Thread: Dramatic reshaping of Obama's National Security Team Announced

Shek, et al,

Sorry to be tardy in my response. As I prepare to rotate from Yemen, I've been a little neglectful.

Yes, phasing it this way, makes my position difficult to defend. And I will admit that I am in the minority relative to my position. Both GEN Petraeus and AMB Crock have huge fan clubs.

Originally Posted by Shek

Please elaborate on the failures of Petraeus and Crocker. Given the hand they were dealt in Iraq upon assuming their posts in 2007, is it your belief that they played those cards badly?

(COMMENT)

I can give you a snapshot of my "personal perspective;" and you can sharpshoot me from there. But I would like to first acknowledge that GEN Petraeus and AMB Crocker are merely examples of a leadership that proved ineffective.

GEN Petraeus:

• First, remember that GEN Petraeus did not just walk on the scene in 2007. He was there long before; CG of MNSTCI and as a Division CG.
  
• While GEN Petraeus is hailed as a counterinsurgency expert, his ideas a very conventional warfare oriented (as opposed to being asymmetric). Like the great surge of Baghdad, the creation of the Sons of Iraq (SOI), the awakening was fueled by a mass injection of money. We essentially bought the insurgents, paying them some much per gun – per month – not to shoot Americans. While it proved effective in the short run, it was not a major factor in the long term stabilization of Iraq.

Victory in Iraq is Defined in Stages (National Strategy for the Victory in Iraq, NSC 2005), established as the guide two years prior to your inquiry point, brooadly outlines the thumbnail objectives:

• Short term, Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces.
• Medium term, Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists and providing its own security, with a fully constitutional government in place, and on its way to achieving its economic potential.
• Longer term, Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.

• When GEN Petraeus took command of MNFI, we were already into the overall military adventure by 5 years (crossing the FEBA), and a 3 years into sovereignty. In 2008, the overall situation, the commanders area of influence and control, was such that the Green Zone took over 200 rockets during the insurgencies Easter Campaign (I was there). Between the region was not stabilized then, and even today, Chief of Mission personnel still ride a Rhino, wearing helmets and vest, to get the 8 miles to the Airport (BIAP) and Camp Victory. Success is judged by the ultimate outcomes and the impact of the consequences.

Ambassador Crocker

• With respect to Ambassador Crocker, the Short-Term objectives to meet political milestones were more important than the outcome and consequences of the milestones. It was more important to say that the Iraqis had an election, then to say that the election was months and months late. It was more important to say that the Iraqis democratically elected a Prime Minister (PM), then to say the person who won the election does not hold an office. It was more important to say that PM was able to arrange a coalition, then to say that largely through the efforts of Iran, PM al-Maliki was able to maintain power by means of the added influence of anti-American Cleric Motadar al-Sadr.

How we judge the "right" or "wrong" --- "success" or "failure" is based on a how well we came to achieve the objectives; and if the phased objectives are taking too long to accomplish.

Originally Posted by Wall Street Journal - Nathan Hodge - ‎Jun 6, 2011‎

WASHINGTON—The State Department is preparing to spend close to $3 billion to hire a security force to protect diplomats in Iraq after the US pulls its last troops out of the country by year's end. In testimony Monday before the ...

Originally Posted by Washington Post - ‎10 hours ago

‎
Although the new Iraqi army seems extremely professional, it is a dysfunctional group focused mostly on internal security. Iraqi politicians and military officials say the armed forces remain dysfunctional. In the photo, Iraq army soldiers and ...

I look at the definition for "victory" and I try to assess where we are. There is an argument to be made that we are nearing the end of the "Short-Term" Objectives. But ther are some that think we are inside the "Medium-Term."

Also, remember that the situation in Iraq is such that it still requires a considerable security effort, even after the majority of forces leave:

Originally Posted by Wall Street Journal - Nathan Hodge - ‎Jun 6, 2011‎

WASHINGTON—The State Department is preparing to spend close to $3 billion to hire a security force to protect diplomats in Iraq after the US pulls its last troops out of the country by year's end. In testimony Monday before the ...

Looking at the overall investment of treasury and blood, and the time on target, one would ask if this is the best we could do. Of course, everyone that is pro-engagement and believes that the US must follow this leadership and course of action, also says that their leadership heors of this military/foreign policy adtenture, did the best that could be done unter the circumstances they faced. While it is an excuse, it is a symptom of a systemic failure in the leadership and national security decision making processes that drive the effort.

Most Respectfully,
R