There is a substantial amount of previous research on public opinion and the use of military force by the United States, but the attainment of a cumulative set of findings has been hindered by the lack of a unified analysis of public opinion across a number of historical cases in which the United States threatened or actually used force. In this article, I have presented such an analysis by studying all opinion surveys on the subject from 1981 to early 2005 and by reconsidering several issues left open in the literature, including the question of casualty aversion and the impact of multilateral sentiment. Several conclusions emerge.
The first conclusion is that both the principal policy objective and the success or failure of a military operation are crucial factors determining the level of citizen support in its aftermath. Comparing across many cases historically or within specific cases, the initial “base” level of support for any intervention is strongly conditioned by its principal policy objective, which is significant politically because politicians must calculate in advance whether military intervention will enjoy popular support. Restraining adversaries is popular, but intervention in civil wars (or peacekeeping in their aftermath) is generally not. In addition, it seems likely that one reason for the public’s reticence is the estimate that intervention in civil wars offers uncertain prospects for success. Civil wars are particularly intractable because of their zero-sum nature, and reconciliation of competing factions requires a political solution rather than a military victory. Defining “success” in such situations is difficult, and achieving it more difficult still.
Second, the public’s sensitivity to the loss of human life must be understood as part of this calculus. Support for using force is lower when the prospect of casualties is mentioned before the event; but when force is actually employed, the public’s support is conditioned by the outcome of the military intervention rather than by the number of casualties that are actually suffered. As several scholars have argued, the public is articulating a cost-benefit calculation. If the United States accomplishes what it sets out to do, citizens generally respond
that it was “worth it.” If the mission fails, public support is withdrawn.
Third, other considerations also influence public opinion. Perhaps most important for the contemporary policy agenda, multilateral sentiment does matter. One of the most interesting findings is that majority support for using force in several historical episodes existed only when the survey question mentioned multilateral participation. Because these survey questions explicitly involved the use of force—they did not offer the “force versus UN” option—it seems plausible that respondents are attracted to multilateral actions because the costs and the risks are shared. Still, one must note that the attraction of multilateral participation, while visible, is nonetheless secondary to principal policy objectives and the cost-benefit calculation of success and failure. Support for restraining foreign adversaries is always higher than support for intervening in internal conflicts, even if the intervention is multilateral. Moreover, even the marginally higher level of support for multilateral interventions in internal conflicts remains at a somewhat tenuous political level. The levels of support for the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo are good examples. Even in questions evoking multilateral action, support remained in a range—about 50 percent—that counseled political caution to two presidents.
A fourth conclusion is that the September 11 terrorist attacks did not fundamentally alter the underlying logic of U.S. public opinion on the use of military force. There are several reasons for this conclusion. The first arises from public opinion on going to war against Iraq, which President Bush closely associated with the “war on terror.” In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the percentage of Americans willing to go to war to eliminate the Hussein regime increased slightly, but by late summer 2002, the percentage had returned to the average that had prevailed throughout the 1990s (fluctuating around 60 percent). To be sure, support for the initial phase of the war was very high, but once the task turned to occupation and “nation building” and the difficulties became apparent, public support dropped closer to 50 percent and occasionally dipped below that level. Nor has the broader strategy of preemption gained much support: Americans remain decidedly unenthusiastic about using force to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to North Korea, Iran, or Syria. In the case of North Korea, support for using force is lower on average than it had been prior to September 11. Certainly, responding to threats or attacks against the United States will continue to enjoy high support, but intervention in internal conflicts remains as unpopular as it ever was, and the occupation phase of the Iraq conflict has likely reinforced that view.
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