If you recall you and i had a discussion about ABM some months ago, and i mentioned i knew an expert in the field. If you wish to debate him about the effectiveness of mylar decoys, here's your chance.
You can find him here:
http://www.divine-salamis.com/phpBB/viewtopic.php?t=688
Stuart
Leutnant
Joined: 21 Jan 2005
Posts: 78
Location: Military-Industrial Complex
"People who are against ballistic missile defense are so for political and/or ideological reasons (the two may not be quite the same). However, they face a problem in arguing against a system that is purely defensive and exists only for the purpose of saving lives. There are some very contorted and spurious arguments against ABM (by the way, on terminology - ABM is a generic term used to mean shooting down ballistic missiles using any technology by anybody), the most common being that if the United States has a shield against missile attack it will immediately launch nuclear missile attacks on everybody else. The very existance of that argument tends to point out the political orientation of those making it.
Since there is no rational case that can be made against ABM on any reasonable theoretical grounds, the opponents of the system are forced to try and argue against it on technical grounds. They do so by manufacturing arguments that, in reality, are already invalid or long obsolete. For example; how often will you see claims that "a few mylar balloons" will fox the US ballistic missile defense system now being brought to readiness? Yet the truth is the decoy problem was solved over 40 years ago; it isn't a problem now and hasn't been for a very long time.
You'll also hear claims along the lines that "we can't build an air defense system that works and missile defense is much harder". Actually that's wrong on both grounds. We can and do build air defense systems that work very well (in the sense that defeating them requires a massive diversion of effort that would otherwise be used for something productive). Also, missile defense is much easier than air defense - missiles arrive in predictable ballistic arcs that essentially cannot be changed and do so without any form of support. Essentially, there are no "wild weasel" ballistic missiles to take down ABM batteries and radars, no worthwhile electronic countermeasures etc.
In short, the "technical objections" to ABM are dishonest attempts to disguise the motivations and orientation of the people who make those objections. To the informed, they are simply displaying their stupidity and ignorance. (by the way, the Scientific American (community) has a long, long history of opposing ABM that goes right back to the early 1960s - and they have displayed massive intellectual dishonesty throughout that period.)."
Given the stakes involved, I'd like to see more successfull tests. I know we are not going to shoot down every missile in a mass attack, but some of the test have been failures despite the narrowly focused testing parameters. We should be able to shoot down a single missile 99% (or better) of the time and I have not seen any data to support this. I support the idea, I just do not want a half assed/incopetent effort that wastes mytax dollars or gives me a false sence of security.
Wishful thinking.Originally Posted by bonehead
No man is free until all men are free - John Hossack
I agree completely with this Administration’s goal of a regime change in Iraq-John Kerry
even if that enforcement is mostly at the hands of the United States, a right we retain even if the Security Council fails to act-John Kerry
He may even miscalculate and slide these weapons off to terrorist groups to invite them to be a surrogate to use them against the United States. It’s the miscalculation that poses the greatest threat-John Kerry
A lot of times hitting the target is really only secondary in testing.
But, if it makes you feel better, the USN SM-3 has scored a direct hit on 4 of 5 tries IIRC.
I don't buy the 99% angle. Sure, I'd like it if it were possible and pay for it if it were feasible, but I am not a believer in making the perfect the enemy of the good. I'll take a missile defense system that is considered 60% effective vs. one that is known to be 0% effective.
And those are just the straight operational realities - the political realities dictate what we already know: we are unlikely to face a threat of massed launches a la what the Sovs/Russians could do. Rather, we expect a threat of more like a dozen or so ballistic launches, or even a single launch threat made by a nation that starts with a "K", ends with an "a", and is filled with people named "Kim". The ability to confidently shrug off such a threat is worth a very very large amount of money once translated into Geopolitical maneuvering.
So if it can work - and the only really dumb idea I've seen right out of the gate in the topic are the Tellerite (Physicist not pig-nosed) orbital fusion bomb-powered self-vaporizing particle cannon - then this voter says "go for it".
As far as the folks that poo-poo the idea of intercepting an incoming ballistic track on its face, I think they lack imagination more than anything else. Technological history is a record of shattered claims of "it can't be done".
-dale
Last edited by dalem; 13 Apr 05, at 03:39.
Even 10% could save millions.
No man is free until all men are free - John Hossack
I agree completely with this Administration’s goal of a regime change in Iraq-John Kerry
even if that enforcement is mostly at the hands of the United States, a right we retain even if the Security Council fails to act-John Kerry
He may even miscalculate and slide these weapons off to terrorist groups to invite them to be a surrogate to use them against the United States. It’s the miscalculation that poses the greatest threat-John Kerry
With the technology that we have, if we can not reliably shoot down a single missile that flys in a, predictable and unalterable ballistics arc, we deserve to die. We DID put men on the moon didn't we. That must have been much more complicated. If the best we can do is 60% we are not putting forth our best effort. Any improvement in the percentages means millions of lives saved and that is the primary reason for the system. All I am saying is not to settle for second best.
Bonehead, you have to consider the closing speeds involved, which are immense to say the least.
60% is plenty good since we plan to launch two interceptors at each inbound.
Furthermore, it's not going to be about stopping 60% of all missiles launched at the US. It'll be about introducing such uncertainty in the minds of our enemies that THEY stop all missiles...by not shooting in the first place.
Keep in mind that a main-force nuclear strike entails a catastrophic decapitating hit on your enemy's C2 and counter-strike capabilities, NOT city-busting. All that will get you is annihilated by the inevitable counter-strike.
Think about a bullet-proof vest, and your mortal enemy is wearing it. You MAY choose to shoot at him, and you may actually be able to kill him, but you're going to have to be lucky, good, or be able to fire so many bullets that the odds of a fatal injury on the 40% that is un-armored is better than the chance he's going to kill YOU first.
So missile defense is extremely valuable even if it only theoretically can stop some unknown percentage of enemy weapons. Because the nature of a planning staff will only accept so many unknown variables in their calculations for success when the stakes are national survival.
Build it, pay for it, and improve it, and let's get the Department of Defense back in the business of DEFENSE of the nation, and stop relying on diplomats, our enemies' concepts of 'acceptable losses' and the tenuous notion of MAD to keep us safe.
"The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory."
- George Orwell
I've always like the old Heinlein idea of renaming it the War Departnment, myself.
-dale
This "expert" hasn't discussed any actual technical aspects of missile defense. He does however seem pretty quick to put words in the mouth of his opponents. If you want to really learn about the practical aspects of missile defense, there is a good article in the November issue of Scientific American:
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?art...mber=1&catID=2
I also remember a good one in Nature about 6 months ago; there is also good information in Science. From what I have read, the general consensus is that national missile defense is not going to be very effective in its current form, but it is being touted as effective and operational. This could lead to politicians making bad assumptions about what protection it will offer the American people.
Here is an interesting story I found in Nature (I don't think I'm really allowed to post this..):
Nature 432, 789 (16 December 2004); doi:10.1038/432789a
Pentagon blocks MIT inquiry into missile data fraud claims
GEOFF BRUMFIEL
Results of missile defence tests kept under wraps.
[BOSTON] The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) has been forced to abandon a fraud inquiry at one of its laboratories after the Pentagon denied it access to the suspect data.
The university wanted to investigate contentious missile defence tests that took place at its Lincoln Laboratory six years ago. "Without access, the investigation cannot be conducted," Charles Vest, MIT's outgoing president, said in a statement on 1 December. Vest left his position on 5 December.
Pentagon officials say that the test data are classified and cannot be released to an investigatory panel on the grounds of national security. But critics see the Department of Defense stance as a political attempt to block further inquiry into the research.
Some government watchdogs say that the Pentagon's approach threatens to undermine the integrity of academic institutions that, like MIT, conduct classified research. "It's an extraordinary situation," says Steven Aftergood, who oversees a project aimed at reducing government secrecy, at the Federation of American Scientists in Washington DC. "It should prompt a rethink of universities' policies on the subject."
At the heart of the debate is a long-disputed series of tests of a sensor designed to detect incoming missiles. Shortly after the tests were conducted in 1997 and 1998, a former engineer from the US defence contractor responsible for the sensor came forward with documents that she claimed proved the contractor had tampered with data to hide the sensor's failure.
An investigation carried out by the General Accounting Office backed the engineer, but a subsequent investigation by the Lincoln Laboratory itself, for the federal government, found that no data had been tampered with.
That led Ted Postol, an MIT physicist and established critic of missile defence, to demand that university officials investigate whether the laboratory had acted improperly. "Lincoln Laboratory knew that the sensor had failed," he contends. "And they failed to tell federal agents."
Postol wrote to Vest in 2001 asking for a separate university-led inquiry. That inquiry was launched in spring 2002 by Edward Crawley, an aerospace engineer at the university, and by the end of that year, Crawley had found enough evidence to justify a full investigation. The plan was for a review to be conducted by a select group of academics from outside MIT who had the security clearance needed to view the classified data.
But the investigation was never begun because it was opposed by the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency. Agency officials declined to comment, but said in a statement that the agency had already been exonerated by earlier inquiries, and that a new investigation only risked leaking classified information about the missile defence system. "The extreme sensitivity of the information at issue precluded granting MIT's request," the statement says.
"The implications of this are very serious," says Sheila Widnall, another MIT aerospace engineer and former secretary of the US Air Force. Widnall chaired a panel to review the university's policy for managing classified research. For such research to be worth the trouble, the panel concluded in 2002, it must be conducted with the highest standards of integrity and in a way that is independent of the funder. "What's happening now does not meet that standard," she says.
My expert is the real deal.
I offered Broken a chance to debate him directly...which obviously extends to you.
Feel free to take him on lad.
Thanks M21Sniper,If you recall you and i had a discussion about ABM some months ago, and i mentioned i knew an expert in the field. If you wish to debate him about the effectiveness of mylar decoys, here's your chance.
You can find him here:
http://www.divine-salamis.com/phpBB/viewtopic.php?t=688
Stuart
Leutnant
Joined: 21 Jan 2005
Posts: 78
Location: Military-Industrial Complex
"People who are against ballistic missile defense are so for political and/or ideological reasons (the two may not be quite the same). However, they face a problem in arguing against a system that is purely defensive and exists only for the purpose of saving lives. There are some very contorted and spurious arguments against ABM (by the way, on terminology - ABM is a generic term used to mean shooting down ballistic missiles using any technology by anybody), the most common being that if the United States has a shield against missile attack it will immediately launch nuclear missile attacks on everybody else. The very existance of that argument tends to point out the political orientation of those making it.
Since there is no rational case that can be made against ABM on any reasonable theoretical grounds, the opponents of the system are forced to try and argue against it on technical grounds. They do so by manufacturing arguments that, in reality, are already invalid or long obsolete. For example; how often will you see claims that "a few mylar balloons" will fox the US ballistic missile defense system now being brought to readiness? Yet the truth is the decoy problem was solved over 40 years ago; it isn't a problem now and hasn't been for a very long time.
You'll also hear claims along the lines that "we can't build an air defense system that works and missile defense is much harder". Actually that's wrong on both grounds. We can and do build air defense systems that work very well (in the sense that defeating them requires a massive diversion of effort that would otherwise be used for something productive). Also, missile defense is much easier than air defense - missiles arrive in predictable ballistic arcs that essentially cannot be changed and do so without any form of support. Essentially, there are no "wild weasel" ballistic missiles to take down ABM batteries and radars, no worthwhile electronic countermeasures etc.
In short, the "technical objections" to ABM are dishonest attempts to disguise the motivations and orientation of the people who make those objections. To the informed, they are simply displaying their stupidity and ignorance. (by the way, the Scientific American (community) has a long, long history of opposing ABM that goes right back to the early 1960s - and they have displayed massive intellectual dishonesty throughout that period.)."
Interesting, but I can tell your friend and I are not going to see eye-to-eye, since he starts with the premise that the American scientific community (including me, I suppose) is guilty of "massive intellectual dishonesty" concerning ABM technology. Evidently, the American scientists who work on the nuclear weapons program, ICBM programs, GPS, etc, etc are all guilty of intellectual dishonesty as well. Heh.
My point was the HTK component of the ABM system is a gigantic waste of money, not ABM in general. I would be curious to know why he believes the Decoy Problem has been solved, 40 years ago no less. Perhaps your friend has discovered a new (and highly classified) force of nature? It is a moot point, since the system being currently deployed has yet to reliably hit a target escorted by a single decoy balloon. In fact, the missile has trouble exiting it's silo. It is a farce.
I will tell you that there IS dishonesty in weapons development, but it is of a different kind than your friend supposes. First of all, there are scientists who over-hype the weapons potential of their pet research project simply to get funding. Likewise, there weapons companies who overhype the capability of their pet program so that Congress won't cancel it. Same very old story.
Last edited by Broken; 14 Apr 05, at 22:46.
That is because it is a well-run program with a realistic performance goal. Neither is true of the HTK interceptor.
If someone really wanted to set off a nuke in the US, they would ship it over here on a container ship. Alternatively an air-breathing cruise missile would do quite nicely and the technology is simpler than an ICBM (remember the V1?). In either case, you are back to 0% effective.
The real threat of people like Kim is when they sell their uranium and technology to folks like Al Queda. A better plan would be to buy NK's uranium output. Kim gets cash, there is less black market uranium around, and it all costs far less than some disfunctional HTK interceptor up in Alaska.Rather, we expect a threat of more like a dozen or so ballistic launches, or even a single launch threat made by a nation that starts with a "K", ends with an "a", and is filled with people named "Kim". The ability to confidently shrug off such a threat is worth a very very large amount of money once translated into Geopolitical maneuvering.
History is chock-full of technological failures due to people who had unrealistic concepts of what was currently achievable. The first lesson of weapon systems design is KEEP IT SIMPLE, STUPID.As far as the folks that poo-poo the idea of intercepting an incoming ballistic track on its face, I think they lack imagination more than anything else. Technological history is a record of shattered claims of "it can't be done".
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