LinkBack URL
About LinkBacks
Reply With QuoteGood article Astralis.
Zakaria: What Bush Got Right | Newsweek Politics | Newsweek.com
What Bush Got Right
For the next president, simply reversing this administration's policies is not the answer.
By Fareed Zakaria | NEWSWEEK
Published Aug 9, 2008
Aug. 18-25, 2008 issue
Compared with the flutters and flurries of the near-daily polls in the presidential race, one set of numbers has stayed fixed for months, even years. President George W. Bush now enters his 23rd consecutive month with an approval rating under 40 percent. (It currently stands at 32 percent.) No matter what he does, or what happens in the world, the public seems to have decided that Bush has been a failure. As a result, both candidates are promising a change from the Bush presidency. Barack Obama, of course, promises a wholly different approach to the world. But even Bush's fellow Republican, John McCain, has on several issues suggested that he would depart from the administration's policies. McCain was last seen with the president at a fund-raiser more than two months ago at which no reporters or photographers were allowed.
A broad shift in America's approach to the world is justified and overdue. Bush's basic conception of a "global War on Terror," to take but the most obvious example, has been poorly thought-through, badly implemented, and has produced many unintended costs that will linger for years if not decades. But blanket criticism of Bush misses an important reality. The administration that became the target of so much passion and anger—from Democrats, Republicans, independents, foreigners, Martians, everyone—is not quite the one in place today. The foreign policies that aroused the greatest anger and opposition were mostly pursued in Bush's first term: the invasion of Iraq, the rejection of treaties, diplomacy and multilateralism. In the past few years, many of these policies have been modified, abandoned or reversed. This has happened without acknowledgment—which is partly what drives critics crazy—and it's often been done surreptitiously. It doesn't reflect a change of heart so much as an admission of failure; the old way simply wasn't working. But for whatever reasons and through whichever path, the foreign policies in place now are more sensible, moderate and mainstream. In many cases the next president should follow rather than reverse them.
Consider as a symbol of this shift Bush's appointment of the World Bank's president. His first choice for the job was Paul Wolfowitz, an arch neoconservative with little background in economics. But by the time Wolfowitz was forced to resign and the post opened up again, Bush realized that he needed a less ideological choice, and he picked the highly qualified and respected Robert Zoellick. Where Dick Cheney was once the poster child for the administration, today policy is being run by Condoleezza Rice, Robert Gates, Stephen Hadley and Hank Paulson—all pragmatists. Change has not extended to all areas, and in many places it's been too little, too late. But that there has been a shift to the center in many crucial areas of foreign policy is simply undeniable.
The most obvious case is Iraq. For many people—a clear majority of those polled—the decision to go to war is now seen as a mistake. But wherever one stands on that issue, it is overwhelmingly clear that the administration made a series of massive blunders in Iraq in 2003 and 2004. It went in with too few troops, dismantled Iraq's Army, bureaucracy and state-owned factories, arrested tens of thousands of Iraqis, mistreated and tortured some of them, and used overwhelming military force against all perceived threats. The outcome? Chaos; an angry, dispossessed and armed Sunni community; a sullen and restless Shiite population; an insurgency; a jihadist terrorist movement, and spreading sectarian violence. In addition, foreign forces were destabilizing the country because both the invasion and the occupation were undertaken without first gaining support from neighboring Arab states or winning international legitimacy. The result was a perfect storm in international affairs, a failure that kept getting worse.
For years, even after it was apparent to almost everyone that the Iraq strategy was not working, the administration stuck to its guns. But by 2005, the failure was simply too large to ignore, so some efforts to repair the situation were made—mostly tactical and incremental moves, like searching for a better Shiite leader and trying to slow down the process of de-Baathification. Some U.S. officials in Iraq freelanced—for example, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad began the outreach to Sunni leaders and militants in 2006, even while his bosses in Washington were steadfastly condemning them as terrorists. American generals in Iraq were also learning from their own failures and advocating changes in tactics. (One of them was to support efforts by tribal sheiks in Anbar to take on their Qaeda rivals, which is why the Sunni Awakening actually preceded the surge.) By 2006, Bush told The Weekly Standard's Fred Barnes that he was searching for new approaches. But it was only after the 2006 midterm-election debacle that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was fired and a new politico-military strategy was put in place with a commander who understood the need for sweeping change.
It took a long time, but the turnaround in our policy in Iraq has been significant. The United States has made broad overtures to the Sunni community, and now actively supports Sunni fighters it had once jailed. We've concentrated on stabilizing Shiite neighborhoods, helping to free them from dependence on militias. We have abandoned dreams of a pure, free market, instead trying to jump-start Iraq's state-owned enterprises in order to create jobs. And we've even been pursuing a more regional approach, trying to get neighboring countries to open embassies in Baghdad and commit to help stabilize Iraq. None of this has changed some of the basic gruesome realities of Iraq—a country from which 2.5 million people have fled (mostly the professional class), thugs and militias rule in too many places, dysfunction and corruption are utterly endemic, and religious theocrats still wield immense power. But given where things were in 2005, the administration has moved firmly in the right direction.
On Afghanistan, there is a more compelling case to be made that the administration mishandled the most important front in the War on Terror. The central critique that Barack Obama makes—that American attention, energy, troops and resources were wrongly diverted from Afghanistan to Iraq—is devastating and hard to dispute. But it's a criticism of Bush policy in 2003. The policy that the administration is currently pursuing is less vulnerable to easy attacks.
Like Obama, Defense Secretary Gates has talked about sending more troops to the region. But the problem is bigger than a lack of American soldiers. European countries haven't contributed enough troops to the effort, and have put absurd restrictions on the forces they do have in theater. Afghanistan itself is extremely complex. The country contains vast swaths of mountainous territory that have never been ruled effectively by the central government, where levels of illiteracy and unemployment are stunningly high, and where Pashtun nationalism has got mixed up with Islamic extremism. Many serious scholars and local politicians argue that more troops would not solve the problem—particularly since the Taliban's back bases are located across the border in Pakistan. And the administration has ramped up spending in the region considerably. Whereas in 2003 it spent $737 million on reconstruction and equipping the Afghan Army, by 2007 it was spending $10 billion.
On North Korea, the administration's reversal has been near total. Within months of entering the Oval Office, Bush publicly repudiated his secretary of State, Colin Powell, for even suggesting that the administration would continue Bill Clinton's efforts to negotiate with Kim Jong Il. But since July 2005, Bush has pursued a very similar approach, in fact an even more multilateral one than Clinton's—four additional parties are now at the table. Bringing in the Chinese has been crucial because they are the only ones who have any real leverage with Pyongyang. Bush began by describing North Korea as part of the Axis of Evil. Today he is considering taking the country off the terror list and has offered economic aid to its regime.
On Iran, the third charter member of the Axis of Evil, the administration has performed a similar about-face. Forget the muttering of various proponents of military action, periodically leaked to newspapers. The efforts of the administration have been diplomatic and multilateral. Its point-person for most of the second term was Nicholas Burns, a veteran diplomat who is viewed with great suspicion by neoconservatives. Last month one of the State Department's senior most officials, William Burns (no relation), joined the Europeans at the table with Iranian negotiators, the first physical American involvement in these talks. One could argue—I would—that the administration's diplomacy is half-hearted and lacks ambition. An offer of direct engagement and negotiations would be a bolder step. But that's not a silver bullet. Such an offer could well prove fruitless. The principal obstacles to a negotiated settlement are Iranian intentions, suspicions and dysfunctions. The general thrust of Bush administration policies has now evolved into the correct one.
The same could be said for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Bush began his term in office vowing that he would not involve himself in Clinton-style efforts at peacemaking. His administration adopted a hands-off approach, allowing resentments to build and conditions to worsen. It gave free rein to irresponsible policies from all parties, encouraging, for example, a thoughtless and ill-planned Israeli attack on Lebanon that ended up weakening Israel, devastating Lebanon and empowering Hizbullah. This year Bush has plunged into the process, holding an international conference in Annapolis at which, for the first time, both Israel and the Palestinians accepted that the purpose of the exercise was to create a Palestinian state. Since that meeting, Rice has made a half dozen visits to the region. All this hasn't produced much yet, may be seven years too late, and perhaps is not the right approach (what is?). But few would argue that U.S. policy is currently on the wrong track.
The ones who would are revealing. Disgruntled conservative hard-liners have been dismayed by the administration's policy in many areas, particularly North Korea, Iran and Israel. John Bolton, formerly Bush's U.N. ambassador and a superhawk, publicly makes the case for betrayal. When Burns joined the talks with Iran, Bolton fumed sarcastically on television that the State Department was obviously "doing its best to ensure a smooth transition to the Obama administration." (Obama has long advocated American negotiations with Tehran.) He described Bush's handling of North Korea as a capitulation, comparing him to Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. John Bolton is absolutely right that Bush has changed course fundamentally in many of these areas. Of course, I would celebrate that fact rather than condemn it.
Other reversals have drawn less opposition. In its early years the Bush administration seemed intent on confirming the conservative stereotype of being utterly uninterested in assistance to poor countries, especially if the money was going to treat AIDS patients. In each of its first two years it spent less than $1 billion on global HIV projects. This year the United States will spend almost $6 billion, most of it in Africa. The president's signature program, PEPFAR, has been a bipartisan success story (although the requirement that some of the money be spent on abstinence programs dilutes the program's effectiveness). Bush's overall efforts on disease prevention and aid have won him praise from an unusual assortment of figures—Bono, Bob Geld of and New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof, who wrote that "George Bush has done much more for Africa than Bill Clinton ever did."
Politically the picture in Africa is more mixed. Bush put time, a presidential envoy and considerable effort behind the negotiations to broker a peace between north and south in Sudan, and he's made some similar attempts in Darfur. (These haven't yielded much, though mostly for reasons that cannot be blamed on the administration.) More generally, however, the administration has been far too focused on the threat of terrorism, providing aid and military assistance to any and every regime—from Ethiopia to Equatorial Guinea—that claimed to be battling Al Qaeda. In a sad replay of the cold war, the United States has allied itself with unscrupulous dictators for no particular gain, only because they have learned to mouth the language of the global War on Terror.
An obsession with terrorism has also made the administration devote too little time and energy to the defining feature of the new world order —"the rise of the rest," by which I mean the growth in economic and political power of countries like China, India, Russia, Brazil and a series of regionally prominent nations like South Africa, Nigeria, Mexico and Kazakhstan. In some cases its policy positions are divided and incoherent, as in the case of Russia. But in several crucial instances, they've pursued extremely sensible strategies.
The most important one, without question, is China. The bilateral relationship between China and America will be the most significant one in the 21st century. Bush began his term poorly on the subject. During the campaign, when asked by Larry King for the single most important area where he would depart from Clinton foreign policy, he cited China. "The current president has called the relationship with China a strategic partnership," Bush said. "I believe our relationship needs to be redefined as one as competitor." The initial months of the administration suggested that Bush would adopt a confrontational approach to Beijing, just as many neoconservatives and Pentagon strategists hoped.
Then in April 2001, four months into Bush's presidency, a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft collided with a Chinese fighter plane about 70 miles from the Chinese island of Hainan, and was forced to make an emergency landing. The Chinese claimed that the American plane had entered and violated Chinese airspace; Washington argued that it was in international airspace. In order to recover the aircraft and crew, Washington had to negotiate with Beijing and—despite much conservative grumbling—Bush agreed to send the Chinese a "letter of two sorries," in which the United States offered some carefully worded expressions of regret about the incident and death of the Chinese pilot.
Since then the administration's China policy has moved toward recognizing the centrality of the relationship. If China can be brought into the existing world order—in some fashion and to some extent—that will greatly improve the prospects for future peace and stability. Bush, despite his grand rhetoric about spreading democracy around the world, has been practical in his relations with the Chinese regime. On the most important issue to Beijing—that of Taiwan—Bush not only sided with the Chinese but has done so in a more direct manner than any previous president. He made clear to the then Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian that were Taiwan to make any moves toward independence, the island would lose the support of the United States. More recently, unlike some heads of government in Europe, Bush chose to attend the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, a move that will earn the United States much good will not just with the Chinese government but also with its people.
Of course, the administration recognizes that the rise of China upsets the strategic balance in Asia. That's led Washington to deepen the strategic relationship with Japan and to develop a new one with India. In the latter case, Bush deserves credit for having transformed the relationship. While Indo-U.S. ties were warm under Bill Clinton, they were always limited by the controversy over India's nuclear program. The Clintonites refused to legitimize India's nuclear program, but for Indians their nukes were absolutely vital. Bush broke the deadlock by accepting, in large measure, that India would have to be treated as an exception and be brought into the nuclear nonproliferation regime as a nuclear power, not a renegade. Now India and America are developing a strategic relationship at many levels of government, which will stand both countries in good stead no matter what the future balance of power in Asia looks like.
If the United States hasn't engaged with this emerging world actively enough, other countries have done even less. In an essay in Foreign Affairs, political scientist Daniel Drezner points out that the administration has sought to give China, India and Brazil more weight in international institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the G8 and other such bodies. Timothy Adams, the undersecretary of Treasury, told The New York Times in August 2006 that "by re-engineering the IMF and giving China a bigger voice, China will have a greater sense of responsibility for the institution's mission."
The fiercest resistance to such reforms comes from Europe. If power in international organizations is going to be allocated on the basis of the current configuration of power, European nations, which are shrinking as a percentage of global GDP, will lose influence. If the U.N. Security Council were to be set up today, would 40 percent of the vetoes be given to European powers?
All this is not meant as a defense of George W. Bush. The administration made monumental errors in its first few years, ones that have cost the United States enormously. The shift in impressions about America's intentions across important sections of the globe, the sense in much of the Islamic world that America is anti-Muslim, the vast and counterproductive apparatus of homeland security—visa restrictions, arrests and interrogations—are lasting legacies of the Bush administration. Its dysfunction and incompetence have left a trail of misery in countries like Iraq and Lebanon, which have been destabilized for decades. The embrace of torture and other extralegal methods has violated America's noblest traditions and provided little in return.
And then there is the administration's record outside of foreign policy. Bush 43 has surely been the most fiscally irresponsible president in American history, taking surpluses that equaled 2.5 percent of GDP and turning them into deficits that are 3 percent. This is a $4 trillion hit on the country's balance sheet. On the central issue of energy policy—the greatest economic challenge and opportunity of our times—Bush has been utterly obstructionist, recycling the self-serving arguments of industry lobbyists. On the whole, Bush's record remains one of failure and missed opportunities.
So why offer this corrective? Because we cannot go back to 2001. The next president will inherit the world as it is in 2009. He will have to examine the Bush administration's policies as they stand in January 2009—not as they were in 2001 or 2002 or 2003—and decide how to accept, modify and alter them. There was a U.S. president who came into office convinced that everything his predecessor had done was feckless, stupid, ill-informed and venal. He rejected and tried to reverse everything that he could, almost as an article of faith. Before he had even examined the policies carefully, he knew that they had to be changed. The base of his party was delighted by his clarity and fighting spirit.
That president, of course, was George W. Bush. His decision to blindly repudiate anything associated with Bill Clinton is what got us into this mess in the first place. Let's hope that the next president, no matter how much he despises Bush, will take a careful look at his administration's policies, America's interests, and the world beyond and do the right thing for the country and its future.
© 2008
The human mind cannot grasp the causes of phenomena in the aggregate. But the need to find these causes is inherent in man’s soul. And the human intellect, without investigating the multiplicity and complexity of the conditions of phenomena, any one of which taken separately may seem to be the cause, snatches at the first, the most intelligible approximation to a cause, and says: “This is the cause!"
-Leo Tolstoy
War and Peace
Good article Astralis.
Win nervously lose tragically - Reds C C
Every action of Bush (actually Cheney) has been rolled back or diluted!
Intent was good. Execution sloppy!
"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."
I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.
HAKUNA MATATA
ray,
a good an epitaph as any for the administration.Intent was good. Execution sloppy!
i have to give him props, though, for at least partly cleaning it up by the second administration.
The human mind cannot grasp the causes of phenomena in the aggregate. But the need to find these causes is inherent in man’s soul. And the human intellect, without investigating the multiplicity and complexity of the conditions of phenomena, any one of which taken separately may seem to be the cause, snatches at the first, the most intelligible approximation to a cause, and says: “This is the cause!"
-Leo Tolstoy
War and Peace
So what ur saying is that they should be forgiven for REALISING they had made mistakes? Very amusing but surely it would have been better not to have made the mistakes in the first place. I however share your hopes that the next president will consider the mistakes made by the Bush Administration before rejecting out of hand the obligations the US has undertaken.
snapper,
you have no idea how rare that is in politics.So what ur saying is that they should be forgiven for REALISING they had made mistakes?
perhaps, but the chance of finding an administration that doesn't make mistakes is probably around the same that you and i will each go to our respective homes and find a trio of willing 20 year old ladies sitting on the bed.Very amusing but surely it would have been better not to have made the mistakes in the first place
in lieu of that particular impossibility i'm willing to take, and give credit, for the improbability as described above.
The human mind cannot grasp the causes of phenomena in the aggregate. But the need to find these causes is inherent in man’s soul. And the human intellect, without investigating the multiplicity and complexity of the conditions of phenomena, any one of which taken separately may seem to be the cause, snatches at the first, the most intelligible approximation to a cause, and says: “This is the cause!"
-Leo Tolstoy
War and Peace
Well granted that all Governments make mistakes. However the Bush Administration has made mistakes that it will take long to repair.
After 9/11 the US had the sympathy and support of the whole world. After briefly instaling a new Government in Afghanistan this goodwill was thrown away on what many neutrals consider an illegal invasion of Iraq. Now perhaps one can argue from a humanitarian point of view that Saddam was a 'monster' etc and perhaps there was low level AlQuaida activity there before the invasion but WMD there were not. A failure of Intellegince? No; It is a failure of leadership to invade when evidence is not 100%. In this 'failure' the US lost the sympathy and support of most of the world. Most of the world now sees the US invasion and instalaton of a "democratic (ie. sympathetic) Government" as essentialy a play for oil domination in the Arabian Gulf (much as the current Russian action in the Caucases is). What this had to do with AlQuaida or 9/11 or WMD has not been proved...
My point is that the Bush Administration has played Geo-Politics and played it badly by losing the 'moral high ground'. It may indeed have been wise to secure bases in the Arabian Gulf to secure oil supplies but the way it was done actualy was detrimental to the US as a whole.
The subsequent retreats on policy in Iraq and on North Korea I agree are welcome and seem to be paying dividends; the 'moral high ground' will take longer to regain and for that Bush is responsible only to the American people.
As regards Guantanamo he has also made American Justice a laughing stock in the eyes of most of the world. It was six years before the first military court hearing and this is not what the 'free world' (the people who look to America for freedom) expect of Justice.
As regards the...I forget the term used for them...kidnappings and transportings of people to countries where they can be tortured; this is quite evidently totaly illegal and the has only been heard of before in what we class 'tyranies'. In doing this the US has involved (whether they knew or not I don't know) its allies and their reputation as democracies and for justice must also be devalued.
The goodwill after 9/11 when the US could truly have stood up as a world leader for Freedom and Justice for all - and it was a great oppotunity - has been blown to shreds by this Administration and the next President will find himself faced by a distrustful and suspicious world. The 'moral high ground' will be harder to take for some considerable time. Ty Shrub!
snapper,
we've gone over this too many times here at WAB, i won't go through this one again.After 9/11 the US had the sympathy and support of the whole world. After briefly instaling a new Government in Afghanistan this goodwill was thrown away on what many neutrals consider an illegal invasion of Iraq. Now perhaps one can argue from a humanitarian point of view that Saddam was a 'monster' etc and perhaps there was low level AlQuaida activity there before the invasion but WMD there were not. A failure of Intellegince? No; It is a failure of leadership to invade when evidence is not 100%. In this 'failure' the US lost the sympathy and support of most of the world. Most of the world now sees the US invasion and instalaton of a "democratic (ie. sympathetic) Government" as essentialy a play for oil domination in the Arabian Gulf (much as the current Russian action in the Caucases is). What this had to do with AlQuaida or 9/11 or WMD has not been proved...
i think you must ask yourself how much this supposed "moral high ground" matters, and how much it actually existed in the first place. osama bin ladin certainly cared not a whit for it; also, in regards to the many restrictions which european NATO allies place upon their troops in afghanistan (the supposed "good war"), one wonders how much it helps there.My point is that the Bush Administration has played Geo-Politics and played it badly by losing the 'moral high ground'. It may indeed have been wise to secure bases in the Arabian Gulf to secure oil supplies but the way it was done actualy was detrimental to the US as a whole.
The subsequent retreats on policy in Iraq and on North Korea I agree are welcome and seem to be paying dividends; the 'moral high ground' will take longer to regain and for that Bush is responsible only to the American people.
As regards Guantanamo he has also made American Justice a laughing stock in the eyes of most of the world. It was six years before the first military court hearing and this is not what the 'free world' (the people who look to America for freedom) expect of Justice.
As regards the...I forget the term used for them...kidnappings and transportings of people to countries where they can be tortured; this is quite evidently totaly illegal and the has only been heard of before in what we class 'tyranies'. In doing this the US has involved (whether they knew or not I don't know) its allies and their reputation as democracies and for justice must also be devalued.
The goodwill after 9/11 when the US could truly have stood up as a world leader for Freedom and Justice for all - and it was a great oppotunity - has been blown to shreds by this Administration and the next President will find himself faced by a distrustful and suspicious world. The 'moral high ground' will be harder to take for some considerable time. Ty Shrub!
i certainly agree bush blew the chance for greater cooperation with his deliberately divisive policies, but also do remember that european politicians also found this to be quite politically profitable, aka schroeder and chirac mindlessly selecting opposing stands to america- whether or not this was really profitable to their countries as a whole.
note also that much european opposition to the war- especially in the political elite decisionmakers- only crystallized when it became clear that bush had screwed it up. europeans were falling over themselves to congratulate bush and to emphasize once again what a dastardly individual saddam hussein was right after the 21-day regime toppling.
to wrap things up, certainly i don't think that bush was right straight down (or i wouldn't have bothered posting this article). but i also believe it is incorrect to state that if bush had been -the- perfect American president, then the whole world would have bowed down and crowned the US with the mantle of "world leader for Freedom and Justice for all".
and when one is speaking of power, the currency of international affairs, one wonders how much different things would have been had europe really bought into iraq. given NATO difficulties to even procure ONE helicopter for afghanistan, i think it would be a mistake to overplay (just as it is to UNDERplay) the importance of being liked by all.
The human mind cannot grasp the causes of phenomena in the aggregate. But the need to find these causes is inherent in man’s soul. And the human intellect, without investigating the multiplicity and complexity of the conditions of phenomena, any one of which taken separately may seem to be the cause, snatches at the first, the most intelligible approximation to a cause, and says: “This is the cause!"
-Leo Tolstoy
War and Peace
The European members of NATO are, I agree, a shambles (UK excluded). Would they have been more forthcoming had Bush not invaded Iraq? I believe they would and that without the political divisions and extended deployment this caused Afghanistan (which all saw as justified) would now be further to being solved. More to the point and quite apart from the Europeans the Islamic world would not have been thrown headlong into the arms of the extremists. Yes I DO believe that this Administration has tarnished the idea not only of American Justice but of Western Justice. Those who claim to fight for freedom cannot justify "extrordinary rendition"!
snapper,
unfortunately the restrictive ROEs were in place before iraq, and had less to do with extended deployment than with the distinct political unpopularity of casualties in general. and this was, again, for the "good war".The European members of NATO are, I agree, a shambles (UK excluded). Would they have been more forthcoming had Bush not invaded Iraq? I believe they would and that without the political divisions and extended deployment this caused Afghanistan (which all saw as justified) would now be further to being solved.
well, aside from the problematic dumping of "the islamic world" into one category, i question again the extent to which this has occurred and the extent to which it matters. very few islamic countries, for instance, supported america's incursion into afghanistan. moreover, much like the european case, had america actually "done iraq right" opposition would have likely stayed muted. i would argue that instead of the invasion causing the backlash, it was the bungled occupation of 2003-2006 that did it. abu ghraib and the sunni-shi'a civil war being the primary factors.More to the point and quite apart from the Europeans the Islamic world would not have been thrown headlong into the arms of the extremists.
from another angle, with the current calming of iraq, the sunni populace there has by and large seen the horrors that al-qaeda inflicts on supposedly "fellow" muslim populations. likewise, although to a lesser extent, the shi'a militia of al-sadr.
perhaps, perhaps not. we still view WWII as the good war in the west today, despite the fact that Allied bombers incinerated hundreds of thousands of germans, japanese, french, and italian civilians. despite shooting surrendering troops, despite the atom bombs, despite the internment camps and the summary executions of collaboraters, many on hearsay alone.Yes I DO believe that this Administration has tarnished the idea not only of American Justice but of Western Justice. Those who claim to fight for freedom cannot justify "extrordinary rendition"!
in any case, i think our main difference here is the vehicle by which we criticize bush. you criticize him on moral and popularity grounds, i criticize him on efficiency grounds. i would care not a whit for european or islamic "displeasure" had the insurgency been choked in the cradle, with 30,000 american troops in a stable iraq by november of 2003.
The human mind cannot grasp the causes of phenomena in the aggregate. But the need to find these causes is inherent in man’s soul. And the human intellect, without investigating the multiplicity and complexity of the conditions of phenomena, any one of which taken separately may seem to be the cause, snatches at the first, the most intelligible approximation to a cause, and says: “This is the cause!"
-Leo Tolstoy
War and Peace
The problem was and is that support (or lack of) to some extent the "efficiency" ; with a more collaborative approach and greater support more resources would have been available. Certainly the dismissal of the Iraqi Army and alot of the government structure with hindsight was a mistake and greater attention should have been paid to occupation plans. If there had been a broader coalition the US may have been forced to recognize this instead of having only had to listen warnings of the UK. I remember reading a (leaked) UK Government analysis after the first Gulf war that predicted civil war had Saddam been brought down then. Certainly such problems had been forseen this side of the 'pond'. The Sunni/Shia communities were essentialy only prevented from civil war by Saddams tyrany.
I agree with you that Bush learned his lessons (and seemingly in in time) and for this he deserves some credit. I believe that broader collaborative approach would (or may) have averted some of the errors that were made.
As to your point about WWll; there can be no doubt that allies held the moral high ground. Hitler was clearly seen to have started this war from the re-occupation of the Rhineland to the invasion of Poland and Russia, as well as the Japanese first strike. Certainly terrible things were done during WWll but they were justified in order to restrain agression and prevent worse. In Iraq the moral case is not so clear or has not been proved. Whatever happened to the WMD arguement? Was this pure fabrication?
Yes I do believe it is important, if not imperative, to have moral right behind you when one is considering risking the lives of ones own countrymen and even more so in any subsequent short or long term occupation; by and large the greater the moral weight on your side the shorter and less troublesome the occupation. Israeli occupation of West Bank proves that no amount of force can coerce conformity. In the UK we call it "Hearts and Minds"!
One loses credibility by claiming one acts for freedom and then sets about it with such extraordinary abuse of power (rendition etc) and breaking ones own rules. If a population does not believe you/trust you, the occupation will be costly and must eventualy fail. Here the moral high ground is the prime key and the US and the West in general may pay dearly yet for the error of the Bush Administration in neglecting this.
Finaly I agree that my 'lumping together' of the entire Islamic world is an over simplification. My main point is that if I were Mr Bin Laden I would have rubbed my hands in glee when Iraq was invaded. This I would have seen as a. a relief from the pressure in Afghanistan b. an opportunity to attack the West at little cost in a new theatre and c. an opporotunity to recruit and propaganda-sise...all of which he has taken advantage of. This is what I meant by "throwing the Islamic world into the arms of the extremists" and I apologise that I did not expand more clearly.
Yes Bush has learned - as a man on the edge of a cliff when the next step finds no solid ground will step back. Certainly the "efficiency" and pre war planning for post war occupation were sadly lacking and mistakes had to be learned. Certainly they have been and things are in better shape - as also with North Korea. Wisdom with hindsight though is easy - great Leaders do not need hindsight and Bush for this reason can never be ranked as 'Great' President. He has done only what Churchill described the job of the Politician "To predict what will happen and then explain why it didn't".
The bottom line is that Bush had (with 9/11) the opportunity to become one of the greatest Presidents in history. He blew it. Neoconservatives that served "at the leisure of the President" screwed it up for him. Mostly through jingoistic hubris that is the Iraq War. Bush was destined for mediocrity from the get-go, just because he is who he is and because of the election being so close; but 9/11 would have kept his approval numbers astronomical; only if he would have NOT listened to/heeded advice from a greedy and evil few that were closest to him. It's an absolute shame, because I think at the core, he is a good man and has had the best of intentions.
[QUOTE=osage18;530977] It's an absolute shame, because I think at the core, he is a good man and has had the best of intentions.
I agree. Perhaps history will judge him more kindly than his current approval ratings would suggest.
Semper in excretum. Solum profunda variat.
The point is have the mistakes of the first term been learned? Well to some extent yes. Does this deserve credit? Not in my opinion when the problems could have been forseen and avoided.
I watched the CSPAN Washington Journal interview this morning with author Bing West. He discussed and took questions about his new book, "The Strongest Tribe." He gave a far more optimistic sit rep of Iraq than we hear on the MSM. He acknowledged that going in was probably a mistake but in the "you broke it, you fix it" vein, the U.S. has/is making Iraq a better place than when Saddam was running the joint(into the ground).
After reading David McCullough's masterpiece biography on Truman, I was amazed to learn how loathed Truman was during his administration. Growing up in the 60's/70's America, I was taught that Truman was one of our better presidents. Looking back in the light of how history played out, the American people at the time turned out to be wrong concerning Truman's decisions.
In the immediate days following 911, the "if you're not with us, you're against us" mentality was strong. The U.S. was ready to get down to some serious killing. I saw a bumper sticker the other day with Bush's face on it. The text read: "Love him or hate him, but he's killed a lot of terrorists."
As with most things, time will tell. My hopes and prayers go out to the Iraqi people. They need a break and like all, they deserve a stable country where they can pursue their own self-interests, select their own leaders and hold those leaders accountable through sound laws and regular elections.
Info on Bing West:
"The Strongest Tribe"
From a universally respected combat journalist, a gripping history based on five years of front-line reporting about how the war was turned around–and the choice now facing America
During the fierce battle for Fallujah, Bing West asked an Iraqi colonel why the archterrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had fled in women’s clothes. The colonel pointed to a Marine patrol walking by and said, “Americans are the strongest tribe.”
In Iraq, America made mistake after mistake. Many gave up on the war. Then the war took a sharp U-turn. Two generals–David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno–displayed the leadership America expected. Bringing the reader from the White House to the fighting in the streets, this remarkable narrative explains the turnaround by U.S. forces.
In the course of fourteen extended trips over five years, West embedded with more than sixty front-line units, discussing strategy with generals and tactics with corporals. He provides an expert’s account of counterinsurgency, disposing of myths. By describing the characters and combat in city after city, West gives the reader an in-depth understanding that will inform the debate about the war. This is the definitive study of how American soldiers actually fought –a gripping and visceral book that changes the way we think about the war, and essential reading for understanding the next critical steps to be taken.
Praise for The Strongest Tribe:
"Balanced, panoramic assessment of the Iraq War by former Marine and Reagan administration veteran West (No True Glory, 2005, etc.), who heralds American soldiers as its unsung heroes amid the “fog of Washington”. . .A timely, eye-opening historical analysis that provides clarity around the difficult choices the next president faces."
--Kirkus (starred review)
"In this important new chronicle of the war in Iraq, Bing West reveals how America reached the brink of defeat in 2006 and then managed in 2007 to stage a stunning turnaround. With its vivid, on-the-ground reporting, his book is a fitting tribute to the honor, valor, and toughness of our soldiers. Notwithstanding numerous mistakes by their leaders, West shows that their sacrifices have made success possible--as long we do not withdraw prematurely."
--Senator John S. McCain
“Sometimes the best way to support the troops is to criticize the generals. Bing West does both well in this book, showing a sympathy for our soldiers and Marines, but also a great ear for military truth and a determination to render events accurately. This is his third and most important book about the Iraq war. Read it.”
-- Thomas E. Ricks, author of FIASCO: The American Military Adventure in Iraq
“A brilliant exposition. Based on extensive experience in the war zone, Bing West recounts how Soldiers and Marines showed the President and the Pentagon the way to solve the Iraq insurgency problem. Echoing the admonition that "all politics are local", The Strongest Tribe convincingly argues that it was a grass roots strategy developed by on-scene officers who forged ties at the tribal level that brought stability to Iraq's turbulent Anbar Province and provided hope for all Iraq.”
-- Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor USMC (Ret.) Co-author of The Generals' War
and COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invation and Occupation of Iraq
“Some four decades ago I told Bing West that his book, the Village, would become a classic in counterinsurgency warfare. And so it did. "The Strongest Tribe" will surely be West's second classic - a moving and detailed account of almost six years of war in Iraq.”
- Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, Nixon administration; Secretary of Defense, Ford administration; Chairman, The Mitre Corporation
About the Author
Bing West was assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs under President Ronald Reagan. He served in the Marine infantry in Vietnam. Later, as an analyst at the RAND Corporation, he wrote the Vietnam classic The Village, that war colleges use as a primer in counterinsurgency. As a correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, West has covered the war for five years. His books on Iraq - No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah and The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the United States Marines (co-authored with MajGen Ray Smith)–have won the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation’s General Wallace M. Greene Jr. Award for nonfiction, the Colby Award for military nonfiction, and the Veteran of Foreign Wars Media Award. West is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations; his articles appear in The New York Times, The Wall St. Journal, and other major newspapers. He appears on National Public Radio and The Newshour with Jim Lehrer.
There are currently 1 users browsing this thread. (0 members and 1 guests)
Posting Permissions
Share this thread with friends: