Shek

For senior officers from Virginia (excluding Lee) who had graduated from West Point, 50% joined the Confederate Army and 50% served in the Union Army. What if Lee had chosen to maintain his commission in the United States and accepted command of the Army of the Potomac? How would the course of the Civil War have changed?

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"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

gunnut

War would be over in 2 years instead of 4; Lincoln wouldn't have been re-elected because the war was over so quickly; the Reconstruction wouldn't have been nearly as harsh for the south; we would have fewer Civil War re-enactments.

Disclaimer: I know next to nothing about the Civil War.

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"Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb.

TopHatter

Oddly enough, most of that would probably have come true.

Bluesman

Given the overwhelming materiel superiority of the US, I don't think the Confederacy would've survived a single campaign by Lee.

Over and out in six months.

I made that case before, but the question then posed was that if Grant had Lee's forces, and Lee had Grant's, AND they switched missions, too (Lee has to subdue the Confederacy; Grant has to inflict losses, defeats and grind away the North's ability to sustain the war), then the war ends quickly. Grant was not Lee's equal. Neither was the Army of Northen Virginia the equal of the Army of the Potomac (especially true in 1864). So, historically, while the better general (Lee) had the 'easier' mission (just keep fighting), he also had the inferior instrument, and, historically, the inferior general (Grant was STILL an ass-kicker with an indomitable will to win) had a tougher mission (attack and destroy the CSA's main field army) and a superior instrument. Stack the deck, though, and give the superior general the superior instrument, and it almost doesn't matter how hard the mission is: a top-notch army led by a first-rate general simply can't be beat.

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"The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory."
- George Orwell

Bluesman

Lee vs. Grant

Skywatcher

What are the chances of southern guerrilla hold outs causing trouble in a shortened war, and without Lee's gravitas to persuade them to go home?

astralis

keith,

a certain boney at waterloo would probably be happier if that were the case!

in any case, the lee of 1861 was not the lee of late 1862 or early 1863; neither was the ANV/AoP of 1861 the same as they were a year or two later. i'm not sure even if the AoP won a stunning success in the 1861 battles that the entire south would have turned on its belly and surrendered.

it would need to be a political surrender, because if the 1861 battles were any indication, both armies would have been in a state of chaos whether they won or lost.

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The human mind cannot grasp the causes of phenomena in the aggregate. But the need to find these causes is inherent in man’s soul. And the human intellect, without investigating the multiplicity and complexity of the conditions of phenomena, any one of which taken separately may seem to be the cause, snatches at the first, the most intelligible approximation to a cause, and says: “This is the cause!"

-Leo Tolstoy
War and Peace

Shek

Lee's army was bled by the end of 1864 (and before) because of Lee's style of fighting. He was lucky to have not seen defeat in the Wilderness, a defeat that would have been because of his poor sense of operational timing of Longstreet's Corps. Through luck he's able to win the race to Spotsylvania. North Anna demonstrated his poor leadership - he commanded through himself, and because he didn't mentor, he failed to take advantage of a ripe opportunity. Cold Harbor was a near miss because Grant/Meade didn't take advantage of an opportunity, and even the failed attack there that finally occurred is nowhere near the defeat that it's made out to be.

In the end, it took 30 days for Grant to reduce Lee and the ANV down to a force that had to throw a Hail Mary (Early's raid) to try and salvage the strategic situation. During this time, the AoP saw huge changes in organization and turbulence due to expiring enlistments. On the other hand, Lee fought with an organization that he had had months to prepare without the turbulence witnessed by the AoP (except for the impact of the casualties), and an organization that he had owned for two years. He was outgeneraled in almost every case during the Overland Campaign, not just simply ground down by superior numbers.

On the other hand, when you look at Grant (who had to manage all Union armies), you can see his proteges kicking a$$ and taking names, with Sherman and Sheridan playing huge roles in winning the overall war. Furthermore, when you look at the logistical challenges that Grant faced in extending his lines of communication, it makes the Overland and Petersburg Campaigns even that much more remarkable. Lee never accomplishes anything near that on the logistics front.

Bluesman

A quibble, if I may:

It wasn't Lee's style of fighting that caused a long casualty roll, but the fact that he almost always was outnumbered. He was forced to take risks, and sometimes the economy-of-force force was beaten badly and took severe casualties. I submit that this wasn't a STYLE thang, but was forced on him by the circumstances he found himself in. And the circumstances were usually mitigated by his masterful generalship.

I know that there is a new point-of-view among revisionist historians to say Lee wasn't all that, but I think they're wrong. Focusing on his casualties (immense) simply doesn't account for the fact that on a battlefield so heavily favoring his enemies, he's naturally going to face big losses. His enemies, with the preponderance of force arrayed against him, should have taken LOWER losses, but they didn't, and I again respectfully submit that's because Lee was overmatching them on the field.

I think you must be posting drunk. That may have been one of the greatest military feats in American military history. Unless you mean SECOND Wilderness. And how ANYbody came away from THAT with anything to be called an army is something only us second-guessers can possibly be arrogant enough to criticize.

NO, it wasn't luck. He anticipated the move, sent cavalry to hold on, started a forced march before he was sure about the move, and managed to get there in time. Lucky you may say, but any delay in seeing into the future, and he'd have lost. THAT, to me, is dam' fine generalship.

North Anna demonstrated that he was better than Grant, because he laid a trap, Grant fell into it just as Lee supposed he would, and was saved BY LUCK. I'll grant you that because Lee could not personally close the deal, Grant survived, and if he'd done proper staffing, his guys could've taken the fight home. But tell me you think that North Anna proved anything BUT Lee's superiority over Grant, and I'll tell you that you're hanging onto your point out of pride.

REALLY. Well, Grant himself, after all the times HE was almost defeated, was frustrated and checked, and racked up a huge casualty roll (almost to the point of losing the war to the 'peace' Democrats - considered it the only thing he regretted during the whole war. I'd say that MAKES it a defeat that it's made out to be.

Yeah, and as unqualified to be a general as I am, I bet I could've gotten Lee to that point, too. Now, listen, I take NOTHING away from Grant as a general, but I'd say you're going far too far in saying that he was Lee's equal, and I'm absolutely calling shenanigans on any claim to Grant's superiority.

And notice: those expiring enlistments weren't a-comin' back. Lee, though, asked for and got a totally-incredible re-up rate from an army that KNEW it was dieing. And you have GOT to be kidding me that the AoNV wasn't undergoing massive upheaval. The leader losses were severe, and the meddling from Richmond was an order of magnitude greater than what his counterpart had to put up with. Note that Early's raid, such as it was, was handled by the AoP HQ. Earlier in the war, Washington took personal charge of field forces to try to stop Jackson and Forrest.)

Absolutely not true. I think Lee was besting Grant at every turn of the card and roll of the dice. Grant's signal strength, and it WAS unique among Federal generals, was his absolute stubborn refusal to ever be finally defeated. And my point remains: Lee, with Grant's army and mission, beats Grant with Lee's army and mission EVERY TIME.

Out-generaled? No. WAY.

You're onto something, here. And if Lee had been General-inChief, I wonder what would have happened with the Army of Tennessee THEN. Bet Bragg would've been finding new employment before he could comprehensively ruin a fine field army.

The 'logistical challenges' GRANT faced? I'm floored.

When Grant started his campaign, he added as an afterthought 10 spare miles of rail. There wasn't 10 miles of track ANYwhere in the entire Confederacy by that time! That Army was magnificently equipped, provisioned and armed, and the 'logistical challenge' Grant had to deal with was keeping the baggage wagons out of Mosby's hands.

ANY general would have been pleased to be faced with the abundance that Grant took with him, and if he had to move it farther, it was mostly due to the fact that he COULD. Lee? By that time, field batteries were being teamed by MULES, and then, when THOSE were running out, the GUNNERS manned the traces. Grant used the finest horseflesh in Maryland to haul pontoons.

Well, I wonder WHY? SERIOUSLY, man, the fact that the dam' army didn't just up and die is a bloody miracle, and the single, last reason to hang on was because Marse Robert asked 'em to. I will bet you that you're not going to make the case that Grant could have inspired that level of deep personal commitment from and army that may have respected him (I certainly would have), but did not LOVE him.

I think, my friend (we's still buds, right?), that you've fallen victim to the 'new history' ailment. Personally, I accept that conventional wisdom is accepted more because it's more of the latter than the former.

Shek

Keith,

The conclusion that Grant is a better general than Lee is not new to modern history, as this half a century old quote from a prominent military historian illustrates. I haven't had a chance to read the whole book, so I can't comment on all his analysis, but I did think it was important to throw it out there to point out that it's not a radical proposition as you would make it out to be.

As to some of the substance of your post (sorry, but it's late and so I can't go point by point), I agree that Chancerlorsville was a Lee victory since it stopped Hooker. However, once again, it came at a proportionately higher cost in casualties, and I'd point out that the concussion that Hooker suffered from the near miss certainly played a part (an element of luck, although you can make your own luck).

You point out that Lee was forced to take high risk gambles because of force ratios; yet, with near parity at Gettysburg, he gambled on Pickett's Charge and decimated his ranks with casualties. You can point to his obstinence at Antietam, gambling with his back to the river and for what strategic gain? It was who Lee was - it was his preferred style of the tactical offense.

As to being outgeneraled during the Overland Campaign, he desperately tried to gain the initiative and was never successful. Grant controlled the operational and strategic initiative throughout the campaign beginning when the first pontoon bridges were laid across the Rapidan. The only time when the initiative could have swung was the initial contact at North Anna, but Lee failed to seize the initiative.

And North Anna brings up a great point - while the Union often had poor maps (all accounts I've read point to Hancock's faulty map as the reason why Petersburg along with its railroad junctions didn't belong to the Union on the night of 15 June), Lee and his troops were fighting on home terrain that they knew very well (e.g., Jackson's use of a bypass during Chancelorsville). We should expect them to do better at using the terrain - for example, North Anna had been scouted out previously by the ANV for use as a defensive position and so Lee should have been able to set up a good position. However, Grant recognized it for what it was once he gained contact with Lee and thus decided not to attack it. Also, because Grant was fighting offensively and Lee was fighting defensive, we shouldn't be surprised at Grant receiving higher casualties. Yet, when you look at relative casualties, you see Grant being successful in attacking the COG of the south and moving towards ultimate victory.

Next, in addressing Spotsylvania, it was luck. According the plan, Anderson's Corps should have arrived five hours later. However, the brush fires started from the fighting in the Wilderness resulted in a movement to daylight that won the race, barely (it barely had the edge as Warren's Corps arrived and deployed immediately into battle). If that corps arrives five hours later, it's facing two Union Corps, one of which is fully prepared and deployed and the other which is probably totally closed.

As to Grant's logistical prowess, he developed and fought a campaign that took advantage of the LOCs he had. He forced the AOP to travel light compared to what it had been and then made sure he had to log to sustain continuous operations. It was a slugfest over extended LOCs, yet, you don't see log being the constraining factor. On the other hand, while the South wasn't as rich in terms of log, it had a terrible supply system that saw a large amount of its food rot and spoil and supplies go unused because they failed to develop their logistics capability (getting is only half the battle - distribution is the other half). Lee could have remedied some of this, and so we cannot overlook the complexity of the Overland Campaign or give a free pass to Lee just because they didn't have plenty. Grant maximized his use of what was available, while Lee failed to optimize what was available.

Lastly, of course there's no hard feelings. Just because you're wrong, I'll forgive ya