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  • Organizing Infantry

    I found this on BRF and have made some editorial changes to reflect the citations. I hope the professionals and knowledgeable enthusiasts comment on it.

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    Organising Infantry

    William F Owen

    “Organisation should be an expression of doctrine and doctrine should be an expression of experience.”
    Lt Col Robert Leonhard –2003 (1).

    A small amount of study will reveal that the vast majority of the world’s infantry units are organised along roughly the same lines. This is often interpreted as being indicative of certain well-founded principles. Close examination shows this to be less than certain.

    Modern infantry organisations are essentially arbitrary, and underpinned with a rationale that supports the status quo. The size and shape of squads, platoons and companies, as we see them today, were and are far more shaped by cost, career, and manpower issues than they are by doctrine or tactics. For example, the operationally proven four-section platoon of 1918 had sunk to three sections by 1938, purely to satisfy economic constraints and the need to procure less automatic section weapons (2).

    This leads to a debate between soldier and accountant, where the soldier states that a section must be eight men, and the accountant then asks “can 6 men with the right equipment, do the same job as 8?”

    Few have yet asked, “how do I best organise infantry to perform operations?” In fact the British Army did ask this question, but only in relation to operating in Northern Ireland, where they re-organised the platoon into the multiple, which was based on “bricks” of 4 men. This was only ever done in Northern Ireland and the question has to be asked, that if the platoon cannot operate in that environment, then how valid an operational grouping is it? Do you need to re-organise for urban operations? Current operational analysis strongly suggest that you might be forced go from rural to urban as part of the same action.

    The first question that has to be asked is how many men can leaders control effectively? “Regardless of the technical ability to communicate with every formation or unit within the span of command, studies have shown that a ratio of more than four or five subordinates of command to one headquarters is the maximum that a commander can effectively manage.” – Army Doctrine Publication 2 – Command, paragraph 0411.

    The above is telling, in two ways. Firstly it was the product of some detailed research by the British Army in the early 1980s and secondly because it reached exactly the same conclusions as the General Ivor Maxse, who was responsible for the British Armies pre-WW1 reorganisation.

    So the first principle we have is that there should be a maximum of 5 sub units under each HQ.

    The second key question to be asked is what is it I want my various units to be able to do? This is near impossible to answer, unless you have a method of operation already defined. But resources also limit what you can do, so this quickly becomes a circular argument. The answer would seem to lie in looking at existing practices and drawing conclusions from them, but beware. How operationally valid is it to have platoon advancing across country, bunker busting as it goes? This might be good training, but is it a good model for your organisation?

    The third question is how will we know if we are achieving our aim - that is to seek effective principles on which to organise infantry? The answer would appear to be that you do not need to re-organise for different operations or conditions, and that operations have become quicker and simpler. If not, then perhaps the principles are not coherent.

    It really isn’t important how many men are in a platoon or if you call X number of men a platoon. Making statements that “you cannot have 16 men in a platoon, because a platoon is 32,” gets the process nowhere. Therefore we aim for broad principles, not absolute numbers.

    Every infantry training pamphlet since 1917 states that platoons and sections will have to be able to operate with less than the optimum number of men, so we should be able to organise any number of men into viable groupings.

    The Fire-Team
    The smallest viable grouping of men is 3. You would not give a task or mission to a smaller group. Take any number between 3 and 15 and see how you can organise that many into viable fire-teams of 3-5 men.
    Examples:
    6 men – worst case, and can either remain as one team or split to 2 x 3 teams.
    11 men – 2 x 4 man teams with 1 x 3 man team.

    There is good evidence this works. Special forces operate for extended periods of time in 4 or 5 man teams. The British Army recommended 3-5 men as the basis for a reconnaissance patrol for many years and this is certainly borne out by men like Sidney Jary, who, based on his operational experience, is emphatic that exercising control over more than 4 others at night, on a complex and dangerous task is asking for trouble (3). ‘You, you and you’ is a powerfully simple basis. Since the first core function is “FIND”, it may be very sensible to base everything on a reconnaissance function.

    We know that a 4-man team can maintain 24-hour observation (4), indefinitely, using one man observing and one man on guard. Five men would find the task less arduous, but 3 would find it too arduous and would have to conduct the task with less security.

    A basic infantry fire-team should have one belt fed weapon and a variety of others that complement each other. In terms of the current issue 5.56mm weapons: a belt fed weapon, such as FN-Minimi, SA-80, plus SA-80 with UGL and an LSW would seem about right.

    Other weapons systems can also benefit from a fire-team approach. The GPMG is often crewed by 2 men in the light role. The No1 carries the gun at 10.9kg + 50 rounds = 12.37kg and the No2 carries 360 rounds 7.62mm link at 10.6kg plus his own weapon, so he’ll have close to an equal load. But, this means that the gun has only 410 rounds immediately available. If there were a No3 and 4, also carrying 360 rounds, then the gun would have 1,130 rounds immediately available.

    If you use the same 4 men to crew 2 guns, then there are 820 rounds between the two guns. And, if one of the gun team loses a man it becomes impossible to support and fire the gun over much time and distance. In other words, the 4-man gun team has true redundancy and more fighting power. The penalty is the partial loss of the services of the two riflemen as specialist riflemen. It depends on whether you see the team as a rifle force supported by a machine gun or a machine gun force supported by riflemen.


    Almost any support weapon system benefits from being grouped with 3-5 men.

    The Fire-Team Group (FTG) (Platoon) The fire-team group is 4 x fire-teams and a weapons-team. Four fire-teams allow for a 1st Echelon, a 2nd Echelon and a reserve. This adheres to the core functions of find, fix, strike, and exploit.
    So, based on this, a full strength FTG is 30 men, - 6 groups of 5 men. (See diagram):

    This suggests that a useful FTG is 4 x fire-teams, a fire GPMG support team, with an HQ. Does this mean a smaller platoon? The current establishment for the platoon is between 36 and 28 officers and men dependant on role (5), so 30 men is not a manning challenge. Amateur mathematicians will note that if each group in a FTG is 4 men, then you have a total of 24. 4 x 24 is 96, and thus the same as 3 x 32. A 24 man FTG gives a company commander 4 manoeuvre units, rather than 3, and thus he can constitute a true reserve.


    Nothing suggested here, is new (6). It is merely an attempt at codifying an approach, already well examined by others, and proven in trials to have some considerable, though not absolute, merit (7).

    To those who say, “well there must be something to the 8-man section. Look at the Roman contubernium” a quick history lesson may prove useful. A contubernium (8) was in rough translation, a mess unit or “tentful”. This was purely an administrative grouping, for eating sleeping and the use of a mule for transport (one hopes). It was nothing to do with fighting. 8 men would not have lasted long on the battlefield of the day, and the basic manoeuvre unit was the cohort (460 men approx). Add to this that a contubernium was, in fact anywhere from 4-10 men and we see those who say, “Well look at the Romans,” are barking up the wrong tree.

    Wilf Owen is a freelance writer and broadcaster. He is the author of Blackfoot Is Missing, Hutchinson, Pbk, £9.99.

    References:

    1. Interview with author. Lt Col Leonhard is the author of “The Art of Manoeuvre”, “Fighting in Minutes” and “Principles of War for the Information Age.”

    2. By 1918 each section had a Lewis Gun. By 1938 the BREN gun was introduced, but at only 3 per platoon.

    3. Interview with author. Sandhurst Jan 14th 2003.

    4. HQ Infantry, Support Weapons Wing, Netheravon. Close Recce Course handbook 1989. and Hugh McManners, Falklands Commando.

    5. This covers a description ranging from Armoured Infantry (36) to Lt Inf (V) (28)

    6. Major (now Lt Col) A D Mason PARA, “Debate: Infantry Low Level Tactics”, ADTN 6. – and Maj (now Lt Col) Jim Storr KINGS “Exercise Sea Wall” BAR 119.

    7. Op cit.

    8. William Smith, D.C.L., LL.D.: A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, John Murray, London, 1875.
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    Last edited by Anoop C; 25 Aug 06,, 14:00.

  • #2
    I don't know what BRF is, but I posted that article on the Land Forces board about a month ago.

    http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/showthread.php?t=13436

    Comment


    • #3
      I think this idea is absolutely dumb. He asks the right questions, especially focusing on the issue of span of control. However, he then proceeds by not truly looking at the questions.

      I've always heard of span of control being maxed out at 6 subordinate units. However, that's in the context of battalion/brigade operations - once you start drilling down to the company and platoon level, where command and control is done in the thick of the fight as opposed to from a TOC, then you are pushing your span of control past 4 subordinate units.

      So, as organized, he already has his infantry platoons maxed out. Add a sniper team, a mortar team, a forward observer team, an anti-tank team (which is an organic capability in US platoons), an air defense team, etc. and you are beyond your span of control and a liability instead of a capability.

      Furthermore, a platoon organized like this is worthless in an intense urban fight. Instead of plotting the moves for his platoon, the platoon leader will be busy controlling clearing teams. I don't want to go too deep on this point because of OPSEC concerns, but the issues are huge!

      Bottomline, given the current operating environment in the world, this platoon structure is a huge flop. If I had to choose a platoon design, I'd adopt the Ranger platoon design (although I'd love to see the USMC platoon in action with it's 3 fire team squads and evaluate its advantages and disadvantages).
      "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

      Comment


      • #4
        What's the Ranger platoon structure like?

        Comment


        • #5
          Originally posted by shek
          although I'd love to see the USMC platoon in action with it's 3 fire team squads and evaluate its advantages and disadvantages.
          In a Commonwealth army you could have been "seconded". Does the USA/USMC currently has any cross assignment programs for infantry (or other branches) officers?
          Reddite igitur quae sunt Caesaris Caesari et quae sunt Dei Deo
          (Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things which are God's)

          Comment


          • #6
            As usual i agree with the ex-wheeled mech puke.

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by -{SpoonmaN}-
              What's the Ranger platoon structure like?
              The platoon is triangular (three maneuver squads) as is the weapons squad relative to the machines guns (three m240Bs). Additional, there are some AT teams that are part of the weapons squad.
              "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

              Comment


              • #8
                Originally posted by sappersgt
                In a Commonwealth army you could have been "seconded". Does the USA/USMC currently has any cross assignment programs for infantry (or other branches) officers?
                If you're talking about Army infantry serving in the Marine Corps, the answer is no. You'd probably be burned at the stake as a heretic. The closest thing we've got to an exchange/cross assignment program is a few token slots at the professional development course for pre-company command captains. I'll have to ask my neighbor about what he thought about the Marines' course (he attended enroute to Fort Bragg).
                "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

                Comment


                • #9
                  Originally posted by M21Sniper
                  As usual i agree with the ex-wheeled mech puke.
                  I fell from the sky and walked once upon a time
                  "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by shek
                    I fell from the sky and walked once upon a time
                    LOL...you abn guys are SO easy to rile up.

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Major Shek,

                      Thank you for your comments. Could you describe the USMC organization?

                      I am still confused about some issues you raised. As I understand it, the article talks about only 5 units in a platoon - 4 fire teams and a weapons support team, which is only one team more than your optimum number of 4 from a control point of view.

                      Your points about a mortar platoon, scout section, sniper section, anti-aircraft platoon etc. would have consequences at the Company level, rather than at the Platoon level, no? For example, in an urban scenario, I would expect that the scout and sniper sections would be required more than the air-defence or the mortar platoon. In the US context, I cannot imagine a scenario where the opponent can field tanks in an urban setting, thus negating the need for a US anti-tank platoon as well. It seems that this question of organization is better addressed at the battalion or birgade level in terms of heavy vs. light forces. Can you comment?

                      If the opponents are rather evenly matched i.e. neither are guerilla units and the fighting is less in urban areas and more in fortified locations, it seems that the issue at hand is - how to conduct a 2 -up attack and still hold a platoon in reserve and how to manage this with adequate bayonet strength in the face of the current trend towards more crew-fired weapons and the extra battle load a soldier carries today.

                      Looking forward to your comments.

                      Rifleman,

                      I apologize for the thread proliferation, but I did not see your post earlier. Anyway, it appears that this thread is getting some response, so I hope it stays.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by Anoop C
                        Could you describe the USMC organization?
                        The Marine Corps rifle squad has traditionally been thirteen men. Three fire teams of four and the squad leader. There are three squads in a platoon. I think the Marine Corps has the machine guns in a company level weapons platoon. I'm not sure about that though.

                        I've heard the Marine Corps is changing their squad slightly. I think they are going to a twelve man squad with two fire teams of four and an headquarters team. The HQ team will have the squad leader, RTO, corpsman, and one other person whose duty position escapes me now. I got this from another forum. I haven't found anything else that appears to confirm it.

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          LOL, the army operated in squads of 'how many guys do i have at the unit today', lol.

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by Anoop C
                            Major Shek,

                            Thank you for your comments. Could you describe the USMC organization?

                            I am still confused about some issues you raised. As I understand it, the article talks about only 5 units in a platoon - 4 fire teams and a weapons support team, which is only one team more than your optimum number of 4 from a control point of view.
                            I'll add some more color to my previous comments - you have three maneuver squads, and then a weapons squads, which will support the platoon's maneuver. That being said, you still have a fourth unit to worry about controlling. On the other hand, the weapons squad leader is your most experienced squad leader and typically only a year or two away from making sergeant first class and being a platoon sergeant. So, in some sense, the weapons squad, while vital to your own maneuver, is already almost on auto pilot. Additionally, because of the mission of the weapons squad, you often have the ability to add the specialty team to the weapons squad (e.g. a sniper team, etc.).

                            Now, I don't know the rank structure of the teams leaders under the article's organization, but I'd be very curious to see how you would man and career progress NCOs from leading 3-4 other men to all of a sudden being responsible for 23 other men. In any event, though, I don't see how you could possibly control 5 other elements at the platoon level, and that's without even adding a single attachment (think of having 5 separate elements in contact at the same time and trying to talk on the same commo net while trying to collate all the information and then effectively maneuver them. Hopefully, that thought demonstrates how difficult it is to do the same with just 4 elements under your command and control.

                            Originally posted by Anoop C
                            Your points about a mortar platoon, scout section, sniper section, anti-aircraft platoon etc. would have consequences at the Company level, rather than at the Platoon level, no? For example, in an urban scenario, I would expect that the scout and sniper sections would be required more than the air-defence or the mortar platoon. In the US context, I cannot imagine a scenario where the opponent can field tanks in an urban setting, thus negating the need for a US anti-tank platoon as well. It seems that this question of organization is better addressed at the battalion or birgade level in terms of heavy vs. light forces. Can you comment?
                            As before, you will often task organize such that instead of a whole section being deployed, you will split them up to increase your potential coverage. Mission dependent, of course, but not uncommon at all. As far as the AT requirement, think beyond armor, but also the ability to destroy a precision guided munition (aka suicide car bomber) at standoff distance to prevent injury to friendly troops. Also, the heavier weapons will come in handy to create breaches in walls, etc. Lastly, killing a Toyota pickup full of muj/jihadis is much more easily done with a Javelin than small arms.

                            I hope this helps to add some more texture to my prior answer and keep the questions coming if I'm not clear.
                            "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by shek
                              The platoon is triangular (three maneuver squads) as is the weapons squad relative to the machines guns (three m240Bs). Additional, there are some AT teams that are part of the weapons squad.
                              Seems sharp to be able to break everything down amongst the maneuver units. I guess this must be particularly true for Rangers since I understand small-units tactics are one of thier areas of expertise and elite infantry yes?

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