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Looking at an Indian-Afghan axis

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  • Looking at an Indian-Afghan axis

    Tuesday, April 18, 2006 E-Mail this article to a friend Printer Friendly Version

    SECOND OPINION: Looking at an Indian-Afghan axis — Khaled Ahmed’s TV Review

    While the Afghan hand is overplayed on the basis of small-power alarmism, Pakistan’s hand is equally overplayed on the basis of the assumption of an area of influence. Self-restraint is difficult in the case of the smaller power; it is essential for the bigger power

    Pakistan has always looked at Afghanistan as an area of its influence, but Afghan nationalism (mainly Pushtun) inclined it to link up with India. Today, the Pushtun factor is (temporarily) ousted from Kabul, so we have the Northern Alliance to cope with. While the Afghan hand is overplayed on the basis of small-power alarmism; Pakistan’s hand is equally overplayed on the basis of the assumption of an area of influence, something like India’s assumptions in relation to Nepal.

    GEO TV (March 8, 2006) had its host Nasir Beg Chughtai discuss the issue of India’s relations with Afghanistan — and Kabul’s accusations against Pakistan that it was aiding and abetting the Taliban attacks into Afghanistan — with PML leader Mushahid Hussain Syed, former ambassador Tariq Fatemi, former ambassador to Kabul Rustam Shah, Brig (r) Rasheed Malik and Prof Mansur Akbar Kundi.

    Brig Malik said that Karzai was put to it by his minister, Abdullah Abdullah of the Northern Alliance, which dominated the defence and interior ministries and the intelligence agencies in Kabul. He said that before this the American envoy Zalmay Khalilzad too had levelled similar charges against Pakistan. The Northern Alliance people had old links with India and had stayed for long years in New Delhi when there was trouble in Afghanistan.

    The “jihadi” Northern Alliance leaned towards India because of Islamabad’s bias in favour of the Pushtun jihadi militias. In the past Pushtun rulers of Afghanistan had good relations with India. India was always a part of Afghan-Pushtun nationalism as a big-power make-weight in the region. Afghanistan’s nationalism is not Tajik or Turkmen nationalism but essentially Pushtun nationalism, which is anti-Pakistan.

    Brig Malik also explored an interesting angle: that India wanted Pakistan’s troops to be posted to the western border so that the army is divided and is not able to ensure proper security on the Indian border. (This was one of the aims of Pakistan’s low-intensity jihad in Kashmir vis-à-vis the Indian army in the 1990s.) When Pakistan had the Taliban ruling Afghanistan it could afford to place its entire army on the border with India as it felt no fear from the direction of the Durand Line.

    He said Karzai was powerless; he could not even visit Kandahar once after becoming president in Kabul because of lack of security. He said America had come to the region to control the oil resource, but Pakistan had its own policy which should not be tangled with that of India.

    Pakistan’s assumption that a change against the Northern Alliance would be in its favour is not correct. Its problems with the Taliban on policy matters showed up the contradictions in the past. It must pursue a firm border policy with Afghanistan. Such a policy will be successful in the proportion that Pakistan has control over its own territory.

    Former ambassador Tariq Fatemi said that Kabul was acting predictably given the nature of the dominant elements there, but he advised a less aggressive response to prevent the bilateral spat from getting out of hand. To keep things cool Pakistan should talk to the Americans because on ground theirs was the strongest presence with 19,000 troops.

    He also recommended using special envoys to Kabul instead of the media in imitation of what Kabul had done. He was particularly concerned about the start of a cold war between Afghanistan and Pakistan as that would redound to the advantage of India.

    Ambassador Fatemi’s advice was correct. The biggest risk would be succumbing to the big-power-next-door’s “moral” outrage. The bigger you are the easier it should be to exercise restraint. Small power nationalism is always intense and self-restraint under it minimal.

    Talat Hussain (AAJ TV, March 8, 2006) talked to former secretary general of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Akram Zaki, Mushahid Hussain Syed, PPP leader Abdullah Riaar and Zahid Saeed, about the Afghan plaint of interference. Mr Saeed thought that Iran could be involved in the affair because of its old links with Northern Alliance. He recommended that Pakistan announce clearly that the bases in Pakistan being used at present by ISAF forces would not be used by the Americans when they attack Iran.

    Mr Riaar said he knew Ambassador Khalilzad personally and thought his complaints about the Taliban living freely in Balochistan and the FATA were genuine. He suspected that those who did not capture the Taliban leaders from Balochistan might be thinking of a Taliban comeback in Afghanistan affording Pakistan the strategic depth it once sought.

    Mr Riaar introduced a fresh perspective into the discussion, which should be welcomed. Only thus will Pakistan succeed in evolving a level-headed policy on Afghanistan.

    Ambassador Rustam Shah agreed that Pakistan should have played cool on Afghan complaints. He said Pakistan had given $250 million to Afghanistan as aid and 60,000 Pakistanis were working in Afghanistan with Pakistan’s exports climbing to $1.2 billion (up from $25 million), second only to its exports to the United States. He emphasised that despite Karzai’s latest statements he was Pakistan’s man in Kabul because he became president with votes facilitated by Pakistan among the 2.5 million refugees still living inside Pakistan.

    He did not think that Iran was involved in the latest controversy. He thought the Northern Alliance was no monolith but had a variety of components with whom Pakistan could interact cautiously. Afghanistan’s relations with India had always been good, in fact better than with Pakistan except for the Taliban phase.

    Surprisingly Ambassador Rustam Shah remained the most balanced discussant despite the hard time he was given by Ahmad Shah Massoud in Kabul.

    Ambassador Rustam Shah also reminded the discussants that India was a big power and was working in Afghanistan on the strong basis of its past relations. The people who ruled Afghanistan today had gone and lived in India for long years. Still India was not alone as the big influential power in Afghanistan.

    In his view Central Asia and Turkey had stronger influence. He advised Pakistan not to become too obsessed with India in Afghanistan because ultimately Pakistan’s proximity and strategic position will dominate.

    A most useful discussion indeed! *
    http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...8-4-2006_pg3_3
    Very interesting indeed.

    Comments.


    "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

    I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

    HAKUNA MATATA
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