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VIEW: The Bush visit in retrospect — Ijaz Hussain
There was also a marked difference in style with President Bill Clinton’s visit in 2000. President Clinton had lectured and hectored the entire Pakistani nation and was reluctant to be seen shaking hands with a military dictator. His successor, however, was comfortable hobnobbing with the man with two hats
The image that captured the outcome of US President George Bush’s visit to Pakistan most succinctly was the one of his reception at the Islamabad airport. In terms of protocol Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, rather than President Pervez Musharraf, receiving the US president was absolutely correct. As President Musharraf explained in his press conference, the American president, too, had never received him at the airport whenever he went to Washington on an official visit. However, the image stood out because it contrasted sharply with the one that came out from New Delhi — showing Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh ignoring protocol to welcome the American president at the airport. It also stood out because not long ago the US president had publicly called President Musharraf a “friend”.
There was also a marked difference in style with President Bill Clinton’s visit in 2000. President Clinton had lectured and hectored the entire Pakistani nation and was reluctant to be seen shaking hands with a military dictator. His successor, however, was comfortable hobnobbing with the man with two hats. Nor did he speak to the Pakistani nation like a headmaster. In substance, however, the treatment was no different. President Musharraf’s virulent public broadside against Afghan President Hamid Karzai was a sign that President Bush had done in private, what President Clinton had done in public. The difference in the styles of the two American presidents is best explained by the fact that unlike Mr Clinton Mr Bush was visiting after the 9/11 tragedy.
While generally correct in his manners, President Bush could not help acting a bit like the boss at the joint press conference saying the purpose of his visit was to ascertain whether or not General Musharraf was still committed to the war on terror. He also lectured his host on the importance of democracy. The latter was left defending his commitment to both fighting terrorism and restoring democracy. He reiterated his unstinting resolve to fight terrorism and promised to hold fair and free elections come 2007. President Bush’s behaviour appeared to be less a reflection of the unequal relationship between the US and Pakistan and more of the perception that President Musharraf’s hold on power depends on US goodwill.
US relations with Pakistan and India were ‘de-hyphenated’ sometime back. However, this appeared not to have sunk into the Pakistani consciousness. The Bush visit brought home this point. The Bush Administration had already indicated that it would not extend the civilian nuclear technology deal to Pakistan. However, swayed possibly by the irrational exuberance of the “Busharraf” phenomenon the Pakistani president perhaps hoped to convince his US counterpart to change his mind. The latter, however, sternly observed that “ Pakistan and India are two different countries with different needs and different histories”, and that the US strategy in the region would take into account “those well known differences”. This caused enormous disappointment in Pakistan.
The US nuclear deal with India is a corollary of the American commitment to help the latter become a global player. The US is motivated by the desire to preserve its own preeminence by promoting India as a counterweight against a resurgent China. In other words, the Bush visit to India was meant to effect a balance of power — like the Nixon visit to China in the 1970s. An unintended consequence of the present visit, however, could be the creation of a regional imbalance in South Asia. The nuclear deal also has the potential to start a nuclear arms race in the region, principally because of the exemption of the fast breeder reactors from the IAEA purview.
The China threat behind the nuclear deal has been compared to the Germany threat in the 19th century. But the comparison is misplaced because unlike the latter, which undertook a policy of “blood and iron” in pursuit of its national objectives, the former insists on harmony and peace. There is nothing to suggest that China is a territorially expansionist power. However, the US is so paranoid about the incubus of rising China that it has not flinched from undermining the NPT which forbids civilian nuclear cooperation with a non-member state. Nor has the fallout this would have in dealing with nuclear weapons ambition of Iran and North Korea deterred the US.
According to some Western analysts the Bush visit to India may have laid the foundations of a cold war in Asia. The emerging political and military alignments in the Chinese neighbourhood seem to attest to it. The US has military alliances with many South East Asian countries and Japan. The latter has broadened it by according permission to the US to move the command headquarters of its Army’s First Corps from the US Pacific coast to Camp Zama near Yokohama. The US is also in the process of moving the command operations of its Pacific Air Force fleet from Guam to Tokyo. These developments are worrying for China because they heighten its threat perception. The nuclear and other cooperation with India may come to be viewed no differently. This could lead to Chinese opposition to the Indian quest for SC seat. Let us not forget that China already opposes the Japanese candidature.
The Bush attitude towards Kashmir during the visit should disabuse Pakistan of any meaningful US “facilitation” in its settlement. The US president gave an encouraging statement on Kashmir in his Asia Society speech emphasising the need for a settlement acceptable to all parties. However, he did not follow it up during his visit to India. Irrespective of the rosy picture the Pakistan government may paint of behind the scenes US pressure on India, Kashmir was not mentioned in the joint statement issued at the end of the Bush visit to Islamabad. Bush did urge the two countries to intensify their efforts to resolve the issue but that does not mean much. Incidentally, this exhortation came in response to a question by a Pakistani journalist.
Much more damaging than President Bush’s failure to pressure India on Kashmir is the conclusion of the nuclear deal for this rules out the possibility of India making any concessions. American and Indian think tanks had been urging the Indian government to get the Kashmir dispute out of the way to achieve a great power status. This was acknowledged by the Indian prime minister who in May 2004 told Jonathan Power that, “the Kashmir dispute is stopping us from realising our potential”. But if India can still conclude the nuclear and other beneficial deals meant to promote it as a global power why should it seek a settlement on Kashmir with Pakistan?
The writer, a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University, can be reached at hussain_ijaz @hotmail.com
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...5-3-2006_pg3_3
VIEW: The Bush visit in retrospect — Ijaz Hussain
There was also a marked difference in style with President Bill Clinton’s visit in 2000. President Clinton had lectured and hectored the entire Pakistani nation and was reluctant to be seen shaking hands with a military dictator. His successor, however, was comfortable hobnobbing with the man with two hats
The image that captured the outcome of US President George Bush’s visit to Pakistan most succinctly was the one of his reception at the Islamabad airport. In terms of protocol Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, rather than President Pervez Musharraf, receiving the US president was absolutely correct. As President Musharraf explained in his press conference, the American president, too, had never received him at the airport whenever he went to Washington on an official visit. However, the image stood out because it contrasted sharply with the one that came out from New Delhi — showing Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh ignoring protocol to welcome the American president at the airport. It also stood out because not long ago the US president had publicly called President Musharraf a “friend”.
There was also a marked difference in style with President Bill Clinton’s visit in 2000. President Clinton had lectured and hectored the entire Pakistani nation and was reluctant to be seen shaking hands with a military dictator. His successor, however, was comfortable hobnobbing with the man with two hats. Nor did he speak to the Pakistani nation like a headmaster. In substance, however, the treatment was no different. President Musharraf’s virulent public broadside against Afghan President Hamid Karzai was a sign that President Bush had done in private, what President Clinton had done in public. The difference in the styles of the two American presidents is best explained by the fact that unlike Mr Clinton Mr Bush was visiting after the 9/11 tragedy.
While generally correct in his manners, President Bush could not help acting a bit like the boss at the joint press conference saying the purpose of his visit was to ascertain whether or not General Musharraf was still committed to the war on terror. He also lectured his host on the importance of democracy. The latter was left defending his commitment to both fighting terrorism and restoring democracy. He reiterated his unstinting resolve to fight terrorism and promised to hold fair and free elections come 2007. President Bush’s behaviour appeared to be less a reflection of the unequal relationship between the US and Pakistan and more of the perception that President Musharraf’s hold on power depends on US goodwill.
US relations with Pakistan and India were ‘de-hyphenated’ sometime back. However, this appeared not to have sunk into the Pakistani consciousness. The Bush visit brought home this point. The Bush Administration had already indicated that it would not extend the civilian nuclear technology deal to Pakistan. However, swayed possibly by the irrational exuberance of the “Busharraf” phenomenon the Pakistani president perhaps hoped to convince his US counterpart to change his mind. The latter, however, sternly observed that “ Pakistan and India are two different countries with different needs and different histories”, and that the US strategy in the region would take into account “those well known differences”. This caused enormous disappointment in Pakistan.
The US nuclear deal with India is a corollary of the American commitment to help the latter become a global player. The US is motivated by the desire to preserve its own preeminence by promoting India as a counterweight against a resurgent China. In other words, the Bush visit to India was meant to effect a balance of power — like the Nixon visit to China in the 1970s. An unintended consequence of the present visit, however, could be the creation of a regional imbalance in South Asia. The nuclear deal also has the potential to start a nuclear arms race in the region, principally because of the exemption of the fast breeder reactors from the IAEA purview.
The China threat behind the nuclear deal has been compared to the Germany threat in the 19th century. But the comparison is misplaced because unlike the latter, which undertook a policy of “blood and iron” in pursuit of its national objectives, the former insists on harmony and peace. There is nothing to suggest that China is a territorially expansionist power. However, the US is so paranoid about the incubus of rising China that it has not flinched from undermining the NPT which forbids civilian nuclear cooperation with a non-member state. Nor has the fallout this would have in dealing with nuclear weapons ambition of Iran and North Korea deterred the US.
According to some Western analysts the Bush visit to India may have laid the foundations of a cold war in Asia. The emerging political and military alignments in the Chinese neighbourhood seem to attest to it. The US has military alliances with many South East Asian countries and Japan. The latter has broadened it by according permission to the US to move the command headquarters of its Army’s First Corps from the US Pacific coast to Camp Zama near Yokohama. The US is also in the process of moving the command operations of its Pacific Air Force fleet from Guam to Tokyo. These developments are worrying for China because they heighten its threat perception. The nuclear and other cooperation with India may come to be viewed no differently. This could lead to Chinese opposition to the Indian quest for SC seat. Let us not forget that China already opposes the Japanese candidature.
The Bush attitude towards Kashmir during the visit should disabuse Pakistan of any meaningful US “facilitation” in its settlement. The US president gave an encouraging statement on Kashmir in his Asia Society speech emphasising the need for a settlement acceptable to all parties. However, he did not follow it up during his visit to India. Irrespective of the rosy picture the Pakistan government may paint of behind the scenes US pressure on India, Kashmir was not mentioned in the joint statement issued at the end of the Bush visit to Islamabad. Bush did urge the two countries to intensify their efforts to resolve the issue but that does not mean much. Incidentally, this exhortation came in response to a question by a Pakistani journalist.
Much more damaging than President Bush’s failure to pressure India on Kashmir is the conclusion of the nuclear deal for this rules out the possibility of India making any concessions. American and Indian think tanks had been urging the Indian government to get the Kashmir dispute out of the way to achieve a great power status. This was acknowledged by the Indian prime minister who in May 2004 told Jonathan Power that, “the Kashmir dispute is stopping us from realising our potential”. But if India can still conclude the nuclear and other beneficial deals meant to promote it as a global power why should it seek a settlement on Kashmir with Pakistan?
The writer, a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University, can be reached at hussain_ijaz @hotmail.com
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...5-3-2006_pg3_3
How far is this premise in keeping with the contemporary events that have unfolded so far including the fact that China has emerged an economic powerhouse and Pakistan riddled with internal identity crisis, requiring it to hold onto others' coattails (in this case wanting to hold onto Bush's, which he spurned rather brusquely and then China's subsequently).
India, it appears, is reaping the benefits of a warm climate of relationship with the US!
