And I'll have an expansion on this later...I know its a shock that I would have an opinion on this!
A good idea poorly executed
A bad idea doomed to failure
I've got all four of the Gordon Rhea books on the Overland Campaign (he has yet to publish his fifth and final book) and was thumbing through the Cold Harbor book last night. Some very fascinating analysis and I think he frames it beautifully within the context of the campaign and the conditions. He thinks the assault on June 3 was a logical choice for Grant, and I think his arguments were compelling, especially in light of the casualty numbers he derives, 3500 for the AOP and 500 for the ANV, which cuts the ratio in half from the most oft cited figures.
Was the assault a good idea poorly executed or a bad idea from the start?
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3
And I'll have an expansion on this later...I know its a shock that I would have an opinion on this!
Frederick the Great's horse was on seven campaigns, but at the end of it all he was still a horse.
I am looking around for Baldy Smith and I can't find him!
I got caught up trying to redo the architecture for future systems requirmeents in the BCTs...damn work!
But I did get my operational art homework done! Go check it out.
I'll try to ellucidate after Scouts tonight...
Frederick the Great's horse was on seven campaigns, but at the end of it all he was still a horse.
Having just finished the 4th book of Rhea's 5-volume set, I'd have to agree with his assessment of the attack at Cold Harbor. The risk vs. reward equation was skewed heavily in favor of the attack, and while the assault on 3 June ended up as the 5th bloodiest day of fighting for the Union army during the Overland Campaign, had they succeeded in exploiting the breakthrough of the salient in Hancock's zone of attack, then they would have been able to turn the flank of the ANV while the ANV had its back essentially pinned to a river.
In the end, I see a strategically correct decision that was executed poorly because of Grant and Meade being too disengaged from the corps commanders. I'd like to read up more on Meade and specifically on the Grant-Meade relationship, as I don't know whether to pin the rose on Grant for not having removed Meade (thus burdening Grant with tactical control of the AoP, detracting from his ability to keep abreast of all Union activities and shape them) or on Meade for being sour grapes and not adapting to Grant being in charge.
Ironically, had Grant attacked 18 hours earlier, instead of being a Confederate (Pyrrhic) victory, it could have been the end of the ANV and Grant may have delivered Richmond to President Lincoln in time for the GOP Convention a few days later.
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3
There are currently 1 users browsing this thread. (0 members and 1 guests)
Share this thread with friends: