Thread: Early Critics Of War Now In Charge

Miami Herald
April 22, 2007

Early Critics Of War Now In Charge

The new managers of the Iraq War are not ideologues and loyalists but skeptics of the White House's early moves in Iraq who have previous experience in war zones.

By Anne Gearan, Associated Press

WASHINGTON -- The White House search for a war czar caps a lengthy reshuffle that has placed pragmatists and critics of the Bush administration's early moves in Iraq in charge of managing a war that the United States feels it can't quit but can't quite win.

Gen. David Petraeus recently took command of U.S. forces in Iraq, Ryan Crocker is the new U.S. ambassador to Iraq and Adm. William J. Fallon recently became commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East. All are skeptics of the previous strategy. The State Department also has a new chief of reconstruction in Iraq who had been a harsh critic of the war's early policies.

The changes came as President Bush has warmed to strategies and ideas he once rejected to turn around the violence and chaos in Iraq -- such as sending thousands more troops to the country in an effort to calm Baghdad.

His new crop of Iraq leaders bypasses ideologues and loyalists in favor of professionals with previous experience in Iraq and war zones.

''None of them are particularly ideological or were associated with the original public push for the war,'' said Kurt Campbell, chief executive officer of the nonpartisan, centrist Center for a New American Security. The new leaders ''are probably quietly appalled that we find ourselves in the situation that we do in Iraq,'' Campbell said.

Last fall's firing of former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was meant to carry a powerful message, but the gradual replacement of generals, diplomats and leaders has attracted less attention.

Rumsfeld's replacement, Robert Gates, summed up the administration's awkward position Friday and implicitly acknowledged the political pressure to end the war.

The administration will assess Iraq's political progress when deciding this summer whether to bring home some of the thousands of extra troops Bush has sent this spring, Gates said during a visit to Baghdad.

''Our commitment to Iraq is long-term, but it's not a commitment to having our young men and women patrolling Iraq's streets open-endedly,'' Gates said.

Last week, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley noted several of the other personnel changes and said they give the administration a chance to rethink how it manages the war. The overall war chief Hadley wants to hire would report directly to Bush.

Crocker and Petraeus went to Iraq in the first months of the war and emerged disappointed with some of the administration's choices and the centralized management style of American leaders in Baghdad. Although neither has been a strong critic of the administration, both have suggested that crucial chances were blown at the start.

All share a reputation for shrewdness and pragmatism. Their writings and résumés suggest they will make the best of a five-year-old war that has not gone as planned, with an eye to getting U.S. forces and advisors out as fast as possible.

Crocker is one of the State Department's most experienced Middle East experts and has worked for both Republican and Democratic presidents. He reportedly warned then-Secretary of State Colin Powell before the 2003 invasion that toppling Saddam Hussein would lift the lid on sectarian violence in Iraq.

Crocker went back to Baghdad last month to replace the talented Zalmay Khalilzad, an energetic Afghan-born U.S. diplomat with a Republican pedigree. Khalilzad made inroads with Sunni leaders and developed a reputation as a dealmaker, but Crocker may carry greater credibility across sectarian lines and among other Arab governments.

Petraeus brings experience and perspective to the top U.S. military job in Baghdad, having commanded the 101st Airborne Division during the initial invasion in 2003. He then returned to build a viable program for training the Iraqi security forces.

Petraeus disliked how fellow military leaders tried to rout the incipient insurgency in 2003, suggesting that heavy-handed tactics would cause more problems than they might solve. He agreed with critics of the decision to disband the Iraqi army.

Petraeus is also an author of the Army's new doctrine on how to fight a counterinsurgency, developed during his stint last year as head of the Combined Arms Center and the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Petraeus' revamped strategy is designed to win back public support along with turf.