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Why Afghans hate Paksitanis

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  • Why Afghans hate Paksitanis

    Use and abuse of history


    By Tanvir Ahmad Khan

    IF time is a mighty river, then the past, present and future are vistas of the same inexorable flow of history. Nations have a collective memory that continues to shape their attitudes and ambitions. When they are as intertwined as Pakistan and Afghanistan, the element of historical determinism is even more pronounced.

    History is a shared garden the fragrance of which permeates the soul of both the people; it is also a prison of unfulfilled desires and projects. Apart from conscious memory, there is a subliminal undercurrent that influences events. It has been the source of an almost inescapable ambivalence in Pak-Afghan relations during the last 58 years.

    In recent contributions to this space, I have dwelt at some length on the implications of a certain tension that has crept into this vital relationship. One noted with regret that a minor crisis revived negative images of a bygone era. This was particularly noticeable on our state-controlled media where presenters suddenly remembered that Afghanistan was the only country in the world to vote against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations.

    An objective study of history would apportion blame equitably and thus rule out a self-righteous posture on either side. Mature nations do not run away from a candid encounter with history. A.R. Siddiqui’s thought-provoking appraisal of Pakistan-Afghanistan ties (April 7) was a welcome reminder of this need. My own long association with Afghanistan and the so-called “Afghan problem” makes me go one step further and suggest that it was never a simple story of “fraternal advances from Pakistan and a deliberate standoffishness, if not, exactly, hostility from the other side.”

    The following four factors stand out in an honest retrospect of our bilateral history: Afghan irredentism, the colonial mindset of Pakistani decision-makers in dealing with Afghanistan during the early post-independence years, Pakistan’s membership of anti-Soviet military pacts that resulted in Moscow’s support for Afghan irredentism and, finally, Pakistan arrogating to itself the prerogative of determining Afghan destiny after the Soviet withdrawal. It is time to come to terms with this legacy so that it does not distort future relations.

    The ebb and flow of Afghan irredentism depended upon a number of factors such as Afghanistan’s assessment of the internal situation in Pakistan, the state of relations of the two countries with other outside powers especially India, Russia and the United States, and the Afghan need to play the Pakistan card for domestic advantage. At a crucial point, the influence of Iran and the oil-rich Arab states also modulated strident demands from Kabul. The history of this complex interaction has become relevant again because of the growing disorder in the tribal areas of Pakistan and its Balochistan province. There is also the factor of a superpower reordering the politics of the region.

    The first concrete resurrection of the irredentist dream took place in the 1940s when the Afghans started to make definite moves as India galloped towards independence. In November 1944, they made the first representation to London that in case India won freedom, they should receive an assurance that the people inhabiting the frontier areas, lost to the British in the 19th century, would either become independent or return to Afghanistan.

    Significantly, another representation made more or less at the same time, also sought a corridor to the sea passing through Balochistan which would end the landlocked situation of Afghanistan. The partition plan of June 3, 1947, brought about intensification of Afghan diplomacy to secure the objectives set out in the representation of November 1944. On June 13 and again on July 10, 1947, Afghanistan formally demanded that the options of the people living between the Durand Line and the River Indus be enlarged so as to include their total independence or their return to Afghanistan.

    Pakistan entered into a dialogue with Afghanistan as early as November 1947. In Karachi, Sardar Najibullah Khan demanded the establishment of a “free sovereign province in the tribal areas inhabited by Pathans and Afghans, free access to the sea either in the form of an Afghan corridor through west Balochistan or by the creation of a free Afghan zone in Karachi.”

    In June/July 1949, the Afghan national assembly passed a resolution repudiating all treaties, conventions and agreements signed between Afghanistan and the British government. The same assembly also resolved not to accept the Durand line as the international frontier between the two countries. In August 1949, Kabul began open sponsorship of the so called Pakhtunistan assemblies on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. The Afghan perception was that the geopolitical situation was fluid and liable to changes.

    In the mid-1950s, Pakistan’s adversarial relations with the Soviet Union became an important factor in the Afghan attitude. Bulganin and Khrushchev visited Kabul in December 1955 and openly declared that the Soviet Union “sympathised with Afghanistan’s policy on the Pakhtunistan issue”. It was a fateful year in which Pakistan and Afghanistan withdrew their ambassadors from their respective posts after the attacks on Pakistani consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar and the flag incident in Kabul. Khrushchev reiterated public support for Afghanistan while visiting Kabul on March 2, 1960. It should be recalled that diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were restored in May 1960 through the mediation of the Shah of Iran.

    Daoud’s coup of July 1973 precipitated another adverse phase in Pak-Afghan relations. As Daoud contemplated Pakistan’s situation in 1972, it might well have occurred to him that it presented an opportunity to assert Afghan interest in the trans-Indus territories of Pakistan. Defeated squarely by India in the eastern wing and haunted in the west by the spectre of a domino effect, Pakistan must have looked fragile.

    Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s successful diplomacy in the region made it difficult for Daoud to sustain his aggressive posture. He was in dire need of external assistance but quickly discovered that Iran and the Arab states expected a rapprochement with Pakistan. In October 1974, during Bhutto’s visit to Moscow, Kosygin publicly expressed the hope for the “speediest settlement of difference that still clouded relations between Pakistan and our friendly neighbour, Afghanistan.” This formulation indicated substantial moderation in Moscow’s stance. By the end of 1974, a clear possibility for a meaningful Pak-Afghan dialogue had emerged.

    Bhutto’s diplomatic gains were partly negated by his political problems in the trans-Indus provinces. He had hoped that draconian measures against non-PPP governments there would be balanced by a proactive policy of opening up tribal lands. In fact, measures designed to generate economic and social development were expected to exert pressure on Afghanistan itself

    India had not followed up its military triumph in East Pakistan with an assault on West Pakistan and the Simla agreement had restored a minimum normalcy to bilateral relations. India had not, however, resisted the temptation of taking advantage of Sardar Daoud’s renewed Pakhtunistan offensive and Bhutto’s troubles in the trans-Indus provinces.

    By the end of 1973, a team of Indian military specialists was training saboteurs in Afghanistan to blow up bridges, culverts, buses and communication lines in Pakistan. I remember discussing its implications for Pakistan-Afghanistan relations with influential kinsmen of Daoud; the two nations ran the risk of a retaliatory spiral. My friend, the late Professor Louis Dupree, was an accidental witness to the counter-stroke that came in the form of an uprising in Panjsher on the night between July 21-22, 1975. He had found that the Panjsher insurgents were almost entirely Panjsheri Tajiks linked to religious parties — the Afghan version of the Ikhwan and probably trained in Pakistan. They failed to trigger off a general revolt against Daoud but played an important part in persuading him to seek reconciliation with Pakistan.

    Bhutto was at his best when he visited Kabul and talked to Daoud alone twice between June 7-11. He understood that Daoud could not immediately announce acceptance of the Durand Line. Bhutto persuaded the Afghan sardar to locate bilateral relations in a framework of the basic concepts of the non-aligned movement. Daoud would, over a period of several months, endorse inviolability of existing borders while Bhutto would wind down the tussle with the “leaders of the Pushtun and Baloch people.” If Daoud was not able to convene a Loya Jirga to sanctify a new Panjshila-based border with Pakistan, the fault largely lay with Bhutto’s failure to accelerate the dismantling of the Hyderabad tribunal against the NAP leaders.

    The story of the Marxist coup that eventually led to Soviet intervention and the Afghan jihad is fresh in our memory. I do not wish to repeat what I have been writing in this column and, in any case, A.R. Siddiqui has just provided an illuminating comment on our role in these events. What is more important is to point out the re-emergence of factors that affect the Afghan optics about Pakistan.

    Some of these factors deserve special emphasis. We have once again plunged the tribal areas and Balochistan into turmoil. The delicate nature of the situation in these territories will never go unnoticed in Afghanistan. Secondly, the unrest there invariably creates a temptation for hard-liners in New Delhi to exploit Pakistan’s difficulties. Third, Kabul’s renewed engagement with a superpower — the agenda of which is not at all clear — shifts the goal post vis-a-vis Pakistan. Fourth, the growing instability in Afghanistan will once again exacerbate misgivings about Pakistan’s intentions.

    One vivid lesson of history is that periods of uncertainty demand direct intervention by the highest leadership of both the states. I know it from personal experience that in 1976 late Mr Bhutto had realized that tension in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations tended to become a vested interest for certain elements on both sides of the Durand Line and that he had resolved to transcend it. Once again, it is a matter fit for the direct engagement of Pakistan’s top leaders. We need to reach an understanding with Kabul not only about the present exigencies but also about the framework of long-term relations. Afghanistan is not in a position to make any dramatic gestures but that should not be a barrier to the identification of ultimate objectives and the adoption of a grand design for political and economic collaboration for decades to come.

    The writer is a former foreign secretary.
    http://www.dawn.com/2006/04/10/op.htm
    A very interesting view that sums up neatly the whole issue.

    And Paksitanis wonder why a Moslem brother dislike them and befriends kaffirs!

    And daydream their fears of a "fioreign hand" work!

    It is their own foolish handiwork as is so evident!
    Last edited by Ray; 10 Apr 06,, 22:00.


    "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

    I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

    HAKUNA MATATA

  • #2
    afgahsn don't tajiks and uzbeks do....real afghans the pushtoon have no beef with us.

    Comment


    • #3
      Do you have a scale which says who is a real afghan and who is not?? And you mean Tajik and Uzbek desscendants as duplicate afghanis? Just dont sprout something that you hardly understand.

      And yeah the Pashtuns really like you, may be thats why they kill your Punjabi soldiers in Wana and northern areas!!
      A grain of wheat eclipsed the sun of Adam !!

      Comment


      • #4
        Plat,

        Heard of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan? ;)

        And his grandson the Air Marshal of PAF ?


        "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

        I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

        HAKUNA MATATA

        Comment


        • #5
          Why Afghans hate Paksitanis
          Simple, B'coz pakistanis love their talibans .
          Hala Madrid!!

          Comment


          • #6
            Originally posted by RayAnd Paksitanis wonder why a Moslem brother dislike them and befriends [I
            kaffirs[/I]!
            I don't think there's a single Pakistani who really cares what the Afghanis think or believe.

            Next time there's a civil war or cross border invasion, please let these unthankful parasites seek asylum with those 'befriend kaffirs'.

            If it was up to me, I'd keep my doors closed and guarded this time.

            Comment


            • #7
              lets be honest, most Pakistani's don't care about afghans, we jsut back our own "pathans" because that keeps that border safer for us, what happens within Afghanistan is thier issue.

              We backed Taliban because they meant we had nothing to worry about on that border, what they did was thier problem.

              Comment


              • #8
                Neo,

                In Afghanistan there was no civil war.

                Paksitan organised one.

                Rather odd that having organised a civil war, Paksitan now wishes to be smug and cute as a cherub!

                Sadly, the "instruments" used by Pakistan to organise a civil war is now running amok in Pakistan itself!


                "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

                I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

                HAKUNA MATATA

                Comment


                • #9
                  Originally posted by Ray
                  Neo,

                  In Afghanistan there was no civil war.

                  Paksitan organised one.

                  Rather odd that having organised a civil war, Paksitan now wishes to be smug and cute as a cherub!

                  Sadly, the "instruments" used by Pakistan to organise a civil war is now running amok in Pakistan itself!
                  How very true that is.. you know Musharraf probably dont sleep well most nights.. he is a man standing on a very thin wire, with nightmares of what will happen when he falls..

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    don't worry, we know how to take out the battereis from our toys.

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by platinum786
                      don't worry, we know how to take out the battereis from our toys.
                      Not much of evidence of that.

                      Even Bush is awaiting such evidence and he said so quite candidly when he addressed the folks in Pakistan along with Mushuraf.


                      "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

                      I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

                      HAKUNA MATATA

                      Comment

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