties.37
This unintended interpretation has gained the weight of collective belief, which has colored the interpretation of orders, events and affected decisions. The myth is so widely accepted that it has become folklore and changed US military bureaucracy.38 As an example, force protection is being institutionalized in formal structures, which underscores its importance, provides additional legitimacy to the myth and enhances its usefulness in explaining the world.39 It becomes a self-sustaining cycle.
The myth then becomes routine. As guidance spreads downward, it becomes more elaborate and restrictive. The inevitable rise of institutional structures produces staff officers with checklists, risk-assessment methodologies and force-protection paragraphs in orders. Force protection rises to the status of a mission from its traditional role as a responsibility. Institutionalizing force protection has become a cottage industry in the US military; it now consumes resources and affects events. Even an intentional impression of zero-casualty tolerance could not have been better reinforced.
It is reinforced more directly when observations fit expectations. Interviews with junior military leaders in Bosnia in 1996 indicated widespread dissatisfaction with what was seen as out-of-touch policy. The troops did not see a high threat, despite the official mission of peace enforcement.40 What uniform and operational procedures are most appropriate for zero-casualty tolerance? Those indicated in the policy—those used for combat. If there were no tacit zero-tolerance policy in effect, junior commanders would expect flexibility in dress and procedures, much as the British enjoy. Yet, authority to be flexible was reserved for more senior military leaders. Local generals commanding the Bosnia division or Kosovo brigade sector were not seen as having the authority to change the posture. It was thought they had to clear exceptions with generals outside the zone of operations.41
Force protection became prioritized above the tactical mission as confusion over the nature of the operation conflated combat procedures and noncombat policy.42 Using the term "force protection" to describe this uneasy mix only exacerbated the confusion. Cohen reinforced the myth with statements about force-protection priority. Conservative tests for committing US forces, such as the so-called Caspar Weinberger-Colin Powell doctrine, complemented the picture by fitting the casualty-intolerance myth.43 Mandated force-protection briefings and frequent inspections have lent additional emphasis. The Army listened to the media and saw its allies next door choose less protection, lending credence to the interpretation. Factor in Mogadishu, initial US political rejection of a Kosovo ground option and an air war prosecuted from more than 10,000 feet.44 The explanation fit the phenomena and created its own weather. The fact that the United States has suffered casualties without any report of adverse action against its tactical leaders has not had any discernible effect on the myth.45 Like paradigms, myths are not replaced, even if they are incorrect, until something better comes along. Both the grass-roots army and its senior leaders have looked at the same phenomenon, seen a different picture and found no reason to change their interpretations.
The zero-casualty myth is built on an assumption that outside beliefs are influential within the military.46 The theory is supported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies that observes, "[T]oday's armed forces will also be pushed by the winds of society's pressures and pulled by the currents created by government polices and technological change. Society's pressures and the ramifications of government policies have a major impact on the current climate within military units."47
The US Army has redefined a commander's traditional responsibility for soldiers and skewed the relationship between it and the mission. But, this new understanding refutes the contention that US and British approaches to similar force-protection doctrine differ because of political pressure on US military leaders.
The Calculus of Casualty Tolerance
Ultimately societies determine what is worth dying for and, therefore, what is tolerable risk. Assessing their militaries requires understanding the underlying social calculus. The United States and Britain use the same formula but weigh the factors differently. When side by side, the nations may respond to the same threat differently. It appears that both US and British citizens tolerate casualties when their interests are at stake. However, Britons find their interests at stake more often, and their interests are of higher relative value. Thus, their tolerance for casualties is naturally higher, and as members of that society, their military leaders are commensurately shaped. US interests are not directly involved as often as British ones and are less often seen as vital.
The United Kingdom historically views itself in terms of its military interventions.48 It has pursued empire for the sake of survival. Because its home islands have few resources, Britain has been tied to the sea. Mercantilism became essential to its prosperity, a trend fueled by demands of the industrial revolution. The growing need for foreign raw materials, labor and markets required subduing competitors and protecting freedom of the seas. Britain's history is replete with wars to sustain itself on sea and shore far from home. Dandeker has also pointed out that the British public is accustomed to casualties.49 Perhaps they will flinch less quickly than Americans simply because, historically, they have not had the luxury.
On the other hand, principal US experiences have been directly linked to home defense or protecting American ideals, not economic survival. The Revolution, Civil War, War of 1812, World Wars I and II, Korea and Vietnam have all been popularly characterized as defending home and the American way of life.50 The fact that several were fought abroad is simply taken as smart strategy designed to avoid war on US soil. Small US expeditions, even those of the early 20th century arguably pursued for economic reasons, are largely unknown to Americans, and where recorded, are characterized as either neutrally or idealistically warranted interventions.51
Traditionally, US wars and military expeditions have been justified as responses to threats against the United States or its citizens abroad.52 In fact, commentators and politicians hailed the end of the Cold War as containment policy succeeding against an "evil empire."53 The Cold War and minor forays were not about acute threats of world war or oil cutoffs. Unlike Britain, the United States has seldom been geographically or economically threatened. The term "casualty tolerance" has different meanings for each country, depending on its culture and politics.
British leaders may consider their interest in the Balkans as more vital than the United States does and not just because of geographic proximity. Moreover, senior British military leaders have been socialized to a tendency to follow British tradition and have no immediate reason to jeopardize their traditional "hearts and minds" campaign by taking a more US-like approach, even though it could immediately reduce casualty risks. The United States would not have the same option of choosing a less-protective posture, not because of casualty intolerance within US society, but because of the heightened standard set by its culture's focus on indi- viduals and by the expectations set by US history.
An Imperial Army
Britain has unapologetically fought wars for economic purposes. The British military serves the monarch and suffers wounds in service of queen and country. British military culture is expeditionary; troops often have deployed in relatively small strength on distant shores.54 As a result, the British have long practiced persuasion based on an iron fist in a velvet glove, a policy or perhaps doctrine refined during their extensive experience with small-scale politico-military operations.55 Resources left them no choice. They had to engage hearts and minds immediately, fighting only when no other choice existed because they have seldom been able to overwhelm an opponent by combat power alone.
In doing so, the British have developed a charisma some call arrogance. It is not. This demeanor enables them to dominate without constant recourse to force of arms and to develop a professional reputation that is a form of symbolic capital.56 Predicated on symbolic capital, the British posture requires calculated, cavalier demonstration for effectiveness. Despite the benefits cited by senior US military leaders, the British have not taken up the US posture because it runs counter to the tradition and culture of British civil and military society. The culture survives because it has proven effective. The British do value soldiers but choose not to risk fixing what works. If they suffer somewhat more, the calculus of their society's tolerance will allow it.
The People's Army
US culture has aided the US Army's willingness to accept an unintended implication of zero-casualty tolerance. The US Army has a reputation as a firepower force—to avoid casualties, the United States invented "reconnaissance by fire," the "daisy cutter" and the atomic bomb. US military doctrine has always been able to overwhelm its opponent with an overmatching force. It deploys and fights in strength with adequate resources to assure victory. The basis for this approach has been an idealistic valuation of the individual, along the lines of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The materiel luxury of bombs and bullets substituted for soldiers' lives reinforces the viewpoint that all men are created equal. Philosophy and wealth do not instill a zero-casualty cultural attitude but, rather, reinforce commanders' traditional responsibility to avoid casualties at all cost. However, it is a short step along the spectrum from minimal to zero casualties, one the US Army is now taking.
US general officers, like their British counterparts, respond to their own culture. The US military's symbolic capital lies in its readiness to use overwhelming force. Senior US military leaders understand this without thought and use it just as the British use their approach. Force-protection policy developers who examine the major influences on US and British militaries rule out direct and indirect political and public influences as causal. Nearly identical doctrines have allowed such different policies because leaders applying the doctrines are products of different cultures, experiences and historical pressures. Because underlying ways of thinking and operating have been effective and codified in traditions that promise further success, it would be surprising if US and British generals had arrived at the same policy.
Successful multinational operations must bridge such gaps simply by coordinating policy during coalition formation and routine military-to-military contacts. Better yet, peacetime engagement with other militaries, including participation in international forums, develops practical interoperability tools and allows people to meet people. There is room for additional research, for instance, to validate or debunk the popular notion that policy dissimilarities are counterproductive. Also, the US Army should examine the balance between mission and casualties, and its potential impact on its warfighting ethic. Armies around the world are transforming. The better they understand these issues, the more promise there is for compatibility when and where it counts.
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1.UK Force Protection Doctrine, January 1999; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], 12 February 1999); US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 30 December 1994); interview with LTC Gary Harrity, Chief, Force Protection Division, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 6 December 2000.
2.US and British force-protection doctrine is similar. The major difference is that British doctrine explicitly includes combat while US doctrine covers noncombat operations in a combat zone.
3.American, British, Canadian, Australian (ABCA) RAINBOW SERPENT Post Exercise Report, (Rosslyn, VA: ABCA Program, 1998), passim, <www.abca.hqda. pentagon.mil> ABCA FOCUS 2000 Post Exercise Report, (Rosslyn, VA: ABCA Program, 1998) F-3, para 13.
4.Buchanan, et al., Operation Joint Endeavor—Descriptions and Lessons Learned (Planning and Deployment Phases) (Arlington, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses [IDA], 1996).
5.Records of the Parliament Stationary Office: Commons Hansard, Written Answers and Official Reports; Lords Hansard, Written Answers, Official Reports; and Select Committee on Defence reports for December 1995 through November 2000, <www.parliament.the-stationary-office.co.uk>.
6.London Timesarchives, <www.thetimes.co.uk >; Daily Telegrapharchives, <www.telegraph.co.uk>, website archives for December 1995 through November 2000.
7.Christopher Dandeker, Head of Department of War Studies, King's College, London, e-mail to Richard R. Caniglia, 18 Sepember 2000, Subject: RE: your project.
8.British House of Commons Committee on Defence, Minutes of Evidence (Question 11), 5 July 2000, <www.parliament.the-stationary-office.co.uk>, accessed 17 November 2000. The only indication of casualty aversion found was Dr. Christopher Coker's testimony before the Select Committee on Defence in hearings on the relationship of the military to the public. In Coker's words, "We live in risk-averse societies. . . . the calculus of risk is the basis on which we elect our politicians."
9.Implementation force for the Dayton accords, followed by the stabilization force (SFOR).
10.Interview with General George A. Joulwan on 24 November 2000, Washington, DC.
11.Remarks by President William J. Clinton at the National Defense University, 29 January 1998.
12.WAMU FM Radio Station, comments by Admiral C. Quigley, Pentagon press briefing on USS Cole, Washington, DC, 2 November 2000.
13.US National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, December 1999, 20.
14.WAMU FM Radio Station, Statement of William Cohen, Pentagon press conference on the USS Cole, Washington, DC, 12 October 2000.
15.Statement of General Wesley K. Clark, commander in chief, US European Command (USEUCOM), before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 29 February 2000, 49.
16.Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, "The Civil-Military Gap and Casualty Aversion" (Draft), a paper prepared for the Triangle Institute for Security Studies Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society, provided September 2000, 30; Eric V. Larsen, Casualties and Consensus (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996); Michael Alvis, Understanding the Role of Casualties in US Peace Operations: Landpower Essay Series (Arlington, VA: Association of the US Army, 1999); Mark J. Conversino, "Sawdust Superpower: Perceptions of US Casualty Tolerance in the Post-Gulf War Era," Strategic Review, Winter 1997.
17.Feaver and Gelpi, 12.
18.Erik V. Larson, "Ends and Means in the Democratic Conversation: Understanding the Role of Casualties in Support of US Military Operations," Ph.D. dissertation, RAND Graduate School, 1996, 320; Feaver and Gelpi, 9 and 28.
19.British House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Minutes of Evidence (Question 11), 5 July 2000. In the UK, General Sir Charles Guthrie, Chief of British Defence Staff, said, "We only do what the market will allow. What the market wants is zero-tolerance of casualties; it wants fewer wounded soldiers coming back; it wants, essentially, no casualties at all if you can get away with it." In context, this referred to preference, not intolerance. See also Lessons Learned Presentation—UK Experiences in Kosovo, Memorandum for Record—TEAL XXXIV Meeting, ABCA Armies' Standardization Program, Agenda Item 10, 5 May 2000, 23, <www.abca.hqda.pentagon.mil>; Wesley K. Clark, "The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead," Parameters, Winter 1999-2000.
20.Joulwan interview.
21.Ibid.
22.Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE) after-action review briefing (unclassified slide), USEUCOM, Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany, 18 March 1997, accessed through IDA, Arlington, Virginia; Brigadier General S. Kindred, commanding general, US National Support Element, notes from interviews conducted by Buchanan, et al., in preparation of Operation Joint Endeavor—Descriptions and Lessons Learned (Planning and Deployment Phases), Volumes I to VI. Access to these notes is restricted and must be granted by the authors.
23.Tony Cucolo, "Grunt Diplomacy: In the Beginning There Were Only Soldiers," Parameters, Spring 1999, 110-26.
24.Remarks before the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Minutes of Evidence (Questions 233 and 234), 3 February 1999.
25.House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Fourteenth Report, Section III, The Conduct of the Campaign, 24 October 2000, para 326.
26.Feaver and Gelpi, 1.
27.Conversino.
28.OJE Joint After-Action Review, USEUCOM, Stuttgart, Germany, December 1995-December 1996, OJE Implementation Phase, Force Protection, 29, accessed via IDA.
29.Buchanan, et al., III-19.
30.FOCUS 2000 Post-Seminar Report, F-3.
31.US Army lieutenant from the 1st Armored Division recently returned from Bosnia speaking to cadets at the United States Military Academy in January 1999; quotation provided by Dr. Shubert, US Joint Center for History, Pentagon ([email protected]).
32.Don M. Snider, John A. Nagl and Tony Pfaff, Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century (Carlisle, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 1-2.
33.US Army Europe Operation Order 1-97, Force Protection (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, US Army Europe, March 1997), para 3a(1).
34.JP 3-07.3; FM 100-23.
35.Interview with LTC Hodgkins, 10 October 2000, Washington, DC. Hodgkins was the defense attache in Bosnia from April 1999 to July 2000. He had daily contact with policymaking commanders involved with both SFOR and KFOR. He stated that force protection was the primary effort, with the mission coming second.
36.Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (New York: Viking Press, 1986), 1 and 20.
37.Joulwan interview.
38.Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, introduction in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio eds. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), chapter 2.
39.The US military has institutionalized force protection by creating bureaucratic organizations to service it. These include staff sections at various levels and doctrine.
40.Notes of interviews conducted by Buchanan, et al., Volumes I to VI, passim.
41.Hodgkins interview.
42.The Joulwan policy was crafted for combat, but the US Army Europe Force Protection Operation Order 1-97 applied to operations short of combat. For operations short of combat, safety is the first priority. For combat the mission is first, and force preservation is handled by combat doctrine on security, not force-protection policy.
43.Secretary of Defense William Cohen said it is "the top" priority; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff described it as "a top" priority.
44.The loss of US soldiers in a failed operation that is credited with causing US withdrawal from Somalia.
45.Multi-National Brigade (East) Operational Overview, 1st Infantry Division, 3 May 2000, lists one US soldier dead and 22 wounded during Kosovo operations.
46.Feaver and Gelpi, 4.
47."American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century," Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2000, <www.csis.org/pubs/am21exec.html>, 19 January 2000.
48.Edgar Schein as quoted by Don M. Snider in "An Uninformed Debate On Military Culture," Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, Winter 1999, 11-26.
49.Dandeker; Ben Shephard interview with British Broadcasting Company (BBC) World Update, BBC World Service, rebroadcast by WETA FM, 9 November 2000. Shephard, author of A War of Nerves, a study of 20th-century military psychology, observed during a discussion of the casualty tolerance of societies that the British are relatively tolerant, given their experience in World War I that has set a baseline for measuring all casualty rates.
50.Vietnam, despite its rising unpopularity after 1968, was initially a popular cause based on defending freedom. The later opposition has challenged only the characterization of the threat as dire and the unproductiveness of the strategy employed, not the basic motivation.
51.A review of the Standards of Learning Test results for Virginia high schools indicates that only 39 percent of students achieved a passing score in US history (Virginia Department of Education), <http://www.pen.k12.va.us/VDOE/Assess...s_history.html>; Ellen C. Collier, Congressional Research Service—Library of Congress, 7 October 1993, <www.history.navy.mil/wars/foabroad.htm>. The United States has deployed forces on named operations abroad 234 times from 1798 to 1993. A Congressional Research Service report overwhelmingly characterizes these in altruistic phrases such as "to protect American interests" and "to protect lives and property."
52.The criteria commonly used for just war theories consider the morality of the object, the risk of collateral damage or casualties and the probability of success.
53."But my nomination for the most important, lasting, and successful American initiative in diplomacy during the 1900's has to be the strategic concept of `containment,' containment of the Soviet Union and world communism." Henry Mattox, editor of American Diplomacy, <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/am...4/edit_14.html>, 8 Sep 2000.
54.Dandeker.
55.Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press, 1960), 322-25.
56.P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977), chapter 4.
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Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. Caniglia is assigned to the Strategic and Operational Doctrine and Maneuver Desk; American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies' Standardization Program; Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA), Washington, DC. He received a B.S. from the University of Nebraska—Lincoln and is completing his M.A. at George Mason University. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, including Equipping and Sustainment Policy and Prioritization Desk, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans—Force Development, Washington, DC; Requirements, Programs and Priorities Division, Headquarters, DA, Washington; director, Aviation Trades Training; Aviation Logistics School, Fort Eustis, Virginia; research and development coordinator, US Army Aviation Applied Technology Directorate, Fort Eustis; S4, 207th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade, VII Corps, Stuttgart, Germany; and S3, 3d MI Battalion, 501st MI Brigade, Korea.
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